[00:59.020 --> 01:02.140]  Welcome and good afternoon on this third day of A New HOPE.
[01:06.380 --> 01:14.280]  We just want to let everyone know we would love to hear any comments you had about your experience here, whether in real life or virtually, whether positive or negative.
[01:14.520 --> 01:16.680]  Please remember, we will read all of your comments.
[01:16.920 --> 01:19.560]  Please send them to feedback at hope.net.
[01:19.920 --> 01:22.620]  Feedback at hope.net.
[01:23.220 --> 01:24.840]  And on to our next speaker.
[01:26.460 --> 01:40.960]  Why in the world are school districts across the country seeking out covert, unaccountable means of gathering intelligence on their students and people close to them?
[01:41.600 --> 01:47.300]  That is the question that our next speaker, Harry Jackson will answer.
[01:53.650 --> 01:54.250]  All right.
[01:54.470 --> 01:55.310]  Well, hello, HOPE.
[01:55.590 --> 01:57.070]  It's my third conference being here.
[01:57.150 --> 01:58.150]  I love coming in here.
[01:58.450 --> 01:59.790]  How many of you are parents?
[01:59.910 --> 02:01.170]  How many of you have kids in public schools?
[02:02.070 --> 02:03.990]  Yeah, you guys are going to want to hear this one.
[02:04.270 --> 02:06.810]  So my name is Harry Jackson.
[02:07.290 --> 02:09.850]  I'm a parent advocate with Parents Offending Education.
[02:09.890 --> 02:12.370]  It's a non-profit bipartisan.
[02:13.650 --> 02:15.350]  But we've been making a lot of noise.
[02:15.510 --> 02:18.910]  So we're going to talk about like we're going to talk about this afternoon.
[02:19.430 --> 02:20.530]  Give you a brief introduction.
[02:20.530 --> 02:23.410]  I'll tell you a little bit about who I am, how I, my origin story.
[02:23.570 --> 02:26.410]  How did I come into this fight, which I didn't expect to be in?
[02:27.630 --> 02:30.030]  The evolution, a literal war on parents.
[02:30.130 --> 02:32.530]  I'm sure most of you have been following what's been going on in the media.
[02:32.730 --> 02:37.030]  A lot of controversy, a lot of political partisan divide with what's going on in our schools.
[02:38.150 --> 02:39.970]  I can give you actually some insight into that.
[02:40.110 --> 02:42.610]  Actually being on the front, being on the front, being on the front lines.
[02:42.830 --> 02:54.710]  And I'm actually glad to actually be in front of this audience specifically to be able to talk about like what some of the, what has been, what has been happening, why parents are reacting the way they are in certain areas of the country.
[02:55.850 --> 02:58.350]  I'll talk about the school social media monitoring policy.
[02:58.510 --> 03:02.630]  What is, what it was purported to actually represent, which most of us agree on.
[03:02.950 --> 03:18.530]  And then how they're trying to modify that to look to, to no kidding, actually create a intelligence collection platform that's not just directed at students, but towards parents or anything that might actually be associated as a threat to a brand in the schools.
[03:18.570 --> 03:20.850]  And we can see where that could be put, potential misuse.
[03:22.490 --> 03:23.950]  Nationwide trends where this is coming out.
[03:24.030 --> 03:28.250]  And I'll give you an update of like what we're doing as parents, as what we're doing as parents to actually combat this.
[03:30.910 --> 03:32.510]  How many of you have ever seen these photos?
[03:33.730 --> 03:34.790]  One, you've seen these?
[03:35.390 --> 03:35.750]  Yeah.
[03:35.970 --> 03:36.130]  Yeah.
[03:36.230 --> 03:36.430]  Okay.
[03:36.630 --> 03:38.690]  One of them's Loudoun County, right?
[03:38.830 --> 03:41.150]  A lot of conservative parents.
[03:42.230 --> 03:43.730]  How about the one to the left?
[03:44.270 --> 03:45.190]  Anyone familiar with that one?
[03:46.250 --> 03:47.630]  That's the next county over.
[03:48.870 --> 03:49.990]  That's Fairfax.
[03:50.910 --> 03:54.670]  That's mostly minorities, mostly left leaning.
[03:55.730 --> 04:01.310]  You've got, there's a firestorm going on in Northern Virginia and there's a big, and there's a big knife fight that's going on.
[04:01.470 --> 04:06.270]  Not between these groups, but between school boards and some of the behaviors and activities that they've been doing.
[04:06.670 --> 04:11.370]  And it's creating like a soup, which is creating a big, which is why a lot of parents are fighting.
[04:11.770 --> 04:24.450]  And you start seeing a lot of different alliances, people you would never expect to be in the same room together that are actually talking and really pissed off that are going to be running for school boards in the next couple of years.
[04:27.460 --> 04:28.040]  All right.
[04:28.300 --> 04:30.100]  I'm going to tell you a little bit about myself, right?
[04:30.260 --> 04:31.280]  So I'm a whistleblower.
[04:31.480 --> 04:32.720]  I actually survived.
[04:34.020 --> 04:34.920]  See that down there?
[04:35.080 --> 04:36.620]  That's a BioWatch program.
[04:36.820 --> 04:43.500]  I actually spoke at that in the HOPE in 2020, where I blew up a $2.2 billion boondoggle at DHS.
[04:44.900 --> 04:46.840]  They tried to strip me of my security clearance.
[04:46.900 --> 04:48.500]  I was on the front page of the LA Times.
[04:48.600 --> 04:50.960]  I actually spoke about this and actually named names.
[04:52.160 --> 04:55.580]  And I actually told people like, you know, how do you survive being a whistleblower?
[04:55.740 --> 04:56.520]  Like, no shit.
[04:56.640 --> 04:57.560]  How do you do it?
[04:58.380 --> 04:59.160]  It sucks.
[04:59.380 --> 05:03.180]  So if you're going to blow the whistle on somebody, be prepared to, you know, find something else to do.
[05:03.820 --> 05:05.680]  Fortunately, I did keep all my clearances.
[05:05.940 --> 05:09.980]  I actually came back and actually consulted at DHS again.
[05:11.000 --> 05:12.380]  A little bit about my background.
[05:12.880 --> 05:16.400]  You see up there, I used to be a professor at National Intelligence University.
[05:16.580 --> 05:17.760]  It's where we teach.
[05:17.960 --> 05:22.780]  I taught the cyber intel as well as transnational threats in their MSSI program.
[05:22.840 --> 05:25.060]  I also teach in a couple of other universities.
[05:25.160 --> 05:26.500]  University of Maryland is another one.
[05:26.660 --> 05:28.500]  I teach cyber as well as there.
[05:29.180 --> 05:31.800]  My background, I talked about intel community.
[05:32.140 --> 05:34.040]  I started out as a human targeteer.
[05:34.500 --> 05:41.560]  That's the person that actually develops all of those dossiers that you see in your James Bond films, determining people who have placement access and accessibility.
[05:41.880 --> 05:44.040]  I've also had experience as a collections manager.
[05:44.260 --> 05:48.780]  I've served as an attache overseas, helping to do collection operations as well.
[05:49.600 --> 05:54.200]  So like, you know, and living in the Washington, D.C. area, it's the spy capital of the world.
[05:54.380 --> 05:58.900]  So when we start seeing something like this happen, pick it out pretty easily.
[05:59.140 --> 06:01.540]  And you have a lot of parents that are also in that community.
[06:01.580 --> 06:02.500]  We see the same thing.
[06:02.620 --> 06:04.500]  We're like, okay, we're going to do something about this.
[06:07.300 --> 06:12.440]  So actually, and I'm currently supporting... I still support three-letter agencies.
[06:12.620 --> 06:13.740]  Right now, I'm supporting FBI.
[06:13.980 --> 06:19.860]  I've been supporting directly as the chief security officer, as well as their information security officer.
[06:20.000 --> 06:21.860]  So I still, you know, I'm still within the community.
[06:21.860 --> 06:23.120]  I'm still doing the same things.
[06:23.280 --> 06:24.660]  I have survived this.
[06:24.980 --> 06:32.500]  So yes, my activism has not detracted from... has not had a negative impact on my professional career.
[06:32.500 --> 06:35.600]  So I can still talk a lot of trash and get away with it.
[06:37.640 --> 06:41.460]  So... Oh, and by the way, my whistleblowing case, that's actually still open.
[06:41.620 --> 06:45.520]  That is still an investigation that I blew the whistle on back in 2016.
[06:46.240 --> 06:59.380]  When you have a bunch of guys who are using federal funds to go to the Olympics, NFL playoff games, some good old NASCAR events as well from those good old Southern boys and good old boy network.
[06:59.640 --> 07:01.060]  And I blew the whistle on that.
[07:01.620 --> 07:07.940]  One thing that I did do, which a lot of other people I've noticed who blew the whistle, I actually kept receipts.
[07:08.060 --> 07:12.920]  Like I actually had like audio recordings and I kept emails and, you know, I kept... I did keep all of that.
[07:13.060 --> 07:15.440]  And it's kind of an interesting experience.
[07:15.600 --> 07:16.320]  Not a fun one.
[07:16.320 --> 07:19.180]  Definitely not fun, but make sure that you're right if you're ever going to do that.
[07:19.320 --> 07:20.800]  If you're ever going to blow the whistle on something.
[07:20.920 --> 07:26.600]  But if you want to talk to me about that later, you know, I can... I do... I do talk for beer.
[07:26.740 --> 07:29.740]  I get better with every beer that I drink when I want to talk about some of these stories, okay?
[07:32.700 --> 07:33.200]  All right.
[07:34.420 --> 07:35.760]  So, wow.
[07:36.260 --> 07:40.060]  How did I end up in some of these things?
[07:40.120 --> 07:44.000]  Now, don't pay too much attention to this.
[07:44.300 --> 07:46.320]  I mean, I'm not some anti-CRT guy.
[07:46.420 --> 07:51.080]  I just don't like the way how they try to implement it, which is really the big issue, right?
[07:51.180 --> 08:02.220]  You just can't really discriminate against one group because you can't put a level of human hierarchy... you can't place a value of... you can't put a hierarchy in human misery, you know, because every... especially in Fairfax.
[08:02.320 --> 08:03.280]  It's a very diverse area.
[08:03.460 --> 08:04.480]  Everyone has different issues.
[08:06.700 --> 08:14.380]  But these are some of the things... I was actually the first black president of the PTA at Thomas Jefferson High School Science and Technology, nation's number one high school.
[08:14.740 --> 08:16.940]  We're actually serious competition for Stuyvesant.
[08:17.460 --> 08:19.460]  I know I talk trash to a lot of Stuyvesant parents.
[08:19.580 --> 08:21.440]  I've been a lot... I'm in contact with some New York parents here.
[08:21.700 --> 08:23.620]  I know New York's got a great education system.
[08:25.360 --> 08:28.160]  So, but we had a lot of challenges.
[08:28.320 --> 08:31.300]  We talked about the changes to admissions process.
[08:31.300 --> 08:32.920]  Now, I'm a father, right?
[08:33.100 --> 08:35.360]  How many dads are really involved in like their kids' school?
[08:37.340 --> 08:37.660]  Okay.
[08:37.880 --> 08:38.500]  You got some.
[08:38.680 --> 08:38.880]  Great.
[08:39.060 --> 08:39.520]  Good on you.
[08:40.000 --> 08:40.220]  All right.
[08:40.240 --> 08:40.960]  Now, let me tell you this.
[08:42.220 --> 08:43.760]  Was it a challenge being involved?
[08:44.800 --> 08:45.760]  Yes, it is, right?
[08:45.880 --> 08:48.360]  Because it's just like, you know, you walk into... there's that hierarchy, right?
[08:48.900 --> 08:51.080]  I mean, I was a single dad at one point, right?
[08:51.160 --> 08:52.620]  And you walk in, you try to volunteer.
[08:52.680 --> 08:58.200]  It's almost like that hierarchy, that... that alpha female room mom.
[08:58.300 --> 08:58.760]  You know what I'm talking about?
[08:58.800 --> 09:00.340]  That guy's like, who wants to volunteer?
[09:00.500 --> 09:02.260]  And you raise your hand and all you hear is a grunt.
[09:02.620 --> 09:04.940]  And then everyone looks right to the mom who's been experienced.
[09:05.060 --> 09:06.240]  And she's like, oh, she's in charge.
[09:06.440 --> 09:07.020]  And there's the dad.
[09:07.140 --> 09:11.480]  You're like, okay, all you're going to do is, you know, if there's something heavy to lift, you go do it.
[09:11.580 --> 09:12.360]  I'm like, okay, fine.
[09:12.560 --> 09:16.340]  You know, I'll be involved in my kid's life, my kid's school and education.
[09:16.480 --> 09:36.240]  But this kind of elevated with some of the activism that we've seen down in Northern Virginia, where... and this leads up to why would they implement this type of a system, where a lot of parents that started protesting started getting doxed by school board activists that have associations with the school board.
[09:36.600 --> 09:40.820]  Like they would actually put up a dossier and dox parents and actually try and harass them.
[09:42.380 --> 09:46.980]  For a little bit about me, what I also do, like I also like I volunteer like a black student fund.
[09:47.140 --> 09:50.640]  They're trying to integrate or desegregate independent schools.
[09:51.360 --> 09:55.700]  And I encountered it when I had somebody call me a segregationist.
[09:55.780 --> 09:58.040]  I was like, what did you just say to me?
[09:58.780 --> 10:00.140]  So it's like game on.
[10:00.380 --> 10:13.360]  And then down in Fairfax, Virginia, when a lot of parents started protesting some of the school board policies, they started up getting kicked out of the local Democratic Party by school board members, actually holding votes.
[10:13.540 --> 10:19.960]  In fact, I was just on a call an hour ago, finding out like, you know, like when people tried to join like their local Democrat, it's mostly, it's mostly Democratic.
[10:19.960 --> 10:20.080]  Democratic.
[10:20.700 --> 10:22.960]  And you find out that you're getting voted off the island.
[10:23.660 --> 10:26.360]  And so it's kind of like, okay, it's game on.
[10:28.780 --> 10:30.300]  Those are a couple of things.
[10:30.320 --> 10:35.040]  And I can tell you some other stories that I might interject depending on the time I have of some other crazy things that have happened.
[10:38.980 --> 10:42.580]  So let's talk about schools that are monitoring social media activity.
[10:42.880 --> 10:51.940]  Now, most of us agree on this, that schools are legally required to have a direct plan to monitor a student's Internet presence, what they're doing online using school assets and resources.
[10:53.400 --> 11:05.240]  Typically, they're only empowered to do this on school-issued emails or devices, though it varies by district, and where they might monitor other social media activity for harassment or bullying, so they can intervene.
[11:05.480 --> 11:07.400]  You know, I think most of us will agree on this.
[11:08.100 --> 11:24.600]  Now, most schools are starting to implement social media monitoring programs under the justification to identify potential active, potential active shooters, because you typically will have in the initial phases a preparation phase, and when they actually will start acquiring the means to actually develop the attack,
[11:24.660 --> 11:25.780]  you have to move very quickly.
[11:26.420 --> 11:33.720]  Also, to how for self-bullying and with self-harm, for those of us that had kids with the pandemic, I'm impacted by this.
[11:33.860 --> 11:35.540]  I talked to a lot of other parents that are impacted by this.
[11:35.720 --> 11:40.900]  Like, you know, mental health is a major issue that this pandemic has had an effect.
[11:41.260 --> 11:45.000]  Remote learning has just been a complete disaster on our youth.
[11:48.280 --> 11:54.060]  And also, I mentioned here, the Educator School Safety Network shows that most bomb threats come from social media.
[11:55.540 --> 11:58.620]  Now, let's go into the nitty-gritty of this, we go about definitions, right?
[11:58.700 --> 11:59.220]  They matter.
[11:59.460 --> 12:02.660]  Now, I said, like, I'm almost a veteran, retired Navy intel officer.
[12:02.800 --> 12:06.300]  So, you tell me I'm going to secure a room that tells me to sweep up and close the door.
[12:06.340 --> 12:11.840]  You tell someone in the Army to secure a building, that means Constantine to wire guns and guards secure the room.
[12:11.940 --> 12:15.600]  You tell someone in the Marine Corps that comes in with overwhelming force, kill everything inside.
[12:15.780 --> 12:20.340]  You tell someone in the Air Force secure a building, it means, oh, five-year lease with an option to buy, right?
[12:20.700 --> 12:20.800]  Okay?
[12:21.040 --> 12:27.660]  It's like, you know, words really do have specific meanings, you know, depending on the community that you're talking to.
[12:28.160 --> 12:30.840]  So, let's talk about, like, you know, the definition of a threat, right?
[12:30.880 --> 12:34.700]  That's a communication or behavior that you intend to harm someone.
[12:34.800 --> 12:36.200]  It can be spoken, written, gestured.
[12:37.020 --> 12:38.940]  I'm not going to read the slide so you can read it there.
[12:39.320 --> 12:41.180]  But then you can also do, like, a threat assessment.
[12:41.600 --> 12:51.360]  And coming from an intelligence background, one thing that they really, really distill to you is ICD-203, analytic standards, and making sure that you do not politicize intelligence.
[12:51.800 --> 12:53.600]  Things go very bad when you do that.
[12:54.040 --> 12:55.120]  Anyone remember Bay of Pig?
[12:55.320 --> 12:56.580]  Or read about Bay of Pigs?
[12:56.860 --> 12:58.020]  It was supposed to fail.
[12:58.600 --> 12:59.700]  It was supposed to fail.
[12:59.860 --> 13:01.460]  It failed spectacularly.
[13:01.640 --> 13:02.960]  Or Cuban Missile Crisis, right?
[13:03.620 --> 13:04.660]  Castor was our guy.
[13:04.880 --> 13:06.400]  This was making him look good.
[13:06.740 --> 13:07.080]  Right.
[13:07.260 --> 13:13.480]  But in that one, they kept on taking away resources to, you know, because they thought, oh, they'll just take it over.
[13:13.720 --> 13:16.260]  And they reduced resources where it was a complete disaster.
[13:16.860 --> 13:20.220]  Cuban Missile Crisis, classic case of mirror imaging fallacy.
[13:20.340 --> 13:26.800]  They're like, no, the Russians would never put ballistic missiles in, medium marine missiles in Cuba, because we would lose our minds, you know?
[13:26.860 --> 13:29.460]  And the Russians were like, well, you've got Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
[13:29.460 --> 13:30.760]  We'll just go do the same thing to you.
[13:30.840 --> 13:33.600]  And we got very, we came very close to World War III.
[13:36.300 --> 13:47.820]  When you talk about the threat, and mentioning this process, it's, you know, with the idea that gets implanted into an actor, a person who's an act, who's an, who's a potensive active shooter, they have the idea, and then the planning stage.
[13:47.920 --> 13:51.880]  And you simply don't have indications of when someone's in the planning stage.
[13:52.120 --> 14:01.180]  For those of us who have sliced up like the Uvalde shootings, even Columbine, the planning stages, that really doesn't have a lot of visibility.
[14:01.620 --> 14:13.480]  But when you start acquiring the means, like you're actually purchasing, like an assault weapon, or you might, you are acquiring the capability to do that, that's typically when you have that first indicator in which you will require a rapid response,
[14:13.680 --> 14:23.300]  which is why schools have started having social media monitoring to get ideas when people are actually starting to have the idea that they might want to do this to allow for rapid intervention.
[14:25.420 --> 14:31.360]  So our school policy, all right, we're the 11th largest school district.
[14:31.660 --> 14:39.680]  They've got over a $3 billion budget, which is DOD-esque type of money, which is subject to rampant fraud, waste, and abuse.
[14:39.860 --> 14:43.880]  And with ESSER funds to help with pandemic learning loss, it's at $4 billion.
[14:44.220 --> 14:46.940]  They put an informal request for a proposal.
[14:47.080 --> 14:50.720]  This is what governments use when they want to require goods or services from contractors.
[14:52.160 --> 15:03.500]  Now, what really should be concerning you about this is that Fairfax County, typically with a lot of other school districts around the country, will follow what Fairfax does.
[15:03.820 --> 15:04.860]  New York is an exception.
[15:05.020 --> 15:05.640]  They do what they do.
[15:06.540 --> 15:09.080]  Other states actually follow what New York does as well.
[15:09.260 --> 15:13.100]  But they will typically mirror what some of the larger school districts will do.
[15:13.520 --> 15:18.640]  And this put up this typical RFP to expand the social media research program.
[15:18.740 --> 15:20.140]  Now, this sounds, you know, benign.
[15:20.560 --> 15:26.720]  Nothing to really worry about until you actually look at the RFP and then you start realizing like, oh my god, what are they, what are these people thinking?
[15:28.440 --> 15:38.040]  Now, this one was to expand it to deter, to detect or deter any negative actions or consequences from social media, which may be directed to racial groups or any other student or teacher with FCPS.
[15:38.240 --> 15:40.780]  All right, that sounds like a legitimate term.
[15:40.800 --> 15:44.500]  Now, I might bring in some other issues here.
[15:45.920 --> 15:55.740]  But other, the current process that they have, and most people wouldn't object to us, is that, you know, this is already in use in other colleges and schools throughout the country.
[15:55.960 --> 15:57.940]  And for example, the use of Social Sentinel.
[15:58.100 --> 15:59.020]  But there's some key differences.
[15:59.520 --> 16:05.320]  Current social media programs do not access your private social media accounts.
[16:06.420 --> 16:10.380]  They only look at private social media, which can be seen by anyone at any time.
[16:10.760 --> 16:13.160]  And they're not for use as an investigative tool.
[16:14.860 --> 16:27.000]  Now, our school board, they're, some of the practices that they've had that have resulted in, well, some of the behavior that they've resulted in, I mentioned that they associate with activists at DOCS students.
[16:27.360 --> 16:39.380]  But when other actions that they have taken over recent years, like for example, if you look at Loudoun County, where before you could have like social, you'd have public comment, commentary at a school board meeting.
[16:39.460 --> 16:40.340]  You can speak for three minutes.
[16:40.500 --> 16:42.400]  You can come every school board meeting, right?
[16:42.440 --> 16:43.780]  Most of us are familiar with that.
[16:44.280 --> 16:45.880]  Loudoun County, they kind of reduce that.
[16:45.980 --> 16:47.600]  They reduce it from three minutes to one minute.
[16:47.760 --> 16:50.900]  Instead of the camera being on your face, it's now towards the back of your head.
[16:51.360 --> 16:54.360]  They also have the presence of private security.
[16:54.560 --> 16:58.760]  The sheriff's office will have nothing to do with it because they realize they're just trying to intimidate parents.
[16:58.760 --> 17:01.980]  But they'll have you walk through a metal detector as if you're going through Rikers Island.
[17:02.500 --> 17:04.080]  I mean, it's like, it's kind of ridiculous.
[17:04.260 --> 17:08.940]  Most of these people are professionals and they don't even meet the definition of a true threat.
[17:10.220 --> 17:12.620]  Fairfax County, they reduce it from three minutes to two minutes.
[17:12.780 --> 17:14.380]  And the same thing, back of your head.
[17:14.780 --> 17:19.500]  They're not going to let you talk if you're criticizing anything that you're talking about.
[17:19.600 --> 17:27.860]  For example, their most recent would be a controversial policy position that they have.
[17:28.540 --> 17:33.340]  Before it was, if you're going to talk about a controversial issue, you have to talk about it in a neutral and objective manner.
[17:33.500 --> 17:36.340]  And you have to present both sides, which sounds reasonable.
[17:36.400 --> 17:41.980]  I think most of us would agree with that because, you know, you have to have an idea that has to fight for it in the marketplace of ideas.
[17:43.460 --> 18:01.700]  But our school board decided that what they wanted to do is to just do away with that and allow issues to be framed where you have certain things that they believe there should be non-controversial, which dealing with race or for whatever reason, they thought it wasn't going to be controversial.
[18:02.140 --> 18:04.220]  And they would basically say they're going to have one side.
[18:04.260 --> 18:05.820]  And a lot of parents are fighting backing at this.
[18:05.960 --> 18:20.340]  And may I remind you that some of these people have been done such an incompetent job within office that when they start purging people from their own democratic party, people are going to start looking for alternatives, which is why you're seeing what's happened in Northern Virginia.
[18:20.940 --> 18:21.380]  Why?
[18:21.540 --> 18:22.880]  What happened in Virginia happened?
[18:23.740 --> 18:30.680]  Particularly if you look at, like, Youngkin's election, most of those people were basically people that got kicked out of their own democratic party.
[18:32.760 --> 18:42.280]  The proposed use that they're having because of the increasing criticism that we've seen is that they now want to create and hire a vendor that actually has no limits on data collection or searches.
[18:42.800 --> 18:44.120]  Anyone see an issue with that?
[18:45.080 --> 18:45.520]  Yeah.
[18:46.180 --> 18:48.580]  Or how about deke scams on dark web searches?
[18:52.560 --> 18:53.480]  What that means?
[18:53.580 --> 18:59.800]  That means that basically, well, a lot of the data, 90% of your intelligence is unclassified.
[19:00.100 --> 19:04.900]  And you can find a lot of people when you find stuff that's not publicly available on open web searches.
[19:05.420 --> 19:09.280]  So you can hire, you can pay for a service, you can find out
[19:12.560 --> 19:18.040]  metadata, you can use to crawling for metadata when you're trying to find information about somebody.
[19:18.500 --> 19:20.680]  Use of all source data, is that the question?
[19:20.900 --> 19:21.400]  Or is it...
[19:22.860 --> 19:23.360]  Yeah.
[19:23.560 --> 19:23.860]  Okay.
[19:24.260 --> 19:27.680]  All source data intelligence means any type of source of information.
[19:27.940 --> 19:29.120]  So, and I'll go into this.
[19:29.320 --> 19:32.160]  For example, what information is your child reporting to you?
[19:33.280 --> 19:34.640]  Is it reporting to the teacher?
[19:35.120 --> 19:48.880]  There have been cases in Fairfax County where a child has complained about their parents getting on their case about doing their homework and a teacher going ahead and reporting to child protective services that there's homework pressure and they visit their house.
[19:49.020 --> 19:56.220]  So there's also like a culture war going on in Fairfax County, particularly on the Asian community, which typically...
[19:56.980 --> 19:59.140]  Fairfax are a little extra when it comes to education.
[19:59.440 --> 20:01.860]  Like a lot of people, nobody moves to Fairfax because they love the weather.
[20:02.140 --> 20:03.400]  That just doesn't happen, right?
[20:03.540 --> 20:04.360]  Because traffic is...
[20:04.360 --> 20:06.340]  Like our traffic is worse than yours.
[20:06.740 --> 20:07.900]  Like it's bad.
[20:08.240 --> 20:10.420]  Like we're only... We compete with LA for traffic.
[20:11.840 --> 20:16.700]  All source data could also be what could be reported from other parents.
[20:16.960 --> 20:29.520]  The problem is that because they're developing this capability and they're immature, they don't vet their sources and they're not adhering to any type of oversight, which the intelligence community certainly has to do and has been held to account during the church and pike committees.
[20:32.600 --> 20:35.600]  So this kind of goes into some of these abuses of power.
[20:36.220 --> 20:38.540]  Warrantless wiretapping we've seen since 9-11.
[20:39.600 --> 20:44.720]  You've seen a growing surveillance society such as the FBI's investigative data warehouse.
[20:45.200 --> 20:50.100]  The Patriot Act, the REAL ID, the no-fly list, which is still a problem.
[20:50.220 --> 20:52.700]  You can easily get on that list but hard to get off.
[20:52.820 --> 20:53.320]  We didn't get vetted.
[20:54.400 --> 20:55.160]  You know, everyone familiar?
[20:55.340 --> 20:56.600]  Some of these seem familiar.
[20:58.420 --> 21:01.600]  And number six, we can talk about the attacks on academic freedom.
[21:05.750 --> 21:07.930]  So this kind of goes like through a history here.
[21:08.050 --> 21:09.230]  We look at this RFP.
[21:09.390 --> 21:10.790]  I'm just looking at my time.
[21:11.090 --> 21:13.350]  You can see up here the church and pike committees.
[21:15.410 --> 21:20.610]  McCarthyism, they wanted to go after suspected subversives, communists.
[21:21.290 --> 21:24.510]  CIA during the Nixon era and under Bush administration.
[21:24.510 --> 21:29.230]  But the surveillance state grew exponentially within this country.
[21:29.950 --> 21:34.290]  And it's been leveraged by subsequent administrations since.
[21:35.270 --> 21:38.530]  So let's talk about this RFP and why she should be scared about this.
[21:38.610 --> 21:44.850]  I mentioned that Fairfax County can serve as a test but what other school districts around the country can use.
[21:45.810 --> 21:48.550]  So this RFP, and I actually published an article about this.
[21:48.630 --> 21:49.910]  I'll show you the impact that it's had.
[21:50.930 --> 21:53.790]  The first one, it goes through all... Actually, I'll back up here.
[21:54.090 --> 22:07.130]  This RFP literally goes through all five steps of the intelligence collection process, from planning direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, which is where the real subject of abuse can happen and dissemination.
[22:07.610 --> 22:11.310]  The speaker before we had mentioned before that humans can understand a narrative.
[22:11.650 --> 22:23.750]  But however, if you politicize intelligence or if you start layering, if you start having biases such as layering, mirror imaging or hurting type of bias, really bad things can happen, particularly in who you share that analysis with.
[22:23.990 --> 22:27.770]  Because it's your support, you're saying that you're supported with data.
[22:30.810 --> 22:39.970]  In step one, we talked about with planning directions where vendors have to show the ability to define assets such as persons, brands, facilities and products.
[22:40.670 --> 22:48.550]  And when they talk about a brand, this can mean anything from groups, facilities to students to the school district's reputation and name.
[22:48.890 --> 22:51.730]  Let me tell you how ridiculous this, how absurd this is.
[22:51.930 --> 22:57.510]  If you're in the intelligence community, like if you're in law enforcement, what's the threshold before you can collect on a target?
[22:57.910 --> 22:58.050]  Right?
[22:58.510 --> 22:59.350]  Probable cause?
[23:00.210 --> 23:02.070]  You have to have probable cause to start collecting.
[23:02.190 --> 23:05.130]  What's the, what's the threshold in the intelligence community, which is a much lower threshold?
[23:06.210 --> 23:07.790]  It just has to abide by your mission.
[23:07.930 --> 23:10.270]  The only thing that really gets you in trouble is if you collect on a U.S.
[23:10.410 --> 23:16.550]  person, or a 5i citizen, or a person who's a green card holder or in the United States.
[23:17.050 --> 23:21.470]  And because if you start doing that, you better be able to tie it directly to whatever mission you're trying to do.
[23:21.590 --> 23:25.130]  If you're doing counter-terrorism support, it has to tie to that.
[23:25.210 --> 23:27.850]  And you can only keep it for a specified period of time.
[23:27.970 --> 23:31.150]  And you can't have a record of collection where you can refer to it back again.
[23:32.210 --> 23:36.290]  If it's a brand, that's a lot of it is a political initiative.
[23:38.470 --> 23:45.370]  Now, Fairfax, I mean, most people could probably agree with some political initiatives, but what happens if you go to other areas of the country, right?
[23:45.810 --> 23:52.130]  You know, think like Texas, Oklahoma, you know, that it can get, it can get pretty, or Mississippi.
[23:52.670 --> 23:54.890]  It could be, this could, this could get, this could get abused.
[23:56.690 --> 24:04.150]  The protecting the ban complete initiatives, agendas, and information that could embarrass FCPS or school board members.
[24:04.730 --> 24:06.750]  This is why you have whistleblowing.
[24:07.490 --> 24:11.310]  You're not supposed to classify information just because it can cause embarrassment.
[24:11.610 --> 24:14.650]  That's why you actually, I mean, I think we all agree on that.
[24:15.130 --> 24:21.790]  So if you have something that's embarrassing to a school board member because it's complete incompetence, they want to actually to know about it.
[24:22.790 --> 24:25.190]  The vendors could build indicators and warnings.
[24:25.370 --> 24:28.110]  Now, I actually have actually, I've actually worked in INW in the Pentagon.
[24:28.990 --> 24:33.250]  So, IntelliJ is working to be able to save queries and set alerts for active listening.
[24:33.510 --> 24:35.170]  So, interaction with your targets.
[24:40.110 --> 24:47.650]  With collection, to have the ability to scan deep and dark web sources, not visible through traditional web searches, such as OSIN.
[24:48.690 --> 24:50.350]  Seemed like a privacy violation.
[24:50.590 --> 24:52.730]  This is actually happening, it's going on right now.
[24:53.910 --> 24:57.650]  Calls for the ability to collect data beyond what is voluntarily provided.
[24:58.170 --> 25:07.270]  So, when I'm an attaché and I'm a, when I was in Morocco, everyone knew that all of us were intelligence officers and what they provided to us, they knew they were providing that freely to the government.
[25:07.530 --> 25:13.530]  Now, if you're going between overt or what's not voluntary, you're now dealing with what's known as covert collection.
[25:13.630 --> 25:14.930]  Not clandestine, but covert.
[25:15.070 --> 25:18.370]  You're not identifying your identity of what you're collecting.
[25:19.310 --> 25:23.130]  Over collection could be the crawling of social media platforms.
[25:23.470 --> 25:24.290]  Email addresses.
[25:24.490 --> 25:27.490]  Association of information with aliases to identify individuals.
[25:27.830 --> 25:31.510]  Dealing with social nodal network analysis.
[25:31.750 --> 25:34.510]  Identifying your relationships with other individuals.
[25:34.810 --> 25:44.870]  Find, essentially, they want to know which parents are complaining about them the most and identifying their true persona, their cyber personas and associating it with true name.
[25:47.870 --> 25:53.030]  Also, we feel integration with the FCPA, with our student information system.
[25:53.450 --> 26:03.690]  This is the information that your student is available on your student, whether if they have whatever disciplinary records, and even using your, your own kid as a collector against you if they're reporting something.
[26:05.070 --> 26:07.750]  And, oh, this is what gets me.
[26:07.850 --> 26:09.690]  This is what scares mostly all of you.
[26:09.990 --> 26:12.870]  The vendor is free to use any data source anonymously.
[26:14.070 --> 26:17.010]  That goes, that directly goes to covert collection.
[26:17.470 --> 26:21.390]  So, if you use, like, for example, a company like, let's say Palantir.
[26:21.610 --> 26:22.650]  Anyone have heard of Palantir?
[26:23.730 --> 26:24.870]  You've heard of Palantir, right?
[26:24.950 --> 26:27.310]  They use, like, their own proprietary software methods.
[26:27.470 --> 26:30.930]  They have a, it's kind of almost like Starlight, you know, like on steroids.
[26:31.430 --> 26:40.570]  I mean, they're able to basically to use and scrape, uh, unstructured data and create visual images for associations.
[26:42.570 --> 26:49.170]  And if you're using any data source, how can you challenge as a parent on who they share this information with?
[26:49.430 --> 26:56.650]  And let me remind you, a lot of our school board members actually have and work with, like, activists that support whatever agenda that they have.
[26:57.670 --> 27:03.090]  We can talk about the exploitation, where you talk about false reduction rate with embedded violence.
[27:03.410 --> 27:12.030]  Um, this is trying to establish true names rather than cyber personas, so they're not really doing anything to vet the accuracy of what's being reported.
[27:12.810 --> 27:18.470]  For example, when you deal with an intelligence committee, we deal with what's known as an IIR, an intelligence information report.
[27:18.590 --> 27:20.330]  It's unvetted intelligence.
[27:20.970 --> 27:25.290]  Whenever you have a source, you're supposed to vet and validate that source for its accuracy.
[27:25.650 --> 27:30.870]  And you're supposed to use all source and multiple methods to validate what you're, to support your assessment.
[27:30.990 --> 27:31.690]  It's a crystal ball.
[27:31.790 --> 27:33.250]  Intelligence is never perfect.
[27:33.510 --> 27:34.710]  This is another problem.
[27:34.850 --> 27:38.570]  Like, they're not being perfect with this, with this process, with this product.
[27:39.970 --> 27:41.910]  And there are analysis and production.
[27:42.230 --> 27:45.370]  This is to visual identify relationships and connections between persons.
[27:45.490 --> 27:47.190]  This is all within the request for proposal.
[27:47.690 --> 27:53.930]  And the ability to have a customizable report on a disparate data set multiple origin points to produce a high-level summary.
[27:54.210 --> 27:59.670]  And the ability to provide a customer report to disparate data set with multiple origin points to produce a high-level summary.
[28:00.530 --> 28:18.170]  This allows them, for example, the potential abuses, that if you are politicizing a particular parent that you really don't like, you can put together, basically, a human targeting package, and you can present it to your Whatever your local law enforcement... and see what actions... what actionable... for them to take action on it.
[28:19.370 --> 28:20.350]  Potential for abuse?
[28:20.630 --> 28:21.110]  Absolutely.
[28:21.370 --> 28:26.750]  Particularly if you're not having... if it doesn't adhere to any type of analytic standards, it's not a subject to any type of oversight.
[28:28.990 --> 28:31.650]  This kind of helps with my other potential abuses.
[28:32.170 --> 28:33.050]  Who's reported?
[28:33.190 --> 28:33.890]  How is it presented?
[28:34.550 --> 28:38.230]  Does it meet Intelligence Community Directive 203 analytic standards compliant?
[28:38.430 --> 28:39.330]  Probably not.
[28:39.990 --> 28:47.290]  You know, if you're in the Intelligence Community, it takes about eight years to become a subject matter expert, to be a competent analyst, to know actually subject matter.
[28:47.430 --> 28:52.910]  Now you're just going to throw this open source capability in the school districts because you're not liking the criticism you're receiving from parents.
[28:54.850 --> 29:04.010]  And just to help you... kind of going back, like for example, Loudoun County, that earlier photo that I showed, they actually had a school district where...
[29:04.010 --> 29:10.030]  school district officials were on a secret Facebook site, collecting information on parents that were criticizing them.
[29:10.910 --> 29:15.950]  One was a gym teacher that spoke out, you know, they had criticized whatever transgender thing.
[29:16.410 --> 29:18.850]  Just, you know, people exercising their First Amendment rights.
[29:19.830 --> 29:26.870]  And then you had the September 21st National School Board Association, where they wanted to invoke the Patriot Act against parents.
[29:28.350 --> 29:31.210]  Now that was interesting.
[29:31.430 --> 29:32.690]  Like, I am on the ground level.
[29:32.890 --> 29:35.050]  At the time, I'm working in Quantico.
[29:35.250 --> 29:37.590]  I'm directly supporting the chief security officer.
[29:38.430 --> 29:41.090]  I quickly... I immediately self-reported that one.
[29:41.190 --> 29:42.970]  I said, guys, I'm going to be showing up on this one.
[29:43.010 --> 29:44.250]  And you think that that was scary?
[29:44.750 --> 29:54.030]  Like, if you look at that memo, it directed the FBI to set up a special task force to work with law enforcement and to set up dedicated architectures to actually look into these threats.
[29:54.510 --> 30:01.890]  Now, mind you, there was absolutely no reporting on actually a true threat that would merit a national capability.
[30:02.190 --> 30:05.990]  Certainly none that would ever exceed the capabilities of what local law enforcement would happen.
[30:08.630 --> 30:11.810]  Well, I mean, he got a letter from the National School Board Association.
[30:12.050 --> 30:13.770]  Merrick Garland decided to write a letter.
[30:14.410 --> 30:18.790]  You know, and also remember, Merrick Garland's son-in-law also runs Panorama Education.
[30:18.790 --> 30:21.370]  So, like, there's a bunny connection there, too.
[30:22.770 --> 30:25.770]  But, you know, there was the outrage from parents when that happened.
[30:25.850 --> 30:29.990]  And you saw a lot of states immediately separate themselves from the NBSA.
[30:30.290 --> 30:34.010]  What federal law?
[30:36.210 --> 30:36.610]  None.
[30:36.610 --> 30:38.290]  Absolutely no federal law that you're breaking.
[30:38.410 --> 30:38.730]  What's that?
[30:39.630 --> 30:41.730]  It's like, we don't need no batches.
[30:42.270 --> 30:43.270]  They don't need a law.
[30:43.430 --> 30:46.690]  They can do what they want because nobody's got the balls to challenge them.
[30:46.790 --> 30:47.390]  Except you.
[30:47.390 --> 30:48.150]  Well, no.
[30:48.290 --> 30:49.190]  There's a lot of parents.
[30:49.310 --> 30:51.090]  Like, they really f*cked up in D.C.
[30:51.330 --> 30:51.910]  Like, they...
[30:53.910 --> 30:56.770]  Well, they picked a fight with, like, parents, like I said.
[30:56.870 --> 31:00.730]  Like, so many of us are, like, in the IC and law enforcement and DOD communities.
[31:00.730 --> 31:01.990]  Like, we're not taking this.
[31:02.550 --> 31:03.010]  You know?
[31:03.110 --> 31:06.330]  And then when you kick us out, like, we move there because, one, it's diverse.
[31:06.810 --> 31:08.330]  Two, the school district's really good.
[31:08.670 --> 31:10.710]  And it's like, and we started seeing this kind of crap go on.
[31:10.790 --> 31:13.690]  Like, most of us have been in, like, in areas and in high-threat...
[31:13.690 --> 31:16.410]  A lot of us have been in countries in high-threat environments.
[31:16.510 --> 31:18.170]  And we kind of recognize this type of behavior.
[31:18.350 --> 31:20.850]  So, I mean, we're gonna start giving it back.
[31:23.630 --> 31:25.450]  So, this kind of goes into, like, this slide.
[31:25.550 --> 31:26.570]  Like, how most of us felt.
[31:26.690 --> 31:29.850]  Like, mostly all of us, like, we were really happy.
[31:29.950 --> 31:30.510]  We were comfortable.
[31:30.650 --> 31:32.730]  This is why we moved to Fairfax, right?
[31:32.730 --> 31:35.250]  And then things kind of, like, changed in, like, the last two years.
[31:35.350 --> 31:39.110]  We were just kind of like, all right, this has gone on far enough.
[31:39.870 --> 31:42.290]  This has happened in other areas of the country, like in Michigan.
[31:43.270 --> 31:47.910]  You had Michigan school board members that were having, collecting dossiers on parents.
[31:49.490 --> 31:53.890]  And this one from Michigan, this was when they were monitoring the social media accounts of parents.
[31:54.150 --> 31:54.550]  I'm sorry.
[31:55.710 --> 31:58.170]  Arizona was when they were collecting dossiers on parents.
[31:58.690 --> 32:03.690]  Can you imagine sending your kids to school and you have a question, all of a sudden, you're finding out that your name is, you're being in a database.
[32:04.330 --> 32:05.410]  They're collecting it on you.
[32:06.030 --> 32:07.070]  And it's not just one kid.
[32:07.130 --> 32:08.090]  What if you have multiple kids?
[32:08.290 --> 32:10.290]  How many have more than one kid in the school system?
[32:11.570 --> 32:16.190]  Yeah, they're collecting a lot of information about you when this is coming through.
[32:19.210 --> 32:20.310]  So, what's the takeaways?
[32:22.170 --> 32:25.370]  Anybody with this capability could be deemed a threat to the brand.
[32:25.890 --> 32:38.470]  So, if you're a mouthy parent at a PTA meeting, and they will come after you at PTA meetings, can be subject to an apparatus that's supported by, you know, a billion-dollar war chest.
[32:39.170 --> 32:40.810]  We talked about the NBSA.
[32:40.930 --> 32:43.170]  We talked about, I mentioned before, the Loudoun County.
[32:44.430 --> 32:48.210]  Within schools across the country, other school directors that use social media monitoring.
[32:48.210 --> 32:53.230]  However, it hasn't been modified to expand the collection capability beyond students.
[32:54.970 --> 32:59.370]  Some other issues dealing with, if you do have this apparatus, how secure is the system, really?
[32:59.490 --> 33:02.290]  We talked about some of the cybersecurity instances in 2016.
[33:02.370 --> 33:09.250]  If in the U.S., on the average, there's about two school districts every day are popped with, like, ransomware or some other incident.
[33:10.310 --> 33:15.290]  When I did a FOIA at my local school board, I found out that, one, they don't have a law of retention policy.
[33:15.290 --> 33:18.850]  They don't have an encryption of data at rest or in transit policy.
[33:19.210 --> 33:22.230]  Again, like working in the federal government, like some of us...
[33:22.230 --> 33:29.650]  There was a speaker earlier at this conference about Executive Order 14-028, which is having a huge impact.
[33:31.290 --> 33:32.210]  There is hope.
[33:32.350 --> 33:38.450]  We have the children's online privacy protection rule, or how are they going to be protecting this type of information.
[33:39.430 --> 33:44.170]  Prohibitions against mandatory collection, user prohibitions, retention, and security.
[33:45.950 --> 33:50.350]  And, well, I'm going to have actually time here to answer about questions for 10 minutes.
[33:50.370 --> 33:52.730]  So I did actually blow the whistle on this one.
[33:53.030 --> 33:57.270]  I actually did publish this article on my findings back in March.
[33:59.030 --> 34:04.470]  And an update on how this had an impact is that they pulled the RFP.
[34:05.290 --> 34:07.810]  They pulled the request for proposal, and then they republished it.
[34:08.090 --> 34:15.270]  But when they republished it, they didn't put any details as to what they want to use, as what they want requesting from vendors.
[34:16.830 --> 34:20.130]  I mentioned before, they said, like, who's got the balls to fight these people.
[34:20.330 --> 34:23.950]  So, like, I'm a group of a lot of pissed off parents.
[34:23.950 --> 34:28.150]  And what we ended up doing, we ended up creating our own shadow board.
[34:29.470 --> 34:32.650]  So think of this, like, as Mystery Science Theater 3000.
[34:34.210 --> 34:41.790]  Where we actually stream our school board meetings, and we actually get reports from other teachers and other parents.
[34:42.010 --> 34:44.350]  And we are putting them on blast.
[34:44.910 --> 34:46.230]  Like, it is raw.
[34:46.490 --> 34:50.070]  And we have, like, in this one, we keep a Zoom meeting.
[34:50.290 --> 34:51.370]  We allow everyone to come.
[34:51.550 --> 34:52.750]  I mean, if you're going to start limiting comment.
[34:53.150 --> 35:00.350]  And this idea exploded when one of our school board members said, we're going to eliminate public comment because it's not conducive to our agenda.
[35:00.610 --> 35:02.390]  And we're just, oh, I know.
[35:02.590 --> 35:03.430]  I hear you.
[35:03.730 --> 35:07.450]  Once we heard that, we're like, not happening today, buddy.
[35:08.490 --> 35:10.110]  So we just, we launched this.
[35:10.250 --> 35:16.230]  And even on our second episode, we actually have four times as many views in the actual school board stream.
[35:17.730 --> 35:22.950]  So, yeah, it's interesting down in what's going on in Virginia.
[35:23.230 --> 35:24.450]  Here's my contact information.
[35:25.110 --> 35:26.050]  You know, I've got a Gmail.
[35:26.370 --> 35:29.110]  I mean, I'm pretty open and social if people want to contact me.
[35:29.450 --> 35:31.790]  So I'll leave some of this open for questions.
[35:31.930 --> 35:35.790]  Somebody's got a question about what's going on down there and elsewhere.
[35:35.950 --> 35:36.350]  Yes, sir?
[35:42.040 --> 35:47.140]  I'm not surprised about this, but, you know, I think this is a great idea.
[35:49.660 --> 35:53.620]  The project official.
[35:53.980 --> 35:54.760]  Yes, they are.
[36:24.420 --> 36:25.760]  Well, that's a great question.
[36:25.920 --> 36:27.300]  Are we looking at higher levels?
[36:27.480 --> 36:31.740]  Well, right now I've got a 15-, 14-year-old and a 16-year-old, which is, I guess, why I drink.
[36:34.140 --> 36:35.860]  But we are looking to expand.
[36:35.860 --> 36:40.660]  And we actually are helping other parents set up their own shadow boards to understand what their school board members are doing.
[36:41.020 --> 36:41.880]  And you're right.
[36:42.640 --> 36:44.500]  Most of these are the lowest-level officials.
[36:44.740 --> 36:52.500]  And it's unfortunate because, in my view, like, the school board races are probably the most important because they're impacting your students' lives.
[36:54.740 --> 36:57.120]  In this case, like, we're not giving them any place to hide.
[36:57.120 --> 37:11.400]  We actually have, like, retiree and volunteers actually showing up at the work session meetings so we can actually hear in real time what they're thinking and the matters are integral to the decision-making process.
[37:12.000 --> 37:19.480]  And for those, like, for Fairfax, it might be like also in the similar and other school districts, a school board member, if more than two of them meet, they actually have to call a meeting.
[37:19.520 --> 37:22.480]  So they can't just meet in secret when they talk about their...
[37:22.480 --> 37:23.920]  Yeah, they're not liking this.
[37:23.920 --> 37:28.140]  And we actually had an impact on the last school board meeting because they weren't expecting...
[37:28.140 --> 37:30.100]  We had an older gentleman who's retired.
[37:30.300 --> 37:31.820]  He's like, hey, I got all the time in the world.
[37:31.900 --> 37:32.560]  What do you want me to do?
[37:32.660 --> 37:41.900]  And we're like, we want you to go to their retreat, their off-site, their retreat, as well as their work session.
[37:42.060 --> 37:46.760]  Now, before this year, they used to actually put the recordings of their work sessions.
[37:46.920 --> 37:52.120]  And then because, like, they're getting a lot of heat, they decided to no longer do that, just publish minutes.
[37:52.120 --> 37:54.600]  And we're like, okay, are these minutes really, like, accurate?
[37:54.680 --> 37:55.960]  So they're like, why don't you show up there?
[37:56.880 --> 37:57.820]  And he did.
[37:57.940 --> 37:59.320]  The guy's telling him his name is Mark.
[37:59.460 --> 38:04.720]  And they wanted to push in, like, an incident, a bias incident accountability program.
[38:05.640 --> 38:07.160]  Which, you're kind of like, well, what does that mean?
[38:07.200 --> 38:08.140]  Well, it's very generic.
[38:08.140 --> 38:13.200]  It's overly broad and vague of, like, how you can report, like, any type of instance of a microaggression or a bias.
[38:13.800 --> 38:17.260]  But you're like, okay, well, is there, like, any type of reasonable person standard?
[38:17.460 --> 38:18.820]  Or is there any type of compelling interest?
[38:18.940 --> 38:21.300]  And, like, they really couldn't articulate that.
[38:21.780 --> 38:23.020]  I hope that answers your question.
[38:23.180 --> 38:23.420]  Yes.
[38:32.900 --> 38:33.500]  Okay.
[38:42.970 --> 38:43.690]  Mm-hmm.
[38:45.670 --> 38:46.270]  Correct.
[38:53.910 --> 38:54.500]  Okay.
[39:06.810 --> 39:07.930]  That's horrible.
[39:08.090 --> 39:11.810]  And that's why you have these programs that are out there, to identify that and to intervene.
[39:11.810 --> 39:12.170]  Right.
[39:12.390 --> 39:12.810]  So, my question.
[39:15.650 --> 39:25.480]  What would you recommend instead in the way of identifying violent incidents before it happened or instead?
[39:25.780 --> 39:32.120]  Well, I'm not criticizing the intent between identifying mental distress or a violent behavior.
[39:32.120 --> 39:36.940]  What I'm criticizing is the expansion to the word brand.
[39:37.880 --> 39:38.340]  Before...
[39:38.340 --> 39:38.920]  Yeah.
[39:39.060 --> 39:39.700]  Seriously, problematic.
[39:39.700 --> 39:40.660]  So, yeah, problematic.
[39:40.880 --> 39:49.020]  We weren't talking about, like, harm, bullying, or aggressions towards a... or any type of demographic or group.
[39:49.360 --> 39:51.060]  Like, that's not even on the table.
[39:51.320 --> 39:53.500]  Like, everyone agrees with that, an event diagram.
[39:53.960 --> 40:08.020]  We're talking about, like, once you start talking about a brand image, or now you no longer have an... or even a process in place of analytic standards, if you have a problem with a parent, because some parents get problematic, and you have no means for how you're going to share the information,
[40:08.200 --> 40:11.360]  who do you share the information with, how long do you retain that information?
[40:11.540 --> 40:16.940]  For example, if you're a parent who has multiple children through the school system, you can collect a lot of information on that parent.
[40:17.240 --> 40:27.380]  And parents have gotten harassed where, even, like, at our school board meetings, like, we've had parents who have had... who've been threatened, who've been assaulted, who have had their cars egged.
[40:27.600 --> 40:29.180]  I mean, I've mentioned about being docs.
[40:29.900 --> 40:32.740]  It's getting to that level in Virginia.
[40:38.880 --> 40:39.480]  Oh, yeah.
[40:39.900 --> 40:41.480]  I'm running for school board in my area.
[40:41.740 --> 40:42.840]  Like, I'm getting rid of these people.
[40:43.140 --> 40:44.060]  Like, they gotta go.
[40:44.720 --> 40:45.780]  I mean, that's what we're doing.
[40:45.940 --> 40:48.860]  We're just... we're gonna run for school board and just take their seats.
[40:49.080 --> 40:51.060]  Because it should never get to that level.
[40:52.160 --> 40:52.560]  Yes?
[40:53.240 --> 41:03.200]  How do you identify causes or issues that are going to...
[41:13.250 --> 41:16.630]  Like, they're grouped and getting wrenched into one or the other?
[41:16.670 --> 41:17.210]  One or the other?
[41:17.450 --> 41:20.430]  So, it's interesting in Fairfax, like, it's a soup, right?
[41:20.550 --> 41:24.330]  So, everyone who's fighting against them, they just want to label us all... everyone is, like, right-wing.
[41:24.990 --> 41:26.290]  That's the immediate label.
[41:26.430 --> 41:29.110]  But then you're kind of like, no, that's not the case.
[41:29.690 --> 41:38.010]  Most of us are having a real problem with, like, for example, like, parental notification, right?
[41:38.010 --> 41:43.110]  Like, a lot of policies, something could happen with your kid, they're not even gonna notify you.
[41:43.670 --> 41:45.310]  And that's a big problem.
[41:46.110 --> 41:48.590]  I mean, that's, you know, there's an issue with parental rights.
[41:49.790 --> 41:51.350]  So, that's what's bringing everyone to part.
[41:51.470 --> 41:53.310]  Now, this is the fight that's bringing everyone together.
[41:53.490 --> 41:57.410]  Now, there might be other issues that the group will splinter, and that's likely gonna happen.
[41:57.590 --> 42:04.930]  But in this one, the behavior with some of these school board members where they're trying to go after parents and harassing parents, that's just not a working strategy.
[42:07.570 --> 42:08.130]  Yes?
[42:08.450 --> 42:10.270]  How do you find out what your school board is doing?
[42:10.830 --> 42:12.110]  Oh, FOIAs.
[42:12.930 --> 42:14.190]  FOIA, FOIA, FOIA.
[42:16.070 --> 42:18.590]  And some of them will actually complain about FOIAs.
[42:19.170 --> 42:22.230]  But you know you can FOIA another person's FOIA as well.
[42:23.890 --> 42:24.750]  So, yeah.
[42:25.190 --> 42:25.650]  Yes?
[42:26.010 --> 42:29.110]  Can FOIA be used on non-governmental records?
[42:29.310 --> 42:31.130]  And is PTA non-governmental?
[42:31.670 --> 42:32.030]  No.
[42:32.390 --> 42:35.030]  A PTA is a different organization.
[42:35.690 --> 42:36.210]  Well, yeah.
[42:36.510 --> 42:38.290]  A private organization, if that's what it is.
[42:38.290 --> 42:39.590]  So, if it's...
[42:39.590 --> 42:40.350]  Well, a PTA...
[42:40.350 --> 42:44.050]  Well, first of all, you gotta understand, like, a PTA really is kind of powerless, right?
[42:44.310 --> 42:48.790]  They're like, you know, you're supposed to be doing, like, your bake sales, coordinating, volunteering for your parents.
[42:48.990 --> 42:54.490]  They're supposed to allow for advocacy for parents, though they will actively try to suppress that in some cases.
[42:54.710 --> 42:55.330]  If you...
[42:55.330 --> 42:56.090]  What's that?
[42:56.090 --> 42:57.590]  It is controlled opposition.
[42:57.930 --> 42:58.610]  Good point.
[42:59.050 --> 42:59.290]  It is...
[42:59.610 --> 42:59.850]  Dude.
[43:00.510 --> 43:01.490]  Google my name.
[43:01.770 --> 43:02.290]  Google me.
[43:02.990 --> 43:03.810]  Like, I was like...
[43:03.810 --> 43:06.490]  With the war I got into with the Virginia PTA.
[43:06.710 --> 43:07.470]  Dude, like, yeah.
[43:07.710 --> 43:08.910]  It is controlled opposition.
[43:09.150 --> 43:10.730]  There's a reason why there's that T in there.
[43:10.930 --> 43:16.790]  You can't take a position that's contrary to any published position paper that they have.
[43:17.450 --> 43:28.530]  As far as the techniques that you can use if it's a Virginia PTA member, you would FOIA the emails of the school board member and if they had a communication with the PTA official.
[43:29.350 --> 43:30.970]  That's how you typically would find it.
[43:32.130 --> 43:32.610]  Yes?
[43:32.890 --> 43:33.570]  I just wanted to
[43:36.610 --> 43:38.670]  say, you know what you're gonna need.
[43:39.210 --> 43:39.990]  And keep it short.
[43:40.190 --> 43:45.720]  Everyone who has children at this point.
[43:46.120 --> 43:46.600]  Absolutely.
[43:46.940 --> 43:49.560]  That's why we're actually gonna have...
[43:49.560 --> 43:54.420]  We're actually put up a schedule where we're gonna be rotating and showing up at all their work session meetings.
[43:54.600 --> 44:02.060]  So, like, when they wanna have, like, the bad idea fairy show up, like, there's gonna be a rally outside the school board and they're gonna see it happen.
[44:02.540 --> 44:03.480]  Like, this is just the...
[44:03.480 --> 44:07.460]  You know, think about, like, all these school board meetings, like, it literally has become like protest rally.
[44:07.940 --> 44:08.680]  Like, I've never...
[44:09.420 --> 44:10.680]  You know, like, I'm in my forties.
[44:10.800 --> 44:14.180]  Like, I would never see this in, like, it was like I was in college or something like that.
[44:15.620 --> 44:15.940]  But...
[44:15.940 --> 44:16.720]  Any other?
[44:17.220 --> 44:17.360]  Yeah.
[44:17.360 --> 44:32.480]  As a rule, I'm generally opposed to the idea of doing any kind of programmatic social media surveillance, even if it's in the name of trying to identify potential threats and all that jazz.
[44:32.720 --> 44:35.540]  I guess I'm just curious what you would...
[44:35.540 --> 44:43.890]  What the value is of having those automated systems there versus just making sure that you have the capacity and the ability to do retroactive...
[44:43.900 --> 44:46.200]  like, if someone makes an act...
[44:46.200 --> 44:56.780]  Like, I was bullied by this person on Twitter, and they make threats against me on Twitter, having the ability to just go in and archive those tweets versus having a bot scrape social media proactively.
[44:57.020 --> 45:00.140]  I don't see the need for that second one versus just having...
[45:00.140 --> 45:02.280]  No, I would agree with you.
[45:02.440 --> 45:15.780]  If you're having somebody who's being threatened, I mean, you should be able to look at it, be able to perform, like, if it is, like, a true, like, a bias incident, because that would certainly, like, escalate, like, how you would respond to that or remediate that issue.
[45:16.940 --> 45:22.400]  But, yeah, but in this case, this is actually, like, trying to control your opposition or criticism.
[45:22.740 --> 45:23.260]  Like, this is...
[45:23.260 --> 45:28.940]  And under the guise of, like, we're trying to protect kids, but we're really trying to, like, you know, keep parents in check.
[45:29.440 --> 45:30.600]  That's kind of...
[45:30.600 --> 45:31.160]  That's...
[45:31.160 --> 45:32.420]  I'm hoping that's the takeaway.
[45:32.780 --> 45:32.920]  Yes?
[45:39.510 --> 45:39.990]  Right.
[45:45.390 --> 45:46.590]  Uh, okay.
[45:46.770 --> 45:47.510]  Well, okay.
[45:47.730 --> 45:48.650]  I'll bring that up.
[45:49.730 --> 45:58.710]  It's a sensitive topic, but, for example, in kindergarten, if your child wants to change their gender identity, they're not going to notify the parents in kindergarten.
[45:59.130 --> 46:00.230]  And that's in training material.
[46:00.390 --> 46:06.570]  I think most parents would want to know if their child's going through some sort of identity crisis, or if they're having gender fluidity, they wouldn't want to intervene.
[46:06.570 --> 46:08.350]  They would want to be there.
[46:08.710 --> 46:10.410]  Or most parents would want to support.
[46:11.050 --> 46:16.370]  Now, you're going to have the one-offs where some parents aren't supportive, and that should be handled on an individual basis, right?
[46:16.710 --> 46:16.870]  But...
[46:22.490 --> 46:23.950]  Well, then you...
[46:23.950 --> 46:24.870]  Then you...
[46:24.870 --> 46:25.910]  Do you handle that, right?
[46:25.930 --> 46:27.730]  If it's abusive, right?
[46:27.830 --> 46:29.850]  Then you handle that appropriately.
[46:30.030 --> 46:30.570]  But I...
[46:30.570 --> 46:35.210]  Does the policy work if you're just going to say for across the board you're not going to involve the parent?
[46:35.370 --> 46:38.290]  Because you do have some parents that are going to intervene and support their children.
[46:38.290 --> 46:43.490]  So, why wouldn't you bring in those people in the support network?
[46:43.610 --> 46:44.810]  It takes a village to raise a child.
[46:46.170 --> 46:46.630]  Okay.
[46:49.650 --> 46:50.390]  Oh, sorry.
[46:50.550 --> 46:51.010]  Oh, sorry.
[46:51.290 --> 46:52.350]  One more question.
[46:52.510 --> 46:52.570]  Yeah.
[46:53.010 --> 46:54.190]  I've already asked a lot.
[46:54.190 --> 46:54.650]  Okay.
[46:58.900 --> 47:04.600]  I can't remember if it was, like, federal law or something, that they have to do some form of social media monitoring.
[47:04.600 --> 47:05.160]  Could you...
[47:05.160 --> 47:06.160]  Could you talk...
[47:06.160 --> 47:07.180]  Like, what...
[47:07.180 --> 47:08.860]  From when does that mandate come from?
[47:08.860 --> 47:09.440]  From where is it...
[47:09.440 --> 47:14.140]  So, that's coming from if you're using, like, your school assets or computers to do, like, inappropriate usage.
[47:14.480 --> 47:17.380]  Like, you know, if you're using it for, like, porn or for furtherance of a crime.
[47:18.140 --> 47:18.440]  That's...
[47:18.440 --> 47:20.380]  You're supposed to have some accountability for that.
[47:20.640 --> 47:20.940]  Okay.
[47:20.940 --> 47:22.140]  Just, like, through the funding...
[47:22.140 --> 47:22.360]  Yeah.
[47:23.620 --> 47:26.770]  If I can join in the conversation...
[47:26.770 --> 47:26.940]  Yeah.
[47:30.550 --> 47:33.450]  I would say that while there may be a very...
[47:34.130 --> 47:35.250]  While there may be...
[47:35.250 --> 47:38.310]  There are definitely parents who might want to harm their children.
[47:38.870 --> 47:45.780]  I think that, by and large, 99 plus percent have their children.
[47:46.020 --> 47:46.560]  Absolutely.
[47:47.460 --> 48:10.370]  It's on the idea that the parents should be treated as, like, a hostile act of these with either own child and that the school board could, as a general rule, intermediate and, you know, potentially discourage communication from the child back to the parent or say,
[48:10.610 --> 48:12.470]  we, the school board, need to...
[48:12.470 --> 48:15.450]  Our role is protecting children from their parents.
[48:15.650 --> 48:20.610]  That, to me, as a parent, is a completely anathema.
[48:20.910 --> 48:23.080]  And it makes the school board basically...
[48:24.160 --> 48:27.060]  They're setting themselves as an enemy of me.
[48:27.640 --> 48:41.540]  Because, like, I can't accept, as a parent, the idea that, you know, I should be considered that parents are a threat to their own children, whereas some sort of benevolent government agency knows what's best.
[48:43.020 --> 48:43.460]  So...
[48:43.940 --> 48:46.860]  And that's why you have this war that's going on, right?
[48:46.920 --> 48:49.140]  Because you're creating a lot of distress on parents.
[48:49.640 --> 48:52.680]  Nobody wants to be able to send their kids to a school where they can have...
[48:52.680 --> 48:54.680]  where they don't know what's going on.
[48:55.180 --> 48:56.180]  Like, that's just not gonna...
[48:56.760 --> 48:57.660]  It's creating...
[48:57.660 --> 48:58.500]  It creates conflict.
[48:58.720 --> 48:59.060]  Yes, sir.
[49:04.340 --> 49:04.820]  Okay.
[49:12.570 --> 49:14.190]  Question from the audience on this.
[49:14.870 --> 49:16.570]  Sir, can you...
[49:16.570 --> 49:24.090]  If you win a lecture to the school board, if your organization has influence over to your school board, can you make sure that...
[49:49.430 --> 49:50.970]  I am with you on that.
[49:51.230 --> 49:57.850]  I am all for a web portal that you don't have to FOIA that's searchable, regarding school policies, as well as other FOIAs.
[49:58.310 --> 49:59.510]  So, I'm not even...
[49:59.510 --> 50:00.910]  I am all for that.
[50:01.690 --> 50:03.010]  Like, yeah, if someone has other...
[50:03.010 --> 50:06.690]  Put that on a portal where if you want to see what other people have FOIAed, you can view that.
[50:06.690 --> 50:07.330]  Yes, sir.
[50:07.870 --> 50:18.950]  Have you seen any connection between the National Association of Teachers and all these racist and sexist indoctrination programs that we read about?
[50:19.230 --> 50:22.390]  Not generally, but enough that it's a problem.
[50:23.410 --> 50:26.310]  Between the teachers doing funny things with the kids.
[50:26.930 --> 50:29.350]  Does it have to do with the union and Randy Weingarten?
[50:29.750 --> 50:30.110]  Oh.
[50:31.830 --> 50:34.930]  That's something I would be very suspicious of, because they've got a record on it.
[50:35.010 --> 50:36.090]  They do, they do.
[50:36.370 --> 50:37.670]  And, yeah, I got two minutes.
[50:38.310 --> 50:39.790]  Yeah, I'm going to wrap up here.
[50:41.790 --> 50:44.650]  Yeah, when you look at like the Randy Guard...
[50:44.650 --> 50:45.650]  That's a great question.
[50:46.430 --> 50:47.270]  It's a club union.
[50:47.930 --> 50:48.650]  It is.
[50:48.790 --> 50:50.490]  And I would say it's...
[50:50.490 --> 50:51.590]  They don't even support teachers.
[50:51.690 --> 50:52.650]  They support administrators.
[50:53.090 --> 50:56.430]  I mean, if you look at a lot of school districts, they're hiring a lot more administrators, not teachers.
[50:56.890 --> 50:57.210]  Yeah.
[50:57.210 --> 51:01.630]  Yeah, and a lot of it's pushing initiatives because it's avoiding accountability.
[51:02.430 --> 51:04.790]  But, yeah, I would say there certainly is.
[51:05.390 --> 51:07.030]  Well, I'm going to wrap up here.
[51:07.090 --> 51:08.030]  I'm going to respect the time.
[51:08.250 --> 51:09.330]  Thank you for having me.
[51:09.430 --> 51:11.690]  Thank you for allowing me to actually speak before this forum.
[51:12.230 --> 51:13.330]  Love coming to HOPE.
[51:14.130 --> 51:15.470]  And, alright, thank you.
[51:25.120 --> 51:26.080]  Thank you so much.