[00:00.870 --> 00:02.120]  Thank you very much, Bernie.
[00:02.570 --> 00:04.800]  It's always nice to be introduced by an old friend.
[00:05.800 --> 00:08.960]  And it's fantastic to be at HOPE.
[00:09.230 --> 00:10.420]  Always a great weekend.
[00:11.620 --> 00:13.820]  I think Emmanuel does this on purpose.
[00:14.040 --> 00:19.380]  He schedules, he looks at the Farmers' Almanac and schedules whatever weekend is set for 100% humidity.
[00:19.820 --> 00:29.340]  So, I am looking forward to spending a lot of time with you guys and meeting you all in the intimate setting of the elevator to the 18th floor.
[00:29.840 --> 00:31.580]  It's going to be a lot of fun.
[00:32.330 --> 00:35.860]  As Bernie somewhat obliquely alluded to, I'm a lawyer.
[00:36.500 --> 00:39.420]  I'm a partner in the law firm Blackstone Law Group.
[00:39.580 --> 00:40.520]  Some of my partners are here.
[00:40.600 --> 00:48.620]  And I'm also CEO of Black Chambers, which is an information security consultancy that works through my law firm and as an agent of my law firm for legal privilege purposes.
[00:49.180 --> 01:08.760]  And in the wake of the Panama Papers, we were helping an international news organization investigate this breach, the veracity of the statement, statements made by Mossack Fonseca, and trying to put in context some of the documents that were part of the bucket of 150 documents that were actually released by the ICIJ,
[01:08.900 --> 01:11.220]  the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
[01:12.680 --> 01:19.800]  And so, I'm very excited to tell you guys a story today that has gotten very, very little attention.
[01:19.960 --> 01:28.800]  And it's a really interesting story that arises from a few documents of the Panama Papers that have major implications.
[01:28.800 --> 01:33.000]  And to tell the story, like all stories, we have to introduce characters.
[01:33.300 --> 01:35.260]  And we have to have a plot.
[01:35.540 --> 01:48.380]  And once we have the characters and the plot in context, then I'm going to show you some truly idiotic emails from Mossack Fonseca that were written by their lawyers and their IT staff.
[01:49.420 --> 01:50.520]  So let's get to it.
[01:50.640 --> 01:51.180]  Enough about me.
[01:51.280 --> 01:52.060]  Enough about the background.
[01:52.080 --> 01:53.760]  Let's talk about Mossack Fonseca.
[01:53.900 --> 02:03.220]  Let's talk about Argentine money laundering and Mossack Fonseca's efforts to cover up their tracks, to destroy data, to hide their lies.
[02:03.820 --> 02:04.800]  Let's get to it.
[02:05.720 --> 02:09.380]  So we start off here in Panama.
[02:09.660 --> 02:10.150]  And we come back.
[02:10.300 --> 02:11.980]  And this story begins in Germany.
[02:12.380 --> 02:13.720]  So we start off in Germany.
[02:13.840 --> 02:18.300]  As you all know, everything began in Munich with Süddeutsch Zeitung.
[02:18.440 --> 02:20.150]  I'm probably butchering that, I'm sure.
[02:20.520 --> 02:24.800]  And this was the situs where...
[02:24.800 --> 02:33.240]  You know, this was a newspaper in Germany that had actually originally published the first stories of the Panama Papers.
[02:33.930 --> 02:37.500]  And actually, they received the documents and then they gave them over to ICIJ.
[02:37.760 --> 02:39.820]  So first we know that this person is anonymous.
[02:40.020 --> 02:40.880]  He's John Doe.
[02:40.940 --> 02:44.020]  He tells Süddeutsch Zeitung that his life is in danger.
[02:44.440 --> 02:48.440]  And there's 2.6 terabytes of data, 11.5 million documents.
[02:48.540 --> 02:49.980]  This is a lot of documents.
[02:51.080 --> 02:52.020]  Which we all know.
[02:52.200 --> 02:56.700]  But I don't want to spend too much time on going into the details of the Panama Papers.
[02:56.940 --> 02:59.720]  Because you all are pretty familiar with the Panama Papers.
[02:59.780 --> 03:01.300]  I'm sure many people have been following it.
[03:01.360 --> 03:04.140]  So we're going to try to gloss over the background as much as possible.
[03:04.460 --> 03:13.360]  Because if there is one thing that I have learned from being at HOPE since literally 1994, it's that you all are a lot smarter than you look.
[03:14.200 --> 03:15.080]  There you go.
[03:16.840 --> 03:19.480]  So let's go from Germany over to Washington.
[03:19.480 --> 03:23.840]  This is the situs of the ICIJ, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
[03:24.040 --> 03:27.840]  So here, now John Doe has remained anonymous to the ICIJ.
[03:28.760 --> 03:33.340]  And they got 107 media organizations, people working in 25 different languages, 80 countries.
[03:33.340 --> 03:37.900]  They analyzed these documents for over a year actually.
[03:38.280 --> 03:41.640]  And the first stories were published this year on 3 April 2016.
[03:42.820 --> 03:46.940]  So these stories all related to data that was released from Panama.
[03:47.360 --> 03:50.540]  Specifically Panama City and specifically Mossack Fonseca.
[03:51.020 --> 03:52.880]  The law firm that is behind this breach.
[03:53.040 --> 03:55.620]  Which is a major, major player in this story.
[03:55.840 --> 03:58.440]  So one of the named partners is Jurgen Mossack.
[03:58.440 --> 04:04.880]  He is actually a German lawyer who migrated to Panama and started Mossack Fonseca about 40 years ago.
[04:05.620 --> 04:09.220]  And I know this picture doesn't really do him, you know, any justice.
[04:09.220 --> 04:15.360]  But I do have to say, it's highly likely that if he looks in the mirror, he doesn't have a reflection.
[04:17.570 --> 04:21.650]  Ramon Fonseca, you know, just argumentative as always.
[04:22.230 --> 04:22.770]  Oh, Ramon.
[04:23.030 --> 04:26.360]  So here's some pictures of their offices.
[04:26.360 --> 04:30.480]  It does look a little strikingly similar to like a little mini NSA building, doesn't it?
[04:31.100 --> 04:33.100]  Some fun facts about Mossack Fonseca.
[04:33.800 --> 04:35.330]  40 offices worldwide.
[04:35.790 --> 04:39.230]  They claim to help their clients achieve privacy.
[04:39.970 --> 04:41.390]  And they definitely do that.
[04:41.590 --> 04:45.290]  And some of their statements have even said that, you know, our offices are supported by secure.
[04:45.450 --> 04:48.300]  State-of-the-art technology that is upgraded continually.
[04:48.830 --> 04:49.920]  Well, we'll show.
[04:49.980 --> 04:51.040]  That's not necessarily true.
[04:51.230 --> 04:53.710]  So here's some more fun facts about some of their clients.
[04:53.710 --> 04:55.360]  They've been involved in FIFA scandals.
[04:55.470 --> 04:57.980]  Two billion dollar trail that leads back to Putin.
[04:58.650 --> 05:02.150]  David Cameron's father, Ian Cameron, had some dealings with them.
[05:02.410 --> 05:04.570]  Lots of people who are on the sanctions list.
[05:05.030 --> 05:09.070]  So, you know, 143 politicians, 12 national leaders, as Bernie mentioned.
[05:09.570 --> 05:14.570]  The release of these documents caused the Prime Minister of Iceland to resign almost immediately in its wake.
[05:14.570 --> 05:23.450]  So the official story of Mossack Fonseca, told by Ramon, of course, is that this was an email breach.
[05:24.100 --> 05:36.830]  And that somebody from the outside had come into their email system, popped it, and then stole 2.6 terabytes of data that goes back with documents over 40 years.
[05:37.160 --> 05:39.010]  It doesn't really make a lot of sense.
[05:39.010 --> 05:43.890]  So one of the things, you know, a lot of people have tried to hypothesize about how this could happen.
[05:44.280 --> 05:47.960]  You know, this state-of-the-art technology necessarily isn't really all that true.
[05:48.210 --> 05:50.960]  You know, we know that they were running outdated versions of WordPress.
[05:51.460 --> 05:54.240]  Drupal, that Outlook wasn't patched since 2009.
[05:54.660 --> 05:56.220]  No segregation of their systems.
[05:57.130 --> 05:58.330]  And no data lineage.
[05:58.520 --> 06:00.650]  They had no data about who was touching their data.
[06:01.460 --> 06:04.270]  That's a problem, especially if you are a law firm.
[06:04.270 --> 06:08.840]  So, the other thing is, we did some fairly simple math here.
[06:09.020 --> 06:09.890]  And you figure it out.
[06:10.280 --> 06:19.460]  2.6 terabytes of data converted to bits is 22,869,841,857,740.8 bits.
[06:19.680 --> 06:26.340]  At 100 megabits per second, you're looking at full throttle, 2.3 days to exfiltrate that amount of data.
[06:26.720 --> 06:29.120]  Now, that's totally degrading the quality of any network.
[06:29.300 --> 06:30.360]  It should take a long time.
[06:30.360 --> 06:35.280]  Even if you had direct access to the data, let's say you're assuming, you know, 40 megabytes a second.
[06:35.510 --> 06:38.600]  You're still looking at a copying time of over 17 hours.
[06:38.830 --> 06:41.210]  This is a big job to take that amount of data out.
[06:41.270 --> 06:44.660]  Look, it can be done from afar, but it's highly unlikely.
[06:44.900 --> 06:48.710]  It's also unlikely that they had data going back 40 years in their email server.
[06:51.860 --> 06:55.220]  So, specifically now, let's get to more of the meat of the story here.
[06:55.220 --> 07:02.450]  Mossack Fonseca, this is the story and the characters that we're going to introduce now, has some connections to Argentine money laundering.
[07:02.800 --> 07:08.420]  And specifically, the Kirchner family, through a conjury of companies that were created in Nevada.
[07:09.010 --> 07:13.160]  And they did some shady things to hide their association with Mossack Fonseca, Nevada.
[07:14.240 --> 07:15.950]  And that's what we're about to get into.
[07:16.510 --> 07:19.710]  So, going back down to, I'm sorry, to Argentina here.
[07:20.010 --> 07:23.040]  In Buenos Aires, specifically, we have Nestor Kirchner.
[07:23.710 --> 07:25.400]  Who's a scary looking dude.
[07:26.310 --> 07:29.040]  Who looks, actually, even scarier as a tattoo.
[07:33.540 --> 07:37.520]  Some fun facts about Nestor, actually, not, you know, he's a scary dude.
[07:37.720 --> 07:41.220]  But he, he's actually did some good things for Argentina.
[07:41.720 --> 07:42.960]  He wasn't all that bad.
[07:42.960 --> 07:48.980]  One of the things that I like about him is that he removed amnesty for torturers during the, the dirty war.
[07:49.100 --> 07:52.000]  For military officers who were engaging in torture and things.
[07:52.220 --> 07:54.780]  And dramatic decrease in, in poverty.
[07:55.160 --> 07:56.500]  He's, you know, he did some good things.
[07:56.680 --> 07:58.200]  But, you know, he's a little shady as well.
[07:58.600 --> 08:02.120]  And in 2007, he became the first gentleman of Argentina.
[08:02.340 --> 08:05.040]  When his wife, Cristina Kirchner, became president.
[08:06.140 --> 08:08.020]  And she's even scarier as a tattoo.
[08:08.460 --> 08:09.800]  As a matter of fact, so.
[08:11.540 --> 08:15.620]  Cristina Kirchner, however, she's a little bit more scandal-ridden than Nestor.
[08:15.800 --> 08:17.180]  I mean, I guess it's arguable.
[08:17.740 --> 08:20.500]  I mean, right from the outset, she was involved in scandals.
[08:20.680 --> 08:22.460]  Suitcase full of money that shows up.
[08:22.540 --> 08:26.220]  That could be relating to some kind of illegal campaign contribution.
[08:27.300 --> 08:33.720]  During their reign, from, well, well, she was president from 07 to, to 15.
[08:34.040 --> 08:35.620]  And I think Nestor started in 2003.
[08:35.620 --> 08:40.920]  So during this reign, their net worth, their family net worth increased tremendously.
[08:41.720 --> 08:43.520]  Some people have said around 1,500%.
[08:43.520 --> 08:46.400]  I think, I think probably more accurate is around 800%.
[08:46.400 --> 08:50.260]  And shockingly, you know, public funds went missing during this period.
[08:51.820 --> 08:59.620]  She's recently also indicted over a currency trade scandal involving, well, obviously the Argentine pesos.
[08:59.980 --> 09:02.280]  So she's got, she's got some issues over here.
[09:02.460 --> 09:07.420]  And now we pop back to right where we are, over to New York.
[09:07.420 --> 09:10.240]  And specifically, right here, New York City.
[09:10.440 --> 09:13.780]  And we're going to talk about a guy, a billionaire by the name of Paul Singer.
[09:14.080 --> 09:21.420]  Paul Singer is very well known in the finance community as being one of the smartest and toughest hedge fund managers out there.
[09:21.500 --> 09:25.400]  He runs something called EMC Management, or Elliott Management Corporation.
[09:26.580 --> 09:28.980]  He's an odd duck too, kind of like Nestor.
[09:29.180 --> 09:36.100]  He's, he's not necessarily a bad dude, but he's, he's a staunch defender of the 1%, huge Republican.
[09:36.720 --> 09:41.880]  But he's an odd duck in that he supports LGBT rights tremendously.
[09:42.280 --> 09:46.540]  And donates a lot of money to LGBT organizations because he has a gay son.
[09:47.360 --> 09:56.100]  And one of the things that he's made a lot of money and a great name for himself doing is the purchase of sovereign debt of foreign nations and then putting the screws to them.
[09:56.280 --> 10:01.560]  And he does this through a subsidiary of Elliott Management called NML Capital.
[10:01.820 --> 10:06.480]  But like all good billionaires, he doesn't incorporate here in the United States for NML Capital.
[10:06.660 --> 10:08.800]  He is instead in the Cayman Islands.
[10:09.060 --> 10:16.240]  So NML Capital was incorporated here and they follow the sovereign debt money making playbook to a T.
[10:16.240 --> 10:17.920]  They look for struggling countries.
[10:18.080 --> 10:19.840]  They buy the debt when it's at its lowest value.
[10:20.200 --> 10:25.300]  Once it's back on track and the country tries to renegotiate, they say, no way, we want our full payment.
[10:25.360 --> 10:28.560]  And if they don't pay, they go to court and they try to force them to pay.
[10:28.880 --> 10:31.220]  So you got to have a lot of money and you got to be patient to do this.
[10:31.380 --> 10:33.640]  And this is exactly what he did with Argentina.
[10:34.240 --> 10:40.960]  You know, in 2001, big depression in Argentina, bought Argentine bonds at an extremely discounted rate.
[10:41.060 --> 10:41.940]  They try to restructure.
[10:42.180 --> 10:43.540]  He says, absolutely no way.
[10:43.540 --> 10:44.500]  And he litigates.
[10:44.500 --> 10:46.900]  So you don't litigate in the Cayman Islands.
[10:47.140 --> 10:49.240]  You come back to New York.
[10:49.680 --> 10:54.940]  And specifically, right down the street, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York.
[10:55.160 --> 10:56.120]  And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
[10:57.660 --> 10:58.520]  They're actually the same building.
[10:58.820 --> 11:03.380]  And he gets an order telling Argentina that you have to pay.
[11:03.380 --> 11:08.940]  You have to pay my debt in pari passu, which means on equal footing.
[11:09.160 --> 11:13.740]  So you can't pay the people that renegotiated their debt, that restructured for 70 cents on the dollar.
[11:14.300 --> 11:17.360]  Before you pay me, you have to pay me at exactly the same time.
[11:17.360 --> 11:21.060]  So, this is a big value debt right now.
[11:21.580 --> 11:26.880]  177 million dollar investment skyrocketed to 4.65 billion U.S. dollars.
[11:27.460 --> 11:29.400]  That's a huge, huge amount of investment.
[11:29.540 --> 11:30.620]  1500% return.
[11:30.900 --> 11:34.580]  This is why Paul Singer is known as one of the smartest and toughest guys out there.
[11:35.180 --> 11:38.920]  So, Argentina says, I'm a foreign nation.
[11:39.340 --> 11:40.240]  Screw you.
[11:40.440 --> 11:42.060]  You can't tell me what to do.
[11:42.060 --> 11:43.240]  We have sovereign immunity.
[11:43.400 --> 11:45.560]  We're taking this goddamn thing to the Supreme Court.
[11:45.760 --> 11:46.380]  So, they do.
[11:46.560 --> 11:47.260]  They go to the U.S. Supreme Court.
[11:48.240 --> 11:59.020]  Because Paul Singer is chasing this guy, or chasing Argentina, and the Kirchner's specifically, the money that they embezzled, allegedly, all over the world.
[11:59.500 --> 12:02.260]  So, it doesn't work out for them in the Supreme Court.
[12:02.420 --> 12:07.780]  The Supreme Court says, yeah, we have nations when they come here, they have sovereign immunity in our courts.
[12:07.940 --> 12:10.560]  But we have one law that establishes sovereign immunity.
[12:10.560 --> 12:12.240]  It's called the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
[12:12.440 --> 12:16.980]  And if the immunity is not delineated in that act, then you ain't got it.
[12:17.380 --> 12:23.280]  So, in Argentina, nothing says you have immunity from post-judgment debt recovery actions.
[12:23.480 --> 12:24.100]  It's not there.
[12:24.160 --> 12:24.840]  You don't have it.
[12:24.900 --> 12:27.500]  They won almost unanimously in the Supreme Court.
[12:27.680 --> 12:29.360]  Now, this pissed Argentina off.
[12:29.440 --> 12:30.340]  There was a big fallout.
[12:30.480 --> 12:38.560]  They actually went to The Hague and tried to have the United States judiciary found engaging in judicial malevolence, whatever that is.
[12:38.560 --> 12:42.060]  But the UN General Assembly didn't like this either, that we allowed people to chase the debts.
[12:42.320 --> 12:47.540]  So, now, NML Capital's got the right to chase the Argentine money all over the world.
[12:47.760 --> 12:56.080]  So, before the Supreme Court order even comes out, they have their lawyers going into Ghana, and specifically Accra.
[12:56.780 --> 13:04.620]  And they convinced the Ghanaian Superior Court, these guys who look like, you know, British barristers here, you know, apparently they still go with the wigs.
[13:04.660 --> 13:05.060]  I love it.
[13:05.140 --> 13:08.100]  You know, I wish I could wear one of those, especially with this hairline.
[13:09.480 --> 13:19.440]  And they convinced the Superior Court that they should see something that's off the coast of Argentina, known as the Fragata Libertad, which belonged to Argentina.
[13:19.740 --> 13:20.860]  This beautiful boat.
[13:21.120 --> 13:26.740]  So, if you can imagine, you know, $4.6 billion of debt, and they go and seize this boat.
[13:26.740 --> 13:28.440]  I mean, I don't know how much this boat could be worth.
[13:28.620 --> 13:32.660]  I'm not a yacht or something, but I don't know, maybe $10, $15 million, tiny fraction.
[13:33.020 --> 13:41.320]  But this is just to be a real thorn in the side of Argentina, and to show them, we're going to embarrass you, and we're going to chase you until we get our money.
[13:41.560 --> 13:57.020]  And so, this actually scared Argentina, and specifically their foreign ministry, who gave express guidance to Cristina Kirchner, not to use their equivalent of Air Force One, known, of course, as Tango One.
[13:57.220 --> 14:01.800]  Because they thought, anywhere that she flew this plane, it was going to be seized by Paul Singer.
[14:02.300 --> 14:11.920]  So, in the middle of a dispute about the Falkland Islands with the British, she was forced to charter private planes from a British company, which was actually pretty embarrassing for them.
[14:12.780 --> 14:18.100]  So now, we come back to the United States, and specifically, Nevada, Las Vegas.
[14:18.100 --> 14:27.620]  You know, a lot of us are going to be there soon, but I don't think that you've seen the grandiose offices of MF Corporate Services, Nevada Limited, which are right over here.
[14:29.340 --> 14:43.040]  And through this subsidiary entity in the United States, what was done was they created 123 entities that were connected to somebody by the name of Lazaro Baez.
[14:43.040 --> 14:51.200]  Now, Lazaro Baez is... we'll find out about him very recently, but very soon, rather.
[14:51.520 --> 14:53.920]  But a lot of these companies, if you look at them, can you read them, actually?
[14:54.220 --> 15:06.040]  A lot of them are deliberately set up, in my opinion, to appear to be construction-related companies, real estate-related companies, chemical-type stuff, things that work on public funds.
[15:06.040 --> 15:12.640]  So, going back to Argentina, we're going to add a name to this particular list.
[15:12.860 --> 15:14.840]  Now, this is Lazaro Baez.
[15:15.940 --> 15:21.040]  And he is directly connected, since 1990, to Nestor Kirchner.
[15:21.220 --> 15:29.080]  And the way that he was connected was actually quite interesting, and sort of ironical, in that he befriended Nestor by leaking bank data to him.
[15:29.080 --> 15:42.200]  When he was a low-level functionary at the bank of Santa Cruz, he apparently had leaked to him data about some of the highest net worth individuals in Santa Cruz, their comings and goings, and their accounts, and what they were up to.
[15:42.840 --> 15:53.000]  And he is recently accused of, you know, you guessed it, embezzling 65 million dollars from the government of Argentina for, of course, or rather through public works contracts.
[15:53.000 --> 15:57.520]  And he seemed to profit extremely well during the reign of the Kirchners.
[15:58.240 --> 16:01.740]  And this particular photo of him, I just absolutely love it.
[16:02.600 --> 16:10.000]  He's quite literally showing, I think it's an Argentine or Chilean journalist, that he does not have any money hidden in his boiler room.
[16:10.160 --> 16:12.880]  That's literally the context of this particular photo.
[16:13.300 --> 16:14.240]  It's amazing.
[16:14.600 --> 16:18.480]  You know, and I have to say nobody, nobody, he definitely doesn't have money hidden there.
[16:18.680 --> 16:21.100]  But nobody apparently asked him what was under that jacket.
[16:22.680 --> 16:24.680]  Why are you wearing a puffer jacket in Argentina?
[16:24.900 --> 16:25.780]  It's hot, right?
[16:27.080 --> 16:27.960]  Totally bizarre.
[16:28.620 --> 16:34.220]  So, knowing what we know, Lazaro, these entities are connected with him, and he's connected to the Kirchners.
[16:34.360 --> 16:38.500]  We go back to Argentina, and there's these worldwide discovery rights.
[16:38.660 --> 16:39.920]  NML is chasing them.
[16:40.020 --> 16:48.760]  So they find, of course, the one person who is the sole employee of Mossack Fonseca Corporate Services Nevada Limited.
[16:48.760 --> 16:52.680]  And she has essentially a paralegal background.
[16:53.020 --> 16:56.480]  She tried to open a tanning business that didn't do so well in Las Vegas.
[16:56.720 --> 16:59.680]  I mean, it's the desert.
[17:02.180 --> 17:04.180]  Sorry, I don't mean to speak, but...
[17:04.180 --> 17:06.320]  And anyhow, she...
[17:07.140 --> 17:09.120]  Yeah, well, all right, I was just going to stop.
[17:09.300 --> 17:12.960]  Anyhow, she doesn't really know how to protect her Facebook photos either.
[17:12.960 --> 17:14.160]  So, here we are.
[17:14.280 --> 17:15.860]  There she is on a motorcycle over there.
[17:15.960 --> 17:18.600]  She's the sole employee of Mossack Fonseca.
[17:19.340 --> 17:21.440]  She does a good job by all accounts.
[17:21.600 --> 17:23.240]  She is outstanding in her field.
[17:23.860 --> 17:26.160]  This is a... it's not a typo.
[17:26.680 --> 17:28.500]  She is outstanding in her field.
[17:28.760 --> 17:29.460]  There you go.
[17:29.700 --> 17:30.260]  Look at that.
[17:30.460 --> 17:30.760]  I know.
[17:31.180 --> 17:31.960]  Fuddy-duddy.
[17:32.300 --> 17:32.700]  Absolutely.
[17:35.200 --> 17:36.700]  So, Patricia Amunatecki.
[17:37.580 --> 17:38.980]  She's the only FF employee.
[17:39.300 --> 17:47.720]  And she had to give sworn testimony in a deposition from NML Capitals lawyers about her connections with Mossack Fonseca Panama.
[17:47.960 --> 17:49.660]  And she really minimized things.
[17:49.840 --> 17:52.500]  I mean, she did not really...
[17:52.500 --> 17:54.220]  She skirted the truth quite a bit.
[17:54.880 --> 18:00.860]  There is a motion outstanding right now that says, you know, in federal court that she lied, essentially.
[18:00.980 --> 18:01.580]  She purged herself.
[18:01.820 --> 18:03.820]  She presented false testimony about these links.
[18:05.060 --> 18:09.500]  She acknowledged there are some back-end services that Panama provides for Nevada.
[18:09.680 --> 18:18.480]  But what Mossack Fonseca Panama was trying to do, essentially, was to disavow all connections to Nevada.
[18:18.480 --> 18:29.720]  Because if there was a direct connection to Nevada, then NML and Paul Singer are going to get all the data they need by a federal court order from Mossack Fonseca Panama.
[18:30.000 --> 18:33.340]  So, they're going to crack the nut way before the Panama Papers breach happens.
[18:34.300 --> 18:38.980]  And Mossack Fonseca is not going to be looking very good at that particular point.
[18:39.080 --> 18:40.080]  Neither are the Kirchners.
[18:40.820 --> 18:43.860]  And they're going to get into a whole mess of trouble.
[18:44.520 --> 18:47.240]  And their other clients are not going to be too happy about this, either.
[18:47.240 --> 18:54.920]  So, what they tried to do is destroy evidence of all connections to Mossack Fonseca Nevada.
[18:55.180 --> 18:58.680]  Now, here's the timing of it.
[18:58.700 --> 19:00.700]  It's actually quite interesting, as well.
[19:01.020 --> 19:04.880]  So, Patricia Amunategui, or depositions, 11 September 2014.
[19:04.900 --> 19:11.500]  The emails that we're about to show you come out on 17 September 2014.
[19:11.500 --> 19:18.140]  And they actually reference conversations with Patricia that happened before 17 September.
[19:18.460 --> 19:30.580]  So, these emails, if you go into the federal court proceeding that's still ongoing between NML Capital and Mossack Fonseca in Nevada and Panama, they reference them.
[19:31.360 --> 19:41.420]  And, but unfortunately, even though you can find these documents and they're a needle in a haystack, somehow, they still convinced the federal court to file all this under seal.
[19:41.660 --> 19:44.300]  So, if you look at the proceeding, you can't really find out too much about it.
[19:44.340 --> 19:45.140]  It's all redacted.
[19:45.240 --> 19:46.640]  All the information is redacted.
[19:46.820 --> 19:49.420]  But, of course, we've got the emails for you.
[19:49.560 --> 19:52.080]  They are, unfortunately, in Spanish.
[19:52.380 --> 19:53.580]  But, hey, this is New York.
[19:53.780 --> 19:55.160]  Everybody speaks Spanish, right?
[19:55.320 --> 19:56.920]  I mean, or knows somebody that speaks Spanish.
[19:57.040 --> 19:58.640]  So, we have some translations for you.
[19:58.940 --> 20:00.160]  And we'll walk through these.
[20:01.020 --> 20:02.440]  And you can read them for yourself.
[20:02.700 --> 20:06.940]  So, one of the first things we have here is the head of IT, Luis Sanchez.
[20:06.940 --> 20:07.460]  Luis Martinez.
[20:07.780 --> 20:11.140]  And he's talking about Patricia, specifically.
[20:11.700 --> 20:12.940]  And he mentions to...
[20:13.500 --> 20:16.240]  Well, he's talking about a conversation that he had with her recently.
[20:16.440 --> 20:19.240]  And they're talking about setting up a double user.
[20:19.480 --> 20:23.100]  She doesn't remember the password that she herself created for the mirrored user.
[20:23.320 --> 20:27.160]  And we're going to see more context about the mirrored user in a second, as well.
[20:27.700 --> 20:31.220]  We helped her with this, but, you know, she can't remember her password, right?
[20:31.360 --> 20:34.780]  We're trying to figure out how to restrict the display of information for the mirrored user.
[20:34.780 --> 20:37.640]  Who knew what Patricia was seeing before they did that, by the way?
[20:37.840 --> 20:39.360]  And now they're talking about this phone.
[20:39.780 --> 20:44.840]  And this phone is interesting because she's already got a story concocted.
[20:44.860 --> 20:50.560]  If anybody asks her about the separate phone that they gave her that's on her desk, she's going to say, oh, it's a direct line to a service provider.
[20:51.360 --> 20:53.400]  And I don't really see a problem with it.
[20:54.100 --> 20:56.080]  But this phone comes up a little bit later.
[20:57.140 --> 21:01.380]  Because now JR, JR, we'll see her in a little bit.
[21:01.540 --> 21:03.520]  She is a lawyer for Mossack Fonseca.
[21:03.760 --> 21:11.260]  And she says, let's change this device so that it's not seen that there's direct access to the entire directory of Mossack Fonseca Panama.
[21:11.640 --> 21:23.780]  Because if somebody comes in and inspects the office, and they see essentially, you know, it's a Cisco IP phone with a full directory of, you know, Ramon and Jurgen's extensions on it, they're going to know that she perjured herself.
[21:24.380 --> 21:26.440]  So they need to hide this, essentially.
[21:26.660 --> 21:29.820]  So they want to take the entire directory off this particular device.
[21:30.160 --> 21:31.960]  Now they talk about printed documents.
[21:32.100 --> 21:34.560]  And this is Louise talking again as number four.
[21:35.000 --> 21:41.500]  So, you know, she needs to print from Citrix, but she needs to be very cautious about leaving physical evidence around.
[21:41.740 --> 21:42.520]  I mean, we're getting there.
[21:42.780 --> 21:43.160]  We're getting there.
[21:43.260 --> 21:45.360]  I mean, these are fairly idiotic, but it gets worse.
[21:46.400 --> 21:49.260]  Now, you know, we want to... and then Josette, the lawyer, chimes in.
[21:49.260 --> 21:55.780]  And says, we want to essentially give the impression that she's a service provider, which was the focus of her testimony.
[21:56.960 --> 21:59.240]  And then Ramon said... I'm sorry, not Ramon.
[21:59.380 --> 22:07.720]  Louise goes into this and says, well, she was given precise instructions here to access CIS through Citrix.
[22:07.780 --> 22:11.240]  And under no circumstances was she going to do it outside of Citrix.
[22:11.760 --> 22:13.440]  But she doesn't do this 100%.
[22:13.440 --> 22:15.660]  So what is CIS here?
[22:15.660 --> 22:21.260]  So CIS stands for the Case Information Service that Mossack Fonseca runs.
[22:21.660 --> 22:24.320]  And this is essentially a client portal.
[22:25.140 --> 22:27.380]  It's not an email portal or anything like that.
[22:27.460 --> 22:31.600]  This is where you can go in and in their own words, you can see who's working on your work.
[22:31.720 --> 22:33.080]  You can check the progress of it.
[22:33.200 --> 22:35.140]  It's where all your documents are stored.
[22:35.340 --> 22:43.660]  It makes a hell of a lot more sense to me that CIS was popped than an email server because this is a big repository of documents.
[22:44.080 --> 22:47.740]  So we know that she is using Citrix to log into CIS.
[22:47.880 --> 22:49.140]  They don't want to have any direct connections.
[22:49.160 --> 22:51.060]  And they have a mirrored user for her.
[22:51.140 --> 22:52.040]  They have a double account.
[22:53.380 --> 22:54.560]  So moving on.
[22:55.440 --> 23:06.600]  Wyoming is also another kind of almost akin to an offshore haven in the United States in the sense that it's often used as a place for incorporation.
[23:06.600 --> 23:07.980]  It's very private for companies.
[23:08.600 --> 23:11.800]  So, of course, Mossack Fonseca has operations in Wyoming as well.
[23:12.000 --> 23:16.800]  And they're here talking about, well, we should treat Wyoming exactly the same way that we're treating here.
[23:18.080 --> 23:20.940]  You know, she should only use the mirrored user.
[23:21.180 --> 23:22.720]  And she should be the only one.
[23:22.800 --> 23:24.820]  This should not be... I'm sorry that...
[23:24.820 --> 23:28.400]  You know, she should basically always be using Citrix.
[23:28.700 --> 23:30.180]  You know, when we're being audited.
[23:30.360 --> 23:31.740]  No direct connections here.
[23:32.440 --> 23:36.380]  And then the lawyer comes in and says, actually, I don't even think that's enough.
[23:36.380 --> 23:39.680]  I think we should just eliminate this entirely and work with her kind of offline.
[23:40.600 --> 23:41.340]  So then this is great.
[23:41.560 --> 23:50.880]  So then Louise chimes in and says, we will run a remote session to eliminate the traces of direct access to our CIS that are not mirror users.
[23:51.080 --> 23:55.140]  But tomorrow or the next day could happen again if she doesn't follow instructions to the letter.
[23:55.400 --> 23:58.200]  In conclusion, I'm very worried about Miss Patricia.
[23:58.480 --> 24:00.240]  She forgets things, gets very nervous.
[24:00.240 --> 24:04.680]  I believe that in this situation it can easily be seen that we're hiding something.
[24:07.610 --> 24:11.150]  A systems auditor with basic knowledge could detect this.
[24:11.370 --> 24:13.070]  Well, they did, didn't they?
[24:13.510 --> 24:15.450]  So this is, this is Louise, right?
[24:15.630 --> 24:20.390]  So now we've got a couple more names here that we want to add to the cast of characters.
[24:20.590 --> 24:21.590]  We've got Louise Martinez.
[24:22.210 --> 24:25.250]  Louise Martinez, head of IT at Mossack Fonseca.
[24:25.250 --> 24:26.170]  He's still there.
[24:26.330 --> 24:27.730]  He's been there 25 years.
[24:28.010 --> 24:31.090]  If I was head of IT at Mossack Fonseca, I wouldn't be smiling like that.
[24:32.130 --> 24:38.590]  Sarah Montenegro, who was also on these particular emails, she happens to be a lawyer as well.
[24:38.830 --> 24:44.590]  It's very troubling when you have lawyers involved in this kind of spoliation of electronic evidence.
[24:45.050 --> 24:46.610]  And then Josette Rockberg.
[24:46.890 --> 24:49.950]  She is somebody that hasn't been a lot in the news.
[24:50.130 --> 24:55.150]  I think only South American news has really ever mentioned her name in the context of the Panama Papers.
[24:55.150 --> 25:07.630]  But here she is, and she was the one that was giving the direction specifically to Louise Martinez about the mirrored users and the phone and switching her out and giving the impression that we want to give that she's a service provider.
[25:08.030 --> 25:12.170]  And then coming up in the next set of emails, we have Andres Garcia.
[25:12.550 --> 25:14.270]  And he's another IT guy.
[25:14.450 --> 25:16.130]  He reports to Louise.
[25:16.590 --> 25:21.470]  So let's look, take a look at the next batch of emails from Mossack Fonseca.
[25:22.030 --> 25:24.270]  So here's Josette talking again.
[25:24.270 --> 25:26.410]  This is a 25 September email.
[25:27.030 --> 25:28.190]  And she writes in line.
[25:28.970 --> 25:29.910]  She's very savvy.
[25:30.410 --> 25:32.650]  And a 24 September email.
[25:33.070 --> 25:37.150]  And so it was very difficult to parse out exactly where her comments were.
[25:37.310 --> 25:39.970]  But we've been able, I think, to figure out exactly which ones were hers.
[25:40.010 --> 25:42.190]  And we highlighted those in yellow for you.
[25:43.010 --> 25:44.070]  So here she is.
[25:46.570 --> 25:54.430]  And she is told by Louise that this particular telephone that we're going to serve, he confirms that it doesn't show any of the corporate directory.
[25:54.610 --> 25:56.330]  And she writes in, oh, that's perfect.
[25:56.470 --> 25:59.950]  I spoke with Patricia working totally off CIS nor through Citrix.
[26:00.650 --> 26:02.270]  And she should do this essentially.
[26:04.110 --> 26:06.310]  And that we're going to be switching out the device.
[26:06.310 --> 26:09.170]  So this is all action through one of their service providers.
[26:09.490 --> 26:12.050]  So then here, we've got the phone set up.
[26:12.190 --> 26:13.210]  So there's no connection there.
[26:13.430 --> 26:14.890]  This is also quite likely.
[26:15.730 --> 26:18.010]  And I think they actually referenced it and I didn't mention it.
[26:18.130 --> 26:23.750]  But it is a telephone that appears to not be on their normal phone system as well.
[26:23.830 --> 26:24.950]  Maybe a separate PBX.
[26:25.030 --> 26:28.650]  Something that doesn't leave logs when she picks up the phone and rings Mossack Fonseca.
[26:28.650 --> 26:32.550]  So here's Louise again, copying Francisco's comments.
[26:32.670 --> 26:34.510]  Now, I don't actually know who Francisco is.
[26:34.630 --> 26:37.910]  Maybe you guys can help in the aftermath of this.
[26:38.110 --> 26:42.370]  But his comments below are actually really quite interesting.
[26:42.550 --> 26:44.050]  And let's step through them all directly.
[26:44.570 --> 26:50.910]  So he says, I'm copying Francisco's comments today when he remotely tried to clean the logs of the Nevada office's PCs.
[26:51.190 --> 26:57.290]  I repeat, Miss Patricia does not have the profile to pass a basic audit without leaving evidence.
[26:57.290 --> 26:58.310]  Watch out!
[26:59.850 --> 27:02.170]  I mean, this clear text email.
[27:02.950 --> 27:04.690]  It's just amazing to me.
[27:05.510 --> 27:10.590]  So then Francisco's comments to Louise are also quite telling.
[27:11.210 --> 27:15.050]  Where he says, today we tried to clean Miss Patricia's PCs.
[27:15.410 --> 27:17.170]  But she told me that she was going to lunch.
[27:17.610 --> 27:19.310]  And this guy is apparently in BVI.
[27:19.550 --> 27:21.270]  I think he got the time difference wrong.
[27:22.150 --> 27:23.730]  And then he mentions Andres.
[27:23.850 --> 27:27.230]  Andres was a character to whom we were just introduced a minute ago.
[27:27.290 --> 27:29.510]  Who reports to Louise, the IT guy.
[27:30.070 --> 27:31.130]  Andres went to Nevada.
[27:31.410 --> 27:32.550]  He cleaned everything.
[27:32.890 --> 27:35.470]  And he brought all the documents with him to Panama.
[27:36.690 --> 27:39.950]  But for some reason, Patricia, she still wants some of these.
[27:40.410 --> 27:48.650]  So the context of the second point is that Patricia is going to have a separate employee working with her quite possibly.
[27:49.290 --> 27:55.650]  And now the people in Panama are really concerned that she's going to be using an account that connects directly to CIS and is going to leave evidence.
[27:56.390 --> 28:01.610]  So, he mentions that, you know, he created two Citrix accounts for Miss Patricia.
[28:01.930 --> 28:09.590]  The drawback was discussed was, if she's not in the office and the girl is essentially using the wrong account and someone comes to inspect, we're screwed.
[28:10.870 --> 28:18.650]  Quite literally, it's just amazing to me that people would put this in an email and lawyers would put this in an email.
[28:20.030 --> 28:24.530]  So the aftermath, the fallout of this, is somewhat interesting.
[28:24.530 --> 28:33.950]  Because we had these emails, I think, before, because we were working with a media organization, they were identified and brought over to us to give context.
[28:34.230 --> 28:39.090]  And before the law firm that is representing NML Capital possibly had them.
[28:39.230 --> 28:40.770]  So we're wondering, what do we do with this data?
[28:41.030 --> 28:42.410]  They eventually found it.
[28:42.530 --> 28:46.810]  And they made a motion for sanctions against Mossack Fonseca.
[28:48.250 --> 28:52.370]  Essentially for giving false testimony, obstructing justice, delaying things.
[28:52.370 --> 28:56.950]  And they specifically said, you know, this is sanctionable conduct.
[28:57.190 --> 29:00.670]  You know, we look at these emails and you see them spoliating electronic evidence.
[29:00.890 --> 29:06.110]  And here, this involves also the presentation of false evidence to the court.
[29:06.350 --> 29:09.630]  It's a very serious charge in a federal court proceeding.
[29:10.050 --> 29:22.830]  And going further, you know, this misconduct, they're saying this is the delay, led to seven different motion sequences, the judge having to issue five orders, a two-year delay, you know, huge amount of litigation.
[29:23.230 --> 29:31.950]  So these sanctions, if they are awarded attorney's fees, are going to definitely arise to the level of millions of dollars of sanctions against Mossack Fonseca.
[29:34.250 --> 29:40.110]  And it's likely, well, Mossack Fonseca actually just put in their opposition to these sanctions on 18 July.
[29:40.550 --> 29:42.390]  They didn't have a whole hell of a lot to say.
[29:43.090 --> 29:47.290]  But, you know, they claimed that, you know, the veracity of these emails was in question.
[29:47.290 --> 29:49.070]  These are emails from the Internet.
[29:49.290 --> 29:50.970]  How could they possibly be ours, right?
[29:53.530 --> 29:55.690]  But it will probably be September.
[29:55.850 --> 30:02.530]  My guess is September 2016 when we see if the federal court is going to bring the hammer down on Mossack Fonseca.
[30:02.690 --> 30:07.290]  And in the wake of this, they have shut down operations in Nevada.
[30:07.490 --> 30:10.250]  Mossack Fonseca, Nevada has been shut down.
[30:10.370 --> 30:13.090]  Patricia has, unfortunately, been let go.
[30:13.090 --> 30:19.370]  And they were the registered agent for, I think, you know, thousands upon thousands of companies that were incorporated in Nevada.
[30:19.570 --> 30:22.330]  So disentangling that relationship was a big job.
[30:22.530 --> 30:28.570]  But they really wanted to stop the flow of information going over to NML Capital about what they were up to.
[30:28.890 --> 30:38.810]  And I think, frankly, in my opinion, you know, those 123 companies that correlate to Lazaro Baez and the Kirchners are probably just the tip of the iceberg.
[30:39.510 --> 30:43.750]  So coming back to Europe here, we go back to Switzerland.
[30:44.290 --> 30:47.250]  And in particular, Geneva for some recent events.
[30:47.770 --> 31:02.970]  So the recent story, or rather, the constant story and the explanation that we hear from Mossack Fonseca, Panama, is that this was an outside person who breached our systems and stole our data.
[31:02.970 --> 31:04.730]  You know, there wasn't anybody inside.
[31:06.950 --> 31:08.550]  And we don't know who did this.
[31:08.690 --> 31:09.630]  We're trying to find it out.
[31:09.810 --> 31:12.450]  They filed some criminal complaints all over the world recently.
[31:12.910 --> 31:15.790]  But yet, their actions sort of belie that.
[31:16.330 --> 31:23.890]  Because, you know, one of the things that we will get into is that they do appear to be looking internally.
[31:24.150 --> 31:29.250]  And some of the things that we still don't know are, you know, who is this John Doe?
[31:29.250 --> 31:36.830]  He issued one statement months ago about, you know, why he did this or why they did this.
[31:36.990 --> 31:39.330]  It's really no indication that it is one particular person.
[31:39.490 --> 31:43.030]  But he did this because of income inequality.
[31:43.610 --> 31:44.950]  We don't really know.
[31:45.030 --> 31:49.050]  There's no specific rationale for how all this data got out.
[31:49.050 --> 31:57.630]  And why were certain parts, I'm sorry, why were certain documents that were, you know, minor documents essentially.
[31:58.050 --> 32:07.590]  You know, out of 11 and a half million of them included in the first 150 documents that were released by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
[32:07.870 --> 32:10.650]  So, we have a bit of a more plausible theory.
[32:10.830 --> 32:14.350]  We know that John Doe was concerned with income inequality.
[32:14.350 --> 32:20.830]  We know that the lawyers and the managers required IT personnel to destroy data.
[32:21.150 --> 32:24.390]  We can assume that they did this very routinely.
[32:24.710 --> 32:34.210]  You see, the nonchalance that's indicated, you know, that is perceived in these emails between the lawyers and the IT personnel indicate that this is happening quite regularly.
[32:34.410 --> 32:35.710]  This is just par for the course.
[32:35.850 --> 32:37.630]  This is a routine operation.
[32:38.810 --> 32:44.870]  So, we also know exfiltrating 2.6 terabytes of data takes a large amount of time.
[32:45.710 --> 32:49.490]  And we know that physical access makes this a lot easier.
[32:50.090 --> 33:01.350]  So, could an internal IT person who was tasked one too many times by the lawyers at Mossack Fonseca to do something that was against his conscience, could he have grown a conscience and become the John Doe whistleblower?
[33:01.350 --> 33:08.370]  This person may have even been, quite possibly, associated with or on the email chains that we just saw.
[33:09.570 --> 33:21.130]  And it could explain why these two documents were cherry picked out of 11.5 million documents to be part of the 150 initial release.
[33:22.490 --> 33:29.810]  Going back to Mossack Fonseca, they do appear to be looking for somebody who was internal to the company.
[33:29.810 --> 33:32.650]  Back on 15 June, I'm not sure if you caught the story.
[33:32.730 --> 33:33.810]  It wasn't a major story.
[33:34.230 --> 33:42.010]  But somebody, an IT department worker in Geneva, was arrested and held on suspicion that he was the person behind this breach and this leak.
[33:43.210 --> 33:47.110]  The ICIJ came out pretty quickly and said, this isn't our guy.
[33:47.590 --> 33:48.790]  We can confirm that.
[33:48.910 --> 33:51.330]  Nonetheless, he seems to have been held for about 10 days.
[33:51.910 --> 33:56.030]  And he was released, I think, around on 24, 25 June.
[33:56.030 --> 33:59.950]  So he was released there, but they're still looking internally.
[34:00.210 --> 34:02.170]  They think that this was an internal person.
[34:02.550 --> 34:06.050]  And quite frankly, I think this is more likely an inside job as well.
[34:06.730 --> 34:18.250]  So one of the things to think about is, well, Mossack Fonseca did a really, really poor job of safeguarding client data.
[34:20.270 --> 34:26.630]  So this raises a very interesting question here about what questions you should be asking of your law firms.
[34:27.530 --> 34:30.170]  And there are, well, quite frankly, there's a lot of them.
[34:32.030 --> 34:35.090]  And, yeah, we don't have to spend a lot.
[34:35.190 --> 34:36.610]  I mean, I think I'm preaching to the choir here.
[34:36.670 --> 34:39.950]  I think you guys know what questions you should be asking of your law firms.
[34:39.950 --> 34:41.530]  And there's even more of them, actually.
[34:41.690 --> 34:44.570]  You can kind of just pick any five or six of these.
[34:44.810 --> 34:45.630]  Some of them go together.
[34:45.630 --> 34:47.110]  If the answer is yes, then ask this.
[34:47.570 --> 34:48.810]  But, you know, there's a lot.
[34:48.930 --> 34:58.710]  And I think most importantly, you know, law firms have all geared up now to revamp and redouble their efforts to safeguard client data.
[34:59.230 --> 35:09.630]  But they have big problems because their profit structure is such that, you know, all partners share profits, all partners share losses.
[35:10.230 --> 35:15.690]  So they have an incentive, unfortunately, not to spend a lot of money on information security.
[35:16.110 --> 35:21.810]  Because the old school equity partners who have been there, these are the senior partners that are remaining in the partnership.
[35:21.990 --> 35:27.530]  They have a major incentive to keep spending down in profits high before they retire.
[35:27.530 --> 35:37.830]  So there isn't going to be a huge expenditure or a huge amount of money spent on information security in the near term unless it absolutely has to be done.
[35:38.110 --> 35:47.390]  And if you think about a lot of these offices, major law firms, and I was part of an international law firm, big AMLA 100 law firm for about eight years.
[35:49.270 --> 35:51.010]  They have offices all over the world.
[35:51.250 --> 35:52.530]  They've got offices in Moscow.
[35:52.610 --> 35:54.050]  They've got offices in Beijing.
[35:54.050 --> 35:55.650]  They have offices in the United States.
[35:55.650 --> 35:57.110]  They have offices in South America.
[35:57.710 --> 36:05.390]  You have to think about the security, both the physical and digital security of those lawyers and the data that they are entrusted with.
[36:06.470 --> 36:15.350]  So one of the things to ask that I think is extremely important is to say, okay, well, you seem to be very forward thinking about your information security policies now.
[36:16.230 --> 36:16.990]  How long?
[36:17.110 --> 36:18.490]  For how long have you had these policies?
[36:19.070 --> 36:23.570]  Probably right after April 3rd when the Panama Papers came out is when these documents are dated.
[36:23.670 --> 36:24.450]  What's the last revision date?
[36:24.590 --> 36:29.210]  Okay, well, they'll show you the last revision date, but ask for the creation date of these policies and these documents.
[36:31.890 --> 36:37.710]  And another thing that I think is actually often overlooked, unfortunately, is that we're hackers.
[36:37.910 --> 36:39.850]  We're here because we're interested in information security.
[36:39.850 --> 36:44.410]  But we often times can overlook kind of the old school physical security concerns.
[36:44.410 --> 36:49.610]  And this relates specifically to law firms operating in Asia and Russia, Ukraine.
[36:49.970 --> 36:57.890]  But I think one of the most important things a law firm can do is engage in some TSCM work or technical surveillance countermeasures.
[36:58.330 --> 37:08.390]  We often forget that because, you know, it's so easy to steal data that the old school methods of exfiltrating data still work.
[37:08.550 --> 37:10.350]  People still use listening devices.
[37:10.590 --> 37:11.770]  People still implant things.
[37:11.770 --> 37:16.870]  And if nobody has swept the office in Moscow ever, that's a problem.
[37:17.270 --> 37:18.190]  That's a big problem.
[37:18.390 --> 37:21.510]  If nobody's looked in Beijing, that's probably a big problem as well.
[37:21.870 --> 37:24.610]  So, these are good questions that I think you can ask your law firm.
[37:24.750 --> 37:27.010]  They're tough questions and they should be able to answer them.
[37:30.230 --> 37:33.010]  So, going back, I want to thank you guys for listening.
[37:33.170 --> 37:35.670]  I think we are wrapping up a little bit early here.
[37:36.370 --> 37:38.310]  And we have some time for some questions.
[37:38.590 --> 37:39.550]  And this is us.
[37:39.550 --> 37:43.450]  I hope you've enjoyed the story of Mossack Fonseca and their bizarre connections.
[37:43.930 --> 37:44.590]  Thank you.
[37:53.390 --> 37:54.510]  Anyone have any questions?
[37:55.430 --> 37:55.730]  Who
[38:00.390 --> 38:00.810]  hates you?
[38:01.610 --> 38:02.530]  Who hates me?
[38:02.690 --> 38:05.050]  I think Jurgen and Ramon, probably.
[38:05.370 --> 38:07.010]  And Josette and Luis.
[38:07.210 --> 38:08.650]  I think they all don't like me.
[38:08.930 --> 38:10.090]  It's a bit tough to see.
[38:10.330 --> 38:10.650]  Go ahead.
[38:10.650 --> 38:11.610]  I have a question.
[38:12.150 --> 38:27.410]  Do you think that jurisdictions like Nevada and Panama and the British Virgin Islands and places like that are still beneficial for individuals or companies looking for this kind of privacy, if you're able to maybe hire a law firm that's not terrible at their jobs?
[38:27.410 --> 38:28.170]  Yes.
[38:28.710 --> 38:29.410]  Well, I think...
[38:29.410 --> 38:29.470]  Yeah.
[38:29.730 --> 38:31.190]  It's an interesting question because...
[38:31.190 --> 38:31.630]  And it actually...
[38:31.630 --> 38:32.470]  It raises a good point.
[38:32.690 --> 38:35.730]  Because what Mossack Fonseca did...
[38:35.730 --> 38:38.650]  Well, what they were very bad at doing was safeguarding client data.
[38:38.950 --> 38:47.730]  But from all appearances, they seemed to look like a pretty forward-looking, full-service law firm that did their job actually quite well in terms of the creation of shell companies all over the world.
[38:47.750 --> 38:53.770]  If you look at the BVI as he referenced, they incorporated, I think, over 100,000 entities in that one jurisdiction.
[38:54.750 --> 38:57.290]  And, yes, they still, I think, should operate...
[38:57.290 --> 39:04.290]  I think in the United States, we're going to be revamping the way our corporate secrecy laws work and specifically with Nevada.
[39:04.850 --> 39:23.330]  But, you know, I think if you are looking at those particular jurisdictions, you need to track what's happening there really quite closely because there are going to be legislative changes that are occurring that really could affect the secrecy and the privacy that you would want to maintain if you are going down there to hide money or,
[39:23.470 --> 39:25.030]  you know, just for privacy purposes.
[39:26.590 --> 39:27.290]  Thanks, Alex.
[39:27.390 --> 39:28.210]  This is totally fascinating.
[39:28.690 --> 39:37.910]  I was wondering if you could tell me, and we've spoken a little bit about your own efforts to sort of improve law offices' own protection of their accounts.
[39:38.110 --> 39:46.910]  I'm wondering how likely is it that someplace really engaged in skullduggery like this that's hiding illicit gains, how likely is it that they would go completely dark?
[39:46.910 --> 39:56.370]  How likely is it that they would manage to get somehow onto the dark net or into Tor hidden services and somehow manage to hide the tracks of the facts that they're doing this?
[39:57.230 --> 40:00.890]  I think it's becoming increasingly likely that they could do that.
[40:01.050 --> 40:03.610]  People are becoming more sophisticated at covering their tracks.
[40:03.770 --> 40:06.750]  And I think, you know, we learn from the mistakes of others.
[40:06.950 --> 40:10.250]  And this is a mistake of others that we quite frankly have seen.
[40:11.010 --> 40:20.790]  The idiocy of sending these types of emails in clear text that will be saved on an email server is just, you know, tremendously stupid to put this in writing.
[40:21.190 --> 40:25.810]  And I think this is something that we all learned from the Sony breach a couple years ago as well.
[40:25.950 --> 40:27.390]  And there was a major fallout from that.
[40:27.550 --> 40:32.290]  And I think that there is going to be a bigger and bigger fallout from the ICIJ as they release more documents.
[40:32.290 --> 40:47.030]  And I know there's been a major criticism of them as well in that they only released a few, but they created this kind of beautiful data visualization of companies and people connected to them, which actually could raise some questions about people without the underlying data to,
[40:47.030 --> 40:49.890]  you know, uncorroborate what looks suspicious.
[40:50.350 --> 40:54.910]  So I think we're learning from... well, law firms are learning from their mistakes.
[40:54.910 --> 41:00.330]  I think it's quite likely that big law firms will have a major problem with this.
[41:00.330 --> 41:02.010]  They've got a lot of issues with corporate governance.
[41:02.170 --> 41:17.510]  But smaller law firms like, you know, that could operate, you know, either in the Caribbean or in kind of offshore places in the European Union, I think quite likely are going to learn from this and will begin to develop anti-forensic countermeasures as well.
[41:18.810 --> 41:19.770]  Gross, but thanks.
[41:20.130 --> 41:20.490]  Excellent.
[41:22.090 --> 41:23.010]  Any other questions?
[41:25.310 --> 41:25.910]  All right.
[41:26.090 --> 41:27.430]  Well, thank you guys very much for listening.
[41:27.550 --> 41:28.430]  I hope you enjoyed the story.
[41:28.430 --> 41:28.550]  Thank you very much for that...
[41:28.970 --> 41:29.210]  All right.
[41:29.210 --> 41:29.590]  Thank you very much.
[41:35.500 --> 41:36.320]  Thank you very much.
[41:36.840 --> 41:37.160]  Thanks everyone.
[41:37.160 --> 41:37.160]  Thank you.