[00:16.060 --> 00:21.400]  After all they said, I could he simply say no.
[00:23.720 --> 00:29.660]  After all they said, he turned away from her to go.
[00:30.040 --> 00:34.080]  She said she wouldn't cry, that was real just a lie.
[00:37.360 --> 00:42.640]  She knows the noises in her mind.
[00:43.480 --> 00:45.380]  Nothing to let us inside.
[00:57.320 --> 01:01.660]  The feeling's gone, she's upside down.
[01:01.980 --> 01:04.880]  The picture's behind her to go.
[01:07.040 --> 01:12.420]  After all they said, could he simply say no.
[01:14.680 --> 01:20.300]  After all they said, he turned away from her to go.
[01:20.820 --> 01:24.840]  She said she wouldn't cry, that was real just a lie.
[01:24.840 --> 01:29.960]  After all they said, could he simply say no.
[01:32.440 --> 01:38.020]  After all they said, he turned away from her to go.
[01:38.500 --> 01:42.280]  She said she wouldn't cry, that was real just a lie.
[01:48.760 --> 01:54.600]  This is supposed to start at 10, but Robert wants four hours and seven minutes.
[01:55.960 --> 01:57.200]  This is Robert Steele.
[01:57.220 --> 01:59.480]  How many of you have seen Robert Steele at past conferences?
[02:00.400 --> 02:00.940]  Excellent.
[02:00.940 --> 02:04.120]  Well, not many.
[02:04.420 --> 02:05.240]  Don't get depressed.
[02:06.720 --> 02:08.420]  Anyway, you guys are going to enjoy yourself.
[02:08.560 --> 02:09.100]  Robert Steele.
[02:16.440 --> 02:19.700]  I think I'm Jello Biafra's evil twin.
[02:20.020 --> 02:21.580]  We were separated at birth.
[02:24.140 --> 02:26.360]  I really love coming to this conference.
[02:27.320 --> 02:29.840]  Because you guys are my breath of fresh air.
[02:29.980 --> 02:31.240]  Guys and gals are my...
[02:31.240 --> 02:35.900]  guys, gals and in-betweens are my breath of fresh air.
[02:38.580 --> 02:42.280]  How many of you heard my hacking national intelligence intro?
[02:43.900 --> 02:45.400]  Okay, so a lot of you missed that.
[02:45.620 --> 02:46.080]  That's okay.
[02:47.700 --> 02:52.000]  www.oss.net has a bunch of stuff.
[02:52.140 --> 02:56.660]  20,000 or more pages of free stuff about open-source intelligence.
[02:56.980 --> 02:58.920]  And it has three reference pages at the top.
[02:59.840 --> 03:00.900]  Is this loud enough?
[03:02.360 --> 03:02.800]  No?
[03:03.180 --> 03:03.660]  Turn it up.
[03:03.800 --> 03:04.840]  Because I'm not going to yell.
[03:05.200 --> 03:05.940]  I'm tired.
[03:06.540 --> 03:07.260]  Turn it up.
[03:07.980 --> 03:08.420]  Somebody?
[03:09.740 --> 03:10.660]  Lazlow with power.
[03:10.780 --> 03:11.120]  There we go.
[03:11.220 --> 03:11.960]  That sounds a little better.
[03:12.880 --> 03:13.320]  Okay.
[03:14.400 --> 03:17.700]  Well, since so many of you didn't hear the other thing, I'll give you a little short story.
[03:17.780 --> 03:20.520]  But let me just tell you that at OSS.net there are three portal pages.
[03:20.880 --> 03:23.640]  One is on why we're failing in the global war on terror.
[03:24.440 --> 03:32.160]  The second is on collective intelligence, which is all those bottom grass roots things that you can pay attention to.
[03:32.380 --> 03:34.740]  And I've been friends with Dead Cow for a while.
[03:34.740 --> 03:36.140]  I still have the original sticker.
[03:36.640 --> 03:39.540]  And I think this hacktivism is a good thing.
[03:39.920 --> 03:43.440]  Anything that reduces censorship and outs corruption is a good thing.
[03:45.680 --> 03:55.340]  www.osint.meetup.com is where you can go to either join an existing OSINT discussion group or start your own.
[03:56.100 --> 04:04.400]  OSINT just happens to be a convenient word for all seven tribes to use as a meetup facility.
[04:04.780 --> 04:05.280]  Okay.
[04:05.420 --> 04:06.900]  I don't own the word OSINT.
[04:07.060 --> 04:08.400]  Nobody owns the word OSINT.
[04:08.580 --> 04:10.900]  It's simply code for public intelligence.
[04:11.280 --> 04:16.180]  It took me a while to talk Laura into doing it because she thought intelligence was too generic a term.
[04:16.180 --> 04:17.780]  But she understood OSINT.
[04:18.360 --> 04:20.580]  So I'd certainly encourage you guys to do that.
[04:21.780 --> 04:29.020]  If you have time, and I'm getting all these admin remarks out of the way in case you just want to leave and go to sleep, which is a very sensible thing that I recommend highly.
[04:31.080 --> 04:37.520]  At Amazon.com, if you go to any one of my books, just look up Robert David Steele and then intelligence is the subject.
[04:38.800 --> 04:50.200]  And those comments where it says, see more about me, it really should say, see my other reviews, my 479 other reviews, and my list of recommended books.
[04:50.220 --> 04:52.840]  I am the number one Amazon reviewer for non-fiction.
[04:53.380 --> 04:54.020]  Thank you.
[04:54.080 --> 04:54.980]  I will go through all of that.
[04:55.320 --> 04:56.400]  God bless you, Lazlow.
[04:58.120 --> 05:02.040]  I'm the number one reviewer of non-fiction about national security and global issues.
[05:02.040 --> 05:07.180]  I'm 53 overall in relation to pulp fiction, movies, and music.
[05:07.740 --> 05:11.420]  And I'm not saying that because that makes me special.
[05:11.420 --> 05:16.320]  I'm saying that because America is reading about national security and global issues.
[05:16.380 --> 05:25.160]  And if you want a real fast, free, two-hour graduate level course on national security, all you have to do is read 479 reviews.
[05:26.040 --> 05:46.220]  Because I have a very systematic coverage of information society, intelligence, quas, spies, secrecy, and all that stuff, emerging threats, international blowback, discontent, hatred for America, strategy, force structure, and then finally U.S. politics and how it's screwing up our national security.
[05:49.040 --> 05:50.460]  Has everybody seen my jacket?
[05:51.400 --> 05:52.020]  Okay.
[05:56.620 --> 05:57.060]  No.
[05:57.580 --> 05:59.940]  Actually, it's a very cheap hex jacket.
[05:59.940 --> 06:02.860]  And I've got a hole in my ass that you can't see from there.
[06:04.340 --> 06:08.980]  From where my watch has been cutting in when I go for my wallet.
[06:09.620 --> 06:10.060]  What's that?
[06:12.920 --> 06:15.160]  I do occasionally go into Infoglut.
[06:15.160 --> 06:15.620]  I'm sorry.
[06:17.040 --> 06:19.440]  But I actually have a couple of structured briefs.
[06:20.120 --> 06:24.300]  But since so many of you missed the other thing, let me just tell you a tiny little bit about where I came from.
[06:25.640 --> 06:28.720]  Because it cost you $20 million for me to get smart.
[06:31.580 --> 06:33.720]  I started out as the son of an oil man.
[06:33.940 --> 06:36.520]  I did 10 years in Latin America, 10 years in Asia.
[06:37.540 --> 06:39.380]  Four years in Vietnam as a kid.
[06:39.860 --> 06:45.120]  Going through 10 coup d'etats, including the one where Diem was murdered, with CIA complicity.
[06:46.820 --> 06:49.180]  Trading cigarettes for bullets after each coup.
[06:49.380 --> 06:51.840]  And then starting golf courses on fire by accident.
[06:52.680 --> 06:54.300]  As I burned the gunpowder.
[06:54.720 --> 06:56.420]  My 14-year-old is going through this now.
[06:59.240 --> 07:01.480]  Came back, went to graduate school.
[07:01.740 --> 07:03.460]  Got a masters in predicting revolution.
[07:03.880 --> 07:07.200]  Decided I'd become too intellectual, so I joined the United States Marine Corps.
[07:08.260 --> 07:10.320]  That had the desired rounding effect.
[07:10.740 --> 07:11.980]  I learned the F word.
[07:14.160 --> 07:15.560]  And I just love it.
[07:15.660 --> 07:17.800]  I mean, any of you that are considering joining the U.S. military, or the U.S. intelligence community, or your local police counterintelligence, do it.
[07:23.220 --> 07:25.860]  You get one chance in your life to join these clubs.
[07:25.860 --> 07:29.480]  And even if you quit after two or three years, it will change you forever.
[07:29.900 --> 07:31.620]  These are all good people.
[07:32.180 --> 07:34.480]  Good, well-meaning people, badly managed.
[07:34.860 --> 07:35.380]  Okay?
[07:35.960 --> 07:39.780]  And we can talk about that in the interactive period after the toucan briefs.
[07:40.900 --> 07:44.180]  But I then found garrison duty very boring.
[07:44.440 --> 07:47.300]  I missed the Vietnam War as a uniformed officer.
[07:47.360 --> 07:48.540]  I was in infantry.
[07:49.040 --> 07:50.540]  So I joined the CIA.
[07:51.200 --> 07:55.100]  And I was very glad to be part of the CIA and a clandestine case officer.
[07:56.220 --> 08:00.360]  Came out from undercover after TOEFL wrote a chapter about me called The Future of the Spy.
[08:03.640 --> 08:15.740]  And did six tours, three overseas clandestine tours, three tours in Washington doing imagery, signals, advanced information technology, smart maps that remember operational histories of a city.
[08:15.900 --> 08:19.440]  So if you're going to go do a dead drop, it reminds you the police chief lives there.
[08:20.080 --> 08:21.440]  You know, things like that.
[08:22.040 --> 08:23.080]  And that was fun.
[08:23.080 --> 08:26.920]  And then the Marine Corps invited me to come stand up to Marine Corps Intelligence Center.
[08:27.360 --> 08:45.040]  Now, up to this point, I think hackers, Jesuits, and spies share one common characteristic, which is they're absolutely certain they are gods that walk three feet off the planet and can do no wrong.
[08:45.860 --> 08:56.540]  So it was a real shock for me, having been a spy who was a god, to actually have to stand up a new national intelligence production facility and produce intelligence.
[08:57.080 --> 09:16.860]  And after spending $20 million, including $10 million for a capability to touch anything that NSA, CIA, FBI, all of these guys produced, I was absolutely stunned to find out that 80 to 90% of what I needed to do policy intelligence, acquisition or procurement intelligence,
[09:17.080 --> 09:28.880]  which is what do we build and buy with your taxpayer dollar, and operational intelligence, 80 to 90% of it was not secret, not in English, not online, and not known to anybody in Washington.
[09:29.140 --> 09:30.580]  This just blew my mind.
[09:30.860 --> 09:33.720]  So I got permission from my general.
[09:33.940 --> 09:35.640]  I spent four years trying to teach the U.S. intelligence community from inside the government, finally gave up.
[09:40.020 --> 09:42.800]  Got permission from my general to run an international conference.
[09:42.940 --> 09:45.100]  We were expecting 150 insiders to show up.
[09:45.760 --> 09:51.100]  629 people showed up, including 15 Swedes, which tells you something about the Swedish early warning network.
[09:52.900 --> 09:53.640]  They're good.
[09:53.860 --> 09:54.760]  Watch your wallet.
[09:57.540 --> 09:58.440]  They're very good.
[09:58.540 --> 09:59.360]  I respect them a lot.
[09:59.960 --> 10:05.600]  So the lawyer said, okay, you had permission for the first one, but now you're famous so you can't do it again.
[10:06.500 --> 10:06.980]  Hello?
[10:07.760 --> 10:09.920]  I succeeded so I can't do it again?
[10:10.500 --> 10:13.100]  This is the logic of bureaucracy and the law.
[10:14.060 --> 10:15.080]  So I resigned.
[10:15.260 --> 10:16.740]  I've given up three retirements.
[10:16.940 --> 10:24.360]  I bet my house, signed a contract with the hotel, and I've been doing these conferences every year.
[10:24.920 --> 10:26.720]  called Global Information Forum.
[10:26.840 --> 10:31.340]  And they're basically about open-source intelligence, intelligence reform, and stuff like that.
[10:31.520 --> 10:39.860]  And unbeknownst to me until this year, the term collective intelligence is acquiring importance everywhere else.
[10:40.100 --> 10:50.080]  And so if you're going to Google, Google for collective intelligence, and then Google for open-source intelligence and OSINT, and you'll get to the cream, such as it is on Google.
[10:51.460 --> 10:53.180]  All right, is that enough of an introduction?
[10:56.210 --> 11:02.330]  All right, this brief is one I've been giving all over the country for the American Committees on Foreign Relations.
[11:03.450 --> 11:05.850]  And I think this headline talks about you guys.
[11:06.590 --> 11:09.390]  A nation's best defense is an educated citizenry.
[11:09.810 --> 11:13.310]  I think hackers have matured tremendously in the last 10 years.
[11:14.730 --> 11:30.150]  I think you now need to become more organized, more structured, and I think we all need to go back to our neighborhoods, and we need to basically have this OSINT meetup kind of thing where once a month, police intelligence, business intelligence, academic intelligence,
[11:30.390 --> 11:32.750]  religious intelligence, these seven tribes are all together.
[11:32.750 --> 11:41.970]  And for those of you that missed the morning speech yesterday, at OSS.net, in the OSINT portal, if you look down, you'll see the OSINT story.
[11:42.330 --> 11:45.030]  It's got the 10-page version of what I said yesterday.
[11:45.330 --> 11:56.030]  And so there are seven tribes, national, military, law enforcement, business, academic, NGO journalists, and then religions, labor unions, and citizens.
[11:56.330 --> 12:08.630]  And these seven tribes need to establish seven areas of standards for data capture, data processing, analytic tradecraft, analytic toolkits, defensive counterintelligence, training and leadership.
[12:08.990 --> 12:13.190]  And then these seven standards, these seven tribes, need to focus on seven issues.
[12:13.630 --> 12:15.630]  Seven big issues in every community.
[12:15.790 --> 12:18.350]  Public health, education, things like that.
[12:18.570 --> 12:18.930]  Okay?
[12:19.190 --> 12:22.750]  So this brief is my orientation to the real world.
[12:26.230 --> 12:31.290]  This is what $70 billion a year is buying, a lot of red space.
[12:33.910 --> 12:38.930]  You're paying $70 billion a year for 2% of what can be known.
[12:39.930 --> 12:45.390]  Basically, I did my second graduate thesis from the University of Oklahoma on what U.S. embassies collect, what the U.S. government collects overseas in all of its forms.
[12:49.630 --> 12:54.730]  And it turns out that embassies are staffed by State Department officers that are in the minority.
[12:55.110 --> 12:58.910]  They have no money with which to pay for legal, ethical information.
[12:59.410 --> 13:03.250]  They're limited by the physics of a 24-hour day and who is willing to be seen with them.
[13:03.730 --> 13:10.050]  The spies, on the other hand, have an unlimited amount of money, but require that you commit treason as a condition for listening to you.
[13:11.210 --> 13:12.830]  Somewhere in here is a pathology.
[13:13.570 --> 13:14.010]  Okay?
[13:14.490 --> 13:15.710]  Spies have too much money.
[13:15.790 --> 13:16.930]  The diplomats don't have enough.
[13:16.930 --> 13:18.210]  We've got to fix that.
[13:18.430 --> 13:23.210]  But this is my informed judgment about what we're actually collecting with this $70 billion.
[13:23.750 --> 13:31.690]  This is the National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, United Nations State, and then the clandestine service.
[13:32.530 --> 13:35.070]  We don't even try to access most information.
[13:35.430 --> 13:40.150]  We don't have people going to listen to every mosque brief worldwide.
[13:40.150 --> 13:44.490]  We don't have people reading Arabic newspapers and neighborhood stuff.
[13:45.050 --> 13:48.070]  We don't even have people reading Hebrew properly.
[13:49.250 --> 13:51.710]  So we can understand the descent in Israel.
[13:52.150 --> 13:58.550]  We don't try and process all of this hard copy stuff into digital, and we can't translate most of what we collect.
[14:00.770 --> 14:02.890]  OSS works in 29 plus languages.
[14:03.970 --> 14:08.950]  This is what it looked like after 9-11, and certainly this should be close to home for those of you from New York.
[14:08.950 --> 14:14.830]  There is such a thing as evil, and we do have to deal with that evil, but I'm going to give you a larger context.
[14:15.670 --> 14:17.770]  These are the players in World War III.
[14:20.710 --> 14:33.190]  Bacteria, and corporate corruption, and ethnic criminal gangs as well as terrorists, and failed nation states, and inattentive citizens.
[14:34.610 --> 14:38.710]  It means most of us are the threats.
[14:40.490 --> 14:41.930]  I'm writing my third book.
[14:42.470 --> 14:49.150]  My first two books, just so you don't think I'm really too far off the reservation, were each had a forward written by a senator.
[14:49.970 --> 14:52.290]  Senator Boren wrote the forward to the first book.
[14:52.390 --> 14:54.410]  Senator Roberts wrote the forward to the second book.
[14:55.110 --> 14:58.750]  They were the past and the present serving chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
[14:58.950 --> 15:04.810]  So don't think of me as some kind of stone-throwing flame-throwing radical that's trying to burn down the IC.
[15:05.190 --> 15:07.750]  This is tough love for the approval of some senators.
[15:08.490 --> 15:10.010]  We need to fix this place.
[15:10.450 --> 15:15.530]  And my third book is on how intelligence is having absolutely no impact on how we spend the taxpayer dollar.
[15:16.170 --> 15:28.650]  We have too much of a heavy metal military, too much technical secret collection, not enough humans, not enough technical processing, not enough state and local intelligence, not enough focus on these other issues.
[15:29.870 --> 15:36.750]  Now for those of you new to this concept of national intelligence, these are the pieces.
[15:38.010 --> 15:41.750]  Collection, covert action, analysis, counterintelligence, leadership.
[15:42.070 --> 15:43.760]  And I want to make two points with this slide.
[15:43.760 --> 15:49.040]  The first is, none of the outer four pieces can work if you have shitty leadership.
[15:49.720 --> 15:53.300]  Which we have had in the U.S. intelligence community for the last 15 years.
[15:54.040 --> 15:54.560]  Okay?
[15:54.900 --> 15:57.260]  We have had really rotten leadership.
[15:59.300 --> 16:00.720]  And a lack of courage.
[16:00.800 --> 16:03.200]  A lack of courage to speak truth to policy.
[16:04.020 --> 16:08.300]  And secondly, all of these pieces have to work together.
[16:08.680 --> 16:13.620]  If you don't have good counterintelligence, then everything you accomplish is worthless.
[16:13.620 --> 16:17.620]  The FBI is just now coming to grips with the fact that it's been penetrated by the Turks.
[16:18.560 --> 16:19.000]  Okay?
[16:19.340 --> 16:21.200]  And the FBI is lying to the public.
[16:21.340 --> 16:27.580]  They're trying to repress an FBI officer's public testimony on the fact that they've been penetrated.
[16:27.580 --> 16:44.160]  on the fact that U.S. citizens doing Arabic translations for the FBI have either refused to translate other Muslims' tape recordings, or even worse, they have provided innocuous translations that have nothing to do with the actual words being said.
[16:45.240 --> 16:48.760]  And the FBI is clueless, or has been clueless up to this point.
[16:48.760 --> 16:50.680]  And now it's not clueless, it's in denial.
[16:51.320 --> 16:51.820]  Okay?
[16:51.960 --> 16:52.820]  The system's broken.
[16:54.500 --> 16:57.940]  Now, everyone asks me, what went wrong in 9-11?
[16:59.000 --> 17:04.520]  And I like to say, there's never an intelligence failure without a preceding and accompanying policy failure.
[17:05.080 --> 17:08.820]  So here's the slide on intelligence, and then I have another one on policy failures.
[17:09.640 --> 17:11.040]  Our satellites went deaf.
[17:11.740 --> 17:23.840]  Just like Reagan blew the fact that we were listening to the Politburo cell phones, and they went silent the next day, a U.S. senator blew the fact that we were listening to Bin Laden's satellite phone calls to his mother and others.
[17:23.840 --> 17:26.560]  He went off the air immediately.
[17:27.560 --> 17:29.240]  Our spies are incompetent.
[17:29.980 --> 17:36.860]  Robert Baer has written the two definitive books on the failure of spying in relation to Saudi Arabia and the Arabs.
[17:37.300 --> 17:43.660]  And in his second book, he also focuses on the fact that we also refused to do open-source information collection.
[17:43.940 --> 17:51.260]  And we refused to actually try and understand anything internal to Saudi Arabia, believing that the Saudis would tell us what we needed to know.
[17:51.700 --> 17:52.860]  How dumb is that?
[17:53.520 --> 17:56.120]  The FBI is still in the pencil and paper mode.
[17:56.280 --> 18:02.440]  Roughly 80 to 85 percent of what your U.S. intelligence community knows is in paper and pencil.
[18:03.080 --> 18:04.700]  It's in hard copy files.
[18:04.800 --> 18:06.000]  It hasn't been digitized.
[18:06.100 --> 18:07.800]  It is extremely difficult to get at.
[18:08.020 --> 18:09.440]  We'll talk about that more later.
[18:09.720 --> 18:11.140]  We don't do translation.
[18:11.500 --> 18:19.320]  The FBI captured an entire apartment building full of Arabic documents after the first 9-11 bombing, the car bombing that failed.
[18:19.780 --> 18:21.020]  They didn't translate them.
[18:21.520 --> 18:26.940]  There was one guy in the New York office that spoke Arabic and he felt he was much too important to be doing that kind of stuff.
[18:27.580 --> 18:29.480]  And there was no money for translating.
[18:29.700 --> 18:34.180]  And the FBI culture is inherently against sharing anything with anybody.
[18:34.180 --> 18:35.140]  Okay?
[18:36.120 --> 18:47.960]  So, I think the CIA is really the most to blame for failing to penetrate and notice the fact that in 1989, the Saudi government told bin Laden to go radicalize all Muslims everywhere.
[18:47.960 --> 18:53.680]  But the FBI has blown it in several considerable ways, including turning away two walk-ins.
[18:54.160 --> 18:58.880]  One in Orlando, Florida, and one in Newark, New Jersey, both of whom had names of the hijackers.
[18:59.060 --> 19:04.180]  And the FBI mentality is such that these were what we call virgin terrorists.
[19:04.180 --> 19:08.820]  They weren't on anybody's database, so the FBI came back and said, well, these guys aren't in our records.
[19:09.380 --> 19:10.860]  You must be a bullshit artist.
[19:11.000 --> 19:11.460]  Get out of here.
[19:12.580 --> 19:14.040]  This is the FBI mentality.
[19:15.200 --> 19:21.920]  Someone tries to report 9-11, and they don't have the names of the new guys that are going to do it, and they throw the source out of the office.
[19:22.680 --> 19:25.320]  That is just utterly amazing to me.
[19:26.560 --> 19:28.900]  Processing, there's no single place where it all comes together.
[19:29.140 --> 19:34.240]  There are all these stovepipes, all these straws, all this inability to share, no standards for...
[19:34.240 --> 19:37.200]  There's no XML, RSS in the intelligence community.
[19:37.980 --> 19:40.980]  There's no security attributes and stuff you can put together.
[19:41.240 --> 19:44.520]  A lot of these people are still using 1970s computers.
[19:45.360 --> 19:45.840]  Okay?
[19:46.220 --> 19:47.820]  I mean, this is the Stone Age.
[19:48.400 --> 20:01.880]  In fact, John Perry Barlow, who's a friend, I brought him in, and Howard Rheingold in 1992, he did a thing for Forbes in which he said, if you want to see what the Soviet Union computing environment looks like, visit the CIA.
[20:05.620 --> 20:06.020]  Okay?
[20:06.160 --> 20:07.160]  Now, analysis...
[20:07.560 --> 20:10.780]  I was privy to the results of a study done immediately after 9-11.
[20:11.480 --> 20:17.540]  We collected two-thirds of the dots, and we spilled half of those dots on the way to the analysts.
[20:17.540 --> 20:25.700]  And with the remaining half, the third of the dots that the analysts got, they basically couldn't connect them.
[20:25.880 --> 20:27.180]  They weren't language qualified.
[20:27.180 --> 20:28.480]  They didn't understand culture.
[20:28.600 --> 20:29.620]  They didn't understand history.
[20:29.820 --> 20:37.500]  And I want to point out to you that two years prior to 9-11, Yosef Bodansky wrote a book called Bin Laden, The Man Who Declared War in America.
[20:38.700 --> 20:42.420]  Nobody wanted to read or buy that book until after 9-11.
[20:43.300 --> 20:51.180]  In 1994, Steve Emerson went out to all the mosques in America and did covert videotapes of imans on U.S. soil calling for the death of U.S. citizens.
[20:54.040 --> 20:58.020]  And it was a PBS broadcast that was widely ignored.
[20:58.020 --> 20:59.020]  Okay?
[20:59.620 --> 21:08.780]  We knew more about Bin Laden and terrorism on August 6th from open-sources than the intelligence community knew from closed-sources.
[21:09.580 --> 21:18.440]  But sock puppet got the sock puppet brief from classified sources that was completely ignorable.
[21:19.540 --> 21:20.580]  And then liaison.
[21:20.880 --> 21:21.720]  Business as usual.
[21:22.480 --> 21:27.140]  Your government is excessively dependent on foreign liaison.
[21:28.000 --> 21:31.480]  We allow other governments to tell us what they want us to know.
[21:31.600 --> 21:35.840]  And we are so naive that we really think that's good enough.
[21:36.560 --> 21:41.440]  And it's even worse than that because I don't think we need to steal secrets against other governments by and large.
[21:41.680 --> 21:43.780]  I think it's governments against gangs now.
[21:43.900 --> 21:44.760]  That's World War III.
[21:44.760 --> 21:49.580]  But we're so naive, we're not even willing to invest the money in open-sources of information.
[21:50.120 --> 21:51.840]  And finally, our mindset is modeled.
[21:51.980 --> 21:52.640]  Now, policy.
[21:53.200 --> 21:56.820]  I guess I've done some of these things in the earlier slide.
[21:57.320 --> 21:59.420]  But policy was the oblivious frog.
[22:00.320 --> 22:14.680]  One of the reasons that I think national security is not playing as big in this run-up to the election is that Bill Clinton had the intellectual runts of the 21st century running his national security policy.
[22:15.880 --> 22:21.260]  Madeleine Albright deliberately repressed reports on terrorism getting worse under Clinton.
[22:21.920 --> 22:24.960]  She did not want the American public to worry.
[22:24.960 --> 22:35.920]  And unfortunately, the American public wasn't willing to notice the barracks bombing in Saudi Arabia, two embassy bombings, the assassination outside CIA, the coal.
[22:36.480 --> 22:39.660]  These were very serious, significant events.
[22:39.660 --> 22:47.080]  And we understood that suicide was an emerging method.
[22:47.420 --> 22:56.300]  And we actually had Senators Hart and Rudman say that hijacking aircraft as flying bombs is a viable means of surprise, attack.
[22:57.000 --> 22:59.320]  But the policy world didn't want to hear it.
[22:59.880 --> 23:01.880]  Dick Clark's book is a fine book.
[23:02.020 --> 23:04.620]  There are a lot of people in the military that hate Dick Clark.
[23:04.620 --> 23:07.320]  There are a lot of people in the intelligence community that hate Dick Clark.
[23:09.200 --> 23:10.680]  I see good in everybody.
[23:11.060 --> 23:15.980]  And I think Dick Clark is 80% right in his book and his concerns.
[23:16.100 --> 23:18.180]  And by the way, his book also has some success stories.
[23:18.500 --> 23:20.960]  Did you know there's a nuclear bomb in the middle of Atlanta?
[23:21.960 --> 23:24.420]  It's the Georgia University nuclear plant.
[23:25.120 --> 23:30.100]  Okay, Dick Clark and one of his people pointed this out to the FBI in the run-up to the Atlanta games.
[23:31.260 --> 23:34.120]  And a lot of good things happened in Atlanta security.
[23:34.120 --> 23:35.800]  This is not all negative.
[23:36.840 --> 23:41.140]  But we accepted all of this and we accepted the lack of action by other nations.
[23:41.320 --> 23:42.980]  Now this is the global processing failure.
[23:43.660 --> 23:46.340]  This is actually a CIA chart that was given to me.
[23:46.800 --> 23:51.260]  It was made in the late 1990s and it evaluated the cost versus the satisfaction.
[23:51.600 --> 23:59.220]  For measurements and signatures, intelligence, imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, state, clandestine intelligence, human, and then OSINT.
[24:00.540 --> 24:01.960]  I added the bullseye.
[24:02.400 --> 24:11.700]  There is no one place in the U.S. government where this all comes together and you can do a mind map, brimstone, elucidon visualization of this stuff.
[24:12.600 --> 24:16.520]  And to the extent that people are doing visualizations, it's fat fingering eye too.
[24:17.320 --> 24:18.260]  Doesn't cut it.
[24:18.260 --> 24:19.340]  Okay?
[24:19.520 --> 24:24.060]  By and large, our visualization programs are retarded and way too expensive.
[24:24.940 --> 24:26.480]  Now this is the real world.
[24:27.560 --> 24:36.860]  In 2002, which is the last year for which I have the stats for everything, there were 23 low intensity conflicts killing over a thousand people each between states.
[24:39.120 --> 24:46.960]  79 conflicts between states killing fewer than a thousand people and 175 violent political conflicts internal to states.
[24:48.980 --> 24:52.960]  There were 18 genocide campaigns going on in 2002.
[24:53.360 --> 24:56.740]  And if you really want to get into genocide, I will tell you two things.
[24:56.900 --> 25:00.660]  First, the holocaust museum pisses me off because it only has one holocaust.
[25:01.580 --> 25:02.020]  Okay?
[25:02.380 --> 25:04.780]  There have actually been 72 holocausts.
[25:05.260 --> 25:07.620]  And there are 18 of them going on right now.
[25:07.980 --> 25:11.880]  And I think we need to understand that genocide is not exclusively jewish.
[25:13.080 --> 25:15.360]  It is actually an international problem.
[25:15.660 --> 25:19.300]  And we tend to ignore the black genocides and that troubles me also.
[25:20.720 --> 25:25.920]  Dr. Greg Stanton, genocidewatch.com, is the living authority on all of this.
[25:26.020 --> 25:27.480]  I encourage you to visit his website.
[25:27.480 --> 25:31.220]  And he talks about how all genocides are predictable.
[25:32.120 --> 25:37.680]  There are the eight stages of genocide, including the early stages when you vilify people.
[25:38.040 --> 25:44.480]  And you kind of begin the propaganda of setting the stage for killing these alien intruders.
[25:46.180 --> 25:47.820]  Genocide is preventable.
[25:47.980 --> 25:50.760]  We've chosen not to prevent it in too many cases.
[25:50.920 --> 25:53.960]  I just finished reviewing General Dallieri's book in Rwanda.
[25:54.480 --> 26:07.860]  Eight nations, I think it was eight nations, including Belgium and the United States, explicitly said that saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of Rwandas was not worth one single additional Western life to be risked.
[26:08.100 --> 26:09.160]  That is a travesty.
[26:09.620 --> 26:12.420]  That is a loss of humanity on a scale beyond comprehension.
[26:13.440 --> 26:15.060]  We're going to run out of water.
[26:15.920 --> 26:20.140]  This is the world of water.
[26:21.060 --> 26:32.880]  And you'll note that the water scarcity coincides with the ethnic fault lines between Europe and Muslim North Arab, Arabia, and between Russia and China.
[26:34.060 --> 26:36.360]  Other global threats to local survival.
[26:36.520 --> 26:38.220]  My wife calls me gloom and doom, by the way.
[26:39.760 --> 26:41.400]  This is my cheerful brief.
[26:43.100 --> 26:48.020]  Other threats to global survival include complex emergencies involving 32 countries.
[26:48.180 --> 26:49.460]  These are called failed states.
[26:50.500 --> 26:54.020]  Millions and millions of displaced refugees in 66 countries.
[26:54.020 --> 26:58.920]  With all of the attendant crime, corruption, and so on, disease that comes with that.
[26:59.700 --> 27:01.480]  Starvation in 33 countries.
[27:02.080 --> 27:04.920]  Modern plagues in 59 countries and rising.
[27:05.160 --> 27:08.100]  I mean, we're talking Ebola reaching Kansas a couple of years ago.
[27:08.360 --> 27:15.100]  In fact, I had a TV marathon as I was trying to rest and saw the hot zone again, which was lots of fun.
[27:16.300 --> 27:17.460]  Child soldiers.
[27:18.400 --> 27:22.000]  I have two and a half teenagers.
[27:22.380 --> 27:31.560]  And I finally understand that they don't have this responsible node that distinguishes between killing people with a real gun and video games.
[27:32.680 --> 27:34.580]  Child soldiers are vicious.
[27:35.580 --> 27:37.520]  Child soldiers are dangerous.
[27:37.520 --> 27:40.640]  And if a child is a soldier, then something has broken.
[27:41.120 --> 27:44.820]  We have water scarcity, ethnic conflict, resource wars, corruption.
[27:45.380 --> 27:46.500]  Corruption and censorship.
[27:46.680 --> 27:48.820]  That's what collective intelligence defeats.
[27:49.520 --> 27:52.500]  And I love the hacker activism and this whole concept.
[27:52.620 --> 27:53.740]  We have to get informed.
[27:54.920 --> 28:00.920]  Now, when I brief generals in England and other places, I always say asymmetric war really stands for, gee, I wish I'd thought of that first.
[28:01.660 --> 28:02.140]  Okay?
[28:02.580 --> 28:07.260]  Because what it is is an out-of-the-box, usually one-of thing.
[28:08.360 --> 28:20.040]  Bin Laden for $500,000 has cost us $100 billion in actual lost revenue and has increased the deficit of the United States by perhaps a trillion.
[28:20.640 --> 28:24.200]  Well, $7 trillion is cumulative, but let's give him credit for $1 trillion.
[28:25.140 --> 28:29.100]  Jesus, $500,000 invested, $1 trillion deficit.
[28:29.220 --> 28:30.740]  That's a hell of a return on investment.
[28:31.080 --> 28:32.600]  He can win that war.
[28:33.640 --> 28:36.880]  He can nickel and dime us to death because we're being stupid.
[28:37.040 --> 28:38.180]  And we'll get into that later.
[28:39.360 --> 28:41.380]  These are the vulnerabilities on the home front.
[28:41.520 --> 28:45.480]  I actually created this slide in the mid-1990s and no one wanted to listen to me then either.
[28:48.360 --> 28:50.080]  9-11, I know, you guys.
[28:50.240 --> 28:51.400]  I mean, but you're a cheap date.
[28:54.980 --> 28:55.940]  No, I love you.
[28:56.060 --> 28:56.900]  Thank you for listening.
[28:56.900 --> 28:59.720]  It truly warms my heart to be here.
[29:01.060 --> 29:02.900]  But, you know, these are the problems.
[29:03.820 --> 29:08.300]  Tunnels, pipelines, bridges, dams, towers, power, financial, comms, transportation.
[29:08.600 --> 29:12.280]  I mean, someone was telling me there are two main power lines coming down from Canada.
[29:12.400 --> 29:13.680]  Either one is a cinch to cut.
[29:15.180 --> 29:20.320]  A friend of mine, General Minahan, did a study of Falcon Air Force Base.
[29:20.320 --> 29:22.880]  He took it down, only attacking off-base points.
[29:23.340 --> 29:26.920]  All he had to touch was the water and the power and the other stuff coming in from off-base.
[29:27.060 --> 29:27.700]  They were out of Schlitz.
[29:28.420 --> 29:30.820]  Economic blahs, we've seen what 9-11 did to us.
[29:30.900 --> 29:31.500]  Data corruption.
[29:31.640 --> 29:32.620]  You want to hurt a capitalist?
[29:33.300 --> 29:34.460]  Don't bomb his house.
[29:34.820 --> 29:36.180]  Move his decimal point.
[29:38.600 --> 29:39.040]  Okay?
[29:39.320 --> 29:40.340]  And then public health.
[29:40.680 --> 29:46.700]  The day will come when 50 terrorists infected with smallpox voluntarily glad hand their way across America.
[29:47.320 --> 29:52.440]  And I really, I strive not to go too far on the hyperbole and stuff, but I'm trying to make a point here.
[29:53.000 --> 29:57.040]  This country has not invested in public health in the last 15 to 20 years.
[29:57.640 --> 30:02.020]  Laurie Garrett wrote a wonderful book called Betrayal of Trust, The Global Collapse of Public Health.
[30:02.120 --> 30:04.580]  We suck in terms of this.
[30:04.660 --> 30:12.300]  And what's happening is that diseases are migrating from animals to humans, and diseases are meeting up in common hosts and mutating.
[30:12.800 --> 30:13.280]  Okay?
[30:13.560 --> 30:18.600]  So just in the last couple of months, we've had bird flu, monkey pox, you know, a whole bunch of things.
[30:19.960 --> 30:22.180]  This stuff is getting very, very scary.
[30:22.580 --> 30:28.280]  The day will come when airplanes and offices have to guarantee the security of their air.
[30:29.240 --> 30:29.720]  Okay?
[30:30.640 --> 30:32.660]  It's probably 10 to 15 years away.
[30:32.860 --> 30:37.840]  But someone is going to pay a premium one of these days for guaranteed clean, uncontaminated air.
[30:37.840 --> 30:41.300]  Or we're going to be walking around with these little nostril masks.
[30:42.740 --> 30:43.960]  So what has changed?
[30:44.260 --> 30:50.420]  What's changed is it's no longer about a heavy metal military kicking ass over there to be watched on the nightly news.
[30:50.720 --> 30:51.800]  It's here at home.
[30:52.580 --> 30:54.160]  It's not state on state.
[30:54.160 --> 30:54.980]  It's individual.
[30:55.680 --> 30:57.440]  It's distributed net war.
[30:58.200 --> 30:59.540]  And it's here at home.
[30:59.800 --> 31:01.020]  And guess what?
[31:01.020 --> 31:03.200]  The government can't protect you.
[31:04.560 --> 31:06.160]  Only you can protect you.
[31:07.500 --> 31:10.500]  This is one of the early things on taking down the West.
[31:11.120 --> 31:17.320]  This draws heavily on Peter Black's Wired magazine article and work that I've done with Winn Schwartau and others.
[31:17.920 --> 31:20.960]  Federal Reserve is down to one hot computer, one cold backup.
[31:21.580 --> 31:22.520]  Internet switches.
[31:22.700 --> 31:23.240]  There are two.
[31:23.380 --> 31:24.280]  MAE West, MAE East.
[31:25.280 --> 31:26.320]  Satellite downlinks.
[31:26.320 --> 31:28.340]  Most satellite downlinks for the U.S. government are within an anti-tank distance from the road.
[31:33.080 --> 31:34.280]  From outside the wire.
[31:35.440 --> 31:39.040]  And when NSA lost its satellite for three days through its own...
[31:39.040 --> 31:40.600]  By the way, I really want to emphasize this.
[31:40.660 --> 31:43.240]  If you didn't hear this this morning, we don't need terrorists to screw us up.
[31:43.300 --> 31:44.020]  We're doing it ourself.
[31:46.040 --> 31:48.160]  I mean, Bin Laden is just the icing on the cake.
[31:49.500 --> 31:56.540]  The crap that corporations are allowing Bill Gates and others to get away with is treason.
[31:57.380 --> 31:59.940]  We are buying shitty stuff.
[32:07.310 --> 32:10.990]  Gates doesn't know this, but if I'm ever president, I'm nationalizing Microsoft.
[32:13.670 --> 32:17.290]  And his ass will be in jail until he agrees to settle for one billion.
[32:19.330 --> 32:20.870]  And then physical targets.
[32:21.030 --> 32:22.370]  You know, this is not about cyber war.
[32:22.630 --> 32:25.410]  There are lots of physical places where we can be hurt.
[32:25.970 --> 32:26.910]  Alaska pipeline.
[32:27.450 --> 32:32.490]  In fact, in Arizona, a gas pipeline blew and people were back in line for gasoline.
[32:32.890 --> 32:35.050]  You know, all of these pipelines are so vulnerable.
[32:35.550 --> 32:38.770]  Panama Canal, 35% of our hard goods.
[32:39.310 --> 32:40.090]  Telephone switches.
[32:40.290 --> 32:43.830]  There are a lot of police stations that haven't changed the original password.
[32:44.450 --> 32:47.350]  So it's real easy to go in and say, hey, Bubba's...
[32:47.350 --> 32:48.330]  Actually, you don't tell them.
[32:48.410 --> 32:55.470]  You go in and you make sure that every phone in the detective division also is recorded at that really small apartment down the street.
[32:56.830 --> 32:58.890]  They don't know that there's a back door.
[32:59.170 --> 33:00.650]  I mean, it's just amazing to me.
[33:01.030 --> 33:02.150]  You know that, of course.
[33:04.210 --> 33:04.610]  Cables.
[33:04.890 --> 33:06.830]  We have these big signs that say, cut here.
[33:08.310 --> 33:08.870]  You know?
[33:09.050 --> 33:11.230]  I mean, we're literally pointing all of this stuff out.
[33:11.230 --> 33:12.310]  And then dams, levees.
[33:12.450 --> 33:18.250]  I mean, New Orleans is toast if an oil service vehicle happens to explode next to the levee.
[33:18.610 --> 33:20.470]  I think we need to talk about these things.
[33:20.590 --> 33:20.970]  Tunnels.
[33:21.250 --> 33:22.570]  Tunnels scare the shit out of me.
[33:23.550 --> 33:24.390]  So where are we?
[33:24.450 --> 33:30.050]  We have four different threats to America that require four completely different security approaches.
[33:30.050 --> 33:32.050]  The old big war.
[33:32.270 --> 33:33.130]  Gang war.
[33:33.410 --> 33:34.610]  Then the poor.
[33:34.750 --> 33:36.630]  The poor have legitimate grievances.
[33:37.470 --> 33:39.810]  We invaded Haiti to keep them there.
[33:40.550 --> 33:41.070]  Okay?
[33:41.410 --> 33:44.570]  And yet, ten years after leaving Haiti, we still haven't built Route 9.
[33:45.210 --> 33:57.190]  In Afghanistan, after all the hullabaloo about building the road and restoring the economy from Kabul to Kandahar to Herat, we ended up with one inch of asphalt to pretend that we had done the road.
[33:57.430 --> 33:57.870]  Okay?
[33:57.990 --> 33:58.670]  This is bullshit.
[33:58.970 --> 34:02.190]  It should not be escaping the notice of the public.
[34:02.330 --> 34:05.550]  The media sucks at doing constructive criticism.
[34:12.110 --> 34:16.210]  So, with the exception of Seymour Hirsch and Robert Young Pelton.
[34:16.710 --> 34:18.510]  And on a good day, Tom Friedman.
[34:18.970 --> 34:19.490]  What?
[34:20.550 --> 34:21.850]  Yeah, I love Pelton.
[34:21.910 --> 34:23.430]  He's spoken at my conference several times.
[34:23.430 --> 34:24.690]  He is absolutely the best.
[34:24.990 --> 34:28.230]  And for a good time, read The World's Most Dangerous Places.
[34:28.530 --> 34:31.130]  And he's got a website, comebackalive.com.
[34:31.670 --> 34:34.770]  No, Robert is one of the guys I really like.
[34:34.770 --> 34:41.130]  Now, I did a crosswalk of all this conflict I've just talked about, against how the Pentagon is actually spending your taxpayer dollar.
[34:41.430 --> 34:42.510]  I have bad news.
[34:43.470 --> 34:49.210]  Not only are they transferring money from your pocket to corporation pockets, but it's only useful 10% of the time.
[34:50.230 --> 34:54.750]  The other 90% of the time, everything the Pentagon is buying is completely irrelevant.
[34:55.050 --> 34:57.770]  And is preventing us from making other investments.
[34:58.470 --> 34:58.950]  Okay?
[34:59.130 --> 35:11.250]  Such as, if I were advising a president, I would still spend $500 billion a year on national security, but I would take big war down by 50%.
[35:11.890 --> 35:13.670]  $250 billion is still a lot of money.
[35:13.730 --> 35:20.170]  We're spending as much money on our military as the next 25 countries put together, including Russia, China, India, and Pakistan.
[35:20.670 --> 35:21.150]  Okay?
[35:21.290 --> 35:22.430]  This makes no sense to me.
[35:22.670 --> 35:23.970]  It's money badly spent.
[35:25.170 --> 35:39.150]  I would increase Special Operations Command to $75 billion, or 15%, and I would add a white hat capability to deliver food, water, and medicine in extremists, under combat conditions.
[35:39.750 --> 35:42.430]  General Zinni's book with Tom Clancy...
[35:42.430 --> 35:49.090]  I stopped reading Clancy long ago, but with Zinni's name on the book, I bought it, and it was great.
[35:49.090 --> 35:49.790]  I reviewed it.
[35:50.310 --> 35:54.910]  Zinni has learned that the fastest way to stop violence is to deliver food.
[35:55.730 --> 35:56.330]  The U.S. government hasn't figured that out yet.
[35:58.670 --> 35:59.110]  Okay?
[35:59.270 --> 35:59.610]  The U.S. government does not believe in delivering food or sewing machines.
[36:02.510 --> 36:03.770]  They just like to deliver bullets.
[36:04.230 --> 36:05.950]  The problem is they don't know who to kill.
[36:07.510 --> 36:09.050]  And we don't do man hunts well.
[36:09.850 --> 36:11.170]  Now, St. Peace...
[36:11.170 --> 36:14.150]  I really had high hopes for Colin Powell.
[36:14.330 --> 36:17.510]  And I have to tell you, I think he uncle-tomed himself into obscurity.
[36:18.090 --> 36:20.030]  The man really betrayed us all.
[36:23.790 --> 36:30.270]  I wanted Colin Powell to get $100 billion a year to run peace war.
[36:30.590 --> 36:34.490]  And to actually be good at going out there with state...
[36:34.490 --> 36:36.230]  USIA, we should reconstitute it.
[36:36.290 --> 36:38.830]  The Peace Corps times five, economic aid.
[36:38.830 --> 36:42.130]  Yesterday morning I talked about what $100 million can buy.
[36:42.730 --> 36:47.870]  $100 million can buy a navy ship of war with all of its ammunition.
[36:48.150 --> 36:51.010]  Or it can buy an army brigade with its tanks and artillery.
[36:51.350 --> 36:53.050]  Or it can buy 1,000 diplomats.
[36:53.070 --> 36:54.710]  Or it can buy 10,000 Peace Corps workers.
[36:54.810 --> 37:02.310]  Or it can buy a water desalination plant that can desalinate 100 million cubic meters of water a year in the Middle East.
[37:02.610 --> 37:06.510]  Or it can buy one day of war in the Middle East over water.
[37:06.510 --> 37:10.010]  Okay, Israel, to take one simple mindless example.
[37:10.390 --> 37:18.370]  Israeli agriculture is producing 3% of Israel's gross domestic product and consuming 50% of the water that it's stealing from the Arabs.
[37:19.310 --> 37:21.070]  This is not smart.
[37:21.810 --> 37:27.130]  This is extremely selfish and it's extremely destabilizing to the entire region.
[37:27.130 --> 37:30.690]  We need a regional water authority for the Middle East.
[37:30.910 --> 37:33.870]  And we need a demilitarized zone with the Palestinians.
[37:34.070 --> 37:39.170]  And we actually have to create two entire new generations that live in peace from kindergarten upwards.
[37:39.730 --> 37:44.530]  The Israelis and the Palestinians that are alive today do not know the concept of peace.
[37:44.530 --> 37:46.210]  They're incapable of executing it.
[37:46.830 --> 37:55.390]  And then finally, here at home, we need to really put money into education, public health, port security is a nightmare, borders, and then intelligence.
[37:55.610 --> 37:58.690]  Citizens have to know who to call and then they have to be listened to when they do call.
[38:00.150 --> 38:02.830]  We're in trouble because the public is tuned out.
[38:03.450 --> 38:09.350]  I guarantee you we will have one or two more 9-11s in America before the public takes this seriously.
[38:10.590 --> 38:14.010]  I wrote a book on this slide, The New Craft of Intelligence.
[38:16.850 --> 38:22.730]  The U.S. government has no idea what other governments have said in the last 200 years on any given issue.
[38:23.370 --> 38:25.970]  We simply don't have a historical database.
[38:26.450 --> 38:32.270]  And one of my highest priorities is to create a digital historical database of public statements by other governments.
[38:32.450 --> 38:38.270]  So, for example, on the Spratly Islands, I want to have a website and I click on it and I issue Spratly Islands.
[38:38.390 --> 38:43.910]  I see what the Chinese have said, what the Filipinos have said, what the Vietnamese have said, what the Australians have said.
[38:44.050 --> 38:52.010]  And then I can click on a different view and for each country I can see past, current, near future, far future, estimated, right?
[38:52.070 --> 38:54.470]  We can do that today with the technology we have.
[38:54.470 --> 39:00.170]  We simply don't have the political will to be serious about substantive information.
[39:00.650 --> 39:03.410]  Global coverage, you can't do it alone, you have to have teams.
[39:03.710 --> 39:10.050]  National intelligence, I've realized, I've had my aha experience, that national intelligence merely means all of us.
[39:10.130 --> 39:11.330]  It doesn't mean just the spies.
[39:11.590 --> 39:15.770]  And we still need spies in secrecy, but they have to be narrowly focused and they have to be successful.
[39:16.370 --> 39:22.770]  These are the seven tribes and what I'll probably do at midnight is stop and we'll have a break.
[39:24.110 --> 39:27.990]  Actually, we'll take a break every hour because it's hard to get in and out.
[39:28.170 --> 39:34.970]  But at midnight, I'll put these pins out and the military police and national guys have to come see me personally.
[39:36.270 --> 39:40.730]  But the rest of you can kind of sort through and just be on your honor to just take one or two pins.
[39:42.330 --> 39:43.530]  I'm going to skip this one.
[39:46.940 --> 39:54.660]  If I had been doing Afghanistan and Iraq, Iraq, Afghanistan would have been a Berlin airlift of food, water, and medicine immediately.
[39:55.280 --> 39:59.460]  And I would have been focusing very much on eradicating the opium crop.
[40:00.080 --> 40:00.220]  Okay?
[40:01.280 --> 40:05.340]  Under U.S. administration, the opium crop has tripled in Afghanistan.
[40:05.340 --> 40:06.500]  Good news for some of you.
[40:07.280 --> 40:10.500]  Bad news for the rest of us.
[40:10.760 --> 40:11.240]  Okay?
[40:11.380 --> 40:12.220]  This is not smart.
[40:12.760 --> 40:14.340]  Iraq should have been a Marshall plant.
[40:14.660 --> 40:20.640]  As we roll those tanks in, we should have been rolling food and water and medicine and put out an announcement.
[40:20.640 --> 40:22.260]  It says, folks, this is a simple deal.
[40:22.440 --> 40:25.220]  We will bring in two water trucks for every tank we take out.
[40:25.280 --> 40:27.260]  And the minute you fire on us, they stop coming.
[40:27.880 --> 40:28.280]  Okay?
[40:28.700 --> 40:30.200]  I mean, we're just not thinking.
[40:30.360 --> 40:32.360]  I mean, Rumsfeld, all those guys overruled.
[40:32.380 --> 40:33.680]  And I really want to emphasize this.
[40:34.300 --> 40:39.500]  Your military intelligence and diplomatic professionals are, by and large, good-hearted, well-meaning people.
[40:39.860 --> 40:41.340]  And they're serious professionals.
[40:41.340 --> 40:44.080]  And they were overruled by the political mafia.
[40:44.740 --> 40:45.140]  Okay?
[40:45.360 --> 40:48.400]  They were specifically, as my 14-year-old would say, dissed.
[40:49.600 --> 40:53.040]  And unfortunately, only a handful of them resigned in protest.
[40:53.860 --> 41:00.700]  The entire Joint Chiefs of Staff should have resigned on the steps of Capitol Hill and made it a media event.
[41:01.120 --> 41:03.900]  We failed that big integrity test.
[41:08.790 --> 41:14.170]  These are the eight points that I think any OSINT working group should establish for any issue it cares about.
[41:15.290 --> 41:20.230]  We used to think that a weekly open-source review was the starting point, I mean, the end point.
[41:20.330 --> 41:21.670]  And that's where CIA still is.
[41:22.090 --> 41:24.270]  But we've actually found it's the beginning point.
[41:24.970 --> 41:27.950]  That weekly review leads to an expert forum discussion.
[41:27.990 --> 41:32.550]  And you don't get to open your mouth in an expert forum until you've passed all of the distance learning.
[41:32.890 --> 41:34.990]  Or been certified by a current master.
[41:35.490 --> 41:37.970]  Because the thing that wastes all of our time are the newbies.
[41:37.970 --> 41:40.150]  Saying, how do I do this?
[41:40.630 --> 41:40.850]  Okay?
[41:41.510 --> 41:43.410]  So, newbies have to pass distance learning.
[41:44.290 --> 41:45.250]  Virtual libraries.
[41:45.490 --> 41:46.750]  So, we only collect stuff once.
[41:46.910 --> 41:47.410]  And then we...
[41:47.410 --> 41:48.530]  Whether it's distributed or not.
[41:48.650 --> 41:52.790]  But we have a centralized Dewey Decimal catalog for the stuff that's available on the web.
[41:53.230 --> 41:53.710]  Securely.
[41:53.950 --> 41:56.450]  With, you know, distinguishing who can access what.
[41:57.970 --> 41:58.910]  Shared calendar.
[41:59.490 --> 42:00.470]  So that...
[42:00.470 --> 42:01.450]  Take water as an example.
[42:01.630 --> 42:05.550]  Any conference anywhere in the world that has water as a topic of discussion.
[42:05.550 --> 42:09.850]  We should have somebody in that town that can go to that conference and write a trip report.
[42:10.170 --> 42:11.810]  And put it into circulation.
[42:12.430 --> 42:15.050]  Of course, XML, RSS, the whole bit.
[42:15.610 --> 42:16.670]  And shared Rolodex.
[42:16.850 --> 42:18.790]  We should be working very fast beyond LinkedIn.
[42:20.030 --> 42:21.150]  I use LinkedIn.
[42:21.810 --> 42:23.630]  I'd love to see you guys all use it.
[42:23.750 --> 42:28.150]  Emmanuel should go to LinkedIn and broadcast this to 2600 and see what happens.
[42:30.270 --> 42:32.230]  But a shared Rolodex.
[42:32.450 --> 42:33.610]  A virtual budget.
[42:33.610 --> 42:36.010]  It turns out that we're all spending money for the same thing.
[42:36.830 --> 42:41.890]  The minute you start telling each other what you're spending money on, you discover enormous redundancies.
[42:42.230 --> 42:45.370]  Which means you've just doubled or tripled your de facto budget.
[42:45.630 --> 42:49.050]  If you're willing to work together to discuss how you're spending money.
[42:50.830 --> 42:54.290]  This is my vision for the future of public intelligence.
[42:55.710 --> 43:02.850]  Basically, I think we should all be paying some kind of subscription fee to cover what's important to us, but then agree to share it.
[43:02.910 --> 43:03.890]  That's kind of the weekly report.
[43:03.930 --> 43:05.390]  And a lot of that can be done by volunteers.
[43:06.170 --> 43:13.730]  Then there's partial sharing, such as a help desk, which keeps track of best sources, best prices, and so on, but doesn't tell you who's asking what.
[43:13.730 --> 43:16.930]  And then at the tribal level, experts on demand.
[43:16.930 --> 43:17.830]  That can be secret.
[43:17.910 --> 43:18.570]  No one else knows.
[43:18.750 --> 43:21.450]  And then at the top secret level, strategic forecasting.
[43:21.650 --> 43:26.250]  And this chart was created by Jan Herring, who is the father of business intelligence in the United States.
[43:27.370 --> 43:30.130]  These are some of the intelligence reforms that I'd go with.
[43:31.990 --> 43:39.810]  Believe it or not, DOD has over 2,000 databases and doesn't have data standards that allow it to link together.
[43:41.130 --> 43:52.130]  In 1988, when some of us were trying to get object-oriented programming and UNIX off the ground in the intelligence community, DOD was still insisting that ADA was the standard language.
[43:54.570 --> 43:55.830]  It boggles the mind.
[43:58.010 --> 44:00.810]  I think that the CIA needs to refocus on analysis.
[44:01.110 --> 44:02.890]  NSA needs to refocus on processing.
[44:03.090 --> 44:05.150]  The NRO needs to refocus on collecting everything.
[44:05.730 --> 44:09.010]  We need a new clandestine service agency that the French can't find.
[44:10.950 --> 44:14.910]  I mean, our clandestine service is a joke today, and we'll have plenty of time for Q&A.
[44:15.370 --> 44:16.950]  And we need a new knowledge foundation.
[44:16.970 --> 44:28.770]  If I had $1.5 billion a year, in fact, if I had $125 million a year, going back into government, I could embarrass the intelligence community into rapid reform.
[44:29.290 --> 44:29.870]  Okay?
[44:30.150 --> 44:38.850]  And one of the things I said yesterday was that OSINT is the wedge in intelligence reform, in acquisition reform, and in governance reform.
[44:39.470 --> 44:43.770]  And so public intelligence is the wedge issue for changing our life for the better.
[44:44.150 --> 44:45.610]  Okay, that's the end of the first brief.
[44:46.710 --> 44:48.070]  Why don't we take a five-minute break?
[44:48.630 --> 44:50.570]  Anyone that wants to go to the bathroom or whatever, go.
[44:50.770 --> 44:52.890]  Anyone that wants to come up and get a pin early, come up.
[44:52.970 --> 44:55.570]  And what I'm going to do is load the brief, and I'll cheat you.
[44:55.650 --> 44:56.770]  I'll actually start in two minutes.
[45:01.330 --> 45:02.410]  How is this going?
[45:06.480 --> 45:07.040]  Okay.
[45:07.340 --> 45:08.260]  I'll tell you what.
[45:09.540 --> 45:10.760]  These are journalists.
[45:11.020 --> 45:11.820]  These are citizens.
[45:13.420 --> 45:13.980]  Business.
[45:15.780 --> 45:17.420]  Non-governmental organizations.
[45:17.680 --> 45:19.260]  Shout out, and someone can hand them.
[45:19.360 --> 45:19.740]  Police.
[45:21.340 --> 45:22.460]  No MI5.
[45:22.620 --> 45:23.040]  Police.
[45:23.380 --> 45:23.720]  You want one?
[45:23.920 --> 45:24.080]  Yes.
[45:24.360 --> 45:24.920]  Absolutely.
[45:25.080 --> 45:25.600]  My pleasure.
[45:27.380 --> 45:27.940]  Okay.
[45:28.580 --> 45:29.140]  Police.
[45:29.720 --> 45:30.280]  Okay.
[45:30.460 --> 45:30.960]  Here you go.
[45:31.720 --> 45:32.080]  Police.
[45:32.080 --> 45:33.780]  We've got military.
[45:34.980 --> 45:35.460]  Spies.
[45:36.900 --> 45:37.380]  Yes.
[45:37.720 --> 45:38.020]  No, no.
[45:38.160 --> 45:38.580]  I'm sorry.
[45:38.740 --> 45:40.940]  You've got to really be a spy and you can't break cover.
[45:41.480 --> 45:42.300]  What would you...
[45:42.300 --> 45:42.720]  Yeah.
[45:42.920 --> 45:43.060]  Here.
[45:43.200 --> 45:44.020]  I've got academic.
[45:44.180 --> 45:44.980]  Who wants academics?
[45:46.360 --> 45:46.720]  Academic.
[45:47.200 --> 45:47.440]  Okay.
[45:48.200 --> 45:49.060]  Who are the academics?
[45:53.580 --> 45:54.060]  Academic.
[45:54.880 --> 45:55.040]  Huh?
[45:55.840 --> 45:56.320]  Journalists?
[45:57.100 --> 45:57.460]  Business.
[45:57.720 --> 45:57.880]  Okay.
[45:58.020 --> 45:58.300]  Hang on.
[45:58.440 --> 45:58.820]  Where's business?
[46:03.820 --> 46:04.300]  Academic...
[46:04.300 --> 46:05.080]  Academic.
[46:07.760 --> 46:08.940]  I'm getting hit on journalists.
[46:09.180 --> 46:09.680]  You do want...
[46:09.680 --> 46:10.040]  Police.
[46:11.120 --> 46:11.200]  Okay.
[46:11.700 --> 46:11.920]  Police.
[46:15.660 --> 46:15.760]  Alright.
[46:15.880 --> 46:17.520]  Once you've got your pen, get out of the way.
[46:18.500 --> 46:18.980]  Shoot.
[46:19.080 --> 46:19.840]  This isn't working.
[46:20.840 --> 46:21.320]  Uh...
[46:22.700 --> 46:23.180]  Okay.
[46:23.360 --> 46:24.380]  So, where's my police guy?
[46:24.780 --> 46:24.880]  No.
[46:25.360 --> 46:26.060]  He's gone.
[46:26.300 --> 46:26.400]  Okay.
[46:26.660 --> 46:27.900]  One more business.
[46:28.380 --> 46:28.860]  Academic.
[46:29.040 --> 46:29.160]  Alright.
[46:30.540 --> 46:31.020]  Academic.
[46:32.900 --> 46:35.580]  I'll tell you what, you take care of academics, alright?
[46:35.760 --> 46:36.640]  One per person.
[46:37.060 --> 46:38.180]  Academics go over there.
[46:38.520 --> 46:39.540]  Business, where's business?
[46:39.640 --> 46:40.000]  Business.
[46:41.280 --> 46:42.080]  You take care of business.
[46:44.100 --> 46:46.580]  Alright, you stay close to me now.
[46:46.740 --> 46:47.520]  One per person.
[46:49.120 --> 46:53.760]  Military, non-governmental, police, police, nothing.
[46:56.660 --> 46:57.580]  You're academic?
[47:01.600 --> 47:02.680]  Only if you're a spy.
[47:03.360 --> 47:04.620]  I mean, really.
[47:04.880 --> 47:06.120]  It's not a collector's item.
[47:06.400 --> 47:07.440]  It's a bad...
[47:07.440 --> 47:08.340]  No, no questions.
[47:10.500 --> 47:11.060]  Business.
[47:11.620 --> 47:12.160]  Business.
[47:13.020 --> 47:13.880]  That's police.
[47:14.580 --> 47:15.880]  Where's the academic guy?
[47:16.740 --> 47:19.120]  Okay, where's the academic guy with the pins?
[47:19.800 --> 47:21.840]  Okay, the academic guy is back there.
[47:23.080 --> 47:24.540]  And who's got business?
[47:25.300 --> 47:26.360]  Business, right here.
[47:26.500 --> 47:27.740]  Okay, business right there.
[47:28.360 --> 47:29.320]  Okay, we're going to stop.
[47:30.760 --> 47:31.940]  Non-governmental organization.
[47:32.200 --> 47:33.260]  Non-profit do-gooder.
[47:34.180 --> 47:34.800]  Oh, what?
[47:34.900 --> 47:35.380]  Yes, I do.
[47:35.460 --> 47:36.400]  Where's the citizen bag?
[47:41.110 --> 47:44.990]  Alright, let's... there's citizens over there, academics here, business there.
[47:45.610 --> 47:47.890]  And we're going to start in one minute.
[47:48.450 --> 47:51.790]  And then you guys bring me back the bag, and then we'll do this again in an hour.
[47:52.750 --> 47:53.330]  What's that?
[47:53.450 --> 47:53.790]  Absolutely.
[47:57.590 --> 47:58.170]  Hold on.
[47:58.350 --> 48:00.090]  Let's do three militaries, and then I'm going to stop.
[48:00.210 --> 48:01.550]  You've got another presentation, right?
[48:01.970 --> 48:03.890]  Military, military, military.
[48:04.150 --> 48:05.130]  How many other militaries?
[48:11.200 --> 48:11.620]  Okay.
[48:11.620 --> 48:12.140]  All right.
[48:12.580 --> 48:15.080]  Comp, okay, NGO, and then we're going to stop.
[48:16.920 --> 48:17.840]  Okay, hold on.
[48:18.940 --> 48:20.300]  Let me stop now.
[48:20.460 --> 48:21.220]  Bring them back in.
[48:21.860 --> 48:22.720]  Bring them back in.
[48:22.720 --> 48:23.540]  Okay, we'll do this again.
[48:24.340 --> 48:25.280]  We'll do this again.
[48:25.900 --> 48:26.000]  Okay.
[48:27.600 --> 48:28.640]  Do you have all your bags?
[48:28.860 --> 48:29.500]  I think so.
[48:29.800 --> 48:30.100]  Count them.
[48:30.300 --> 48:34.240]  One, two, three, four, five, six, seven.
[48:34.340 --> 48:35.300]  One bag is out.
[48:36.480 --> 48:37.600]  One bag is out.
[48:39.540 --> 48:41.160]  All right, one bag is still out.
[48:42.940 --> 48:43.460]  Let me see.
[48:43.460 --> 48:48.400]  Citizen, business, police, national, military.
[48:49.080 --> 48:50.060]  Maybe I do have them.
[48:50.240 --> 48:50.700]  Oh, business.
[48:51.000 --> 48:51.100]  No?
[48:52.100 --> 48:53.100]  Yeah, we got it.
[48:54.620 --> 48:55.600]  That's military.
[48:56.420 --> 48:57.520]  What color is that?
[48:59.040 --> 49:00.000]  How many are there?
[49:00.140 --> 49:00.320]  Seven?
[49:00.840 --> 49:01.860]  Eight, actually.
[49:05.640 --> 49:07.120]  Five, six, seven.
[49:07.420 --> 49:08.980]  All right, one bag is missing.
[49:09.820 --> 49:10.540]  Let me see.
[49:10.700 --> 49:24.260]  Citizen, business, police, military, national, military, police, business, academia.
[49:24.840 --> 49:25.620]  Oh, journalists.
[49:25.800 --> 49:26.780]  Where's the journalist bag?
[49:26.960 --> 49:27.340]  Okay, good.
[49:27.380 --> 49:27.980]  Where'd you get that?
[49:28.220 --> 49:28.900]  I gave it to him.
[49:29.120 --> 49:29.580]  Yeah, good.
[49:30.060 --> 49:31.060]  All right, we're going to start again.
[49:31.980 --> 49:33.360]  Are your slides on your website?
[49:33.380 --> 49:33.740]  Yes.
[49:34.060 --> 49:35.680]  My slides are on my website.
[49:35.680 --> 49:35.820]  Are your website?
[49:36.120 --> 49:36.360]  Okay.

[00:00.540 --> 00:05.160]  I don't think that you really believe that 9-11 was the result of an intelligence failure.
[00:05.400 --> 00:07.720]  I mean you, the master of spies.
[00:08.420 --> 00:13.660]  What we know right now is that the FBI and CIA had five informants with first and last names.
[00:13.760 --> 00:16.560]  At the moment, Atta was on the watch list from the German intelligence since 1998.
[00:16.940 --> 00:21.620]  They knew exactly that there was a pending terrorist attack with hydrating planes.
[00:21.740 --> 00:23.360]  They had five war drills.
[00:23.540 --> 00:27.600]  On that day, the NRO postponed their own drill, crashing planes into the headquarters.
[00:27.600 --> 00:32.360]  It was Amalgam Virgo in June 2001, but they exactly probed this.
[00:32.440 --> 00:33.540]  You have all the names.
[00:33.580 --> 00:33.860]  All right, stop.
[00:35.240 --> 00:36.600]  Hold that, hold that, hold that.
[00:36.600 --> 00:38.040]  We can't make a dialogue and you will...
[00:38.040 --> 00:38.760]  Not right now, no.
[00:38.960 --> 00:44.300]  Right now what I want to do is do this brief and then I will be here and I will answer your question at 2 o'clock this morning.
[00:44.900 --> 00:47.380]  If I survive, yes, but until then...
[00:47.380 --> 00:47.520]  I'm sorry, please.
[00:47.580 --> 00:49.760]  9-11 was an inside job and we will do everything.
[00:49.760 --> 00:50.040]  Bullshit.
[00:50.180 --> 00:51.540]  Have the courtesy to sit down.
[00:51.640 --> 00:51.860]  9-11's movement.
[00:52.740 --> 00:53.320]  Crush him.
[00:57.500 --> 01:02.400]  I will gladly entertain heretical and lunatic positions later.
[01:04.140 --> 01:07.560]  And I will tell you there's lots of ways of looking at this.
[01:08.180 --> 01:09.260]  I've heard them all.
[01:09.420 --> 01:13.920]  I am probably the one person that has really studied the OSINT on 9-11 comprehensively.
[01:15.580 --> 01:17.520]  And we will have the dialogue.
[01:17.700 --> 01:19.440]  This is a four-hour marathon session.
[01:19.440 --> 01:23.680]  But first, I want to go through the failure of 20th century intelligence.
[01:23.940 --> 01:24.440]  All right?
[01:24.520 --> 01:27.420]  I want you guys to have a context for having an intelligent dialogue.
[01:28.560 --> 01:31.720]  Not that you're unintelligent, but bear with me.
[01:33.520 --> 01:37.440]  The bottom line here is that America is an industrial-era country.
[01:38.040 --> 01:40.680]  We have an industrial-era educational system.
[01:40.680 --> 01:44.400]  We have an industrial-era media system with Barron's.
[01:44.540 --> 01:50.380]  We have an industrial-era Congress, which is completely ineffective at processing information.
[01:50.680 --> 01:54.360]  And we have an industrial-era intelligence community.
[01:55.680 --> 01:58.260]  Now, a very quick history of intelligence.
[01:58.260 --> 02:03.440]  The original concept for intelligence was a secret wars between governments.
[02:04.420 --> 02:04.940]  Okay?
[02:05.200 --> 02:08.480]  So, for centuries, that's been the primary focus of intelligence.
[02:08.480 --> 02:11.280]  How can we screw another government secretly?
[02:12.080 --> 02:12.400]  Okay?
[02:12.980 --> 02:17.320]  Then Sherman-Kent, after World War II and as part of the OSS...
[02:17.320 --> 02:20.480]  It took me three weeks to figure out open-source solutions.
[02:20.480 --> 02:24.760]  I had the OS, but being a Marine, it took me three weeks to figure out the third word.
[02:26.560 --> 02:38.900]  But originally, the OSS was conceptualized as a global open-source intelligence organization that would use predominantly academics to do strategic intelligence based on open-sources.
[02:39.100 --> 02:44.400]  Things like the price of oranges in Paris telling you whether the railway bridges had been bombed or not.
[02:44.700 --> 02:45.200]  Okay?
[02:46.280 --> 02:47.620]  And he tried that.
[02:48.360 --> 02:50.480]  Hasn't been successful, but it remains valid.
[02:50.600 --> 02:53.800]  Where I think we need to go and where all these collective intelligence guys...
[02:53.800 --> 02:57.920]  If you Google on collective intelligence, you'll find everybody other than Robert Steele.
[02:58.840 --> 03:04.600]  There are at least eight different bottom-up, self-generating groups that I think are very important.
[03:04.600 --> 03:07.340]  We need to move toward being a smart nation.
[03:07.780 --> 03:12.300]  A smart nation is a nation in which every one of us is an intelligence minute man.
[03:12.740 --> 03:15.580]  Every one of us understands the process of intelligence.
[03:15.580 --> 03:21.300]  We know how to apply it to our work, whether it's art history or defending the neighborhood.
[03:21.640 --> 03:22.800]  We know how to do this.
[03:23.840 --> 03:26.540]  Now, some of the failures that we've had in intelligence...
[03:26.540 --> 03:34.120]  And by the way, I have to tell you with all earnestness, given a choice between incompetence and conspiracy, always go with incompetence.
[03:34.580 --> 03:35.100]  Okay?
[03:35.100 --> 03:36.440]  And believe me.
[03:37.580 --> 03:41.120]  Incompetence is vastly more likely in the U.S. government.
[03:41.660 --> 03:45.220]  And let me say on a positive note, this is a great country.
[03:45.440 --> 03:46.660]  You're smart people.
[03:46.800 --> 03:49.700]  We can survive massive amounts of incompetence in Washington.
[03:51.300 --> 03:52.540]  Although I am getting worried.
[03:54.440 --> 03:57.140]  We have basically ignored open-source information.
[04:00.600 --> 04:07.700]  I was hired by one branch of the U.S. government to go out and evaluate and monitor terrorist insurgent opposition websites because they weren't satisfied with what the national intelligence people were doing.
[04:07.980 --> 04:23.740]  In less than 60 days, for under $60,000, we identified and evaluated 396 terrorist insurgent opposition websites in 29 languages, including Gaelic, Catalan, Urdu, Farsi, all those normal ones.
[04:23.820 --> 04:27.160]  The only two languages we didn't do that we wish we had were Berber and Aramaic.
[04:27.540 --> 04:28.020]  Okay?
[04:29.740 --> 04:30.880]  I have a secret.
[04:31.360 --> 04:32.580]  I'll share it with you.
[04:32.940 --> 04:36.080]  I don't insist that my translators be U.S. citizens eligible for clearances who speak the language at a shitty level.
[04:42.080 --> 04:49.520]  I go for indigenous people that speak their own language at English at a 4 or 5 level on a scale of 5.
[04:49.880 --> 04:58.080]  And I use various cover mechanisms to have them work successfully for what they think is a European company concerned about risk.
[04:58.640 --> 04:59.220]  Okay?
[04:59.700 --> 05:01.000]  This is not hard.
[05:01.120 --> 05:02.660]  If I can do it, why can't CIA?
[05:02.660 --> 05:05.740]  Now, I got to say CIA is doing some things right.
[05:05.920 --> 05:08.700]  And we will have a three-hour discussion.
[05:09.220 --> 05:10.480]  But we need OSINT.
[05:11.780 --> 05:13.460]  We don't do non-official cover.
[05:15.320 --> 05:19.920]  Jim Pavot screwed this country as director of clandestine operations.
[05:20.960 --> 05:38.180]  He and a guy named Ted Price and several directors, Tenet, Deutsch, Woolsey, mediocrities, every single one of them, going back to Stansfield-Turner who gutted the clandestine intelligence service, firing all of the ethnics.
[05:38.540 --> 05:41.260]  We used to have a clandestine service that looked like the United Nations.
[05:41.580 --> 05:44.200]  I mean, we're talking turban seeks the whole nine yards.
[05:44.420 --> 05:49.900]  And then we started going for white boys from Kansas and young white boys from Kansas.
[05:50.480 --> 05:52.460]  CIA doesn't hire anyone over 35.
[05:53.140 --> 05:54.440]  I've done a press release.
[05:54.580 --> 05:59.160]  If you Google for clandestine service and Robert Steele, you'll probably see, and it's got my five-part solution.
[05:59.160 --> 06:01.220]  But we have been lazy and cheap.
[06:01.500 --> 06:08.160]  You cannot do clandestine operations from an official installation that has local guards that work for the local counterintelligence service.
[06:08.660 --> 06:09.720]  You just can't do it.
[06:10.360 --> 06:10.880]  Okay?
[06:11.120 --> 06:12.740]  And you're in dreamland if you think you can.
[06:14.280 --> 06:15.680]  We don't do a processing.
[06:16.260 --> 06:24.380]  The National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and by the way, now that it's called the National Geospatial Agency, NEMA stands for not interested in maps anymore.
[06:25.360 --> 06:25.650]  Okay?
[06:26.300 --> 06:29.800]  Jim Clapper has gone way over the top on digital.
[06:30.320 --> 06:32.400]  One laptop for every 500,000 people.
[06:33.220 --> 06:35.380]  That was what he sent to NATO for Bosnia.
[06:38.640 --> 06:44.580]  The NEMA report in December 1999 said, essentially, we have spent trillions on collection and nothing on processing.
[06:45.200 --> 06:56.580]  We process less than 10% of our secret images, less than 6% of our Russian and Chinese signals, less than 3% of our European signals, less than 1% of our rest of world signals.
[06:56.840 --> 07:05.700]  We process roughly a million out of several billions of intercepted calls on a daily basis.
[07:05.700 --> 07:09.160]  And by processing, I mean some form of cursory examination.
[07:09.680 --> 07:10.160]  Okay?
[07:10.280 --> 07:15.780]  The reality is that when something like 9-11 happens, we're usually about 30 days late in processing it.
[07:16.780 --> 07:17.940]  We miss it completely.
[07:17.940 --> 07:21.840]  And our people don't speak Arabic beyond the three level, by and large.
[07:22.880 --> 07:24.280]  We don't have data standards.
[07:26.760 --> 07:30.600]  I believe in open spectrum, open-source software, and open-source intelligence.
[07:30.600 --> 07:32.700]  We don't have geospatial attributes.
[07:32.900 --> 07:47.440]  In 1988, I told the general defense intelligence program managers, of which I was one for the Marine Corps, I said, fellas, we're not going to get to automated all source fusion until we have both a time date stamp and a geospatial stamp.
[07:47.540 --> 07:48.820]  This is not hard to understand.
[07:49.960 --> 07:58.600]  But today, in the 21st century, we are still not doing geospatial tagging of all of the information that we're collecting worldwide.
[07:58.600 --> 08:00.580]  This is just flat out nuts.
[08:01.920 --> 08:05.540]  XML Geo, NASA, Google on XML Geo.
[08:05.920 --> 08:10.880]  NASA, and particularly the NASA people at Moffitt in Texas, are trying to get XML Geo going.
[08:11.240 --> 08:12.760]  It's something I support.
[08:13.000 --> 08:25.520]  And I would just like to see everyone voluntarily adopt some kind of geospatial standard coding, so that any data has codes for the point on the Earth that it refers to.
[08:27.140 --> 08:28.740]  We don't do all source mixing.
[08:29.100 --> 08:30.700]  Don't get me started on security.
[08:32.540 --> 08:33.800]  I believe in security.
[08:33.960 --> 08:34.980]  I believe in smart security.
[08:35.020 --> 08:38.120]  I don't believe in moronic security, which is what we have now.
[08:39.700 --> 08:41.120]  Compartmentation is the enemy of knowledge.
[08:41.260 --> 08:45.380]  I guarantee you the next 9-11 will happen not because we didn't know, but because we didn't share.
[08:47.660 --> 08:50.120]  We're going to know about 9-11 somewhere in the U.S. government.
[08:50.540 --> 08:54.020]  And because we didn't share, it's going to happen again.
[08:54.880 --> 08:58.060]  This is why NSA, I think, needs to be the National Processing Agency.
[08:58.980 --> 08:59.340]  Yeah.
[09:00.440 --> 09:01.440]  No, but trust me on this.
[09:01.640 --> 09:02.580]  We can...
[09:02.580 --> 09:12.220]  You know, one of the interesting things about aggregate data mining is that you're doing pattern analysis, and you don't violate your privacy until you're known to be in contact with a terrorist.
[09:12.840 --> 09:13.460]  Okay?
[09:13.920 --> 09:16.700]  I mean, aggregate data mining is a cool idea.
[09:17.000 --> 09:21.860]  And pattern analysis is actually the heart of signals intelligence, not reading the content.
[09:22.520 --> 09:23.160]  Okay?
[09:23.400 --> 09:24.820]  It's pattern analysis.
[09:25.080 --> 09:34.360]  And you don't violate individual privacy until you have a really rock-solid picture that says, this guy is making repeated phone calls to a known terrorist safe house.
[09:34.900 --> 09:35.420]  Okay?
[09:35.740 --> 09:37.500]  So, I support privacy.
[09:37.660 --> 09:38.920]  I don't support the PATRIOT Act.
[09:39.000 --> 09:40.040]  I support privacy.
[09:40.580 --> 09:42.420]  And I support smart intelligence.
[09:42.420 --> 09:44.860]  And I think we have to be serious about this.
[09:46.000 --> 09:52.880]  One of the main problems we make in analysis is we try and put expertise, foreign languages, and security clearances all in the same person.
[09:53.780 --> 09:55.960]  By and large, that's almost mission impossible.
[09:57.740 --> 10:00.140]  We're focused on threats instead of opportunities.
[10:01.300 --> 10:07.440]  We have been focused on creating a military designed to beat Russia and China in state-on-state war.
[10:08.340 --> 10:11.620]  We have spent almost nothing on the other three threat classes.
[10:11.740 --> 10:14.140]  And we have spent almost nothing on stabilizing the world.
[10:14.740 --> 10:19.040]  Ambassador Mark Palmer has written a book called The Other Axis of Evil.
[10:19.900 --> 10:23.140]  It's about the 44 dictators that survived Saddam Hussein.
[10:23.140 --> 10:25.820]  There are 44 dictators in the world.
[10:26.020 --> 10:28.920]  Dictators, by definition, create failed states.
[10:29.480 --> 10:34.640]  And Ambassador Palmer recommends a new undersecretary of state for democracy.
[10:34.980 --> 10:37.100]  And you have two assistant secretaries.
[10:37.240 --> 10:39.340]  One for the guys that agree to a leveraged buyout.
[10:39.560 --> 10:40.980]  One for the guys that don't.
[10:41.680 --> 10:42.020]  Okay?
[10:43.360 --> 10:46.540]  I think most of them will agree to a leveraged buyout.
[10:47.540 --> 10:50.760]  And then over in the Pentagon, I want to have an undersecretary for peacekeeping.
[10:51.620 --> 10:53.060]  And humanitarian assistance.
[10:53.420 --> 10:57.460]  And I want to use the military machine to start delivering medicine and food and water.
[10:58.440 --> 11:00.120]  We don't do preventive investments.
[11:00.980 --> 11:01.420]  Okay?
[11:02.800 --> 11:06.160]  Our emphasis is on the local and the current, vice the global and the future.
[11:06.280 --> 11:08.740]  I love Stuart Brand's book, The Clock of the Long Now.
[11:09.220 --> 11:12.880]  It took me five years to read it because I really thought it was about a clock.
[11:15.900 --> 11:22.180]  But now I understand it's about teaching all of us to adopt what the Native Americans call seventh generation thinking.
[11:23.340 --> 11:27.180]  How does our decision today impact seven generations out?
[11:28.060 --> 11:34.600]  That's what we should be thinking about if we want our children and our grandchildren to have the quality of life that we have today.
[11:34.600 --> 11:36.560]  And it's getting worse by the day.
[11:37.760 --> 11:39.480]  We have to teach our politicians.
[11:40.240 --> 11:43.520]  Politicians are getting away with murder today because we're not holding them accountable.
[11:44.480 --> 11:47.780]  They're basically spending three quarters of their time with their hand out.
[11:48.600 --> 11:49.120]  Okay?
[11:52.400 --> 12:01.330]  I see you guys as part of an army of volunteers that makes it impossible for Joe and Jane's six-pack to sleep at night.
[12:02.720 --> 12:04.140]  They have to pay attention.
[12:04.780 --> 12:17.880]  I'm about to start a nonprofit in Stockholm and we're going to try and recruit retired intelligence officers from all seven tribes around the world to serve as volunteers to take an education package into every schoolhouse, every chamber of commerce meeting,
[12:18.020 --> 12:22.580]  every social club, every labor union to basically say, folks, we have to pay attention.
[12:23.090 --> 12:26.620]  I know I'm preaching to the choir here, but this is really serious.
[12:26.710 --> 12:28.900]  If we don't pay attention, we are going to be screwed.
[12:30.590 --> 12:32.820]  We fail to impact on the national budget.
[12:33.940 --> 12:36.940]  National intelligence has absolutely nothing to do with what the U.S. government spends its money on because our senators and congressmen are being bought off.
[12:42.100 --> 12:46.330]  In fact, I just posted something on OSS.net a couple months ago.
[12:46.880 --> 12:49.440]  Medical journals can no longer be trusted by the doctors.
[12:50.620 --> 12:58.440]  Because just about every medical article is written by someone funded by the drug company whose drugs he's talking about.
[12:59.100 --> 12:59.660]  Okay?
[12:59.660 --> 13:02.940]  I mean, we have lost our integrity across the board.
[13:07.560 --> 13:09.220]  So I have a simple reform.
[13:09.420 --> 13:15.300]  I think companies have to pay taxes on what they tell their stockholders they made a profit on.
[13:15.320 --> 13:17.780]  And we do have to have global campaign finance reform.
[13:17.860 --> 13:19.600]  We have to end gerrymandering.
[13:19.900 --> 13:22.240]  We should have basically virtual constituencies.
[13:22.240 --> 13:24.480]  You select whatever party you want to be of.
[13:24.480 --> 13:26.340]  And then that entire state.
[13:27.080 --> 13:30.580]  Everyone who's a libertarian gets to vote for the libertarian no matter where they live.
[13:31.160 --> 13:31.420]  Okay?
[13:32.920 --> 13:34.120]  And there are other reforms.
[13:34.280 --> 13:37.160]  I've posted something on my website called Citizen in Search of a Leader.
[13:37.880 --> 13:41.360]  And a lot of these ideas are Ralph Nader's, although he doesn't play well with others.
[13:43.280 --> 13:44.900]  And I really would like to see...
[13:44.900 --> 13:46.080]  I don't think Kerry's going to win.
[13:46.320 --> 13:51.220]  I think if Kerry wants to win, he has to use the Democratic Convention, as I said yesterday.
[13:51.220 --> 13:53.860]  So many of you were not here then.
[13:53.860 --> 13:55.580]  I'll repeat this because I think it's important.
[13:55.880 --> 14:14.560]  If anyone knows John Kerry or John Edwards, please tell them they're not going to win unless they use the Democratic Convention to announce a national convention of all parties, including moderate Republicans, who will come up with a unity plank and a unity cabinet that will be announced in advance of the general election.
[14:15.240 --> 14:22.180]  And John Kerry, I've told his staff, they don't listen, but they've certainly heard from me more ways than one.
[14:22.300 --> 14:26.140]  I've said, you can't beat the Republican dog with the Democratic dog.
[14:26.260 --> 14:28.020]  You can only beat him if you're a dog catcher.
[14:28.160 --> 14:32.140]  And the dog catcher issue in this election is restoring the vote to the individual.
[14:32.860 --> 14:33.300]  Okay?
[14:33.500 --> 14:34.620]  We don't have that today.
[14:35.200 --> 14:36.560]  Half of America is disenfranchised.
[14:37.260 --> 14:39.280]  And a quarter of it is not paying attention.
[14:41.720 --> 14:44.180]  Policy failures, we fail to impact on policymakers.
[14:44.460 --> 14:46.260]  Our policymakers are loosely educated.
[14:47.400 --> 14:51.460]  They have gotten to where they are by being schmoozers, not by being smart.
[14:53.920 --> 14:58.500]  Until 9-11, we had senators and congressmen bragging that they did not have a U.S. passport because nothing that happened overseas mattered to their constituents.
[15:04.220 --> 15:04.700]  Okay?
[15:04.940 --> 15:07.740]  Now, after 9-11, a lot of them still don't have a passport.
[15:07.740 --> 15:10.960]  And you should ask every single one of your congressmen and senators, do you have a passport?
[15:11.340 --> 15:12.860]  Do you study foreign affairs?
[15:12.980 --> 15:14.580]  Do you understand the intelligence failures?
[15:15.620 --> 15:17.180]  We have to educate them.
[15:17.840 --> 15:20.380]  We failed to win public support for intelligence.
[15:21.180 --> 15:31.720]  Bill Clinton let intelligence and defense run to pot, no pun intended, because he was vulnerable on the draft-dodging, pot-smoking issues.
[15:31.720 --> 15:42.540]  And so he got Secretary Cohen, who is an enormous mediocrity, to basically be part of the military-industrial complex and run the Pentagon into the ground.
[15:44.480 --> 15:48.780]  We have to understand that national intelligence is not about spies and secrecy.
[15:48.960 --> 15:50.200]  It's about knowing.
[15:50.600 --> 15:51.880]  It's about understanding.
[15:52.240 --> 15:54.000]  It's about spending our money properly.
[15:54.000 --> 15:55.600]  It's about behaving properly.
[15:56.360 --> 16:02.360]  Bin Laden could not have asked for a finer result out of 9-11 than the invasion of Iraq.
[16:03.060 --> 16:04.780]  It brought the far enemy near.
[16:10.080 --> 16:11.920]  We failed to impact on what we buy.
[16:12.400 --> 16:15.960]  When I stood up to Marine Corps Intelligence Center, the first thing I ordered was a study.
[16:16.140 --> 16:21.640]  First, I had to get the Marine Corps to agree on what 69 countries we thought were important.
[16:22.160 --> 16:26.940]  I had no particular intent when I selected 69, but a general felt uncomfortable with it.
[16:27.040 --> 16:29.340]  We said, okay, it's 67 countries and two island groups.
[16:35.280 --> 16:36.860]  He was a very prudish general.
[16:38.960 --> 16:42.540]  But I said, I want this study to be unclassified with unclassified findings.
[16:42.700 --> 16:48.280]  And one of the things we discovered was that the Navy and the Air Force are building aircraft to a standard aviation day that is warm and not humid.
[16:49.240 --> 16:50.580]  65 degrees and not humid.
[16:50.580 --> 16:55.720]  It turns out that the real-world aviation day is 80 degrees and humid more often than not.
[16:55.840 --> 17:00.540]  And in six very important countries, including Afghanistan, it's over 6,000 feet in elevation.
[17:01.640 --> 17:07.920]  Which means that all of these airplanes can carry half as much, half as far, and they can only loiter over the battlefield for five minutes at a time.
[17:08.020 --> 17:08.800]  This is not cool.
[17:09.640 --> 17:10.080]  Okay?
[17:10.700 --> 17:11.840]  Cross-country mobility.
[17:12.800 --> 17:19.500]  We can't move in 79% of our countries other than on the roads and bridges that are in place.
[17:19.500 --> 17:29.640]  And, oh, by the way, while we're busy building 97-ton artillery systems and 70-ton tanks, it turns out nobody sells a truck that weighs more than 30 tons to anyone in the third world.
[17:29.660 --> 17:29.940]  Why?
[17:30.320 --> 17:31.900]  Because the bridges can't carry them.
[17:31.900 --> 17:34.920]  This is what my 14-year-old would call a clue.
[17:35.900 --> 17:36.440]  Okay?
[17:37.380 --> 17:41.540]  We should not be building things that weigh more than 30 to 40 tons.
[17:42.300 --> 17:43.680]  Line of sight distances.
[17:43.680 --> 17:48.660]  We spend incredible amounts of money being able to hit a gnat's ass at 3,000 meters.
[17:49.220 --> 17:53.840]  Well, it turns out the gnat has to be carrying an emitter for us to hit him.
[17:55.060 --> 18:00.280]  But it also turns out most of the world is under 900 meters and it's covered by jungle canopy.
[18:00.840 --> 18:01.800]  Or it's urban.
[18:01.920 --> 18:02.720]  Or it's mountainous.
[18:03.400 --> 18:07.720]  Only one quarter, six countries, of the cases we looked at were actually fair.
[18:07.720 --> 18:10.040]  Fortunately for us in the Gulf War, they were all there.
[18:11.060 --> 18:16.980]  But by and large, in most of the world, you need to be able to kill things at under 900 meters under canopy.
[18:17.180 --> 18:18.600]  And the satellites can't help you.
[18:19.140 --> 18:19.380]  Okay?
[18:21.060 --> 18:24.160]  Our satellites can find a grapefruit, but you have to tell them where it is.
[18:24.800 --> 18:25.240]  Okay?
[18:25.320 --> 18:26.860]  That's why we couldn't find the scuds.
[18:28.840 --> 18:33.080]  Ports, airheads, it turns out we can't deliver in 50% of the ports.
[18:33.620 --> 18:36.660]  It's too shallow, there's no turning radius, there's no pier side.
[18:36.660 --> 18:39.240]  So, we have to go to airheads.
[18:39.400 --> 18:44.220]  Well, the Air Force is busy building these long-range transports that won't fit on most airports.
[18:44.900 --> 18:45.320]  Okay?
[18:45.480 --> 18:49.200]  The C-130 is still the most viable delivery system for most of the world.
[18:50.480 --> 18:52.820]  And then C-4, anti-Internet, open.
[18:53.040 --> 18:58.920]  I believe that NATO and the Partners for Peace cannot afford American NATO DOD standard communications.
[19:00.000 --> 19:07.440]  You know, I mean, we're going into places where we end up having to spend special forces teams with all of our secret radios that doesn't work.
[19:07.600 --> 19:11.540]  We have to elevate the security of the Internet to the point where anybody can play.
[19:11.780 --> 19:14.000]  And we can create come-as-you-are coalitions.
[19:14.580 --> 19:16.540]  And then OOTW assets.
[19:16.660 --> 19:18.500]  I'm just back from teaching at Fort Bragg.
[19:18.880 --> 19:23.780]  And one of the things we discussed is we desperately need a division of military police.
[19:24.140 --> 19:27.280]  We need a division of civil affairs officers.
[19:28.060 --> 19:33.600]  We need a division of open-source intelligence public affairs liaison officers.
[19:33.940 --> 19:36.480]  We are just investing in the wrong things.
[19:38.460 --> 19:40.280]  We haven't impacted...
[19:40.280 --> 19:43.760]  I used to pay Cistran $1,000 a month to translate my website.
[19:44.080 --> 19:47.960]  But the Austrians in particular complained about the German.
[19:48.280 --> 19:51.040]  The French, of course, complained about everything.
[19:52.520 --> 19:53.560]  And so I stopped.
[19:53.740 --> 20:00.500]  And it turns out, looking into it, the reason that Cistran wasn't working was because Bill Gates keeps migrating and mutating his application program interfaces.
[20:01.820 --> 20:03.280]  Microsoft should not be a lawsuit.
[20:03.420 --> 20:04.160]  It should be a standard.
[20:04.260 --> 20:04.940]  It should be a law.
[20:05.560 --> 20:11.260]  That any software program will publish its application program interfaces and the handshake will be stable for three years.
[20:11.780 --> 20:12.120]  Okay?
[20:12.300 --> 20:13.240]  This is real simple.
[20:13.360 --> 20:14.040]  And it wasn't my idea.
[20:14.120 --> 20:14.840]  It was John McCartney.
[20:14.900 --> 20:15.620]  He's the father of AI.
[20:16.160 --> 20:19.820]  We had the other hackers group that I'm a member of as the Silicon Valley hackers.
[20:19.940 --> 20:21.020]  Those are the guys with the money.
[20:22.700 --> 20:24.900]  John Gilmore, employee number five of Sun.
[20:27.520 --> 20:31.560]  Phil Zimmerman, Stuart Brand, Glenn Tenney, guys like that.
[20:31.760 --> 20:37.060]  And I try to go out there every two or three years because that's where I get energized in another way.
[20:37.720 --> 20:40.740]  We haven't defined an agile security architecture.
[20:41.100 --> 20:43.520]  We failed to define generic functionalities.
[20:43.700 --> 20:46.660]  The bottom line is there's no analytic toolkit that we can all share.
[20:47.020 --> 20:47.920]  There should be.
[20:47.920 --> 20:50.740]  This slide is called the catalyst slide.
[20:50.860 --> 20:52.920]  If you Google for catalyst, you should find it.
[20:53.000 --> 20:54.900]  Computer-aided tools for the analysis of S&T.
[20:55.240 --> 21:10.680]  We knew at CIA in 1986 that we needed 18 functionalities on a desktop, including modeling and simulation, structured argument, anomaly detection, all of this stuff, all these data conversion things.
[21:10.680 --> 21:11.880]  And guess what?
[21:12.000 --> 21:24.340]  In 1988, CIA made a decision that it would standardize on the IBM PS2, the dumbest terminal on the face of the earth.
[21:24.660 --> 21:37.060]  And the reason CIA made this decision, putting aside all of the stuff that we experts were saying about object-oriented programming and analytic tools and stuff, they said, yeah, but it's easy to have good security with the IBM PS2.
[21:37.740 --> 21:41.480]  If you want to be a moron and have good security, this is the perfect choice.
[21:42.100 --> 21:42.480]  Okay?
[21:42.860 --> 21:45.260]  And so CIA had a lobotomy in 1988.
[21:47.440 --> 21:49.180]  We failed to provide for intelligence.
[21:49.420 --> 21:53.940]  All of these systems that we're building in DOD, all of this Homeland Security stuff, there's no money for the data.
[21:54.700 --> 21:57.140]  There's no money for the interoperability among agencies.
[21:58.320 --> 22:01.980]  Homeland Security is a monstrous deception on the public.
[22:04.080 --> 22:06.540]  Intelligence is being treated as a free good and it doesn't exist.
[22:07.660 --> 22:13.540]  Commanders are still assuming that they'll get what they need, but in fact, no one's being held accountable for not knowing and not being able to get it.
[22:14.440 --> 22:16.300]  We can't do wide area surveillance.
[22:16.960 --> 22:18.360]  We still can't process.
[22:18.500 --> 22:23.920]  We're so busy building all these UAVs, but these UAVs are like looking at the battlefield with a straw.
[22:24.200 --> 22:32.460]  And there's no technology yet practical for taking 15 UAVs and bringing it all together into a consolidated picture.
[22:32.720 --> 22:35.480]  Which, by the way, is what I also want to be able to do with your cell phones.
[22:35.980 --> 22:49.020]  So if there's another sniper thing, I want an alert and everybody with a cell phone just sticks it up, points it at random and beams it back to Scotty, and boom, we have a 360 of that picture.
[22:49.260 --> 22:50.200]  Completely voluntary.
[22:53.180 --> 22:55.280]  We can't do real-time change detection.
[22:55.660 --> 22:56.600]  It's just terrible.
[22:57.380 --> 22:58.860]  We can't do the last mile.
[22:59.140 --> 23:01.740]  We can't see under jungle canopy or into city streets.
[23:01.860 --> 23:03.160]  We can't find single individuals.
[23:03.420 --> 23:05.720]  It's a great book on the hunt for Pablo Escobar.
[23:05.720 --> 23:07.640]  But look at Noriega and Panama.
[23:08.080 --> 23:12.620]  We already had 12,000 troops in one of the largest CIA stations in Latin America and Panama.
[23:12.900 --> 23:15.660]  And we had to invade the country to get one guy.
[23:16.560 --> 23:17.520]  That's incompetence.
[23:17.820 --> 23:21.340]  That should have been a special ops team with silencers and good CIA intelligence.
[23:23.600 --> 23:28.480]  If, and by the way, Noriega had been told he had to get out of jail free card from the White House.
[23:29.100 --> 23:34.900]  The White House and Bill Casey told Noriega, you let us support the Contras from Panama and you can do all the drugs you want.
[23:35.260 --> 23:43.260]  Just like Brzezinski told Pakistan that they could have the bomb as long as they supported the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets.
[23:43.400 --> 23:43.620]  Okay?
[23:43.740 --> 23:47.180]  We're cutting deals out of the White House that are in complete violation of U.S. law.
[23:48.320 --> 23:50.020]  And this is a non-partisan.
[23:50.380 --> 23:52.380]  I'm not bashing any particular party.
[23:52.500 --> 23:53.600]  It's the nature of the beast.
[23:57.710 --> 24:02.090]  The U.S. Air Force now requires 24 hours in order to change a bombing package.
[24:03.790 --> 24:06.990]  In my day, you had Civil Air Patrols that could hit anything.
[24:08.010 --> 24:08.890]  24 hours.
[24:09.110 --> 24:10.390]  It's down to 24 hours.
[24:10.390 --> 24:12.170]  Oh, it's down to 24 hours.
[24:12.290 --> 24:12.510]  Okay.
[24:12.670 --> 24:13.690]  Well, depending on the mission.
[24:13.690 --> 24:18.690]  But in General Clark's book and in several other books, they're saying you have to give us 24 hours notice.
[24:19.090 --> 24:20.270]  The ads are 72 hours.
[24:20.290 --> 24:21.970]  Oh, please don't get technical with me.
[24:22.770 --> 24:24.350]  The point is it's a problem.
[24:24.350 --> 24:24.770]  Okay?
[24:24.790 --> 24:26.790]  I want people on five-minute strip alert.
[24:26.870 --> 24:28.990]  I want mixed packages ready to go.
[24:29.130 --> 24:31.790]  I want stuff deliverable within one to two hours.
[24:31.810 --> 24:34.650]  Just like I want a platoon of Marines anywhere in the world within 24 hours.
[24:34.710 --> 24:35.610]  We can talk about that later.
[24:38.150 --> 24:38.950]  Philosophical failure.
[24:40.030 --> 24:42.230]  We've confused secrecy with intelligence.
[24:44.690 --> 24:47.150]  We've failed to create a generic intelligence discipline.
[24:47.350 --> 24:50.430]  And we've failed to develop regional or global intelligence networks.
[24:50.590 --> 24:55.990]  Congressman Simmons is now personally taking an interest in open-source intelligence.
[24:56.190 --> 25:02.350]  And we're trying very hard to get $125 million in end-of-year money for a program.
[25:02.530 --> 25:04.130]  It's in my OSINT page.
[25:04.470 --> 25:10.990]  Basically, I want to put $10 million open-source intelligence collection facilities in each of the theaters, including NorthCom.
[25:11.230 --> 25:13.030]  And I want them to be multinational.
[25:13.250 --> 25:15.710]  I want a data warehouse for sharing with NGOs.
[25:16.030 --> 25:22.870]  I want a digital history center for cutting the spines off Chinese and Islamic and other publications and creating the digital history.
[25:23.330 --> 25:24.770]  And so on and so forth.
[25:26.730 --> 25:27.610]  I'll tell you something.
[25:27.690 --> 25:32.030]  The only thing that's going to protect us against terrorism and other ills is public sharing.
[25:32.030 --> 25:35.690]  Now, I don't know how come I understand this and the U.S. government doesn't. 
[25:37.450 --> 25:38.590]  I think you do.
[25:39.390 --> 25:43.650]  The bottom line is the new paradigm rewards sharing more than it rewards secrecy.
[25:44.270 --> 25:47.070]  Secrecy is an outdated, pathological concept.
[25:47.270 --> 25:48.550]  There have been books written about this.
[25:49.310 --> 25:55.630]  Voltaire's Bastards, Ellsberg's new book is actually quite good on secrets, a memoir.
[25:55.630 --> 25:58.570]  And my review of Ellsberg's book will help you.
[25:59.370 --> 26:01.190]  Basically, secrecy is pathological.
[26:02.690 --> 26:04.750]  Can't have smart spies in a dumb nation.
[26:05.810 --> 26:14.330]  I think the rest of the world has made a serious mistake in letting Americans lead the whole global secret intelligence process.
[26:14.610 --> 26:20.450]  I am doing what I can to nurture the people who are thinking about a European intelligence network.
[26:20.450 --> 26:25.130]  And one of the first things I told them was don't try and create a central intelligence agency for Europe.
[26:25.590 --> 26:29.830]  In the age of distributed information, central intelligence is an oxymoron.
[26:30.470 --> 26:30.990]  Okay?
[26:31.310 --> 26:33.130]  You need to have a network approach.
[26:34.730 --> 26:36.610]  Conclusion, spies only know secrets.
[26:37.450 --> 26:41.270]  Intelligence is about discovering, discriminating, distilling, and delivering answers.
[26:42.810 --> 26:44.430]  And I did my second thesis.
[26:44.430 --> 26:54.590]  I looked at three embassies where I'd served and came to the conclusion that we were collecting roughly 10% of what could be known that was relevant to our interests.
[26:54.810 --> 27:08.830]  But then in sending it back by hardcopy pouch to Washington, we were spilling 80%, which is where my informed guess comes from that Washington is operating on 2% of the relevant international national security information.
[27:10.590 --> 27:25.290]  My former partner, Mark Lowenthal, who's the ADCI for analysis and production today within the intelligence community, when he was staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence, he used to try and tell the clandestine service,
[27:25.410 --> 27:29.590]  you don't get points for collecting information in the hardest or most expensive way possible.
[27:30.270 --> 27:32.410]  But that's precisely what we keep doing.
[27:32.950 --> 27:45.670]  Because it benefits a corporation building it, and it benefits a congressman, your average congressman or senator is getting a 2.5% to 5% payoff from every contract that goes into their state.
[27:46.330 --> 27:46.810]  Okay?
[27:46.990 --> 27:47.830]  That's the standard.
[27:48.590 --> 27:54.350]  We need to make it so that we double their salaries and we cut off their hands if they take money from corporations.
[27:55.670 --> 28:01.730]  And last but not least, I was a consultant to an intelligence community project that was trying to think about tasking.
[28:02.490 --> 28:08.830]  And I said, wait a minute, you say the only thing you're trying to ask is which of the secret ints should you task?
[28:09.090 --> 28:10.030]  And they said, yeah.
[28:10.670 --> 28:12.870]  I said, there are three other questions you should ask first.
[28:13.610 --> 28:15.910]  First question you should ask is, do we already know this?
[28:16.530 --> 28:17.730]  And can we find it?
[28:18.370 --> 28:20.150]  And the answer is no, we can't find it.
[28:20.230 --> 28:21.390]  We don't know if we know this.
[28:21.390 --> 28:23.710]  It's too hard, so we get it again.
[28:24.130 --> 28:29.130]  The second question we should be asking is, if we don't already know this, can we get it from someone else?
[28:29.450 --> 28:33.810]  From another ally, from another member of the seven tribes, whatever.
[28:34.590 --> 28:44.530]  If we can't find it and we can't get it for free, can we buy it from the private sector at a price we can afford, a reasonable price, then time and security constraints and so on?
[28:44.530 --> 28:49.170]  And only if you can't find it, get it, or buy it should you steal it.
[28:50.950 --> 28:53.250]  The U.S. intelligence community has not matured to this point yet.
[28:54.490 --> 28:56.130]  Make sense or add value.
[28:56.530 --> 29:03.110]  One of the things that the national intelligence community is being told today by the Special Operations Command is that nothing they're producing is useful.
[29:05.090 --> 29:22.390]  When I was a battalion landing team agent, a very privileged position for a young second lieutenant, because among other things it meant that when you went on a Navy ship you had what's called a conics box for your safes, and there was always room for cases of beer that the Navy couldn't find because it was classified.
[29:26.850 --> 29:31.610]  That was definitely the most powerful second lieutenant in Asia for a brief time.
[29:33.310 --> 29:37.670]  What SOCOM is saying is don't bother sending us finished production, we need the raw data.
[29:38.190 --> 29:46.730]  And so where I think we're going to end up is with a distributed network that collects on demand, processes on demand, and produces on demand.
[29:47.190 --> 29:51.510]  And finished broadcast production is history by and large.
[29:52.490 --> 29:56.270]  It's about actionable answers, not secrets, not spies, not toys.
[29:56.530 --> 30:00.130]  And I really do truly believe in the proven craft of intelligence.
[30:00.510 --> 30:03.650]  I think you have some intelligence professionals you can be proud of.
[30:03.650 --> 30:08.230]  You also have some that should be, at a minimum, covered with honey and nailed down over an ant pit.
[30:09.810 --> 30:10.390]  All right.
[30:10.650 --> 30:12.470]  Now, that's the end of the brief.
[30:13.570 --> 30:14.450]  It's 11...
[30:14.910 --> 30:16.650]  It's 11.15, let's say.
[30:16.850 --> 30:19.350]  What I want to do is take a 10-minute break.
[30:19.890 --> 30:21.710]  We're going to do the pins up here again.
[30:21.810 --> 30:22.970]  Let's take a 15-minute break.
[30:23.110 --> 30:23.970]  We'll do the pins again.
[30:24.230 --> 30:28.810]  And at 11.30, I will start doing questions and answers.
[30:29.850 --> 30:33.070]  And basically, Lazlow, get the big Samoan guy.
[30:34.610 --> 30:39.630]  And what we're going to do is we're going to ask civil questions that are very brief.
[30:39.630 --> 30:41.610]  And you only get one question.
[30:42.690 --> 30:44.710]  And then we'll do as much interaction as you want.
[30:44.850 --> 30:47.190]  I'll stay in this room as long as there are 100 people here.
[30:47.530 --> 30:49.010]  Which I think we've got right now.
[30:49.490 --> 30:49.770]  Okay?
[30:50.010 --> 30:52.070]  So, 15-minute break and we'll do pins up here.
[30:54.270 --> 30:55.210]  How is this going?
[30:56.070 --> 30:56.470]  Sorry?
[30:57.290 --> 30:57.690]  Excellent.
[30:57.990 --> 30:58.970]  You're done with this, yes?
[31:06.290 --> 31:07.530]  Do I have a wife?
[31:08.890 --> 31:09.250]  Okay.
[31:10.350 --> 31:10.970]  Which one are you?
[31:11.270 --> 31:12.130]  Oh, you've got to be cool.
[31:12.310 --> 31:13.310]  I'm just in security.
[31:13.570 --> 31:14.450]  I know I don't want to.
[31:14.470 --> 31:15.170]  Are you sure?
[31:15.170 --> 31:16.370]  He's military, actually.
[31:16.490 --> 31:17.270]  He flies helicopters.
[31:18.550 --> 31:18.910]  Here.
[31:19.050 --> 31:20.630]  One of my precious military bits.
[31:25.190 --> 31:26.150]  Take a pin.
[31:26.790 --> 31:27.730]  I'll talk to you later.
[31:27.790 --> 31:28.110]  All right.
[31:28.210 --> 31:28.470]  Hold on.
[31:28.570 --> 31:29.110]  Let me give you a card.
[31:29.110 --> 31:30.950]  His nickname is Psycho, so...
[31:31.650 --> 31:32.010]  You.
[31:32.750 --> 31:33.810]  But go ahead, sir.
[31:36.190 --> 31:40.550]  How are you going to address data integrity in a distributed environment?
[31:40.950 --> 31:41.970]  By encrypting it.
[31:43.870 --> 31:45.790]  What if it's not any good before you encrypt it?
[31:46.230 --> 31:46.490]  Ah.
[31:46.690 --> 31:49.930]  Then you hunt down and kill the person that put it up in the first place.
[31:51.430 --> 32:02.330]  I'll tell you, you know, at the other hackers conference about 10 years ago, we had an actual discussion about personal templates and personal reputations.
[32:02.970 --> 32:07.030]  And it's really interesting because it preceded this whole blogging thing.
[32:07.270 --> 32:10.150]  By the way, all of my lectures are available on my website.
[32:11.150 --> 32:12.570]  Don't try it with the modem.
[32:12.890 --> 32:13.370]  Ah.
[32:13.610 --> 32:16.030]  But if you have a high speed line, you can easily download.
[32:16.230 --> 32:18.210]  And I have lectures that review the literature.
[32:18.650 --> 32:19.130]  Ah.
[32:19.270 --> 32:23.250]  So literature on emerging threats, literature on strategy and blowback and all this stuff.
[32:23.290 --> 32:24.850]  It's a really fine student resource.
[32:26.370 --> 32:41.850]  But basically, I think that templates and your personal reputation is going to be much more valuable as a source for ad hoc inquiries and hiring and cash and so forth.
[32:42.070 --> 32:47.610]  And I think over time, just like Amazon and eBay, people are going to get rated.
[32:48.050 --> 32:51.510]  And the people doing the rating are going to get rated.
[32:51.510 --> 32:55.710]  And so if you have a moron constantly giving you a one, eventually he wipes himself out.
[32:56.210 --> 32:56.590]  Okay.
[32:56.930 --> 32:57.530]  Um.
[32:58.010 --> 33:08.750]  But I think our personal reputation and tagging all data with who collected it is going to eventually help create this citizen world brain, ah, concept.
[33:09.230 --> 33:13.930]  I think data absolutely must have attributes about everyone who has touched it.
[33:13.930 --> 33:15.550]  The chain of custody, if you will.
[33:16.250 --> 33:16.270]  Um.
[33:16.890 --> 33:17.070]  Yeah.
[33:17.070 --> 33:20.810]  Like we used to do in evidence when I was shaking down my Marines for drugs.
[33:21.250 --> 33:28.090]  You know, when I found drugs in their socks, I had to actually have a receipt for every person that touched that all the way up to the courtroom.
[33:28.590 --> 33:28.950]  Ah.
[33:29.190 --> 33:34.910]  And so I think information is going to need to have a chain of custody and biases and attributes and all of that.
[33:35.010 --> 33:37.630]  And in this day and age, that's a simple thing to do.
[33:37.630 --> 33:38.270]  Yes, sir.
[33:38.490 --> 33:41.330]  Have you looked at all the DOD metadata repository?
[33:41.910 --> 33:41.970]  Um.
[33:42.130 --> 33:44.090]  It's at xml.dod.mil.
[33:44.250 --> 33:47.670]  They're doing a lot of stuff you're talking about, geospatial, um, coordination and stuff.
[33:47.830 --> 33:50.450]  But I don't think all the attributes like data integrity are in there.
[33:50.570 --> 33:51.530]  Do you have any comments on that?
[33:52.290 --> 33:52.570]  Um.
[33:53.390 --> 33:56.730]  Paul Straussman, who was the director of defense information, is a friend of mine.
[33:56.850 --> 33:57.750]  And he tried hard.
[33:58.150 --> 34:00.990]  He came up with this concept of corporate information management.
[34:01.450 --> 34:03.690]  And I extended it to global information management.
[34:03.930 --> 34:07.470]  The bottom line is that DOD is over 2,000 fiefdoms.
[34:07.470 --> 34:09.370]  None of which give a shit about any of the others.
[34:09.850 --> 34:10.130]  Um.
[34:11.110 --> 34:15.250]  And I'm sure there are wonderful efforts across DOD that I'm not familiar with.
[34:15.450 --> 34:18.090]  And that sounds like something I'd love to get an email on.
[34:18.410 --> 34:18.850]  Um.
[34:20.350 --> 34:25.190]  But the bottom line for me is I think we need an Internet standards process for data.
[34:25.290 --> 34:26.710]  I don't think NIST is working.
[34:27.090 --> 34:27.530]  Uh.
[34:27.810 --> 34:28.850]  As best I can tell.
[34:29.250 --> 34:30.330]  Do you have a follow-up?
[34:31.010 --> 34:34.210]  Well, I'm just aware they're building a DOD metadata repository now.
[34:34.210 --> 34:38.390]  They're getting the standards put together for the templates and the document type definitions.
[34:38.710 --> 34:39.010]  Um.
[34:39.210 --> 34:40.490]  But it's all like beta from what I've seen.
[34:40.610 --> 34:41.790]  Are they asking for public comment?
[34:42.030 --> 34:42.750]  I believe so.
[34:42.890 --> 34:43.010]  Yes.
[34:43.250 --> 34:43.750]  Well, that's good.
[34:43.950 --> 34:44.710]  That's progress.
[34:45.490 --> 34:45.650]  Um.
[34:47.190 --> 34:47.870]  Any other questions?
[34:50.350 --> 34:50.750]  Okay.
[34:50.870 --> 34:51.750]  Quick spy story.
[34:51.870 --> 34:55.610]  There I was in a McDonald's in a Central American country wearing my goatee.
[34:55.690 --> 34:57.610]  And in the tropical heat it started to come off.
[34:57.610 --> 34:59.990]  So I finished the rest of the meeting like this.
[35:01.270 --> 35:01.630]  Next.
[35:01.930 --> 35:02.090]  Uh.
[35:02.550 --> 35:02.750]  Yeah.
[35:02.910 --> 35:03.430]  I have a question.
[35:04.470 --> 35:06.730]  If we're going to be collecting this data for you...
[35:06.730 --> 35:07.810]  No, you're not collecting for me.
[35:07.910 --> 35:08.670]  You're collecting for yourself.
[35:08.850 --> 35:09.170]  But go ahead.
[35:09.410 --> 35:11.390]  So how are we going to be given access to the data?
[35:11.570 --> 35:13.730]  Or are we going to be given access to the data?
[35:15.910 --> 35:22.170]  I don't have all the solutions, but I think that we have failed to harness the volunteer manpower.
[35:22.410 --> 35:26.210]  And we have also failed to get to microcache to the point where it's effective.
[35:26.610 --> 35:27.090]  Um.
[35:27.650 --> 35:28.710]  I would like to get to microcache.
[35:29.270 --> 35:30.790]  I'd like to get to e-copyright.
[35:30.910 --> 35:32.350]  I'd like to get to audit trails.
[35:32.710 --> 35:36.470]  And these are all things way beyond my technical competence.
[35:37.270 --> 35:37.390]  Um.
[35:38.090 --> 35:43.210]  My IT guy is Steve Arnold from Arnold Information Technologies in Kentucky.
[35:44.190 --> 35:44.210]  Um.
[35:45.890 --> 35:48.110]  And we talked to In-Q-Tel and others.
[35:48.110 --> 35:48.910]  Um.
[35:50.410 --> 35:56.350]  Basically, I think we need to restore the idea of an information commons and the Internet begins that process.
[35:56.770 --> 36:00.510]  But the real data is the data that is in protected databases.
[36:00.930 --> 36:11.550]  And one of the reasons that I want to increase security on the Internet is because I want to increase the prospects for sharing stuff with more and more people.
[36:11.830 --> 36:12.350]  Yes, sir.
[36:12.670 --> 36:17.030]  In terms of how are you going to get or how do you propose people actually?
[36:17.830 --> 36:18.710]  Use the data.
[36:18.890 --> 36:21.710]  Not use the data, but kind of that cultural reform.
[36:21.930 --> 36:22.910]  Is it lead by example?
[36:23.330 --> 36:26.090]  Is it to show people, hey, this is what you can get over here?
[36:26.530 --> 36:29.750]  As opposed to, right now you've got, like you said, the 2,000 fiefdoms.
[36:30.370 --> 36:33.190]  What's their incentive to go with this other program?
[36:33.330 --> 36:34.610]  That they can do their job better?
[36:35.470 --> 36:36.650]  That's a big part of it.
[36:36.650 --> 36:40.570]  I just paid $1,500 for a CEO sales course.
[36:41.890 --> 36:43.490]  CEO selling to CEO.
[36:43.810 --> 36:49.090]  And it's interesting because my whole life I've been trying to explain things to people in a rational way.
[36:49.370 --> 36:55.450]  And they made it crystal clear to me, look, if it ain't about sex or profit or power, they're not going to listen.
[36:56.270 --> 36:57.930]  And don't try and sell them anything.
[36:57.930 --> 36:59.910]  Ask them what their problem is and then solve it.
[37:00.730 --> 37:06.770]  And then explain to them that the reason you cost three times as much is because they're not adding up the hidden costs of doing it with the other guy.
[37:08.090 --> 37:08.950]  That's in a nutshell.
[37:09.090 --> 37:10.330]  Now you don't have to pay the 1,500.
[37:10.970 --> 37:11.290]  Thank you.
[37:12.650 --> 37:18.770]  But I realize we really haven't done a good job of holding people accountable for being stupid.
[37:20.930 --> 37:26.930]  And my 14-year-old hates the Fairfax County school system, which is a pretty good school system.
[37:28.030 --> 37:32.990]  But he got an F in biology and his excuse was an acceptable one to me.
[37:33.150 --> 37:34.250]  He says, Dad, I was bored.
[37:34.390 --> 37:36.050]  The last quarter she just showed videos.
[37:37.710 --> 37:39.010]  I can understand that.
[37:39.630 --> 37:41.690]  I'd be not only bored but pissed.
[37:42.030 --> 37:44.830]  I mean, he got an A the quarter that they were doing lab work.
[37:45.530 --> 37:48.970]  This is a kid that spent nine hours waiting to catch a fish.
[37:49.510 --> 37:49.990]  Okay?
[37:49.990 --> 37:52.750]  I have no doubts about his intelligence or his perseverance.
[37:52.750 --> 37:58.970]  I do have doubts about, you know, the teachers kind of getting lazy and using videos as a substitute for being teachers.
[38:00.050 --> 38:02.830]  And so I don't have all the answers.
[38:03.010 --> 38:05.670]  But I think Google has come a long way.
[38:06.030 --> 38:07.690]  The Internet has come a long way.
[38:07.770 --> 38:09.030]  I don't like Google answers.
[38:09.410 --> 38:14.050]  I think Google is sitting on an $8 billion a year pot of gold.
[38:14.050 --> 38:19.690]  And they are so hung up on their goddamn algorithms that they're not willing to do commercial intelligence.
[38:20.630 --> 38:26.270]  Because if you take the bell curve for the people that use Google, put me on one end.
[38:26.330 --> 38:29.990]  I spend $5,000 to $10,000 a year buying books and things on the Internet.
[38:31.910 --> 38:36.090]  That doesn't count the $200,000 or $300,000 I pay for consultants and things like that.
[38:36.910 --> 38:39.130]  But as an individual, $5,000.
[38:39.490 --> 38:41.030]  And then at the bottom, put zero.
[38:41.250 --> 38:43.270]  The median point maybe is $500.
[38:44.130 --> 38:50.190]  Google is sitting on $8 billion a year in on-demand information sales.
[38:50.210 --> 38:52.430]  And I don't think Google answers is the way to go.
[38:53.490 --> 38:55.170]  So do you have any other comment?
[38:55.790 --> 38:57.550]  So you're proposing more of a...
[38:57.550 --> 39:03.010]  You're thinking at least along the lines of a top-down hold accountable and that will propagate down through the organization versus...
[39:03.010 --> 39:04.650]  I think it's a pull system.
[39:05.010 --> 39:05.950]  It's not a push system.
[39:06.110 --> 39:16.350]  And it's a system in which the pull is accompanied by accountability, audit, and attributes of every person that's touched that data.
[39:17.090 --> 39:18.830]  So that you know who's touched that data.
[39:18.990 --> 39:22.430]  And actually you can even convene a meeting about that data.
[39:22.710 --> 39:29.510]  You know, with one button, you hit every person who's touched it and you give them a financial or sexual incentive for having a conversation.
[39:29.510 --> 39:30.990]  Okay, next person.
[39:32.230 --> 39:32.750]  Slowly.
[39:33.090 --> 39:33.490]  Yes.
[39:33.710 --> 39:39.990]  So you talked about how education contributes to this as one of the people wearing the academic button.
[39:42.110 --> 39:50.430]  How...what is a basic toolkit in your opinion for educating citizens for a society that will help make intelligence, you know, for everyone possible?
[39:50.830 --> 39:54.610]  Just either kids, you know, on up through adults, like adult education as well as child education.
[39:54.610 --> 40:00.950]  We...someone smarter than me said that we've spent a hundred years perfecting a school system that creates factory workers.
[40:02.230 --> 40:03.450]  I think that's right.
[40:04.050 --> 40:05.990]  We're not teaching kids how to learn.
[40:06.210 --> 40:09.070]  We're basically paying for very expensive childcare.
[40:10.370 --> 40:13.990]  And we're doing in 18 years what could probably be done in five.
[40:15.110 --> 40:18.010]  If we really went at it in a more intelligent way.
[40:18.010 --> 40:35.410]  I personally believe that we should move to a new triad system in which people spend one-third of their time studying, one-third of their time traveling or in internships or community service, and one-third of their time working every year of their life.
[40:36.090 --> 40:36.510]  Okay?
[40:37.290 --> 40:39.550]  We are completely out of touch with what we need.
[40:41.810 --> 40:43.190]  But if I can ask a follow-up.
[40:43.490 --> 40:49.390]  On a really basic level, just for...at the point of dealing with the information, what kinds of things do people need to know?
[40:53.840 --> 41:01.000]  The reason that I'm creating this non-profit in Stockholm, because I think the Swedes have replaced the Canadians as the trusted third party.
[41:01.580 --> 41:03.540]  And we're creating it with nine languages.
[41:03.760 --> 41:06.080]  It's Golden Candle Society in nine different languages.
[41:06.440 --> 41:09.860]  I need to buy the domain names next week, so please don't beat me to it.
[41:13.680 --> 41:24.900]  But what I want to do is recruit retired intelligence professionals from all seven tribes, and I want to create a standard educational package on the proven process of intelligence.
[41:25.840 --> 41:31.560]  The proven process of intelligence is significantly different from academic research in some ways.
[41:34.760 --> 41:40.840]  Generally, anything that is broadcast or is published for general distribution, is research.
[41:41.400 --> 41:50.720]  Intelligence is about answering an important question for someone specific, who is going to take an action or do something that actually makes a financial or sexual difference in their lives.
[41:50.920 --> 41:52.960]  Okay, these guys really drove it home to me here.
[41:57.420 --> 42:03.860]  And so, for example, I had a general, I had a two-star general send a one-star general an email.
[42:04.000 --> 42:05.980]  He said, tell me everything about mining U.S. harbors.
[42:07.420 --> 42:16.400]  And so this one-star sent it to a colonel who sent it to me, and we spent $3,000 and four man days figuring out all of the ways that ports could be mined.
[42:16.400 --> 42:20.780]  Air mines, land mines, sea mines, sent back the two-star and said, this isn't what I wanted.
[42:21.120 --> 42:23.600]  What I wanted to know was how could a U.S. militant close a U.S. port?
[42:26.120 --> 42:27.540]  It's a completely different question.
[42:28.040 --> 42:37.980]  And because the one-star didn't have the balls to ask the two-star, sir, why do you want to know and what context and so forth, we wasted $3,000 in four man days.
[42:38.560 --> 42:40.440]  Getting the question right is very important.
[42:41.220 --> 42:42.080]  Requirements analysis.
[42:42.740 --> 42:43.540]  Requirements definition.
[42:43.540 --> 42:51.480]  You really have to understand what it is you want to know and why and when and how long the answer should be and just how much money you want to spend.
[42:51.620 --> 42:54.200]  Do you want a $5 answer or do you want a $5,000 answer?
[42:54.380 --> 42:55.780]  It's a requirements definition.
[42:56.180 --> 42:58.260]  Then collection management, knowing who knows.
[42:58.460 --> 43:02.480]  I am appalled at the number of people that don't understand citation analysis.
[43:03.540 --> 43:13.860]  Using the Social Science Citation Index or the Science Citation Index, both published by the Institute of Scientific Information, created by Eugene Garfield, one of America's most brilliant people.
[43:14.400 --> 43:24.020]  I can find out for $1,000, $500 in a dialogue ranking command and $500 in analyst time, I can find out who the top 100 people in the world are on anything.
[43:24.800 --> 43:34.760]  If I have to do a study on left-handed Lithuanians with earwax problems, I can find the top 10 guys or gals or in-betweens on that.
[43:35.740 --> 43:43.720]  And then I call up, I decide or my client decides what citizenships are acceptable and I call up the top guy and I say, hey, I want to send you a check for $2,000.
[43:44.280 --> 43:46.500]  And he says, oh, no one's ever called me and said that before.
[43:46.560 --> 43:47.860]  And I said, well, here's what I want you to do.
[43:48.080 --> 43:50.740]  And I don't want it to take more than four to six hours of your time.
[43:50.800 --> 43:53.300]  And oh, by the way, I want the answer within three working days.
[43:53.300 --> 43:54.900]  And they do and I do.
[43:55.680 --> 44:00.560]  And so there are very few people I can't hire overnight on a phone call.
[44:01.340 --> 44:04.060]  And I don't bother hiring just anybody.
[44:04.060 --> 44:09.880]  I only hire people who are in the top 10 to 100 in their selected field.
[44:09.960 --> 44:14.280]  And oh, by the way, they know the 100 that don't publish, who are in government or elsewhere.
[44:14.580 --> 44:16.580]  And then source discovery and validation.
[44:16.800 --> 44:21.220]  I mean, I think source discovery and validation is extremely important and we're not paying enough attention to it.
[44:21.220 --> 44:27.000]  Most of what is available on the Internet, most of what is available from commercial media is crap.
[44:28.680 --> 44:32.080]  We now talk about blue OSINT and black OSINT.
[44:32.420 --> 44:35.420]  Blue OSINT is new knowledge created on the fly.
[44:36.600 --> 44:44.060]  Using legal and ethical methods, including ground walkers and $4 a day PhDs and stuff like that.
[44:44.280 --> 44:47.680]  We will actually go and do interviews, take pictures, do whatever.
[44:47.680 --> 44:54.320]  And we will create knowledge that is not available in books or newspapers or magazines or dissertations.
[44:54.820 --> 44:58.240]  Black OSINT is OSINT that's so good I don't want you to know I can do it.
[44:59.360 --> 45:04.200]  Because the sources will dry up just as they dry up when secret sources and methods are blown.
[45:04.780 --> 45:06.680]  And we're doing black OSINT now.
[45:08.600 --> 45:12.600]  So I think what people need to know is that there is a process of intelligence.
[45:13.060 --> 45:19.480]  That there is a discipline and patience and methodology of learning and research and intelligence.
[45:21.120 --> 45:25.880]  And that if you want to play video games all your life, that's fine, but you're going to go hungry.
[45:27.640 --> 45:30.300]  You know, and I'm having this discussion with my 14-year-old.
[45:30.360 --> 45:31.300]  It's driving me crazy.
[45:31.620 --> 45:35.880]  I mean, he really thinks he can make it as a hamburger flipper at McDonald's.
[45:38.140 --> 45:38.540]  Murph.
[45:38.900 --> 45:39.940]  Did that answer your question?
[45:40.740 --> 45:41.140]  Okay.
[45:41.320 --> 45:41.760]  Next, sir.
[45:42.760 --> 45:43.060]  Hi.
[45:44.120 --> 45:46.220]  Just, you were talking about standards before.
[45:46.440 --> 45:47.960]  And I guess I'm one of those people that's...
[45:47.960 --> 45:51.020]  The other people that are really excited about the idea of collective intelligence.
[45:51.300 --> 46:06.500]  And I believe there's some standards that DOD has been working on called DAML and OIL, which are both based on top of RDF for allowing information to be found and shared and more easily classified than perhaps you could in a standard RDBMS.
[46:06.980 --> 46:09.700]  And the standard I'm most excited about is called Topic Maps.
[46:09.740 --> 46:11.000]  And I'm wondering if you've heard about that.
[46:11.000 --> 46:13.640]  I'm pretty sure some of these technologies could be of use.
[46:14.120 --> 46:17.320]  Well, I would love to see a dialogue emerge on that.
[46:17.420 --> 46:18.520]  I'd certainly welcome an email.
[46:18.740 --> 46:21.800]  You can get my card or send an email to bear at OSS.net.
[46:22.260 --> 46:26.880]  I mean, Arnold handles the technical questions and other people handle the technical questions.
[46:28.880 --> 46:33.500]  So don't look to me as being intelligent about standards or anything like that.
[46:33.600 --> 46:35.480]  But I think the discussion needs to be held.
[46:35.480 --> 46:42.020]  Vint Cerf, I think, did a tremendous job setting a voluntary rapid Internet standards process.
[46:42.620 --> 46:47.980]  There are also people like Robert Herman who ran ANSI, the American National Standards Institute, who hate standards.
[46:48.460 --> 46:50.660]  They think standards are the enemy of progress.
[46:51.820 --> 46:58.820]  I personally think better is the enemy of good enough, and I think proprietary is the enemy of progress.
[47:00.080 --> 47:05.100]  And so we need to have standards that are good enough for sharing.
[47:05.260 --> 47:07.320]  And I mean, one of the things I've stopped doing is...
[47:07.320 --> 47:09.560]  It really pisses me off that my U.S. government client requires that I use Microsoft.
[47:12.940 --> 47:23.720]  And so I've started posting as much as I can in RTF just because it makes me angry that DOC and PPT aren't translatable and migratable and all these other things.
[47:23.720 --> 47:25.620]  Can I... Sorry, I had another thing.
[47:25.620 --> 47:26.580]  You can do whatever you want.
[47:27.280 --> 47:27.640]  All right.
[47:28.940 --> 47:31.880]  I was actually going to ask a smart-ass question, so it's good that you just said that.
[47:32.060 --> 47:33.000]  Here's my smart-ass question.
[47:33.120 --> 47:38.840]  Earlier on, you said that, you know, given the choice between incompetence and conspiracy, always choose incompetence.
[47:39.920 --> 47:51.760]  Now, in 1999, there was a B-1 bomber flew over from the States to Kosovo and dropped two B-1 bombs on the Chinese Embassy in the middle of the Kosovo War.
[47:52.680 --> 47:55.560]  And afterwards, they said, well, we had the wrong map.
[47:55.700 --> 47:58.180]  We were working from a tourist map from 19...
[47:58.180 --> 47:58.200]  Yeah.
[47:58.400 --> 47:59.440]  Do you honestly believe that?
[47:59.640 --> 48:01.600]  Well, I've heard two competing stories.
[48:01.780 --> 48:05.100]  They're both believable, but the incompetence one is more believable.
[48:08.440 --> 48:18.220]  The conspiracy or deliberate attack thing is that that was the intelligence section of the Chinese Embassy and they were getting too big for their britches in an area that we considered to be our preserve.
[48:19.420 --> 48:25.140]  They were running arms and doing other things and it was a very deliberate attack on China.
[48:25.840 --> 48:35.920]  I'm less inclined to believe that in part because I don't think they've actually been very active out there compared to what they're doing, say, against the Uyghurs.
[48:38.200 --> 48:57.320]  The incompetence one, and by the way, as this was happening, I had a Russian 1997 10,000 scale map of Belgrade on my office wall from Eastview Publications, Eastview Cartographic in Minneapolis, which is my geospatial counterpart.
[48:59.780 --> 49:16.560]  The U.S. government is very reluctant to use Russian military maps and other foreign maps because Jim Clapper and NGA really think they can do a better job with one-meter imagery and the shuttle mission data, which got us the digital terrain elevation data.
[49:16.560 --> 49:18.900]  And so they try and create stuff on the fly.
[49:19.000 --> 49:20.300]  The problem is they're not fast enough.
[49:21.880 --> 49:27.560]  I have U.S. government clients that come to me for Russian military maps and digital and hard copy because NGA can't meet their time deadlines.
[49:31.460 --> 49:33.120]  Let me diverge for just a moment.
[49:33.260 --> 49:37.060]  I really believe that imagery and geospatial information is extremely important.
[49:37.200 --> 49:40.340]  Now, let me tell you about one of the problems with relying on classified imagery.
[49:41.120 --> 49:45.080]  Classified imagery is basically like having a bucket full of postage stamps.
[49:45.460 --> 49:53.600]  And these postage stamps have been taken at different years, different seasons, different times of day, different angles of look.
[49:54.220 --> 49:54.820]  Okay?
[49:55.280 --> 50:03.760]  And so when you combine all these postage stamps with the digital terrain elevation data, you get something that's almost incomprehensible in my experience.
[50:04.580 --> 50:12.120]  Whereas if you take commercial imagery, 10-meter spot, which by the way, I had to tell NGA that spot had two satellites.
[50:12.380 --> 50:16.420]  Which meant that it had a revisitation of every two days, not every 30 days.
[50:16.780 --> 50:17.200]  Okay?
[50:17.420 --> 50:20.900]  But you take 10-meter commercial imagery for the broad swath.
[50:21.060 --> 50:24.000]  You get a nice, clean, wide area look.
[50:24.340 --> 50:27.900]  You bring in the digital terrain elevation data, then you slide in the Russian.
[50:27.900 --> 50:37.060]  It takes hundreds of man years to do the data extraction from imagery to convert that into a chart as cultural features and contour lines and all that.
[50:37.320 --> 50:45.000]  And then, in the Chinese Embassy case, you ask a defense attaché that's been there recently, who will tell you you have the wrong address.
[50:45.300 --> 50:51.000]  And this was the one target picked by CIA, and I actually believe that it was picked in error.
[50:52.060 --> 50:53.520]  That's my personal belief.
[50:53.720 --> 50:56.300]  I have no access to privileged or classified information.
[50:56.600 --> 51:03.560]  But truly, in my 30 years or more of experience in the classified world, incompetence beats conspiracy every time.
[51:04.420 --> 51:05.120]  Yes, sir?
[51:05.220 --> 51:08.640]  You mentioned the Peace Corps both the other morning and today.
[51:08.800 --> 51:11.420]  And I was wondering what you saw as the benefits of the Peace Corps.
[51:11.420 --> 51:18.200]  Is it merely the immediate benefits of what the people involved do by building bridges and infrastructure or whatever?
[51:18.380 --> 51:24.660]  Or is it more a matter of goodwill with other nations on top of the immediate benefits?
[51:26.400 --> 51:29.820]  The Peace Corps should be 10 to 50 times larger.
[51:30.320 --> 51:35.580]  And we should double or triple the salaries and the compensation.
[51:36.660 --> 51:40.420]  We should do that as part of a larger integrated strategy.
[51:40.420 --> 51:42.520]  There is no one in the U.S. government, whether in the State Department, CIA, or anywhere, there is no one in the U.S.
[51:47.280 --> 51:49.640]  government that has a finger on every single U.S. government program going into any single country.
[51:52.440 --> 51:52.840]  Okay?
[51:53.100 --> 51:54.400]  So Sudan, for example.
[51:54.840 --> 52:00.440]  There are at least 150 action officers, only 15 to 20 of whom are talking to each other.
[52:00.960 --> 52:01.360]  Okay?
[52:01.400 --> 52:05.280]  And so you have these obscure little law enforcement programs and these obscure little things.
[52:05.280 --> 52:12.100]  And then if you add to that all the faith-based diplomacy and the NGO actions and the business actions, it's all out of control.
[52:14.600 --> 52:15.780]  I've forgotten your question.
[52:17.640 --> 52:22.980]  Extend to the Peace Corps' benefit, whether it's merely immediate or whether it has long-reaching cultural benefits.
[52:22.980 --> 52:35.320]  I have come to the conclusion that we need to spend $500 billion a year on overseas preventive measures, including having a minimal big war force.
[52:37.080 --> 52:47.040]  If we don't stabilize the world, if we don't stop illegal migration, if we don't stop trading women and children, if we don't stop ethnic criminal gangs, and ethnic criminal gangs is one man, one bullet.
[52:47.300 --> 52:49.140]  And I really don't give a shit about a trial.
[52:50.440 --> 52:52.780]  You know, we have to get tough.
[52:53.060 --> 52:55.500]  But the problem is we're not smart enough to be tough.
[52:55.920 --> 52:59.780]  We're not smart enough to identify these guys and track them down in their holes.
[53:00.380 --> 53:06.320]  And at the same time, we're creating more terrorists every day than we're killing.
[53:07.620 --> 53:17.180]  You know, I think it's absolutely ludicrous to be in Iraq as an occupying force rather than as a peaceful force.
[53:17.220 --> 53:18.780]  I think we busted the piggy bank.
[53:19.720 --> 53:25.540]  And so we need a national strategy that is actually coherent and uses all of the instruments of national power.
[53:25.700 --> 53:27.760]  Joe Nye did a pretty good book on this.
[53:28.040 --> 53:30.620]  Not the soft power book, which is a shallow book.
[53:31.300 --> 53:33.780]  But the earlier one on...
[53:34.160 --> 53:34.980]  What was it called?
[53:35.100 --> 53:37.860]  Who remembers Joe Nye's next to last book?
[53:39.280 --> 53:39.640]  No?
[53:39.820 --> 53:40.760]  You guys got to read more.
[53:42.840 --> 53:43.680]  In my area.
[53:43.820 --> 53:45.060]  But anyway, you can read my reviews.
[53:47.040 --> 53:59.040]  There is no government program, for example, for the Pacific region, that says, okay, here are all the State Department programs, here are all the AID programs, here are all the Peace Corps programs, here are all the Special Operations and Military programs.
[53:59.040 --> 54:06.520]  And one of the things I told the guys at Fort Bragg is, your civil affairs and PSYOP stuff ain't worth shit if we're not delivering water and food.
[54:07.140 --> 54:13.320]  I mean, you can do all the hearts and minds crap you want, but if we're not delivering water and food, it kind of lacks credibility.
[54:14.480 --> 54:15.500]  And so the U.S. government right now...
[54:16.700 --> 54:20.560]  David Abshire wrote the world's longest job description.
[54:20.560 --> 54:22.980]  It was a book called Preventing World War III.
[54:22.980 --> 54:28.820]  The entire book was focused on describing the position of counselor to the president for strategic thinking.
[54:30.240 --> 54:35.780]  And in my first book, I end with suggesting four major reforms in the office of the presidency.
[54:36.060 --> 54:41.340]  I think the presidency has become too complicated to just elect one man who then picks his buddies.
[54:41.340 --> 54:43.680]  I think we need to elect a team.
[54:43.880 --> 54:48.920]  I think presidential candidates need to be required to identify their cabinets in advance of election.
[54:56.820 --> 55:08.820]  We need to have a national office of strategic thinking with a grand strategy division that thinks ahead and a crisis management division that manages interagency operations to respond to crises.
[55:08.820 --> 55:11.760]  We need to elevate the intelligence community.
[55:12.240 --> 55:15.820]  I'd make the next director of national intelligence equivalent of the Federal Reserve.
[55:16.160 --> 55:17.900]  A non-partisan professional.
[55:18.040 --> 55:21.920]  One of the problems we have is most people, most DCIs have no clue what they're doing.
[55:22.980 --> 55:25.000]  They're coming in out of the political side.
[55:25.120 --> 55:30.840]  John Lehman will be an absolute disaster as a director of central intelligence if he gets it.
[55:31.080 --> 55:37.460]  Porter Goss would be partially educatable, but Porter's still hung up on having been a case officer.
[55:37.460 --> 55:47.280]  And I think congressional oversight over intelligence has been grossly negligent for the past ten years.
[55:47.460 --> 55:52.140]  And so Porter's got a lot to atone for, but I don't think he realizes that.
[55:52.780 --> 55:55.120]  So the Peace Corps is an important piece.
[55:55.120 --> 55:57.920]  I think Americans are good-hearted, decent people.
[55:58.060 --> 56:02.500]  I would particularly like to see us sending out Muslim Peace Corps workers.
[56:04.460 --> 56:08.020]  No Muslim, in my experience, is going to listen to a white boy from Kansas.
[56:09.960 --> 56:13.100]  And so we really need to leverage our melting pot.
[56:13.340 --> 56:14.800]  And we're not doing that.
[56:15.040 --> 56:17.940]  Let's leave it there and come back to it another time, okay?
[56:18.340 --> 56:19.180]  You can hit me.
[56:19.240 --> 56:19.960]  I'll be here till 2.
[56:20.220 --> 56:20.820]  Yes, sir.
[56:20.820 --> 56:27.440]  We have 3 and a half months to election.
[56:28.640 --> 56:38.460]  And almost every part of government is assuming that something will happen.
[56:38.460 --> 56:48.660]  This will be about 27 October and about 100th anniversary of opening subway in New York.
[56:48.660 --> 57:11.160]  And if we assume that we can fix borders, close borders to came here and 2, 3 guys, bad guys, they can attack easy and 3 methods.
[57:11.400 --> 57:15.890]  One would be, for example, dirty bomb, some type biological...
[57:16.700 --> 57:17.380]  Do you have a question?
[57:17.380 --> 57:21.540]  And eventually some tunnel like subway.
[57:21.760 --> 57:27.180]  What do you think, if agreed with your knowledge, where will be this attack?
[57:27.620 --> 57:28.640]  Because it's almost...
[57:28.640 --> 57:35.140]  Well, first off, I think there are over a thousand sleeper people in the United States.
[57:35.360 --> 57:43.860]  And some of them have married blonde, blue-eyed babes and have had children by these blonde, blue-eyed babes and they don't know that they're covered for action.
[57:45.220 --> 57:53.160]  That at some point in time, the guy will fill the soccer van with the family and use that to do something really horrific that includes suicide.
[57:54.280 --> 57:59.340]  So we have a lot of sleepers in the United States, a lot of Hamas, a lot of Pakistani bad boys.
[58:00.680 --> 58:11.460]  And just to take an example from Pakistan, which is now exporting terrorism by official government policy to Bangladesh, Kashmir, Nepal, Sri Lanka and now Phuket.
[58:11.540 --> 58:13.540]  Phuket, Thailand is a Bali waiting to happen.
[58:15.140 --> 58:21.500]  The south part of Thailand is mostly Muslim, Malay Muslims, and they've basically been on the short end of the stick.
[58:21.740 --> 58:23.780]  And I will come back to the United States in a minute.
[58:24.020 --> 58:30.160]  They've been on the short end of the stick in terms of Thai cultural bigotism toward them.
[58:30.320 --> 58:37.600]  And so they get the bottom of the barrel in terms of government assistance and school projects and things like this.
[58:37.600 --> 58:53.340]  And what's happening now is basically the Pakistanis in particular are trying to export terrorism into southern Thailand and they're trying to take these legitimate local grievances and then turn them into armed insurrection.
[58:54.100 --> 58:59.260]  Thailand is going to become a lot uglier in the next year or two.
[58:59.860 --> 59:06.100]  Early in this year, there were a large number of people killed in Thailand.
[59:06.100 --> 59:09.580]  Now, coming back to the United States, there's a Pakistani example.
[59:09.680 --> 59:19.040]  In Naples, we found 28 Pakistanis in an apartment building with 100 cell phones, maps of all the NATO facilities, and enough explosives to take out a three-story building.
[59:19.220 --> 59:20.880]  They are all over this country.
[59:21.420 --> 59:21.680]  Okay?
[59:21.860 --> 59:24.020]  Closing the borders is not going to stop this.
[59:24.140 --> 59:25.780]  And we can't close the borders anyway.
[59:25.820 --> 59:26.440]  It's impossible.
[59:27.400 --> 59:37.240]  I've actually been out on a... when I was a CIA mid-career course, which is like our war college, I went out to the San Diego border and we watched them herd people with horses.
[59:39.960 --> 59:44.140]  You know, it's impossible to control our border with the way things are going.
[59:44.280 --> 59:49.840]  Now, after 9-11, they stopped coming because they thought we might shoot them.
[59:51.500 --> 59:55.980]  But after about two or three days, they figured out we wouldn't shoot them and the borders became porous again.
[59:55.980 --> 59:56.680]  And...
[59:56.680 --> 59:57.320]  Umm...

[00:00.000 --> 00:03.660]  Their electoral responsibilities is another question.
[00:04.480 --> 00:05.280]  Yes, sir.
[00:06.580 --> 00:13.940]  With an OSINT information repository, do you ever believe there's a need for anonymous information submission?
[00:13.940 --> 00:17.900]  Or should only the right people be able to figure out who the actual submitter is?
[00:18.000 --> 00:24.820]  I think everybody... well, there is a value to anonymous sources that are consistently proven right.
[00:26.380 --> 00:28.260]  I don't have any hard rules.
[00:28.960 --> 00:33.240]  On balance, I think being open about who you are and what you've collected is right.
[00:33.240 --> 00:37.460]  Because if you're stealing the information and posting it, that's not really OSINT.
[00:37.980 --> 00:38.920]  That's theft.
[00:41.080 --> 00:45.920]  And so I'm not looking to inspire... I mean, I encourage whistleblowing.
[00:46.620 --> 00:48.800]  I encourage anonymous whistleblowing.
[00:49.000 --> 00:58.120]  I encourage the reporting of any violation by any corporation of its responsibilities to its stockholders, to its clients, to the government, and so forth.
[00:58.460 --> 01:00.800]  I don't have any hard and fast answers.
[01:01.040 --> 01:10.560]  But on balance, I think that openly identifying yourself with data that you touch is inevitably going to make the system self-policing.
[01:11.460 --> 01:11.940]  Okay?
[01:17.700 --> 01:22.240]  Now, with all the information that OSINT helps gather, who do you believe should hold the keys to it?
[01:22.240 --> 01:26.300]  And do you believe that those people are secure enough to hold that information?
[01:26.600 --> 01:27.280]  No, no, wait a minute.
[01:27.340 --> 01:28.620]  I think you should hold the keys to it.
[01:28.700 --> 01:30.120]  I think it should be public intelligence.
[01:31.340 --> 01:34.600]  You know, actually, OSINT should be completely public.
[01:34.800 --> 01:37.400]  OSINT is when you... OSINT is broadcast.
[01:37.640 --> 01:40.240]  OSINT is what's created for a person.
[01:40.240 --> 01:52.100]  And obviously, if a major bank wants to put a billion dollars of investment into a specific point in Indonesia, they want to keep that secret until they've bought the land and cut the deals and all of that.
[01:52.240 --> 02:00.680]  And so the OSINT supporting that is unclassified in the raw form and proprietary in the finished form.
[02:01.480 --> 02:12.060]  And one of the things we've talked about with some Swedish companies is that it may be that you want to release that to the public domain after you've done your business so that you're adding to the pot.
[02:12.700 --> 02:14.620]  This is not about keys.
[02:14.960 --> 02:16.940]  This is not about control.
[02:17.280 --> 02:26.840]  If anything, it's about bottom-up, bacteria-like self-propagation and networking and on-the-fly discovery.
[02:27.800 --> 02:31.380]  I mean, I don't feel I'm hitting it right.
[02:31.640 --> 02:33.760]  Does someone want to explain to me what his question was?
[02:34.840 --> 02:36.320]  Do you want to add to that?
[02:38.280 --> 02:44.860]  With the information that OSINT does help gather, now there's going to be valuable information to it.
[02:45.480 --> 02:46.760]  Well, let me give you an example.
[02:47.000 --> 02:56.740]  Let's say I have this vision that's in my second book of I want you to be able to sit down and type in your ZIP Code and immediately see a list of issues that are important to you.
[02:56.940 --> 02:59.420]  Education, water, whatever, disease.
[02:59.420 --> 03:02.660]  And then I want you to be able to click on, let's say, water.
[03:03.040 --> 03:03.820]  And boom.
[03:04.260 --> 03:15.340]  And so for your ZIP Code, it shows the past water disasters and violations and the current ones and the near future and far future to the extent that that is being predicted by anyone.
[03:15.580 --> 03:19.580]  And then you can click and say, see a map of water in your ZIP Code.
[03:19.580 --> 03:26.500]  And then all of a sudden you'll see a citizen who is downstream from a factory who has just reported an effluent discharge.
[03:27.200 --> 03:30.300]  And this is like near real-time citizen intelligence.
[03:30.720 --> 03:37.720]  And all of this stuff, rather than being lost into the bureaucracy, is open to you for the creation of public intelligence.
[03:38.200 --> 03:45.700]  So it may be that based on that warning, a bunch of you get together at an OSINT meeting and say, hey, let's have someone go take a sample of the water every week.
[03:46.100 --> 03:46.960]  Or every day.
[03:47.160 --> 03:47.600]  Or whatever.
[03:47.680 --> 03:48.720]  You see where I'm going with this?
[03:49.300 --> 03:50.460]  It's kind of like...
[03:50.460 --> 03:52.760]  And I don't want to say this is original to me.
[03:52.840 --> 03:55.800]  I'm the one that's made the transition from government to public intelligence.
[03:55.800 --> 04:00.120]  But Pierre Teilhard de Chardin had the concept of Neuosphere.
[04:00.340 --> 04:00.640]  H.G.
[04:00.680 --> 04:01.960]  Wells had World Brain.
[04:02.600 --> 04:06.200]  Howard Bloom, who was here in New York, wrote Global Brain.
[04:07.840 --> 04:10.700]  Pierre Livy in France has written Collective Intelligence.
[04:11.700 --> 04:13.860]  Howard Rheingold has written Smart Mobs.
[04:15.540 --> 04:17.900]  Tom Attlee has written The Towel of Democracy.
[04:19.120 --> 04:23.700]  The subtitle is something like How Co-Intelligence Can Make a Better World for All of Us to Live In.
[04:23.700 --> 04:27.140]  I don't see OSINT as a restricted club.
[04:27.420 --> 04:33.900]  I see it as a process of sharing and informally acting and assigning.
[04:34.140 --> 04:41.360]  One of the reasons we're never going to beat the terrorism with the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security is because they're a command and control hierarchy.
[04:41.620 --> 04:44.920]  And you cannot do top-down prevention.
[04:45.180 --> 04:50.780]  You have to do bottom-up awareness and surge.
[04:51.280 --> 04:53.340]  After 9-11, I was interviewed by BBC.
[04:53.900 --> 04:55.560]  And I said, it ain't gonna happen again.
[04:56.100 --> 04:57.120]  And they said, why not?
[04:57.200 --> 04:59.680]  I said, because the old paradigm was be calm, see Cuba.
[05:00.440 --> 05:00.820]  Okay?
[05:01.500 --> 05:05.900]  The new paradigm is kill the asshole or you're gonna die yourself and maybe inside of a large building.
[05:07.580 --> 05:09.400]  Business class has figured this out.
[05:10.280 --> 05:10.680]  Okay?
[05:10.940 --> 05:14.440]  I don't think we're gonna see another hijacking of the kind that we saw in 9-11.
[05:14.440 --> 05:20.200]  Now I'm worried about the ease with which you can put suitcases loaded with explosives onto these planes.
[05:20.340 --> 05:23.960]  And we still don't have the Kevlar carts, you know, and all the planes and stuff.
[05:24.060 --> 05:25.220]  So we'll have more disasters.
[05:25.460 --> 05:33.460]  But OSINT is about a self-organizing community of interest in the truest sense of the word.
[05:33.820 --> 05:34.480]  Next person.
[05:35.080 --> 05:36.780]  Are you guys okay with these questions?
[05:37.220 --> 05:39.020]  Would you rather have more spy stories?
[05:39.720 --> 05:40.160]  No.
[05:40.500 --> 05:41.180]  Spy stories.
[05:41.560 --> 05:42.440]  Spy stories?
[05:43.760 --> 05:44.360]  All right.
[05:44.460 --> 05:45.160]  You two guys.
[05:45.260 --> 05:47.640]  You two guys for questions and then we'll do some spy stories.
[05:49.020 --> 05:49.460]  Um...
[05:50.020 --> 05:50.460]  I'm...
[05:50.460 --> 05:52.920]  I really think that this is a good idea, however.
[05:53.160 --> 06:00.200]  I don't think that government would be willing to change over, especially with stuff like, uh...
[06:00.200 --> 06:00.980]  Oh, what was it?
[06:01.060 --> 06:01.260]  I think...
[06:01.260 --> 06:02.400]  I don't care what government wants.
[06:02.480 --> 06:03.260]  It's what you want.
[06:03.400 --> 06:05.340]  Yeah, I know it's what we want, but I mean like...
[06:05.340 --> 06:06.280]  Get on with it.
[06:06.620 --> 06:07.060]  Uh...
[06:07.060 --> 06:14.640]  The government wants us to be, uh, you know, in prison basically with stuff like COINTELPRO where, you know, they invade groups that...
[06:14.640 --> 06:18.780]  The minute you get me 75% turnout at the polls, I get you a new government.
[06:19.020 --> 06:20.460]  Yeah, I understand that.
[06:20.580 --> 06:25.340]  But I think that, uh, most people are afraid rather than willing...
[06:26.100 --> 06:26.540]  I mean, obviously...
[06:26.960 --> 06:27.980]  Ignorance breeds fear.
[06:28.200 --> 06:30.100]  The people here aren't afraid.
[06:30.280 --> 06:32.160]  We're trying to learn new things, but...
[06:32.160 --> 06:34.020]  I think people are less afraid than apathetic.
[06:34.680 --> 06:35.120]  Uh...
[06:35.120 --> 06:40.100]  The Supreme Court, to my enormous surprise, has concluded that enemy combatants get a right to a lawyer.
[06:41.240 --> 06:41.680]  Um...
[06:41.680 --> 06:42.320]  This is good.
[06:42.660 --> 06:45.760]  It took them too damn long, uh, to get to that.
[06:46.400 --> 06:51.240]  Had I been Chief Justice or an advisor to the Chief Justice, I would have demanded that case the day it happened.
[06:51.980 --> 06:56.760]  I mean, Padilla should have had the Supreme Court's interest from day one, and it's a disgrace that they didn't.
[06:58.380 --> 06:58.980]  Um...
[06:58.980 --> 07:06.180]  Look, one of the really cool things about American democracy is that you only get screwed as far as you want to be.
[07:06.660 --> 07:07.180]  Okay?
[07:07.820 --> 07:08.400]  Uh...
[07:08.400 --> 07:09.800]  This country is apathetic.
[07:25.420 --> 07:26.020]  Um...
[07:27.360 --> 07:31.800]  It will take another 10 or 15 years, but you know what?
[07:32.120 --> 07:36.400]  These guys can only steal so much before the rest of America notices.
[07:36.400 --> 07:39.320]  And if we have a combination of another Enron...
[07:39.320 --> 07:40.500]  I mean, look at the last two years.
[07:40.660 --> 07:42.560]  Every major institution in America has failed.
[07:43.160 --> 07:45.760]  Congress failed to control the purse and prevent war.
[07:46.460 --> 07:47.020]  Uh...
[07:47.020 --> 07:51.400]  The media failed to report honestly and turn down fully funded anti-war infomercials.
[07:52.160 --> 07:54.500]  Fully funded infomercials.
[07:55.000 --> 07:57.340]  Academia stinks, by and large.
[07:57.580 --> 07:58.100]  Uh...
[07:58.100 --> 08:01.280]  At least in my area of expertise in foreign and national security.
[08:02.380 --> 08:02.660]  Um...
[08:02.940 --> 08:03.260]  What?
[08:05.760 --> 08:07.120]  Yes, I agree with you.
[08:07.240 --> 08:07.860]  We agree on this.
[08:08.000 --> 08:09.040]  The media is controlled.
[08:09.320 --> 08:10.580]  I agree with you.
[08:10.740 --> 08:12.840]  But that's one of the cool things about the Internet.
[08:15.380 --> 08:16.220]  All right, later.
[08:17.400 --> 08:17.820]  Okay.
[08:18.320 --> 08:18.680]  Later.
[08:18.920 --> 08:19.100]  Later.
[08:19.300 --> 08:19.420]  Please.
[08:19.620 --> 08:20.260]  You're being disruptive.
[08:21.600 --> 08:22.020]  Um...
[08:22.020 --> 08:23.260]  The thugs are coming.
[08:25.820 --> 08:27.400]  All right, don't beat the shit out of him.
[08:27.500 --> 08:28.040]  Just cut his hair.
[08:28.780 --> 08:29.200]  Um...
[08:29.200 --> 08:29.500]  Okay.
[08:31.160 --> 08:34.640]  I'll give you five minutes of personal attention when we finish.
[08:34.980 --> 08:35.060]  Okay?
[08:37.160 --> 08:37.680]  Um...
[08:37.680 --> 08:38.940]  Every institution has failed.
[08:39.640 --> 08:41.520]  Our corporations are...
[08:41.520 --> 08:45.320]  I mean, you know, 95% of America is hard working on a small business.
[08:45.580 --> 08:46.060]  Okay?
[08:46.120 --> 08:48.300]  It's just the big dogs that are really failing.
[08:48.500 --> 08:49.020]  Halliburton.
[08:50.340 --> 08:50.860]  Um...
[08:50.860 --> 08:51.400]  Citibank.
[08:51.400 --> 08:53.780]  In fact, there's a book I recommend to all of you.
[08:53.900 --> 08:57.220]  Gold Warriors by Peggy and Sterling Seagraves.
[08:57.700 --> 09:04.980]  Gold Warriors is about MacArthur discovering all of the Japanese gold in Japan that could not get through the blockade.
[09:05.140 --> 09:10.940]  And it became the world's largest covert slush fund for buying corruption worldwide.
[09:11.780 --> 09:14.760]  And presumably it's controlled out of Treasury, not out of CIA.
[09:16.400 --> 09:16.880]  Um...
[09:16.880 --> 09:19.280]  Bottom line for me is that...
[09:19.280 --> 09:21.480]  Is that Jonathan Schnell has it right.
[09:21.640 --> 09:22.560]  Gandhi had it right.
[09:23.280 --> 09:26.260]  Nonviolent informed resistance wins every time.
[09:27.440 --> 09:29.940]  You know, Jonathan Schnell has a great line in his book.
[09:30.060 --> 09:32.460]  He says, violence is how the few control the many.
[09:34.140 --> 09:36.840]  Nonviolent resistance is how the many control the few.
[09:37.620 --> 09:38.240]  Okay?
[09:38.600 --> 09:42.100]  And so I advocate nonviolent informed resistance.
[09:42.660 --> 09:44.800]  We can take this country back.
[09:45.000 --> 09:48.120]  And it starts with electoral reform.
[09:48.620 --> 09:51.360]  Kerry's a damn fool for not making it his number one issue.
[09:51.620 --> 09:52.640]  Thank you very much.
[09:53.360 --> 09:54.160]  Okay, next.
[09:55.440 --> 09:56.060]  Um...
[09:56.060 --> 09:57.620]  This is more just a...
[09:57.620 --> 09:58.240]  uh...
[09:59.100 --> 09:59.720]  uh...
[09:59.720 --> 10:00.040]  comment.
[10:00.460 --> 10:01.080]  Um...
[10:01.080 --> 10:04.020]  Several years ago I was helping a friend write a report about...
[10:05.540 --> 10:06.160]  um...
[10:06.160 --> 10:06.760]  money laundering.
[10:07.180 --> 10:09.780]  And the topic came, how do you get communication from...
[10:09.780 --> 10:11.700]  two unconnected parties.
[10:12.040 --> 10:15.960]  So that you could, let's say, do a gifting network from one person to another and therefore...
[10:15.960 --> 10:18.480]  you know, in exchange for something like money or something.
[10:18.620 --> 10:19.600]  The Halawa system, yeah.
[10:20.200 --> 10:21.080]  And uh... got to thinking about systems.
[10:22.860 --> 10:25.220]  Like, you know, posting an eBay auction that... that is theoretical and things like that.
[10:27.620 --> 10:28.020]  But... the real big thing that really came up was...
[10:30.060 --> 10:32.980]  what better way to communicate with, let's say, sleeper cells...
[10:32.980 --> 10:34.060]  than with spam.
[10:35.840 --> 10:36.740]  I like it.
[10:37.400 --> 10:39.760]  A spam email message could be sent to thousands.
[10:40.820 --> 10:41.720]  Fifty of them...
[10:41.720 --> 10:41.740]  That's very good.
[10:41.740 --> 10:42.860]  ...are the important targets.
[10:43.060 --> 10:43.540]  That's very good.
[10:43.660 --> 10:44.900]  Everyone else is gonna delete it.
[10:45.060 --> 10:45.540]  And it hides the pattern.
[10:45.540 --> 10:46.080]  The ones that know to look.
[10:46.660 --> 10:48.080]  And most spams are weirdly spelled...
[10:48.080 --> 10:49.780]  So we should look for the guys that don't delete the spam.
[10:50.000 --> 10:50.600]  I like that too.
[10:50.860 --> 10:51.060]  So what we really...
[10:51.060 --> 10:51.460]  Yeah.
[10:52.100 --> 10:53.520]  And what we really need...
[10:53.880 --> 10:56.260]  is anyone who replies to spam or...
[10:56.260 --> 10:57.060]  also...
[10:57.060 --> 10:57.660]  I like it.
[10:57.760 --> 10:59.360]  But frankly, they like Playboy more.
[10:59.400 --> 10:59.460]  Yeah.
[11:00.340 --> 11:01.140]  Or also...
[11:01.140 --> 11:01.240]  Steganography.
[11:01.420 --> 11:04.080]  What we need is a large division of federal agents...
[11:04.080 --> 11:05.780]  whose wonderful job it is...
[11:05.780 --> 11:07.840]  is to read every spam they can find.
[11:07.840 --> 11:08.300]  There isn't.
[11:08.380 --> 11:08.900]  There isn't.
[11:09.000 --> 11:10.940]  Let me tell you where the federal government is focusing.
[11:11.140 --> 11:13.220]  The federal government is focusing on Cuba.
[11:14.600 --> 11:18.320]  Your boat or airplane can now be possessed without trial...
[11:18.320 --> 11:21.640]  if you have a chart of Cuba on it...
[11:21.640 --> 11:24.600]  and are suspected of being interested in violating the embargo.
[11:24.780 --> 11:27.700]  This is a major cover article in one of the yachting magazines.
[11:28.420 --> 11:28.740]  Okay.
[11:28.920 --> 11:29.440]  Let's move on.
[11:29.540 --> 11:29.980]  I love it.
[11:30.140 --> 11:30.860]  Both of the ideas.
[11:30.980 --> 11:33.060]  Last question and then I'll try and do some spy stories.
[11:33.320 --> 11:33.560]  Hi.
[11:33.560 --> 11:35.120]  Or answer questions about spying.
[11:35.660 --> 11:36.120]  Hi.
[11:36.980 --> 11:40.980]  I really like the idea of a social intelligence system.
[11:41.560 --> 11:44.060]  Do you have a particular vision for...
[11:44.060 --> 11:49.260]  I mean, as far as I understand, it's a data integration system and then a system that allows public...
[11:49.260 --> 11:52.060]  Seven tribes, seven standards, seven issues to start with.
[11:52.400 --> 11:52.640]  Okay.
[11:52.840 --> 11:55.620]  Are there any working prototypes that we could take a look at?
[11:55.640 --> 11:56.940]  Google on collective intelligence.
[11:57.600 --> 11:58.040]  Okay.
[11:58.040 --> 12:07.140]  One of the things I like about collective intelligence is some of the concepts there on the wisdom of the crowd, knowledge management, validation, and so on.
[12:07.300 --> 12:12.140]  You can also go to my website and read the OSINT story, which is inside of the OSINT portal.
[12:13.340 --> 12:14.720]  But it hasn't happened.
[12:14.840 --> 12:16.000]  I think it's about to happen.
[12:17.340 --> 12:25.220]  OSINT.meetup, which only has 88 people signed up in 54 cities right now, but is potentially huge.
[12:26.260 --> 12:31.280]  OSINT.meetup.com is my best shot at trying to get people to self-organize.
[12:31.280 --> 12:47.900]  Imagine what would happen if here in New York City, OSINT.meetup.com created a water committee, a fire committee, a tunnel committee, or whatever, and then got people from police intelligence, military intelligence, labor unions.
[12:48.100 --> 12:51.080]  I mean, these labor unions can communicate with everybody in that tunnel.
[12:51.080 --> 12:53.360]  And so then self-organize.
[12:53.520 --> 12:58.140]  And so what kind of weekly report do you want to create for water risks in New York?
[12:58.320 --> 12:59.780]  What kind of distance library?
[12:59.900 --> 13:01.660]  What kind of distance learning?
[13:01.780 --> 13:02.700]  What kind of virtual library?
[13:03.320 --> 13:04.480]  I don't have the answer.
[13:05.120 --> 13:08.720]  I think this is going to be self-organizing from the bottom up.
[13:08.720 --> 13:16.620]  And so I would say to you, whatever issue is important to you, use the Internet and these collective intelligence initiatives.
[13:16.760 --> 13:20.440]  For instance, the collective intelligence wiki was just opened.
[13:21.060 --> 13:23.480]  And it's already got 279 pages on it.
[13:23.740 --> 13:29.760]  And you can Google for collective intelligence wiki, or you can just go to the collective intelligence blog.
[13:30.360 --> 13:31.880]  Don't look to me as a leader.
[13:32.340 --> 13:35.820]  I'm a provocateur, an agitator.
[13:35.820 --> 13:38.260]  You guys are going to have to lead yourselves.
[13:38.820 --> 13:39.300]  Okay?
[13:39.940 --> 13:40.860]  All right, spy stories.
[13:43.260 --> 13:45.300]  Well, what kind of spy stories do you want?
[13:53.080 --> 13:53.740]  What's that?
[13:58.480 --> 14:01.740]  All right, what do you suppose the most important skill in spying is?
[14:05.640 --> 14:06.120]  Listening.
[14:07.600 --> 14:10.920]  What do you suppose the second most important skill in spying is?
[14:11.560 --> 14:11.960]  Listening.
[14:12.480 --> 14:12.700]  Listening.
[14:14.040 --> 14:14.440]  Typing.
[14:17.490 --> 14:18.990]  I am not James Bond.
[14:19.230 --> 14:20.270]  I've carried a gun.
[14:22.110 --> 14:23.290]  But let me tell you something.
[14:23.410 --> 14:26.330]  For every hour of agent meeting, you've got four hours of typing.
[14:26.910 --> 14:33.870]  And if you're handling a terrorist live, you have to do what's called I said, he said transcripts, and you're the only one that can do them, and that is a bitch.
[14:34.950 --> 14:41.050]  Because with a terrorist, you usually end up having a four- to eight-hour meeting, because it's so hard to get in and out.
[14:41.250 --> 14:45.430]  And so you end up having to transcribe that four to eight hours over two to three days.
[14:45.630 --> 14:47.250]  It is a real pain in the ass.
[14:48.090 --> 14:51.430]  We didn't have IBM's voice thing at the time.
[14:51.510 --> 14:53.270]  This was back in the mid-80s.
[14:53.270 --> 14:57.530]  So listening and typing are the two most important skills.
[14:58.050 --> 15:06.590]  Now, spying consists of spotting, assessing, recruiting, handling, and terminating.
[15:06.870 --> 15:10.250]  Which means a cash settlement, not execution.
[15:13.210 --> 15:18.090]  Although we have terminated with extreme prejudice, which does stand for murder.
[15:19.510 --> 15:20.630]  I haven't done it.
[15:21.670 --> 15:28.950]  But basically, spotting in theory, in any given country, you're supposed to be looking for things that are really important to national security.
[15:29.150 --> 15:30.810]  That's not what actually happens.
[15:32.530 --> 15:38.430]  Across most of the world, even up to today, although today Iraq is just consuming everything.
[15:38.970 --> 15:46.490]  But across most of the world, we've had stations in Africa and elsewhere, primarily because that was the easiest way to get a Soviet to drink booze with us.
[15:47.310 --> 15:51.290]  And so, spying has been mostly about drinking with Soviets.
[15:53.190 --> 15:53.670]  Okay.
[15:54.410 --> 15:57.130]  I'll tell you what, you don't ever want to drink with a Soviet.
[15:59.770 --> 16:06.110]  I mean, I never did it because it was so disgusting, but the recommended protocol is to eat a bar of butter first.
[16:07.250 --> 16:08.730]  It works, I'm told.
[16:08.950 --> 16:10.670]  But it's not something I want to do.
[16:10.930 --> 16:13.630]  I'd just rather get drunk and fall asleep.
[16:16.430 --> 16:21.230]  But anyway, that's the main reason the clandestine service existed, to chase Soviets.
[16:21.230 --> 16:23.470]  We didn't give a shit about what was happening in Africa.
[16:23.470 --> 16:28.310]  We didn't give a shit about Hutu and these other ethnic divisions.
[16:28.870 --> 16:35.110]  We didn't even give a shit about internal policies that were extremely corrupt and committing genocide.
[16:35.470 --> 16:44.210]  I mean, you know, how can 18 genocides go on in this world and the United States public, the United States Congress, the United States White House thinks it has other priorities?
[16:45.330 --> 16:52.410]  How can Lake Powell in Arizona go down by 200 meters and Las Vegas is about to lose water?
[16:52.570 --> 16:55.290]  They're talking about selling the Mohave aquifer to Los Angeles.
[16:56.150 --> 16:56.630]  Okay.
[16:57.150 --> 17:00.630]  Las Vegas is going to burp in five to seven years and be out of water?
[17:01.090 --> 17:03.490]  This is what I would call a real estate disaster.
[17:04.190 --> 17:04.710]  Okay.
[17:05.850 --> 17:07.270]  Nobody's paying attention to this.
[17:08.070 --> 17:11.790]  Actually, I love the movie, this ice movie, Climate Change.
[17:12.010 --> 17:14.070]  I've invited them to speak at my next conference.
[17:14.930 --> 17:19.430]  We're really not serious about not only global warming but global freezing.
[17:19.830 --> 17:21.870]  We're not serious about controlling bacteria.
[17:23.190 --> 17:25.890]  We are going to have plagues in the United States.
[17:26.830 --> 17:29.290]  We are going to have a lot of these troubles.
[17:30.970 --> 17:37.970]  So spying, spotting is you're supposed to kind of say, okay, let's say I want to penetrate the New York City mayor's office.
[17:39.510 --> 17:41.630]  The first thing I want to do is figure out who works there.
[17:42.430 --> 17:44.350]  And I want to figure out who the key people are.
[17:44.430 --> 17:47.750]  Who are the key communicators that handle every piece of paper that goes into the mayor?
[17:48.070 --> 17:49.250]  Who's his scheduler?
[17:50.930 --> 17:52.410]  Who are the people with vulnerabilities?
[17:52.410 --> 17:54.510]  And so you do a lot of homework on these people.
[17:55.810 --> 17:58.530]  And you recruit what are called access agents.
[17:59.730 --> 18:02.050]  So let's say you want to get into the mayor's office.
[18:02.190 --> 18:07.170]  Maybe you start with getting that really great looking blonde that's covering the mayor's office for the New York Times.
[18:08.230 --> 18:10.030]  Actually, they're probably too well paid.
[18:10.590 --> 18:11.590]  For some rag.
[18:12.190 --> 18:14.750]  You know, someone who could use an extra thousand bucks a month.
[18:15.110 --> 18:17.410]  And you say, look, you know, I'm false...
[18:18.250 --> 18:19.530]  This is called false flagging.
[18:19.530 --> 18:24.290]  You say, I represent a major corporation that is trying to get a contract with the city.
[18:24.330 --> 18:26.170]  I'd like your help in understanding the mayor.
[18:26.810 --> 18:28.110]  Okay, that's how it starts.
[18:28.430 --> 18:32.510]  And once they get used to the thousand bucks a month, and you're real nice to them.
[18:32.890 --> 18:35.390]  And, you know, they get used to committing treason.
[18:37.650 --> 18:41.330]  And I think that's how we do it.
[18:41.330 --> 18:43.690]  And so spotting, assessing, recruiting.
[18:44.370 --> 18:49.250]  Recruiting is basically dressing it up in a way that's acceptable to them.
[18:49.470 --> 18:53.530]  You understand the person well enough so you can make a pitch that they'll accept.
[18:57.230 --> 19:03.850]  And most people can accept money in return for betraying an employer, by and large.
[19:04.450 --> 19:10.650]  Especially if you make them think that it's being done in a way that doesn't actually conflict with their own ideals and whatnot.
[19:10.910 --> 19:12.750]  And that's just why we like false flags so much.
[19:15.110 --> 19:17.050]  Or what are called commercial recruitments.
[19:18.150 --> 19:26.490]  And then handling, in theory, handling includes asking them the right questions, getting to and from meetings without being seen.
[19:29.710 --> 19:35.350]  Various sources and methods for capturing their information in a way that it can be destroyed if you're arrested.
[19:36.110 --> 19:39.490]  One of the problems with CIA is it's lazy about security.
[19:40.610 --> 19:43.330]  It's case officers don't live covered, they live immunity.
[19:43.330 --> 19:49.450]  They all carry diplomatic passports so that the worst that will happen to them is they'll be thrown out of the country.
[19:50.530 --> 19:52.590]  Occasionally they'll get beat up.
[19:52.870 --> 19:54.770]  In Russia they like to beat us up first.
[19:57.310 --> 20:01.750]  And you use these people, you use access agents to put in technical devices.
[20:03.010 --> 20:06.810]  For example, in the overhead of a minister's office.
[20:08.150 --> 20:12.050]  Or in the back seat of his car when it's at a service station.
[20:12.050 --> 20:14.670]  But a lot of this technical stuff doesn't work.
[20:15.530 --> 20:17.650]  You have what's called a path loss distance.
[20:17.950 --> 20:19.870]  About 100 meters, 200 meters.
[20:20.070 --> 20:24.050]  And if you can't get out beyond that path loss distance, you start to lose your tactical.
[20:24.270 --> 20:28.630]  However, because fiber and all these other things are... NSA is starting to go deaf.
[20:28.630 --> 20:31.390]  So close in remote is getting popular.
[20:32.450 --> 20:42.750]  Which is to say putting stuff in to specific tactical locations so that you can capture the unencrypted conversation before it goes into an encrypted system.
[20:43.470 --> 20:45.310]  That's very labor intensive.
[20:45.930 --> 20:48.070]  It's a lot easier to read newspapers.
[20:50.130 --> 20:56.570]  And one of the things that I've discovered is that pattern analysis from OSINT beats the crap out of classified intelligence.
[20:56.730 --> 20:59.650]  I'll tell you a real story where I took on the entire intelligence community.
[20:59.850 --> 21:01.070]  It's not a spy story.
[21:01.750 --> 21:02.970]  But it has some lessons.
[21:02.970 --> 21:12.730]  On the 5th of August of 1995, I think it was, the Aspen Brown Commission had four witnesses on open-source intelligence.
[21:13.090 --> 21:19.230]  One of my classmates from a Harvard intelligence policy course, Phyllis Provost McNeil, got me in, which was a surprise.
[21:20.010 --> 21:25.670]  Tony Lake testified and I think he said something like, I call my friends at Harvard or whatever.
[21:27.450 --> 21:32.670]  The RAND Corporation testified and they said, the Internet has everything you need to know in OSINT and we know how to get it.
[21:33.090 --> 21:34.690]  This was back in 94, 95.
[21:37.350 --> 21:45.430]  David Sarnoff Lab at Princeton, which is partially funded by the National Reconnaissance Office, came in and said, we don't know what OSINT is, but high definition TV will make it better.
[21:46.650 --> 21:47.010]  Okay.
[21:47.490 --> 21:49.170]  That was their pet rock that year.
[21:49.910 --> 21:53.390]  And then I came in and I said, we're missing 80% of what we need to know.
[21:54.090 --> 22:05.590]  And I made enough of an impression on the members of the commission so that General Allen asked me at the end of the day if I'd be willing to take on the entire U.S. intelligence community in a benchmark exercise.
[22:05.770 --> 22:06.550]  Sure, no problem.
[22:08.310 --> 22:09.790]  And so he turned to Britt Snyder.
[22:09.830 --> 22:10.490]  This is five o'clock.
[22:10.590 --> 22:13.170]  I was actually on my way to DEFCON to speak.
[22:14.930 --> 22:19.950]  And he turned to Britt Snyder, who I think will be a future leader of the intelligence community.
[22:19.950 --> 22:23.950]  And he's the only guy, he's one of two people that served on both the church committee and the Aspen Brown commission.
[22:24.490 --> 22:25.650]  And he was staff director.
[22:26.030 --> 22:30.050]  And if I were to be put into a position of power today, the first person I would call is Britt.
[22:30.950 --> 22:32.150]  He knows his stuff.
[22:33.570 --> 22:34.910]  But anyway, he said, Burundi.
[22:35.890 --> 22:40.130]  It's five o'clock on a Thursday afternoon by 10 o'clock on Monday, the FedEx delivery time.
[22:40.310 --> 22:43.050]  Let's have everything the U.S. intelligence community has.
[22:43.190 --> 22:47.430]  Every image, every signal, every clandestine report, whatever they've got.
[22:47.970 --> 22:49.710]  And then he turned to me and says, do what you do.
[22:50.510 --> 22:52.030]  At the time, I had an assistant.
[22:52.170 --> 22:56.170]  I called her from the car and told her where to send five faxes.
[22:56.270 --> 22:58.430]  And then she sent a six fax with a phone number to me.
[22:58.830 --> 23:09.230]  And so on Friday, the day before my speech at DEFCON, I spent the day twisting four or five CEOs' arms into giving me $100,000 worth of free support.
[23:09.830 --> 23:17.410]  By 10 o'clock on Monday morning, LexisNexis had identified the top ten journalists in the world reporting on Burundi and Rwanda based on their byline.
[23:17.410 --> 23:20.170]  All of them immediately available for debriefing.
[23:20.430 --> 23:22.510]  Journalists only publish 10% of what they know.
[23:22.690 --> 23:29.270]  And the best stuff that they know is the biographics, the corruption, all of the personality and networking and contacting details.
[23:29.750 --> 23:39.630]  From the Institute of Scientific Information in Philadelphia, the top hundred people in the world writing reputable academic articles and foreign affairs and other articles about Burundi and Rwanda.
[23:39.630 --> 23:46.310]  From Oxford Analytica in England, which is run by David Young, who worked with Kissinger on the National Security Council and attended Oxford.
[23:46.570 --> 23:49.630]  He's harnessed Oxford University as a little mini think tank.
[23:49.890 --> 24:01.130]  From them, I got 22 page executive summary suitable for president or prime minister on why Burundi and Rwanda were important in terms of geopolitical references that the U.S.
[24:01.250 --> 24:03.230]  State Department was trying to avoid coming to grips with.
[24:04.150 --> 24:14.170]  From ECU publications, 100% of Burundi in 1 to 50 combat charts from Russia, which we don't have maps for 90% of the world.
[24:14.410 --> 24:14.810]  Okay?
[24:15.070 --> 24:20.710]  We do not have maps below 100,000 to 150,000 level for 90% of the world.
[24:20.770 --> 24:23.550]  And it turns out it's the 90% where all the bad stuff happens.
[24:23.550 --> 24:24.190]  Okay?
[24:25.610 --> 24:29.690]  And then belatedly from...oh, from Jane's.
[24:30.430 --> 24:35.330]  One paragraph summaries of every article they'd ever written on Burundi and the military situation there.
[24:35.530 --> 24:45.430]  And then for me, they went out and created one page orders of battle for the tribes at a time when CIA was still counting just the uniform army in Burundi.
[24:45.430 --> 24:53.670]  And then belatedly from spot homage, 100% of Burundi, cloud free, less than three years old, already in the archives, and therefore inexpensive.
[24:54.350 --> 24:59.830]  CIA had one of those cute little maps and a regional economic study in the chapter from the world fact book.
[25:01.390 --> 25:02.210]  No shit.
[25:04.090 --> 25:04.630]  Okay?
[25:04.970 --> 25:06.090]  It was no contest.
[25:06.430 --> 25:07.770]  We weren't paying attention.
[25:08.790 --> 25:12.150]  That story repeats itself every single day today.
[25:13.230 --> 25:15.630]  Whether it's genocide or water, disease or whatever.
[25:15.830 --> 25:22.610]  Now, I don't want you to think I'm bashing CIA because the analysts...I just did a press release that was critical of Senator Roberts' recent findings.
[25:22.810 --> 25:27.290]  I think that he bashed the analysts too much and he didn't bash the clandestine service enough.
[25:27.590 --> 25:31.470]  He also completely overlooked the fact that CIA can't process everything it knows.
[25:32.430 --> 25:34.970]  He overlooked the fact that they're not doing open-sources.
[25:34.970 --> 25:45.770]  He overlooked the fact that DOD controls three of the national agencies, which are completely disrespectful of the DCI's guidance, and several other things.
[25:46.370 --> 25:55.830]  That's a real-world comparison of $50 billion versus $500 to a million in gross annual operating costs.
[25:58.410 --> 26:03.250]  I can generally beat the crap out of anybody within 48 to 72 hours for under $10,000.
[26:05.710 --> 26:07.470]  I've perfected this as an art form.
[26:07.950 --> 26:08.930]  Okay, spy stories.
[26:09.070 --> 26:10.530]  I had to carry a gun in El Salvador.
[26:10.690 --> 26:11.590]  That's not very usual.
[26:11.870 --> 26:15.250]  I used to teach rules of engagement for my battalion.
[26:15.250 --> 26:21.450]  It's a long, complex process of when and how you can kill people, with specific reference to innocent civilians.
[26:21.890 --> 26:28.470]  And my chief of station handed me my 9mm and he says, Use this when you don't really care about losing your job.
[26:30.210 --> 26:31.470]  I understood that one.
[26:33.050 --> 26:36.790]  That was my rules of engagement for combat in El Salvador.
[26:37.970 --> 26:39.210]  Someone asked me a question.
[26:40.070 --> 26:40.730]  Yes, sir.
[26:41.770 --> 26:43.150]  Spy story questions now.
[26:43.150 --> 26:44.690]  We'll move away from OSINT.
[26:44.890 --> 26:44.910]  Okay.
[26:45.950 --> 26:50.010]  This might sound like an inappropriate question, but I'm going to frame it in such a way.
[26:50.030 --> 26:51.490]  Nothing's inappropriate here, as long as it's brief.
[26:51.770 --> 26:52.130]  It is.
[26:52.650 --> 27:06.810]  Could you talk a little bit, either whether you had direct involvement or just the history you know, of really badly botched or badly conceived CIA operations, most of which that have come from policies of politics at the very high up.
[27:06.990 --> 27:08.210]  Let's start with Central America.
[27:08.330 --> 27:08.790]  Yeah, Central America.
[27:08.810 --> 27:11.070]  And then we can go on to Afghanistan and Iraq.
[27:13.150 --> 27:18.570]  You know, I am one of the unindicted members of the Central American Task Force.
[27:19.890 --> 27:24.950]  I was too junior to really be engaged in drug running, money laundering and murder.
[27:26.990 --> 27:30.470]  But there's a wonderful book by John Perry called Lost History.
[27:30.470 --> 27:35.510]  And what he's talking about is all of the bad stuff that came out of Central America, also Vietnam.
[27:36.470 --> 27:40.830]  I mean, George Allen has written a book on Vietnam called None So Blind.
[27:41.530 --> 27:47.210]  And the basic thing is it's about cooking the books in Saigon and ignoring the truth in Washington.
[27:47.210 --> 27:49.870]  I don't think we needed a war in Central America.
[27:50.170 --> 27:53.530]  I think we have really misunderstood the power of food and water.
[27:53.670 --> 27:56.130]  I think we should lift the Cuban embargo and flood them with the Internet.
[27:56.650 --> 27:57.050]  Okay?
[27:57.670 --> 28:01.170]  I mean, it's just flat out stupid to have an embargo on Cuba.
[28:01.170 --> 28:04.830]  It's the last clean beach in the Western Hemisphere.
[28:05.430 --> 28:06.030]  Okay?
[28:06.410 --> 28:07.750]  I want that beach.
[28:10.970 --> 28:11.750]  Yes, sir?
[28:14.580 --> 28:16.120]  What about incompetence?
[28:16.280 --> 28:19.700]  It's almost like there's a tenure system that people don't...
[28:19.700 --> 28:21.500]  Well, hang on.
[28:21.580 --> 28:23.320]  I haven't really answered your question.
[28:23.440 --> 28:23.840]  What was it?
[28:25.300 --> 28:27.800]  Well, look, after Vietnam...
[28:27.800 --> 28:31.480]  In fact, as a result of Vietnam, we learned how to run drugs and launder money.
[28:31.760 --> 28:32.240]  Okay?
[28:33.120 --> 28:36.640]  Vietnam taught a whole bunch of case officers how to be bad boys and girls.
[28:37.260 --> 28:47.040]  We repeated that experience in Central America, only we used Southern Air Transport and let them make the money by running drugs.
[28:48.200 --> 28:52.980]  We funded Contras who turned out to be really murderous, corrupt assholes.
[28:54.620 --> 28:56.340]  And I don't think we needed that war.
[28:56.660 --> 29:03.640]  You know, if we would spend half the money we spend suborning people on peace ops, I think we'd get a lot further.
[29:03.920 --> 29:12.040]  Now, Afghanistan, nobody thought through the implications of creating a global Islamic Jihad.
[29:12.780 --> 29:15.380]  I will tell you, CIA did not fund Bin Laden.
[29:15.640 --> 29:17.620]  He had his own funding from Saudi Arabia.
[29:17.620 --> 29:24.980]  And in fact, there were major frictions between the Arab Jihadists and the legitimate Afghanistan Mujahid.
[29:25.540 --> 29:27.840]  And Milt Bearden and Jack Devine are both friends of mine.
[29:28.220 --> 29:37.100]  And I think we really failed to think through what it would mean for Russia to lose control over the Central Asian Front.
[29:37.100 --> 29:40.600]  Now, there are six fronts that are in play now.
[29:41.820 --> 29:46.260]  Central Asia, where Pakistan's government is actively exporting terrorism.
[29:46.700 --> 29:52.560]  Saudi Arabia is actively tolerating terrorism as a price for stability, which is false.
[29:53.120 --> 29:54.380]  But you have Central Asia.
[29:54.600 --> 29:57.260]  You have Western Africa, which is mostly Muslim.
[29:58.120 --> 30:02.380]  You've got the Pacific Rim running down from Southern Thailand through Malaysia.
[30:02.380 --> 30:04.480]  Malaysia is a successful Muslim state.
[30:04.720 --> 30:05.640]  It's a model.
[30:05.780 --> 30:09.660]  We should be pouring tons of money into Malaysia and not a single American.
[30:10.320 --> 30:10.760]  Okay?
[30:10.960 --> 30:14.960]  Setting up a special operations training camp in Malaysia is asking for a disaster.
[30:15.980 --> 30:18.240]  And then Philippines and so forth.
[30:18.880 --> 30:20.200]  You've got Latin America.
[30:20.380 --> 30:26.680]  It has an increasingly Muslim population in the tri-border region down by Argentina and stuff.
[30:26.680 --> 30:31.140]  You've got increasing connections between ethnic criminal gangs and terrorists and so forth.
[30:31.300 --> 30:32.060]  Thank you very much.
[30:34.900 --> 30:37.100]  And so I don't think we thought through Afghanistan.
[30:37.420 --> 30:41.400]  We sure as hell, at the policy level, did not think through Iraq.
[30:41.980 --> 30:45.540]  Because Iraq, first off, was an unnecessary war.
[30:47.080 --> 30:48.680]  Saddam Hussein... what?
[30:48.920 --> 30:49.440]  Really?
[30:50.620 --> 30:52.900]  Well, I kind of know how you feel about this.
[30:53.020 --> 30:55.000]  But I stand on my record.
[30:55.240 --> 30:58.760]  If you go back over my website over the last two years, you will see...
[30:58.760 --> 31:03.040]  If you just Google for Impeach, Bush, Cheney, you'll see the stuff they haven't seen yet.
[31:03.220 --> 31:09.440]  And I deliberately decided not to delete anything now that I'm making progress with certain elements of the administration.
[31:11.400 --> 31:13.100]  Intelligence failed, but policy failed too.
[31:13.100 --> 31:18.280]  You know, Paul O'Neill in his book, The Price of Loyalty, says that under Reagan and Bush 1,
[31:21.500 --> 31:25.340]  policy started with its ideological preferences, but at least it considered the facts.
[31:25.960 --> 31:30.820]  In the Bush administration, Karl Rove decides what the outcome is going to be, never mind the facts.
[31:31.120 --> 31:32.940]  And then Dick Cheney is the enforcer.
[31:34.400 --> 31:36.460]  So, I think we've made a lot of mistakes.
[31:36.460 --> 31:43.700]  And what I would like to do with CIA is clean it up to the point that every secret intelligence report has a public intelligence counterpart.
[31:44.060 --> 31:48.080]  And the people are treated as a constituency, as is Congress.
[31:48.620 --> 31:49.160]  Okay?
[31:49.340 --> 31:50.560]  Let's go to another person.
[31:50.660 --> 31:51.220]  Spy Stories.
[31:53.420 --> 31:55.420]  This is more of a methods question.
[31:55.580 --> 32:07.480]  Can you confirm or deny that the agency used or still uses shortwave numbers transmissions to message its assets?
[32:09.240 --> 32:11.720]  There's a wonderful directory of all U.S. Embassy radio communications frequencies around the world.
[32:19.440 --> 32:26.620]  The last time I was involved in clandestine communications, it involved number groups.
[32:27.440 --> 32:30.660]  And it involved all radio frequencies.
[32:31.800 --> 32:33.200]  One-time pads.
[32:34.960 --> 32:40.840]  And usually the first digits had an indicator as to whether it was a real message or a filler message.
[32:41.320 --> 32:43.320]  Ninety-nine percent of them were filler messages.
[32:44.060 --> 32:48.760]  So, the traffic is constant just to avoid traffic pattern analysis?
[32:49.000 --> 32:49.200]  Exactly.
[32:49.740 --> 32:50.320]  Thank you.
[32:50.540 --> 32:51.000]  You're welcome.
[32:52.720 --> 32:53.360]  Okay.
[32:54.000 --> 32:54.800]  Anything else?
[32:55.060 --> 32:55.460]  No.
[32:55.920 --> 32:56.480]  All right.
[32:56.620 --> 32:57.640]  We'll have a question here.
[32:57.840 --> 32:59.180]  Please feel free to take a break.
[32:59.360 --> 33:04.500]  I mean, I realize it's hard, but enough of you seem to be interested.
[33:04.920 --> 33:05.500]  Yes, sir?
[33:05.680 --> 33:07.060]  I don't know if you spoke about this.
[33:07.120 --> 33:08.140]  I just kind of walked in.
[33:09.120 --> 33:11.540]  But being from the CIA and all that stuff...
[33:12.120 --> 33:12.520]  Previously.
[33:13.040 --> 33:13.440]  Previously.
[33:13.440 --> 33:18.720]  What is your stand on the polygraph and using it to actively...
[33:18.720 --> 33:22.880]  The polygraph is, first off, not reliable.
[33:24.260 --> 33:26.120]  The polygraph can be beaten.
[33:26.460 --> 33:29.740]  The polygraph is not a science.
[33:30.020 --> 33:31.180]  It is more of an art.
[33:31.420 --> 33:39.940]  The most effective use of the polygraph is in the pre-disclosure phase, when people are inspired to reveal things and talk about that.
[33:40.980 --> 33:45.340]  Having said that, I will also say that the polygraph is a valuable tool.
[33:45.620 --> 33:50.920]  There's a book called Spies and Lies by one of the CIA's best polygraph examiners in Vietnam.
[33:51.120 --> 33:51.960]  It's a wonderful book.
[33:52.120 --> 33:54.880]  And if you do nothing else, read my review of that book.
[33:57.720 --> 33:59.900]  The polygraph is one of many tools.
[33:59.900 --> 34:11.340]  Now, the problem that we have is that Washington is dominated by a security bureaucracy that got to its august rank after 20 years of checking safes at night.
[34:11.920 --> 34:14.200]  These are not rocket scientists.
[34:15.020 --> 34:16.740]  And they tend to...
[34:16.740 --> 34:17.420]  Thank you, Lazlow.
[34:17.840 --> 34:19.340]  They tend to...
[34:20.840 --> 34:28.820]  They tend to be 90% too lax and 10% too hard.
[34:30.420 --> 34:31.960]  Ames was too lax.
[34:32.440 --> 34:40.840]  I mean, how much does it take to figure out that the guy paid cash for a $500,000 house and was driving a Jaguar on a GS-14's pay?
[34:41.600 --> 34:44.180]  Which at the time was $65,000 a year.
[34:45.840 --> 34:49.560]  On the other hand, they can be like an inquisition.
[34:49.700 --> 34:52.100]  And they can castrate you without trial.
[34:53.160 --> 35:04.040]  I just came from dinner with a case officer that was basically thrown out of the agency for sleeping with an Israeli and not breaking off the relationship when she was told to.
[35:05.560 --> 35:07.020]  She thought she was in love.
[35:07.040 --> 35:08.600]  I'm pretty sure he was in lust.
[35:10.550 --> 35:18.140]  And based on the conversation, I'm inclined to think that the Israeli may also have been saying things that were picked up by signals that she didn't realize he was saying.
[35:18.140 --> 35:28.020]  Sometimes Israelis will justify their expense account by claim... or others will justify their expense account by claiming that someone is a recruited agent or is providing information.
[35:28.220 --> 35:29.360]  It may be completely false.
[35:29.740 --> 35:33.420]  But he managed to screw this lady in more ways than one.
[35:35.760 --> 35:42.360]  So, the other problem with security is... and intelligencecareers.com really understands this problem.
[35:43.220 --> 35:51.340]  Corporations are allowed to hire 10% of the people to work on a contract that requires clearances without clearances.
[35:51.660 --> 35:53.680]  But they can only do that for six months.
[35:54.160 --> 35:58.580]  But it takes 18 months for this incompetent government to do a security investigation.
[35:59.320 --> 35:59.840]  Okay?
[36:00.380 --> 36:05.580]  And that's one of the reasons why they prefer white boys from Kansas and virgins from West Virginia.
[36:06.980 --> 36:08.680]  Because they've never met a foreigner.
[36:09.720 --> 36:13.220]  And as a result, they're getting the wrong kinds of people into the system.
[36:13.480 --> 36:15.580]  They're also getting people that are way too young.
[36:16.260 --> 36:22.340]  If I were changing things today, I would take one-fifth of the people from the under 35 population.
[36:22.600 --> 36:28.560]  I would try not to kill them with grenade accidents in training, which just happened a year ago.
[36:30.550 --> 36:34.580]  And then the rest of them are mature U.S. citizens that have spent a lifetime building cover.
[36:37.580 --> 36:40.540]  I can crack any cover inside of a week to 30 days.
[36:40.960 --> 36:46.680]  You cannot build a false legend today with all the computers and everything.
[36:46.720 --> 36:47.800]  It's just too easy to check.
[36:48.280 --> 36:58.660]  So what you do is you get guys that have been 40 to 50 years old who have been overseas, have a Rolodex speak the language, have unwittingly built their cover, and then you bring them into the spy game.
[36:59.560 --> 37:01.340]  And tell them if you're caught, you're fired.
[37:01.900 --> 37:03.600]  So they'll take security seriously.
[37:05.080 --> 37:11.740]  You have what are called career agents, which are very well qualified Venezuelans, Pakistanis, whatever.
[37:12.180 --> 37:13.720]  You treat them just like case officers.
[37:13.740 --> 37:14.700]  We don't have these anymore.
[37:15.300 --> 37:20.640]  Treat them just like case officers in the field, but they never come back to headquarters and they never touch secrets.
[37:21.230 --> 37:22.760]  Or SIGINT or anything else.
[37:23.540 --> 37:26.300]  You have field stations that are multinational.
[37:26.540 --> 37:27.500]  This is how I would run it.
[37:27.860 --> 37:29.420]  You have field stations that are multinational.
[37:29.560 --> 37:33.600]  The DEA has figured out how to make use of honest Mexican cops.
[37:33.900 --> 37:39.120]  And the way you do it is you bring them out of their system and you put them into your own little brotherhood group.
[37:39.660 --> 37:40.780]  And that works.
[37:41.710 --> 37:45.160]  Letting Mexican headquarters tell you what they want you to know doesn't work.
[37:45.460 --> 37:47.120]  Okay, so we need to go after...
[37:47.120 --> 37:49.420]  For instance, the French are really good at penetrating the Arabs.
[37:49.420 --> 37:57.200]  They've managed to create a second, third generation of Arabs that are both loyal to France and able to penetrate the Arab communities.
[37:57.420 --> 37:58.680]  We should be using them.
[37:59.260 --> 38:03.340]  And the same thing with Israelis who have some really fine Arab penetrations.
[38:04.980 --> 38:08.580]  And then, last but not least, it's just business.
[38:09.460 --> 38:16.180]  We persist in treating spying as a thing that requires that you take a polygraph and that you be a recruited asset.
[38:16.880 --> 38:22.840]  There are some cases where I just want to be able to go up to a guy and say, look, I want you to put this technical device into this thing going to this place.
[38:23.020 --> 38:25.500]  I'll give you a million dollars and you'll never hear from me again.
[38:25.800 --> 38:26.920]  It's just business.
[38:27.920 --> 38:28.280]  Okay?
[38:29.260 --> 38:31.980]  Well, you've got to be going to exactly the right place.
[38:33.500 --> 38:36.360]  But the point is, we're being very unimaginative.
[38:36.700 --> 38:40.920]  And the polygraph, unfortunately, I think security has become part of the problem.
[38:42.340 --> 38:47.020]  If I were advising a new DCI, one of my first directives would be to completely revamp security.
[38:48.740 --> 38:51.580]  Security is now part of the problem, not part of the solution.
[38:52.260 --> 38:54.780]  And that's true across all of the agencies.
[38:55.630 --> 38:56.940]  NSA polygraphs are better.
[38:57.200 --> 38:58.780]  This is good news for you, I'm sure.
[38:59.280 --> 39:01.580]  NSA polygraphs are better than CIA polygraphs.
[39:02.540 --> 39:04.440]  NSA, you get a bigger, softer chair.
[39:04.740 --> 39:07.040]  And they're kinder and gentler in their probing.
[39:09.520 --> 39:12.600]  So, I encourage all of you to consider working for the U.S. intelligence community.
[39:14.120 --> 39:17.540]  Even if you only do it for a couple of years, it will change you forever.
[39:20.260 --> 39:30.220]  And if you can't work for the U.S. intelligence community, then go to intelligencecareers.com and pick up a job at SAIC or any one of these beltway bandits that is making a fortune pretending to do intelligence.
[39:31.920 --> 39:33.300]  And have a little fun.
[39:33.780 --> 39:36.760]  Just like you only get to be an infantry officer once in your life.
[39:38.000 --> 39:39.900]  And it's something you can only do when you're young.
[39:40.340 --> 39:41.120]  Another question.
[39:43.100 --> 39:44.080]  Shall we take a break?
[39:45.980 --> 39:46.540]  Yes, sir.
[39:51.800 --> 39:53.680]  We handle incompetence by ignoring it.
[39:53.780 --> 39:59.200]  You know, part of the problem is that in the age of the Internet, in theory, you should be able...
[40:00.500 --> 40:09.040]  Our approach, at least the CIA approach, is once you have your SI/TK CIA level clearance, you can pretty much go anywhere and see anything.
[40:10.420 --> 40:11.720]  And it shouldn't be that way.
[40:12.120 --> 40:15.960]  I mean, you should be able to only see things in your area.
[40:15.960 --> 40:20.240]  And at the same time, you should not be blocked from seeing things.
[40:20.360 --> 40:22.280]  One of the problems we have is over-compartmentation.
[40:22.560 --> 40:25.960]  I invented the reverse search at CIA precisely because of this.
[40:26.200 --> 40:29.800]  What was happening was analysts were asking questions of the system.
[40:30.000 --> 40:34.820]  Like, say, what do we know about Libyan T-72 tanks doing this?
[40:34.820 --> 40:37.900]  And the DO was refusing to tell the analysts.
[40:38.960 --> 40:46.540]  And so I invented the concept of a reverse search, which would tell the DO that this analyst had this question and why they needed to know.
[40:46.700 --> 40:56.720]  When I was taken by my chief of station up to talk to the analysts before I went to my first field station assignment, his marching orders were, keep your mouth shut, don't tell them anything.
[40:58.260 --> 41:02.780]  Now, we are trying, CIA has tried to merge analysts and collectors.
[41:03.680 --> 41:12.280]  Look, what you have is good-hearted people who are being hired by the wrong model, managed by the wrong mindset, to the wrong ends.
[41:13.700 --> 41:27.620]  You don't create a world-class intelligence community with young kids out of Kansas and really shitty technical processing and no clandestine service and no attention to open-sources of information and excessive reliance on foreign liaison.
[41:28.000 --> 41:32.160]  So what you have is systemic incompetence rather than personal incompetence.
[41:32.660 --> 41:35.140]  Every person there wants to do a good job.
[41:35.140 --> 41:53.380]  Every person there is also helpless in the face of decades of an ossified industrial-era system that basically demands that you go through the motions and pretend everything's fine, when in fact the system is in the terminal phase of its collapse.
[41:53.820 --> 41:55.640]  And all of us knew this in 1985.
[41:56.780 --> 42:19.040]  In fact, when I reviewed Janine Bruckner's book on litigating the intelligence community, what CIA liked to do to its agitators was send them to a fitness-for-duty physical where the emphasis was on calling them nuts and then threatening them so that they would resign in order to preserve their options for other federal employment by not being labeled nuts by CIA.
[42:20.200 --> 42:28.580]  In fact, as I look back at the five or ten people, five to ten people that I know that had fitness-for-duty physical experiences and then resigned, they weren't nuts.
[42:28.680 --> 42:29.700]  They were the ones that had it right.
[42:30.700 --> 42:37.960]  John Gentry wrote a book called Lost Promise, I think it is, about all that's wrong with CIA analysis.
[42:38.280 --> 42:41.680]  I've written the book on intelligence, which is all that's wrong with the entire community.
[42:42.600 --> 42:49.080]  Others have written similar books, and yet they were labeled as traitors, outcasts, and so forth.
[42:49.400 --> 42:54.040]  Had they listened to us in 1985 through 1990, I'm pretty sure 9-11 would not have happened.
[42:55.000 --> 42:56.860]  We brought 9-11 on our own heads.
[42:57.020 --> 42:57.360]  Yes, sir?
[42:57.360 --> 43:02.420]  Do you have any stories about inter-alliance action, the U.S.-U.K. agreement, or being...
[43:03.840 --> 43:04.900]  Yes, yes.
[43:06.660 --> 43:08.540]  The U.S. is not allowed to collect on U.S. politicians, so the British do it for us.
[43:12.220 --> 43:18.200]  And we collect on the Canadians, and it's like a round robin, so we break each other's laws on each other's behalf.
[43:18.200 --> 43:19.240]  Yes, sir?
[43:19.600 --> 43:22.980]  I apologize if this question has already been asked.
[43:22.980 --> 43:23.320]  No sweat.
[43:23.520 --> 43:24.560]  I'm used to being ignored.
[43:25.100 --> 43:26.140]  Well, no, I was out.
[43:26.400 --> 43:26.580]  I know.
[43:27.920 --> 43:28.740]  9-11.
[43:30.320 --> 43:37.200]  I mean, there was in place NORAD system, where basically it would intercept an aircraft that's straight out of air space.
[43:37.600 --> 43:41.400]  And the system actually worked pretty good before 9-11.
[43:41.620 --> 43:47.220]  I mean, hundreds of airplanes had gone off course, and they were able to intercept them within 10 minutes.
[43:47.220 --> 43:52.960]  On this day, the Air Force missed all four, I guess, or as I understand from the story.
[43:53.460 --> 43:54.540]  How could that happen?
[43:55.180 --> 44:03.900]  Well, I think the best account on record is Dick Clark's, although I believe the commission on 9-11 will come out with some other stuff.
[44:07.730 --> 44:12.950]  A guy named Charles Perra, I think, wrote a book called Normal Accidents, Dealing with High-Risk Technology.
[44:12.950 --> 44:20.150]  He talks about how simple systems have single points of failure that fail in easy to diagnose and correct ways.
[44:20.610 --> 44:29.570]  Complex systems have multiple points of failure that interact in their multiple cascade, very hard to diagnose and fix.
[44:30.690 --> 44:34.610]  And the U.S. government is a constellation of complex systems that don't talk to each other very well.
[44:34.610 --> 44:45.410]  I'm willing to believe that 9-11 was a catalog of errors across a number of points, including Bush's not coming back to town.
[44:48.230 --> 44:59.310]  I also think it's very important to emphasize that a large part of the loss of life in 9-11 occurred because our police and fire communications in New York suck.
[45:00.150 --> 45:03.570]  They're not designed to be reliable and high-rise buildings.
[45:04.090 --> 45:05.470]  They're not designed to be interoperable.
[45:06.410 --> 45:08.790]  They're not designed... In fact, this is still true overseas.
[45:09.130 --> 45:14.150]  As Marines are flying in to rescue an embassy, they can't talk to the embassy from the helicopter.
[45:14.910 --> 45:15.310]  Okay?
[45:15.710 --> 45:18.990]  We have just basically built... I mean, you guys know the word kludge.
[45:19.730 --> 45:21.630]  Okay, this is kludge on steroids.
[45:22.430 --> 45:22.830]  Okay?
[45:23.650 --> 45:24.970]  The U.S. government is a mess.
[45:25.890 --> 45:27.450]  It's got many good people.
[45:28.090 --> 45:30.290]  Everybody, I think, tries to do a good job.
[45:30.430 --> 45:32.410]  And it's just a total mess.
[45:32.830 --> 45:38.290]  Command and control, communications, computing, and intelligence is Kafkaesque.
[45:38.630 --> 45:43.650]  But it's been able to intercept every other airplane that's straight from airspace before that time.
[45:44.650 --> 45:52.150]  I don't know the facts, but I think here we had basically 20 to 30 minutes during which half of it was wasted.
[45:53.850 --> 45:55.170]  There are also economies.
[45:55.390 --> 45:56.630]  The Pentagon has been gutted.
[45:57.110 --> 45:58.970]  People are no longer doing strip alerts.
[46:01.610 --> 46:06.110]  I just think everything that could have gone wrong did go wrong.
[46:06.250 --> 46:09.410]  You just refuse to believe that conspiracy could have been possible.
[46:09.570 --> 46:11.650]  No, you show me the facts and I'll believe it.
[46:11.790 --> 46:13.170]  But I don't think the facts are there.
[46:14.390 --> 46:19.270]  You know, there's this urban myth about the Israelis told every jew in the World Trade Center not to show up for work.
[46:19.270 --> 46:19.930]  I don't think so.
[46:21.070 --> 46:21.550]  Huh?
[46:23.630 --> 46:29.150]  Look, let's go back to the basic fact that Al-Qaeda hit the World Trade Center with a car bomb in 1993.
[46:30.150 --> 46:33.970]  They have a track record of coming back to the same target.
[46:34.110 --> 46:37.210]  They have a fixation on cultural targets.
[46:37.370 --> 46:39.530]  There were, in fact, several airplanes.
[46:39.690 --> 46:43.470]  I think the grounding the airplanes immediately was one of the...
[46:44.230 --> 46:48.330]  In retrospect, I wasn't smart enough to think about this on the day of the event.
[46:48.450 --> 46:57.770]  I think what I would have done was sent out a broadcast message from the President to every single airline, offering an immediate presidential pardon to anybody who murdered an asshole on the way to the cockpit.
[46:58.170 --> 46:58.530]  Okay?
[46:58.810 --> 47:01.010]  And let the planes continue on their path.
[47:01.010 --> 47:03.330]  Because that cost us a lot of money to ground the aircraft.
[47:03.330 --> 47:11.510]  But grounding the aircraft actually prevented hits on Sears Tower in Chicago and Bank of America and CNN in Atlanta.
[47:11.710 --> 47:15.310]  Bank of America in San Francisco and CNN in Atlanta, which were also on the list.
[47:15.390 --> 47:18.130]  And I think there was another plane designated for the White House or the Capitol.
[47:18.670 --> 47:18.910]  Okay?
[47:19.350 --> 47:22.770]  So grounding the airplanes actually prevented several other things.
[47:24.210 --> 47:32.130]  I mean, when I look at the FBI, I know FBI special agents and they're good, dedicated, smart people who are trapped in a really rotten system.
[47:32.130 --> 47:41.890]  If you look at Special Agent Rowley's testimony, she's got shitty management, shitty data processing, shitty relations with the CIA.
[47:42.330 --> 47:44.090]  The whole system's broken.
[47:44.530 --> 47:45.070]  You know?
[47:45.270 --> 47:51.630]  And so if you want to talk about a conspiracy, I will talk about a conspiracy of inattentive publics and inattentive politicians.
[47:52.090 --> 47:54.970]  And intelligence professionals who haven't been willing to speak up.
[47:55.150 --> 48:01.930]  There were 15 books by intelligence practitioner authors published in the two years prior to 9-11.
[48:01.930 --> 48:03.830]  That's an unheard of number of books.
[48:04.010 --> 48:07.090]  All of them advocating draconian intelligence reform.
[48:07.650 --> 48:10.950]  And nobody prior to 9-11 wanted to listen to me or anybody else.
[48:11.330 --> 48:12.030]  Very quickly.
[48:12.250 --> 48:16.270]  Well, basically I just want you to...
[48:16.270 --> 48:16.830]  30 seconds.
[48:17.250 --> 48:26.910]  Confirm or deny, you don't feel comfortable making an authoritative statement about the technical details involving the airplanes unable to be...
[48:26.910 --> 48:36.090]  I would be willing to believe that Dick Cheney and Karl Rove understood that Franklin Delano Roosevelt wanted Pearl Harbor to happen in order to be able to mobilize America.
[48:36.210 --> 48:43.630]  And I would be willing to believe that Dick Cheney and Karl Rove, if they had some inkling of 9-11, would have downplayed it in order to allow it to happen.
[48:43.630 --> 48:45.430]  And don't think this is unusual.
[48:45.610 --> 48:58.790]  Jim Bamford in the Puzzle Palace wrote how the JCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed a covert operation to kill Americans on American soil in order to justify an attack on Cuba.
[48:58.790 --> 49:04.390]  Do not underestimate the idiocy of people in power.
[49:04.950 --> 49:19.770]  But on balance, I think 9-11 was a catalog of errors spanning multiple years, all of which can be traced back to a combination of political irresponsibility and professional incompetence across the board.
[49:20.210 --> 49:20.630]  Okay.
[49:20.630 --> 49:20.850]  Thank you.
[49:22.710 --> 49:23.170]  Next.
[49:23.690 --> 49:27.030]  I was wondering if you could tell us anything about number stations.
[49:28.090 --> 49:28.810]  Number stations?
[49:29.110 --> 49:29.350]  Yeah.
[49:30.050 --> 49:30.610]  Oh, we did?
[49:30.970 --> 49:31.370]  We did?
[49:31.890 --> 49:32.250]  No.
[49:32.530 --> 49:34.650]  What I can tell you is that I have to go to the bathroom.
[49:41.780 --> 49:42.920]  I'll just recycle.
[49:45.520 --> 49:45.980]  All right.
[49:46.060 --> 49:48.000]  One quick question, and then I'm going to go to the bathroom.
[49:48.100 --> 49:51.460]  We'll take a 10-minute break, and then I'll continue with whoever wants to survive.
[49:51.660 --> 49:57.960]  And if I could ask the staff to supervise the pins for 10 or 15 minutes, any of you that haven't gotten a pin.
[49:57.960 --> 49:58.720]  And no repeaters.
[49:58.840 --> 50:00.480]  I've taken your photo, every single one of you.
[50:01.320 --> 50:01.760]  Okay.
[50:02.700 --> 50:04.200]  This might be a dangerous question.
[50:04.200 --> 50:08.200]  However, let's say you were a terrorist organization plotting against the United States.
[50:09.040 --> 50:10.220]  What would you attack?
[50:10.600 --> 50:16.300]  And more to the point, how would you, as the United States, defend against that sort of an attack?
[50:16.700 --> 50:20.420]  School kids and shopping malls across America.
[50:20.980 --> 50:22.020]  How do you defend it?
[50:22.260 --> 50:23.180]  How do you defend from it?
[50:23.520 --> 50:23.700]  Excuse me.
[50:23.880 --> 50:25.980]  By scaring the crap out of every single parent.
[50:27.320 --> 50:27.800]  Okay.
[50:28.420 --> 50:29.700]  Tom Ridge hasn't done it.
[50:30.380 --> 50:33.080]  See, we cannot do top-down protection.
[50:33.380 --> 50:35.180]  We have to do bottom-up protection.
[50:36.040 --> 50:43.700]  For example, I was asked to review the Marine Corps counter-terrorism plan by a colonel that respected my work.
[50:43.920 --> 50:48.220]  And I said to him, all you've done is triple the guards and double the cement.
[50:48.900 --> 50:51.420]  I said, that's not how you defend an installation.
[50:51.420 --> 50:56.480]  What you have to do is have an 800 number and a website URL.
[50:56.480 --> 51:00.240]  And I said, you have to go out 50 kilometers around your perimeter.
[51:00.240 --> 51:07.040]  And you have to brief every waitress and every truck driver and every rental car guy and every hotel, motel clerk, whatever.
[51:07.240 --> 51:10.560]  And you have to tell them what you're worried about and what you're looking for.
[51:10.780 --> 51:13.240]  And then when they call, you shouldn't hang up on them.
[51:13.240 --> 51:14.180]  Okay.
[51:14.420 --> 51:21.140]  So that's kind of pushing out this concept of neighborhood watch, which is a perfectly legitimate, voluntary concept.
[51:21.320 --> 51:24.300]  It is not about total awareness and peeping on your arm.
[51:24.360 --> 51:32.960]  By the way, in Iraq, we are jailing and killing people who are being declared as terrorists and criminals by jilted lovers and people who want to get out of debt.
[51:33.060 --> 51:36.040]  The same thing that happened with the Phoenix program in Vietnam.
[51:36.520 --> 51:37.600]  We are naive.
[51:39.420 --> 51:45.020]  I don't believe that we are any safer from the Homeland Security expenditures on first responders.
[51:45.440 --> 51:53.660]  It doesn't help us do preventive counterintelligence inside America, given that I've said we've already got a thousand sleeper agents inside America.
[51:54.400 --> 52:00.480]  And second, everything we're doing in our foreign policy is essentially aiding and abetting bin Laden.
[52:00.680 --> 52:03.160]  George Bush is a bin Laden wet dream.
[52:04.740 --> 52:06.700]  For a short sort of follow-up.
[52:06.920 --> 52:07.320]  All right.
[52:07.720 --> 52:07.820]  Quickly.
[52:08.240 --> 52:16.180]  For all the information that this would generate for all the calls that you're going to get and deluge with information, is the answer to sorting through this information more money?
[52:16.200 --> 52:18.160]  Or what is the answer to sorting through...
[52:18.160 --> 52:18.600]  Mindset.
[52:19.620 --> 52:21.280]  We've got plenty of money in America.
[52:21.560 --> 52:22.820]  I'm going to go to the bathroom.
[52:22.820 --> 52:24.480]  I will be back in 10 minutes.
[52:24.480 --> 52:33.260]  And if the staff can try and make sense of these pins, please, I ask you to be on your honor and not come up for another pin.
[52:34.580 --> 52:37.800]  If you've already gotten one, you go ahead and do whatever you can.
[52:38.420 --> 52:39.620]  Back in 10 minutes.
[52:42.400 --> 52:43.480]  How is this coming?
[52:43.480 --> 52:43.540]  How is this kind ofolivated?
[52:43.700 --> 52:43.800]  We have little pictures.
[52:43.800 --> 52:44.100]  It's not.
[52:44.120 --> 52:44.280]  Exactly!

[00:01.590 --> 00:04.450]  There's a question here, I just asked everyone here actually.
[00:04.650 --> 00:14.930]  I love that idea that you have on the, you know, spreading the envelope and obviously it's been used in a sense in totalitarian systems like China.
[00:15.350 --> 00:17.090]  Okay, because everybody's watching everybody else.
[00:17.250 --> 00:27.790]  But here's my other idea, which is, you should be using perhaps maybe a training program for, and by the way, I'm a native U.S. citizen, so you guys are real patriots, right?
[00:27.790 --> 00:34.910]  You should actually be using children, because children are suspicious of a lot of things.
[00:35.150 --> 00:40.350]  And if they're trained properly, they can watch and then see if there's something bad is happening.
[00:40.790 --> 00:42.350]  Is that, what do you think of that possibility?
[00:42.550 --> 00:43.970]  I mean, now that could be a bit big brother.
[00:44.210 --> 00:46.350]  Well, I'll tell you what's happening in Iraq.
[00:46.610 --> 00:50.990]  What's happening in Iraq is that the teenagers are turning out to be our best friends.
[00:52.190 --> 00:58.750]  And the teenagers are both, have open minds and are more recognizing.
[00:59.570 --> 01:01.350]  I don't want to recruit children.
[01:01.570 --> 01:03.090]  I want to educate children.
[01:03.350 --> 01:10.090]  I believe that intelligence should be taught in every classroom beginning with middle school.
[01:10.410 --> 01:13.260]  I think we should have national intelligence honor societies.
[01:14.680 --> 01:22.240]  And I think people should be rewarded for setting up a ZIP Code issue coverage network for anything.
[01:22.620 --> 01:32.540]  I don't care if you want to track West Nile disease in your neighborhood or if you want to examine how many of your neighbors have gone into...
[01:32.540 --> 01:36.660]  I don't... This is not a police program.
[01:36.780 --> 01:42.420]  This is about neighborhood watch at a level of sophistication that the Internet now makes possible.
[01:42.420 --> 01:43.480]  Yes, sir.
[01:44.120 --> 01:45.780]  Yeah, I have a comment and then a spy question.
[01:46.360 --> 01:54.320]  Are you familiar with the FBI's InfraGuard program and the efforts they've made at open source intelligence and dissemination?
[01:55.020 --> 01:56.780]  You're not talking about the library thing?
[01:58.080 --> 02:02.140]  No, it's a public-private partnership the FBI put together with...
[02:02.140 --> 02:04.540]  The focus is corporate America, which kind of makes it...
[02:04.540 --> 02:06.300]  Well, yeah, they have a number to call.
[02:06.620 --> 02:10.180]  No, they actually have a program where you get involved.
[02:10.180 --> 02:11.360]  You have quarterly meetings.
[02:12.980 --> 02:17.640]  One of the problems is they still bring a lot of the government bureaucracy with them.
[02:18.000 --> 02:23.960]  So in order to get a lot of the closed-source intelligence, you have to get cleared, get a background check, all that kind of good stuff.
[02:24.000 --> 02:29.140]  But there's a lot of training and intel that they send out on a daily and weekly basis.
[02:29.140 --> 02:34.380]  Well, I'm vaguely familiar with some of these things that FBI has done.
[02:34.460 --> 02:40.560]  But what I really want to emphasize is security in the neighborhood is a bottom-up, seven-tribe process.
[02:41.140 --> 02:46.280]  And I like to think of the FBI as a trawler, a federal trawler.
[02:46.280 --> 02:51.240]  You do not catch terrorists by having a federal trawler crisscrossing America.
[02:51.500 --> 02:55.060]  You catch terrorists by teaching the local police how to fish.
[02:56.440 --> 03:05.960]  And that's why Brent Scowcroft paid serious attention to my one-page memo on reforming intelligence before he gave up on this administration.
[03:05.960 --> 03:08.760]  And he asked me to expand on the homeland security thing.
[03:08.920 --> 03:30.760]  And what I had proposed that was very sensible was $30 million per state, 1.5 billion total, for the creation of a generic state intelligence center with 15 five-man watch teams that was not hardwired for counterterrorism.
[03:30.760 --> 03:41.640]  The mistake we're making across America is we're trying to hardwire a few privileged people into a cement bunker with CIA-approved communications and FBI-approved communications.
[03:41.640 --> 03:47.660]  And it's absolutely useless for natural disasters or crime waves or plagues emerging.
[03:47.840 --> 04:01.100]  We can now spot an epidemic in an illegal immigrant community between four days and four weeks in advance of previously stuff by tracking over the grocery counter prescriptions and the specific combinations.
[04:03.100 --> 04:07.660]  So on balance, I think the FBI needs to be a team player and it will never be the leader.
[04:09.040 --> 04:14.940]  Yeah, I would encourage you to look into the program because it actually does a bottom-up approach.
[04:15.100 --> 04:16.200]  But here's my spy question.
[04:16.360 --> 04:16.600]  Okay.
[04:17.300 --> 04:19.460]  Are you familiar with the book Charlie Wilson's War?
[04:19.600 --> 04:19.720]  Yeah.
[04:19.720 --> 04:20.160]  Okay.
[04:20.860 --> 04:24.720]  In there, there was criticism particularly of a lot of the purges that took place.
[04:24.840 --> 04:28.060]  And it sounds like you were there in the same timeframe.
[04:28.500 --> 04:39.100]  And I wonder if you would like to address either stories around that particular book or the author's commentary on the ethnic purges that happened.
[04:39.360 --> 04:43.020]  Well, the author was drawing heavily on Gus's experience.
[04:44.880 --> 04:58.100]  And I think Stansfield-Turner began the process of destroying the American intelligence community because of his naval flag fascination with technical solutions.
[04:58.120 --> 05:04.000]  I've said that one of the biggest mistakes we've made in American intelligence is substituted technology for thinking.
[05:04.560 --> 05:11.480]  Stansfield-Turner was also, and I have to tell you I'm a naval officer, but Marines see things differently.
[05:11.480 --> 05:19.000]  And sometimes we think of a certain category of Navy officer as prissy white mice.
[05:20.100 --> 05:27.260]  And Stansfield-Turner had a prissy disaffection for clandestine intelligence.
[05:27.680 --> 05:32.600]  He's one of these guys that thinks it's cleaner to do it with technology.
[05:32.600 --> 05:34.200]  And so he gutted us.
[05:34.520 --> 05:36.500]  He gutted the clandestine service.
[05:38.280 --> 05:40.460]  And then we had a series of mediocrities.
[05:40.560 --> 05:46.820]  The only one that was any good really was Dick Helms, whose book is worth reading or my summary of his book.
[05:47.840 --> 05:49.420]  I think I've forgotten your question.
[05:54.450 --> 05:54.970]  Yeah.
[05:54.970 --> 06:02.570]  Well, it was, you know, it's not so much a purge as really bad management.
[06:03.730 --> 06:11.330]  American intelligence has never, with the possible exception of Dick Helms, but even Dick had his problems, American intelligence has never been managed professionally.
[06:12.770 --> 06:16.750]  And General Odom makes this point in his book, Fixing Intelligence.
[06:17.010 --> 06:25.930]  He points out that DCIs generally come from a political background or a staff suck-up background or a single-discipline background.
[06:26.570 --> 06:29.490]  And as a result, they don't have the diverse...
[06:29.490 --> 06:41.390]  I'm one of the very few officers I know who served in three of the four directors at CIA, who's done SIGINT, who's done IMMINT, who's stood up a Marine Corps or Defense Intelligence Center, and then gone on to be a guru for open source intelligence.
[06:41.530 --> 06:45.330]  I don't know anybody quite like me in terms of that diversity of experience.
[06:46.710 --> 06:53.930]  And if I were advising a DCI, I would say to him, you really do need to ensure that you understand all of the problems here.
[06:54.030 --> 06:57.050]  I mean, take Mike Hayden as an example, the director of NSA.
[06:57.170 --> 06:58.850]  I think he's a particularly gifted officer.
[06:58.850 --> 07:00.410]  He can't fix NSA.
[07:01.150 --> 07:05.270]  I mean, from day one, Barbara McNamara and others were fighting him.
[07:05.730 --> 07:17.410]  Hayden and Black listened to me when I said I thought NSA should become a national processing agency and it should begin by having a pilot project that does OSINT for all of the world on terrorism.
[07:17.690 --> 07:25.350]  And that then sets the foundation for deciding how to surge your assets and where to emphasize and so forth.
[07:25.710 --> 07:29.410]  He actually got me in front of every single general and colonel in the collection division.
[07:29.970 --> 07:34.470]  And they all heard out my brief and at the end they said, well, you know, geez, that's really nice, but we do SIGINT.
[07:35.190 --> 07:43.350]  And Hayden is on record as saying that every time he wants to terminate a program, the only guy that knows all the details is the guy that would lose his job if he terminated the program.
[07:45.310 --> 07:46.350]  Okay, because of compartmentation.
[07:47.190 --> 07:49.450]  So the system is desperately broken.
[07:49.690 --> 07:52.370]  It's less about purging and more about bad management.
[07:52.550 --> 07:54.110]  I mean, I've written two books on this subject.
[07:54.250 --> 07:55.030]  I'm working on a third.
[07:55.270 --> 07:57.630]  There have been at least another 15 to 20 books.
[07:57.690 --> 08:02.410]  I've published a list of top 20 intelligence books and you don't have to buy and read all the books.
[08:02.530 --> 08:07.450]  You can just read my summaries if you're willing to accept me as a point of departure.
[08:07.450 --> 08:08.030]  Yes, sir.
[08:09.650 --> 08:12.790]  I wanted to thank you for actually coming out here today.
[08:13.090 --> 08:13.570]  Oh, I like this.
[08:13.790 --> 08:15.490]  This has been an amazing experience.
[08:15.910 --> 08:31.330]  And I wanted to see if you can shed some light on something that is kind of like personal, I guess, in a sense, which is we, my family and I, we actually came out of Cuba and we made it here in the 1960s.
[08:31.470 --> 08:35.510]  The only three countries that speak proper Spanish are Cuba, Colombia and Spain.
[08:37.230 --> 08:37.590]  Yeah.
[08:39.310 --> 08:39.670]  But...
[08:42.430 --> 08:46.950]  The question, the thing that I had is, I mean, you know, I made it here to the United States when I was six years old.
[08:47.350 --> 08:52.170]  You know, our family came over on a program, I guess, that the United States had called the Freedom Flights.
[08:52.450 --> 08:52.610]  Hmm.
[08:53.550 --> 08:55.670]  And it was like at the height of the Cold War.
[08:55.730 --> 09:00.210]  And we've made it as a family from starting literally from zero.
[09:00.670 --> 09:04.210]  You know, we didn't have a pasta pit in and piss in and that kind of thing.
[09:04.210 --> 09:20.090]  And it's always, I've always wondered what the hell is it about Cuba exactly that has put us as a nation into being, you know, what we are to the world, which is I still don't understand it at the age of 40.
[09:20.090 --> 09:21.710]  It comes back to mindset.
[09:22.110 --> 09:22.670]  And thanks a lot.
[09:22.850 --> 09:22.990]  Yeah.
[09:23.110 --> 09:23.970]  It comes back to...
[09:23.970 --> 09:24.830]  De nada, caballero.
[09:25.290 --> 09:27.410]  It comes back to mindset.
[09:28.310 --> 09:31.390]  You know, we actually started the Cold War.
[09:31.610 --> 09:44.910]  I mean, if you look at Jim Banford's book on Puzzle Palace and stuff, when the Soviet Union was defenseless after World War II, we were running bomber flights deep into the Soviet Union over the Arctic Circle just to see how far we could get before they noticed.
[09:45.290 --> 09:46.590]  How stupid is that?
[09:47.630 --> 09:52.030]  And so we basically pushed the Soviets to invest heavily in the military.
[09:52.030 --> 09:58.630]  We've also been so obsessively concerned about communism that we accepted fascism in the United States as a trade-off.
[09:59.370 --> 10:08.950]  I mean, we imported the Nazi rocket scientists and others, and if you look at Karl Rove, he is a direct descendant of Nazi war criminals.
[10:08.950 --> 10:10.090]  Okay?
[10:10.530 --> 10:12.310]  His father changed his name.
[10:12.630 --> 10:17.330]  But the fact is, Rove is in a direct path back to Nazism.
[10:19.630 --> 10:23.450]  And so we allowed Nazis to influence U.S. policy against communism and to make the U.S. much harder against communism.
[10:27.710 --> 10:29.970]  We basically built a communist boogeyman.
[10:30.290 --> 10:34.310]  And the Vietnam War and this whole issue of dominoes turned out to be wrong.
[10:34.310 --> 10:39.490]  Now, I rarely review DVDs on Amazon, but I just reviewed Robert McNamara's DVD.
[10:39.950 --> 10:42.250]  And I summarized his eleven lessons.
[10:43.070 --> 10:49.250]  And, you know, I think McNamara and Colby are two of the people who grew the most after leaving office.
[10:52.230 --> 10:54.790]  And there's a lot to be said there.
[10:55.050 --> 10:56.850]  Communism is not a threat.
[10:57.930 --> 11:03.090]  And we should be emphasizing making legal, legitimate democracy.
[11:03.090 --> 11:07.930]  Part of the problem with America is it's bought off... let's take Sudan as an example.
[11:08.070 --> 11:09.910]  Sudan is a hotbed of terrorism.
[11:10.610 --> 11:13.030]  It's also got a major genocide going on.
[11:13.210 --> 11:19.430]  But because the Sudanese government pretends to be supporting the global war on terrorism, we're letting them get away with mass murder.
[11:19.690 --> 11:23.030]  As well as active terrorism in their own borders.
[11:23.330 --> 11:25.210]  And so we're really living a lie.
[11:25.690 --> 11:27.650]  We're living a lie at multiple levels.
[11:28.210 --> 11:32.010]  I said in one of my press releases the other day, we're in a hundred year war, six fronts.
[11:32.390 --> 11:35.750]  I don't think I completed them all, but the Middle East was obviously one.
[11:36.410 --> 11:38.770]  India, Pakistan, Kashmir, all of that.
[11:40.330 --> 11:42.050]  We slept through the first quarter.
[11:42.690 --> 11:44.730]  We're lying our way through the second quarter.
[11:45.010 --> 11:48.330]  We are going to be hurt bad in the third quarter.
[11:48.330 --> 11:55.730]  And whether we win this game or not in the fourth quarter depends a lot on how soon we can recover one man, one vote.
[11:56.990 --> 11:57.550]  Sir.
[11:58.190 --> 11:59.350]  Thank you for the talk.
[11:59.950 --> 12:01.230]  Pure spy question.
[12:01.830 --> 12:04.130]  Which country has the best intelligence service?
[12:04.490 --> 12:06.230]  Your ranking, top three countries.
[12:06.950 --> 12:09.270]  None of them has the best intelligence service.
[12:09.510 --> 12:12.310]  The question was which country has the best intelligence service.
[12:14.730 --> 12:18.310]  I think every country has its strengths and its shortcomings.
[12:18.490 --> 12:23.350]  The United States, for example, is quite good at spending massive amounts of money thoughtlessly.
[12:25.510 --> 12:31.110]  And in fact, when I lecture my British and Australian colleagues, I say, you know, we're really treating this alliance wrong.
[12:31.250 --> 12:38.250]  What it ought to be is Australian languages, American money, British brains, and the Canadian reputation for helplessness.
[12:39.370 --> 12:41.350]  You know, that's an alliance that works.
[12:42.910 --> 12:48.130]  And the South Africans right now are about to build a new OSINT center and they've learned not to take computers from Americans.
[12:48.550 --> 12:48.990]  Okay?
[12:49.250 --> 12:50.630]  They figured that one out.
[12:50.790 --> 12:52.290]  I said, just take the cash.
[12:55.510 --> 12:57.390]  But we're good at spending money.
[12:57.470 --> 12:58.450]  We're not good at anything else.
[12:58.570 --> 13:01.770]  The Israelis, I think, are good at very specific kinds of operations.
[13:02.090 --> 13:06.250]  They're also good at using reservists for open source intelligence collection.
[13:07.610 --> 13:10.750]  The Swedes used to be very good at open source intelligence.
[13:11.010 --> 13:13.890]  My partner, Mats Bajor, got an award from the King of Sweden for this.
[13:14.930 --> 13:16.990]  Scotland Yard in London.
[13:17.230 --> 13:32.670]  The Queen of England just gave out an order of the British Empire to my friend, Detective Steve Edwards, who created the OSINT unit at Scotland Yard that is putting people in jail, big people, terrorists and major corporate criminals, using OSINT to create these networks and link analysis.
[13:33.030 --> 13:35.490]  And Interpol is sending questions to Scotland Yard.
[13:35.590 --> 13:41.370]  And inside of ours, he is providing exactly which corporate boards people are connected to.
[13:41.450 --> 13:45.370]  And he's identifying people that are doing major league arms smuggling and so forth.
[13:47.230 --> 13:51.030]  I think the Indians are very good in some select areas.
[13:51.030 --> 13:53.870]  I think the French are very good at counterintelligence against Arabs.
[13:55.490 --> 13:59.290]  The South Africans are very good at clandestine intelligence, black on black.
[14:01.170 --> 14:05.770]  In fact, after the revolution, the South Africans, the best blacks went into intelligence.
[14:06.810 --> 14:10.930]  And all of the whites are in the process of training them as they're flipping.
[14:11.830 --> 14:18.730]  And they also had the benefit that just before the revolution, there was an entire new intelligence campus built for South Africa.
[14:18.810 --> 14:22.770]  But they're still only at 19 baud for their Internet connection.
[14:22.910 --> 14:23.730]  That breaks my heart.
[14:24.790 --> 14:30.070]  So I don't think there is any intelligence community that has all the pieces lined up.
[14:30.250 --> 14:31.610]  You remember my little slide?
[14:31.770 --> 14:36.910]  You had collection, counterintelligence, covert action, analysis and leadership.
[14:36.910 --> 14:40.690]  There is no one community that I know of that's got it all together.
[14:40.910 --> 14:42.770]  You could say relatively to their country.
[14:42.950 --> 14:43.430]  What's that?
[14:43.990 --> 14:48.650]  You could say in relation to their country, which intelligence service serves their country best?
[14:53.830 --> 14:55.050]  That's a hard question.
[14:55.050 --> 14:56.630]  I'd have to think about that.
[14:57.930 --> 15:09.610]  Because one of the things you really have to consider is what is the cost to a country of intelligence operations that are counterproductive or cost a lot of money.
[15:09.610 --> 15:13.310]  I think every intelligence services has some good and some bad.
[15:13.690 --> 15:16.410]  Why don't you tell me what your answer is and then we'll take it from there.
[15:17.470 --> 15:18.430]  I don't really know.
[15:18.650 --> 15:21.490]  I know Israeli service has always been very good for Israel.
[15:21.670 --> 15:23.910]  It's good in narrow casting.
[15:24.050 --> 15:26.450]  But it also has started to fail lately.
[15:26.450 --> 15:27.750]  Yes, it has.
[15:27.930 --> 15:32.550]  And in fact, I think one of the problems with the U.S. not reading Hebrew is that we don't see the internal opposition.
[15:35.610 --> 15:49.250]  There's a very famous article that was written by an Israeli general about a year ago that basically said that the Israeli policy against Palestine was out of touch with reality, was based on false intelligence, was political manipulation.
[15:53.340 --> 16:01.300]  It does not help to assassinate or capture single individuals if you're bulldozing entire villages at the same time.
[16:02.740 --> 16:10.680]  And it's also not helpful if you're stealing the water from the entire Middle East to support an agriculture sector that is producing 3% of your GDP.
[16:10.680 --> 16:12.900]  This is just flat-out stupid.
[16:13.500 --> 16:14.000]  Okay?
[16:14.460 --> 16:16.340]  No disrespect intended.
[16:16.620 --> 16:17.960]  It's just a statement of fact.
[16:19.720 --> 16:22.020]  And so one of the things...
[16:22.020 --> 16:24.640]  I'm struggling with whether I redirect my third book.
[16:25.400 --> 16:31.860]  My third book was originally intended to focus only on the $500 billion for national security.
[16:32.140 --> 16:42.420]  I'm now toying with the idea of saying that we need a new domestic intelligence agency that uses only open sources and methods to understand the most pressing domestic problems.
[16:42.880 --> 16:47.100]  For instance, in America, we have a very pressing domestic problem with the working poor.
[16:47.920 --> 16:50.200]  That should be an oxymoron, but it's not.
[16:50.780 --> 16:54.700]  I mean, the working poor is the title of a book, and it's a very delicate cycle.
[16:54.960 --> 17:06.700]  I mean, if your childcare breaks down, or the bus doesn't show up, or your alarm clock doesn't go off, or you have a major injury in your family, your entire life is destroyed, and you drop below the poverty line.
[17:06.700 --> 17:10.480]  I think we need to have intelligence about our own domestic situation.
[17:10.720 --> 17:19.400]  So, for example, in the Israeli case, I would say, fellas, we need to think about importing food and not using so much water.
[17:20.980 --> 17:38.760]  We need to think about asking for an international demilitarized zone, and actually creating a multi-billion dollar fund to basically raise two generations in peace, with a 30-year commitment for this international force staying.
[17:39.900 --> 17:44.940]  There are a whole bunch of other things, but the bottom line is I think most countries do not have a grand strategy.
[17:45.240 --> 17:48.280]  They do not have an interagency coordination process.
[17:48.500 --> 17:55.020]  They do not have holistic intelligence covering both domestic and international issues in a coherent, sensible way.
[17:55.020 --> 18:08.900]  For example, our foreign aid investments in Africa are trivial compared to how we screw the Africans with our tariffs and other, you know, anti-trade initiatives.
[18:09.180 --> 18:18.960]  So, by and large, I would say to you, I think most countries are unintelligent, and right now intelligence is part of the problem, national intelligence is part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
[18:18.960 --> 18:20.480]  Okay, next.
[18:20.740 --> 18:22.300]  Sorry, may I have one follow-up question?
[18:22.740 --> 18:32.660]  With open source intelligence, if you collect intelligence from various people, who do you intend would be the sink for this intelligence?
[18:32.880 --> 18:34.020]  Would it be a select few?
[18:34.260 --> 18:34.560]  No.
[18:34.680 --> 18:36.700]  Or would it also be the entire communities?
[18:37.680 --> 18:41.720]  Open source intelligence is a come-as-you-are, mix-and-match network.
[18:44.200 --> 18:51.980]  What would that sometimes plant panic for, you know, the entire society if somebody reports a terrorist in, I don't know, in Kansas?
[18:52.920 --> 18:56.020]  Well, if he's associated with hope, we'll take it accordingly.
[18:57.340 --> 19:01.160]  You know, the point is, this is a self-healing system.
[19:02.420 --> 19:08.600]  Okay, it's a bottom-up self-healing network, self-evaluating, self-policing.
[19:08.600 --> 19:10.540]  This is not a command and control solution.
[19:10.780 --> 19:29.220]  I want to jumpstart it with $125 million a year in government money, but then I want to rapidly expand that to a $1.5 billion a year global network, where corporations, NGOs, businesses, universities, newspapers, all have a vested interest in optimizing the amount of information that can be shared.
[19:29.220 --> 19:32.720]  And then that sharing is processed in different ways.
[19:33.480 --> 19:34.520]  Okay, next person.
[19:35.520 --> 19:37.040]  Are we doing all right here in the back?
[19:38.140 --> 19:49.540]  It seems that a lot of countries use their intelligence apparatus to kind of aid local companies, the country, or the companies in that country in industrial espionage.
[19:51.100 --> 19:53.500]  What are some of the more egregious offenders?
[19:53.780 --> 19:54.480]  I know it's alleged...
[19:54.480 --> 19:59.060]  France, Germany, Israel, followed by China and Russia.
[20:00.220 --> 20:01.940]  How egregious is the United States?
[20:02.100 --> 20:04.360]  How well do we help our industries maintain...
[20:04.360 --> 20:05.140]  Not well at all.
[20:06.580 --> 20:16.320]  One of the problems that we have is that most of our officers are focused on hard targets, on foreign liaison, and they don't have economics degrees.
[20:17.000 --> 20:20.320]  We don't do well at economic intelligence, as best I can tell.
[20:20.320 --> 20:23.640]  I haven't had privileged access at CIA since 1988.
[20:24.860 --> 20:27.480]  But the State Department is having the same problem.
[20:27.720 --> 20:32.820]  It used to be that the State Department ideal officer was what was called a Paul Mill officer.
[20:33.140 --> 20:36.160]  He was politically astute and able to deal with the U.S. military.
[20:36.860 --> 20:44.340]  What we're finding that the State Department needs today is people who have a deep understanding of both indigenous history and culture and macroeconomics.
[20:46.000 --> 20:49.480]  And so we're talking about a Paul Econ officer.
[20:51.040 --> 20:54.160]  So I think as globalization spreads...
[20:54.160 --> 20:58.120]  One of the things we haven't done, you know, there's books about why people hate America and all of this.
[20:58.440 --> 21:10.600]  We haven't done a proper analysis, I think, in terms of political, legal, military, socioeconomic, ideocultural, technodemographic, and natural geographic.
[21:17.300 --> 21:33.560]  We haven't done a strategic analysis of the state of the world and the U.S. budget and what needs to change over the next six years in order to increase legitimate governments, stabilize unstable failed states, end crime, end disease, end poverty, end hunger, dramatically reduce small arms.
[21:33.660 --> 21:35.260]  Part of the problem is we're corrupt.
[21:35.900 --> 21:40.680]  We are the major manufacturer and distributor of small arms in the hands of children around the world.
[21:41.760 --> 21:45.180]  We are the major manufacturer and distributor of nuclear materials.
[21:45.500 --> 21:53.620]  In fact, the last proper inventory of plutonium and stuff was done in 1996 by David Albright out of Washington.
[21:54.460 --> 21:56.720]  There's more plutonium available in U.S. military installations for theft.
[21:59.220 --> 22:01.460]  And we have no idea where all our stuff is.
[22:04.020 --> 22:15.000]  Actually, from the other side of that, you were mentioning earlier, you said that when you were assembling your intelligent assessment, you went to like these six CEOs and kind of twisted their arms.
[22:15.660 --> 22:21.860]  How can businesses better work with the government to try to take some of the burden off of them?
[22:21.860 --> 22:25.840]  I mean, what role do you see them taking percentage-wise in the amount of information?
[22:26.000 --> 22:28.540]  Yeah, that's a very, very helpful question.
[22:29.020 --> 22:34.360]  First off, there's something called the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, which is at about the fourth grade level.
[22:36.380 --> 22:40.840]  And I think most businesses today don't do business intelligence.
[22:40.840 --> 22:54.400]  First off, we did an analysis of our competition and found out that our competition was, more often than not, an ignorant middle manager that thought he knew it all and didn't need business intelligence and didn't want to spend money on buying information,
[22:54.480 --> 22:55.840]  especially tailored information.
[22:58.560 --> 23:05.840]  Our next biggest competitor are things like the Internet and Foctiva and other so-called easy-quick solutions that just give you a tiny thing.
[23:05.840 --> 23:09.320]  We're also finding most published information is not really valuable.
[23:09.500 --> 23:15.520]  You actually have to go out and collect exactly what you need, when you need it, in relation to the very specific context that you're operating in.
[23:16.140 --> 23:25.880]  What I would do if I were a business is I would make it a point to treat business intelligence as a specialization with direct access to the CEO, and I would evaluate.
[23:26.020 --> 23:28.960]  I'd add it to every fitness report, every performance evaluation.
[23:31.140 --> 23:34.760]  Employee description number one would be collect and utilize business intelligence.
[23:35.500 --> 23:40.100]  And then you start developing an internal program to create what are called smart organizations.
[23:41.440 --> 23:51.960]  If I were a business with interest in the Middle East, I would make it a point to do a citation analysis on the Middle East and then to systematically start identifying who the top government people are, not only in the U.S. government, but in the Australian government and other governments.
[23:54.260 --> 24:02.760]  And I would work very hard to create one of these OSINT meetup virtual networks with the eight-point star for my shared interest.
[24:02.980 --> 24:05.660]  And I would use information rather than money as wampum.
[24:06.360 --> 24:07.000]  Okay?
[24:08.760 --> 24:11.000]  I have a spy question for you.
[24:12.800 --> 24:15.540]  Say you had to disappear tomorrow.
[24:15.700 --> 24:17.180]  How would you do it?
[24:20.180 --> 24:21.900]  With a lot of prior planning.
[24:24.740 --> 24:28.560]  I miss the guy that did ten years of practical anonymity.
[24:28.680 --> 24:30.560]  That was an interesting topic to me.
[24:32.520 --> 24:35.980]  I have not invested in disappearing.
[24:36.220 --> 24:42.800]  In part because I have three children and America is a make-or-break situation for me.
[24:43.520 --> 24:54.600]  But if I were disappearing, I would certainly eliminate all use of electronic devices and all use of credit cards and I would go strictly cash and work for food.
[24:56.220 --> 24:56.820]  Good morning.
[24:57.240 --> 24:58.300]  And by the way, hang on a second.
[24:58.360 --> 24:58.860]  Where is that guy?
[24:59.780 --> 25:00.720]  How would you do it?
[25:02.340 --> 25:02.700]  Huh?
[25:03.860 --> 25:04.740]  Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[25:04.880 --> 25:05.840]  How would you do it?
[25:09.400 --> 25:13.360]  Well, in my experience, disappearing takes a lot of work.
[25:14.840 --> 25:18.760]  I actually love the... one of John Le Carré's books was very interesting.
[25:18.940 --> 25:20.480]  This guy had two different identities.
[25:20.760 --> 25:24.000]  One was his weekend identity and one was his weekday identity.
[25:24.700 --> 25:31.720]  And he would move between two different spots, which had completely separate identities so that he could flush any time in either direction.
[25:32.920 --> 25:35.600]  I'm looking forward to the Bourne Supremacy, by the way.
[25:37.080 --> 25:41.340]  I mean, you know, these movies are wonderful about real spying.
[25:41.600 --> 25:42.260]  Go on.
[25:42.920 --> 25:43.620]  Good morning.
[25:44.100 --> 25:44.800]  Hey, Render.
[25:46.160 --> 25:48.700]  Congratulations to all of you for staying around this late.
[25:49.260 --> 25:51.180]  So, good hand for... big hand for all of you.
[25:51.200 --> 25:53.100]  Yeah, I'm going to ask for the old guy's schedule next year.
[25:53.220 --> 25:56.220]  Same day, open at 10 and start at 8.
[25:56.500 --> 25:57.600]  First, quick question.
[25:57.780 --> 26:01.260]  Who scheduled you for first thing in the morning after all the drinking starts?
[26:01.920 --> 26:04.380]  I unfortunately had to miss your talk yesterday morning.
[26:04.380 --> 26:06.440]  You can get the OSINT story on my website.
[26:07.080 --> 26:07.500]  I will be.
[26:07.540 --> 26:10.640]  I think, you know, they're trying to open at a conventional hour.
[26:12.260 --> 26:13.020]  Conventional for who?
[26:13.240 --> 26:14.180]  Well, that's true.
[26:14.400 --> 26:19.380]  I mean, you know, what I would do is have them replay my tapes at night someplace.
[26:21.040 --> 26:26.620]  But really, in your case, particularly since we know each other, I would say go to my website and read the OSINT story.
[26:27.160 --> 26:29.760]  That's what I spend my days doing at work when I should be doing real work.
[26:29.760 --> 26:30.400]  Okay, good.
[26:30.600 --> 26:31.860]  Yeah, I think people...
[26:31.860 --> 26:34.060]  Let me tell you, CIA, my wife still works there.
[26:34.380 --> 26:38.980]  First thing I'm going to do at CIA if I ever have the chance to shut down the gossip networks.
[26:39.580 --> 26:44.380]  There is a users group on everything, including defecating lizards.
[26:44.760 --> 26:53.380]  And CIA employees spend at least a third of their time doing gossip about sleep apnea, whatever.
[26:53.760 --> 26:56.240]  It's absolutely amazing the amount of loss product.
[26:56.240 --> 27:01.800]  Between Bill Gates and gossip, I think we're about 25% productive in most of America.
[27:02.340 --> 27:07.120]  To my real question here, you keep talking about global brain, you know, everybody contributing things.
[27:07.220 --> 27:13.700]  You know, if they find some vulnerability or some intelligence useful to the community, that you post it and share it with everyone else.
[27:14.060 --> 27:15.500]  We're not at that point yet.
[27:16.260 --> 27:31.400]  I found my situation, myself in a situation a couple of times with my war driving data that I find an access point that is blatantly in a government installation or someplace you just should not have an open access point.
[27:31.600 --> 27:31.660]  Right.
[27:31.680 --> 27:34.320]  One particular one was a provincial prison.
[27:34.540 --> 27:39.140]  Step one is tell the government and step two is tell the newspaper.
[27:39.140 --> 27:40.340]  The problem is who?
[27:41.380 --> 27:43.900]  And without getting myself arrested is the other half of it.
[27:43.980 --> 27:47.880]  Because if you found an open access point in a prison, I don't want to end up on the other side of that wall.
[27:48.000 --> 27:57.420]  No, I mean, I think you can do very well with anonymous postal mail, especially if you mail it to someone else and they mail it from another city.
[27:58.830 --> 28:02.660]  But I think we have a responsibility to report things like this.
[28:02.800 --> 28:06.260]  And I just had the same question or a similar question from someone in San Diego.
[28:06.640 --> 28:11.040]  And I said, you tell the government and then you tell the government that if they ignore you, you're going to tell the newspaper.
[28:11.460 --> 28:12.500]  I was about to ask that.
[28:12.660 --> 28:14.780]  How effective is it going to the media?
[28:14.880 --> 28:17.500]  Is this going to change their minds or are they just going to clamp up?
[28:17.640 --> 28:18.340]  The government is scared of the media.
[28:19.190 --> 28:23.180]  And also, I would info your congressman if you want to be overt.
[28:23.280 --> 28:23.400]  I'm Canadian, remember?
[28:23.700 --> 28:23.940]  Huh?
[28:24.040 --> 28:24.900]  I'm Canadian, remember?
[28:24.900 --> 28:26.380]  Oh, you're Canadian.
[28:26.780 --> 28:28.380]  I thought we'd revoked your passport.
[28:28.660 --> 28:29.100]  Okay.
[28:29.220 --> 28:29.700]  They keep trying.
[28:30.120 --> 28:31.880]  But they're just so easy to copy.
[28:32.340 --> 28:32.540]  Yeah.
[28:32.920 --> 28:45.560]  Now, you know, I, in 1994, I said the hackers ought to create a website at which they gave corporations and the government 30 days in which to fix known obvious flaws and access points.
[28:45.700 --> 28:48.040]  And at the end of 30 days, it was posted publicly.
[28:48.540 --> 28:50.680]  I still think that's useful.
[28:51.400 --> 28:59.040]  And, in fact, 2600 could render a national service by providing a place where things like that can be reported and your identity concealed.
[28:59.280 --> 29:06.880]  Well, one of them right now is a site called Wiggle, a wireless Internet geographical logging engine where war drivers from all over the world submit their data.
[29:07.360 --> 29:14.360]  And anybody can go in and, well, for the states at least, punch in their ZIP Code and see all the access points there and just check around their building.
[29:14.460 --> 29:15.040]  Send me an email about that.
[29:15.140 --> 29:15.460]  I will.
[29:15.460 --> 29:15.480]  I will.
[29:15.780 --> 29:16.220]  Yeah.
[29:16.720 --> 29:17.520]  That would be fun.
[29:18.340 --> 29:19.160]  Next question.
[29:20.220 --> 29:20.620]  Hi.
[29:20.920 --> 29:21.200]  Hi.
[29:21.280 --> 29:23.260]  You mentioned that you used to work for the CIA.
[29:23.780 --> 29:24.220]  Yes.
[29:24.440 --> 29:26.440]  And your wife also works for the CIA right now?
[29:26.580 --> 29:26.880]  She still does.
[29:27.120 --> 29:34.040]  What do you say about people that say that, well, since you once worked for the CIA, you are always the CIA asset?
[29:35.380 --> 29:37.040]  You know, I'm glad you asked that question.
[29:37.200 --> 29:39.820]  I'm going to go ahead and advance my conclusion.
[29:41.160 --> 29:45.060]  I was thinking about how to end my statement at 2 o'clock.
[29:45.160 --> 29:51.320]  But let me go ahead and give you my ending in relation to your question.
[29:52.060 --> 29:56.700]  Well, before you start, let me mention that I disagree with a lot of your analysis.
[29:57.080 --> 29:57.320]  Mm-hmm.
[29:58.320 --> 29:58.580]  Okay.
[29:58.760 --> 29:58.980]  So?
[30:00.080 --> 30:00.800]  What's your point?
[30:01.280 --> 30:03.160]  Well, I'm curious if you're a CIA asset.
[30:03.620 --> 30:04.020]  Okay.
[30:04.160 --> 30:05.100]  Well, let me give you my ending.
[30:05.200 --> 30:05.480]  I am.
[30:05.880 --> 30:06.140]  Thank you.
[30:06.140 --> 30:09.820]  I have spent the last six years taking pictures of every single one of you.
[30:11.460 --> 30:15.420]  And I have got, finally, I'm getting an award for this next week.
[30:15.540 --> 30:18.080]  I've got a digital database of every single one of you.
[30:18.520 --> 30:20.500]  There is a SWAT team downstairs.
[30:20.920 --> 30:22.340]  Eric has been arrested already.
[30:25.480 --> 30:26.900]  And, guys, thank you.
[30:26.960 --> 30:28.960]  I would never have gotten my award without your help.
[30:28.960 --> 30:36.700]  And, by the way, it took CIA 60 people to create all of my book reviews and the 20,000 pages on my website.
[30:37.800 --> 30:40.880]  And let me tell you, I didn't think they could do it.
[30:41.300 --> 30:41.700]  Okay?
[30:41.960 --> 30:42.840]  There's a cash award?
[30:43.080 --> 30:43.420]  What?
[30:43.620 --> 30:44.900]  Is there at least a cash award with them?
[30:44.920 --> 30:46.320]  Yeah, there's a cash award.
[30:46.320 --> 30:49.620]  And now for my punchline, a la Wozniak.
[30:49.620 --> 30:50.680]  I'm just kidding.
[30:54.690 --> 30:55.830]  Look, you know what?
[30:55.910 --> 30:56.490]  I'll tell you what.
[30:56.590 --> 30:57.390]  I am what I am.
[30:57.570 --> 31:00.710]  And some of you have seen me for six years.
[31:00.770 --> 31:03.910]  And if you think I'm a CIA asset, then God bless you.
[31:04.150 --> 31:04.910]  Stay away from me.
[31:05.810 --> 31:06.370]  Yes, sir?
[31:06.850 --> 31:08.630]  I'll start off with a spy question.
[31:08.870 --> 31:09.170]  Yeah, good.
[31:09.170 --> 31:13.170]  Based on popular movies, or mainstream movies.
[31:13.650 --> 31:16.610]  What, in your opinion, is the most accurate...
[31:16.610 --> 31:17.190]  George Smiley.
[31:17.550 --> 31:19.470]  All of the George Smiley books and movies.
[31:19.690 --> 31:21.070]  And the most ridiculous movie?
[31:21.310 --> 31:21.790]  Angel.
[31:24.690 --> 31:26.950]  We don't send kids into battle like that.
[31:28.150 --> 31:30.210]  I mean, really, Angel is the most ridiculous.
[31:31.810 --> 31:33.010]  Further follow-up?
[31:34.450 --> 31:35.130]  Another one.
[31:35.250 --> 31:38.190]  If you could run down the list of the seven tribes and your...
[31:38.190 --> 31:40.350]  the competency ratings that you give them.
[31:40.490 --> 31:41.010]  Gladly.
[31:41.670 --> 31:44.210]  It's also in the free...
[31:44.210 --> 31:45.970]  Well, I don't know if it's in the free chapter of my book.
[31:46.130 --> 31:46.230]  Okay.
[31:47.290 --> 31:48.330]  National, 50%.
[31:49.350 --> 31:51.730]  Military, 40%, primarily because of targeting.
[31:54.630 --> 31:55.670]  Police, 20%.
[31:56.930 --> 32:00.510]  Business, 30%, but only because of the oil companies and the pharmaceuticals.
[32:01.990 --> 32:05.250]  Academy, 30%, only because of a few really good programs.
[32:08.050 --> 32:09.050]  NGOs, 10%.
[32:10.570 --> 32:11.570]  Media, 10%.
[32:14.710 --> 32:16.950]  Religions, 10% to 20% depending.
[32:17.150 --> 32:20.370]  B'nai B'rith gets really good points for following Arabs in certain neighborhoods.
[32:21.010 --> 32:23.650]  Opus Dei gets really good points for some of the stuff it does.
[32:23.930 --> 32:25.170]  The Mormons get points.
[32:25.310 --> 32:27.950]  But by and large, it all isn't as structured.
[32:27.950 --> 32:34.030]  In fact, there's a great book on spying in the Vatican that changed my mind.
[32:34.150 --> 32:37.850]  Alan Dulles and I both used to think that the Pope was the most informed person on the earth.
[32:38.110 --> 32:39.150]  Turns out he's not.
[32:39.470 --> 32:43.890]  A lot of his priests are stupid and his cardinals are very, very egotistical.
[32:45.130 --> 32:51.250]  And the Catholic hierarchy seems to be basically dominated by cardinals with clerks.
[32:52.630 --> 32:53.890]  But it's interesting.
[32:56.290 --> 33:11.530]  Based on the ultimate ends of where you see the open source intelligence model going, where would that leave the traditional model of national intelligence if the open source intelligence evolved to where you would like to see it?
[33:11.530 --> 33:17.510]  I can cut what we spend on national intelligence by a third and redirect that to public education.
[33:25.880 --> 33:26.400]  And...
[33:26.400 --> 33:27.380]  All right, you gotta...
[33:27.380 --> 33:27.840]  Last question.
[33:28.060 --> 33:28.720]  All right, real quick.
[33:29.060 --> 33:31.280]  Is the...
[33:31.860 --> 33:42.180]  Based on civil liberties, where do you see ideally the divide or not a divide between national intelligence versus international intelligence and the wall between the two?
[33:42.300 --> 33:43.040]  Thanks for coming out.
[33:43.220 --> 33:44.060]  Sure, my pleasure.
[33:44.060 --> 33:51.440]  Well, first off, I think we need a domestic intelligence agency that uses only open sources and methods to keep all of the departments of government honest.
[33:52.660 --> 33:54.080]  And I mean, I really...
[33:54.080 --> 33:59.220]  We're not getting a proper honest public intelligence estimate, for example, on water scarcity in the United States.
[34:01.000 --> 34:07.500]  Second, I think the FBI will never be competent at anything other than interstate crime, and even there barely so.
[34:08.840 --> 34:27.320]  I would like to see a new counterintelligence agency that has a business counterespionage division, a national trader counterintelligence division, and a domestic support counterterrorism division in which local law enforcement has the lead and the FBI is always in support.
[34:27.320 --> 34:30.170]  Not the FBI, but this new agency is always in support.
[34:30.900 --> 34:32.960]  The feds are not going to solve your problems.
[34:34.190 --> 34:34.800]  Yes, sir.
[34:34.960 --> 34:36.380]  Thank you again for being here.
[34:36.380 --> 34:37.110]  It's a pleasure.
[34:37.110 --> 34:38.750]  This talk has been a real gem of this conference.
[34:39.000 --> 34:44.020]  I'll preface my question by saying that I've worked for a federal government research laboratory.
[34:44.170 --> 34:58.540]  I can personally attest to this sensation of being surrounded by people who mean very well and feeling like you're petrified by this calcified bureaucracy and, you know, drenched in this incompetent management, basically.
[34:58.540 --> 35:12.440]  So my question is, can you recommend any specifically non-military career paths that you think are aligned with this sort of progressive intelligence reform that you're talking about?
[35:14.500 --> 35:16.440]  I'm tempted to say NASA.
[35:19.760 --> 35:25.150]  NASA's got some good things going on, but they also have the same bureaucratic problems.
[35:30.290 --> 35:33.830]  I don't really see any centers of excellence.
[35:35.110 --> 35:36.770]  I think we have to create them.
[35:36.830 --> 35:46.470]  In fact, one of the things I did while I was here in New York was have lunch with Jack Devine, who was the former head of the clandestine service and one of my old rabbis.
[35:46.550 --> 35:48.270]  And we were talking about business intelligence.
[35:48.270 --> 35:57.510]  And we've both come to the conclusion that tailored, on-demand collection, translation, and intelligence production is about to get traction.
[35:58.370 --> 36:01.510]  I think broadcast news has killed itself.
[36:03.190 --> 36:06.150]  You know, I mean, if you watch Fox News, you deserve what you get.
[36:06.370 --> 36:06.470]  Yeah.
[36:08.470 --> 36:08.950]  And...
[36:10.110 --> 36:10.590]  So...
[36:10.590 --> 36:14.810]  And so I really, I really believe that in the next...
[36:14.810 --> 36:17.710]  I mean, remember, I've been laboring for 14 years on this.
[36:18.110 --> 36:25.910]  Senator Moynihan, great senator from the state of New York, wrote a book called Miles to Go, in which he says it takes 25 years to make changes.
[36:26.570 --> 36:33.310]  The political science literature says it takes six years to make changes in a corporate organization that wants to make the change.
[36:33.510 --> 36:37.910]  I think if you add secrecy and too much money to that, it takes it up to 18.
[36:39.070 --> 36:42.230]  And then if you add the federal government to that, it takes it out to 25.
[36:42.230 --> 36:43.870]  So we're more or less at the same number.
[36:44.510 --> 36:45.850]  It's going to be another 10 years.
[36:45.850 --> 36:56.210]  But what I think we're starting to see now is I've helped 40 governments worldwide create open source intelligence facilities and capabilities, mostly inside the military, some in law enforcement.
[36:56.490 --> 37:01.250]  My partner, Mats Bajor, is helping businesses worldwide improve their business intelligence.
[37:01.710 --> 37:12.110]  And what I see coming down the pike here in the next five years is an explosion in on-demand tailored intelligence using legal open sources and methods.
[37:12.870 --> 37:14.230]  So I'm very excited by this.
[37:14.330 --> 37:20.570]  So barring any specific current agencies, then what sort of general paths would you say in terms of...
[37:20.570 --> 37:22.050]  From a career perspective, would you recommend...
[37:22.050 --> 37:24.030]  It absolutely does not hurt you to join the U.S. military as a civilian or uniform person and learn the process of intelligence.
[37:28.870 --> 37:31.510]  For all of its flaws, it's a good starting point.
[37:32.210 --> 37:33.830]  And then migrate that out.
[37:33.930 --> 37:37.130]  And you should have a lot of fun with intelligencecareers.com.
[37:37.130 --> 37:39.910]  Just look at all of the jobs that are going begging right now.
[37:40.570 --> 37:45.330]  Get any one of them at intelligencecareers.com and think of it as a hack.
[37:46.210 --> 37:46.390]  You know?
[37:47.590 --> 37:53.550]  And, I mean, some guys came up to thank me for telling them in 1994 to get a haircut and learn how to wear a suit.
[37:54.950 --> 37:56.430]  Because these jobs can be had.
[37:56.550 --> 37:57.310]  I mean, you're not far.
[37:57.690 --> 38:00.450]  By the way, your T-shirt reminds me, I encouraged the U.S. government to send a bunch of people here in 1994.
[38:02.510 --> 38:11.430]  And I was particularly amused by the teams of the two-man teams with closely cropped hair, white T-shirts, shorts, and black Corofan shoes.
[38:12.650 --> 38:15.470]  That was Air Force intelligence at the time.
[38:15.470 --> 38:16.950]  I think they've improved since then.
[38:17.410 --> 38:18.610]  All right, sir, your question.
[38:18.790 --> 38:23.610]  Oh, you'd mentioned a short while ago a need for a national trader intelligence system.
[38:24.050 --> 38:31.110]  On that subject, what's your take on the whole Valerie Plame outing and who do you think did it?
[38:31.710 --> 38:39.090]  I think Scooter Libby and Dick Cheney's office did it with Karl Rove's explicit approval and Dick Cheney's explicit concealment after the fact.
[38:40.290 --> 38:41.770]  What are your feelings on it?
[38:43.710 --> 38:46.850]  It has the potential to be Al Capone's tax return.
[38:48.770 --> 38:49.570]  It really does.
[38:49.770 --> 38:54.870]  Do you think this will ever be... where do you think the investigation will lead, regardless of who's found to have done it?
[38:54.870 --> 39:03.250]  Part of our problem is that the Republicans control both houses of Congress and the moderate Republicans are being intimidated by the extremist Republicans.
[39:04.710 --> 39:06.370]  And the people haven't spoken.
[39:06.790 --> 39:10.510]  Right now, the people don't care about Valerie Plume's outing.
[39:13.290 --> 39:21.910]  Inasmuch as the Vice President's office, in my humble opinion, very flagrantly and deliberately violated a national law, I'd like to see them brought to justice.
[39:23.810 --> 39:29.110]  I would like to see Dick Cheney brought to justice for soul sourcing billions of dollars to Halliburton.
[39:31.050 --> 39:34.510]  You know, these guys are bending or breaking every rule they can find.
[39:36.190 --> 39:42.770]  And the outing of Valerie Plume, I think, is one of the things that George Tenant simply had to be honest about.
[39:43.210 --> 39:45.230]  And it led to his eventual resignation.
[39:45.490 --> 39:45.710]  Wow.
[39:46.370 --> 39:48.790]  But it's Al Capone's tax return, in my opinion.
[39:49.650 --> 39:50.230]  Thank you.
[39:50.370 --> 39:50.870]  And thank you for coming.
[39:50.870 --> 39:50.990]  My pleasure.
[39:51.110 --> 39:52.070]  I think Cheney's history.
[39:52.230 --> 39:54.370]  I think Grove decided that about six months ago.
[39:54.570 --> 39:58.490]  And now the only question is whether it's Gugliani or...
[39:59.550 --> 40:01.190]  I don't think it'll be Colin Powell.
[40:01.350 --> 40:01.970]  It's Gugliani.
[40:01.970 --> 40:03.130]  I don't think it'll be McCain.
[40:03.310 --> 40:07.610]  I think Gugliani right now, in my opinion, is the front runner for a mindless ticket.
[40:13.080 --> 40:13.660]  What's that?
[40:14.720 --> 40:15.700]  Torture doesn't work.
[40:16.620 --> 40:18.380]  Torture is farm boy, school boy stuff.
[40:20.580 --> 40:23.240]  That prison was grossly mismanaged.
[40:24.000 --> 40:25.720]  Now see, part of the problem with Iraq...
[40:26.220 --> 40:28.860]  I hate to say this, but I'm going to have to go to the bathroom again.
[40:30.200 --> 40:32.440]  See, I have a small gluttonous throat.
[40:32.600 --> 40:37.560]  And if I don't keep it constantly lubricated, it starts to collapse on itself and tickles and then I start to choke.
[40:37.560 --> 40:43.720]  And so one of the aspects of my life that is constant is imbibing normally water, but lots of fluids.
[40:47.980 --> 40:49.260]  Now, where were we?
[40:49.380 --> 40:50.600]  Because I wanted to... Oh, torture.
[40:52.300 --> 40:54.240]  Look, Rumsfeld screwed the U.S. government.
[40:54.800 --> 40:56.420]  He screwed the American public.
[40:56.740 --> 41:01.980]  Because he... First off, Chalabi, I think, was an Iranian agent of influence.
[41:01.980 --> 41:09.400]  And the Iranians are laughing their heads off because they pulled off the best strategic deception in our history.
[41:09.700 --> 41:16.660]  They got six really ignorant people to believe Chalabi, who had already been fired by CIA as a thief and a liar.
[41:17.200 --> 41:17.660]  Okay?
[41:17.960 --> 41:22.680]  And Chalabi, basically, when you're feeding false information, you feed what they want to hear.
[41:22.680 --> 41:30.720]  And so Chalabi fed these morons the hearts and flowers and flowers in the street and smiles and liberation, all that.
[41:30.940 --> 41:41.520]  So Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were deceived into thinking that Iraq would be a cakewalk and that we could do it light with precision munitions and limited numbers of ground troops.
[41:41.520 --> 41:47.640]  The military professionals told them in no uncertain terms that we needed massive...
[41:47.640 --> 41:50.760]  There's actually a standard number for an occupation army.
[41:50.940 --> 41:56.000]  And make no mistake about it, this was an occupation army, but it wasn't created as an occupation army.
[41:56.060 --> 41:57.080]  It wasn't staffed up.
[41:57.300 --> 42:02.740]  So having gone in and beat the crap out of them, we were then left literally naked and empty.
[42:02.740 --> 42:13.200]  And so Rumsfeld then had to make up for that with a massive influx of reservists who are not trained, equipped, and organized to actually be an occupying army.
[42:13.460 --> 42:16.380]  We broke the social contract with the National Guard.
[42:16.820 --> 42:24.380]  I mean, the deal with the National Guard is weekends and two weeks and, you know, once every 15 years you replace a body bag.
[42:25.100 --> 42:27.620]  But we broke the social contract with them.
[42:27.620 --> 42:38.660]  And so what Rumsfeld has done is put a whole bunch of untrained contractors and untrained reservists in place of the military professionals that, by the way, Clinton cut.
[42:39.560 --> 42:40.160]  Okay?
[42:40.500 --> 42:44.020]  The peace dividend actually gutted the Pentagon on the human side.
[42:44.560 --> 42:49.640]  And Rumsfeld at the same time did not fix the human shortfalls when he had his chance.
[42:49.640 --> 42:54.060]  He chose instead to spend $70 billion on weapons systems he still hasn't defined.
[42:55.100 --> 42:59.720]  Plus another $7 billion on missile defense, which is a bullet hitting a bullet in the sky.
[43:00.100 --> 43:00.660]  Okay?
[43:01.120 --> 43:01.920]  It ain't gonna happen.
[43:03.120 --> 43:07.880]  I mean, these guys are morons in practical, thoughtful terms.
[43:07.900 --> 43:11.540]  But they have some ideological world views that are just utterly amazing.
[43:11.860 --> 43:26.180]  And Chalabi literally sucked us into that war because the White House chose to turn off the diplomatic professionals, the intelligence professionals, even as ignorant as they were, the intelligence professionals had serious reservations about this.
[43:26.340 --> 43:29.860]  And the White House basically turned off the military, the diplomats, and the professionals.
[43:30.100 --> 43:32.160]  The media went on this witch hunt.
[43:33.200 --> 43:35.620]  Questioning the war was unpatriotic.
[43:36.040 --> 43:38.460]  And the stupid American public bought it.
[43:38.800 --> 43:40.160]  And Congress bought it.
[43:40.160 --> 43:42.800]  And a lot of us were trying to say, hey, wait a minute.
[43:43.020 --> 43:44.660]  You know, I mean, fully paid info ads.
[43:44.760 --> 43:47.180]  You look at my record on my website saying, this is nuts.
[43:49.200 --> 43:49.840]  Just terrible.
[43:50.320 --> 43:51.640]  Anyway, torture doesn't work.
[43:51.720 --> 43:52.680]  They'll tell you what you want to hear.
[43:52.820 --> 43:53.180]  Yes, sir.
[43:53.680 --> 43:54.000]  Hi.
[43:54.360 --> 43:55.540]  I'd like to ask...
[43:55.540 --> 44:02.760]  We've talked about this system, which we would use to catalog observations and items of intelligence from open sources.
[44:02.760 --> 44:07.260]  And I'd like to see if you could elaborate just a little more on whether...
[44:07.260 --> 44:12.700]  What items of information we could tag each of those observations with, which would make the system useful.
[44:12.760 --> 44:19.700]  And in what ways we could search and index that data so that it...
[44:19.700 --> 44:23.480]  How would that be designed so that this would be a good system?
[44:23.620 --> 44:30.540]  I don't have any of the final technical answers other than to say that, at a minimum, we should be doing XML, RSS-compliant stuff.
[44:30.540 --> 44:33.780]  It should have a date and time tag as well as a geospatial tag.
[44:33.980 --> 44:38.460]  It should have attributes for who collected it, who validated it for posting.
[44:39.740 --> 44:44.000]  If it's translated information, it should have a direct link back to the original.
[44:46.160 --> 44:48.720]  And I think, over time, this will work itself out.
[44:50.060 --> 44:50.500]  Okay.
[44:50.500 --> 44:52.360]  I'm going to have to stop and go to the bathroom.
[44:52.420 --> 44:56.000]  And I promise you three guys that it'll take no more than five minutes.
[44:56.240 --> 44:58.200]  And when I come back, I'll answer your questions.
[44:58.200 --> 45:00.580]  Can the staff handle the pins again?
[45:01.040 --> 45:02.700]  And then I'll be right back.
[45:02.900 --> 45:05.100]  Please, don't take one if you've already taken one.
[45:06.560 --> 45:08.040]  Where's the national pins?
[45:12.350 --> 45:13.730]  Considerably more than that.
[45:14.570 --> 45:23.210]  How frequent and what methods do you think are used by their handlers to make sure that their agents are still around and ready to go?
[45:23.210 --> 45:27.270]  And would you say that they have weapons now stored in the United States?
[45:27.270 --> 45:30.810]  And what type of facilities would you guess that they are stored in?
[45:31.590 --> 45:39.150]  Well, that's a little broad for me to give you a really definitive answer.
[45:39.150 --> 45:42.910]  But I would say that like the...
[45:42.910 --> 45:46.110]  Well, first off, they come into the country so easily.
[45:46.250 --> 45:48.330]  I mean, one of the 19 hijackers are...
[45:48.330 --> 45:50.010]  I can't remember all the details.
[45:50.210 --> 45:54.930]  But we're letting guys show up without a visa, without a passport, saying that they need asylum.
[45:55.350 --> 45:58.710]  We're interviewing them and letting them out on the street, never to be seen again.
[46:00.530 --> 46:03.890]  You know, we don't have real security here in the United States.
[46:04.570 --> 46:05.770]  We're very naive.
[46:06.490 --> 46:08.710]  And I think our regulations are...
[46:09.790 --> 46:11.550]  I mean, for me, it's simple.
[46:11.630 --> 46:13.370]  You want to visit the United States, you're a guest.
[46:13.410 --> 46:15.150]  You need a police check from your home country.
[46:15.530 --> 46:19.650]  And if enough of you end up being bad boys, we close the border to that country.
[46:21.150 --> 46:22.570]  For me, this is not hard.
[46:23.550 --> 46:25.150]  Obviously, there are a lot of politicians.
[46:25.390 --> 46:26.990]  There are a lot of corrupt deals going on.
[46:26.990 --> 46:30.550]  There's an enormous amount of Saudi money being channeled to every U.S. congressman and political figure of consequence.
[46:34.070 --> 46:38.330]  I mean, George Bush doesn't hold hands with just about everybody.
[46:38.530 --> 46:43.570]  He only holds hands with Saudi princes and the occasional Chinese tennis player coach.
[46:44.710 --> 46:50.310]  I'm told by the Dutch, by the way, a completely sober Dutch intelligence officer told me the Chinese have pictures.
[46:51.210 --> 47:02.010]  They got young George so drunk when he was a teenager in his father's house in Beijing that I think they got compromising pictures whether he was actually homosexually engaged or not.
[47:02.150 --> 47:02.870]  It looks like it.
[47:03.330 --> 47:07.710]  I don't know if this is true or not, but this is what a sober Dutch intelligence officer told me.
[47:09.250 --> 47:10.770]  So I just share this.
[47:10.770 --> 47:18.530]  I will also mention to you that John Kerry and others have been talking about Bush's hanging out with a notorious black drag queen at Harvard.
[47:19.470 --> 47:25.790]  And when Kerry says he knows Bush, I think he knows Bush in terms of drugs, alcohol, and drag queens.
[47:28.810 --> 47:33.410]  So whatever, I don't know what the truth is, but I think Bush is a walking lie.
[47:33.770 --> 47:36.910]  I mean, I think his faith is false.
[47:37.690 --> 47:39.450]  His mind is shallow.
[47:40.690 --> 47:45.370]  His heart is actually much more vicious and evil than people realize.
[47:46.090 --> 47:48.910]  And I think he is starting to become mentally unbalanced.
[47:50.210 --> 47:58.530]  And there are reports starting to emerge now on congressional newspapers about his staff being terrified that Bush is going to lose it before the election.
[47:59.210 --> 48:04.570]  For me, the ideal thing would be McCain, not Giuliani as vice president, and Bush goes nuts in January.
[48:06.110 --> 48:07.250]  You know, but we'll see.
[48:07.730 --> 48:08.290]  Yes, sir.
[48:09.450 --> 48:14.490]  So, what does a gay libertarian computer scientist do to get into the intelligence sector?
[48:15.830 --> 48:17.210]  Pretend to be a Pakistani.
[48:19.530 --> 48:20.550]  I've got the beard.
[48:21.030 --> 48:21.790]  Hey, no sweat.
[48:21.890 --> 48:23.530]  You can do it because they don't speak Arabic.
[48:23.910 --> 48:27.910]  Okay, so just pretend to be an educated Pakistani with really good gouge.
[48:29.970 --> 48:32.690]  You know, the libertarian is not an obstacle.
[48:32.890 --> 48:34.650]  Actually, the gay isn't an obstacle either.
[48:35.530 --> 48:43.590]  As long as you're declared gay and can't be blackmailed, these days I think they're relaxing that too.
[48:45.070 --> 48:48.810]  Where most people lose it is on habitual use of strong drugs.
[48:49.870 --> 48:52.730]  And if that's not an issue for you, I encourage you to apply.
[48:52.950 --> 48:54.130]  Ball soda's all right, right?
[48:54.290 --> 48:54.670]  What's that?
[48:54.810 --> 48:55.330]  Ball soda?
[48:55.470 --> 48:55.870]  That's okay?
[48:56.030 --> 48:57.010]  All the way to jolt.
[48:57.230 --> 48:57.510]  All right.
[49:02.630 --> 49:04.770]  Now, are you wearing panties or underpants?
[49:05.110 --> 49:05.570]  Nothing.
[49:09.410 --> 49:11.750]  You know, that's what Bill Clinton should have said.
[49:13.910 --> 49:15.750]  Which happens to be my answer also.
[49:16.170 --> 49:16.470]  Go ahead.
[49:17.570 --> 49:19.330]  First of all, thank you for coming out.
[49:19.430 --> 49:20.370]  Oh, it's my pleasure.
[49:20.570 --> 49:20.970]  I really appreciate it.
[49:21.250 --> 49:27.530]  You mentioned that you helped create open source intelligence agencies in multiple foreign countries.
[49:27.790 --> 49:27.810]  Right.
[49:27.810 --> 49:31.550]  I wanted to solicit more information out of you.
[49:33.210 --> 49:35.690]  Well, I've kind of started to forget the list.
[49:35.870 --> 49:40.010]  But basically what I do is I go in and I lecture and I catalyze.
[49:40.190 --> 49:44.130]  And then they throw me out of the country and do stuff and don't tell me about it.
[49:45.890 --> 49:49.570]  But among the best are the Swedish.
[49:50.010 --> 49:51.290]  I didn't help the Norwegians.
[49:51.410 --> 49:52.190]  They did it on their own.
[49:52.190 --> 49:53.710]  And everyone respects them enormously.
[49:54.030 --> 49:55.810]  The British military screwed it up.
[49:55.890 --> 49:57.690]  The Australians have three OSINT centers.
[49:57.910 --> 50:00.030]  A military, a law enforcement, and one other.
[50:01.550 --> 50:07.290]  And so basically I've just been going around since 1992 when I hosted this conference.
[50:07.290 --> 50:08.890]  I've trained over 7,000 people.
[50:09.670 --> 50:12.410]  And indirectly, probably another 21,000.
[50:13.650 --> 50:21.010]  And in fact, one of my favorite photos in my office is of a Ukrainian military officer standing next to a computer which has my website on it.
[50:22.110 --> 50:30.970]  One of my State Department running buddies was in the Ukraine and they brought him in as a diplomat and they said, this is what we use, open sources.
[50:31.330 --> 50:32.690]  And it was my website.
[50:32.890 --> 50:34.790]  And so he took a picture and gave it to me.
[50:34.790 --> 50:38.970]  And I've been told that I've influenced people around the world that I have no clue exist.
[50:40.310 --> 50:47.450]  Part of the problem is that the conventional bureaucracies in all of these countries are fighting open source intelligence.
[50:47.830 --> 50:50.870]  Like real men or real spies don't do open source intelligence.
[50:51.210 --> 50:58.110]  I was having a semi-clandestine meeting in France with the colonel in charge of French open source intelligence for General Heinrich.
[50:58.610 --> 51:00.690]  I've spoken in the French Senate twice.
[51:03.790 --> 51:07.550]  And he said to me, Mr. Steele, I can't get them to take open source seriously.
[51:07.550 --> 51:08.870]  I said, look, here's what we're going to do.
[51:09.530 --> 51:12.270]  We're going to have a cover sheet, code word Oscar Sierra.
[51:12.510 --> 51:17.390]  And it's going to have super top secret and more color code hashes for compartment and things.
[51:17.490 --> 51:22.730]  And we're going to announce that only the top ten people in France can read this special new code word.
[51:23.490 --> 51:27.290]  And the colonel looked at me and says, Mr. Steele, that's a very French solution.
[51:30.270 --> 51:31.970]  So, you know, we have our obstacles.
[51:31.990 --> 51:37.630]  I actually feel closer to my KGB counterparts than I do to the FBI or to the White House or to anybody else in the U.S. government.
[51:38.630 --> 51:42.050]  Intelligence professionals around the world are very similar in many ways.
[51:42.050 --> 51:46.070]  They have similar mindsets, similar cultures, similar attitudes, and similar obstacles to reform.
[51:48.230 --> 51:50.510]  Unrelated questions, since you mentioned it recently.
[51:50.750 --> 51:58.930]  Could you talk about your knowledge of the Saudi investment in the United States and the role that it's playing in our...
[51:58.930 --> 52:00.230]  Ripe for nationalization.
[52:00.230 --> 52:00.310]  That's a huge medical situation.
[52:01.390 --> 52:03.990]  I would never have let Bin Laden's relatives get out of town.
[52:04.130 --> 52:06.110]  That, to me, was an absolutely corrupt act.
[52:12.310 --> 52:12.670]  measuring the basta-mii assembly.
[52:12.670 --> 52:18.970]  There's a friendly white collar prison in Connecticut that I would have asked them all to stay at, for a couple of weeks.
[52:20.530 --> 52:21.650]  Or shoot the plane down.
[52:21.810 --> 52:22.350]  So sorry.
[52:25.050 --> 52:27.910]  You know, I mean, what better target, as long as they're all there?
[52:31.630 --> 52:32.890]  I've forgotten your question again.
[52:33.990 --> 52:44.150]  I want to find out the general effect, in your view, of the immense amount of money that is invested in this country by the Saudis.
[52:44.370 --> 52:46.390]  And what do you think...
[52:48.310 --> 52:49.610]  I think the U.S. has prostituted itself in multiple ways.
[52:53.370 --> 53:02.870]  You know, Robert Bayer's books are the best on this, and he ends his book Sleeping with the Devil talking about the Saudi corruption of America.
[53:02.890 --> 53:09.870]  He says, America is lying there on the bed with her legs spread, looking at the Saudi wallet on the bureau.
[53:11.270 --> 53:12.490]  Great way to end the book.
[53:12.970 --> 53:13.970]  We've sold out.
[53:14.090 --> 53:15.170]  We've lost our integrity.
[53:15.370 --> 53:21.850]  And we've lost our integrity because our citizens are allowing politicians to make decisions based on money rather than intelligence.
[53:22.710 --> 53:24.250]  You know, this is real simple.
[53:24.470 --> 53:27.690]  You know, we have to take back this government or we're screwed.
[53:28.250 --> 53:29.230]  It's that simple.
[53:29.970 --> 53:32.810]  And unfortunately, John Kerry doesn't seem to get it.
[53:33.870 --> 53:39.350]  I mean, I think because he knows Bush so well from Harvard, I think he's delusional.
[53:39.610 --> 53:46.470]  And I also think that the Republicans are willing to use everything, including assassination, to keep power.
[53:46.470 --> 53:47.830]  I'm serious.
[53:50.390 --> 53:54.190]  I believe that the Republicans have violated the laws in the past.
[53:54.610 --> 54:01.710]  The head of the electronic voting company has told Bush publicly at a fundraiser that he guarantees Bush will win the election.
[54:03.650 --> 54:08.130]  That may or may not have been partly in jest, but this whole electronic voting thing is a mess.
[54:10.470 --> 54:15.370]  I believe that if it's Democratic base against Republican base, the Republicans win.
[54:16.030 --> 54:26.550]  And John Kerry has one shot at winning, and that's by being a dog catcher and making electoral reform the number one issue and by announcing a coalition cabinet in advance.
[54:26.550 --> 54:30.230]  And we're creating a new post for Jello, Minister of Culture.
[54:32.610 --> 54:33.530]  Thank you.
[54:37.990 --> 54:38.650]  Thanks.
[54:38.650 --> 54:40.850]  This question is a little off the wall, but I've always been curious.
[54:41.830 --> 54:48.790]  With the collapse of the Soviet Union, what happened to the numerous sleeper agents that were no doubt present in the United States?
[54:49.230 --> 54:52.850]  Don't underestimate the competence of the Soviet KGB.
[54:53.850 --> 55:02.010]  In fact, Oleg Kalugin, who is a retired KGB officer in charge of the first directorate, has written a book.
[55:02.710 --> 55:05.170]  And he was also elected to the Republican parliament.
[55:05.170 --> 55:10.990]  And one of the points he made was that he was using open source intelligence as a substitute for agent recruitments.
[55:11.670 --> 55:14.310]  By and large, I think the Soviets were largely ineffective.
[55:14.670 --> 55:20.110]  Now, where they may have had some success was with immigrants and people like that.
[55:21.230 --> 55:22.070]  But you know what?
[55:22.150 --> 55:31.150]  The problem with spying is you actually have to know what you're looking for, and you have to have access to what it is you're looking for, and you have to be able to take it back and make sense of it.
[55:31.150 --> 55:35.890]  It's a lot easier to make sense of the world if you get your act together in open sources first.
[55:36.350 --> 55:36.970]  You know?
[55:37.130 --> 55:39.890]  And then do very selective clandestine stuff.
[55:46.640 --> 55:50.900]  I don't know if the Soviets have many sleepers.
[55:50.980 --> 55:53.840]  They probably have some around the national labs and things like that.
[55:53.840 --> 56:05.940]  But by and large, I think they're focusing more on domestic internal security and eliminating the Tatars and the Chechnyans than they are on us.
[56:06.660 --> 56:24.760]  A friend once theorized to me that since the Soviet Union has no doubt had the technology to build things like suitcase nukes for many years, what are the chances that Soviet operatives were present in the United States for some long period of time during the 1980s with such devices?
[56:24.780 --> 56:26.740]  I would say very, very, very high.
[56:27.560 --> 56:33.820]  And two-thirds of the hundred suitcase nukes are unaccounted for according to a Soviet Major General.
[56:34.860 --> 56:36.460]  Where is that information available?
[56:36.460 --> 56:37.380]  I can't remember.
[56:37.540 --> 56:38.960]  It's in one of the many books I've read.
[56:39.540 --> 56:46.340]  But two-thirds of the Soviet nuclear bombs are unaccounted for according to the Soviets.
[56:46.600 --> 56:47.100]  Thank you.
[56:47.340 --> 56:47.800]  My pleasure.
[56:48.300 --> 56:48.980]  Yes, sir.
[56:49.540 --> 56:59.080]  By the way, I expect one will go off in Australia at the same time that bin Laden hijacks a Pakistani nuclear armed sub and takes out the Bahrain headquarters.
[56:59.320 --> 57:00.300]  Have a nice day.
[57:01.560 --> 57:01.840]  Okay.
[57:02.180 --> 57:04.800]  I have three spy story questions.
[57:04.800 --> 57:07.180]  Hopefully, they will be fun stuff.
[57:07.880 --> 57:15.960]  First of all, there was a book out last year about a spy, I believe, named John O'Neill.
[57:16.140 --> 57:20.940]  The book was, if I remember correctly, The Man Who Warned America.
[57:21.240 --> 57:32.260]  In that, it mentioned that American spies who are on foreign land depend upon American foreign embassies.
[57:32.260 --> 57:36.740]  And the ambassador over there for the security and information.
[57:37.260 --> 57:54.220]  But there have been cases where those foreign ambassadors, in the name of maintaining foreign relationships, have been an obstacle to the spies who were working on the foreign land.
[57:54.220 --> 57:57.480]  And I want to know about if you have had any such encounters.
[57:58.420 --> 57:59.740]  It's a two-way street.
[58:00.700 --> 58:09.680]  We have some politically appointed morons as ambassadors who don't appreciate the few positive things that spying can do.
[58:09.680 --> 58:18.040]  But we also have some very arrogant, ignorant chiefs of station who deceive and manipulate ambassadors.
[58:19.180 --> 58:20.580]  It's all human nature.
[58:20.820 --> 58:26.760]  I think we can dramatically improve our foreign service by dramatically increasing their money and their numbers.
[58:27.160 --> 58:30.500]  One of the problems we've had is we've eliminated all the secretaries in embassies.
[58:30.500 --> 58:34.700]  So the junior foreign service officer is now a very expensive secretary.
[58:35.720 --> 58:37.380]  The whole system is broken.
[58:38.100 --> 58:49.200]  I would like to have a university of a republic, a university of the republic, where all seven tribes send their best and their brightest to train at the entry, mid-management, and CEO level.
[58:49.200 --> 58:52.260]  And I would like to have interagency training classes.
[58:52.600 --> 59:02.180]  So that for any given country, let's say Sudan, once a year, there is a conference and an ongoing continuing education for every person in the U.S. government touching Sudan.
[59:03.800 --> 59:08.420]  And they all come together and they actually walk away with a roster of who's doing what in Sudan.
[59:08.640 --> 59:12.440]  And then you can extend that to have a more select group that does the seven tribes.
[59:12.440 --> 59:25.980]  So for example, the European conflict prevent... ECCP, European something conflict prevention, is now starting to produce guidebooks to all of the NGO programs country by country.
[59:26.320 --> 59:27.940]  No one's ever done that before.
[59:28.580 --> 59:29.760]  So we're getting there.
[59:29.860 --> 59:31.200]  The Internet is making a lot possible.
[59:31.360 --> 59:33.060]  One more question very quickly, not three.
[59:33.680 --> 59:34.200]  Okay.
[59:35.660 --> 59:36.780]  Tell us...

[00:01.280 --> 00:05.760]  Pablo Escobar's accountant, who was my next-door neighbor.
[00:05.860 --> 00:06.260]  A story.
[00:07.040 --> 00:07.440]  What?
[00:07.780 --> 00:10.040]  A story, like, how did you do it?
[00:10.160 --> 00:13.080]  Some story, like a novel or a movie, you know?
[00:13.540 --> 00:14.960]  A spy story, come on.
[00:16.140 --> 00:16.960]  All right, all right.
[00:16.960 --> 00:17.900]  Come on, a spy story.
[00:17.900 --> 00:18.960]  Okay, all right, well.
[00:19.980 --> 00:23.100]  The best time to do an audio op is when they're building the building.
[00:23.760 --> 00:31.360]  And so you have a construction worker who basically pulls out the sample tiles and then we prepare two or three.
[00:31.780 --> 00:34.980]  And then they're installed as the tiling is being installed.
[00:35.900 --> 00:36.700]  It works.
[00:39.260 --> 00:52.600]  One of the constant problems we have is when you do install an audio device, you have to find an appropriate place to put the listening post because you have path loss, you know, limitations, depending on the neighborhood and the environment.
[00:52.760 --> 00:54.280]  So that's the second part of the challenge.
[00:55.060 --> 01:06.820]  The third part of the challenge is getting a listener transcriber who can be trusted to be attentive and yet filter out the 99% of the stuff that's garbage.
[01:07.740 --> 01:13.500]  You know, for every hour of tape, you're going to get, at best, five minutes of useful information if you're really lucky.
[01:13.720 --> 01:14.800]  It's closer to one minute.
[01:16.420 --> 01:18.540]  Good spying is very labor-intensive.
[01:20.420 --> 01:23.180]  Good spying requires really excellent targeting.
[01:23.460 --> 01:27.020]  And most spying today is not worth the money we're paying for it.
[01:29.360 --> 01:30.380]  Another story.
[01:30.880 --> 01:38.620]  The last thing you want to do in the middle of the night in a country with trigger-happy policemen is run a roadblock at two in the morning.
[01:40.660 --> 01:41.660]  In alias.
[01:41.980 --> 01:43.760]  In a car rented in alias.
[01:44.300 --> 01:48.260]  But it helps if you've broken the rules and still have your diplomatic passport with you.
[01:50.780 --> 01:52.980]  And so I got out of a scrape there.
[01:53.700 --> 01:59.760]  My worst experience as a spy, I was responsible for penetrating the extreme left in El Salvador.
[02:00.540 --> 02:07.020]  And the colonels in charge of the country thought that I was a leftist sympathizer and threatened to kill me.
[02:07.800 --> 02:15.040]  It really causes you concern when the colonels in charge of a third world country have come to you and said, we're going to kill you.
[02:16.220 --> 02:26.060]  And so I went underground and got an administrative message from the CIA a day later saying, we're already paying for your house.
[02:26.780 --> 02:29.580]  We can't pay for a hotel at the same time.
[02:30.020 --> 02:34.460]  And we sent back a message, what part of assassination don't you understand?
[02:35.840 --> 02:37.340]  You know, so that was scary.
[02:38.380 --> 02:41.780]  By and large, I think spying is like being a cop.
[02:42.040 --> 02:44.620]  I mean, it's 90% boredom and 10% terror.
[02:45.940 --> 02:50.780]  And usually the terror is being induced for the wrong reasons today.
[02:52.000 --> 02:53.700]  There are some pretty good things.
[02:54.200 --> 02:59.480]  I think some of the spying that we did on the Soviet Union in theory saved us billions and billions of dollars.
[02:59.480 --> 03:05.560]  There's no question in my mind that CIA has paid for itself with its occasional successes.
[03:06.840 --> 03:19.120]  But by and large, unfortunately, too much of spying today is about cocktail parties and false recruitments and playing the numbers game and reporting stuff that's completely out of context.
[03:20.640 --> 03:22.160]  I actually did an assessment.
[03:22.780 --> 03:26.180]  I was responsible for counterintelligence against a denied area target.
[03:26.700 --> 03:32.980]  And I did an assessment of where that target was present all over the world and then how well we had done against it.
[03:33.780 --> 03:35.200]  Nobody was paying attention to it.
[03:35.280 --> 03:37.480]  Nobody was being held accountable for that stuff.
[03:38.160 --> 03:41.140]  Another true story, just to show you how bad our records are.
[03:41.660 --> 03:44.840]  When I took over that account, I said, all right, give me a list of all the people we know.
[03:44.840 --> 03:46.760]  And they came back with 200 names.
[03:46.880 --> 03:47.940]  I said, this can't be right.
[03:48.240 --> 03:51.460]  I've reported this many just in one tour from one place.
[03:51.920 --> 03:55.220]  So we hired an annuitant to go through all the hard copy files.
[03:55.520 --> 03:59.040]  We ended up, instead of 200 names, we ended up with 3,200 names.
[03:59.620 --> 04:05.940]  So then we asked ourselves, why is it that 3,000 of these names haven't been indexed?
[04:05.940 --> 04:06.960]  So we go down in the basement.
[04:07.100 --> 04:18.020]  Well, it turns out the weak link in CIA is the GS1 barely high school educated clerks responsible for transferring information from messages into the microfiche.
[04:18.600 --> 04:22.620]  So at the end of every CIA message, we say, field message, we say, index all names.
[04:22.900 --> 04:35.300]  And so these girls, all of whom had a chip on their shoulder, an attitude for being very poorly paid and basically doing this work, if a message said index all names and it had one to three names on it, they'd do it.
[04:35.300 --> 04:44.180]  If it were a prisoner or a defector interrogation and it had 50 or 100 names, they'd say shit and move it to the outbox without processing it.
[04:44.700 --> 04:47.980]  That's the weak link in our national intelligence community.
[04:48.140 --> 04:49.640]  The same problem exists at the FBI.
[04:52.160 --> 04:53.540]  What's another spy story?
[04:54.160 --> 04:55.580]  Well, another spy story.
[04:55.660 --> 04:57.500]  And this actually goes to this incompetence thing.
[04:57.620 --> 05:02.880]  We captured a terrorist once and the National Guard did us the favor of beating him into a bloody pulp.
[05:04.700 --> 05:13.620]  And came up to me with 50 names of his contacts, PLO contacts, all the way down from Canada through Latin America.
[05:13.920 --> 05:16.140]  So we sent a night action to the FBI.
[05:16.300 --> 05:19.560]  This was considered a very high priority potential plot kind of thing.
[05:19.560 --> 05:22.880]  And the FBI came back immediately with no traces.
[05:24.540 --> 05:27.820]  Well, 80% of the FBI's information is in paper form.
[05:28.380 --> 05:31.660]  And I know they didn't call someone in to go through the paper at night.
[05:31.840 --> 05:36.700]  So it took me two weeks to get the legal attaché to send in the traces if it were his own.
[05:36.700 --> 05:42.700]  And they came back with a three-page arrest report in the United States and the fact that he'd been expelled from Canada.
[05:43.280 --> 05:43.780]  Okay?
[05:44.080 --> 05:48.080]  I was one of the two officers assigned terrorism a full-time target at that time.
[05:48.140 --> 05:55.060]  And the FBI was basically telling the CIA, stick it in your ear, we don't really care about supporting you on terrorism.
[05:55.840 --> 05:56.340]  Okay?
[05:56.900 --> 05:57.700]  Next person.
[05:58.720 --> 05:59.240]  Thank you.
[05:59.840 --> 06:00.160]  Wait.
[06:00.260 --> 06:01.220]  Haven't you already asked a question?
[06:01.460 --> 06:03.040]  I did ask one before, but...
[06:03.040 --> 06:03.160]  All right.
[06:03.280 --> 06:04.820]  Let's get someone who hasn't asked one before.
[06:08.090 --> 06:08.510]  All right.
[06:08.550 --> 06:08.970]  I'll tell you what.
[06:09.090 --> 06:09.630]  You just...
[06:09.630 --> 06:10.430]  All right.
[06:10.430 --> 06:10.770]  All right.
[06:10.770 --> 06:10.870]  All right.
[06:10.870 --> 06:11.410]  It's a quick one.
[06:11.530 --> 06:13.850]  It's not like asking somebody to say stories for half an hour.
[06:14.930 --> 06:19.950]  What do you think is the plausibility of this story that's...
[06:19.950 --> 06:23.830]  or the premise of this story that's being reported in the New Republic, I think?
[06:23.830 --> 06:40.650]  I think that four high-ranking Pakistani intelligence officials were being pressured by the White House to capture Bin Laden before the election, but more specifically during the week of the Democratic National Convention.
[06:41.270 --> 07:02.890]  I don't know if they cut it that close, but I have from multiple open sources that the original plan was that the Pakistanis would capture Bin Laden and would turn him over covertly southwest of Jalalabad in Afghanistan in the late July timeframe for the purpose of making it appear that the U.S. had caught him and not alienating the Muslims.
[07:05.370 --> 07:09.770]  I have new separate open sources that say that Pakistan is reconsidering the deal.
[07:10.670 --> 07:15.550]  And basically, Bin Laden is one of two heroes in Pakistan.
[07:15.550 --> 07:17.070]  The other one is the nuclear guy.
[07:18.070 --> 07:26.010]  And I think the Americans are extremely naive and foolish to believe that Bin Laden will be turned over by Pakistan.
[07:26.210 --> 07:52.330]  I do believe that shortly after the Pakistanis started bulldozing villages in the Waziristan area, which I'm intimately familiar with from open source work that we've done, down to tribal studies and biographies with photos of village elders, I do believe that the Pakistanis very quickly took protective possession of Bin Laden after they started bulldozing the villages.
[07:52.630 --> 08:03.150]  I believe my personal speculation is that he is in a very comfortable guest house in Pakistan as an honored guest of the Pakistani government.
[08:03.310 --> 08:10.330]  His lieutenants are being allowed to fly freely in and out of Pakistan on commercial aircraft without any interruption.
[08:11.470 --> 08:16.370]  I don't know for sure, but Howard Bloom has a multi-person research effort going.
[08:16.590 --> 08:22.310]  The Pakistanis have three French Aegis submarines that are nuclear potential.
[08:22.850 --> 08:26.690]  And the Pakistanis have only been building nuclear missiles for submarines.
[08:26.950 --> 08:47.470]  And Howard is very carefully examining, and I have shared this with the Chief of Naval Operations, very carefully examining the possibility that the radical elements of the Pakistani military and the ISI have already agreed to let Bin Laden hijack one of these submarines and get far enough out past Sri Lanka to be able to nuke Bahrain.
[08:48.770 --> 08:54.110]  I think we are extremely foolish if we underestimate Bin Laden's strategic genius.
[08:55.470 --> 08:56.030]  Thank you.
[08:58.070 --> 08:58.710]  Two questions.
[08:59.130 --> 09:09.730]  First one is, I heard a story about how when the U.S. Embassy was built in, or I can't remember if it was multiple, but the U.S. Embassy built in Russia, the problem was you couldn't import all the materials in, so you had to mine it locally.
[09:09.730 --> 09:10.650]  Oh, they wired the place.
[09:10.730 --> 09:11.330]  Oh, yeah, that's what I was saying.
[09:11.390 --> 09:13.630]  Because I heard they put in like random transistors and stuff in all of them.
[09:13.630 --> 09:14.870]  Yeah, but the Chinese did it better.
[09:15.350 --> 09:18.290]  The Chinese knew we had metal detectors, so they used ceramics.
[09:18.710 --> 09:19.830]  And they vibrate or so?
[09:19.830 --> 09:20.930]  Oh, it's amazing.
[09:20.930 --> 09:24.090]  I mean, you know, a ceramic channel from here to there.
[09:24.570 --> 09:27.330]  And then there's a little Chinese guy squatting down there listening.
[09:27.490 --> 09:27.610]  No.
[09:27.850 --> 09:29.650]  Actually, if you read...
[09:29.650 --> 09:30.650]  I'm serious.
[09:30.790 --> 09:31.110]  They did.
[09:31.170 --> 09:31.970]  It was masterful.
[09:32.090 --> 09:32.890]  They did ceramics.
[09:33.190 --> 09:44.150]  But if you read Jim Bamford's book, Body of Secrets, or I think it's Body of Secrets, he talks about the 5,000-person North Vietnamese signals intelligence group.
[09:44.310 --> 09:56.230]  And these people were digging tunnels up under the G3 sections of Benoit Air Base and other places, and they were actually sending a North Vietnamese guy fluent in English to camp under the G3 shop.
[09:57.210 --> 09:59.270]  And I have never met a U.S. general that is actually willing to use an encrypted phone.
[10:02.870 --> 10:05.090]  These guys define arrogance.
[10:05.390 --> 10:13.510]  And so they're all blowing all these missions in the clear and having conversations from their generals, helicopters, and things like that.
[10:13.690 --> 10:17.950]  The North Vietnamese beat our ass in part because they had really superior signals intelligence.
[10:19.030 --> 10:22.250]  The other one is I remember listening earlier when you were saying about...
[10:22.250 --> 10:27.710]  I guess you were half-jokingly saying about how you probably have a picture of all of us and whatnot.
[10:27.710 --> 10:39.010]  And I was wondering whether or not you did it, how would you go along about getting everyone's photo here, background information, what would you do to bug the entire place or track everyone's conversation?
[10:39.010 --> 10:39.990]  It wouldn't be worth it.
[10:40.310 --> 10:45.410]  Well, but in theory that you did it, not worth it or not, what would you do?
[10:45.590 --> 10:46.770]  And then back into the process.
[10:46.950 --> 10:49.550]  Well, in theory, there's a camera in one of these grills.
[10:49.890 --> 10:54.010]  And there's a guy in a remote collection who's systematically taking each of your pictures.
[10:54.710 --> 10:56.770]  Then there's a program called Face Trace.
[10:56.890 --> 11:02.590]  And we just run that against all the DMV records and try and get some matches there.
[11:02.590 --> 11:04.570]  We check all the hotel records in the area.
[11:06.130 --> 11:08.550]  We have two or three surveillance that are, you know...
[11:08.550 --> 11:10.310]  I mean, you guys got to change colors, you know.
[11:10.410 --> 11:11.430]  Black is kind of obvious.
[11:12.870 --> 11:14.110]  Okay, yeah, he's undercover.
[11:15.730 --> 11:26.090]  You know, and I think within a couple of weeks, over the course of six years, you know, it would be a fairly simple matter to have a directory.
[11:26.090 --> 11:27.710]  But I don't think it's really that worth it.
[11:27.930 --> 11:29.830]  At least ten of you are agents for the U.S. government.
[11:31.630 --> 11:38.750]  So, you know, honest to God, one of the neat things about my life is that I'm a spy who can say it doesn't work.
[11:39.250 --> 11:39.730]  Okay?
[11:39.990 --> 11:43.070]  And that's what makes me cool about open source intelligence.
[11:43.070 --> 11:45.590]  I'm not a librarian saying, please use the library.
[11:47.310 --> 11:51.190]  And so, it really wouldn't be worthwhile.
[11:51.230 --> 11:53.850]  As a matter of fact, I think I've said this before.
[11:53.850 --> 11:55.390]  In fact, it wasn't here.
[11:55.770 --> 11:58.850]  But at one of the first InfowarCons, I debated...
[12:00.570 --> 12:03.170]  Might even have been... I don't think it was Vint Cerf.
[12:03.310 --> 12:04.230]  But it might have been Vint Cerf.
[12:04.290 --> 12:10.190]  I debated someone on the question of, are hackers pathological scum or a national resource?
[12:11.470 --> 12:17.610]  And I think the group, which was 50% government, 50% hackers, I think divided in an even tie.
[12:18.830 --> 12:22.410]  But one of the things that I believe is that hackers are a national resource.
[12:22.410 --> 12:26.650]  And I think that the government fears...
[12:32.240 --> 12:36.580]  I'm doing that just so you won't put ice cubes in my air conditioner duct, like you did the first year.
[12:39.140 --> 12:42.240]  But, you know, the government fears what it doesn't understand.
[12:42.820 --> 12:50.440]  And the government doesn't understand most of the world, including its own domestic issues and potentials.
[12:51.020 --> 12:51.720]  Next person.
[12:51.820 --> 12:52.400]  Thank you so much.
[12:53.700 --> 12:55.200]  I'm going to actually ask a question.
[12:55.280 --> 12:55.740]  May I ask another?
[12:56.000 --> 12:56.300]  Yeah.
[12:56.580 --> 12:56.820]  All right.
[12:57.740 --> 12:59.380]  You discussed Sudan several times.
[12:59.520 --> 13:00.280]  You at least brought it up.
[13:00.560 --> 13:05.240]  And I studied Sudan quite a bit for a political science class on the way to my math degree.
[13:05.440 --> 13:07.760]  Did you read White Nile, Black Blood?
[13:08.240 --> 13:08.660]  No.
[13:08.880 --> 13:09.740]  And I probably should have.
[13:09.920 --> 13:13.800]  In fact, I ended up not doing... the research I thought was pretty good, in retrospect, not so great.
[13:13.980 --> 13:20.530]  But I found my best resource for current events was rather than news or any public source...
[13:21.830 --> 13:22.870]  I will take more.
[13:22.990 --> 13:23.270]  Thank you.
[13:23.590 --> 13:23.870]  Go on.
[13:24.010 --> 13:30.110]  NGOs like Human Rights Watch, they seem to have people on the ground really watching who's being hurt today, if nothing else.
[13:30.610 --> 13:33.410]  Do you find them to be a useful resource in the intelligence community?
[13:33.410 --> 13:35.430]  Like anything else... you know, it's funny.
[13:35.590 --> 13:40.930]  I was not a good economics student, but I learned I could always get A's on my comparative economics exam.
[13:40.930 --> 13:49.610]  Because whenever the question is, should you use the market model or the command model for this problem, the answer is always a little of each or both.
[13:51.610 --> 13:53.410]  NGOs are mixed.
[13:54.670 --> 14:00.750]  First off, some NGO people are extremely acutely sensitive, aware, informed, and knowledgeable.
[14:02.670 --> 14:07.830]  However, a large number of them are young people that are very stupid and like to drink beer.
[14:08.930 --> 14:11.250]  And so there's an NGO party culture.
[14:12.310 --> 14:14.210]  And a lot of these people... thank you.
[14:14.690 --> 14:16.970]  You know, a lot of these people are out of touch.
[14:17.230 --> 14:23.410]  They're just basically there to be a glorified Peace Corps person and have something to talk to and they're unemployable anywhere else.
[14:24.790 --> 14:31.370]  So like anything else, every single organization, every single group of people is a mixed bag.
[14:31.370 --> 14:36.170]  And a big part of the human challenge is figuring out which ones actually know what they're talking about.
[14:36.450 --> 14:40.710]  For example, for Indonesia, I have an Australian Army Corporal that calls around to the NGOs.
[14:40.730 --> 14:47.010]  And he's got a list of people that basically have proven knowledgeable and are willing to talk.
[14:47.130 --> 14:51.310]  And he chats them up in Indonesian from Australia.
[14:51.810 --> 14:52.310]  Okay?
[14:52.570 --> 14:52.890]  Thank you.
[14:52.890 --> 14:53.870]  Yes, sir.
[14:54.030 --> 14:56.110]  I think we're going to stop here in about four minutes.
[14:57.070 --> 14:58.110]  I'll try to make these quick.
[14:58.330 --> 15:00.850]  Also, they may not be within your expertise.
[15:01.470 --> 15:02.870]  This year, the U.S. Navy has done something unusual where they've actually gotten 10 of their 12 carrier groups out into sea all at the same time.
[15:10.210 --> 15:15.990]  Seven of them, which are patrolling around the Pacific right now, you want to speculate any ideas what they might be doing?
[15:18.270 --> 15:19.230]  I'll speculate.
[15:21.350 --> 15:23.970]  I don't think Taiwan is going to become a flashpoint.
[15:24.110 --> 15:26.790]  I think Bush is vulnerable on a number of fronts.
[15:28.130 --> 15:30.710]  And I don't think we want to pick a fight with China right now.
[15:33.270 --> 15:36.530]  But addressing the Taiwan thing with the presence is one of them.
[15:37.610 --> 15:43.250]  Providing platforms for special forces insertion from offshore and visible points is another one.
[15:44.290 --> 15:48.570]  There is real concern about the Philippines and Indonesia exploding.
[15:48.870 --> 15:52.010]  The Straits of Malacca is a disaster waiting to happen.
[15:53.190 --> 15:57.670]  But I also think that the Navy leadership has been very ineffective.
[16:00.330 --> 16:09.250]  I believe the minimal Navy that the United States needs is 450 ships, including a humanitarian assistance fleet and a brown water fleet.
[16:12.750 --> 16:16.610]  And the U.S. Navy Admirals are making do with 320 ships of the wrong size.
[16:17.990 --> 16:22.710]  And as a result, we're six days away from anywhere because of that.
[16:22.890 --> 16:27.270]  Well, I guess what's bothering me about the whole thing is it's actually a very difficult thing to do, even for the United States Navy.
[16:27.270 --> 16:27.470]  Sure it is.
[16:27.470 --> 16:31.810]  We're supposed to have one out, one in cycle, and one back.
[16:31.810 --> 16:32.150]  Yeah.
[16:32.870 --> 16:35.490]  I mean, it's a very costly thing to do.
[16:35.850 --> 16:39.110]  They've decided they're going to do this now, over the summer.
[16:39.670 --> 16:45.130]  And then just, it doesn't seem like they're just going out there just to make sure that the Straits of Malacca...
[16:45.130 --> 16:46.290]  I have no special knowledge.
[16:46.630 --> 16:46.990]  Okay.
[16:48.230 --> 16:52.870]  Well, the last question is also made me not be in your expertise.
[16:52.870 --> 17:10.390]  I guess I don't quite understand why, I guess, the United States government is so heavy in terms of, you know, arranging their navy around carrier groups, where, you know, if they were going to be using a major action, say, against China or something like that,
[17:10.670 --> 17:15.170]  basically a couple of sea-skimming missiles with tactical nukes could take out...
[17:15.170 --> 17:21.370]  Carriers provide the fastest, most efficient way of transferring money from your pocket to the military industrial complex.
[17:22.430 --> 17:23.430]  Thank you.
[17:25.950 --> 17:33.050]  Would you say that Saddam Hussein was tracked down and captured the way it was reported in the media?
[17:33.330 --> 17:37.790]  Or were there other entities involved that were not disclosed in the media?
[17:39.390 --> 17:54.630]  I don't have special or privileged knowledge, but all of the reporting that I'm seeing, including informal emails from Special Forces people in Iraq, are that the national intelligence community had nothing to do with capturing Saddam Hussein.
[17:54.950 --> 18:14.030]  This was, in fact, some very talented reservists that moved I-2, the link analysis program, into the field, and they were on top of every person being debriefed, and they cross-hatched Saddam's family network, which was already known, with defector reports on sightings and other things,
[18:14.270 --> 18:17.730]  and they basically were able to get into the general area.
[18:18.230 --> 18:22.570]  And then Saddam's guards freaked out and abandoned him, and they're running away.
[18:22.830 --> 18:24.050]  They completely missed it.
[18:24.110 --> 18:25.190]  They were at the wrong place.
[18:25.310 --> 18:31.510]  And then when the guards bolted, they drew the attention of the special unit to this little place.
[18:31.510 --> 18:36.690]  And then, God bless the alert military guy that realized that he had a Styrofoam fake cover.
[18:36.870 --> 18:40.210]  Had the guards done a better job of covering it up, I don't think we would have found them.
[18:41.390 --> 18:43.930]  Very, very expensive manhunt.
[18:44.290 --> 18:44.970]  Yes, sir?
[18:46.550 --> 18:53.530]  This is a more generic question, but it's obvious what you think of the current administration.
[18:54.970 --> 19:20.810]  But do you think that currently the combination of the liberal media, like Fahrenheit 9-11, Air America Radio, all the publications and books that have come out recently that have been more, I would say, bipartisan than usual, all of a sudden, will have the effect that you would like to see in the next election?
[19:20.810 --> 19:22.550]  The short answer is no.
[19:23.890 --> 19:32.110]  If I were John Kerry, I would be cutting the spines off every single one of those books and massively indexing them and then visualizing all of that information.
[19:32.350 --> 19:35.550]  I would have a grand vision for coalition government.
[19:35.550 --> 19:48.650]  I would have a grand vision for very specific solutions for each of no fewer than 21 issues, say seven national security, seven domestic, seven electoral privacy, constitutional issues.
[19:49.470 --> 19:51.170]  And I'd be somewhat organized.
[19:51.630 --> 19:55.170]  I think Kerry is the last loser of the Clinton era.
[19:56.130 --> 20:07.190]  Between his staff and his advisors and his mediocre information technology, I am receiving absolutely abysmal crap from his campaign.
[20:07.190 --> 20:21.530]  I got a washed-out, badly-printed selection of quotes on national security from John, and some 12-year-old girl had written at the bottom, Dear Robert, I know you're concerned about national security.
[20:21.530 --> 20:23.970]  Here's some information that bears on your interests.
[20:24.250 --> 20:25.110]  Love, Angela.
[20:25.630 --> 20:26.150]  Excuse me.
[20:26.310 --> 20:26.890]  F*ck me.
[20:28.030 --> 20:39.370]  Well, my question isn't what you think about Kerry, but do you think the media and the focus, which has mostly been against Bush and not in support of Kerry...
[20:39.370 --> 20:39.650]  Wait, wait.
[20:39.690 --> 20:40.990]  What media has been against Bush?
[20:41.410 --> 20:41.910]  Huh?
[20:42.050 --> 20:42.610]  Not CNN.
[20:43.110 --> 20:43.970]  Not the New York Times.
[20:44.250 --> 20:44.290]  Well, no, no, no, no.
[20:44.450 --> 20:48.030]  All the books, the liberal media has come out much stronger than it has previously.
[20:48.030 --> 20:48.530]  What liberal media?
[20:50.010 --> 20:50.510]  Well...
[20:50.510 --> 20:54.810]  I mean, name one major, authentic liberal media, other than Samar Hirsch.
[20:54.810 --> 20:58.430]  We're talking about new stuff, like Fahrenheit 9-11.
[20:58.850 --> 21:02.830]  You know, that might make some impact, but frankly, I don't think it will.
[21:02.950 --> 21:06.290]  Joe and Jane Sixpack are not going to see Fahrenheit 9-11.
[21:06.470 --> 21:07.710]  Neither are the working poor.
[21:07.950 --> 21:09.790]  Neither are the Cubans and the Hispanics.
[21:11.070 --> 21:12.030]  Okay, but...
[21:12.030 --> 21:14.290]  And oh, by the way, the Muslims are in the majority now.
[21:14.490 --> 21:14.690]  Right.
[21:15.170 --> 21:19.090]  And I'm not at all sure that Kerry is doing a decent job of addressing them.
[21:19.970 --> 21:20.150]  Right.
[21:21.490 --> 21:22.250]  You know what?
[21:22.250 --> 21:27.050]  I wrote an article on greaterdemocracy.org saying that if the vote were held today, I would vote for Bush.
[21:28.850 --> 21:34.550]  And my point, which certainly outraged one or two people, my point is that Kerry right now is a placebo.
[21:35.430 --> 21:37.550]  He is a disorganized mess.
[21:38.070 --> 21:52.130]  And although John Edwards is a shining light for the future, right now, in terms of the larger strategic picture, I'd rather have Bush pissing off the world for another four years than John Kerry pretending to put a Band-Aid on it.
[21:53.330 --> 21:53.850]  Okay?
[21:54.890 --> 22:00.910]  Kerry isn't even close to winning this election in my judgment because he...
[22:00.910 --> 22:02.210]  Well, let's start with his haircut.
[22:02.690 --> 22:03.130]  Okay?
[22:03.790 --> 22:08.730]  That is the most f*cked up haircut I have ever seen on a presidential candidate.
[22:09.330 --> 22:12.430]  I mean, that guy has gone one moose too far.
[22:13.630 --> 22:21.750]  His wife is a bitch who has told him publicly in front of senators when he said, come on over to my house.
[22:21.910 --> 22:23.350]  She has said, John, it's my house.
[22:24.170 --> 22:24.630]  Okay?
[22:25.110 --> 22:26.930]  We're talking world-class bitch here.
[22:27.210 --> 22:28.030]  Rich bitch.
[22:29.350 --> 22:30.170]  He's jewish.
[22:30.330 --> 22:30.830]  He's French.
[22:32.190 --> 22:37.790]  You know, I actually did a study of all the Republican attack possibilities on Kerry, and they are almost endless.
[22:39.610 --> 22:43.650]  If John Kerry doesn't get his shit together in the next 30 years, in three to 60 days, he's history.
[22:44.470 --> 22:45.390]  Yeah, he's toast.
[22:45.710 --> 22:46.030]  Really.
[22:46.150 --> 22:48.630]  And it's a shame because this country deserves great leadership.
[22:48.890 --> 22:51.670]  But John Kerry isn't good enough to lead this country by himself.
[22:51.810 --> 23:00.950]  He's got to pick a coalition team, and he's got to get the Greens, the Libertarians, the Independents, and the 25% of the moderate Republicans like me that want to vote for something different.
[23:01.470 --> 23:05.870]  He's got to get us on board, and he hasn't even taken the first baby step in that direction.
[23:07.310 --> 23:07.830]  All right.
[23:07.950 --> 23:08.870]  Why don't we...
[23:08.870 --> 23:09.630]  Yeah, one more.
[23:09.730 --> 23:11.290]  You two guys, and then we'll stop there.
[23:11.290 --> 23:17.830]  What do all these spy agencies think of stations like WBAI and all our call and comments and everything like that?
[23:17.930 --> 23:19.590]  I think they ignore them and they're unaware of them.
[23:21.070 --> 23:21.730]  That's it.
[23:22.190 --> 23:22.690]  Anyway.
[23:23.650 --> 23:25.850]  Have you ever thought of running for office?
[23:28.710 --> 23:29.730]  I don't know.
[23:31.830 --> 23:37.050]  You know, unfortunately, you guys are...
[23:37.050 --> 23:38.530]  Somebody give me a good number.
[23:38.950 --> 23:41.150]  N to the minus 15th of the U.S. population.
[23:43.570 --> 23:49.930]  I don't think I would have the same appeal to Joe and Jane Sixpack, although I do get resonance.
[23:50.250 --> 23:53.710]  I'll tell you, there are direct leaders and there are indirect leaders.
[23:53.970 --> 23:57.170]  Direct leaders are really good at political schmoozing and all of that stuff.
[23:57.170 --> 23:59.670]  I mean, you guys bring out the best in me in some ways.
[24:00.950 --> 24:10.070]  But I am more of an indirect thought leader and reader and thinker and I would probably be best as a special assistant to John Edwards.
[24:10.070 --> 24:16.770]  And frankly, I hope that if Kerry were successful in winning, I hope Edwards will not make the mistake that Al Gore did.
[24:17.410 --> 24:19.830]  Al Gore and Leon Firth blew it.
[24:20.210 --> 24:25.270]  They had eight years in which to set up the infrastructure for a follow-on victory.
[24:25.750 --> 24:34.790]  And Leon Firth got really fat and really ignorant, trying to keep up with the minutiae of day-to-day national intelligence, national security.
[24:34.790 --> 24:38.970]  If Edwards comes in, he should not focus on being deputy president.
[24:39.150 --> 24:48.430]  He should be focusing on training and equipping the bureaucracy to basically implement reforms that will take 16 to 25 years to see through.
[24:48.810 --> 24:50.550]  He has to take the long term.
[24:54.890 --> 24:59.070]  And it is my hope, although I don't expect it to happen.
[24:59.230 --> 25:00.630]  Nader doesn't play well with others.
[25:00.790 --> 25:02.930]  Kerry is not willing to make concessions to Nader.
[25:03.570 --> 25:07.790]  I think the Libertarians and the Greens are basically trash this year.
[25:08.650 --> 25:10.250]  The Independents have no leadership.
[25:10.530 --> 25:12.930]  And the moderate Republicans have not been able to find leadership.
[25:12.930 --> 25:21.330]  Although there is now sort of a bubbling surge of blackmailing Bush into some very specific compromises for the...
[25:21.330 --> 25:24.690]  The moderate Republicans are starting to rebel on the Hill and elsewhere.
[25:24.970 --> 25:28.130]  And I think Karl Rove has already decided Cheney has to go.
[25:28.350 --> 25:35.350]  And unfortunately, I think America is stupid enough to elect Giuliani Bush and maybe move Sean O'Keefe over to defense.
[25:35.990 --> 25:38.150]  John Lehman will be a disaster at CIA.
[25:40.090 --> 25:45.590]  I don't think that we will make many intelligent policy choices in four more years under Bush.
[25:46.370 --> 25:48.190]  But I will vote for Bush.
[25:48.290 --> 25:48.950]  No, I'm going to stop.
[25:49.210 --> 25:53.330]  I will vote for Bush if Kerry doesn't get his shit together.
[25:53.550 --> 25:54.770]  Let's end on that note.
[25:55.010 --> 25:55.430]  Good night.
[25:55.430 --> 25:55.610]  Thank you.
[25:55.610 --> 25:56.390]  Thank you.