

About speaker

- Robert Graham
- CTO/Network
- Writing Carnivore-like systems for 10 years

Talk


- Intro to Carnivore
- Legal details
- Technical details
- FAQ
- Reason for talk
 - Nothing you read in mainstream media is relevant to the technical details; this bugs the heck out of me

- "They that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- Benjamin Franklin, 1759
- The more we ask the government to do, the more we must give up liberty
 - Example: drug laws make it hard for small businesses to get bank accounts because they must prove they aren't laundering drug money
 - Example: privacy advocates that want the government to pass laws, inviting the government to tax, regulate, and police

What is Carnivore?

A program designed to intercept Internet communication to and from people who are part of a criminal investigation.

Carnivore may *chew* all the data on the network, but it only actually *eats* the information authorized by a court order



Proper Usage

- Proper legal authority
 - E.g. court order
- Assistance and cooperation of the ISP and sysadmin
- Observance of relevant statutes, practices, etc.

Protocols

- IP (from/to IP address)
- FTP (logs filenames transferred)
- NNTP/Usenet (logs access to newsgroups)
- SMTP (logs e-mails triggered by FROM or TO e-mail address)
- HTTP (logs URLs)
- IRC (port filter)
- Instant messaging (port filter)

Based upon

- C++, WinNT OS, COTS Pentium III, 128M RAM,, 4-18G disk, 2G Jaz drive (for evidence)
- No TCP/IP stack (!!!)
- Hardware authentication (???)
- Hardware network isolation device (Shomiti/NetOptics tap?)
- COTS communications software (Etherpeek?)
- Rumored modem dial-in?

EtherPeek plugins

Enabled	Display	Notify	Max Severity	Plug-in
	V		Severe	Checksums
		~	Severe	Duplicate Address
✓	✓	~	Severe	FTP Analysis
	V		Severe	ICMP Details
	V			IP Details
	V	V	Severe	Land Attack
	V			NetWare Details
~		v	Severe	Newsgroup Watcher
	V	V	Severe	Oversize IP
~	✓			SMTP Analysis
~	v			Telnet
~	✓	~	Severe	Web URL

http://www.robertgraham.com/slides/UUtoorcon

Etherpeek Descriptions

- FTP: "Detects FTP downloads and logs information on the location of the downloaded file and the address or name of the machine that initiated the download."
- Newsgroup: "Detects access to Usenet news and logs information on the newsgroups and the address or name of the machine that initiated the action"
- SMTP: "Displays contents of and counts SMTP sessions"
- URL: "Detects accesses to WWW services over your net and logs the URL retrieved and the address or name of the machines that initiated the request"

Law: Fourth Amendment

- Wiretaps cannot cover the Internet. FBI cannot monitor all e-mail looking for the word "bomb".
- Federal district judge must grant court order
 - Who (exactly, including e-mail)
 - Why (probable cause)
 - What (exactly which lines will be tapped, what info protocols)

Law: court order

- Two orders
 - One allowing FBI to collect the data
 - One requiring ISP to aid the FBI

Law: (cont)

- Emergency exceptions
 - Needs court order in 48-hours
 - Only Attorney General or Deputy
- Only FBI, and only certain felonies
- Hard evidence for court room
 - Not background intelligence gathering

Law: (cont)

Minimization

- Only the communications covered by the court order, and nothing more
- If extra stuff leaks in, must be discarded

Defense

- Gets to challenge accuracy of data.
- May move to suppress if not legally obtained

Law: enabling legislation

- Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (aka. "Title III")
- 1986 ECPA (Electronic Communications Privacy Act)
- 1994 CALEA (Digital Telephony bill)
 - Carriers must provide wiretap facilities
 - ISPs are carriers
- 1998 roving wiretap
 - Allows FBI to eavesdrop on many people as long as they only pay attention to the suspect

Law: hearsay

- Sniffer logs are considered hearsay
- No proof that they are accurate, reliable, and trustworthy

Law: hearsay

- Must satisfy certain criteria
 - Produced with normal course of business day in and day out
 - Must be "authenticated": verified by qualified witness; Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
 - Must be "best evidence": if at all possible, must be the original copy.

Law: more hearsay

- Even "best evidence" not reliable
 - Can't prove who was at the console
 - Computer can be used as a relay (e.g. Trojan Horse)
 - Computer's IP/e-mail address can be *easily* spoofed

Law: chain of possession

- Evidence must be "sealed"
- Must document everyone who handles it and why
- Must not be altered, except in certain cases (which must be carefully documented)
- Conclusion: FBI must not put a TCP/IP stack on Carnivore box, and must lock up the disk and document everyone who handles it.

Law: trap and trace/pen register

- POTS: (partial warrant, easy to get)
 - Record everyone who dials a number
- Carnivore:
 - Everyone who FTPs a certain file
 - Everyone who accesses a certain webpage
 - Everyone who reads a certain newsgroup
 - Everyone who connects to a #chatroom


Law: wiretap

- POTS: (full warrant, hard to get)
 - Eavesdrop, van parked out on the street, somebody is actually monitoring the data.
 - Turns off the recorders if hears somebody on the line who isn't the suspect (e.g. wife, child)
- Carnivore:
 - All e-mails from/to an address
 - All traffic to/from IP address (or IP address as retrieved from TACACS/RADIUS for user account)

How SMTP works

- HELO robls
- MAIL FROM:<alice@robertgraham.com>
- RCPT T0:<bob@altivore.com>
- DATA
- Subject: Hi\n\nBob, I've got the plutonium that you wanted.\nI'll expect payment through a money order to my Cayman Islands account. \n-Alice
- •
- QUIT

(Each of these a separate packet)



For Help, press F1

SMTP packet

```
00d0 b758 92a1 0040 05a4 7932 0800 4500
                                               ...X...@..v2..E.
 0
                                               .S..@....-....
10
    0053 f100 4000 8006 f52d 0a0a 0009 0a00
    0064 0e9d 0019 0414 6e84 4e27 8c8a 5018
                                                .d....n.N'..P.
20
    219d 0265 0000 4d41 494c 2046 524f 4d3a
30
                                               !..e..MAIL FROM:
40
    203c 526f 6265 7274 2e47 7261 6861 6d40
                                                < Robert . Graham@
50
    6e65 7477 6f72 6b69 6365 2e63 6f6d 3e0d
                                               networkice.com>.
60
    0a
```

How Carnivore works

- For all packets sent to port 25:
- If data starts with "MAIL FROM" or "RCPT TO", compare the e-mail address against the court-authorized e-mail address.
- If the e-mail addresses match, start collecting this session (IP to/from, port to/from)
- Save the raw packets to Jaz drive

Etherpeek Omnivore

Capture Buffer Options ? 🗶					
┌ ▽ Continuous capture ————————————————————————————————————					
File path:					
carnivore/bobsmith.pkt					
Stop when files occupy 1000 megabytes					
Limit each packet to 64 bytes					
Buffer size: 1024 kilobytes					
Show this dialog when creating a new capture window					
OK Cancel Help					

http://www.robertgraham.com/slides/00toorcon

Eval RFP (Aug 24, '00)

- All the info and only the info
- Introduce new risks (operational, security) to the ISP
 - Crash them? Buffer overflow?
- Risk of unauthorized monitoring (intentional, unintentional) by FBI or non-FBI personnel? (ie. Misuse by rogue FBI agents)
- Protections (audit, procedures, etc.) adequately address the risks above?

http://cryptome.org/carnivore-rfp.htm

All the info?

- Keep up with network traffic?
- Handle IP fragmentation or TCP segmentation?
- Handle SMTP state machine? (e.g. ESMTP pipelining)
- Good things:
 - By keeping the packets, you can clearly pin-point where it has failed via TCP sequence numbers.
 - Not getting all e-mail isn't a problem you can't wiretap all communication anyway (phone, e-mail, letter's friend).

All the info?

- Can it handle fragmentation?
- HELO robls
- MAIL FROM:<alic@e@rob
- ertgraham.com>
- RCPT TO:<bob@altivo
- re.com>
- DATA
- Subject: Hi\n\nBob, Le
- t's get together.
- •
- QUIT

Only the info?

- Is address matching exact or partial?
- Does it correctly parse the RSET?
- HELO robls
- MAIL FROM: <malice@robertgraham.com.au>
- RCPT T0:<bob@altivore:com>
- DATA
- Subject: Hi\n\nBob, Let's get together.
- · RSET
- MAIL FROM: <john@yahoo.com>
- RCPT T0:<mary@hotmail.com>
- DATA
- Subject: foo\nasdfasdfasdf\n
- QUIT


Only the info?

- Does it correctly parse the dot in face of TCP retransmits or pipelining?
- HELO robls
- MAIL FROM: <malice@robertgraham.com.au>
- RCPT T0:<bob@altivore.com>
- DATA
- Subject: Hi\n\nBob, Let's get togethet.\n.\n
- RSET
- MAIL FROM:<john@yahoo.com>
- RCPT T0:<mary@hotmail.com>
- DATA
- Subject: foo\nasdfasdf\n
- .
- QUIT

Only the info?

- People often share accounts
 - I.e. they share the identical e-mail address.
 - Remember, Carnivore has no problem with distinct e-mail accounts.
 - Traditional wiretap requires the recorders to be turned off in cases where another family member makes the call.
 - This probably isn't all that serious.

Operational risks?



Carnivore is 100% passive. Introduces no additional operational risks; though initial insertion is a small issue

Security risks?

- BUFFER-OVERFLOW!!!
 - In the underlying COTS software
 - In their plugins
 - Stats
 - Probably less than 1-kloc, easy to audit
 - But most such services have buffer overflows.
- But can't transmit
 - But Carnivore probably cannot transmit, so any compromise of the box won't result in ISP compromise

FBI misuse

- Can the FBI misuse the system?
 - Yes
 - Easy to configure to capture all traffic
 - Other plugins may be active
 - Other software may be on the box (e.g. TCPDUMP)
- However
 - Rarely connected to backbones, usually next to servers
 - FBI has just as much potential for misuse without Carnivore

Protections adequate?

- Not a technical question.
 - Real question: what % of the time will be misused?
- My guess: probably less than 1%
 - The FBI is a quagmire of bureaucratic processes.
 - They FEAR evidence that is not provided through the normal channels.

Eval RFP (reprise)

- All/only info
 - Not OK! Not enough and too much
- Operational/security risks
 - OK
- Misuse
 - Technically easy to misuse
- Protections
 - Adequate

Earthlink: case study

- Earthlink claims that Carnivore crashed their system
- FBI claims that Carnivore cannot crash networks
- They are both right
 - Carnivore normally runs as separate device, but you can also install directly on a server, which may cause numerous problems
 - Probably caused by WinNT RAS bug

Protocol stacks

Network ICE

Carnivore

Data saved

Data saved

Pattern Match

Pattern Match

SMTP state machine

TCP sequencing

IP reassembly

High-speed Sniffing

Slow Sniffing

<source>

- Can Carnivore suck up e-mail from unintended targets?
 - Yes (though FBI says "no"), though rare
- Will Carnivore corrupt e-mails, obtain fragments, or accidentally insert fragments of other e-mails?
 - No; Carnivore captures original packets, not email, so all fragments clearly labeled

- Is Carnivore superfast?
 - The FBI thinks so; my own stuff runs 10-100 times faster, so I'm a little disdainful (I think they just don't know any better).
 - Most deployments are right next to a server or mirrored on a switch, so it probably can keep up.
 - If it were placed on a major backbone, it would die a gruesome death

- Is Carnivore sophisticated?
 - No. It is extremely simple (<500 lines of code)
 - They can't even figure out how to use libpcap (for Windows and UNIX), they must instead use a commercial-sniffer.
 - It is magic trick, like making an elephant disappear; only impressive because it looks big and you don't know what it does.

- Does Carnivore "astonished industry specialists"
 - No.

- How often is Carnivore used?
 - In less than 10% of court orders demanding email, roughly 25 times in last 18 months.
 - Mostly terrorism cases, according to the FBI,
 but also mentions hackers and drug trafficking
 - Most testimony I've read from the FBI seems to stress "protecting children" (I.e. kiddy porn, chat rooms, etc.)

- Is Carnivore an unrestrained Internet wiretap?
 - No. It is on the edges in only a couple of places, it only obtains a few people's e-mails, and each unit is removed after a few weeks, and is only authorized by high-level federal judges, and is only installed with the assistance of the ISP

- Is it permanently located at the ISP?
 - No, judge usually requires a weekly review.
 Extremely difficult to get a judge to allow it for more than 45 days.
 - There is no vast network of Carnivore machines at ISPs, only a few isolated ones on the edges of the network.

- Why doesn't the FBI release source code?
 - Because hackers will find away around it (humor: hackers would just use PGP).
 - They use commercially licensed code they cannot release (contractually).
 - Title 18 USC 2512 prohibits possession of devices designed to eavesdrop on other people's communications
 - Because they change the source depending upon the incidence (I.e. still under development)

- Is the FBI forthcoming on basic details?
 - The FBI claims it is forthright with all basic details and not hiding anything. But as shown in this presentation, I've had to reverse engineer a lot of basic information that they've hidden.

- Does Carnivore store/forward packets?
 - This is a false rumor widely claimed in the media. Carnivore is just a sniffer.

Q&Q

- How does this relate to Britain's Regulatory Investigative Powers (RIP) bill?
 - RIP requires every ISP to install a monitoring device that is active all the time.
 - Like Carnivore, only collects data with a court order.
 - Wants key recovery

- How does this relate to Russia's SORM (System of Ensuring Investigative Activity)
 - SORM requires ISPs to forward all traffic to the KGB/FSB, who then gets to do anything they want with it for any reason.
 - No warrant needed.
 - Demands key recovery

Further Resources

- http://www.altivore.com
- http://www.robertgraham.com/xfer/altivore
- http://www.epic.org
- http://www.eff.org