[00:03.530 --> 00:09.300]  Okay, so I know there are some of you who felt you didn't applaud enough for Daniel's amazing speech.
[00:09.510 --> 00:10.340]  Here he is again.
[00:26.680 --> 00:33.040]  I also would like to introduce Trevor Tim from the Freedom of the Press Foundation, founder of the Freedom of the Press Foundation.
[00:33.500 --> 00:34.380]  He's going to be here.
[00:39.940 --> 00:44.780]  He will have selected some questions from Twitter that you guys have submitted.
[00:45.260 --> 00:56.400]  And I guess this is a good time to remind people in the press, it's not a press conference, so the questions we're going to ask Edward later come from our attendees, and hopefully there will be questions that you're interested in as well.
[00:57.280 --> 01:00.520]  Please just follow our guidelines and everything will be cool.
[01:01.640 --> 01:03.600]  And that's... oh yes, I almost forgot.
[01:03.880 --> 01:16.500]  We have a third panelist who will be joining us from Russia, one of my real heroes, and I think many people in this room, many people in the hacker community, many people in America.
[01:18.060 --> 01:19.560]  Edward Snowden, welcome.
[01:39.250 --> 01:39.970]  Hi guys.
[01:44.770 --> 01:45.830]  How is it over there?
[01:47.990 --> 01:49.170]  Good to be back in the air.
[01:54.770 --> 01:55.690]  Can you hear me now?
[02:03.720 --> 02:05.780]  That last quote was actually for the FBI.
[02:05.940 --> 02:06.680]  I wasn't for you guys.
[02:06.820 --> 02:09.020]  I'm hoping we can help them pad out the indictment tonight.
[02:15.100 --> 02:19.140]  So I'm having a little bit of trouble here on the stage, but I think I can hear Dan's microphone.
[02:19.140 --> 02:29.620]  I want to start out by saying to Dan Ellsberg, thank you for everything you've done, for all of your service, both in the government and outside of the government.
[02:29.720 --> 02:43.000]  Everything you did for us as a nation, as a society, you have given us, you have given so many, so much, and told us the truth about what our government was doing at a time when the truth was very hard to get.
[02:44.500 --> 02:59.080]  And I have to say, I actually, I watched a documentary about your life as I was grappling with these issues myself, and it had a deep impact and really shaped my thinking, so thank you for everything you've done.
[03:08.120 --> 03:16.780]  Ed, Ed, I see you've shaved since I last saw you, and I have to tell you, you didn't have to do that for this audience.
[03:21.190 --> 03:27.970]  Well, luckily I've got plenty of black t-shirts, but I do not have the Keith Alexander brand dad jeans.
[03:31.250 --> 03:32.670]  I'll save those for DEFCON.
[03:37.490 --> 03:44.530]  So, I'm going to try to stay largely out of the way and let these guys talk, but I think there's a few topics that we'd like to cover.
[03:45.430 --> 03:53.470]  And to start with, I was hoping Dan could describe what it felt like the first time he heard about Edward Snowden.
[03:54.090 --> 04:00.650]  His feelings on hearing his name and seeing what he had given the world.
[04:00.930 --> 04:07.170]  And if his feelings have changed since, and how he's grown to feel about Edward Snowden.
[04:08.610 --> 04:10.730]  I can tell you exactly what I felt.
[04:12.650 --> 04:17.710]  Hope, actually, which had not been in great supply for me recently.
[04:17.710 --> 04:22.410]  When I saw this, the name of this conference, I had mixed feelings about it.
[04:23.790 --> 04:28.970]  My feelings of hope go up and down a little, and they haven't been too high.
[04:29.150 --> 04:35.810]  And there's no question, I felt that when Chelsea Manning was revealed.
[04:36.150 --> 04:48.190]  I used to, you know, I used to ask in a way, how often do you need a Pentagon Papers, which is a massive disclosure that is unequivocal of documents that really shows...
[04:48.190 --> 04:50.610]  One document doesn't do it, as Ed knows.
[04:51.470 --> 04:55.250]  And then they can say, well, we changed that the next day.
[04:55.490 --> 05:02.130]  That was just some particular little department, some low-level person, originally made that or something.
[05:02.310 --> 05:11.090]  So what you really need is a massive stuff, as in the Pentagon Papers, that shows, no, this is what they said the next day and the day after that, and here was the official policy, and so forth.
[05:11.570 --> 05:14.590]  And I waited 40 years to hear that.
[05:14.850 --> 05:28.130]  And so I was pretty much losing hope that there would be anybody inside who was willing to risk his freedom, his life or her life and freedom, to put out what needed to be put out.
[05:28.950 --> 05:39.170]  Because if you put out a lot of stuff, and I want to get into this with you, Ed, it's technically you have to be something of a specialist to put out a lot of stuff and not be identified.
[05:40.490 --> 05:42.930]  So I was feeling not hopeful that it would come.
[05:43.050 --> 05:45.790]  And then just three years after Manning comes Snowden.
[05:45.910 --> 05:48.330]  So there's no question, I thought, it is possible.
[05:49.650 --> 06:00.350]  And in fact, Ed, you once told me that you hoped, among other things, to show that one could do this and be successful.
[06:01.230 --> 06:05.370]  And I'd be interested to hear, actually, from you what your measure...
[06:05.370 --> 06:10.870]  There's no question in my mind, you have been successful, but what you had in mind when you wanted to show that people could do this.
[06:11.190 --> 06:13.330]  Because after all, you are out of the country, et cetera.
[06:14.850 --> 06:17.870]  Well, so there's a lot of things to address there.
[06:17.990 --> 06:18.950]  I mean, that's a big topic.
[06:19.070 --> 06:25.130]  But you said something that I want to respond to first, which was you kind of touched on technology.
[06:25.130 --> 06:28.790]  You talked about how people recently are specialists.
[06:29.130 --> 06:35.750]  They're able to use specialist skills to gather information that's tremendously important to the public, but we've been denied access to it.
[06:35.770 --> 06:48.230]  And they're able to publish that and get it around the world before anyone's able to stop it, before they're able to kill the story, and before they're able to basically shut the public out of the room of government.
[06:48.230 --> 06:51.050]  You know, they sort of divorce us from our democracy.
[06:51.990 --> 06:59.030]  And the key for me there is that technology empowers dissent.
[06:59.390 --> 07:04.010]  This is something we've seen again and again, and people forget this because they think about it only in modern times.
[07:04.090 --> 07:05.710]  They only think about it in the recent examples.
[07:05.790 --> 07:10.690]  They think about me, they think about Manning, they think about other people who followed in the same sort of thread.
[07:10.830 --> 07:13.450]  But they forget that technology actually enabled you.
[07:13.950 --> 07:19.390]  People forget about the fact that you were, you know, in a garage with a Xerox machine.
[07:19.630 --> 07:26.490]  You know, a copy machine might not seem like a killer app to a lot of people, but that enabled you to get this back to the public.
[07:26.710 --> 07:32.410]  And the same Xerox machine that gave you that gave us Samizdat in the former Soviet block.
[07:33.950 --> 07:50.850]  And what that tells me, and what I think is important for our society, and I don't just mean in the United States, I mean around the world, is to recognize that technology empowers individuals, it empowers voices, it empowers democracy in a way that can turn one man into a movement,
[07:50.870 --> 07:53.670]  or a woman into a world power.
[07:53.910 --> 08:01.630]  And that has fundamentally changed the way that we relate to our government, and more importantly, the way our government relates to us.
[08:02.110 --> 08:09.690]  You know, they say when people fear the government, we have tyranny, but when the government fears people, we have democracy, we have liberty, we have freedom.
[08:09.690 --> 08:11.250]  And I think that's very true.
[08:11.430 --> 08:12.570]  And we see that more and more.
[08:12.850 --> 08:33.670]  When the government has been left sort of in the dark, even when we have whistleblowers who come up and stand at a great risk to bring things to the public, people like Bill Binney, Thomas Drake, Ed Loomis, who end up getting, you know, these guys get pulled out of the shower naked at gunpoint in front of the families.
[08:33.770 --> 08:34.530]  Their lives are destroyed.
[08:34.650 --> 08:35.590]  Their careers are destroyed.
[08:35.970 --> 08:37.110]  They're discredited.
[08:37.270 --> 08:39.110]  You know, they said they're disgruntled.
[08:39.850 --> 08:45.290]  There's these broad campaigns brought against them, but they didn't have hard evidence.
[08:46.010 --> 08:47.170]  They did everything right.
[08:47.290 --> 08:49.030]  They went through the system and the system destroyed them.
[08:49.150 --> 08:49.830]  The system buried them.
[08:49.830 --> 08:51.490]  And we see this happen again and again.
[08:52.010 --> 08:53.750]  Something very important happened today.
[08:53.990 --> 08:55.450]  A lot of people haven't seen it yet.
[08:55.550 --> 09:04.350]  In the Washington Post, there's an opinion article by a former State Department official who has basically said he's bound by classification.
[09:04.350 --> 09:11.370]  He had to get the article screened by the government to redact any classified information before he could publish it.
[09:11.450 --> 09:27.770]  But the Washington Post ran it and he basically said, Executive Order 12333, which is one of the signals intelligence authorities, which allows the United States to intercept, basically, communications that are occurring overseas, is being used to collect incredible amounts of communications,
[09:27.770 --> 09:34.330]  not just on people around the world, not just innocents everywhere, but specifically on Americans, which is precisely what the United States is.
[09:34.330 --> 09:35.990]  The United States government has said they are not doing.
[09:37.910 --> 09:45.490]  And this is the kind of thing that's illustrative because what he revealed was explosive.
[09:45.690 --> 09:47.250]  It should be on the front page of every newspaper.
[09:47.250 --> 10:06.270]  But instead, it's an opinion article on one newspaper because there's not clear, irrefutable evidence that brings the president to the podium, that brings the Congress to, you know, the press, and says, we have to have a national conversation where the public is given back its seat at the table of government.
[10:06.270 --> 10:14.810]  And we, as a society, are given the opportunity to decide where the lines should be drawn, not a few officials sitting behind closed doors.
[10:14.930 --> 10:24.650]  And I think that is a new power that technology has given us over the last hundred years that is increasing in frequency, strength, magnitude.
[10:24.650 --> 10:45.610]  And if we pair that with a responsibility to use appropriately, to police ourselves, the way our technology grows, and not sleepwalk into new protocols, into new usages, into new applications for these things, but we really think about the implications of putting,
[10:45.630 --> 11:02.490]  you know, RFIDS in our sneakers and our washing machines and the things we buy at the grocery store, we will have not a dystopian future, but we will have a democracy in which citizens around the world, in every country, are empowered, regardless of the policies of their government.
[11:02.650 --> 11:08.730]  And we, at the very minimum, will know the truth of our world and the truth of our governments, and it will not be able to be hidden from us anymore.
[11:20.280 --> 11:29.800]  So, Ed, you mentioned two NSA whistleblowers that came before you, Thomas Drake, who is in the front row here, and Bill Binney, who spoke at The Last HOPE two years ago.
[11:30.460 --> 11:35.580]  And, of course, here sits Daniel Ellsberg, the most famous whistleblower in U.S. history.
[11:36.200 --> 11:41.040]  Were you aware of their stories prior to what you did?
[11:41.340 --> 11:45.980]  How familiar were you with the Pentagon Papers and Dan Ellsberg?
[11:45.980 --> 11:49.100]  And did you learn any lessons from them?
[11:49.640 --> 11:52.660]  And are there lessons future whistleblowers can learn from you?
[11:54.480 --> 11:54.920]  Absolutely.
[11:55.220 --> 11:56.820]  I mean, I followed this closely.
[11:57.000 --> 11:58.640]  I think everybody in the intelligence community did.
[11:58.940 --> 12:03.080]  Because what people forget is that, you know, we in the public, we see these stories.
[12:03.120 --> 12:07.500]  They come on the news, you know, the Justice Department, the President, all the talking heads.
[12:07.500 --> 12:09.640]  They say these guys are bad guys.
[12:09.780 --> 12:11.080]  They say they risked the country.
[12:11.240 --> 12:12.540]  They say they're, you know, spies.
[12:12.760 --> 12:14.180]  They've been charged under the Espionage Act.
[12:14.320 --> 12:15.820]  They did bad things.
[12:16.420 --> 12:28.520]  But when you look at what happened, when you look at the bad faith the government used in their case, particularly against Thomas Drake, which eventually collapsed, and they dropped the Espionage Act charges and basically agreed to call it a day.
[12:30.720 --> 12:35.140]  You've got to remember that inside the intelligence community, they're trumpeting these things.
[12:35.280 --> 12:47.520]  They're holding these guys up as examples to say, look, if you say what's going on, if you step out of line, even if, even if you're doing it for the right reasons, even if you're doing it the right way, there will be repercussions.
[12:48.280 --> 12:53.280]  You know, they talk about internal channels and whatnot, but these guys used internal channels.
[12:53.280 --> 12:56.740]  And they, people like Thomas Drake, they ended up getting indicted.
[12:57.400 --> 13:01.660]  And this is something that I paid very close attention to and I learned a great deal from.
[13:02.100 --> 13:12.220]  And I think it reminds us that, you know, the Founding Fathers, they didn't fight a revolution to have a right to sort of internal processes.
[13:12.440 --> 13:13.840]  The Supreme Court, I do this recently.
[13:14.360 --> 13:19.720]  You know, some internal secret policy is not democracy, and that's not checks and balances.
[13:20.060 --> 13:20.840]  That's bureaucracy.
[13:21.560 --> 13:32.800]  If we're gonna have democracy, if we're gonna have an enlightened citizen, if we're gonna be able to actually provide, you know, consent of the governed, we have to know what's going on.
[13:32.880 --> 13:34.800]  We have to know at least the broad outlines of our policies.
[13:35.000 --> 13:39.880]  And we can't have the government shut us out from every action, you know, that they're doing.
[13:40.120 --> 13:44.200]  Now, that doesn't mean we need to know the name of every single surveillance target that's out there.
[13:44.340 --> 13:59.820]  We need to know the details of every particular operation against every factory that's in there or anywhere, But we have a right, as Americans and as members of the global community, to know the broad outlines of government policies that have a significant impact on our lives.
[14:00.440 --> 14:04.600]  And I think that's something that Tom Drake showed me how to do the right way.
[14:14.530 --> 14:16.730]  So, Dan, my next question is for you.
[14:17.830 --> 14:23.430]  Oftentimes, Ed's biggest critics often invoke your name.
[14:23.430 --> 14:29.570]  And they invoke it in a positive way and try to contrast what you did with what Edward did.
[14:30.470 --> 14:31.890]  Can you talk about that a little bit?
[14:31.970 --> 14:32.870]  How does that make you feel?
[14:33.250 --> 14:34.250]  Do you agree with them?
[14:34.330 --> 14:35.050]  Do you disagree with them?
[14:35.130 --> 14:43.610]  The most recent was actually Secretary of State John Kerry, who said that you were a hero, but Ed was not.
[14:43.910 --> 14:46.070]  And so, can you expand on that a little bit?
[14:46.670 --> 14:50.970]  Well, this bullshit, in a way, started with Barack Obama.
[14:52.930 --> 15:08.550]  When somebody actually took the occasion to ask him about Manning, in San Francisco, I was going to say here, where I come from, in San Francisco, and said, well, didn't Chelsea Manning, then Bradley, do exactly what Ellsberg did?
[15:08.870 --> 15:13.370]  You know, and with... well, he could have answered that various ways.
[15:13.570 --> 15:18.410]  What he said was, Ellsberg's material was classified in a different manner.
[15:19.090 --> 15:21.670]  Well, that was true, in a way.
[15:22.150 --> 15:29.570]  As I mentioned earlier, everything that Manning put out was secret or less, and everything I put out was top secret.
[15:30.010 --> 15:31.050]  That was the difference.
[15:32.410 --> 15:35.630]  And I think the person asking the question didn't pursue that.
[15:36.310 --> 15:52.090]  And of course, in your case, we'll come back to that, but in your case, higher than top secret, you know, communications intelligence stuff, which I would earlier have said didn't deserve to be put out until you see what it says.
[15:52.290 --> 16:02.490]  And then you see it's evidence of criminality, and should not be subject to criminal prosecution for revealing it, even though it is higher than top secret.
[16:02.490 --> 16:16.930]  So, since then, that was with Manning, and I found then, that was starting in 2010, that thanks to Manning and now to you, I'm getting more favorable publicity than in 40 years, 40 years.
[16:18.070 --> 16:25.170]  Because suddenly, people who were all for putting me in prison for life before now realize that I was really a very good guy.
[16:25.170 --> 16:28.850]  I was the... I was the good whistleblower.
[16:29.010 --> 16:33.230]  And so, I'm totally, of course, rejected this from the beginning.
[16:33.350 --> 16:41.690]  I didn't want to be a foil for showing up badly to people that I totally admired, you know, and identified with.
[16:42.370 --> 16:49.210]  Because there have been lots of leakers, whistleblowers, and I appreciate them all, ones who put out information that should have been known.
[16:49.310 --> 16:49.770]  They're anonymous.
[16:49.950 --> 16:51.210]  I don't know their names on the whole.
[16:51.210 --> 17:08.830]  But the difference here, to me, with Manning and you, was that each showed very clearly, as I had felt 40 years ago, a willingness to put out enough material that was going to really be serious, put us in prison for life.
[17:08.830 --> 17:27.330]  When I read that Manning had said, as I used to say, to Adrian Lamo, the wrong guy to confide in, that he was willing to go to prison for life, or even be executed, I said to myself, I have waited 40 years to hear somebody say that.
[17:27.550 --> 17:29.470]  That's the way I felt 40 years ago.
[17:29.970 --> 17:31.570]  And it's taken this long.
[17:31.570 --> 17:34.370]  But so I felt immediately in identification with him.
[17:35.050 --> 17:39.410]  Obviously, in your case, in Manning's case, in my case, we all have different backgrounds.
[17:39.650 --> 17:41.110]  We're different in many ways.
[17:41.250 --> 17:44.350]  But we have the same access, interestingly, you know, comparable, comparable.
[17:45.090 --> 17:47.150]  And different kinds of things.
[17:47.370 --> 17:58.410]  So I identified with them, and I couldn't bear to hear me getting good press from the Secretary of State and from others, on the grounds that my motives were different.
[17:58.950 --> 18:02.030]  And, for example, you mentioned, you know, some of the specifics here.
[18:02.410 --> 18:10.090]  Well, Ellsberg just put out information that was historical, you know, three years old at the most recent.
[18:10.310 --> 18:12.730]  Well, that's because I didn't have the most recent.
[18:14.630 --> 18:19.550]  If I had had the current documents, I would not have bothered to put out history.
[18:20.510 --> 18:24.070]  My interest was not in setting the record straight.
[18:24.070 --> 18:28.330]  My interest was in ending an old ongoing war, helping to end an ongoing war.
[18:28.550 --> 18:35.530]  And for that, I would much have preferred to put out current documents, which I, at that moment, didn't have access to.
[18:35.790 --> 18:38.950]  Very few people did in the government, even in the White House.
[18:38.950 --> 18:42.830]  It was a big secret what Nixon was really up to, including nuclear threats.
[18:43.030 --> 18:48.730]  And I hoped that my documents would show a pattern that extended into the present.
[18:49.050 --> 18:50.050]  And I failed.
[18:50.950 --> 19:06.310]  Hardly anybody was willing to extrapolate and say, well, Ellsberg has shown that four previous presidents lied in the same way, escalated in the same way, made the same kind of secret threats, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, but it ended with those.
[19:06.450 --> 19:07.270]  It ended before Nixon.
[19:07.490 --> 19:12.270]  So I thought maybe they'll figure out that maybe the current president is doing the same.
[19:13.230 --> 19:14.830]  No, it took documents.
[19:14.990 --> 19:16.010]  And I didn't have that.
[19:16.210 --> 19:22.090]  So for years, I've been saying to people, it's got to be with documents, even though that increases their risk.
[19:22.290 --> 19:29.170]  Well, people know that, basically, but they weren't willing to take the risk, I'm sorry to say, and couldn't do it in an honest way.
[19:29.350 --> 19:38.030]  So then Manning came out with his millions, hundreds of thousands, actually, cables, and then you with documents.
[19:38.650 --> 19:47.310]  And it's like Mordecai Venunu in Israel with photographs that Israel had a nuclear program and even an H-bomb that they weren't willing to admit.
[19:47.530 --> 19:50.430]  And it took those documents, which took the risk.
[19:50.670 --> 20:01.890]  So what I was saying is, I saw right away, without having met you, without having met Manning, that this is someone who I identify with.
[20:02.190 --> 20:05.050]  And at the same time, new heroes.
[20:05.150 --> 20:08.090]  He said, what was my feeling when I heard Snowden's name?
[20:08.210 --> 20:10.350]  I said, well, I have a new hero now.
[20:11.510 --> 20:12.810]  And so, thank you.
[20:13.790 --> 20:14.490]  Thank you.
[20:20.760 --> 20:28.920]  If I could actually follow up on that, I think there's a really important point there that hasn't been real well addressed in the media.
[20:29.420 --> 20:47.880]  And that was, you said you acted, you know, not to reveal a specific illegality, but to end a war, to basically correct failures of policies that were costing lives, that were costing us the future of our country at a critical moment where things could be changed,
[20:48.080 --> 20:51.140]  where we could step back sort of from the brink and enjoy a better society.
[20:51.920 --> 21:10.460]  And I think people need to remember that these stories that are being published by journalists, the journalists are working together with their editors, with their institutions, to really analyze whether these things are in the public interest, whether they will benefit us as a society to know,
[21:10.680 --> 21:18.490]  and not publish things that are just, you know, gossip, or they don't have a significant justification for going into the public domain.
[21:19.240 --> 21:36.100]  Since these stories were real, we did not only learn sort of the new truth of our world about the fact that all of our communications are being intercepted, collected, analyzed, and stored automatically.
[21:36.600 --> 21:56.580]  And that means that all of our ideas, all of our thoughts, all of our expressions, all of our associations, who we talk to, who we meet, who we love, who we hate, all of these things are now subordinated to the officials, to the policies of a few guys behind closed doors.
[21:57.720 --> 22:00.880]  And we don't know, we can't hold them to account.
[22:01.040 --> 22:02.180]  They don't answer to us.
[22:02.400 --> 22:04.540]  They don't even answer to the full body of Congress.
[22:05.060 --> 22:10.540]  There are only eight members in Congress, they're called the Gang of Eight, who get fully briefed on these intelligence programs.
[22:10.540 --> 22:27.200]  And interestingly, the intelligence committees that are supposed to oversee these programs, these guys who have access to classified information, they receive more money from actually all of them.
[22:27.320 --> 22:34.500]  Every single member of this committee receives money from the top 20 intelligence companies in the United States.
[22:35.140 --> 22:39.380]  And they also receive more money from these companies than any other members in Congress.
[22:39.380 --> 22:51.400]  In fact, a single one of these congressmen, his name is Dutch Ruppersberger, received over 350 grand from these companies alone.
[22:51.700 --> 22:54.740]  That's not all of us' donations, that's just from these top 20 companies.
[22:56.350 --> 23:10.380]  So, when we think about the revelations, when we think about the fact that we've learned what's going on, when we have an ability to bait it, when we have the ability to correct this overreach, when we have the ability to protest unconstitutional activities that never should have begun.
[23:10.700 --> 23:15.680]  But we also have a broader civic understanding of how our government works.
[23:16.280 --> 23:19.820]  We see that the most senior officials in government have been lying under oath.
[23:19.960 --> 23:22.960]  They've been making false statements to Congress, for example, James Clapper.
[23:23.180 --> 23:24.340]  But not just Congress.
[23:24.500 --> 23:25.620]  It's not just the lies we know of.
[23:25.700 --> 23:27.520]  There are other ones that didn't get as much attention.
[23:27.520 --> 23:37.740]  For example, the Department of Justice, the Solicitor General of the United States, he lied to the Supreme Court twice in writing.
[23:38.040 --> 23:39.440]  And it was in the New York Times.
[23:39.660 --> 23:43.940]  But, you know, this didn't become the front page news that, you know, persists and we respond to.
[23:44.700 --> 23:50.640]  But it was a direct revelation that came out on the newspaper on June 7th.
[23:50.640 --> 23:53.440]  It was when we found out that people had them surveilled.
[23:55.620 --> 24:09.500]  To dial back, because it gets technical in terms of surveillance authorities, what happened is the government was using warrantless surveillance to collect evidence to justify warrant applications for warranted surveillance.
[24:10.620 --> 24:14.960]  That's a violation of both the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment for people who are keeping score.
[24:17.090 --> 24:22.820]  And what's interesting is they didn't report this to the courts, and they didn't report this to defendants.
[24:23.000 --> 24:25.620]  But then they later told the Supreme Court that they were.
[24:25.980 --> 24:27.360]  And it turned out that was untrue.
[24:28.440 --> 24:32.080]  If we don't know these kind of things, we don't know our government.
[24:32.700 --> 24:39.060]  We have to be able to know not just what governments do, but how they act, in order to decide how closely we need to scrutinize their behaviors.
[24:39.400 --> 24:47.540]  And if we didn't have whistleblowers like you, like Tom Drake, and like everybody else who's come forward at tremendous risks, we would have a less open, less free, and less accountable society.
[24:47.740 --> 24:51.100]  And because of that, I think it's worth taking risks to do this.
[24:52.310 --> 24:54.380]  And it's not just what's illegal.
[24:54.720 --> 24:57.040]  You know, the scandal is what is legal.
[24:57.260 --> 24:59.040]  The scandal is what's happening every day.
[24:59.140 --> 25:02.580]  The unconstitutional activities that are still occurring right now.
[25:02.860 --> 25:04.700]  The fact that we look at...
[25:05.280 --> 25:09.160]  For example, one of the things that's been talked about a lot is how to fix this.
[25:09.160 --> 25:16.200]  The fact that the most, the least controversial program, in terms of do we end it?
[25:16.280 --> 25:17.020]  Does this do nothing?
[25:17.420 --> 25:19.400]  Is section 215...
[25:21.020 --> 25:31.640]  And section 215 of the Patriot Act basically says that, hey, we can collect the call records, metadata records, from everybody in the country, regardless of whether they are suspected of any crime, any wrongdoing.
[25:31.900 --> 25:35.480]  And we have to ask, you know, what does that do?
[25:35.900 --> 25:37.000]  Why are they doing this?
[25:37.000 --> 25:37.680]  What is the value?
[25:37.820 --> 25:40.680]  Because if you encrypt communications, right, they don't get anything out of that.
[25:40.780 --> 25:43.760]  This is just the signaling records.
[25:43.920 --> 25:45.940]  This is like what a private eye collects.
[25:46.160 --> 25:49.640]  Who you meet, who you talk to, when it happened, where it was at.
[25:49.960 --> 25:54.620]  Not the exact content of what was said during these calls.
[25:54.900 --> 25:56.640]  So encryption protects the content.
[25:57.320 --> 25:59.360]  But we forget about associations.
[25:59.780 --> 26:00.900]  And that's what this is about.
[26:01.220 --> 26:05.520]  These programs like section 215, mass surveillance in general, is not about surveilling you.
[26:05.900 --> 26:07.460]  It's not about surveilling me.
[26:07.880 --> 26:10.340]  It's about surveilling us collectively.
[26:11.440 --> 26:16.760]  It's about watching the company for everybody in the country and on a global scale.
[26:17.100 --> 26:22.400]  This is basically a big data program which provides the raw data that can then be analyzed.
[26:22.780 --> 26:23.640]  It can be filtered.
[26:23.640 --> 26:33.240]  It can be subjected to rules, for example, like we've seen on Skid Score, that says everything you do is being analyzed.
[26:33.380 --> 26:34.720]  It's being weighted.
[26:34.960 --> 26:36.100]  It's being measured.
[26:36.860 --> 26:40.460]  And that's without regard to whether or not you've done anything wrong.
[26:40.840 --> 26:43.340]  So when people say, you know, why does this matter?
[26:43.860 --> 26:44.960]  Why do I care?
[26:45.180 --> 26:46.620]  You know, why should I get up off the couch?
[26:46.620 --> 26:55.180]  It's because, again, when we think about this in terms of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, you know, it's an unreasonable seizure because there's nothing to justify doing it.
[26:55.280 --> 26:57.060]  It happens in advance of any criminal suspicion.
[26:57.380 --> 27:09.620]  Or the due process violations under the Fifth Amendment, where the government is basically saying, we're going to use warrantless surveillance to collect evidence to then secretly use to get a warrant application.
[27:10.960 --> 27:16.180]  or the First Amendment violations of our freedom to associate, right?
[27:16.360 --> 27:26.020]  Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press, freedom of speech, or our right to associate, to enjoy the company of whoever we want.
[27:27.620 --> 27:31.820]  If you let go of your rights for a moment, you've lost them for a lifetime.
[27:32.080 --> 27:35.640]  And that's why this matters, is because it happened and we didn't know about it.
[27:35.780 --> 27:37.360]  We weren't told about it.
[27:37.360 --> 27:41.320]  In the post-September 11th period, we had programs stood up like STELLARWIND.
[27:41.620 --> 27:45.160]  They collected all of our Internet metadata, all of our calling metadata.
[27:45.440 --> 28:00.020]  And it was creating a massive, deep, robust data set that allows us to look at connections and actually programmatically analyze the connections of everybody at every place all the time.
[28:00.180 --> 28:01.920]  And I think that's not what this country is about.
[28:02.040 --> 28:03.960]  I think that's a fundamentally un-American thing.
[28:04.080 --> 28:17.940]  And I think we the people, you the people, you in this room, right now have both the means and the capability to help build a better future by encoding our rights into the programs and protocols upon which we rely every day.
[28:18.420 --> 28:21.240]  And that's what a lot of my future work is going to be involved in.
[28:21.320 --> 28:27.300]  And I hope that you will join me in the freedom of the press and every other organization in making that a reality.
[28:39.750 --> 28:48.390]  So I should mention, both Dan Ellsberg and now Ed Snowden are on Freedom of the Press Foundation's board of directors.
[28:48.410 --> 29:00.610]  And we really want to make it our goal to help journalists and sources and everyone connect in a way that can be protected from the government's eyes when...
[29:00.610 --> 29:05.270]  and essentially protect our right to privacy and freedom of speech.
[29:05.490 --> 29:10.210]  And so I think that brings me to my next question for Ed.
[29:10.490 --> 29:14.330]  And this comes from one of the Ask Snowden questions on Twitter.
[29:14.590 --> 29:21.910]  Is what specifically can designers and developers and others working in technology start to do to make things better?
[29:21.990 --> 29:25.250]  And are there specific examples out there that you would like to see people follow?
[29:26.870 --> 29:34.150]  So, when I talk about this, it's always difficult because it's entirely dependent on the threat model of the individual who's operating.
[29:35.170 --> 29:48.410]  You know, GamGam in the home has a different set of priorities than somebody who's working to report on the malfeasance of a deeply irresponsible government and an authoritarian regime.
[29:49.090 --> 29:51.750]  And so, generally, when I talk about this, I say encryption.
[29:51.750 --> 30:02.130]  I say encryption, encryption, encryption, because it's an important first step that denies the government access to anything more typically than suspicion, which is drawn from association.
[30:02.510 --> 30:09.370]  But when we talk about how we fix this stuff for the future, we've got to realize that association is often the problem.
[30:09.690 --> 30:11.110]  It doesn't end at encryption.
[30:11.350 --> 30:12.290]  It starts at encryption.
[30:12.650 --> 30:27.950]  Because if you don't think about the links, sort of the signals that are happening, when I email you, and the government can't read the content of the communication, where they go, you know, why is an employee of the government, who was at work on Thursday at the Central Intelligence Agency,
[30:28.130 --> 30:39.590]  or the National Security Agency, or the FBI, who works on programs which would be deeply embarrassing to the government, why are they contacting someone at the Freedom of Press Foundation, or the Washington Post, or the New York Times?
[30:39.890 --> 30:49.510]  And so we get tools like SecureDrop, which are good because they allow us to use mixed routing networks, like Tor, to sort of obfuscate our direct network path.
[30:49.990 --> 30:59.710]  But we've got to think about the fact that today, if people are connecting through a phone, that's not super helpful because the phone, for example, sees that you're connecting to Tor.
[30:59.890 --> 31:01.130]  It sees you're a Tor user.
[31:02.570 --> 31:09.890]  A good example of this, or really a bad example in terms of OPSEC, is this recent American spy who was discovered in Germany.
[31:10.990 --> 31:16.270]  He was apparently, allegedly in the newspapers, spying for the United States against Germany.
[31:17.010 --> 31:20.250]  He then, I guess, wasn't satisfied with what was going on.
[31:20.350 --> 31:25.770]  So he said, hey, I'm going to shop myself to what I think are the Russians, because he got an email.
[31:25.970 --> 31:27.450]  He was using Gmail, by the way.
[31:27.630 --> 31:28.730]  Great, great OPSEC there.
[31:29.330 --> 31:31.570]  And he got an email that pretended to be the Russian embassy.
[31:32.170 --> 31:33.830]  And they said, hey, you want to sell us some documents?
[31:33.930 --> 31:35.570]  He said, oh, yeah, sure, sure.
[31:35.570 --> 31:38.430]  And he sent them three classified documents.
[31:39.830 --> 31:40.950]  Now, this is an email.
[31:41.150 --> 31:43.330]  I don't know whether it's encrypted or non-encrypted.
[31:43.470 --> 31:44.730]  That hasn't really been covered in detail.
[31:45.350 --> 31:56.330]  But the key is, the adversary that was on the distant end of the communication, in this case, German counterintelligence for his model, although he's actually, allegedly, a spy.
[31:56.470 --> 31:57.730]  He's not interested in public interest.
[31:57.930 --> 31:59.110]  He's interested in money.
[32:01.770 --> 32:08.390]  Is the fact that when he did this, he was the only one who had access to these documents, who was out of the office at the time.
[32:08.610 --> 32:10.050]  He took the day off to send this email.
[32:10.470 --> 32:22.550]  So again, you know, we're not talking about the most sophisticated guy in the world, but this is the kind of thing you have to worry about, in terms of how do governments discover their adversaries?
[32:22.790 --> 32:27.690]  And the same techniques they use to discover spies, they use to discover journalists.
[32:29.470 --> 32:45.070]  You know, the Risen case, and the Rosen case, both of these are journalists in the United States, where, for example, the government was trying to get James Risen, the New York Times reporter, to reveal his source, or they were subpoenaing an AP reporter,
[32:45.150 --> 32:53.250]  I believe, all of the phones, all of the phones in their office to say, who from the government called the Associated Press?
[32:54.050 --> 32:56.070]  These are associational records.
[32:56.270 --> 32:59.390]  They didn't get the content of the calls, but they were trying to figure out what was going on.
[32:59.590 --> 33:08.990]  When we think about how we fix these programmatically, when we think about these in terms of protocols, we need to have protocols that are resistant to traffic analysis.
[33:08.990 --> 33:12.770]  They need to be padded, basically, even if there's some level of performance penalty.
[33:13.130 --> 33:24.070]  So you can't look at differences in, for example, Skype conversations and tell which phoneme or word was spoken based on packet size, the signaling speed, and so on and so forth.
[33:25.750 --> 33:36.930]  You also need to use some sort of mixed routing, some sort of shared infrastructure that divorces the individual connection from the individual origination point.
[33:37.010 --> 33:37.930]  And that's still a hard problem.
[33:38.010 --> 33:42.570]  We haven't solved that in sort of a performance-respective manner.
[33:42.570 --> 33:44.170]  Tor does a really good job.
[33:44.570 --> 33:46.150]  But Tor is also TCP only.
[33:46.290 --> 33:47.110]  It doesn't handle UDP.
[33:47.890 --> 33:49.350]  And a lot of other things like that.
[33:49.770 --> 33:55.850]  But this is something that's better to really get down and have everybody get in together.
[33:56.330 --> 33:57.170]  Sort of red team.
[33:57.290 --> 34:03.650]  If somebody pitches an idea, and the other people in the community, whether that's Twitter, whether that's a mailing list, they tear it down.
[34:03.970 --> 34:05.290]  It's the peer review model.
[34:05.410 --> 34:06.950]  That's how we do these things and we fix it.
[34:06.950 --> 34:09.030]  We need people to attack these systems.
[34:09.570 --> 34:14.330]  We need people to work as adversaries to try to find holes so we can fix them.
[34:14.710 --> 34:17.290]  And there's also the user experience issue.
[34:17.430 --> 34:21.330]  For example, GPG is robust and pretty reliable encryption.
[34:22.430 --> 34:24.090]  Unfortunately, it's damn near unusable.
[34:24.290 --> 34:27.830]  I mean, it's fine if you're comfortable with command line.
[34:27.970 --> 34:29.790]  It's fine if you're good with key management.
[34:30.030 --> 34:34.390]  But again, GamGam at the home is never going to be able to do that sort of thing.
[34:34.390 --> 34:37.870]  We need encryption, mixed routing.
[34:38.190 --> 34:45.650]  We need non-attributable communications or un-attributable Internet access.
[34:45.750 --> 34:46.890]  UIA, for example.
[34:47.270 --> 34:48.970]  That's available to people.
[34:49.110 --> 34:50.050]  It's easy.
[34:50.230 --> 34:51.490]  It's transparent.
[34:51.810 --> 34:52.970]  And that's reliable.
[34:53.350 --> 34:56.470]  That we can use not just here in the United States but around the world.
[34:56.670 --> 34:58.390]  Because again, this is a global problem.
[34:58.890 --> 35:02.810]  The National Security Agency, the FBI, these guys led the way.
[35:02.810 --> 35:05.690]  Because we've got the biggest budgets and we're the most aggressive.
[35:07.430 --> 35:08.970]  But we're only the first.
[35:09.210 --> 35:09.970]  We're not the last.
[35:10.210 --> 35:12.310]  This is going to get a lot worse before it gets better.
[35:12.670 --> 35:19.490]  And we have to, you know, the grad students of the world, have to be thinking about what they can do to fix this.
[35:19.570 --> 35:21.290]  They need to think in adversarial terms.
[35:21.590 --> 35:31.010]  They need to think about how are the worst people on earth going to try to subvert and break your system.
[35:31.270 --> 35:35.970]  To not just damage individuals, but to damage governance.
[35:36.350 --> 35:38.630]  To shield themselves from oversight and accountability.
[35:38.910 --> 35:40.070]  And what can you do?
[35:40.590 --> 35:41.850]  What do you know?
[35:42.170 --> 35:45.430]  What can you think up to help shield us from that?
[35:45.670 --> 35:47.830]  And the techniques are only limited by our imagination.
[35:49.730 --> 35:52.670]  And a couple of things...
[35:55.620 --> 35:56.280]  Okay.
[35:57.020 --> 36:04.140]  I hope people are taking notes here, or in the darkness, or texting the suggestions.
[36:04.380 --> 36:06.340]  He's giving you your marching orders.
[36:07.120 --> 36:07.220]  Okay.
[36:08.380 --> 36:09.400]  They know this stuff.
[36:09.740 --> 36:09.920]  What?
[36:11.780 --> 36:12.060]  I hope.
[36:12.440 --> 36:14.500]  It's just two things to me.
[36:15.120 --> 36:16.660]  I've got a lag here.
[36:16.740 --> 36:17.500]  I'll have to take this off.
[36:17.660 --> 36:26.880]  By the way, I have to say, with my hearing problem, the reverberation earlier, before these, was such that I missed a lot.
[36:26.880 --> 36:27.380]  I'm sorry.
[36:27.480 --> 36:31.000]  And I look forward to seeing a rebroad, you know, on this on the web.
[36:31.160 --> 36:33.860]  I missed a lot of what Ed was saying.
[36:33.880 --> 36:34.600]  I'm sorry to say.
[36:34.740 --> 36:35.880]  But now I can with this.
[36:36.980 --> 36:38.260]  Not when I'm talking, though.
[36:38.460 --> 36:38.860]  There's a lag.
[36:40.620 --> 36:41.440]  Two things.
[36:42.180 --> 36:59.040]  We've been talking a lot about your people out here, and helping sources, which is of extreme importance, helping sources anonymously, and without being attributable, get their information to journalists, to journalists, essentially, and to the public,
[36:59.220 --> 37:00.800]  and to Congress, very possibly.
[37:02.380 --> 37:13.540]  For example, with the overhearing that we've just heard about, you know, Feinstein, by CIA, it's a real trick to get this stuff even to the Intelligence Committee, which is kind of a black hole for information anyway.
[37:13.820 --> 37:16.200]  But I can't get it to them without the CIA knowing.
[37:17.120 --> 37:20.520]  There is also the problem there of going directly after journalists.
[37:20.740 --> 37:21.520]  And if you're...
[37:21.520 --> 37:22.420]  This is what I was thinking.
[37:23.000 --> 37:34.380]  If you are successful in inspiring the people here to find ways of software that they can rarely use, you know, with even as...
[37:34.380 --> 37:36.960]  I'm not even on Twitter, for example.
[37:37.900 --> 37:40.040]  At my age, it's enough to be on email.
[37:42.440 --> 37:44.160]  So, but easy to use.
[37:44.820 --> 37:46.220]  Then, they need...
[37:46.220 --> 37:52.180]  Right now, when they can find the sources and shut them off, that gives you your government-controlled press.
[37:52.320 --> 37:57.780]  A government press that is simply authorized information from the government, whether it's classified or not.
[37:57.960 --> 38:04.400]  They put out a lot of information that is classified because it supports their programs and their reputation and whatnot.
[38:04.400 --> 38:11.420]  So, most leaks of classified information are actually authorized by an agency or a high official or whatnot.
[38:11.640 --> 38:21.040]  But supposing it becomes possible now for that handful of whistleblowers really to get the information in, then they would want to go after the by-line journalist who prints it.
[38:21.260 --> 38:23.780]  Now, so far, they have not done that.
[38:24.640 --> 38:33.100]  They accept the idea that the public will go along with prosecutions of officials who signed a non-disclosure agreement as I did or you did.
[38:34.180 --> 38:44.860]  And without really thinking of the fact that that agreement is not subject in corporations or elsewhere to criminal prosecution, to punishment by prison and whatnot.
[38:45.060 --> 38:51.180]  It's subject to a lot of other things like ostracism and losing your job, which is enough to keep people silent anyway.
[38:51.540 --> 38:55.900]  But supposing now that gets harder to do and they can't shut off all the sources.
[38:56.440 --> 39:01.720]  They haven't yet gone against the freedom of the press idea by directly prosecuting journalists.
[39:02.920 --> 39:12.140]  Assange, they have kept on ice here all this time with a grand jury going, with the threat basically that they're going to go after him on the grounds that he's not a real journalist.
[39:12.620 --> 39:13.400]  Something like that.
[39:13.580 --> 39:14.820]  I mean, an in-between person.
[39:16.400 --> 39:19.440]  But actually, of course, as you know and I know, the people...
[39:19.440 --> 39:30.020]  Assange didn't do anything that could possibly really be prosecuted that wasn't also done by the New York Times and by The Guardian, by The Observer, which they're reluctant to go after.
[39:30.440 --> 39:44.260]  It's my opinion, I'm putting this to you, but my opinion, that that lies next on the grounds that supposed journalist called Michael Kinsley accused Glenn Greenwald.
[39:44.260 --> 39:47.900]  And Peter King has done the same and I think a number of others.
[39:48.100 --> 40:00.280]  And that is, you guys, you journalists, are aiding and abetting a crime, a criminal, with the assumption being from the beginning that the leaking is criminal.
[40:00.400 --> 40:06.380]  You know, I raise that question as to whether that should be regarded as constitutional to regard us as criminals.
[40:06.380 --> 40:20.060]  But if you do unequivocally regard us as criminals and people like you, then the logic that people who are helping them get their information to the public are indeed helping for sure.
[40:20.220 --> 40:20.920]  That's what they are doing.
[40:21.120 --> 40:25.580]  But aiding and abetting is a legal term and it has to do with a crime.
[40:25.880 --> 40:27.120]  And perpetrating.
[40:27.260 --> 40:33.360]  Wasn't it David Gregory who asked Greenwald, you know, insofar as you are aiding and abetting.
[40:33.360 --> 40:37.780]  He's saying, insofar as you are a criminal, why should you not be punished?
[40:38.180 --> 40:56.660]  So, listening to you, I was really thinking, I didn't bring it out before, to accept that giving the information is unequivocally criminal is, I think, the first step almost surely to going along with Kinsley and Gregory and so many others, aiding and abetting,
[40:56.780 --> 40:59.580]  or rather helping, publishing, is also criminal.
[41:00.020 --> 41:01.320]  Seems logical, normal.
[41:02.820 --> 41:06.440]  And they will go after that as well.
[41:06.780 --> 41:09.400]  So, I don't know, is that something you thought about or not?
[41:10.260 --> 41:14.440]  Yeah, I mean, it's a really complex topic.
[41:14.440 --> 41:33.700]  And I think, when we talk about whether or not the government begins going after journalists, this is the real sticking point for me, because in terms of my political philosophy, as it relates to technology here, is, I would say, almost Stallman-esque.
[41:34.440 --> 41:36.420]  When we think about free software...
[41:38.440 --> 41:48.000]  When we think about free software, we need to think about software as a means of expressing our freedom, but also defending our freedom.
[41:48.960 --> 41:51.500]  Governments rely on the same technologies we do.
[41:51.720 --> 41:53.600]  They adopt the same standards.
[41:53.600 --> 41:55.340]  They use the same products.
[41:55.660 --> 41:57.340]  And this happens worldwide.
[41:57.340 --> 42:16.800]  So, the solution to that, when you ask me, is whether or not the United States government can manage to behave itself, to restrain itself against violating the Constitution, against bringing suits against journalists, against limiting the freedom of the press.
[42:16.800 --> 42:19.020]  Other governments will make different decisions.
[42:19.500 --> 42:35.300]  And if we want to live in a better, more enlightened world, what we need to do is we need to remove those capabilities from the governments by enshrining our rights into our means of communications, by denying them those capabilities, at least on a massive, untargeted level.
[42:36.440 --> 42:42.420]  Because, you know, you can't pitch a zero day at every mobile phone and every computer that's out there, or it's going to get caught.
[42:42.600 --> 42:48.960]  It's going to get caught by a researcher, and it's going to end up on, you know, The Verge, Ars Technica, or any one of these other sites.
[42:50.440 --> 42:51.840]  And there's going to be a post-mortem.
[42:51.960 --> 42:52.340]  They're malware.
[42:52.500 --> 42:53.880]  It's going to be reused and repurposed.
[42:53.980 --> 42:54.460]  They're going to find it out.
[42:54.560 --> 42:55.420]  They're going to be traced back to you.
[42:56.860 --> 43:12.600]  But governments can still pursue their legitimate means for law enforcement, for intelligence collection, on a targeted basis by using those zero days, only when they are the least intrusive and essential means of getting the intelligence that they require.
[43:12.600 --> 43:18.980]  But it sort of shuts them out of doing this on a broad social level, where they target every journalist that's out there, you know, every news agency.
[43:19.780 --> 43:26.500]  And this is the way, I think, in the future, we need to focus more and more toward how we do this.
[43:26.820 --> 43:39.640]  And when you talk about journalists, like David Gregory, like Michael Kinsley, for the audience, if you hadn't followed that story, Michael Kinsley argued, basically, that it was not the place of journalists to decide what the public should and should not know.
[43:39.960 --> 43:46.340]  His infamous quote was, that decision, as to what we, the public, should know, must ultimately be made by the government.
[43:49.800 --> 43:50.960]  Some people can't be helped.
[43:52.460 --> 43:56.920]  But the key there is that they are representing class interests.
[43:57.140 --> 43:59.400]  And we need to recognize them as a class, right?
[43:59.400 --> 44:11.080]  These journalists, who are basically reflexively going to protect policies that are working against the public interest, should not be trusted to inform us, right?
[44:11.120 --> 44:13.540]  We need to mark their names and remember what they're writing about.
[44:13.860 --> 44:20.860]  It's helpful that we get all these different views and, you know, they participate in the debate, they help inform us, because we need that marketplace of ideas.
[44:21.140 --> 44:35.160]  But at the same time, when it's being done to actually limit debate, when they're saying these people shouldn't be able to make these points, these people shouldn't be able to publish these stories, this news should never end news, we need to watch out for that.
[44:35.420 --> 44:37.740]  Because that's not ever going to benefit the public.
[44:38.100 --> 44:43.200]  That's making society, that's making government, that's making institutions necessarily less accountable.
[44:43.820 --> 44:46.120]  And it's a chilling effect that we need to look out for.
[44:46.700 --> 44:49.700]  In terms of class interests, again, when we talk about how do we fix this?
[44:49.980 --> 44:51.120]  How do we patch these holes?
[44:51.960 --> 45:07.740]  Julian Assange made a plea at one point where he said, hackers of the world unite, sysadmins of the world unite, anybody out there who, you know, posts on Stack Overflow, you know, the Stack Exchange, anywhere like that, you guys are part of the technical elite,
[45:08.260 --> 45:08.540]  right?
[45:08.600 --> 45:30.560]  If you've even heard of Tor or Tails or Hoonix or even OpenVPN, you know, hell, if you've even heard of Linux, you know, you are an advocate that is going to help us move forward in shifting the middle ground of technical literacy for the next generation,
[45:30.720 --> 45:30.820]  right?
[45:31.060 --> 45:37.780]  A lot of young people right now, they understand how technology works to an extent, but the system functions are hidden from them.
[45:38.060 --> 45:40.400]  They don't know where the dangers are, right?
[45:40.400 --> 45:42.180]  They don't know where their communications are exposed.
[45:42.320 --> 45:44.600]  They don't know how networking works.
[45:45.400 --> 45:47.880]  They trust their devices to handle everything.
[45:49.280 --> 45:57.100]  We all, any of us who know even the slightest bit, have a civic duty to help educate the people around us.
[45:57.220 --> 45:58.820]  Just like the rise of literacy, right?
[45:58.880 --> 46:02.820]  We had an obligation to teach people around us how to read and write.
[46:02.820 --> 46:14.980]  We have to teach people in our society how to interact with society, with technology, safely, reliably, and in a way that serves the interests of all of us, not just a select few.
[46:15.080 --> 46:20.780]  We don't want a high priesthood of technology, no matter how good that is for us, because it's bad for the world.
[46:21.960 --> 46:23.520]  And I think...
[46:31.560 --> 46:32.440]  I think...
[46:32.440 --> 46:33.320]  Go ahead, Dan, sorry.
[46:33.320 --> 46:34.460]  No, I was just saying...
[46:34.460 --> 46:36.300]  I was very struck by...
[46:36.300 --> 46:36.840]  Sorry.
[46:37.240 --> 46:45.340]  Something you said in Vanity Fair, the quote is accurate, which is that every one of us...
[46:45.340 --> 46:46.300]  I was very struck...
[46:46.300 --> 46:52.460]  Every one of us, and I believe this is absolutely true, has known things that were wrong...
[46:52.460 --> 47:01.780]  saw things, has seen things that were wrong, that should be known, that should be exposed, and as you put it, we have turned our eyes away because we were intimidated.
[47:01.780 --> 47:03.400]  And I happened...
[47:03.400 --> 47:19.020]  And you were speaking of yourself, speaking of myself, and come back to that, but I believe that's true of every human on earth, that there are times when they bite their tongues, they keep their mouths shut, because to reveal it would lose a relationship,
[47:19.600 --> 47:25.720]  or in very private matters, or a job, or a career, whatever, and they've kept it...
[47:25.720 --> 47:39.540]  And then you said, then you said, but there comes a time, you know, when the level of inhumanity, or the wrongness, is so great, that you have to cross over that line, as you said.
[47:39.640 --> 47:41.140]  And you said, I crossed over that line.
[47:41.500 --> 47:43.620]  Now, to tell, after all.
[47:43.900 --> 47:49.740]  Now, I thought, when I read that, that's Edward Snowden, who did that.
[47:50.340 --> 47:51.840]  And that's Chelsea Manning.
[47:53.200 --> 47:54.760]  And how many others?
[47:55.100 --> 48:12.620]  When you said, there comes a time when you, very generally, cross over that line, and tell the truth, even at cost, to your relationships, to your boss, to your friends, to your everything else, most people, I have to say, never do reach that line.
[48:12.620 --> 48:19.760]  They never do reach a point when they decide to take a risk of their own status, and their own relationships, and their own job.
[48:20.060 --> 48:26.220]  And the test of that is that many of them have been tested on things like the continuation of a wrongful war.
[48:27.240 --> 48:29.060]  Thousands of lives, hundreds of thousands.
[48:29.220 --> 48:35.640]  In the case of tobacco, they've had 500,000 lives a year lost by tobacco.
[48:35.920 --> 48:43.560]  Look at GM right now, the handful, but you know, striking, where they deliberately covered up, covered up is not only in the...
[48:43.560 --> 48:47.820]  How many people at GM knew that lives were being lost and people were being injured?
[48:48.100 --> 48:49.260]  And who spoke out?
[48:50.280 --> 48:51.560]  Nobody, I don't think so.
[48:52.180 --> 48:52.660]  Tobacco?
[48:52.900 --> 48:53.460]  Two people.
[48:55.180 --> 49:04.820]  One thing that I hope from you, Ed, from your example, is that more people will be inspired to take even significant risks.
[49:05.160 --> 49:10.660]  In other words, we're talking, you and I, and the whole group here, about lowering the risks for people.
[49:11.020 --> 49:12.940]  And that's undoubtedly essential.
[49:13.300 --> 49:18.320]  But in the end, there will always be a risk, as you say, end point problems and so forth.
[49:18.480 --> 49:24.040]  And the willingness to take that risk for civilians is very rare.
[49:24.860 --> 49:41.000]  It was, as you may know, it was Bismarck, of all people, who said, civil courage, he almost invented that phrase, civil courage, courage on the battlefield is very common in our country, our Prussian country.
[49:41.340 --> 49:44.820]  And at that point, he says, but civil courage is another matter.
[49:44.940 --> 49:45.520]  It's very rare.
[49:45.740 --> 49:46.980]  It's willingness to risk.
[49:47.340 --> 49:51.620]  Now, as I said before Manning and before you, I'd virtually give...
[49:51.620 --> 49:53.640]  I have to say I'd almost given up on it.
[49:53.980 --> 49:56.100]  And you're showing an example now.
[49:56.720 --> 50:07.220]  Manning didn't get the... he got a lot of attention, but he didn't get the effect in this country, except, as I've said earlier, for getting our troops home from Iraq, that you did.
[50:07.660 --> 50:08.520]  And why?
[50:08.700 --> 50:16.880]  Because I think, in Manning's case, he was showing what we were doing to other people in the third world, foreigners, others, not us.
[50:19.160 --> 50:29.920]  And you... and actually, in my case, was the effect because of the millions of Vietnamese that were being killed wrongly.
[50:30.380 --> 50:31.960]  Every one of them is wrong.
[50:32.220 --> 50:52.080]  When I read the Pentagon Papers and realized that, for the first time, that the very beginning, we were supporting a French colonial reconquest of a country, which I thought of as un-American, whether it was illegal internationally or not, I saw every death in Vietnam as being unjustified homicide.
[50:52.700 --> 50:57.420]  And to me, that was murder, mass murder, and I couldn't be part of that anymore.
[50:57.720 --> 50:58.280]  So I changed.
[50:58.420 --> 51:10.120]  Well, the American people didn't respond, I'm sorry to say, on the whole, except for people in audiences like this, to the mass murder, but there were 58,000 Americans in the process of dying then, see?
[51:10.660 --> 51:18.280]  And in your case, again, it wasn't so much directly dying, but what was being done to us, and people are objecting to that.
[51:19.060 --> 51:23.260]  So I think we have to have a different standard, and you show the possibility of it.
[51:23.600 --> 51:36.940]  Your colleagues in NSA, as you've said, agreed with you, many of them, this is wrong, it shouldn't be happening, but I have a mortgage, I have a marriage, I have, you know, this and that, children to go to college, and that was enough.
[51:38.120 --> 51:46.020]  Even though we're talking about this massive, you know, intrusion, which is a new world, basically, that people need to know about.
[51:46.020 --> 51:48.220]  So it shouldn't be only you.
[51:48.540 --> 51:54.880]  I would hope that some of your colleagues, who I would suspect, let me give you a little piece of experience from my experience.
[51:56.240 --> 52:02.560]  If you were in a room with your former colleagues now, I would expect them to leave that room.
[52:03.780 --> 52:05.920]  And they would not be in touch with you.
[52:06.020 --> 52:14.880]  If you can tell me that a former colleague from NSA has in any way communicated with you, to say you did the right thing, or in any way.
[52:15.560 --> 52:17.860]  I would guess there was zero on that.
[52:17.920 --> 52:19.600]  That was my experience at the RAND Corporation.
[52:19.880 --> 52:22.780]  You lose every friend you have who has a clearance.
[52:22.960 --> 52:24.000]  That's all your friends.
[52:24.280 --> 52:27.700]  So, but you're not made of sugar, as you've shown.
[52:29.020 --> 52:31.140]  You can deal with that.
[52:31.300 --> 52:33.800]  I saw you say yesterday, wasn't it in the paper?
[52:33.800 --> 52:38.460]  If I'm in chains in Guantanamo, I can live with that.
[52:39.300 --> 52:40.940]  Well, that didn't surprise me, Ed.
[52:41.060 --> 52:43.800]  That's the person I find you to be.
[52:44.080 --> 52:45.200]  That was not a surprise to me.
[52:45.220 --> 52:47.680]  It's a pretty unusual statement, you know, after all, isn't it?
[52:47.860 --> 52:49.560]  Well, let's make it a little less unusual.
[52:50.940 --> 52:56.880]  You went in the Special Forces, tried to get, and your legs broken, and so forth, didn't go over there.
[52:56.880 --> 53:00.500]  I used my Marine training in Vietnam as a civilian.
[53:00.700 --> 53:03.960]  I had been a Marine Company commander in peacetime.
[53:04.180 --> 53:06.140]  And so I used that training in Vietnam.
[53:06.420 --> 53:07.740]  So I saw combat.
[53:07.880 --> 53:09.020]  I walked with troops in combat.
[53:09.260 --> 53:14.060]  There you see courage, physical courage, every minute, every day.
[53:15.600 --> 53:18.740]  People doing the job or trying to save their comrades.
[53:19.120 --> 53:20.820]  That kind of courage is marvelous.
[53:21.820 --> 53:28.580]  As a Marine once said at Tarawa, uncommon courage was a common virtue.
[53:29.180 --> 53:29.680]  Okay, right.
[53:30.200 --> 53:37.640]  When you're doing it for the boss, for the commander in chief, with the applause of your country, even if you don't get the applause, most of it is anonymous.
[53:37.980 --> 53:42.040]  But you know they would approve you if they knew of it, what they were doing.
[53:42.160 --> 53:44.380]  And they would hold you accountable if you didn't do it.
[53:45.020 --> 53:49.220]  We should have a different standard than we do for our civilian officials.
[53:49.220 --> 53:54.120]  And not just official, you know, I don't know if you regarded yourself as an official, but a middle level person.
[53:55.620 --> 53:59.460]  It shouldn't be simply that you are the extraordinary hero that we thank.
[54:00.160 --> 54:03.180]  It should be that we should ask the question of those other people.
[54:05.040 --> 54:07.800]  What made you think you could keep this secret that long?
[54:08.040 --> 54:08.880]  Keep it totally.
[54:09.080 --> 54:09.660]  Keep your mouth.
[54:09.800 --> 54:16.480]  A lot of blood has flowed because people bit their tongues and swallowed their whistles and didn't speak out.
[54:16.480 --> 54:19.340]  And it's time, I think, that we not prosecute them.
[54:19.500 --> 54:22.840]  But tell them that is not the way to preserve a democracy.
[54:22.840 --> 54:24.760]  You are not fulfilling your oath.
[54:24.880 --> 54:32.140]  And I'll just end by saying, people ask, as I used to be, is he patriot or traitor?
[54:32.440 --> 54:34.220]  You know, that's the headline in all these things.
[54:34.820 --> 54:37.160]  Edward Snowden, patriot, that drives me nuts.
[54:37.400 --> 54:40.420]  The very thought, you know, that people could regard you as a traitor.
[54:40.420 --> 54:49.340]  The ignorance of the media and the congresspeople and the interviewers who raise that question offends me as an American.
[54:49.540 --> 54:54.740]  They think that it can be traitorous to tell the truth to your fellow countrymen.
[54:55.780 --> 54:56.260]  But...
[54:56.260 --> 54:56.680]  It is terrible.
[55:02.160 --> 55:05.040]  He is the standard I would like to see set.
[55:05.460 --> 55:07.740]  I am sure the standard I would like to see set.
[55:10.040 --> 55:14.860]  Snowden was the one person in the f*cking NSA who did what he absolutely should have done.
[55:15.740 --> 55:17.980]  How many people should have done what you did?
[55:23.160 --> 55:24.120]  Chelsea Manning.
[55:26.540 --> 55:29.260]  I said this about Chelsea when it came out, and I say it now.
[55:30.640 --> 55:35.780]  Patriot or traitor, said we all took the same oath to uphold and defend the Constitution.
[55:35.780 --> 55:40.040]  I've already said there are people who violate it all the time, thousands.
[55:40.280 --> 55:43.560]  There are people who are against it, like Cheney and some others.
[55:43.560 --> 55:50.040]  But when it comes to upholding that oath, no one in the U.S. military services, up to the Commander-in-Chief, has fulfilled her oath to defend and support the Constitution, like Chelsea Manning.
[56:00.060 --> 56:01.700]  And no one in the U.S. executive branch, in any branch, has fulfilled your oath, the oath to uphold and support the Constitution, as well as you.
[56:08.840 --> 56:09.540]  So thank you.
[56:19.530 --> 56:21.750]  That's a hard phrase.
[56:24.850 --> 56:25.970]  I would...
[56:31.870 --> 56:33.850]  I'm still politically very moderate.
[56:34.590 --> 56:36.170]  You know, I think...
[56:36.170 --> 56:46.410]  It's funny, the very first time I met Glenn Greenwald, sort of the lead journalist that I talked to in Hong Kong.
[56:47.990 --> 56:49.130]  He called me a radical.
[56:49.590 --> 56:52.530]  And that was a surprise to me, because that was the first time I had ever been called a radical.
[56:53.210 --> 56:54.990]  But he didn't mean it in a bad way.
[56:55.190 --> 56:56.130]  He called you what?
[56:56.370 --> 56:56.930]  Say it again.
[56:57.070 --> 56:57.610]  A radical.
[56:59.310 --> 57:00.030]  A political...
[57:00.030 --> 57:00.810]  Radical action.
[57:01.030 --> 57:01.630]  Radical action.
[57:02.050 --> 57:02.410]  Right.
[57:04.230 --> 57:09.650]  But the key is, I think there are so many people, throughout the government, throughout the country, who are trying to do the right thing.
[57:09.770 --> 57:19.410]  But as you said, there is this burden, this compulsion, this operational inertia, where they feel...
[57:19.870 --> 57:20.690]  You know, they...
[57:20.690 --> 57:22.530]  We talked about this in the office.
[57:22.870 --> 57:24.110]  People who saw this was wrong.
[57:24.210 --> 57:25.370]  Who agreed this was wrong.
[57:25.650 --> 57:27.010]  Who were disturbed by it.
[57:27.150 --> 57:28.910]  And who felt we needed to do something.
[57:29.050 --> 57:31.030]  But at the same time, we all have families.
[57:31.410 --> 57:32.550]  We all have mortgages.
[57:32.630 --> 57:33.290]  We all have lives.
[57:33.410 --> 57:34.430]  We all have things we want to do.
[57:34.510 --> 57:35.290]  Things we want to enjoy.
[57:35.890 --> 57:36.650]  As you did.
[57:36.770 --> 57:37.530]  You did too.
[57:38.050 --> 57:38.410]  Right.
[57:38.610 --> 57:38.750]  Right.
[57:38.750 --> 57:40.690]  I mean, I loved Hawaii.
[57:42.050 --> 57:42.490]  Everybody.
[57:42.770 --> 57:44.510]  You know, I don't have to say I loved my family.
[57:46.970 --> 57:48.750]  But you put those things at risk.
[57:48.870 --> 57:59.410]  And I knew the highest possibility of when I walked out of the office in Hawaii on the last day was that I would never make it out of the airport.
[58:01.850 --> 58:13.090]  But I accepted that because I knew that, as you said earlier, we all have a limit to the level of incivility, of inhumanity we can see and do nothing about.
[58:13.270 --> 58:16.250]  And when you cross that line, you have to do something.
[58:16.410 --> 58:23.870]  But at the same time, we can't judge people too harshly for human nature.
[58:24.010 --> 58:33.470]  If people have a different analysis, a different weighting of the risk, at least for me, what's important for us is not to condemn them, but to enable them, to empower them.
[58:33.530 --> 58:42.850]  I don't want to take a negative stance of judging them and saying, you didn't do what you were supposed to do, you didn't do what you swore you would do, even if that is the case.
[58:43.070 --> 58:48.450]  I think of it from an engineer's perspective and go, how can we fix it?
[58:48.750 --> 58:53.410]  How can the people in this room reduce the costs to action?
[58:53.630 --> 59:06.990]  How can the people in this room, how can the people around the world, how can anybody who's seen what's happened in the last year, what thoughts do you have about how we can make sure we get the truth of what our governments are doing?
[59:07.250 --> 59:14.530]  That we have a seat at the table of government, regardless of how authoritarian our government, regardless of what their response would be.
[59:14.730 --> 59:19.150]  Because when they do something wrong, we will know about it.
[59:19.410 --> 59:22.170]  And they won't know who told the world about it.
[59:22.690 --> 59:28.170]  And critically, this is the thing, this is not about anarchy, this is not about wiping out government.
[59:28.170 --> 59:44.070]  This is about saying, when governments realize that when they do unlawful things, when they do unconstitutional things, or when they do things that are entirely legal, but comprehensively immoral, we will find out about it.
[59:44.690 --> 59:46.490]  That will change the world.
[59:46.630 --> 59:48.270]  That will change the way we live.
[59:48.690 --> 59:53.310]  Because the problem today is, when you bring, you know, a case when...
[59:53.310 --> 01:00:13.090]  The system we have today is secret agencies operating under secret policies, secret interpretations of laws, overseen by secret courts, rubber stamp courts, who in 35 years have said no only 13 times out of 35,000.
[01:00:13.670 --> 01:00:22.710]  When that's the way it goes, and you know, they're overseen by these congressmen who are getting their pockets stuffed full of dollars by these intelligence contracting companies.
[01:00:24.750 --> 01:00:35.110]  What the government has done, when we look at this, any one of those steps in isolation, the fact that it takes 10 years to get this heard in an open court, at the Supreme Court instead of a secret court.
[01:00:35.510 --> 01:00:40.530]  When we look at what that is in isolation, any step, it might look like, you know, clever lawyer by the government.
[01:00:40.690 --> 01:00:51.990]  But when we look at it comprehensively, what it is, is the government has developed an exploit chain that provides basically the root password to our constitution.
[01:00:52.410 --> 01:01:00.810]  They've escaped the sandbox of our democracy, and they're basically using it to change our Bill of Rights without us seeing it.
[01:01:00.890 --> 01:01:02.910]  And when we go, what does the Bill of Rights say?
[01:01:03.150 --> 01:01:05.630]  The root kid is telling us, oh, well, the Fourth Amendment is still there.
[01:01:05.770 --> 01:01:06.890]  But in reality, it's gone.
[01:01:07.310 --> 01:01:12.170]  Something completely different is happening behind the scenes, and we can't allow that.
[01:01:12.170 --> 01:01:25.490]  And the only way we can stop that from being sort of a retrospective action, where we go back and investigate and try to figure out who did something wrong, who we should hold to account, is we have to make sure we stop it before it happens.
[01:01:25.570 --> 01:01:32.310]  And the only way that's going to happen is if we have transparency and we have accountability for the senior officials who f*cked up in the first place.
[01:01:58.700 --> 01:02:00.320]  Well, very good.
[01:02:01.200 --> 01:02:04.260]  First of all, let me say I agree.
[01:02:04.420 --> 01:02:05.320]  I understand what you're saying.
[01:02:05.380 --> 01:02:06.880]  Don't condemn these people.
[01:02:07.040 --> 01:02:08.440]  Or, you know, that isn't the important thing.
[01:02:08.980 --> 01:02:18.660]  But you and I are talking, we're having a real discussion here, because we do have a somewhat different focus, and I happen to think that both approaches are important.
[01:02:19.480 --> 01:02:20.560]  Let me distinguish.
[01:02:21.600 --> 01:02:40.860]  Actually, when I keep mentioning this 40 years between 1973, when my trial ended, in 2013, when you came out, that was 40 years, or 71, 2010, and so forth, I, in fact, came to feel that I was apparently just asking too much.
[01:02:42.340 --> 01:02:46.980]  That somehow, you keep saying, you know, everybody has a limit.
[01:02:47.780 --> 01:02:52.220]  And what I was seeing was, no, a few people have a limit.
[01:02:52.640 --> 01:02:54.220]  And most of them have no...
[01:02:54.680 --> 01:03:10.280]  By the way, as you said, there's no question, at all times, there are people in the system who are criticizing, who are raising questions, who are even, you know, saying this is wrong or whatnot, up to a point, as you did before, you know, you went all the way and talked to other people.
[01:03:10.860 --> 01:03:17.640]  But their limit is going outside, going outside channels, going to the public, going... that limit doesn't get crossed.
[01:03:17.740 --> 01:03:21.060]  They're taking a risk even complaining or criticizing, some of them.
[01:03:21.280 --> 01:03:24.340]  And they may even lose their jobs as a result, eventually.
[01:03:24.340 --> 01:03:32.520]  But they get another job, as long as they haven't broken that promise to keep their mouth shut about anything.
[01:03:32.940 --> 01:03:33.020]  See?
[01:03:33.180 --> 01:03:34.500]  They can get another job then.
[01:03:34.600 --> 01:03:35.260]  They can be trusted.
[01:03:35.560 --> 01:03:38.200]  They will stay inside the system like George Floyd.
[01:03:38.380 --> 01:03:40.240]  Anyway, during the Vietnam War.
[01:03:40.900 --> 01:03:41.860]  But they don't.
[01:03:41.860 --> 01:03:47.540]  And so I'd come to feel nobody... apparently nobody can do this.
[01:03:47.620 --> 01:03:47.980]  I don't know.
[01:03:48.220 --> 01:03:50.220]  It's so necessary and it's so obvious.
[01:03:50.380 --> 01:04:04.840]  The price of not doing it, the price of the government achieving total control, total control of the embarrassing things and the plans they're made, is Vietnam War and the Iraq War.
[01:04:05.820 --> 01:04:17.440]  The approach to climate we've had right along, the nuclear weapons policies, which are incredibly reckless, insanely reckless, that have gone on without exposure from people on the inside.
[01:04:17.620 --> 01:04:18.540]  They don't have a limit.
[01:04:18.700 --> 01:04:23.080]  So as I was saying, you and Manning did show me there are some people out there.
[01:04:23.740 --> 01:04:31.820]  I've always felt that there were more who had the capability to cross that line than we were seeing and, you know, the advantage.
[01:04:32.120 --> 01:04:36.880]  And your approach is to make it less dangerous, less risky.
[01:04:37.020 --> 01:04:39.660]  And I agree that's essential and can be done.
[01:04:39.840 --> 01:04:43.820]  And the people in this very room are contributing to that and can contribute to it.
[01:04:44.380 --> 01:04:53.420]  As we were speaking last time, you and me, I have, being not a technologist, less optimism about technology than you have.
[01:04:53.560 --> 01:04:55.520]  You know infinitely more about it than I do.
[01:04:55.520 --> 01:04:58.720]  But I'm more than twice the age you are.
[01:04:59.280 --> 01:05:05.360]  And the future of Titanic, let's say, is in my mind, even though that was before me.
[01:05:05.940 --> 01:05:08.700]  But the challenger, for example.
[01:05:09.160 --> 01:05:10.020]  And I don't put my...
[01:05:10.020 --> 01:05:26.100]  It's hard for me to believe that all these people together will make the process of telling embarrassing things about the government, which is exactly what the public needs to know, to hold them accountable, to have an influence on policy, that that can be made totally riskless.
[01:05:26.840 --> 01:05:30.400]  I think that there will remain a risk of some kind.
[01:05:31.080 --> 01:05:31.300]  And...
[01:05:31.300 --> 01:05:32.180]  I think that's fair to say.
[01:05:32.320 --> 01:05:33.680]  I mean, I don't think we're ever going to...
[01:05:33.680 --> 01:05:34.540]  You probably agree with that.
[01:05:35.180 --> 01:05:35.800]  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[01:05:35.920 --> 01:05:39.260]  There's never going to be a fully risk-free thing.
[01:05:39.320 --> 01:05:40.960]  But what we can do is we can mitigate this.
[01:05:40.960 --> 01:05:41.480]  Yes, yes.
[01:05:41.720 --> 01:05:45.180]  We can try to make it a little bit more available, a little bit less painful.
[01:05:45.180 --> 01:05:45.500]  Okay.
[01:05:47.140 --> 01:05:47.580]  And...
[01:05:47.580 --> 01:05:48.720]  Yeah, it's...
[01:05:48.720 --> 01:05:49.100]  No, I'm saying...
[01:05:49.100 --> 01:05:51.260]  What you're saying, if I may say, is crucial.
[01:05:51.400 --> 01:05:52.540]  It's crucial that they do that.
[01:05:52.560 --> 01:05:53.620]  And what you're saying is crucial.
[01:05:53.820 --> 01:06:09.640]  But I just want to put in a word for what I've been saying here, which is to hope that people like you and the others who have been speaking out here, like Tom Drake and Jesselyn Radack, and the other who have spoken the truth, is that people can be inspired of it,
[01:06:09.820 --> 01:06:16.760]  that they will be more whistleblowing than there has been, even given risk.
[01:06:17.400 --> 01:06:30.280]  And, you know, I was handed in here, as we were coming in, a thing from Expo's Fact, which is a poster that is appearing in Washington right now.
[01:06:30.280 --> 01:06:32.940]  And it has a... with my picture on it, actually.
[01:06:33.140 --> 01:06:37.040]  And it has a big headline saying, don't do what I did.
[01:06:39.240 --> 01:06:45.080]  Because I, for years, didn't want to talk about people...
[01:06:45.080 --> 01:06:51.900]  I talked about civil disobedience and the need to do it, and in connection with nuclear things, in other words, I've gotten arrested more than 80 times, and so forth, and I wanted...
[01:06:51.900 --> 01:06:55.840]  People generally did not have access to classified information.
[01:06:56.060 --> 01:06:59.420]  So I wasn't talking to people who had that access generally.
[01:06:59.420 --> 01:07:00.880]  I mean, they won't let me talk to them.
[01:07:02.100 --> 01:07:03.700]  And anyway, get an audience there.
[01:07:03.920 --> 01:07:11.460]  And so I didn't want to say, you should be whistleblowers, because that sounded too much like saying, do what I did.
[01:07:11.600 --> 01:07:14.700]  And that seemed self-promoting, and I didn't want to do it.
[01:07:15.080 --> 01:07:19.040]  And then I thought of what they were quoting on that poster, a new way to put it.
[01:07:20.020 --> 01:07:21.060]  Don't do what I did.
[01:07:21.820 --> 01:07:24.120]  Don't wait till the war has started.
[01:07:24.840 --> 01:07:27.460]  Don't wait till thousands more have died.
[01:07:28.100 --> 01:07:41.960]  Before you tell the truth with documents, and it doesn't say it on the sign, but it said, even at personal cost, even at your personal risk, that people should see, yes, you're not in prison, but you are in exile.
[01:07:42.500 --> 01:07:58.980]  And probably, I have to say, I say very sadly, I think indefinitely, I do not see this Congress and any future president or this one changing the law as they should, rescinding paragraph E of 18 U.S.C. 793, which should be rescinded as unconstitutional.
[01:08:02.500 --> 01:08:03.720]  I don't think that's going to happen.
[01:08:03.720 --> 01:08:11.940]  And that means you couldn't come back and have a fair trial ever that I really foresee in this country.
[01:08:12.780 --> 01:08:15.020]  In other countries, they may change their laws.
[01:08:15.160 --> 01:08:19.220]  That's in process of allowing a public interest defense and allowing an argument.
[01:08:19.960 --> 01:08:23.500]  And I would love to see that in this country, but I don't see it happening.
[01:08:23.680 --> 01:08:25.080]  So that means you have it in exile.
[01:08:25.200 --> 01:08:28.160]  Well, for many people, that could be a negative thing.
[01:08:28.260 --> 01:08:30.520]  Well, look, he did it, and look what you're telling us to do.
[01:08:30.600 --> 01:08:32.020]  He can't come back to his own country.
[01:08:33.100 --> 01:08:36.660]  But the fact is, you showed, first of all, you're not in prison.
[01:08:36.880 --> 01:08:49.120]  If you came back here, as you know and I know, you would not be able to talk to the public, to make your case to the public the way Carrie and Hillary Clinton have urged you to do.
[01:08:49.240 --> 01:08:53.760]  Hillary actually said, make your case to the public, which actually affects the legal.
[01:08:54.380 --> 01:08:54.820]  Bullshit!
[01:08:55.040 --> 01:09:01.160]  You would be in an isolation cell like Chelsea Manning, not for ten and a half months, but for the rest of your life, I believe.
[01:09:01.160 --> 01:09:02.760]  from the moment you were arrested.
[01:09:02.980 --> 01:09:08.120]  So you could not make your case the way you can and are doing for the whole world right now.
[01:09:08.120 --> 01:09:09.020]  So it's essential.
[01:09:09.720 --> 01:09:15.760]  I said this right, it was essential for you to be out of the country when you made your revelations.
[01:09:15.960 --> 01:09:16.900]  That was another difference.
[01:09:17.280 --> 01:09:19.980]  People said, well, Dan Ellsberg stayed and faced it and so forth.
[01:09:21.400 --> 01:09:33.840]  Another whole thing all together, but I was able to speak to demonstrations, to interviews, everything, as you're doing now from outside the country, inside the country, even while the FBI was looking for me.
[01:09:33.860 --> 01:09:36.820]  I was on Walter Cronkite in the evening.
[01:09:37.920 --> 01:09:42.800]  Evening news in an undisclosed location in Cambridge, which got him very excited.
[01:09:42.800 --> 01:09:44.280]  Wow, I've never done anything like this.
[01:09:44.820 --> 01:09:46.900]  And there I am.
[01:09:47.000 --> 01:09:48.940]  The FBI is looking for me all over the world.
[01:09:49.060 --> 01:09:51.000]  And I'm on evening news.
[01:09:51.340 --> 01:09:54.540]  Well, you are too, but you had to be out of the country.
[01:09:54.700 --> 01:09:57.060]  And it was essential that the people hear from you.
[01:09:57.400 --> 01:10:04.260]  So what I'm saying is, people can look at him and say, here is a guy who understood that it was worth taking a risk.
[01:10:04.880 --> 01:10:08.780]  Worth risking and even sacrificing personal relationships.
[01:10:09.100 --> 01:10:12.560]  I'm so glad your father was able to go to Russia and see you.
[01:10:12.680 --> 01:10:17.500]  But, you know, if you're in an isolation cell, lots of luck, you know.
[01:10:18.040 --> 01:10:25.200]  So Chelsea Manning has never been interviewed by a reporter from the time she was arrested in Kuwait in 2012.
[01:10:25.480 --> 01:10:29.780]  No reporter has been able to see her face to face and talk to her.
[01:10:30.020 --> 01:10:32.900]  So you would have the same prospect.
[01:10:33.800 --> 01:10:34.940]  And it's worth it.
[01:10:35.440 --> 01:10:36.720]  You did the right thing.
[01:10:37.060 --> 01:10:40.600]  I don't even have to ask you whether you regret paying this price.
[01:10:40.600 --> 01:10:41.620]  I can't even imagine.
[01:10:41.800 --> 01:10:43.020]  You know, the thought wouldn't occur to you.
[01:10:43.200 --> 01:10:52.520]  I never met a person who went to prison against the draft, against the war, and I know a lot of them, who inspired me to give the Pentagon Papers.
[01:10:52.780 --> 01:10:58.940]  I don't know one who ever told me they regretted the two, three years in prison that they spent.
[01:10:59.300 --> 01:11:02.040]  So that's an example that has to be seen.
[01:11:02.040 --> 01:11:09.160]  And yes, lower the risks, but also get the message out, it's worth taking the risk.
[01:11:09.260 --> 01:11:11.280]  A war's worth of lives may be at stake.
[01:11:11.400 --> 01:11:14.220]  And our democracy, in your case, is at stake.
[01:11:14.340 --> 01:11:14.660]  Thank you.
[01:11:25.470 --> 01:11:26.130]  Thank you.
[01:11:28.790 --> 01:11:33.710]  There are a couple things I could say on that, just real quickly, because I think we're running down on time.
[01:11:35.230 --> 01:11:35.650]  But...
[01:11:36.250 --> 01:11:39.310]  We got an extra 20 minutes, so...
[01:11:39.310 --> 01:11:39.550]  Okay.
[01:11:39.630 --> 01:11:40.250]  Keep talking.
[01:11:40.470 --> 01:11:41.530]  We can go till...
[01:11:42.750 --> 01:11:43.990]  We can go till five of.
[01:11:44.990 --> 01:11:45.430]  Okay.
[01:11:51.800 --> 01:11:52.820]  There's a lot there.
[01:11:56.080 --> 01:11:59.460]  One of the things was you touched on patriotism a little bit earlier.
[01:12:00.560 --> 01:12:02.660]  And I think everybody in this room would agree.
[01:12:02.840 --> 01:12:07.160]  You know, most of the time people who attend hacker conferences have already learned this lesson in life.
[01:12:07.800 --> 01:12:15.460]  But being a patriot doesn't mean, you know, obedience to authority.
[01:12:18.210 --> 01:12:27.340]  Putting aside your obligations to your people, to your country, for the benefit of your government, is the opposite of patriotism.
[01:12:28.560 --> 01:12:37.240]  Oaths to authority are one of the most dangerous and corrosive things that a person can agree to in any society, in any culture around the world.
[01:12:37.660 --> 01:12:47.500]  What we require, what we should encourage, are oaths to values, right?
[01:12:47.620 --> 01:12:48.400]  Like our constitution.
[01:12:48.400 --> 01:12:54.140]  If they didn't want us to stand up for our constitution and say, you guys, this is...
[01:12:54.140 --> 01:12:56.720]  the most ridiculous shit I've ever seen.
[01:12:56.900 --> 01:12:59.860]  You know, you're spying on everybody in the country and everybody in the world.
[01:12:59.980 --> 01:13:02.160]  You're not even bothering to get a court order for it.
[01:13:02.220 --> 01:13:04.540]  A real court order instead of your secret court order.
[01:13:07.180 --> 01:13:08.900]  You're not doing anybody any favors.
[01:13:09.600 --> 01:13:24.840]  You know, and if they expect us to do that, if they expect us to stay silent in the face of extraordinary, massive, widespread violations of the constitution, they shouldn't ask us to take the oath in the first place.
[01:13:25.040 --> 01:13:26.760]  You know, because they're not serious about it.
[01:13:31.780 --> 01:13:34.160]  There was something else you mentioned there, but I'm sorry.
[01:13:34.200 --> 01:13:37.180]  I actually have a really short working memory, so I've completely lost it.
[01:13:37.220 --> 01:13:37.820]  I wasn't taking notes.
[01:13:39.500 --> 01:13:40.320]  That's my problem.
[01:13:41.940 --> 01:13:42.700]  You're too young.
[01:13:42.700 --> 01:13:43.360]  You're too young.
[01:13:43.420 --> 01:13:43.500]  You're too young.
[01:13:43.620 --> 01:13:44.000]  That's my problem.
[01:13:46.620 --> 01:13:49.000]  A lifetime of memes and, you know, law cats.
[01:13:49.160 --> 01:13:50.440]  Things like that will do that to you.
[01:13:53.100 --> 01:13:54.040]  What can I say, guys?
[01:13:54.160 --> 01:13:54.900]  Child of the Internet.
[01:13:58.420 --> 01:14:00.080]  But really, it's how do we come together?
[01:14:00.180 --> 01:14:01.200]  How do we fix the problem?
[01:14:01.360 --> 01:14:01.560]  Right?
[01:14:01.640 --> 01:14:05.100]  We know what we have, but the key is you talked about the way things are.
[01:14:05.420 --> 01:14:07.080]  You talked about the system we have today.
[01:14:07.080 --> 01:14:19.840]  You talked about the proclivities of people to sort of protect their own interests to the detriment of the people around them, to the detriment of their own families, to the detriment of themselves for the sake of comfort.
[01:14:20.080 --> 01:14:23.480]  Because comfort is a tremendous, you know, motivating in human force.
[01:14:23.600 --> 01:14:28.860]  When we talk about funny cat pictures, you know, on the Internet, it sounds stupid, but we love these things.
[01:14:29.040 --> 01:14:30.660]  You know, they mean a lot to us.
[01:14:30.660 --> 01:14:45.200]  But the key is, when we talk about the government sort of, you know, again, attacking the hypervisor of our democracy, getting out there and, you know, it's changing the domain, the boundaries of our rights, without telling us about it.
[01:14:45.420 --> 01:14:48.220]  If they can do it to the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment, they can do it to anyone.
[01:14:48.620 --> 01:14:48.940]  Right?
[01:14:49.260 --> 01:14:51.520]  You may say, I don't care about politics.
[01:14:51.780 --> 01:14:53.180]  I don't care about you spying on me.
[01:14:53.300 --> 01:14:54.360]  I care about you spying on me.
[01:14:54.680 --> 01:14:55.520]  It's going to happen.
[01:14:56.060 --> 01:14:56.420]  Right?
[01:14:56.420 --> 01:15:09.500]  When you cede, when you cede not just the privileges, but the rights that are inherent to you, and you sort of make a bargain and say, okay, these aren't rights that are inherent to my nature.
[01:15:09.640 --> 01:15:12.000]  These aren't rights that belong to the human condition.
[01:15:12.140 --> 01:15:14.480]  But these are rights that are given to me by the government.
[01:15:14.740 --> 01:15:16.860]  And they can be sort of peeled back at any time.
[01:15:17.040 --> 01:15:18.160]  You're never going to get those back.
[01:15:18.380 --> 01:15:19.420]  It's going to get worse.
[01:15:20.700 --> 01:15:23.860]  The Founding Fathers said, people get the government they deserve.
[01:15:24.380 --> 01:15:36.420]  And if people aren't willing to stand off, if people aren't willing to take risks to reveal wrongdoing, even if it means they have to burn their own life down to do it, their families are going to have to do it in that society.
[01:15:36.720 --> 01:15:39.460]  Their children and their descendants and everybody after us.
[01:15:39.620 --> 01:15:43.140]  The values that they hold dear will disappear from the world we live in.
[01:15:43.420 --> 01:15:47.500]  And we all have an ability to push back against that.
[01:15:47.580 --> 01:15:50.320]  We all have the ability to contribute.
[01:15:51.200 --> 01:15:54.600]  And the open-source movement is a great example of this.
[01:15:55.320 --> 01:15:57.200]  But it's not limited to programming.
[01:15:58.080 --> 01:15:58.880]  It's politics.
[01:15:59.100 --> 01:15:59.800]  It's the way we live.
[01:15:59.900 --> 01:16:01.040]  It's the way we talk to our friends.
[01:16:01.120 --> 01:16:02.320]  It's the way we talk to our enemies.
[01:16:02.800 --> 01:16:08.060]  We have the ability to build a better, more equal, more fair, and more just society for everybody.
[01:16:08.440 --> 01:16:11.660]  And the advance of technology is a very dangerous and destabilizing thing.
[01:16:11.660 --> 01:16:13.640]  When we don't think about the way this is moving forward.
[01:16:13.760 --> 01:16:18.960]  When we think about the increase in robotization of the workforce.
[01:16:19.620 --> 01:16:24.620]  The fact that we have young people who have tremendous student debt that they're never going to be able to get rid of.
[01:16:26.060 --> 01:16:28.740]  That's not dischargeable for bankruptcy proceedings.
[01:16:28.880 --> 01:16:29.920]  Thanks, government, for that one.
[01:16:31.640 --> 01:16:45.120]  We have a new class that are indentured servants in a very new and modern way that's very corrosive to the sort of egalitarian ideals that we as Americans aspire to uphold.
[01:16:47.080 --> 01:16:56.160]  And if we don't take chances, if we don't take risks to push back and say, look, we have a place in this society.
[01:16:56.160 --> 01:16:57.660]  We have a place in this world.
[01:16:57.880 --> 01:17:14.820]  And if you guys in government are not going to represent the public's interests, if you're going to represent your own interests, if you're going to represent elite interests, if you're going to represent class interests exclusively to the detriment of the electorate that puts you We are actually in that seat.
[01:17:15.100 --> 01:17:18.380]  We are going to rebuild a new society around you.
[01:17:19.120 --> 01:17:26.720]  And thanks to the same technology that screwed us in many ways, we are now empowered in new ways.
[01:17:26.920 --> 01:17:41.100]  You know, when we talk about all of these things, when we talk about mass surveillance, when we talk about the fact that, you know, we've got these famous inquisitors in history that said, give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest man and I'll find something in them to hang him with.
[01:17:41.100 --> 01:17:45.320]  You know, we're not talking about inquisitions from medieval times.
[01:17:45.320 --> 01:17:48.220]  We're talking about Keith Alexander, you know.
[01:17:48.460 --> 01:17:53.900]  And it's up to us to change that because we can revoke that permission from them.
[01:17:54.320 --> 01:18:15.300]  We can try democratically, but if they say no, if they say we're going to exclude you from that debate, if we're going to exclude you from those discussions, if we're going to play games like they're doing in the UK where they passed an extraordinary expansion of surveillance powers just last week under the guise of an emergency law when they've been ignoring the emergency for the last year,
[01:18:17.640 --> 01:18:28.820]  we have not just the capability, but we have an obligation to push back against that and to create the side we want to move in.
[01:18:37.830 --> 01:18:43.990]  So we only have about two minutes left.
[01:18:44.450 --> 01:18:50.330]  Do each of you want to take a minute to address each other or address the audience?
[01:18:51.950 --> 01:19:04.190]  Well, Jesse, we really do agree fundamentally here because you talk about risks, and you talk about bypassing the people who don't take risks in the government, building a new technology.
[01:19:04.550 --> 01:19:08.010]  I just want to say that too will take risk.
[01:19:08.230 --> 01:19:25.310]  In other words, people as we know from Aaron Schwartz, as we know from the others who have gone down here basically, Jeremy Hammond and the others, and Tom Drake who tried to do this, and William Benny, Kurt Wiebe and so have tried within Channels to do all this.
[01:19:25.590 --> 01:19:28.070]  There is risk, even if you don't get prosecuted.
[01:19:28.850 --> 01:19:31.510]  So people will have to be willing in all the service.
[01:19:31.690 --> 01:19:36.550]  Even here, even here, it will take risk possibility.
[01:19:36.730 --> 01:19:43.630]  And remember, Tom Drake yesterday, and Justin, we talk a lot, and you and I talk a lot about the Constitution and rights.
[01:19:43.630 --> 01:19:49.310]  But you know, that's not in the end, that's not the beginning and end of the problem here.
[01:19:49.590 --> 01:19:53.630]  After all, the Constitution authorized slavery for a long time.
[01:19:53.830 --> 01:19:57.350]  The Fugitive Slave Act was upheld by the Supreme Court.
[01:19:57.390 --> 01:20:01.550]  And the people who violated that at great risk were doing the right thing.
[01:20:02.190 --> 01:20:15.870]  When Rosa Parks refused to get up from her seat, she was violating in Montgomery, Alabama, she was violating a law that had been upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court, if that's not an oxymoron of some kind.
[01:20:16.170 --> 01:20:20.250]  But the fact was, it was civil disobedience.
[01:20:20.350 --> 01:20:21.150]  It was necessary.
[01:20:21.530 --> 01:20:38.970]  If they change the law, or I should say, if the Supreme Court upholds for the first time, it's never addressed this question, the Espionage Act, with its strict liability, with its no public interest, without any of the changes that are necessary.
[01:20:39.870 --> 01:20:44.190]  If they uphold that and say it's constitutional, we will have lost pretty much of our First Amendment.
[01:20:44.410 --> 01:20:47.910]  And without the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment and other things.
[01:20:48.390 --> 01:20:51.550]  And that will have to be violated at that point.
[01:20:51.810 --> 01:20:54.410]  There will have to be civil disobedience at that point.
[01:20:54.550 --> 01:21:04.990]  And the Supreme Court will have said five of them, maybe more, maybe six, will have said, it's constitutional to allow for government solely by handout.
[01:21:05.310 --> 01:21:07.250]  And a lot of journalists will live with that.
[01:21:07.490 --> 01:21:17.290]  Michael Kinsley and David Gregory will take their handouts with no problem and allow the government to have the last word as to whether something should be redacted or not.
[01:21:18.510 --> 01:21:20.850]  There will still be newspapers, as in China.
[01:21:21.310 --> 01:21:24.630]  But the fact is, we will have lost the independent branches.
[01:21:24.630 --> 01:21:28.690]  We don't have much in Congress now or in the courts, but something.
[01:21:28.970 --> 01:21:31.170]  We will have lost the ability to rebuild that.
[01:21:31.730 --> 01:21:36.890]  And the effect will be, as I say, more unnecessary wrongful wars.
[01:21:37.170 --> 01:21:41.510]  And so more climate depredation and so forth.
[01:21:41.730 --> 01:21:55.830]  So we need more people like you, as I keep saying, manning others, but also people who are less courageous, if I may say, but who are willing to take some risk and to discover that there are limits to what they will put up with.
[01:21:55.830 --> 01:21:58.470]  That's in this audience and in the government.
[01:21:59.250 --> 01:22:05.030]  And they will quickly find, if they ask that question, that there are limits and I should be willing to take a risk.
[01:22:05.190 --> 01:22:08.490]  They'll discover what I discovered in 1969.
[01:22:09.550 --> 01:22:14.370]  The government has gone beyond those limits for me, and they have to be exposed.
[01:22:16.070 --> 01:22:17.950]  And with that, I think we'll leave it there.
[01:22:18.130 --> 01:22:23.470]  It won't be hard to find the limit if you start asking yourself whether there is a limit and whether you should go across it.
[01:22:24.290 --> 01:22:25.770]  Ed, do you have any closing thoughts?
[01:22:26.190 --> 01:22:26.750]  Ed, Ed.
[01:22:27.930 --> 01:22:36.650]  Just real quickly, look around everybody who's in this room, right?
[01:22:36.970 --> 01:22:44.350]  And recognize that we've got a broad cross-section of people who are thinking about these issues, working on these issues, and affected by these issues.
[01:22:44.530 --> 01:22:47.810]  There are people from the NSA in this room right now.
[01:22:48.430 --> 01:22:51.850]  They pay for travel costs to go to conferences and everything like that.
[01:22:51.970 --> 01:22:55.790]  And then the people who go, they write up little reports and they share it with everybody else.
[01:22:56.050 --> 01:22:58.890]  They go to different tracks so they make sure they see all the fun talks.
[01:23:00.730 --> 01:23:06.110]  But the key is, even for you guys who work for the NSA, who are in the room, I'm not telling you what to do.
[01:23:06.470 --> 01:23:08.130]  I'm not telling you what to believe in.
[01:23:08.730 --> 01:23:10.630]  And it's okay if you hate me.
[01:23:10.690 --> 01:23:12.090]  It's okay if you disagree with me.
[01:23:12.090 --> 01:23:19.350]  It's okay for everybody to look at this because we have to decide how we feel, right?
[01:23:19.430 --> 01:23:23.430]  We've got to stop thinking that what's on the news is the gospel truth.
[01:23:23.610 --> 01:23:27.570]  What an official says behind the podium is exactly the right answer.
[01:23:27.670 --> 01:23:29.570]  Or what I say is something that should be relied on.
[01:23:29.650 --> 01:23:31.110]  I could be totally full of shit.
[01:23:32.190 --> 01:23:35.950]  You've got to figure out what you believe in and stand for it.
[01:23:35.950 --> 01:23:38.770]  You have to stand for it, you know?
[01:23:38.990 --> 01:23:44.990]  And whether I'm a good guy, whether I'm a bad guy, whether I'm a hero, whether I'm a traitor, none of that matters.
[01:23:45.750 --> 01:23:50.970]  Criticize me, hate me, but think about what matters in the issues, right?
[01:23:51.230 --> 01:23:55.290]  Think about the world you want to live in and then be a part of building that.
[01:23:55.590 --> 01:23:57.770]  If I could ask you to do one thing, that would be it.
[01:23:58.150 --> 01:23:59.650]  Thank you to everybody here.
[01:24:00.070 --> 01:24:02.770]  And thank you, Van Ellsberg, for everything you've done.
[01:24:03.010 --> 01:24:03.830]  Thank you very much.
[01:24:19.230 --> 01:24:19.850]  Thank you.
[01:24:25.770 --> 01:24:27.500]  I can hear the whistles really well.
[01:24:32.630 --> 01:24:33.990]  I can hear that even better.
[01:24:39.790 --> 01:24:40.540]  Thank you, everyone.
[01:25:05.910 --> 01:25:06.430]  Thank you.
[01:25:19.430 --> 01:25:20.850]  I really don't know what to say.
[01:25:26.240 --> 01:25:27.960]  Dan, do you know what to do when this happens?
[01:25:31.770 --> 01:25:34.890]  Okay, our hands are going to be hurting for a few days, but it was worth it.
[01:25:35.790 --> 01:25:37.150]  Thank you, Ed Snowden.
[01:25:37.310 --> 01:25:38.370]  Thank you, Daniel Ellsberg.
[01:25:38.370 --> 01:25:39.330]  Thank you, Trevor, Tim.
[01:25:39.530 --> 01:25:42.550]  Thank you, attendees, for making this such an amazing experience.
[01:25:43.310 --> 01:25:44.970]  I think we've really made history today.
[01:25:45.990 --> 01:25:51.110]  Our schedule is a bit late, so things are going to be one hour behind.
[01:25:51.370 --> 01:25:52.550]  One hour and a little bit of change.
[01:25:53.110 --> 01:25:59.070]  So we're going to try and start the next talks on all three tracks as close to 4 o'clock as possible.
[01:25:59.070 --> 01:26:08.770]  Please file orderly into whatever direction you wish to file and continue being responsible and have a lot of fun.
[01:26:11.070 --> 01:26:11.510]  All right.
[01:26:11.790 --> 01:26:12.230]  All right.
[01:26:12.390 --> 01:26:12.810]  We'll see you soon.
[01:26:12.910 --> 01:26:13.390]  All right.