[00:00.580 --> 00:02.340]  So hi, my name is Gus Andrews.
[00:02.420 --> 00:10.480]  I have a strange background in that I've done educational technology and anthropological research and I now do work in computer usability.
[00:10.740 --> 00:17.140]  And so I'm going to do a little work talking today about how everyday people think about the Internet and how they think about their computers.
[00:17.920 --> 00:20.520]  And hopefully that will help you with a number of things.
[00:21.180 --> 00:25.360]  Thinking about applying this to a number of situations that a lot of us face.
[00:26.000 --> 00:29.780]  How many people are sort of the go-to fix-it person for computers around them?
[00:30.300 --> 00:33.300]  How many of you also have a t-shirt that says, no, I will not fix your computer?
[00:33.500 --> 00:33.980]  Yes, okay.
[00:34.120 --> 00:34.500]  A number of you.
[00:35.040 --> 00:36.480]  I'd rather you didn't wear that shirt.
[00:36.620 --> 00:37.820]  We'll talk about that in a moment.
[00:38.020 --> 00:43.440]  But this is sort of talking about how you got to the point where you want to wear that shirt.
[00:44.260 --> 00:53.920]  We'll talk about how to convince coworkers or other people around you to improve their security practices and some of the reasons why they might not be improving their security practices in ways that you'd like to see.
[00:54.860 --> 00:57.300]  This applies... a lot of this stuff will apply to usability as well.
[00:57.420 --> 00:59.880]  I'll be talking a little bit about human-computer interaction.
[01:01.620 --> 01:03.240]  And teaching also at any level.
[01:03.440 --> 01:04.540]  Be that at a crypto party.
[01:04.780 --> 01:06.320]  Be that in a classroom.
[01:06.540 --> 01:08.180]  Be that just sort of like casually and formally.
[01:08.840 --> 01:12.280]  So the stuff we'll be talking about is not just like shit I came up with myself.
[01:13.660 --> 01:14.700]  I will cuss a lot.
[01:15.800 --> 01:19.920]  It will come sort of from cognition a lot of the time.
[01:20.040 --> 01:22.840]  And also from studies of human-computer interaction.
[01:23.100 --> 01:24.540]  And then also from some of my own research.
[01:24.760 --> 01:26.080]  So I'll be talking about a couple projects.
[01:28.120 --> 01:30.780]  So the funny thing is I realized how dated this is.
[01:30.960 --> 01:31.880]  How many...
[01:32.380 --> 01:35.600]  We're going to have to start explaining to people that no, that was never a cup holder.
[01:35.720 --> 01:37.060]  That was actually a CD drive.
[01:37.260 --> 01:38.920]  Because like what even is a CD these days?
[01:39.160 --> 01:47.200]  But this is sort of the classic thing about like why did somebody believe that they should be using their CD drive to hold a cup?
[01:47.300 --> 01:51.740]  Because this is the legendary story that that was what somebody was using their CD drive for.
[01:52.440 --> 01:55.720]  So the common reaction to this is just to say, God, you're stupid.
[01:55.980 --> 01:56.120]  Right?
[01:57.480 --> 01:59.880]  I want to tell you about this image for a second though.
[02:00.060 --> 02:01.540]  Everybody needs to go find this image.
[02:01.700 --> 02:02.560]  The title of this image.
[02:02.700 --> 02:04.900]  It is a Creative Commons licensed image on Wikimedia.
[02:05.000 --> 02:08.000]  The title is Sabu and his Tandy.
[02:11.100 --> 02:13.800]  I was just... Like it made my entire day.
[02:14.140 --> 02:16.360]  And Sabu is so sad about his Tandy.
[02:16.580 --> 02:20.140]  Like when you tell Sabu he's stupid, he can't use his Tandy.
[02:20.440 --> 02:21.880]  So go find this image.
[02:21.940 --> 02:24.780]  Use it in all your slide decks because it's the best image ever contributed to the Internet.
[02:26.320 --> 02:26.680]  Right?
[02:26.780 --> 02:28.480]  So we all know you shouldn't call people stupid, right?
[02:29.340 --> 02:30.200]  That's not helpful.
[02:30.320 --> 02:35.040]  It will not get you to where you want to be in terms of communicating to people what they need to know.
[02:35.640 --> 02:43.880]  So I want to explore some of the the reasoning that people actually use when they make decisions about their computers and how it specifically impacts their security, but also the things you're helping them on.
[02:44.560 --> 02:46.320]  And then also I want to explore some moments.
[02:46.400 --> 02:51.360]  There may be moments where you are inadvertently telling people they're stupid and not really realizing you're doing that.
[02:51.440 --> 02:55.080]  So we're going to talk about that a little bit as well and the impacts of what happens when that goes down.
[02:55.760 --> 02:57.480]  So first I'll talk a little bit about my dissertation.
[02:57.800 --> 02:59.880]  I had this awesome opportunity.
[02:59.880 --> 03:07.560]  I'm still not even totally sure how it happened to look into some moments where people were really misunderstanding where they were online.
[03:07.860 --> 03:09.540]  So I was at blogs like this one here.
[03:09.700 --> 03:11.840]  This is some J Random blogger, Johnson blog.
[03:12.640 --> 03:26.340]  And he wrote this great post that basically says, Man, my love of ordering personalized printed crap online may be the single dorkiest thing about me and I can tell you why leaving the scouring of the Shire chapter out of Peter Jackson version of the Return of the King totally undermined Tolkien's original message,
[03:26.460 --> 03:27.100]  blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
[03:27.100 --> 03:35.180]  So anyway, so he talks about ordering customized Heinz ketchup bottles and then post-it notes and Jones soda and things like that.
[03:35.640 --> 03:39.880]  And then somebody shows up in the comments and says, Did you know you can get customized personally printed M&Ms?
[03:40.040 --> 03:40.660]  Here's a link.
[03:40.880 --> 03:41.820]  And that was totally cool.
[03:42.100 --> 03:46.660]  So it was just this sort of neat little thread about getting personalized stuff and making it say weird things.
[03:47.460 --> 03:49.620]  But then the strangers started showing up.
[03:49.760 --> 03:54.860]  There were people who were showing up and none of us could figure out why they were there.
[03:54.860 --> 04:00.040]  So this woman writes in, I found the order for custom printed M&Ms in the coupon section of the Providence Journal Sunday paper.
[04:00.220 --> 04:03.880]  It said nothing about ordering ketchup first or anything about the blog.
[04:04.320 --> 04:08.660]  All I wanted was to surprise my 80 year old aunt who loves M&Ms with a special custom order.
[04:08.780 --> 04:09.640]  What is this?
[04:09.640 --> 04:10.300]  A scam?
[04:10.640 --> 04:11.880]  If it is, it's pretty cruel.
[04:12.040 --> 04:12.620]  Please respond.
[04:15.340 --> 04:18.640]  So the response is basically WTF.
[04:18.840 --> 04:20.060]  Like why did this happen?
[04:20.200 --> 04:24.640]  And so a lot of the people who were responding to comments like these were going, don't you people read?
[04:25.160 --> 04:26.120]  What are you stupid?
[04:26.300 --> 04:27.620]  Oh, God, where do you think you are?
[04:27.880 --> 04:28.520]  Look up there.
[04:28.740 --> 04:29.480]  There's the URL.
[04:29.620 --> 04:31.340]  The URL tells you what site you're on, right?
[04:32.100 --> 04:33.360]  But she wasn't the only one.
[04:34.620 --> 04:39.020]  I am trying to get you to your website URL so I can order some of the custom printed M&Ms.
[04:39.200 --> 04:40.260]  What am I doing wrong?
[04:40.720 --> 04:43.400]  Went to Google and put in the website but was not able to get on the site.
[04:43.880 --> 04:45.220]  Was not able to enter the promo code.
[04:45.320 --> 04:46.300]  Would like some help if possible.
[04:46.300 --> 04:50.320]  So what I note here specifically is that she says you're, right?
[04:50.460 --> 04:53.560]  So she's not orienting to the fact that this is somebody else's site entirely.
[04:53.560 --> 04:56.700]  She's orienting to something else and it's not clear what.
[04:57.560 --> 05:08.200]  One of the things I noted, going back to the previous slide, the thing that convinced me that these people were not just not reading at all, this woman found this page and she said ketchup, right?
[05:08.340 --> 05:11.780]  Like she's like ketchup was somehow involved because the title was ketchup of the people.
[05:11.780 --> 05:13.760]  And it says Johnson blog across the top.
[05:13.860 --> 05:23.040]  So she read blog and she read ketchup but there's something in her reading skills that were not quite working out for her in the modern Internet context of doing reading.
[05:23.380 --> 05:34.560]  So what I was doing was thinking a lot about how these people were just reading in a different way and it happened to be one at odds with the sort of powerful ways of reading the Internet.
[05:35.140 --> 05:39.160]  And the powerful ways of reading the Internet are really looking at the URL.
[05:39.160 --> 05:45.140]  So here's one of the blog's regular readers saying, do you know if you type in this URL in search, your blog is the only result.
[05:45.560 --> 05:51.460]  And so that is how people found their way to this blog, was that they had entered the URL probably into the search bar.
[05:51.740 --> 05:59.680]  And this is actually before most browsers were disambiguating, or not disambiguating between URL bar and search bar.
[05:59.800 --> 06:02.920]  So everybody was just putting searches into the URL bar.
[06:04.100 --> 06:06.180]  And so it leads directly there.
[06:06.180 --> 06:12.160]  So what I was sort of thinking as people were doing this is that they were, they thought they were having a conversation.
[06:12.940 --> 06:17.260]  And if you go up to somebody and you say, you know, I want to talk about M&Ms.
[06:17.380 --> 06:19.340]  And they say, hello, ketchup and blog.
[06:19.600 --> 06:22.560]  You say, what the crap is going on here, right?
[06:22.640 --> 06:26.000]  So like, it's not, they were assuming normal rules of human conversation.
[06:26.160 --> 06:26.980]  This is not unreasonable.
[06:27.300 --> 06:29.680]  You know, they just didn't know how to read the Internet as it was.
[06:29.800 --> 06:34.060]  And so it's just, there was something in the mismatch of how that, what they thought about what they were doing.
[06:34.560 --> 06:38.240]  And what people will do in the end is they just make sense with what they have.
[06:38.380 --> 06:42.660]  And that's what I've been focusing on a lot this year, is just sort of how are people making sense of the Internet.
[06:44.380 --> 06:47.280]  Does, does like what they just said, does that make sense to you?
[06:47.360 --> 06:49.420]  Like the stuff with the ketchup and the blog and the M&Ms?
[06:49.560 --> 06:52.740]  No, it doesn't make sense to us because we're the ones going, read the URL.
[06:52.960 --> 06:54.580]  The URL tells you where you are.
[06:54.740 --> 06:56.400]  But these people didn't even know what a URL was.
[06:56.540 --> 07:09.680]  I was seeing elsewhere in the study that when people were talking about links and they were talking about addresses and URLs, the people who were showing up and leaving the weird comments were never talking about, they never said anything about address.
[07:09.900 --> 07:14.520]  They said things like, here is my home address, which was not a good thing to divulge, but they were doing that anyway.
[07:15.420 --> 07:17.680]  You know, like here is my street address, please come and harass me.
[07:18.500 --> 07:25.660]  And then, you know, the commenters who knew what was going on in the blog were saying, look at the URL, look at the URL.
[07:25.780 --> 07:28.960]  So there was this big gap in the things that they were using to make sense.
[07:29.700 --> 07:38.800]  Google, of course, was also making its own kind of sense, and that kind of sense was really confusing people because, like the woman said, there was... this is the only result left for that URL.
[07:38.960 --> 07:42.540]  M&Ms actually did have one... did have a result for that as well.
[07:42.620 --> 07:43.600]  The original result was there.
[07:44.080 --> 07:49.540]  But M&Ms had taken down that particular offer, and so all that was left was a single one pixel by one pixel white graphic.
[07:49.980 --> 07:52.920]  And so the page looked completely to blank unless you were looking at the source code.
[07:52.920 --> 07:59.820]  So that was pretty magical too, but to Google, you know, Google is like, well, obviously what you want is URL for M&M ketchup blog.
[08:00.000 --> 08:00.800]  Yes, you have it.
[08:00.940 --> 08:03.120]  And people are like, I don't speak this language.
[08:03.120 --> 08:03.980]  What are you talking about?
[08:04.240 --> 08:08.240]  So, you know, Google is making sense one way, and other people are making sense in other ways.
[08:09.840 --> 08:16.420]  And so, you know, what you have to take a look at is what people are using to reason with.
[08:17.900 --> 08:28.340]  Aristotle was under the impression that... and made the argument, and as many thinkers have since, I think Locke did as well, that the child when born is a tabula rasa, a blank slate.
[08:29.640 --> 08:36.060]  And the fact of the matter is if you look at more contemporary research on growth and learning, that is not the case.
[08:36.460 --> 08:38.880]  Nobody comes into anything, even birth.
[08:39.020 --> 08:42.040]  Like, you know, you are shaped by some of the experiences in the womb even.
[08:42.660 --> 08:46.440]  You are shaped by your immediate sensory stimuli when you're very young.
[08:46.600 --> 08:51.480]  For example, if you don't get any nurturing, you don't really develop well emotionally, and you develop sort of attachment disorders, right?
[08:52.380 --> 08:57.020]  So, by the time they get to you at a crypto party, right, they're really not a blank slate.
[08:57.140 --> 08:58.080]  They're not an empty vessel.
[08:58.220 --> 08:59.760]  There are already things in their heads.
[08:59.840 --> 09:00.880]  They're very definitely things.
[09:00.880 --> 09:05.680]  And so I will talk a little bit about sort of how I'm seeing people.
[09:05.980 --> 09:13.740]  They will, if you don't understand what's already in their heads, you will find that they will build new knowledge on top of their old knowledge.
[09:14.100 --> 09:16.280]  And it's not always going to go the way you want.
[09:16.480 --> 09:29.780]  And so that's a reason to, before you start talking at a crypto party or in your class or wherever, even if you're just a lecturer at a college, lecturing can be really super ineffective if you're just piling knowledge on top of students and not really getting a sense of what they already know.
[09:30.320 --> 09:34.720]  If you know there are misconceptions that students may have, you want to go and suss those out.
[09:34.840 --> 09:42.040]  Maybe if you have a survey, big massive survey lecture course at the university, you could do a little survey and say, you know, what do you believe about this X, Y, and Z.
[09:42.140 --> 09:46.820]  And if they're showing up that they have a number of misconceptions, it's good to address those quickly.
[09:46.840 --> 09:48.940]  Or if you could just address them in the course of your lecture anyway.
[09:49.180 --> 10:01.800]  So one of the things I found this year, this year I did a study where I was having everyday people and experts as well draw maps basically of how they thought email worked.
[10:02.540 --> 10:05.840]  With an eye to looking at how they believe the Internet worked.
[10:05.960 --> 10:07.680]  Because I feel like email is a little bit easier to understand.
[10:07.820 --> 10:12.460]  You don't have to understand about like it's serving a page and server client architecture and things like that.
[10:12.600 --> 10:14.980]  So it's maybe a little bit clearer to some people.
[10:17.620 --> 10:21.800]  And mental model is a term that you will hear a lot from cognitive researchers.
[10:21.940 --> 10:27.080]  It basically means, you know, the idea that people have sort of a working system model in their brain.
[10:28.140 --> 10:30.240]  The idea of mental models is actually questions.
[10:30.440 --> 10:35.020]  Some people are sort of going, okay, well, what people are actually doing is just accessing that knowledge on the fly as they go.
[10:36.100 --> 10:41.380]  But, you know, there's enough sort of critical mass around mental models that it's at least interesting to look at these maps.
[10:41.380 --> 10:48.860]  And I'll show you some of those in a moment as an artifact to understand, you know, what people will come up with when you ask them.
[10:48.940 --> 10:50.220]  And what they will sort of put together.
[10:51.360 --> 10:55.420]  So during the course of doing this, I did a number of interviews a couple places.
[10:55.560 --> 10:56.960]  We had one site doing this in the Netherlands.
[10:56.960 --> 11:00.880]  We had one site doing it here in Brownsville and Harlem in the Bronx.
[11:01.260 --> 11:06.120]  And then we had one site in Rhode Island doing, you know, having people draw their maps of things.
[11:07.580 --> 11:13.540]  And one of my respondents, while he was drawing his map, talked about ping time.
[11:14.040 --> 11:16.800]  Which surprised me because I hadn't expected him to be that technical.
[11:16.960 --> 11:19.880]  He was sort of making a lot of other mistakes in a lot of ways when he was talking.
[11:20.560 --> 11:27.480]  And when I say mistakes, he's not matched up to what an IT guy would know to do in order to make the system work for him correctly.
[11:27.480 --> 11:32.180]  So, I mean, he can be coming up with something that maybe works for him but turns out to be sort of faulty.
[11:32.180 --> 11:35.360]  Because it doesn't match up with the actual reality that's out there.
[11:36.740 --> 11:42.400]  What he said was, when you open a link, it pings off a router.
[11:42.880 --> 11:46.180]  And then he pointed to a picture of a satellite that he'd drawn to mean router.
[11:47.860 --> 11:52.880]  And he says, if that link takes more than five seconds to load, it's encrypted.
[11:57.940 --> 12:01.000]  So, the very interesting thing was that he had said ping at all, right?
[12:01.080 --> 12:02.900]  Like, he knew the words ping and router.
[12:03.520 --> 12:08.720]  And as I talked to him further, it turned out that he'd actually taken a couple of community college courses on IT.
[12:08.960 --> 12:10.520]  It was sort of a basic entry-level course.
[12:11.000 --> 12:15.920]  And so, what had happened is he'd gone from using that knowledge and he'd just misappropriated it.
[12:16.000 --> 12:22.580]  Like, he'd just misunderstood what was going on and sort of built this concept in his mind where that was going to tell you about security.
[12:22.580 --> 12:27.600]  He had a number of really interesting ideas that were sort of not matched up to how the system actually worked.
[12:29.000 --> 12:47.300]  So, my guess is that it would have to take more practice and more regular use and more correction by other people working in an environment around him for him to actually get the actual meaning of what pinging was and whether encryption actually had anything to do with loading links and things like that.
[12:47.300 --> 12:49.560]  So, he didn't really have... he was not really clear on that.
[12:49.700 --> 13:00.080]  But that was... because he was not a tabula rasa, you know, like, he was sort of taking and working with these things in his environment and making them work for him in a way that made sense when he was explaining things to me.
[13:00.880 --> 13:01.860]  So, here's some of the maps.
[13:02.020 --> 13:05.900]  This one is... like I said, I had experts draw maps because I wanted to get sort of a baseline.
[13:06.900 --> 13:09.240]  And this one just kind of blew my mind.
[13:09.240 --> 13:14.360]  This one was... this guy... I said... like the... you gave people a very specific script.
[13:14.520 --> 13:16.340]  So, they'll give you... everybody will give you more or less the same thing.
[13:16.440 --> 13:19.180]  That's how you reduce variables in this particular kind of social research.
[13:19.520 --> 13:24.620]  And I said, explain to me how an email message gets from you to your friend.
[13:25.020 --> 13:31.800]  And he started out in the upper left-hand corner by saying something on the order of, well, you know, blah, blah, blah, blah, within this machine and blah, blah, blah.
[13:31.860 --> 13:32.620]  I'm like, wait a minute, wait, wait, wait.
[13:32.620 --> 13:44.320]  You just explained to me how an email message could get from your friend to you if you were both using the same computer and using an obscure protocol that I think nobody actually uses anymore.
[13:44.960 --> 13:47.780]  So, I had to actually... like... because he was very, very exacting.
[13:47.780 --> 13:48.740]  He was probably somewhere on the spectrum.
[13:48.980 --> 13:52.600]  He was very, very exacting and said, you know, really had to be...
[13:52.600 --> 13:56.100]  I had to make very clear to him, like, this is like... this is the scope.
[13:56.200 --> 13:59.000]  Give me the general practice that most people have to deal with.
[13:59.060 --> 14:01.500]  But as you can see, his knowledge was incredibly rich.
[14:01.500 --> 14:05.060]  Like, he had multiple ways of thinking through the system.
[14:05.200 --> 14:07.020]  There's multiple protocols mentioned on there.
[14:07.260 --> 14:13.140]  There's multiple, you know, like, instances of servers and routers and hubs and things like that that are all sort of working into the system.
[14:13.380 --> 14:15.540]  And that's because this is a guy who's actually worked on this stuff.
[14:15.660 --> 14:16.560]  Like, he has touched these things.
[14:16.660 --> 14:17.580]  He's been at the command line.
[14:17.640 --> 14:18.300]  He has touched code.
[14:18.960 --> 14:20.440]  So, this is the way he thinks of it.
[14:21.500 --> 14:24.200]  Here is a mental model from one of my folks...
[14:24.200 --> 14:25.680]  one of my pairs of folks up in Harlem.
[14:25.880 --> 14:30.520]  This is actually a really interesting pair of people who I'll probably come back to later and talk about.
[14:31.060 --> 14:32.200]  It was a mother and a daughter.
[14:33.760 --> 14:36.340]  And you'll see that they talked about...
[14:36.340 --> 14:39.060]  They were pretty sophisticated compared to a lot of the other folks they were working with.
[14:39.120 --> 14:40.000]  They talked about packets.
[14:40.580 --> 14:41.860]  They talked about IP addresses.
[14:42.000 --> 14:43.500]  And when they said IP addresses, I'm like, how do you know that?
[14:43.600 --> 14:46.680]  And the 16-year-old daughter was like, well, I set up my Xbox.
[14:47.180 --> 14:47.540]  Right?
[14:47.820 --> 14:55.120]  So, it was interesting to me to see that, like, the only people who really talked about that stuff were people who had had experience with it somehow.
[14:55.120 --> 14:56.860]  And this is one of the things that a lot of people...
[14:56.860 --> 15:00.240]  When people make the argument, oh, the kids these days, they're so brilliant with the technical, blah, blah, blah.
[15:00.540 --> 15:02.860]  The millennials and their super great technical skills.
[15:03.020 --> 15:08.140]  I think we're going to see a massive technical gap within the next, I don't know, couple decades or so.
[15:08.780 --> 15:14.660]  Because there will be a whole generation of kids who never had to work at the command line and never had to contact a server and anything like that.
[15:14.760 --> 15:22.500]  But the kids who were working off the Xboxes, who were working on setting up their Xboxes and communicating with their friends, those are the ones you should probably hire because they have the background knowledge.
[15:22.640 --> 15:25.440]  And they've got a working knowledge that you can build on in a constructive way.
[15:26.200 --> 15:31.560]  So don't let anybody sell you the millennials are super good at tech thing because they have the iPads, whatever, blah, blah, blah.
[15:33.000 --> 15:35.220]  So I'm sure you're on preaching to the choir.
[15:35.920 --> 15:38.040]  So yeah, we've done the study in a number of places.
[15:38.200 --> 15:43.040]  So that is one of the more sophisticated knowledge maps from people who were not experts in this field.
[15:43.520 --> 15:48.760]  I think the least sophisticated and most your moment of Zen map that has shown up in...
[15:48.760 --> 15:53.860]  This is not from this study, but a previous study done by a researcher who I worked with on this study, was this map.
[15:59.030 --> 16:00.350]  Just meditate on this.
[16:03.070 --> 16:03.790]  It's beautiful.
[16:04.070 --> 16:05.370]  It's just like, it's so simple.
[16:05.590 --> 16:08.230]  Wouldn't it be nice, like, if everything was that simple?
[16:08.470 --> 16:12.050]  How much easier would it be to protect your servers if there was no server?
[16:12.170 --> 16:13.270]  It was just an arrow in between.
[16:14.030 --> 16:15.790]  But you know, once again, this is...
[16:15.790 --> 16:19.550]  I mean, what this is, is sometimes you get people just sort of going, I have no idea.
[16:19.750 --> 16:24.210]  All I know is there's a laptop and my friend's laptop and there's something going between them and that's all I get, you know?
[16:24.830 --> 16:25.470]  We actually...
[16:25.470 --> 16:30.270]  One of the things we did on this study that we ran just recently was give them more scaffolding so that they had...
[16:30.270 --> 16:33.150]  We prompted them and you sort of kept going and sort of said, and what else?
[16:33.250 --> 16:33.670]  And what else?
[16:33.770 --> 16:35.590]  And that helped elicit more of their models.
[16:38.610 --> 16:41.390]  So here's one of the sort of...
[16:41.390 --> 16:47.090]  Another one of the maps from the folks in Brownsville locally who...
[16:47.090 --> 16:53.790]  This particular map was interesting because it has two patterns that showed up really regularly in this study of folks.
[16:56.130 --> 16:57.470]  And that is...
[16:57.470 --> 16:58.330]  There are two things.
[16:58.470 --> 17:09.890]  So one of them is that people tended to draw separate systems for mobile devices and desktop and laptop devices because they were under the impression that they...
[17:09.890 --> 17:17.870]  Or at least when they were thinking that out, they were not thinking about how those were connected even though, no doubt, you can send an email from your mobile device to your laptop and a lap back and forth.
[17:18.030 --> 17:19.210]  But that was sort of not on their radar.
[17:20.410 --> 17:28.050]  I think the best comment I had was from this one older couple in one of our other sites who...
[17:28.050 --> 17:37.270]  The man turns to the woman at one point and he's like, Now, you may not know this, but I've been able to access my mail on my phone and my laptop at the same time.
[17:38.810 --> 17:40.670]  And his wife was like, Oh, can you?
[17:40.750 --> 17:42.070]  I've never seen that before.
[17:43.910 --> 17:49.050]  So, you know, there's obviously a lot of other conceptions that are sort of not, you know, underlying that.
[17:49.210 --> 17:50.310]  Like there's sort of a sense of...
[17:50.310 --> 17:52.690]  Like the way he talked about it, it was just like, it's magic, right?
[17:52.830 --> 17:53.490]  Like it's not...
[17:53.490 --> 17:57.510]  It was not something that, you know, there was some sort of system underlying it.
[17:59.030 --> 18:01.070]  Mailboxes were specifically the thing that was missing.
[18:02.550 --> 18:07.890]  I should say that one of the things we did in the study, we first had people draw a freehand map like this where we just said, fill up a blank page.
[18:08.250 --> 18:10.130]  And then we gave them a little bit more scaffolding.
[18:10.130 --> 18:16.790]  We actually gave them icons and stickers of particular elements that were involved in sending email.
[18:17.670 --> 18:23.270]  And so even when we gave them the sticker that said mailbox, they used it in some unexpected ways.
[18:23.330 --> 18:25.090]  And I'll talk about that more in just a moment.
[18:26.010 --> 18:36.270]  The other really interesting pattern that kept coming up that I was kind of like weirded out by was like, when they talked about Wi-Fi or routers or things like that, this is a freehand, so they came up with a router themselves.
[18:36.650 --> 18:41.970]  There was sort of this faucet model where it's like the Internet comes in through the Wi-Fi device.
[18:42.970 --> 18:46.550]  And there's no indication that that communication goes back out through that same device.
[18:47.150 --> 18:48.410]  Where it goes is not entirely clear.
[18:48.510 --> 18:51.430]  Like they clearly had a sense that it goes through, but frequently it would go around the router.
[18:51.610 --> 18:52.110]  It would go someplace else.
[18:52.190 --> 18:53.810]  So you notice that here the routers are just like...
[18:54.210 --> 18:59.610]  The stuff in the middle is the stuff, you know, that's stuff going between the two computers, but the routers are just sort of there.
[19:00.010 --> 19:03.190]  They're bringing the Internet into your house, But they're not sending anything back out again.
[19:04.150 --> 19:04.210]  Right?
[19:04.450 --> 19:11.550]  So, like I was saying, with Icon... with mailboxes specifically, like I said, people are reasoning off of surface features.
[19:11.750 --> 19:17.090]  So when they thought about mailbox, what they thought was, this is the thing I click on in order to get to my mail.
[19:18.090 --> 19:22.930]  And I think the whole concept of mailboxes generally like, you know, I have multiple mailboxes.
[19:23.110 --> 19:24.890]  You know, junk is a mailbox.
[19:25.350 --> 19:29.530]  The reason I have mailboxes is there's one on the server, and it's remote, and I have to access it.
[19:31.090 --> 19:39.170]  You know, and they're not thinking about, like, you know, there's... it can sync up because it's both on the server and it's on my device at the same time.
[19:39.790 --> 19:47.210]  Can anybody in the audience hazard a guess as to why any of us, who are maybe not even all that formally trained, understand that there's mailboxes on servers?
[19:47.850 --> 19:48.830]  So let me just shout it out.
[19:51.890 --> 19:52.250]  Sorry?
[19:52.250 --> 19:52.350]  Right?
[19:55.410 --> 19:56.030]  Because servers.
[19:56.350 --> 19:57.410]  I'm not hearing too clearly.
[19:57.970 --> 20:03.950]  My guess is that generally it's because we were around for an era when you didn't have constantly synced mail, right?
[20:04.030 --> 20:09.810]  Like, you were aware that sometimes there would be... you would have to go back and access your mail and get it synced up.
[20:09.930 --> 20:11.810]  And I forget which protocol is which.
[20:11.930 --> 20:12.450]  POP and IMAP.
[20:12.830 --> 20:13.430]  POP3, right.
[20:13.630 --> 20:14.970]  So... and that's the one we're using now?
[20:15.110 --> 20:15.710]  Or that's the...
[20:16.570 --> 20:17.710]  IMAP is what we use... yeah.
[20:17.890 --> 20:20.690]  So the thing is, we remember POP3, and nobody else remembers POP3.
[20:20.690 --> 20:22.790]  So that's... we don't... they don't have that to reason with.
[20:22.910 --> 20:25.130]  All they have to reason with is there's an icon and it's on my machine.
[20:26.130 --> 20:27.150]  And so, of course, servers.
[20:27.250 --> 20:27.830]  Servers were gone.
[20:27.970 --> 20:28.630]  There were no servers.
[20:28.850 --> 20:32.010]  And even when we gave them stickers of servers, sometimes they wouldn't use them.
[20:32.190 --> 20:36.490]  Sometimes they would go from their hand-drawn maps and where they had said satellite or something like that.
[20:36.590 --> 20:39.510]  And then they'd say, oh, well, I meant server, right?
[20:39.590 --> 20:40.690]  So they were seen as interchangeable.
[20:40.750 --> 20:41.790]  And it was frequently satellites.
[20:43.450 --> 20:47.830]  Especially... so I think a lot of the folks I was talking to in New York were sort of mobile-first populations.
[20:47.990 --> 20:49.290]  They hadn't spent as much time on the desktop.
[20:50.190 --> 20:53.750]  And so that was how they thought that their phone connectivity was getting to them.
[20:54.290 --> 20:57.350]  So that was sort of... that infrastructure was all sort of hidden, basically.
[20:57.530 --> 20:59.930]  Like, it was... it was behind the scenes and they didn't have that to reason with.
[21:00.010 --> 21:00.930]  They couldn't think about it, right?
[21:01.350 --> 21:11.350]  So I've been thinking, actually, one of the things that could conceivably be helpful to users... I know the trend in usability is to make interfaces as simple as is humanly possible and not burden users with additional information.
[21:11.490 --> 21:13.890]  But some sort of thing, like, this is syncing with the server.
[21:14.010 --> 21:14.850]  The server is a thing.
[21:15.010 --> 21:19.610]  And you can see it, like, almost like that, you know, Microsoft Windows, like, your thing is going into the trash basket.
[21:19.910 --> 21:27.470]  Like, some... some little animation might just go a long way to helping people understand that there is a... something out there that's not your machine where your stuff is.
[21:27.990 --> 21:37.830]  The other thing that just completely blew my mind is there was these... a couple of casual offhand comments made by various people to the effect of, wires aren't cool anymore.
[21:39.530 --> 21:46.350]  So that was, like, people sort of going, well, of course, all of this goes through the air, it goes through the air, it goes through the air.
[21:46.950 --> 21:52.470]  We just, like, it's like the new trend, the new hotness is Wi-Fi, and so we don't use wires.
[21:52.630 --> 21:53.830]  They don't believe that anything is going over wires.
[21:54.030 --> 21:56.250]  So, you know, forget teaching them about wiretapping.
[21:56.430 --> 21:58.790]  You know, forget teaching them about that kind of connectivity.
[21:59.590 --> 22:09.290]  I think the best comment I had there was one... a couple of women I was talking to, one of them said, yeah, it goes through the fiber, which I think is in the air.
[22:10.410 --> 22:17.210]  So that was, like, that was... it's just, you know, she's... she's heard the word fiber, and she's heard that things are in the air, and that's... that's what she puts together.
[22:17.330 --> 22:19.930]  Like, she has to make sense of it, so that is how she puts those things together.
[22:20.770 --> 22:36.710]  So going back to this map, again, of the mother-daughter pair, if you see the little thing that sort of looks like a colon or a tube full of marbles up to the upper left of the globe there, it was at one point she started talking about how mail wouldn't go through sometimes if you made an attachment that was too big,
[22:36.790 --> 22:39.090]  and the mail was being sent through as packets.
[22:40.270 --> 22:45.270]  And, you know, so she had some sense of, like, file size mattered, and attachments mattered, and packets were the way things went.
[22:45.530 --> 22:50.790]  She wasn't completely clear on the details, but this was probably the most sophisticated sense of how these things had gone.
[22:51.050 --> 22:57.710]  What I learned about this woman eventually is that she had done an associate's degree in computer science in 2002.
[22:58.030 --> 23:04.330]  She's now working on medical systems at a hospital, and so she understood... she also understood a lot about HIPAA protections and privacy and things like that.
[23:04.510 --> 23:12.150]  Had also been reading the news, so she's thinking a lot about Hillary Clinton's server and things like that, but she had what has sometimes been called fragile knowledge.
[23:13.190 --> 23:18.870]  So when she was talking about those packets, she started talking about, you have to use a Zip drive.
[23:20.590 --> 23:23.190]  You have to use... who here has never heard of a Zip drive?
[23:23.730 --> 23:25.210]  A couple millennials in the room, maybe?
[23:25.610 --> 23:29.530]  Zip drives have been out of date since, like, 2002 when she was in school, right?
[23:29.830 --> 23:32.610]  But, of course, she's also got this to reason off of, right?
[23:33.030 --> 23:36.170]  This is what we give people to look at to think about a compressed file.
[23:36.310 --> 23:36.970]  It's all zipped up.
[23:37.150 --> 23:40.790]  So to her, she was conflating the two of them and still trying to make sense.
[23:41.190 --> 23:44.930]  So the really tragic thing is, here's a woman who actually did have the concepts pretty well.
[23:45.010 --> 23:56.990]  She had a good infrastructure of mental model to build on, but just, like, because she hadn't been kept up, you know, either through her job or, like, ongoing professional training, she was using words that, like, if she was trying to test in at a job interview or something like that,
[23:57.110 --> 23:59.610]  she might have people be like, oh, she's so stupid, you know?
[24:00.230 --> 24:03.210]  Which would be terrible, because she really... she got it better than a lot of other people.
[24:03.450 --> 24:10.250]  And so the trick is really, I think, sort of helping people build ongoing knowledge that helps them be flexible.
[24:10.430 --> 24:12.570]  Like, help them... so like I said, she's got the system.
[24:12.730 --> 24:15.970]  She had a sense of how the parts are related to each other, how the server worked into things.
[24:16.610 --> 24:29.170]  Making sure that people have some really basic things like that can help them rather than, sort of, going... like, one of the worst ways you can possibly teach with computers—and I'm sure all of you know this —is go and click this button, and then go and click this button,
[24:29.190 --> 24:34.090]  and then go and And click this button and the next time Windows goes ahead and changes word again, like they're basically screwed.
[24:34.250 --> 24:41.110]  They have no way to know what to do because they don't know multiple ways of doing the same thing and they don't know why they're doing what they're doing.
[24:42.030 --> 24:44.890]  A couple more thoughts on people's mental models.
[24:44.970 --> 24:52.930]  This is an absolutely great study done by some security folks at Google who also talked to experts and non-experts about their recommendations for security practices.
[24:53.930 --> 25:03.510]  I think one of the most interesting things that sort of came out of what they found was... so obviously, everyday people tend to think using antivirus software is the best way to make yourself safe, which of course we all snicker at, right?
[25:04.850 --> 25:06.530]  And that...
[25:06.530 --> 25:18.890]  what they sort of talked about, the Google researchers talked about is experts know, like Sandy Clark said yesterday in her talk, that security is... or software is broken.
[25:19.090 --> 25:20.210]  It's broken, it's flawed.
[25:21.030 --> 25:24.310]  Everyday people don't realize that the problem is in the software that they're running.
[25:24.410 --> 25:29.630]  They think they can have an add-on thing that blocks from outside threats that are entirely external to their machines.
[25:29.890 --> 25:36.470]  So that's like a fundamental concept underneath there that is really hurting everyday people when they're thinking.
[25:36.630 --> 25:41.050]  And if we can talk to them a little bit more about like, you know, it's... your computer is broken.
[25:41.310 --> 25:44.170]  And then, of course, you're going to have to explain, like, well, why isn't there a warranty?
[25:44.370 --> 25:46.810]  Or, like, why don't I have some recourse against this, right?
[25:47.050 --> 25:49.210]  So... passwords, too.
[25:49.690 --> 25:51.610]  There's some interesting stuff I was finding about passwords.
[25:51.750 --> 26:00.890]  People who used Google authentication were forgetting that passwords were even involved in securing their mailboxes just because they did it once on their device and they've never had to go back to it again.
[26:02.030 --> 26:05.250]  So those are all sort of possible conceptions that people have.
[26:06.850 --> 26:12.510]  In building systems and doing human-computer interaction, you have to think a lot about cognitive load.
[26:12.690 --> 26:16.870]  You have to think about, like, what kind of burden you're giving people when they have to think through things.
[26:17.690 --> 26:27.870]  I got temporarily infamous in certain circles of open source software in the past couple of years because at one point I made a video called why the command line is not usable.
[26:28.830 --> 26:31.390]  And I took all sorts of trollage and flames from that.
[26:32.430 --> 26:36.270]  And I was really mostly complaining about a particular command line interface, which I'll show you in a second.
[26:36.490 --> 26:48.330]  But if you apply the heuristics, the patterns that usability researchers use, to the command line, you begin to get a sense of why we've moved away from the command line for everyday users.
[26:48.490 --> 26:54.650]  Why it's something where we're giving people, you know, GUIs and why basically we have GUIs, right?
[26:54.770 --> 26:56.390]  So why people need those.
[26:57.030 --> 27:05.930]  One of the major rules of usability is build for recognition instead of recall, right?
[27:06.390 --> 27:11.030]  When you're using the command line, you have to recall what it is you have to put in here, right?
[27:11.250 --> 27:16.650]  And for most of us who use the command line on a regular basis, not a big deal because we remember, you know, various words and tasks.
[27:16.850 --> 27:27.050]  But for people who use it infrequently, for people who have never used it before, the amount of cognitive work they have to do, the amount of cognitive load we're putting on them to make them remember this stuff is prohibitive and makes them feel like crap.
[27:27.830 --> 27:30.610]  So that was the reason I was basically making this argument here.
[27:30.870 --> 27:35.710]  And this is the kind of thing... this is also sort of why users use Post-its for their passwords.
[27:35.850 --> 27:40.570]  Like if they have to recall their password, that's additional cognitive work they have to do and it might slow them down.
[27:41.470 --> 27:46.110]  When people get slowed down, they will try to circumvent your system and they'll do something else and that's what those Post-its are.
[27:46.890 --> 27:59.330]  So the more we can do to help people recognize something, like, you know, CAPTCHA is sort of going, like, this is a horse, like, poke at all the horses, like that kind of stuff gives people an easier way to recognize, like, what they need to do.
[27:59.670 --> 28:03.550]  Or like giving them a button that says send rather than being like, remember the command for send, right?
[28:04.830 --> 28:11.770]  This is the video I made for Tahoe Laughs about, like, why they needed to give me something other than a command line to work with when we were doing usability work.
[28:12.790 --> 28:18.770]  Some of the heuristics that I was sort of... the other things about the command line, you have to give people visibility of system status.
[28:19.410 --> 28:20.990]  To some extent they were doing that here.
[28:21.110 --> 28:23.230]  They were letting the user know it was up to the computer.
[28:23.530 --> 28:25.970]  But they weren't doing it in human language.
[28:26.110 --> 28:27.770]  So you need to use words that users know.
[28:28.750 --> 28:32.750]  So, you know, like, files were skipped.
[28:32.910 --> 28:34.570]  Like, what do we... what does it mean, and skipped?
[28:34.790 --> 28:37.250]  You know, like, that's not something that necessarily everybody's going to understand.
[28:38.330 --> 28:41.650]  You know, and they're not necessarily going to understand what's going here.
[28:43.910 --> 28:54.850]  Another cognitive property that everybody should think about when they're thinking about supporting users at the interface level is cognitive dissonance, which is a thing that will scare people and send them away and also give them a lot of work to do.
[28:55.350 --> 28:59.350]  This is my example from Enigmail, which I use regularly to encrypt my mail.
[29:00.550 --> 29:03.050]  And this is the scariest goddamn thing they do.
[29:03.050 --> 29:08.990]  Every time you receive an encrypted message, even if your focus is on a completely different program, they pop up this thing being like, password, please.
[29:09.210 --> 29:11.690]  And I'm like, that is the spamiest looking thing I have ever seen.
[29:12.490 --> 29:17.370]  Like, did one of these Pinkie Pie graphics suddenly like make... is there some horrible malware going on here?
[29:18.110 --> 29:20.030]  So that's... you don't want to do things like that.
[29:20.310 --> 29:26.330]  Don't cause people to suddenly, like, freak out about the difference between what they want to be doing and, you know, what is going on behind the scenes.
[29:26.450 --> 29:29.370]  I'm still working with Enigmail and various other folks about that.
[29:29.490 --> 29:30.750]  That's a difficult thing to do.
[29:32.730 --> 29:39.570]  It's this Bermuda triangle between Enigmail, GPGTools, and Thunderbird, all of which are in various stages of repair and maintenance.
[29:39.870 --> 29:45.910]  And, like, between them is this pop-up, which we cannot make go away until they all sit down in the same room and we force them to fix that code.
[29:47.430 --> 29:49.230]  So... right.
[29:49.370 --> 29:54.230]  So you want to have also another heuristic that you want to think of when you're thinking of usability design.
[29:55.190 --> 29:59.990]  You want the system... you want a match... there to be a match between the system and the real world.
[30:00.130 --> 30:02.090]  Like, use icons that people recognize, for example.
[30:02.650 --> 30:03.690]  And be consistent.
[30:03.850 --> 30:06.610]  Don't use the word directory to mean, like, five different things.
[30:06.750 --> 30:08.530]  Don't use an arrow to mean, like, five different things.
[30:08.730 --> 30:10.490]  Like, try to make sure that there is a space.
[30:11.050 --> 30:13.590]  So moving on to a slightly different shape of things here.
[30:14.210 --> 30:19.350]  Another sense of cognitive dissonance is... comes from Frantz Fanon, the anthropologist.
[30:20.210 --> 30:27.990]  If people have a core belief about something and you are asking them to believe something very different, that's not an easy thing to do.
[30:28.130 --> 30:31.050]  And it's... especially when it comes to, like, security training and lecturing.
[30:31.810 --> 30:36.870]  You can't just go in and plonk this knowledge on people and expect that they're going to change their habits.
[30:39.150 --> 30:39.590]  Sorry.
[30:39.730 --> 30:40.070]  The reader.
[30:40.190 --> 30:40.310]  Okay.
[30:40.890 --> 30:49.850]  So you want to... you want to make sure that you understand the values that people may have about privacy and security where they are in their lives right now.
[30:50.730 --> 30:54.310]  There's a really interesting one when we... once again, when we were talking with some of the folks in Brownsville.
[30:54.470 --> 30:54.830]  Brownsville.
[30:55.550 --> 30:58.330]  We were showing them Signal, the encrypted text client.
[30:58.710 --> 31:00.570]  And we sort of said, see, what do you think about this?
[31:00.990 --> 31:06.050]  And they said, well, we can see the chat record, so we assume that this is not safe.
[31:06.930 --> 31:08.190]  Because they were used to Snapchat.
[31:09.010 --> 31:11.810]  And so that was going to cause them some cognitive dissonance.
[31:11.910 --> 31:13.390]  They were like, no, this does not look safe.
[31:13.510 --> 31:17.450]  Because our assumption, our cultural assumption is the message must be gone for it to be gone.
[31:18.490 --> 31:21.610]  The other one that they came up with was people kept complaining to me.
[31:21.710 --> 31:24.270]  They're like, somebody sent me a picture of myself in a bathing suit.
[31:24.370 --> 31:25.570]  They were clearly trying to blackmail me.
[31:25.750 --> 31:26.910]  How can people do that?
[31:27.070 --> 31:28.310]  How can they just take your pictures?
[31:28.450 --> 31:29.210]  That shouldn't be legal.
[31:29.930 --> 31:30.250]  Right?
[31:30.370 --> 31:41.490]  So people... a lot of people were not there when the moment of history and the Internet happened where you could scrape the entire UI, much less the images of a website and, like, create your own White House site, you know, just because you scraped the UI, or the, you know, the graphics and the CSS and the HTML.
[31:45.350 --> 31:49.390]  So, like, you know, that's also causing people some concern.
[31:49.590 --> 31:55.530]  They don't really understand why that's happening because they don't have the underlying model of there's no stopping you from copying an image.
[31:55.650 --> 31:58.930]  Like, they don't have that underlying knowledge of what's going on a lot of the time.
[32:00.790 --> 32:01.510]  There was another one.
[32:01.570 --> 32:01.730]  Yes.
[32:01.830 --> 32:09.410]  Another thing that happened with Signal, so the, the, ultimately the response with Signal where we had, you know, them saying, it looks like the chat log is there.
[32:09.530 --> 32:16.710]  One of them said, this looks like something the feds would use to keep track of you, which was exactly the opposite of what Signal wants them to think.
[32:17.470 --> 32:26.190]  And so there was something that very different that needed to happen in the messaging, whether it was like, you know, it needed to look more like apps that they were familiar with, or whether it needed to not keep a chat log.
[32:26.870 --> 32:28.150]  More work needed to be done.
[32:28.270 --> 32:35.290]  I'm talking to this particular community, which Brownsville, by the way, is one of the most highly policed Surveiled communities in the country, and has been for years and years and years.
[32:35.370 --> 32:39.250]  There's some amazing articles, and I think like Vice, about how bad police corruption is there.
[32:39.370 --> 32:42.550]  So these are people who had genuine security concerns from the local police.
[32:43.390 --> 32:46.650]  So other things that happened with mismatch of existing culture and beliefs.
[32:47.610 --> 32:48.730]  Adoption of technology generally.
[32:48.870 --> 32:51.050]  This is an amazing study that Apple did back in the 80s.
[32:51.050 --> 32:58.270]  I think they updated it recently, where they gave computers to schools, thereby ensuring that I was a permanent customer.
[32:59.250 --> 32:59.570]  Ooh!
[32:59.570 --> 33:00.910]  And destroying my image.
[33:01.030 --> 33:01.170]  There we go.
[33:02.570 --> 33:04.410]  So yeah, that was how they got us.
[33:04.750 --> 33:10.930]  But then they also did a lot of studies of why some teachers would continue using technology, and how they would use it, and how they wouldn't.
[33:11.250 --> 33:23.310]  And one of the things they found is that the teachers who did not continue to use the computers they were given, or would use them in sort of like drill and kill boring kinds of ways, those were the teachers who believed that... who placed a high emphasis on order in their classroom.
[33:23.430 --> 33:35.150]  Like if they were used to making everybody sit down and shut up, in not having students excitedly share information with each other or techniques, and if they were not used to having students like actually teach the entire class, and stepping aside and letting students have expertise,
[33:35.690 --> 33:37.370]  then they weren't gonna continue on with that technology.
[33:37.570 --> 33:43.530]  Which of course then, you know, wastes entire generations of students who are in the classrooms with teachers who are really frustrating that way.
[33:43.810 --> 33:54.910]  But... so that's something where this particular study emphasized that when you are working with teachers to try to get them to adopt technology, You have to work on their existing culture of teaching and their existing beliefs about teaching.
[33:55.190 --> 33:56.810]  And you may need to say, okay, now get ready.
[33:57.310 --> 33:59.230]  This is gonna cause your students to talk to each other.
[33:59.510 --> 34:01.590]  And you may just have to let go on that.
[34:01.730 --> 34:04.250]  Like, and here are some ways to help you manage that a little bit better.
[34:04.790 --> 34:15.830]  Otherwise, you know, if you don't do that sort of cultural work, and that's actually, that was sort of a major failing of the One Laptop Per Child project too, is they just sort of didn't have anybody in there doing the cultural work to sort of match things up with what people were doing in the local community.
[34:16.490 --> 34:20.930]  That can really ultimately slow you down in terms of adoption.
[34:21.690 --> 34:22.270]  Let's see.
[34:22.410 --> 34:24.130]  I think I'm gonna actually skip over the next slide.
[34:25.550 --> 34:26.970]  Talking is going to be noticing time.
[34:27.790 --> 34:33.650]  So, there are some other sort of things that are sort of more at the cultural, personal level.
[34:34.190 --> 34:36.070]  There's a thing called stereotype threat.
[34:37.890 --> 34:50.290]  And the sort of finding here is that if you say to people before they start a task, something about them that is sort of a negative perception of people like them.
[34:50.410 --> 34:52.510]  So, if you say like, women aren't good at math.
[34:52.930 --> 34:58.670]  Or if you say something that's sort of, even if it's just sort of a veiled thing about that, like, or gay people are just not cool and ought to go away.
[34:59.210 --> 35:09.110]  You know, if you do that, no matter what the task is, especially if it's a related task, the performance of whoever you're talking to will be impaired.
[35:09.110 --> 35:14.590]  And I'm suddenly just noticing the irony of how I've been scheduled right now against somebody who tends to make homophobic comments in his talk.
[35:16.550 --> 35:16.870]  Yeah.
[35:17.150 --> 35:18.590]  So, there's a reason I didn't want that to happen.
[35:19.630 --> 35:20.090]  So, yeah.
[35:20.210 --> 35:22.810]  I mean, that ultimately, people will perform less well.
[35:22.950 --> 35:31.470]  So, frequently, if you go in and you sort of say anything about even calling attention to somebody's gender or their race when you're, you know, coming in.
[35:31.610 --> 35:38.350]  And that may be as simple as, you know, like, a lot of us as white people sort of come in and like, yeah, I'm going to talk like African American vernacular English.
[35:39.430 --> 35:40.090]  Don't do that.
[35:40.270 --> 35:42.010]  Like, I do it all the time and I really shouldn't.
[35:42.150 --> 35:52.250]  But like, that kind of, that sort of foregrounding of things about some characteristic of people may cause them to have a harder time working with you to learn something right after that.
[35:53.770 --> 35:55.690]  And so, yeah.
[35:55.810 --> 36:01.830]  So, stereotype threat is the, is what happens when, you know, you present somebody with a stereotype and that sort of lessens their performance.
[36:02.170 --> 36:04.250]  This may also contribute to learned helplessness.
[36:04.890 --> 36:09.350]  Some early cognitive studies, the animal-based ones, this is the perfect picture.
[36:09.450 --> 36:10.430]  It's like, no, help.
[36:11.810 --> 36:17.490]  So, if you, if you, if you're consistently going to somebody in your family and you're like, why don't they get it?
[36:17.570 --> 36:19.170]  I've told them this a hundred million times.
[36:19.790 --> 36:21.010]  Learned helplessness might be part of it.
[36:21.510 --> 36:34.970]  The initial cognitive finding was that when you give animals shocks, I always hate seeing studies like that, but if you give animals shocks and don't give them a way out of it, even when you eventually give them a way out of it, they may ultimately decide there's nothing they can do.
[36:35.010 --> 36:39.930]  And you will actually have to physically put them up and take them, pick them up and take them away from the shocks in order to get them to do things.
[36:40.550 --> 36:47.070]  And this is also something that's been, there's, there's research that's sort of built on this into thinking about human characteristics and culture.
[36:47.750 --> 36:49.930]  And there was one quote that I found on Wikipedia that was amazing.
[36:50.070 --> 36:58.130]  It was, helplessness born in the face of inescapable prejudice matches the helplessness born in the face of inescapable shocks.
[36:58.570 --> 37:07.270]  So, just like if you shock a dog and, you know, don't let it get out of that situation, if you tell somebody over and over again, you know, you are worthless, you will never achieve anything.
[37:07.870 --> 37:13.250]  And if you just, if they face racial prejudice or gender prejudice, they will just eventually decide like, okay, there's nothing I can do.
[37:13.770 --> 37:14.090]  Right?
[37:14.210 --> 37:20.390]  So that's sort of at a cultural level, that's stuff that you really want to make sure that you're not doing, you're not finding any way of doing that.
[37:20.950 --> 37:23.410]  And then also, I think that happens a lot with technology as well.
[37:23.550 --> 37:29.730]  Like too, if the technology just continues to break and continues to break and people don't understand why it's happening, they may just go like, I have no idea.
[37:30.490 --> 37:35.950]  And that may be why we're seeing this really terrifying statistic that just came out from some analysis of census data recently.
[37:37.390 --> 37:41.270]  And this is, I think, sort of a post-Snowden kind of learned helplessness.
[37:41.890 --> 37:49.050]  40% of Americans now report that they have reduced the amount of commercial activity they're involved in online.
[37:49.150 --> 37:50.110]  They're not, they're buying less.
[37:50.410 --> 37:52.930]  Or they are watching what they say online.
[37:54.370 --> 37:56.110]  And that's, that's pretty terrifying.
[37:56.310 --> 37:57.530]  Like, that's what we call a chilling effect.
[37:57.710 --> 38:03.790]  You know, people have just had their identity stolen and had their identity stolen and had their accounts locked and had been kicked out of them.
[38:04.010 --> 38:10.490]  And they've, you know, heard... I mean, like, one of the things I was really hearing in my study is that people were just saying over and over, like, there's nothing we can do, right?
[38:10.570 --> 38:11.950]  Like, everybody has access to everything.
[38:12.050 --> 38:15.030]  Like, everybody has access to everything is kind of a phrase that I heard all the time.
[38:15.210 --> 38:24.410]  Like, they don't have the models of the U.S. government can do this, my local police force can do this, the Chinese government can do this, and Google can do this, and my angry ex-boyfriend can do this, right?
[38:24.510 --> 38:29.950]  So, like, they're just sort of Taking that as like, this is a bunch of shocks, there's nothing I can do, and they're going full kitten.
[38:31.050 --> 38:34.730]  It's just cute, but terrifying and sad, so feel bad for kitten.
[38:34.970 --> 38:37.330]  And the 40% of Americans who are now kittening out that way.
[38:38.830 --> 38:41.730]  I think this also has sort of a corollary in media studies.
[38:41.890 --> 38:56.950]  There's this idea of mean world syndrome, where if you watch a lot of TV about how violent your neighborhood is, or just if you watch a lot of violent TV generally, or a lot of stuff about crime, but specifically local news especially, you will just believe that the world around you is super dangerous.
[38:57.170 --> 38:59.750]  And I think we're actually seeing that play out in the political campaigns right now.
[39:00.630 --> 39:02.950]  This sort of sense of appealing to people's mean world syndrome.
[39:03.090 --> 39:05.090]  They're like, you've heard that everything's dangerous, right?
[39:05.150 --> 39:06.030]  You've heard that on the news.
[39:06.150 --> 39:06.650]  It's the news.
[39:06.790 --> 39:07.470]  How could it be wrong?
[39:07.890 --> 39:11.810]  Not paying attention, of course, to the fact that, you know, TV news has to compete with entertainment.
[39:12.030 --> 39:15.370]  So of course they're gonna, you know, whatever bleeds leads, and they're just gonna run with that stuff.
[39:15.650 --> 39:22.610]  So I think it's similar, you know, with one we're reporting on cybercrime, when we're doing all these super scary stories about tech in the media.
[39:22.850 --> 39:24.210]  And people were definitely referring to that.
[39:24.310 --> 39:28.130]  They're like, I learned this thing on CSI Miami, I saw this thing on the local news, you know, whatever.
[39:28.390 --> 39:35.590]  So they are, they're picking up things from the media, and that's part of what's forming their mental model, and that is contributing to this 40% of people who want to stop.
[39:35.790 --> 39:37.910]  So terrifying stuff, what can you do?
[39:38.410 --> 39:40.470]  Obviously, don't tell people they're stupid.
[39:40.690 --> 39:50.310]  This may include things like, be careful if you're sighing, be careful if you're rolling your eyes, be careful if you're just slumped like... You gotta, you gotta watch yourself.
[39:50.470 --> 39:55.570]  You gotta be very composed and just like, don't give off any signs, if you can, that you're really frustrated with a person.
[39:55.630 --> 40:01.010]  I know it's hard, but like, because they may interpret it as like, oh god, they think I'm stupid and I just, I can't learn anything, right?
[40:01.110 --> 40:02.490]  So that's, that's when they may just turn off.
[40:03.710 --> 40:08.870]  Before you begin to lecture people, before you begin to tell them what to do, get them to tell you what they think is going on, right?
[40:08.930 --> 40:09.970]  Ask questions first.
[40:10.490 --> 40:13.550]  They don't have to draw out the mental model, the mental map of what they think is going on.
[40:13.630 --> 40:16.090]  Although, if you want to try that, that helps too, that's really cool to see.
[40:17.930 --> 40:26.790]  Just have them explain it to you one way or another, and then if you see any misconceptions, that's the moment to be like, okay, well, the thing I need to think about when I'm telling them things, you don't have to interrupt them, but like, when you start talking to them,
[40:26.870 --> 40:39.430]  you can say, okay, so you thought that, you know, your mailbox was just on your computer, but did you know the reason why it's so magical and you can access your phone and your computer at the same time is because there's a mailbox on both machines, right?
[40:39.610 --> 40:43.350]  So don't over explain either, like, just, just give them sufficient stuff.
[40:43.530 --> 40:47.930]  Like, don't be like that guy who was like, and then there's this protocol where you can send things to yourself on your own computer.
[40:48.190 --> 40:48.970]  Like, don't, don't, don't do that.
[40:49.090 --> 40:49.610]  Please don't do that.
[40:49.730 --> 40:52.950]  Like, just keep it as, keep it relevant and, and salient and necessary.
[40:53.810 --> 40:57.390]  Don't, also, don't assume they're saying, they, they have the assumptions that I've given you here.
[40:57.450 --> 40:58.710]  They may have a completely different assumption.
[40:58.810 --> 40:59.970]  There may be completely different things.
[41:00.150 --> 41:00.770]  You'll find out.
[41:00.970 --> 41:03.650]  I'm always out collecting people's interesting takes on things.
[41:03.730 --> 41:11.650]  I've met a woman who, on a plane once, whose mother was terrified of computers because she was terrified of copy-paste because she couldn't see the clipboard.
[41:11.750 --> 41:18.230]  She has no idea what was on it, and I think she didn't have the tool of, like, open a text editor, just paste whatever's in there, and you know it's not gone for good.
[41:18.350 --> 41:20.990]  Like, I learned that so long ago, I don't even remember that anymore.
[41:21.150 --> 41:30.070]  I remember, I imagine most of you do too, but there are, there may be random things that are, are really causing people's anxiety about this stuff, and maybe sort of holding them back.
[41:30.750 --> 41:35.110]  When it comes to stereotype threat, encourage people to think of their strengths beforehand.
[41:35.290 --> 41:42.850]  Like, if, if, you know, you know that they're good at math, or you know that they're really good at, you know, if they're really careful with their privacy in other things.
[41:43.030 --> 41:47.150]  Like, you know, if they're thinking about their diary, or, you know, they, something like that.
[41:47.310 --> 41:49.790]  Like, just say, hey, you know, you did really well on that.
[41:49.850 --> 41:51.910]  Let me show you a couple of other tricks, you know, that you can do.
[41:52.350 --> 42:00.430]  Because if you emphasize people's strengths, then that will definitely help lessen stereotype threat, and the negative effects that cause people to sort of bow out.
[42:01.330 --> 42:03.050]  Emphasize multiple sides of their identity.
[42:03.110 --> 42:04.350]  I had somebody come to me recently.
[42:04.550 --> 42:13.670]  He's not here today, but he mentioned that he'd seen me at a previous conference and wanted to introduce to me his young daughter, because she has other people in her family who are saying to her, just be pretty, just be girly.
[42:14.350 --> 42:15.890]  And I'm like, I can't help you with that.
[42:15.990 --> 42:17.070]  I've never been pretty and girly.
[42:17.190 --> 42:26.390]  But, you know, if you can emphasize to people, you know, other sides of their identity, it's like, you know, hey, you know, you fixed the blender, or you fixed, you know, you changed the oil in your car.
[42:26.490 --> 42:27.370]  This is as simple as that.
[42:27.490 --> 42:33.030]  Like, if you can bring out other things in their lives, just remind them that they're competent.
[42:33.210 --> 42:33.970]  Like, that matters.
[42:34.050 --> 42:34.910]  It does go a long way.
[42:35.530 --> 42:37.330]  Praise their success when they succeed at something.
[42:37.650 --> 42:39.330]  Compare it to, you know, standards.
[42:39.750 --> 42:45.790]  You have to come up with some sort of standards for thinking about, like, how secure they could be, and then give them constructive feedback.
[42:45.970 --> 42:49.290]  Not like, don't ever do that, you know, just just give them stuff that they can build on.
[42:49.910 --> 42:52.530]  I found this technique actually really works really well.
[42:52.590 --> 42:54.050]  This is not clear at all from what this is.
[42:54.430 --> 42:57.630]  This is a Dictaphone.
[42:57.630 --> 43:02.390]  Studs Terkel, the journalist, I think it was, used to go out when he was interviewing in the field.
[43:03.130 --> 43:08.070]  And he had found that, you know, and with, tape recorders frequently terrify people.
[43:08.170 --> 43:13.470]  If you interview people, this, like, you'll, if you'll figure this out, even if it's just your phone, people will be like, ugh, scary recording device.
[43:13.830 --> 43:27.370]  He took the ugliest, oldest, nastiest, complicated-est machine he could, and would take a long time fussing over, setting up, and cuss at it, and be like, oh, this terrible machine, and basically bring people around on his side, and be like, you know,
[43:27.450 --> 43:30.290]  like, we're both in this together against this broken machine, right?
[43:30.390 --> 43:44.590]  So like I said, if you, if you go with the line, software is broken, that is hugely helpful, because unless that has really worked for me before, I was at a nice international conference we go to in Valencia, Spain, and a friend of mine, the guy who was to become my friend,
[43:44.630 --> 43:55.510]  deeply, after this incident, comes up to me from, a guy from Zimbabwe, and he's like, I'm so sorry, I don't encrypt my things as often as I should, I really mean to, I know I should be good about this, and I said, honey, it's not your fault, the software is broken.
[43:56.070 --> 43:57.690]  And he said, I like your energy!
[43:57.990 --> 44:07.730]  And then, like, we were just, like, fast friends from that, and it's been an amazingly productive thing, because he now is open enough, like, he was, he was like, nobody had said that to him before, that it wasn't his fault.
[44:07.970 --> 44:14.190]  Emphasize to people that it's not their fault, you know, tell them that stuff is broken, point out the things that are broken, and be like, that's not your fault, right?
[44:14.330 --> 44:15.170]  That helps a lot.
[44:16.650 --> 44:22.770]  And like I said, you know, keep it salient, talk about the stuff that's sort of specific to what they're going through at that point in time.
[44:24.530 --> 44:26.330]  Stereotype threat also, sorry.
[44:27.570 --> 44:30.370]  This, I love this slide, because it's so useful for a lot of things.
[44:32.650 --> 44:42.410]  One of the things that really, and in all of this are, all of us are responsible for this, this is a very important concept you need to break yourself out of, because it's been proven to impair student performance.
[44:43.110 --> 44:55.410]  When a student believes that they are inherently smart and good at something, that that's just who they are, they're a genius, they're gifted, they're talented, they will actually perform more poorly than if they think about how, when they practice something,
[44:55.530 --> 44:56.970]  they improve at it, right?
[44:57.270 --> 45:04.250]  That is actually, it's like across the board consistently, if you emphasize to students that how they're growing and how they're learning, that's important.
[45:04.430 --> 45:12.210]  So I think we need to stop talking about the geniuses in this field, the Steve Jobs, the Bre Pettis, the whoever, Mark Zuckerberg, blah blah blah, stop it.
[45:12.370 --> 45:13.450]  Like that's not helping anybody.
[45:13.770 --> 45:15.530]  Your being a genius isn't helping anybody.
[45:15.650 --> 45:20.470]  We all need to focus on, you know, how practicing lets us improve all of our skills.
[45:22.190 --> 45:28.130]  Something that came up in Cory Doctorow's talk earlier that I really wanted to mention, because some people were sort of asking, like, how do we do this?
[45:28.190 --> 45:32.890]  How do we get people around the way that they're thinking when they have these really denialist models of thinking about things?
[45:33.150 --> 45:40.870]  I read an article a little while ago that I'm clinging to for dear life because I really hope it works given the sort of number of really terrible ideas that are going around out there.
[45:41.410 --> 45:53.090]  One of the most effective things apparently you can do to get people to give up on a firmly held bad belief is get them to, once again, explicate their mental model.
[45:53.170 --> 45:56.150]  Get them to explain to you and say, how does that work?
[45:56.650 --> 45:57.650]  Have them spell it out.
[45:57.770 --> 46:01.070]  And they may not write in front of you, go, oh, no, you're right.
[46:01.630 --> 46:08.210]  But it's been proven that later on they will actually begin to sort of go, oh, wait a minute, I really, that was not right.
[46:08.330 --> 46:09.070]  That was not cool.
[46:09.350 --> 46:18.010]  And I've actually heard, I've been talking with a number of folks lately who came out of religious fundamentalist families and began to encounter news about evolution and things like that.
[46:18.810 --> 46:22.610]  And, you know, they'll, you know, it's a slow process.
[46:22.790 --> 46:26.510]  Like, and one of the challenges is, once again, it's against deeply held beliefs.
[46:26.750 --> 46:34.310]  And in the case of evolution and thinking about systems of biology, it conflicts with their sense of self as well.
[46:34.450 --> 46:44.770]  One of the most terrifying things is to think that you might have been wrong, that you may have been wrong all this time about, you know, how the universe works and what your place in it is.
[46:45.090 --> 46:56.710]  And so it's not easy to get people to sort of get out of these models that don't match up with the biological or technical systems or governmental systems that we want them to think about.
[46:57.650 --> 47:07.290]  But it just takes, you know, beginning to make a couple cracks in that wall and then giving them space and supporting them in thinking about themselves in other ways, like beginning to think of themselves as different kinds of people.
[47:07.630 --> 47:09.130]  So, excellent.
[47:09.210 --> 47:11.370]  I think I actually came out of this with time for questions, although not too many.
[47:11.890 --> 47:12.790]  Here's my information.
[47:12.950 --> 47:15.450]  There's Sabu and his Tandy again, because he's just the best.
[47:15.610 --> 47:17.070]  Oh, oh, oh, wait, and a special surprise.
[47:17.170 --> 47:18.670]  I also make a show called The Media Show.
[47:19.130 --> 47:20.690]  I'm gonna pop out of this right now.
[47:20.830 --> 47:22.790]  We are just now putting an episode, up an episode.
[47:22.970 --> 47:23.630]  I'm gonna make it happen.
[47:23.870 --> 47:24.570]  Make it go live.
[47:24.790 --> 47:25.610]  Make it go live.
[47:26.390 --> 47:27.170]  Oh, come on.
[47:28.870 --> 47:29.690]  There's, where's the button?
[47:30.290 --> 47:30.650]  Unlisted.
[47:30.830 --> 47:31.150]  There we go.
[47:31.290 --> 47:31.590]  Public.
[47:32.190 --> 47:32.950]  Save, publish.
[47:33.630 --> 47:38.750]  Brand new episode of The Media Show out as of exactly right now about how hackers find your passwords.
[47:39.370 --> 47:41.650]  If you've been enjoying hope and feel like you're learning a lot.
[47:41.970 --> 47:43.110]  Oh, did it not show up over there?
[47:43.930 --> 47:44.790]  I'm so sorry.
[47:45.050 --> 47:46.970]  Just show you the special, specialness.
[47:47.050 --> 47:47.390]  Hold on a second.
[47:48.410 --> 47:49.730]  Eh, eh, eh, eh.
[47:49.810 --> 47:50.070]  No.
[47:50.210 --> 47:50.950]  Focus on this window.
[47:51.090 --> 47:51.250]  Boo.
[47:51.410 --> 47:51.530]  Okay.
[47:51.770 --> 47:52.130]  Sorry.
[47:52.210 --> 47:52.810]  It's now live.
[47:52.950 --> 47:53.890]  I've just put up the video.
[47:55.350 --> 48:05.370]  It's a simple way of sort of taking some of the messages from hope about the fact that, like, generally it's more often social engineering and more often non-technical attacks that are the ways that people find your passwords.
[48:05.770 --> 48:06.990]  The whole episode is about that.
[48:07.090 --> 48:10.770]  So go to youtube.com slash the media show.
[48:11.730 --> 48:13.010]  And that's up there.
[48:13.130 --> 48:14.430]  You can also find me me at these other places.
[48:14.610 --> 48:16.990]  The Medium link is actually my, um, usability work.
[48:17.150 --> 48:20.870]  I've published a lot of open source goodies there, um, that you can use on your software project.
[48:21.090 --> 48:23.150]  And if you have any questions, please come up to the microphone.
[48:23.330 --> 48:23.730]  It's right there.
[48:23.930 --> 48:27.130]  Thank you very much for being here in the time when there's a big other speech going on.
[48:30.500 --> 48:34.620]  I am, I am always super amazed at how many people, like, how do so many people show up for my talk?
[48:34.740 --> 48:35.960]  I'm just jawing about some shit.
[48:36.120 --> 48:36.280]  Okay.
[48:36.700 --> 48:37.360]  Yes, question.
[48:38.440 --> 48:39.340]  Um, thank you.
[48:39.640 --> 48:50.080]  So, what do you do when people don't want to engage or the degree to which they engage progressively gets less?
[48:50.560 --> 48:55.620]  Like, when they say, I have this problem, fix it.
[48:55.680 --> 48:57.200]  And you say, okay, I'll teach you how.
[48:57.360 --> 48:57.680]  Uh-huh.
[48:57.680 --> 48:59.260]  No, I don't have time for that, fix it.
[48:59.400 --> 49:04.780]  Or when they start swearing and saying how much they hate it because they've forgotten their password.
[49:05.000 --> 49:05.120]  Mm-hmm.
[49:05.160 --> 49:06.960]  And they know the issues that they've forgotten their password.
[49:07.260 --> 49:08.000]  Mm-hmm.
[49:08.600 --> 49:10.140]  Or they... Passwords are hard.
[49:10.380 --> 49:11.960]  Like, acknowledge for them that passwords are hard.
[49:12.160 --> 49:15.700]  Like, human memory is... Especially when we have to remember so many of them and we're not supposed to reuse them.
[49:15.860 --> 49:17.980]  So, like, I would say acknowledge that.
[49:18.180 --> 49:18.840]  Like, yeah.
[49:19.020 --> 49:19.600]  And support that.
[49:19.600 --> 49:20.480]  They have a set of known passwords.
[49:21.240 --> 49:21.240]  Yeah.
[49:21.240 --> 49:23.380]  It's just they don't want to bother going through them.
[49:23.820 --> 49:24.100]  Yeah.
[49:24.200 --> 49:26.920]  Well, you know, you can remind them, you know, distributed cognition is a thing.
[49:27.020 --> 49:29.400]  If they have a list and they're written down, be like, hey, just go check your list.
[49:29.500 --> 49:31.660]  You know, there is a password safe, I believe.
[49:31.800 --> 49:32.020]  What is it?
[49:32.080 --> 49:32.460]  One Pass?
[49:32.700 --> 49:34.540]  Is that the one that's... One Password?
[49:34.760 --> 49:35.680]  Last Password?
[49:35.900 --> 49:37.480]  Yeah, I've tried setting them up on Last Pass.
[49:37.520 --> 49:37.640]  Yeah.
[49:37.780 --> 49:41.560]  Yeah, I mean, that's... If they're not going for that, I mean, one of the things sometimes is maybe you just have to back away.
[49:41.860 --> 49:44.840]  You have to be like, I'm going to give you space to deal with this.
[49:44.960 --> 49:46.880]  If they really don't have time, they really don't have time.
[49:47.680 --> 49:49.420]  You know, and you can acknowledge that.
[49:49.820 --> 49:55.340]  But then, once again, like, you know, emphasize other things that they've done successfully.
[49:55.640 --> 50:00.980]  Try to see if there's other things that they use to remind themselves, right, about things regularly.
[50:01.260 --> 50:05.060]  If they're not using the password frequently, then, you know, that's part of the thing.
[50:05.160 --> 50:07.400]  Like, if you can suggest to them, like, maybe you want to practice this.
[50:07.560 --> 50:13.220]  Like, maybe instead of having autosave password, Maybe for a while, just leave it so you have to type it in, and then you'll remember it.
[50:13.340 --> 50:15.120]  Like, it may come back to you a little bit more easily.
[50:15.460 --> 50:15.860]  So, yep.
[50:15.940 --> 50:16.440]  Thank you.
[50:18.480 --> 50:18.840]  Hi.
[50:18.840 --> 50:24.860]  So, you talked a lot about how to communicate with the people on the other side, the people who are not technical.
[50:25.100 --> 50:27.300]  And I want to kind of turn it 180 degrees.
[50:27.480 --> 50:34.500]  Because when you were doing all these examples of people's mental models, and you were telling us, okay, they are not stupid.
[50:34.700 --> 50:37.000]  They are acting on all those assumptions.
[50:37.000 --> 50:41.200]  But, you know, we all kind of said, we groaned, we kind of snickered at it.
[50:41.340 --> 50:49.780]  We're like... and as professionals, as IT professionals, it is our job to not do that.
[50:49.920 --> 50:53.700]  But on the other hand, we have all those anecdotes and all those stories that we tell each other.
[50:53.900 --> 51:05.900]  So, what would you tell... how should we change or how should we acknowledge that we have the tendency to, you know, have this there versus us game here?
[51:05.900 --> 51:06.100]  Sure.
[51:06.760 --> 51:15.260]  I think one of the... one of the things I can think of is, is for my dissertation, one of the things I really had to do was come around from being like, what is wrong here?
[51:15.460 --> 51:17.320]  To being like, aren't people fascinating?
[51:17.500 --> 51:18.400]  Like, I'm really coming to see...
[51:19.220 --> 51:21.380]  Like, it's just... I love watching things break.
[51:21.540 --> 51:23.620]  And so, I think it's just like, wasn't this marvelous?
[51:23.820 --> 51:28.560]  And then try to figure out like, rather than just laughing at it, try to find the sense in it, I think is really the thing.
[51:28.660 --> 51:30.020]  And that takes... that definitely takes some work.
[51:31.040 --> 51:33.400]  And sometimes, you know, it's just like, bad habits.
[51:33.600 --> 51:43.080]  Like, I... God, there was a guy at the UN who was breaking the shared server by taking the entire folder off the server every time he needed one document, and then copying it back to another place on the server.
[51:43.280 --> 51:45.260]  I was like, sir, you are the problem.
[51:46.280 --> 51:46.900]  Good God.
[51:47.500 --> 51:48.540]  But he wasn't the only problem.
[51:48.620 --> 52:00.020]  Actually, the IT guy was also giving people a lot of... a lot of things.
[52:00.740 --> 52:01.020]  Hello.
[52:01.840 --> 52:02.580]  Thank you for your talk.
[52:03.660 --> 52:11.720]  For those of us who do technology education, like, as part of our job, can you recommend any good books on, like, pedagogy or, like, ways to think about it that might help us?
[52:13.400 --> 52:14.000]  That's a... Yes.
[52:14.920 --> 52:15.280]  Let's see.
[52:15.340 --> 52:16.420]  It's a way to think about pedagogy.
[52:16.540 --> 52:19.240]  I mean, like, anything coming out of MIT, to be honest.
[52:19.420 --> 52:22.740]  Like, generally, MIT has a lot of really good old stuff, you know, going back to see more papers.
[52:23.140 --> 52:27.040]  The Apple Classrooms of Tomorrow study was sort of good at a lot of levels, but that was sort of high level.
[52:28.240 --> 52:30.140]  Unfortunately, I don't know of as many as I'd like.
[52:30.760 --> 52:33.100]  I've sort of moved away from my education stuff specifically.
[52:33.240 --> 52:35.220]  Anybody in the audience have one or two to call out?
[52:35.320 --> 52:36.580]  Good books on tech pedagogy?
[52:37.400 --> 52:38.540]  I think they haven't been written.
[52:38.700 --> 52:39.980]  It's possible that we should write them.
[52:41.420 --> 52:43.560]  Because... and I actually... so I've actually been working on a project.
[52:43.680 --> 52:59.060]  One of the things I wanted to do with the mental models project was to try to encourage education policy to stop being like, push this button here in Microsoft, or kids need to learn to copy and paste and be like, okay, we need to teach them some really basic things about network architecture.
[52:59.120 --> 53:02.080]  Because if we don't do that, possibly in civics class, maybe?
[53:02.280 --> 53:03.960]  Because then we could talk about digital rights.
[53:04.220 --> 53:08.960]  Or you could do it in coding class, and then maybe when kids make code, they could actually put it up where people could use it.
[53:09.100 --> 53:19.200]  Or you could do it with, you know, your media literacy or your English class, your language arts class, and say, like, it's important to learn a URL, because here's what a URL can tell me about how somebody owns something.
[53:19.200 --> 53:22.760]  So hopefully, I will write that up, and then we can move on that.
[53:22.900 --> 53:28.360]  And that reminds me also, Mozilla had a bunch of digital literacy standards that I helped contribute to a little while ago.
[53:28.700 --> 53:34.700]  Those are worth looking up as well, because I think we came up with a document that was really nice, and would be worth holding more educators to.
[53:35.040 --> 53:35.160]  Cool.
[53:35.300 --> 53:35.740]  Thank you.
[53:35.800 --> 53:36.040]  Thank you.
[53:36.840 --> 53:38.160]  How am I on time, A.V.?
[53:38.160 --> 53:38.400]  Done.
[53:38.580 --> 53:38.840]  Done?
[53:39.120 --> 53:40.420]  Thank you very much for coming.