[00:00.000 --> 00:00.800]  Okay.
[00:07.660 --> 00:09.540]  Oh great, now it wants to install MapPoint.
[00:09.720 --> 00:10.160]  Beautiful.
[00:11.800 --> 00:12.240]  What?
[00:12.460 --> 00:14.860]  It's in a continuous install loop for MapPoint 06.
[00:15.600 --> 00:16.040]  MapPoint?
[00:16.360 --> 00:17.960]  All I did was click start presentation.
[00:19.120 --> 00:19.280]  Girl.
[00:19.320 --> 00:20.580]  I hate your laptop.
[00:20.840 --> 00:21.480]  Did it come up?
[00:22.080 --> 00:22.780]  Are we good?
[00:23.020 --> 00:23.040]  Yes.
[00:24.380 --> 00:25.640]  Where are your speech notes?
[00:26.520 --> 00:28.460]  In the same directory, in my documents.
[00:28.800 --> 00:29.160]  No, no.
[00:29.400 --> 00:30.180]  Where are they on here?
[00:30.180 --> 00:30.980]  Oh, I don't know.
[00:30.980 --> 00:35.480]  Why does it... Do you want to grab mine quick?
[00:35.640 --> 00:35.980]  It's on there.
[00:36.640 --> 00:37.120]  Your what?
[00:37.300 --> 00:37.680]  My laptop.
[00:38.080 --> 00:38.580]  Where is it?
[00:38.640 --> 00:39.380]  Just quick, grab it.
[00:39.500 --> 00:40.280]  It's on Hibernate.
[00:40.360 --> 00:41.020]  It's already set up.
[00:41.700 --> 00:43.600]  I don't know why the hell you do this.
[00:45.820 --> 00:48.500]  You pester the crap out of me because your laptop sucks.
[00:51.140 --> 00:55.220]  I swear I want a sticker for mine that says this is not my boyfriend's laptop because this sucks.
[00:56.240 --> 00:56.600]  I do.
[00:56.860 --> 00:58.180]  I'm just going to stick yours over here.
[00:59.060 --> 01:00.060]  Mine's got enough battery in it.
[01:00.060 --> 01:01.380]  Just grab your supply.
[01:01.460 --> 01:02.340]  It's plugged in under the desk.
[01:04.500 --> 01:06.200]  We have to get you Office 07.
[01:06.380 --> 01:08.320]  I swear to God we're getting you Office 07.
[01:08.920 --> 01:11.340]  I'll settle for a decent laptop with a decent bias.
[01:12.180 --> 01:12.740]  Keep it up.
[01:12.800 --> 01:13.960]  You'll get one for Christmas, dude.
[01:16.060 --> 01:16.820]  Set a promise.
[01:17.160 --> 01:21.120]  If you keep up your good behavior and I get a job, you can have a laptop for Christmas.
[01:21.820 --> 01:23.580]  So you better start finding people to hire me.
[01:23.680 --> 01:23.800]  Yeah.
[01:23.800 --> 01:24.700]  We got a laptop for Christmas.
[01:25.100 --> 01:25.620]  We'll talk about that.
[01:25.620 --> 01:26.080]  How's that?
[01:28.420 --> 01:29.540]  Is that a good deal or what?
[01:31.400 --> 01:33.060]  Stick this in because I got notes on here.
[01:33.600 --> 01:34.000]  Oh.
[01:37.760 --> 01:39.300]  All the notes are in the slide, remember?
[01:39.580 --> 01:41.160]  Uh, my other notes are here.
[01:41.560 --> 01:41.900]  Oh.
[01:43.160 --> 01:44.980]  I copied them off while you were in the shower.
[01:45.120 --> 01:45.840]  And then leave it there.
[01:46.200 --> 01:47.300]  Just leave the cap here.
[01:49.480 --> 01:51.360]  It was on the desktop a second ago.
[01:52.820 --> 01:54.020]  Dude, it was right there.
[01:54.020 --> 01:54.980]  I'll pull it off that.
[01:59.280 --> 02:00.720]  There's no screens around there.
[02:01.020 --> 02:02.480]  And it advances the same way.
[02:02.920 --> 02:03.140]  Okay.
[02:06.660 --> 02:08.680]  I put it on the right so you can see what you're doing.
[02:08.980 --> 02:09.340]  Okay.
[02:10.180 --> 02:11.740]  I love you dearly, but I hate your laptop.
[02:12.100 --> 02:13.160]  Tell me when it comes up.
[02:13.360 --> 02:14.520]  It's a blue screen at the moment.
[02:14.960 --> 02:15.580]  Yeah, it's blue.
[02:15.740 --> 02:17.620]  It needs to be a bullet hole.
[02:24.020 --> 02:24.920]  Do we see a bullet hole?
[02:25.300 --> 02:25.400]  Yes.
[02:25.600 --> 02:26.340]  We have a bullet hole.
[02:26.500 --> 02:26.880]  Great.
[02:27.740 --> 02:29.700]  From a Starbucks in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
[02:32.400 --> 02:33.260]  I took it.
[02:34.680 --> 02:35.880]  A lot of control up there.
[02:36.040 --> 02:36.240]  Yeah.
[02:36.460 --> 02:37.260]  The natives are restless.
[02:42.480 --> 02:44.700]  I swear, I'm getting you Office of Seven.
[02:45.600 --> 02:47.400]  Tonight, you will have Office of Seven.
[02:47.700 --> 02:48.720]  I already have it.
[02:49.100 --> 02:49.540]  On your laptop.
[02:49.540 --> 02:50.180]  Just not installed.
[02:50.320 --> 02:50.700]  Oh, yes.
[02:50.840 --> 02:51.180]  You will.
[02:52.600 --> 02:53.620]  Trust me, you will.
[02:56.460 --> 02:57.960]  Second on the current resolution.
[02:58.020 --> 02:58.620]  From the beginning.
[02:59.060 --> 02:59.460]  Go.
[03:03.480 --> 03:04.440]  There's your speech notes.
[03:04.600 --> 03:06.540]  You can zoom as required by your vision.
[03:06.740 --> 03:08.340]  There will be a scrolly bar if you need it.
[03:09.220 --> 03:11.060]  And there's your advanced slide button.
[03:11.260 --> 03:11.940]  The little arrow.
[03:12.260 --> 03:13.620]  You can draw on it if you want.
[03:13.800 --> 03:14.520]  Okay, cool.
[03:14.720 --> 03:15.160]  Thank you, Joe.
[03:15.600 --> 03:17.760]  Just give me a moment here while I set some other things up.
[03:18.840 --> 03:19.240]  Yeah.
[03:19.580 --> 03:23.300]  As long as you don't drag anything into the right-hand pane, that will stay up.
[03:23.300 --> 03:24.340]  Okay.
[03:27.480 --> 03:28.040]  Okay.
[03:28.040 --> 03:29.220]  It shouldn't do anything funky.
[03:29.660 --> 03:29.780]  Okay.
[03:31.400 --> 03:33.500]  My apologies to the lateness here.
[03:33.640 --> 03:34.940]  I'll get started here momentarily.
[03:35.240 --> 03:36.240]  Turn the volume off.
[03:36.700 --> 03:38.420]  I don't know if it's going to make any noises.
[03:39.820 --> 03:40.380]  There it is.
[04:03.430 --> 04:03.790]  Whoops.
[04:07.540 --> 04:08.260]  Cancel that though.
[04:08.520 --> 04:09.160]  There we go.
[04:09.260 --> 04:09.960]  That's the other one.
[04:12.800 --> 04:14.380]  That was the wrong one anyways.
[04:15.960 --> 04:17.560]  That's what I get for having betas.
[04:19.820 --> 04:20.500]  Okay.
[04:22.060 --> 04:23.200]  Hello, everybody.
[04:23.560 --> 04:27.420]  My name is Smoke, or at least so I think.
[04:28.040 --> 04:43.880]  Two years ago, I had a third-party conference over in what is now the Zoom Room, Zeus, describing some ideas I had at that time involving an idea I called, at the time, Democracy 2.0.
[04:44.500 --> 05:03.220]  Basically, it involves a thought experiment at the time that to build an electronic voting infrastructure that is securable and open from the get-go, from the start, and to build it that way.
[05:03.220 --> 05:10.740]  And so far, there's people coming closer, even today, but still need some work yet.
[05:11.500 --> 05:16.620]  First, we'll start with an abridged history of past election technologies and the vast diversity between them.
[05:16.920 --> 05:27.340]  As a whole, the only way you can develop a newer, more secure voting platform is to gain a full understanding of the current and past methods of the problems associated with them.
[05:29.140 --> 05:37.780]  There have been numerous and diverse methods used in the past, starting with paper-based electronic voting systems or document ballot voting systems.
[05:38.040 --> 05:43.180]  It started out as a system where the votes were cast and counted by hand using physical paper ballots.
[05:43.480 --> 05:52.200]  With the advent of electronic tabulation, this evolved into a system of hand-marked paper ballots counted electronically.
[05:52.200 --> 06:07.020]  Direct record electronic voting system record using a ballot displayed through a mechanical or an electrical optical component that's activated by the voter through a button or a touch screen.
[06:07.980 --> 06:13.620]  This kind of system produces data using a computer and records votes as digital images in its memory.
[06:13.620 --> 06:22.920]  Post-election, it produces a tabulation of the voting data that has been stored in its removable memory device as a printed copy.
[06:23.420 --> 06:32.820]  This system gained popularity in 2002 due to the Help America Vote Act mandate that one handicapped accessible voting system be provided per polling place.
[06:33.180 --> 06:39.380]  Most jurisdictions satisfied that with the use of a DRE, and some opted to switch over entirely.
[06:39.380 --> 06:42.660]  By 2004, 30% of registered U.S.
[06:42.720 --> 06:44.640]  voters used some kind of DRE system.
[06:45.420 --> 06:56.440]  A public network DRE is a DRE that transmits vote data from individual polling places to another location via a public network, the Internet.
[06:56.980 --> 06:57.740]  Real good idea.
[06:58.880 --> 07:08.800]  Vote data can be transmitted both as each ballot is cast periodically as lumps of ballots through the election day or as one complete batch at the end of the voting day.
[07:08.800 --> 07:11.640]  We know how well the security of the Internet is here.
[07:12.360 --> 07:21.660]  In Switzerland, however, this is an established part of local referendums where voters have passwords assigned to them to access ballots through the postal service.
[07:22.480 --> 07:28.960]  In Estonia, people cast their votes if they choose to, can use an e-voting system via the Internet.
[07:28.960 --> 07:41.820]  Voters are given specific days they can vote during and using a national ID card equipped with a microchip are able to get access to an online ballot using a card reader and a government assigned PIN number.
[07:42.940 --> 07:56.100]  Optical scan voting systems work similar to Scantron systems where voters darken an oval and feed their ballot into an optical reader which then identifies which circle was filled in and adds it to that candidate's total.
[07:57.360 --> 08:05.580]  I'll break from the speech here for a moment to mention, I did hear the talk yesterday on hacking democracy and how easy it is to defeat that.
[08:09.360 --> 08:17.340]  Now that we know some of the different systems that are available in the U.S. and Europe, we can discuss some of the companies that provide them for our use.
[08:23.670 --> 08:28.210]  Diebold election systems has had some scandals in the past related to their voting machines.
[08:28.570 --> 08:35.150]  Election systems made by Diebold are responsible for tallying approximately 80% of the votes cast here in the U.S.
[08:35.890 --> 08:45.650]  Their GEMS central tabulator software version 1.18.15 counted most of the votes in the 2004 presidential election.
[08:45.650 --> 08:51.410]  It was the center of controversy related to apparent voting irregularities.
[08:52.250 --> 08:59.410]  In 2006, Diebold made the decision to remove their name from the front of voting machines to help boost voter confidence.
[09:00.450 --> 09:01.370]  Imagine that.
[09:01.870 --> 09:09.110]  In August 2007, the company tried to reinvent themselves to voters and changed their name to Premier Election Solutions.
[09:11.150 --> 09:17.650]  Sequoia Voting Systems is one of the largest providers of electronic voting machines here in the U.S.
[09:18.030 --> 09:19.690]  Sorry, I'm not used to speaking in public.
[09:20.950 --> 09:28.030]  They are the chief competitor to Premier, and they were the first to introduce voter verified paper audit trails in the U.S.
[09:28.430 --> 09:37.770]  The company was purchased by Smartmatic on March 8, 2005, and they claim the world's only fully secure and fully auditable voting technology today.
[09:38.910 --> 09:51.110]  Related to that is the fact that Sequoia Voting Systems was implicated by former employees in the Hanging Chad scandal by rumors of intentionally manufacturing poor paper ballots destined for West Palm Beach, Florida.
[09:54.770 --> 10:04.050]  Election Systems and Software is the result of a merger between American Information Systems Incorporated and Business Records Incorporated in 1980.
[10:04.050 --> 10:10.970]  At the root, they are owned by the Omaha World Herald Company, publisher of Nebraska's largest newspaper.
[10:11.590 --> 10:20.350]  They claim to be the largest manufacturer of voting machines in the U.S. as of 2007 and customers in 1,700 localities.
[10:20.810 --> 10:27.490]  Although they only have 350 employees, they boast revenues of $117 million annually.
[10:28.350 --> 10:37.430]  Senator Chuck Hagel, name rings a bell, was the CEO of ESS up until they produced the voting equipment for the 96 Senate elections.
[10:38.450 --> 10:50.690]  March 2006, U.S. primaries revealed their machines to have poor quality control, faulty memory cards were cited at the time, had poor quality reporting, and caused problems with election preparedness.
[10:50.690 --> 10:58.850]  The state of Indiana had launched an inquiry into the machines, which were settled when the company paid the state $750,000.
[10:59.490 --> 11:08.670]  West Virginia and Arkansas also have pursued cases against ESS, but the company denied any problem with its machines and cited errant poll workers.
[11:09.110 --> 11:19.850]  Their Incavote Plus optical scan system was revoked from use in California five months after it was initially approved, March 2007 to August 3, 2007.
[11:21.630 --> 11:23.330]  Hart InterCivic...
[11:23.330 --> 11:25.070]  One moment...
[11:25.070 --> 11:36.550]  Hart InterCivic is a privately held U.S. company headquartered in Texas that provides electronic election systems, geospatial systems, and print solutions to various jurisdictions.
[11:37.610 --> 11:41.210]  Their equipment is used by 300 jurisdictions nationwide.
[11:41.210 --> 11:55.190]  They are the producers of ESSlate, a DRE voting solution specifically designed to accommodate disabled voters by providing a select wheel and digital push-button interface as opposed to a touch screen system.
[11:55.950 --> 12:01.750]  On August 3, 2007, their system replaced the Incavote Plus optical system in California.
[12:02.370 --> 12:19.850]  A December 15, 2007 report commissioned by the state of Ohio found that one Hart InterCivic system being used in the state had critical flaws that could undermine the integrity of the 2008 general election and were therefore immediately decommissioned until further testing is done.
[12:20.890 --> 12:24.630]  And there are advantages and disadvantages to all these voting machines.
[12:25.150 --> 12:28.330]  And voting machines in and of themselves are no exception.
[12:31.310 --> 12:44.430]  MIT's Charles Stewart estimates that up to one million more ballots were counted in 2004 as opposed to in 2000 because electronic voting machines detected votes that paper-based ballots and paper-based machines missed.
[12:45.930 --> 12:46.650]  Disadvantages.
[12:47.070 --> 12:54.190]  It is being argued that theoretically humans are not equipped to verify operations occurring with an electronic machine.
[12:54.190 --> 12:57.330]  And because of that, the operations cannot be trusted.
[12:57.870 --> 13:05.770]  That is furthered by computing experts arguing that true programmers cannot trust any program they did not author themselves.
[13:06.570 --> 13:14.890]  Under a secret ballot system, there is no known input nor any expected output to compare electoral results.
[13:15.090 --> 13:22.750]  Thus, accuracy, honesty, and security of the entire electronic system cannot be verified by humans at this day.
[13:23.670 --> 13:33.350]  Because not everything is perfect, and we all know technology is not infallible, there have been certain groups formed and legislation passed to help make life a bit more fair.
[13:35.930 --> 13:39.550]  Electronic voting systems store ballots in digital form and memory.
[13:39.710 --> 13:42.490]  This method is used exclusively by DRE systems.
[13:42.990 --> 13:52.210]  When electronic ballots are used, there is no need to print paper ballots and no risk of running out of ballots, thereby significantly reducing both costs and waste.
[13:52.830 --> 14:01.250]  This also allows ballots to be offered in multiple languages using a single machine, which is required by the National Voting Rights Act of 1965.
[14:02.410 --> 14:06.930]  King County, Washington's demographics require them under U.S.
[14:07.210 --> 14:18.150]  federal election law to provide ballot access in Chinese, which means they need to decide how many Chinese language ballots they need and how many to put at each polling place, thereby wasting a significant amount of paper.
[14:18.850 --> 14:38.370]  The National Voting Rights Act of 1965, also called the Voting Rights Act, outlaws the requirement that would-be voters must pass a literacy test before they can register to vote, and provides for federal registration of voters in areas where less than 50% of eligible minority votes registered.
[14:38.370 --> 14:42.810]  This act implies that it establishes an explicit right to vote for U.S. citizens.
[14:43.430 --> 14:45.610]  However, there is no such federal right.
[14:45.930 --> 14:47.910]  For example, ex-felons can't vote.
[14:48.150 --> 14:50.490]  Instead, it grants a fundamental right.
[14:51.030 --> 14:55.610]  The Help America Vote Act, or HAWA, has three goals.
[14:55.790 --> 14:58.970]  Replace punch card voting systems with computerized ones.
[14:59.290 --> 15:04.990]  Create the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of federal elections.
[15:04.990 --> 15:10.190]  and establish a minimum election administration standards.
[15:11.050 --> 15:21.130]  HAWA mandates that all these states and localities upgrade the aspects of their election procedures, including voting machines, registration processes, and poll worker training.
[15:21.690 --> 15:28.210]  Specifics of implementation have been left up to each state, so there's going to be varying interpretations of federal law.
[15:28.990 --> 15:37.150]  The Americans with Disabilities Act demands handicapped access be provided in at least one voting booth in every voting precinct.
[15:37.770 --> 15:55.090]  One study done shows that the voting rate among people with disabilities is 20% points less than non-disabled people, because more than 20,000 polling places across the nation are inaccessible, thereby depriving disabled people of their fundamental right to vote.
[15:55.090 --> 16:03.650]  Now, let's try to take a look at a more in-depth look at the newest voting technologies available today and coming in the near future.
[16:06.030 --> 16:12.590]  Prime 3 was developed by the Human Centered Computing Lab at Auburn University in 2005.
[16:12.590 --> 16:31.390]  It offers a secure, open-source, multimodal electronic voting system, which is able to deliver the necessary system security, integrity, and user satisfaction safeguards through a user-friendly interface that accommodates all people regardless of technical ability.
[16:31.790 --> 16:42.990]  It implements what they call the universal design, meaning the product is designed to be used in all environments by as many people as possible, regardless of age, ability, or situation.
[16:44.290 --> 16:51.850]  It is designed to be barrier-free, so it can be used by the illiterate, the blind, the deaf, and the physically disabled.
[16:52.910 --> 17:03.970]  Punch Scan is touted as the first vote-capturing system to offer fully end-to-end verifiability of election results beyond ordinary paper audit trails.
[17:03.970 --> 17:12.590]  The entire Punch Scan election process is said to be so easy it can be summarized on a single printable sheet of 8x5x11 paper.
[17:13.490 --> 17:23.710]  End-to-end cryptographic independent verification is a mechanism built into an election that allows voters to take a piece of the ballot home with them as a receipt.
[17:23.710 --> 17:36.190]  It doesn't allow voters to prove to others how they voted, but only that they have properly indicated their votes to election officials and to verify with extremely high assurance that all votes were counted properly.
[17:39.330 --> 17:45.310]  Scantegrity is an integrity assurance add-on for any conventional optical scan voting system.
[17:45.310 --> 17:55.070]  It gives voters the ability to verify that their votes were recorded and tallied correctly without altering the basic form of the ballot or how the voter uses it.
[17:55.450 --> 18:09.610]  It provides a low-footprint audit companion solution for any current optical scan voting system using special audit symbols, including unobtrusively in the ballot printing, out of the way of the actual ballot information.
[18:10.230 --> 18:14.450]  As you can see by the graphic in the corner, which actually isn't on this slide...
[18:15.730 --> 18:16.410]  I'm sorry?
[18:18.450 --> 18:19.830]  Okay, did it come up?
[18:20.890 --> 18:21.770]  Oh, sorry.
[18:22.250 --> 18:29.510]  As you will see by the graphic in the corner, more and more people are concerned if their votes are counting or if it's a crapshoot.
[18:30.010 --> 18:35.090]  Some places are putting that concern aside and experimenting with distance balloting.
[18:36.730 --> 18:38.410]  That's the graphic, by the way.
[18:41.810 --> 18:56.290]  The Operation Bravo Foundation aims to foster grassroots exploration and development of practical and reproducible electronic solutions that can significantly improve the overseas absentee voting process.
[18:56.990 --> 19:03.330]  Okaloosa County, Florida is home to over 20,000 active duty military and their dependents.
[19:03.330 --> 19:18.090]  This high concentration of overseas military voters means that the county's elections office is highly motivated to find a better way to manage today's methods of providing timely and effective service to those distance balloting constituents.
[19:18.970 --> 19:25.530]  Numerous overseas voting pilot projects were started throughout recent years, but none of them proved beyond the experimental phase.
[19:25.530 --> 19:42.190]  The intent is to have a new distance balloting system in place by the 2008 presidential election, with the express intention of developing a solution that could be subsequently implemented as a standard election administration process throughout the U.S.
[19:43.930 --> 19:53.550]  A secure and scalable distance balloting environment will be established for up to 900 self-selecting overseas voters who are registered in Okaloosa County.
[19:53.850 --> 20:04.610]  The pilot program will position remote electronic voting kiosks at three overseas locations chosen for their proximity to qualified voters in the U.K., Germany, and Japan.
[20:04.610 --> 20:19.690]  These kiosks will be open for 10 days prior to the November 4th election and will be administered by county election officials using a proven transparent and secure electronic remote voting technology over a secure VPN connection.
[20:20.310 --> 20:24.610]  The votes will then be delivered to a secure county server for official tally.
[20:24.610 --> 20:33.090]  This means no paper, no mail, no hassle, no waiting, and voters will get a receipt saying your ballot has been cast to prove their ballot was counted.
[20:33.630 --> 20:41.630]  This is our first real concrete mention of true verification via cryptography, in this case using a VPN.
[20:45.560 --> 20:56.280]  Systems that allow voters to verify their vote is recorded and then tabulated with an appropriate mathematical calculation can alleviate concerns that their vote has not been correctly recorded.
[20:57.160 --> 21:13.080]  An electronic receipt signed by the voting authority using a digital signature can conclusively prove the accuracy of the tally but cannot guarantee the anonymity of the voter's choice which can be an enabler for voter intimidation or vote selling.
[21:13.560 --> 21:25.060]  There are solutions that aim to let the voter verify their vote personally, but a third party wouldn't have that ability.
[21:25.060 --> 21:39.180]  This would be done by tagging each vote with a randomly generated session ID that would allow the voter to check that their specific vote or that session ID, specific session ID, was recorded correctly through a public ballot audit trail.
[21:39.940 --> 21:50.080]  Machines that are able to provide immediate feedback for voters can aid in the detection of undervoting or overvoting, which could result in an errant ballot total.
[21:50.740 --> 21:56.500]  In order to protect against hidden agendas, many groups have called for transparency and with good reason.
[21:58.940 --> 22:06.520]  The open rights group purpose is to preserve digital rights and their freedoms by making people aware of digital rights issues.
[22:06.520 --> 22:11.800]  They also put journalists in contact with experts, thereby fostering grassroots activists.
[22:12.260 --> 22:19.700]  Their biggest campaigns involve digital rights management, the extension of copyright protection to sound recordings, and e-voting security.
[22:20.340 --> 22:30.060]  The organization was formed based on a panel discussion held at Open Tech 2005 after several people illustrated that there was a serious interest towards change.
[22:30.820 --> 22:44.660]  They are the major forefront in pushing for transparency of voting practices as well as strengthen privacy and human dignity through the opposition of automatic vehicle tracking, communication, data retention, and RFID chipping.
[22:45.120 --> 22:53.220]  A complete audit trail should be available in addition to transparency to help prevent potential problems that would otherwise have gone unnoticed.
[22:55.820 --> 23:14.780]  Voter verified paper audit trail, also called verified paper record or VVPAT, is designed as an independent verification system for voting machines designed to permit voters to check if their vote was cast correctly, which would aid in the detection of election fraud or machine malfunction.
[23:15.380 --> 23:17.080]  However, this has some problems.
[23:18.120 --> 23:25.540]  Videos taken documenting voter behavior during an actual election showed that most voters do not verify their choices.
[23:25.740 --> 23:27.980]  They just take their receipts and throw them away.
[23:28.480 --> 23:34.140]  A manual recount or audit using a VVPAT system is labor-intensive and extremely costly.
[23:34.420 --> 23:37.700]  It is likely to be unaffordable to most candidates.
[23:37.700 --> 23:57.740]  The re-creator of this, Dr. Rebecca Mercuri, described it in her PhD desertions as the proposed answer to the auditability question through having the voter machine print a paper ballot or other paper facsimile that can be visibly verified by the voter before being entered into a secure location.
[23:58.220 --> 24:01.400]  This has been commonly referred to as the Mercuri method.
[24:02.440 --> 24:10.920]  End-to-end auditable voting systems provide independent verification through the storage of digital ballots using cryptographic methods.
[24:11.240 --> 24:22.920]  This provides voters with a receipt to allow them to verify that their vote is included in the tally and that all the votes cast were done so by valid registered voters.
[24:23.300 --> 24:27.500]  The receipt would not permit a voter to prove to others who they voted for.
[24:28.660 --> 24:33.440]  The two quotes you see are from a draft written by researchers for the NIST.
[24:34.240 --> 24:36.380]  The first is from the actual draft.
[24:36.680 --> 24:41.860]  And the second is an explanation that was required after some people claimed it could be misinterpreted.
[24:42.880 --> 24:47.320]  Auditing could also be a stepping stone to show if any vote tampering had taken place.
[24:51.060 --> 25:00.180]  The image you see there is courtesy of Diebold's online store where anyone who so desires can purchase a key to unlock any Diebold touch voting console.
[25:01.380 --> 25:06.440]  People have had these keys made based on this picture and two others found online that give greater detail.
[25:06.980 --> 25:09.620]  Also rumored to work with hotel mini bar keys.
[25:12.100 --> 25:17.400]  Inadequately secured hardware can be subject to physical tampering which includes insertion of foreign hardware.
[25:17.720 --> 25:23.960]  This could allow for man in the middle style attacks which means that even sealing machines might not be sufficient protection.
[25:24.800 --> 25:28.780]  I'm sure the other talk demonstrated that quite explicitly.
[25:29.640 --> 25:35.820]  Some groups counter claim that with proper review and testing procedures they can detect fraudulent code or foreign hardware.
[25:36.240 --> 25:45.760]  They further go on to say that with the inclusion of a proper chain of custody, it would theoretically eliminate the possibility of hardware software insertion.
[25:46.540 --> 25:50.780]  I don't know if anybody here reads Ed Felton's blog at freedomtotinker.com.
[25:51.920 --> 25:56.120]  Yeah, he posted how many pictures of voting machines in the Trenton area?
[25:58.000 --> 26:03.760]  Some security experts have demanded that voting machine source code should be made publicly available for inspection.
[26:04.280 --> 26:10.480]  Others suggest publishing voting machine software under a free software license like it has done in Australia.
[26:11.140 --> 26:20.720]  In order to thoroughly prevent any and against all the problems that we've discussed, there are methods of certification and testing which machines can go through.
[26:26.920 --> 26:35.120]  Parallel testing involves randomly selecting voting machines on election day and ensuring that they yield the same results when given the same input.
[26:35.580 --> 26:40.260]  In the U.S., there is no mandatory federal certification for voting machines.
[26:40.620 --> 26:44.180]  They leave each state up to policing their own voting machines for validity.
[26:44.180 --> 26:58.420]  The U.S. Election Assistance Commission has assumed the federal responsibility for accrediting voting system testing labs and certifying voting equipment through the Voting System Verification and Laboratory Accreditation Program.
[26:58.980 --> 27:16.300]  Their goal is to independently verify that voting systems comply with the functional capabilities, accessibility, and security requirements necessary to ensure the integrity and the reliability of the voting system operation as described by the voluntary voting system guidelines.
[27:16.780 --> 27:27.900]  To ensure that not every lab can apply for accreditation, the NIST recommends labs for accreditation through the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program.
[27:27.900 --> 27:35.500]  The ACM published a document entitled Small Vote, Manipulations Can Swing Elections.
[27:35.820 --> 27:38.160]  The URL is there.
[27:38.500 --> 27:48.140]  Which uses mathematical reasoning to determine that the 2000 U.S. presidential election could have ended differently if only two votes in each precinct were changed.
[27:48.920 --> 28:01.800]  They determined that 90% of the total votes were cast via e-voting machines, while the remaining 10% were cast in some paper-based method, and therefore would not count towards the total of e-voting machines required.
[28:02.340 --> 28:12.420]  Each machine contains a total... a number of ballots for each candidate A, designated by M, that will be changed to votes for candidate B.
[28:12.880 --> 28:17.580]  One machine is required per a certain number of votes, denoted by V.
[28:17.580 --> 28:26.900]  For this, they used 200, which assumes 200 voters per every machine, which gives each voter 4.2 minutes, on average, to cast their ballot.
[28:27.520 --> 28:35.440]  The number of voting machines required per precinct would be 90% times the number of votes cast, forward slash V.
[28:36.260 --> 28:48.060]  According to the records, there were 184,394 voting precincts in the 2000 election, which works out to an average of 572 votes cast per precinct.
[28:48.560 --> 29:03.680]  If a malicious person is only able to change votes on a per-precinct basis, they would only have to change two votes per precinct in the states of Florida, New Mexico, and Iowa, in order to sway the outcome of the entire election.
[29:04.600 --> 29:13.760]  The Verified Voting Foundation advocates the use of voter verified paper trails, or paper ballots, for all elections in the U.S.
[29:13.780 --> 29:21.780]  so that voters can inspect individual permanent records of their ballots before they are cast, and so that meaningful recounts may be conducted.
[29:22.520 --> 29:31.940]  The Open Voting Consortium was born of the problem of broken voting, which began during the 2000 election debacle.
[29:31.940 --> 29:41.400]  It was started by Jim Welch, a voter who made his selections on a touch-screen voting machine, only to notice that his votes were mysteriously changed before his eyes.
[29:41.860 --> 29:50.900]  When he alerted the election judge to this, he was given the option to complete his current ballot or void it and try a new ballot on the same defective machine.
[29:52.140 --> 30:00.840]  This degraded his confidence in the current electronic voting architecture, which led him to band together with others and support open voting, which strives for two things.
[30:00.840 --> 30:13.020]  One, the entire voting system must be open to public scrutiny, no trade secrets allowed, and a paper ballot receipt can be handled, stacked, counted, and recounted if necessary.
[30:13.480 --> 30:23.820]  They currently have a beta version of open source voting software based off of Ubuntu Linux called OVC, and that can be found at the URL that's up there.
[30:23.940 --> 30:30.340]  It runs on a stripped-down version, customized, of Ubuntu, and it's actually a very interesting software.
[30:31.280 --> 30:43.960]  There is a possible solution that would ensure security of the electronic voting platform, and there is other research being conducted by the Trusted Computing Group related to platform security.
[30:47.530 --> 30:59.610]  Now, before I go into this part of the talk, I was here for Richard Stallman's talk at the last hope, and at the sixth hope, regarding the TPM and how evil it can turn out to be.
[30:59.930 --> 31:09.810]  But if you think about it, this would be one application where a trusted computing chip just may come in handy for verifying any type of cryptography involved in that process.
[31:09.810 --> 31:21.670]  The Trusted Computing Group's primary goal is to help users protect their informational assets, like data, password, keys, etc., from compromise due to foreign code execution or physical theft.
[31:22.150 --> 31:38.050]  The organization was defined in such a way to enable broad participation, efficient management, and widespread adoption of their specifications, most notably the Trusted Platform Module and the Trusted Network Connect specifications.
[31:38.050 --> 31:45.550]  We believe that a combination of these two specifications together could be the beginning of a solution for insecure electronic voting.
[31:45.930 --> 31:53.270]  For the sake of time constraints, we'll only be covering just the TPM as it relates to hardware and software security.
[31:54.930 --> 32:00.010]  The TPM is a microcontroller that stores keys, passwords, and digital certificates.
[32:00.430 --> 32:13.670]  It is affixed to the motherboard in a way that it functions below the BIOS level to ensure a secure boot environment for a system which could be used to prevent foreign or untrusted code execution on an electronic voting platform.
[32:14.430 --> 32:31.850]  Access to the platform could be denied if the boot sequence was not as expected, if foreign hardware that was not present at last boot is detected at the current boot, or if foreign code is executed that causes the hash value of any file on the boot checklist to change.
[32:32.630 --> 32:48.030]  Systems with TPM chips offer hardware-based security for numerous applications including files and folder encryptions, password management, VPN, and PKI authentication, as well as wireless authentication for 8021X specifications.
[32:48.730 --> 33:01.330]  This would help ensure voting machines that report their result via a VPN or an encrypted channel over a public network would remain secure in the event an attacker were able to make an attempt to sniff the network traffic.
[33:02.370 --> 33:12.830]  TPMs are provided in various discrete and integrated forms through AdMail, Broadcom, Infineon, Sinosun, ST, Microsystems, and Winbon.
[33:12.830 --> 33:18.010]  They are designed to work in desktop, notebook, tablet, PC, and server architectures.
[33:19.050 --> 33:29.110]  Currently, Dell, Fujitsu, Gateway, HP, Intel, and Lenovo openly admit to carrying models which have TPMs built onto the motherboard by default.
[33:29.750 --> 33:34.290]  Even ASUS and my non-functional laptop over there has a TPM chip.
[33:35.430 --> 33:49.590]  As part of the specification, they have designed the TPM so that vendors can package it or provide input-output methods suitable for inclusion in systems other than PCs, possibly into electronic coding platforms.
[33:49.950 --> 33:55.690]  Let's take a bit closer look at the actual algorithmic specifications.
[33:57.690 --> 34:05.710]  Asymmetric key functions for on-chip key pair generation use a hardware random number generator, private key signatures, and public key encryption.
[34:05.710 --> 34:11.870]  This provides private key detection which enables more secure storage of files and digital secrets.
[34:12.230 --> 34:22.110]  There is hardware-based protection for the symmetric keys associated with software-encrypted files and for the private keys used for digital signatures.
[34:22.570 --> 34:30.790]  The random number generator is used to create keys and perform operations on private keys which are protected by the TPM even when in use.
[34:31.690 --> 34:41.830]  Secure storage of hash values through a series of platform control registers, or PCRs, allows them to use a secure reporting of certain variables.
[34:42.190 --> 34:50.310]  Hash is created through inventory of the system hardware and through a list of files checked at boot are stored using PCRs.
[34:51.030 --> 34:59.570]  Now that we know what algorithms it uses and what it's capable of working with, you're probably wondering what operating systems it's compatible with.
[35:02.660 --> 35:11.120]  Several members of the TGC have designed Linux-based software stacks to extend compatibility among a variety of operating systems.
[35:11.400 --> 35:22.980]  There are specifications for trusted servers, trusted mobile devices, trusted storage, and therefore a trusted infrastructure that are being worked towards finalization even now as we speak.
[35:22.980 --> 35:29.980]  The TGC design does not have any requirement that software be certified by any organization.
[35:29.980 --> 35:33.500]  For example, how Microsoft uses verified drivers.
[35:34.000 --> 35:47.740]  The idea is that it can be so flexible it can be used on a variety of platforms and through a variety of software to secure record data and to securely store and sign digital keys.
[35:47.740 --> 35:53.720]  There are some complements that can be used in addition to the TPM for security purposes.
[35:57.510 --> 36:07.470]  Smart cards and biometrics are considered fixed tokens that are used to enhance user authentication, data, communications, and or platform security.
[36:08.470 --> 36:13.330]  Microsoft's BitLocker drive encryption is designed specifically to make use of a TPM.
[36:13.330 --> 36:27.050]  The PC client specifications developed by the TGC are used to protect critical system files and user data to help ensure that a computer running Windows Vista has not been tampered with while offline.
[36:27.410 --> 36:36.390]  For this to work properly, the TPM must be of a specification 1-2, and the system's bias must meet TGC requirements.
[36:37.030 --> 36:42.490]  It is possible to use BitLocker without a TPM if you store the keys on a USB flash drive.
[36:42.490 --> 36:47.530]  However, this is not the preferred configuration, nor was it designed to be the typical usage.
[36:48.250 --> 36:56.250]  The TPM is designed to be secure through a series of authentications done at the lower levels of the boot process.
[37:00.690 --> 37:04.190]  TPM authentications secure... you can read everything that's there.
[37:04.730 --> 37:17.670]  One thing I wanted to mention here as well is I've been looking at a program called Trusted Grub, which was being worked on right now by a university in Germany whose name is escaping me at the moment.
[37:19.070 --> 37:21.670]  You can ask me about the talk once I get my laptop back.
[37:21.850 --> 37:22.990]  Sorry, my notes are on there.
[37:24.490 --> 37:35.770]  The end result of all this, if it were properly implemented, would be faith in a corruption-free political process that could be restored once this is properly implemented.
[37:36.350 --> 37:40.670]  And voter interest, of course, can be greatly increased because then you'll know your vote will actually count.
[37:44.080 --> 37:52.460]  For more information and a discussion forum where you are encouraged to participate if you wish, you can visit my site, somethingdifferent.us.
[37:52.460 --> 37:55.700]  Or you can email me at the address listed there.
[37:57.920 --> 37:58.800]  Any questions?
[38:01.750 --> 38:10.430]  When you heard about voter planning, it's like if someone's out of school, they're more likely to vote for an increase in school funding.
[38:11.930 --> 38:17.350]  They've been thinking that, um, that's the, like, maybe it was more of a...
[38:44.890 --> 38:45.310]  Um, Uh, yeah.
[38:46.870 --> 38:48.110]  Do we have an iPhone here?
[38:48.410 --> 38:49.810]  If you're also the microphone, you're good.
[38:50.810 --> 38:50.950]  Sure.
[38:55.270 --> 38:57.970]  What I asked about was voter priming.
[38:58.790 --> 38:59.390]  Is it?
[39:03.840 --> 39:06.300]  Probably not, but, um, well, here, try this one.
[39:15.380 --> 39:16.640]  Is there a microphone back there?
[39:17.560 --> 39:21.400]  Uh, well, what I asked about was, uh, voter priming.
[39:21.500 --> 39:26.040]  It's been shown that, um, if you vote in a school, you're more likely to vote for schools.
[39:26.300 --> 39:32.080]  And certain images, time to get your thought about more, about certain, um, topics and issues.
[39:33.680 --> 39:36.320]  It was, uh, I heard about it in, uh, Scientific America.
[39:36.320 --> 39:38.700]  They were talking about voter priming on one of their podcasts.
[39:39.660 --> 39:49.440]  And it was shown, it was shown about 4-8% in the test and 2%, or 2-4% at actual polling places.
[39:51.540 --> 39:52.420]  Voter priming?
[39:52.700 --> 39:53.700]  Um, like images.
[39:53.920 --> 40:00.200]  Like, uh, if you're in a church, you might vote more on pro-life issues or, you know, moral issues, cultural issues.
[40:00.860 --> 40:02.240]  That would more...
[40:02.240 --> 40:05.660]  It's not, it's not, it's not electronic, but it still has something to do with...
[40:05.660 --> 40:14.380]  Right, that's not electronic, however, what you're describing there is, is a pattern of how voters are going to vote at the polling place, depending on their background, for example.
[40:14.640 --> 40:15.660]  That's entirely allowable.
[40:15.840 --> 40:17.180]  I mean, it is what it is.
[40:17.720 --> 40:21.200]  Yeah, but they're saying that it might intimidate more voters, and so...
[40:21.700 --> 40:26.940]  Uh, voter, you got a point there, in a way, as far as voter intimidation goes, or coercion.
[40:27.120 --> 40:31.220]  Uh, that would, that would not be, uh, something that would...
[40:32.320 --> 40:42.820]  Well, as it, as, uh, the current technology is right now, if you go into a voting booth, okay, you're still going to vote, you're conscious, regardless of what you're conditioned to believe or whatever otherwise.
[40:43.040 --> 40:43.220]  Yeah.
[40:43.580 --> 40:48.100]  Because once the curtain closes, that's the whole, that's the whole idea behind the secret ballot to begin with.
[40:48.100 --> 40:48.180]  Yes.
[40:48.880 --> 40:52.180]  That's not what, he's saying that's not what the statistics are showing.
[40:52.300 --> 41:01.220]  Yeah, it's just a feeling that, he's saying the statistics are showing the exact opposite, that 40% are voting, based on the images you're seeing, whether they're in a school or whatever they're voting.
[41:01.260 --> 41:05.220]  Right, that's of those people who are saying the way they voted after they leave the booth, though.
[41:05.840 --> 41:13.520]  Once they're in that booth, they're going to vote whatever way they want, and the value of the secret vote is still preserved, because they can say anything they want once they come out.
[41:17.390 --> 41:17.530]  Yeah.
[41:17.970 --> 41:18.730]  You follow what I mean?
[41:18.730 --> 41:24.290]  I mean, once you're in that, once you're in that booth, you're gonna vote the way you want regardless of what you tell anybody when you get outside.
[41:24.590 --> 41:30.470]  Yeah, well, what I'm saying is they actually did the research and they found out it might be...
[41:31.830 --> 41:37.430]  It would be something to be concerned about, yeah, but there's gonna be a high error rate depending on how many people tell the truth.
[41:37.690 --> 41:44.310]  Yeah, but what they're trying to do is get more places out of churches and try to get them more in local areas.
[41:45.670 --> 41:50.750]  Because there's a lot of places where most of the places you'll vote will be churches.
[41:52.190 --> 41:54.650]  Right, churches are very popular for voting places.
[41:54.810 --> 41:55.970]  I used to vote in one myself once.
[41:56.170 --> 41:58.110]  Yeah, churches and schools and stuff.
[41:58.330 --> 42:03.310]  But at no time did I feel that my vote was coerced one way or another just because it was in the house of God.
[42:03.910 --> 42:07.890]  Yeah, but what I'm saying is the research is showing when they do the statistics.
[42:08.810 --> 42:16.090]  They did a mock voting section, which was like in a laboratory, it wasn't an actual election.
[42:16.390 --> 42:19.510]  And actually seeing what the results were, you kind of really lie about them.
[42:20.070 --> 42:21.270]  I'd have to read up on that.
[42:21.410 --> 42:23.790]  I did not hear anything of that.
[42:23.990 --> 42:25.550]  Well, I'll send you the link or something.
[42:25.910 --> 42:27.350]  Send me the link, you got my aim.
[42:27.870 --> 42:28.110]  Yeah.
[42:29.010 --> 42:29.290]  Yes?
[42:29.570 --> 42:32.310]  When do you think these new systems will be in place in the United States?
[42:33.090 --> 42:35.210]  Some of these systems are actually already in place.
[42:35.350 --> 42:44.190]  Say, for example, the Open Voting Consortium's OVC disk is actually being pushed out right now for the state of California.
[42:44.530 --> 42:55.670]  And in fact, here in the state of New York, up in upstate New York somewhere, they're exploring the possibility of using live CDs for a replacement electronic voting system.
[42:56.650 --> 43:00.290]  So how secure do you think the upcoming presidential election is going to be?
[43:01.650 --> 43:04.410]  I'm sure there's going to be a lot more eyes on it than there were in 2004.
[43:04.930 --> 43:07.070]  So that in and of itself is going to be a good thing.
[43:07.950 --> 43:18.130]  The only thing you can say as far as having a secure election is they will get secure as time goes on, as newer technologies come out and being developed, and that those technologies are applied.
[43:18.990 --> 43:20.330]  It's not going to happen overnight.
[43:21.670 --> 43:25.010]  But with time, you know, the systems will get better.
[43:26.150 --> 43:29.490]  Unfortunately, I'm sure the attack will get better as well.
[43:29.490 --> 43:31.470]  The attack vectors and the threat models and such.
[43:31.950 --> 43:33.930]  But it's a never-ending game.
[43:35.150 --> 43:38.110]  Just like anything else as far as information security.
[43:38.390 --> 43:40.850]  You can only secure it for so long until somebody hacks it.
[43:41.770 --> 43:43.330]  And then it kicks up to the next level.
[43:44.110 --> 43:44.630]  Hi.
[43:45.310 --> 43:53.390]  I'm interested in a particular part of the electronic vote, which is the verification that my vote is being counted properly.
[43:54.590 --> 44:07.030]  I looked at this a while ago, and none of the systems that I've ever seen solve a particular problem of being able to verify that your vote was counted without actually having to trust the machine or the software that's on it.
[44:07.030 --> 44:21.710]  The black box with the hole with low-tech solution is nice because if I see a representative from both parties there, or at least I see one from mine, I know that when that box is open, he's going to make sure that my vote counted for his party.
[44:21.710 --> 44:43.610]  But if I have to trust some third party like Diebold to write software that doesn't encrypt my vote and then send it incorrectly and then come back and then knowing we decrypt it back improperly so it reports back to me that I have voted for who I thought I voted for but it sent off incorrect information.
[44:43.610 --> 44:54.170]  I'm wondering if any of the solutions that you've shown up here actually enable me to have confidence in my electronic vote without actually trusting the developers of the machine.
[44:54.510 --> 44:56.870]  That's where open source software comes in.
[44:57.170 --> 45:08.310]  But I actually can't... I mean, I can't trust the people who are actually putting the ballot boxes in the halls.
[45:09.050 --> 45:24.370]  Let's say I can verify that what's released on their public website is good and it's going to count my vote correctly but the person who's bringing that machine to the voting hall is also corrupt.
[45:26.210 --> 45:38.210]  With a black box vote and I trust and I see Bush and Gore standing there waiting for the box to be open, I know that the right guy is going to see mine claim my vote for himself.
[45:38.210 --> 45:48.910]  But if someone corrupt is bringing the ballot box to the hall and reprogramming it right before it goes live, then I can't trust my electronic vote.
[45:49.110 --> 45:50.330]  And that's a good point.
[45:50.410 --> 45:52.990]  That's where a chain of custody system would come in handy.
[45:53.190 --> 46:09.270]  Where anyone who handles that device and or leaves it alone or puts it wherever in whatever room for whatever reason, a chain of custody would keep a record of those interactions with the machine itself from the moment it leaves the storage facility, how it's trucked,
[46:09.430 --> 46:13.610]  how it's handled, where it's left, how long, was it open, was it locked?
[46:14.110 --> 46:27.530]  Are there policies that are being spoken about to have a chain of custody involve a trained software engineer to view the source code and then verify it and then make sure it doesn't leave a secure chain of custody?
[46:27.530 --> 46:30.970]  Or are we trusting the developers of the original system?
[46:31.270 --> 46:41.350]  In addition to trusting the developers of the original system, if you go to the openvotingconsortium.com, for example, you can download the demo CD and all the source code used with it.
[46:41.610 --> 46:43.630]  You can examine it from that point.
[46:43.630 --> 46:51.550]  I had actually spoken with Alan Deckard, who is the primary proponent of the Open Voting Consortium.
[46:51.770 --> 47:10.250]  I had spoken with him at great length last night, and he does say that even though the downloadable software there now is in beta, it is being worked on as far as hardware security and chain of custody issues are being addressed right now.
[47:10.250 --> 47:13.070]  And I would imagine he would have more news forthcoming.
[47:13.310 --> 47:15.930]  He's presenting this very...
[47:15.930 --> 47:23.010]  He's presenting his software in the near future, I think in August 27th, I think, in San Francisco.
[47:23.310 --> 47:29.250]  I could be wrong on the place too, but if you go to openvotingconsortium.org, he would have all the details there.
[47:29.250 --> 47:30.250]  Okay, thank you.
[47:35.640 --> 47:42.220]  Regarding the issue of a paper trail, there seems to be this perception that the current paper-based system is, in fact, secure.
[47:43.400 --> 47:50.300]  There is certainly ample evidence out there to indicate that paper receipts used in lunches in the past were not secure.
[47:50.580 --> 47:55.340]  There's stories about ballot boxes being lost or thrown out by mistake and so forth.
[47:55.340 --> 48:03.080]  So, there's... I'm puzzled by the fixation on paper receipts for the voting process.
[48:03.680 --> 48:09.160]  When those paper receipts are certainly as open to compromise as anything electronic.
[48:10.640 --> 48:12.960]  Plus, there's issues of actually producing them.
[48:13.160 --> 48:16.920]  Does the paper... do you have enough paper for the printer at the voting place?
[48:17.080 --> 48:28.000]  Is the toner cartridge going to run out at 2 in the afternoon and the polls are still open for another 6 hours and nobody can get a toner cartridge because, you know, there's no opposition, no staples, and buy one?
[48:28.780 --> 48:29.840]  That sort of thing.
[48:30.020 --> 48:43.420]  So, I guess, the paper receipts seem like a good idea, but I'm not sure if they're really a practical idea or that they accomplish anything other than making people feel good about what they've done.
[48:43.420 --> 48:53.200]  It does, by itself, of course, paper votes, for example, by themselves have been subject to tampering itself over the years.
[48:53.560 --> 48:59.040]  But it still serves as a backup mechanism for disaster recovery.
[48:59.200 --> 49:06.460]  If something honestly should happen with the machine, then you can use that verified paper trail to reconstruct the actual vote.
[49:06.460 --> 49:14.060]  So, by itself, it's not the answer, but in combination with electronic voting machines, it can serve as a part of the answer.
[49:15.380 --> 49:23.660]  You mentioned, you cited an MIT study that a million more votes were counted in 2004 than 2000.
[49:25.710 --> 49:34.040]  Did more people vote in 2004 or is it just that we had a better job where there were a million votes that probably weren't counted in 2000?
[49:35.000 --> 49:38.600]  I actually don't have that data handy, but it... I'm sorry?
[49:38.780 --> 49:41.180]  They were better able to be counted?
[49:41.480 --> 49:44.580]  They were better able to be counted, apparently.
[49:44.720 --> 49:46.840]  So, a higher turnout or it could have been better counted?
[49:46.980 --> 49:47.340]  Mm-hmm.
[49:48.060 --> 49:48.500]  Right.
[49:49.940 --> 49:51.100]  It wasn't specified at the time.
[49:52.100 --> 50:11.660]  And the other thing I want to ask you about the 2004 election, because all the sort of the intimate theory was that, in Iowa in particular, that these programs, that voting machines were programmed, some before the voting started, and that there were a lot of votes cast there.
[50:13.020 --> 50:15.580]  There was an over count and there were both a point count.
[50:15.860 --> 50:19.960]  Have you looked at the studies from Ohio and have you made any conclusions on those?
[50:21.320 --> 50:25.660]  Matt Blaze would be a better responder to that question.
[50:25.880 --> 50:38.100]  I did not... I was not involved in that operation or in any of those operations myself, but I would tend to trust most, if not all, of the recommendations that they had made at that time.
[50:41.790 --> 50:47.770]  My question was on getting involved in the government and regulating the way that the government is done on our machines.
[50:48.190 --> 50:54.150]  I did research on it, and basically, software testing takes time and money, and we need employers to do it.
[50:54.550 --> 50:56.950]  And companies tend to cut costs anywhere that they can.
[50:58.010 --> 51:08.350]  Would you suggest that, you know, we do a little more in terms of regulating what testing needs to be done on our machine in order to be accredited in the state or federal level?
[51:10.530 --> 51:16.630]  A uniform set of security standards would be a good start, both for the software and the hardware.
[51:17.050 --> 51:23.010]  The entire design should be inspected, as well as tested in a real-life situation.
[51:26.580 --> 51:31.980]  But unfortunately, at the moment, there is no set guidelines for that.
[51:32.380 --> 51:37.700]  The Help America Vote Act is only certifying certain testing laboratories for that.
[51:43.710 --> 51:44.490]  Anybody else?
[51:46.250 --> 51:47.650]  I see a hand back there.
[51:48.250 --> 51:49.170]  Okay, go ahead.
[51:50.010 --> 51:50.150]  In
[51:59.670 --> 52:04.530]  Australia, are there any security problems with security features they have because of those systems?
[52:05.050 --> 52:06.950]  At the moment, I'm not aware of it.
[52:06.950 --> 52:08.090]  That's not saying it can't happen.
[52:08.550 --> 52:08.770]  Okay.
[52:16.630 --> 52:20.790]  Is the Open Consortium looking at the possibility of quantum encryption?
[52:20.790 --> 52:23.530]  It seems like that technology is just a few years away.
[52:23.770 --> 52:25.530]  At the moment, no.
[52:25.670 --> 52:28.190]  No mention was made of that, but it's an interesting thought.
[52:30.090 --> 52:39.710]  And in fact, if that could be somehow married to a hardware-verified cryptographic chip like the TPM, or something better that comes out, hey, I'd be all for it.
[52:46.280 --> 52:47.020]  Anybody else?
[52:50.970 --> 52:52.150]  Still got a few minutes left.
[52:57.590 --> 52:58.230]  Okay, then.
[52:58.370 --> 52:59.050]  I guess this is it.
[52:59.150 --> 53:03.150]  If you have any questions, feel free to ask me after the talk here.
[53:03.250 --> 53:04.610]  I'll be floating around here or there.
[53:05.550 --> 53:07.090]  And thank you for letting me speak.
[53:17.550 --> 53:20.030]  I just realized you have my notes on the other computer.
[53:20.430 --> 53:20.950]  That's okay.
[53:20.950 --> 53:21.790]  I just found one.
[53:22.070 --> 53:23.990]  I found out the problem is why it won't hibernate.
[53:24.050 --> 53:24.830]  What was wrong with it?
[53:25.550 --> 53:26.130]  How about it?
[53:27.130 --> 53:29.290]  Anybody find an adult powers plan here?
[53:29.570 --> 53:30.550]  No one's recorded one.
[53:30.570 --> 53:30.790]  Okay.
[53:30.870 --> 53:31.070]  Let me go.
[53:31.070 --> 53:32.070]  Did you grab my power supply?
[53:32.090 --> 53:32.590]  I got it.