[00:00.000 --> 00:00.580]  Hello.
[00:04.120 --> 00:04.880]  Thanks for coming.
[00:05.640 --> 00:07.900]  And, yeah, we showed the movie last night.
[00:07.980 --> 00:09.360]  We did a Q&A at like 3 in the morning.
[00:09.400 --> 00:11.500]  So I'm going to do the best I can.
[00:12.360 --> 00:13.640]  How do we want to dive in, guys?
[00:14.400 --> 00:21.940]  Should we let Josh get started since he's the most involved in the ongoing appeal of this case?
[00:23.060 --> 00:25.380]  Do you want to just give us like a state of...
[00:26.420 --> 00:28.100]  where things are at?
[00:29.240 --> 00:32.100]  So currently, hopefully everyone can hear me.
[00:32.300 --> 00:32.800]  Hello, everyone.
[00:35.260 --> 00:48.560]  We are right now in the process of preparing our reply brief to the government's brief in opposition to our appellate brief.
[00:48.920 --> 00:52.300]  And that we will be filing as of right now.
[00:52.480 --> 00:54.540]  It seems that it's going to be on August 1st.
[00:55.520 --> 01:09.760]  So, you know, the purpose of that is basically just to respond to some of the points that the government raised in their opposition to our appellate brief.
[01:10.220 --> 01:13.480]  And certainly, you know, I believe that we have the stronger position.
[01:13.940 --> 01:20.620]  And looking forward to, you know, having the opportunity to respond to the government.
[01:21.040 --> 01:22.520]  And that's kind of where we're at right now.
[01:23.800 --> 01:30.040]  I'm curious, I mean, just so I know how to start talking, how many people in here know much about this case?
[01:30.220 --> 01:31.620]  Does everybody know a lot about it?
[01:31.700 --> 01:32.200]  Is there any reason?
[01:32.360 --> 01:34.540]  Should we just go give you a quick summary of what happened?
[01:34.640 --> 01:34.880]  Yes.
[01:35.260 --> 01:38.220]  Yeah, because we're kind of diving in all the way in the deep end.
[01:38.220 --> 01:41.040]  And for a lot of you, you probably will just have no idea what we're talking about.
[01:41.040 --> 01:43.740]  So, yeah, no, it's okay.
[01:44.080 --> 01:49.360]  The Silk Road was a market on the dark net.
[01:49.540 --> 01:50.800]  You probably have all heard of Silk Road.
[01:51.420 --> 01:55.360]  It was a robust community forum, anonymous users.
[01:55.520 --> 01:57.700]  It was a marketplace.
[01:57.960 --> 02:04.440]  It predominantly sold drugs in terms of the percentage of what was being moved around on it.
[02:05.360 --> 02:26.140]  In 2013, a young man from Texas named Ross Ulbricht was arrested in San Francisco and charged with being the Dread Pirate Roberts, who was accused of being the Dread Pirate Roberts, who was the primary controller, presumed controller of the Silk Road, was extradited from San Francisco to New York,
[02:26.160 --> 02:33.440]  and went through a lengthy pretrial process in New York here in the Southern District here in Manhattan.
[02:34.440 --> 02:48.300]  And went to trial in 2015, and in that trial was ultimately found guilty in all charges, which were primarily drug kingpin charges, hacking charges, that sort of thing.
[02:48.480 --> 02:54.440]  And it was a fairly contentious case.
[02:54.560 --> 03:09.080]  There was a lot of implications and questions around it in terms of how one would know exactly how you try a case based on anonymous users and encrypted technology, how you know what the evidence is, whether it's real, whether it's not.
[03:10.200 --> 03:15.220]  Bitcoin played a very big part in this story because the Silk Road used Bitcoin.
[03:15.800 --> 03:20.380]  And I would go a step farther and say the Silk Road actually kind of made Bitcoin happen.
[03:20.420 --> 03:23.480]  Though I know a lot of people don't like it when people say that.
[03:23.480 --> 03:25.680]  They certainly popularized Bitcoin.
[03:26.860 --> 03:31.080]  So there's a lot of it, a lot of sort of cross-section implications, especially for this community.
[03:31.560 --> 03:34.960]  You know, you're dealing with a trial that involved the drug war.
[03:35.260 --> 03:39.660]  It involved Bitcoin, financial regulation, and it involved cyber.
[03:41.040 --> 03:46.360]  And, you know, and sort of that community because it was a very politically oriented community on Silk Road.
[03:46.480 --> 03:50.520]  It wasn't what everyone was doing, it wasn't just political by any means, but there was a lot of that.
[03:51.480 --> 03:52.580]  So it was an interesting case.
[03:52.700 --> 03:56.980]  I got involved pretty early on, not as early as Andy.
[03:57.080 --> 04:05.680]  I'm gonna let him speak for himself and started making a movie about this right around when Ross was arrested and was very, very entwined in the Silk Road community.
[04:05.840 --> 04:18.280]  I ended up with incredible access to the chief architects of Silk Road who I'm, you know, still in contact with and then people in law enforcement and then people on Ross's family and on the defense team.
[04:18.280 --> 04:24.220]  So it certainly occupied the greater part of my life for several years and kind of still does.
[04:24.320 --> 04:26.280]  You kind of can't get out once you get in.
[04:28.180 --> 04:31.920]  So those are the basic, I'd say, ground rule implications of what happened.
[04:32.080 --> 04:41.380]  And, you know, subsequent to Ross's sentence, he was sentenced to essentially a double life sentence without the possibility of parole, which they're currently appealing.
[04:42.080 --> 04:48.020]  It was very intense, very extreme sentence and there's been a lot of stuff that's come out since the trial.
[04:48.200 --> 04:58.340]  There were rogue agents that people have discovered that were stealing Bitcoin and also manipulating the site and had full access to the site and the ability to manipulate things that were going on on Silk Road.
[04:58.460 --> 04:59.900]  There's a lot of questions that haven't been answered.
[04:59.900 --> 05:05.640]  So the case is still very much of interest to a lot of people besides just the defense.
[05:07.440 --> 05:14.560]  Having worked with Alex on his film Deep Web, you know, I was attracted to Alex's approach in part because there has been this...
[05:14.560 --> 05:26.880]  I've been covering this case, the whole Silk Road story since, I guess, 2011 when I first saw this kind of janky looking website that was offering psychedelic drugs for sale for Bitcoins.
[05:26.880 --> 05:31.820]  And it seemed like it must be a joke, but it was not a joke and grew into a massive black market.
[05:32.940 --> 05:44.800]  And then I interviewed the Dread Pirate Roberts through the Silk Road's messaging, anonymous messaging system in 2013, just before Ross Ulbricht was arrested and the site was seized.
[05:46.520 --> 05:52.160]  But it's... so it's been very weird for me as the... as I felt like I was the reporter who was discovering this story.
[05:52.160 --> 05:59.460]  And then with Ross's arrest, it suddenly became this massive mainstream media phenomenon.
[05:59.720 --> 06:06.420]  And it was just... their viewpoint on it was very different from the way that I saw it.
[06:06.700 --> 06:22.340]  I had been following the Dread Pirate Roberts as this almost, like, ideological, political figure who was leading what he described as a movement of people on the dark web, trying to carve out this libertarian free trade zone, more or less, where, you know,
[06:22.460 --> 06:30.680]  if we can't follow our really anarchist ideals in the real world, we can do it in this little bubble that we've created with cryptography.
[06:31.180 --> 06:34.300]  It was a crypto anarchist experiment, as he described it.
[06:34.300 --> 06:42.480]  And then suddenly, when it was on the cover of Time Magazine and Newsweek, it was like, the dark web, how to keep your children safe from, you know, Internet drug dealers.
[06:43.260 --> 06:56.300]  And Alex, I appreciate the fact that his film does acknowledge that the Silk Road was a political movement in addition to, like, a very lucrative scheme.
[06:56.300 --> 07:13.440]  Although, I think it's always important to point out that there's no evidence that Ross Ulbricht enjoyed the millions of dollars in Bitcoins that he amassed as a result of running this, of running the Silk Road, that he lived this incredibly austere lifestyle and just,
[07:13.440 --> 07:18.520]  you know, kept the money in the digital equivalent of, like, a piggy bank they never touched.
[07:18.760 --> 07:24.700]  He was not, you know, living large on the profits from this.
[07:24.700 --> 07:28.640]  So, I do continue to see Ross Ulbricht as a political figure.
[07:28.780 --> 07:34.460]  I think that that's something that has been lost in the mainstream story about this.
[07:34.620 --> 07:49.500]  But then, the other things I think we wanted to talk about in this panel, the kind of, the other kind of, like, deeper story of the Silk Road is, first, the massive corruption of the two agents who were involved in the Silk Road takedown.
[07:50.060 --> 08:08.660]  One from the Drug Enforcement Administration, Karl Mark Force, and one from the Secret Service, Sean Bridges, who both engaged in a kind of mercenary criminal behavior that I would say, in some ways, eclipses Ross Ulbricht in the sense that they really were in it just for themselves.
[08:08.660 --> 08:09.900]  They had no political motives.
[08:10.040 --> 08:12.380]  They were stealing Bitcoins from the Silk Road.
[08:12.560 --> 08:17.780]  They were extorting money from Ross Ulbricht as they also tried to track him down.
[08:18.320 --> 08:27.000]  They, at the same time, were selling him information about the law enforcement investigation into the Silk Road, all under different pseudonyms that they had created.
[08:27.000 --> 08:38.120]  So, it's a, it was a, when all of this came out and these guys were tried and then convicted and sentenced, there was an insane twist to this already unbelievably twisty story.
[08:38.820 --> 08:51.800]  And then I think, I also just wanted to make sure we touch on the, the, the insanity as well of, of, of Ross's sentence, Ross's double life sentence for what essentially are convictions on non, non-violent crimes.
[08:51.800 --> 08:59.860]  I mean, you've probably all heard about the murder for hire accusations in the trial, but those were not charged crimes.
[09:00.160 --> 09:06.300]  He actually faces charges in a different case altogether in Maryland for those murders for hire.
[09:06.460 --> 09:07.600]  That has not come to trial.
[09:07.780 --> 09:15.020]  And yet he was sentenced essentially, uh, for those, for those violent crimes, although he wasn't convicted of them.
[09:15.120 --> 09:31.500]  So it's, it's a, uh, maybe Josh can talk about how that works, but it's, it's, it continues to kind of, uh, well, I just, I think it's like ever so slightly appalling that Ross Ulbricht, among many other thousands of people in the United States justice system,
[09:31.680 --> 09:35.060]  can be convicted of non-violent crimes and then sentenced to life in prison.
[09:35.220 --> 09:50.800]  But in this case, it's especially, um, troublesome because it does seem like there was a backdoor kind of trick used to essentially accuse him of, of murder without convicting him of it and then sentence him based on those sort of non-charged crimes.
[09:51.080 --> 10:00.880]  Um, so I actually just want to touch on the, uh, government corruption that Alex mentioned and also, um, Andy just mentioned.
[10:01.040 --> 10:05.320]  So that's one of our, you know, major points on, on appeal.
[10:05.640 --> 10:22.620]  Um, and so with the, during, during the court, like while we were preparing for trial, uh, I would say maybe four, I don't remember exactly the timeline, maybe four to six weeks before the trial, we, we like the defense team learned about this massive,
[10:22.620 --> 10:31.400]  uh, corruption of DEA agents that were very centrally involved in the investigation of the Silk Road.
[10:31.580 --> 10:49.220]  Uh, and we spent, I mean, I don't know, you know, how many, how many hours, but a lot of time, uh, litigating this issue in the court as to whether we would be able to, you know, bring, essentially let the jury know about this, you know, astounding level of corruption.
[10:49.820 --> 10:55.320]  And, you know, ultimately it was determined that, you know, we, we weren't able to bring any of that out during the trial.
[10:55.840 --> 11:05.700]  Um, you know, I was just talking with, uh, Lynn, uh, Ross's mother before, who she's also giving a talk after this, uh, somewhere on this floor.
[11:05.980 --> 11:07.160]  Madison room, I believe.
[11:08.160 --> 11:08.680]  Okay.
[11:09.000 --> 11:20.580]  Um, and you know, so I, I've spent the past, uh, the past week, I've been doing this like intense, uh, criminal defense, like trial training program.
[11:20.840 --> 11:32.580]  And one of the things that they harp on is this notion of, you know, primacy and recency that people, you know, tend to remember the first thing that they hear and the last thing that they hear.
[11:33.180 --> 11:45.740]  And so, you know, had the first thing that we've been able to tell the jury about been about to focus on the astounding level of corruption that was, you know, central to
[11:49.040 --> 11:50.100]  central to the government.
[11:50.220 --> 12:02.360]  I mean, it wasn't central to the government's case, but like the, the guys closest to this case that were conducting the investigation for law enforcement, have we been able to, you know, open on that and was, had that been in, you know, the jury's mind during,
[12:02.360 --> 12:06.600]  uh, you know, the course of the government presenting their evidence at trial.
[12:06.940 --> 12:12.040]  Um, you know, I, I truly believe that, you know, that would have made a difference.
[12:12.260 --> 12:24.340]  Um, and so that's, you know, a major issue, uh, that we, Can you just explain like how this came to be that you were not allowed to talk about the fact that you, I mean, you knew some of the facts about these corrupt agents involved in the investigation,
[12:24.340 --> 12:25.900]  but we're not allowed to mention them at trial.
[12:26.300 --> 12:28.740]  What is the just, what was the government's justification for that?
[12:29.480 --> 12:42.380]  Uh, I mean, so there was, there was also, there was a investigation, uh, pending into this matter in another jurisdiction.
[12:42.560 --> 12:45.460]  And, um, you know, it was all being done under seal.
[12:45.640 --> 12:52.700]  And so, you know, the government said, oh, well, you know, we can't bring this stuff in because it's being, you know, this investigation is being conducted completely under seal.
[12:52.960 --> 12:58.520]  And, um, you know, that was essentially their, you know, argument to the court.
[12:58.680 --> 13:16.900]  Um, there were several, um, events that occurred during the course of the, of the, the case, even before trial, um, that kind of pointed to different types of malfeasance in, in the way that the case had been conducted.
[13:17.640 --> 13:29.240]  Um, and there was a, a very big question, which never got satisfied about how the, the server, the Silk Road servers were accessed in the first place, which was never satisfactorily, uh, responded to.
[13:30.240 --> 13:40.620]  And, uh, I mean, I think that, that, uh, as an outsider, um, what was really apparent to me was the speed at which they really wanted to run this thing through the system.
[13:40.940 --> 13:59.060]  And, you know, and part of that, you know, just to be really unbiased is that, um, the, the, the, the, the technology, the idea of trying to put a case before a jury that involves Bitcoin and encryption and the dark net and the deep web.
[13:59.080 --> 14:02.880]  And most people don't know what any of those things are, much less what the difference is between those things.
[14:03.140 --> 14:09.560]  And, uh, you know, the implications of a, of a, of an anonymous community and then you add the political element.
[14:10.060 --> 14:15.920]  It, it, you know, I think it made their head swim and it was emblematic, um, to me.
[14:16.060 --> 14:29.580]  This is something I dealt with on a much lighter note when I was, you know, researching the Napster story, which I was involved in from, from when Napster was in existence is when I first met those guys and started working on that story was the huge disconnect between the sort of institutional,
[14:29.580 --> 14:33.620]  uh, elements that were trying to break these systems and then the systems themselves.
[14:33.960 --> 14:39.640]  And there was such a huge disconnect in understanding, uh, on the institutional side.
[14:39.800 --> 14:44.240]  And, and that means government, uh, corporations, law enforcement, and also largely the press.
[14:44.420 --> 15:00.520]  I mean, there was very little understanding, you know, people there, I could count almost on one hand, people like Andy and other journalists, Patrick, who, you know, maybe he's at a hacking collective somewhere where he disappeared, but, um, uh, who really understood these technologies deeply and,
[15:00.520 --> 15:03.520]  and were, and were also not only that, but then willing to write about it.
[15:03.940 --> 15:11.820]  Uh, because there was a lot of, of fear about really stepping forward and making certain claims about what the Silk Road was, whether you liked it or not.
[15:12.320 --> 15:14.720]  Uh, you know, the party line was just, this is drugs, this is bad.
[15:14.820 --> 15:16.220]  We shut it down, you know, the end.
[15:16.360 --> 15:22.940]  And, and, you know, some people in the media I talked to, I was talking about this earlier, said to me early on that to them, it was Occam's razor.
[15:23.100 --> 15:24.020]  It was straight, it was straightforward.
[15:24.200 --> 15:25.380]  It was exactly what it looked like.
[15:25.380 --> 15:32.500]  And knowing what I knew, because I'd gotten pretty inside the Silk Road by then, you know, I, it was anything but Occam's razor.
[15:32.860 --> 15:38.100]  And as the story went on, it was just, you would learn that there was more things that weren't what they seemed and more things that weren't what they seemed.
[15:38.120 --> 15:39.000]  And this was complicated.
[15:39.200 --> 15:43.760]  And this was, was, uh, needed to be given a bit more oversight than it was being given.
[15:44.200 --> 15:57.160]  Um, and so sort of to be in the trial for me, um, and I was not there the whole time, but to when I was there and then to be there in the sentencing, you know, it was sort of like being kicked in the stomach because you really felt like there was no, it was,
[15:57.280 --> 15:59.960]  I'd been with the story for so long And it just wasn't there.
[16:00.340 --> 16:03.040]  There was no representation in that courtroom.
[16:03.500 --> 16:13.660]  There was really not room given for it to be able to express what this thing was that you could try to form a rational understanding of what actually happened.
[16:14.920 --> 16:17.040]  It just was moved through very quickly.
[16:17.160 --> 16:18.420]  They just tried to keep it very contained.
[16:18.580 --> 16:19.740]  This is a drug thing.
[16:20.000 --> 16:21.540]  Just look at it as a drug thing.
[16:21.760 --> 16:22.140]  The end.
[16:22.300 --> 16:22.580]  Goodbye.
[16:23.220 --> 16:25.680]  And it was clearly just so much more to it.
[16:25.900 --> 16:28.760]  And so I wasn't exactly surprised by the rogue agents.
[16:28.860 --> 16:33.740]  I found out about them as the trial was unfolding through another source that I had.
[16:33.900 --> 16:41.760]  That this one major source, the one Andy mentioned, Force, who had been a very big part of the Silk Road Task Force out of Baltimore.
[16:42.440 --> 16:45.420]  It was becoming clearly evident that this guy was up to no good.
[16:45.580 --> 16:50.380]  And then the levels to which he was up to no good got more and more labyrinthine.
[16:50.380 --> 16:52.960]  And go far beyond just stealing Bitcoin.
[16:53.560 --> 16:59.940]  And, you know, the direct engagement he had, even with inciting these murder for hires.
[17:00.080 --> 17:00.800]  And there were no murders.
[17:00.840 --> 17:04.220]  It was all sort of, you know, basically like sting ops.
[17:04.440 --> 17:06.480]  And it was...
[17:06.480 --> 17:07.020]  And scammers.
[17:07.280 --> 17:07.940]  Yeah, exactly.
[17:08.080 --> 17:09.260]  It's kind of scams, basically.
[17:10.140 --> 17:12.960]  And a lot of that had been manufactured by the rogue agents.
[17:13.140 --> 17:15.760]  So, you know, the story just got more and more complicated.
[17:15.760 --> 17:19.380]  And the people that I knew inside the Silk Road were getting more and more outraged by what they saw.
[17:19.400 --> 17:21.460]  Because it just wasn't what they knew had happened.
[17:21.760 --> 17:25.640]  And so it wasn't as if I sat there and went, I know what's going on.
[17:25.700 --> 17:27.260]  And dammit, no one will tell the truth.
[17:27.320 --> 17:29.080]  You didn't really know what was going on.
[17:29.180 --> 17:33.720]  It was really hard to have any indication of what actually concretely had happened.
[17:33.860 --> 17:37.700]  And I feel very unsatisfied with the possibility that I may never find out.
[17:37.740 --> 17:38.200]  No matter...
[17:38.200 --> 17:40.040]  I know a lot more than most people do.
[17:40.720 --> 17:43.180]  And more than we were able to put in the movie for legal reasons.
[17:43.440 --> 17:46.120]  But it was very, very frustrating.
[17:46.520 --> 17:48.400]  I can only imagine what it was like for you.
[17:50.040 --> 17:50.400]  So...
[17:50.800 --> 17:52.920]  And I won't put you on the spot by making you talk about that.
[17:54.040 --> 17:54.400]  But...
[17:56.620 --> 17:57.700]  Well, it was really bizarre.
[17:57.840 --> 17:59.320]  I sat in every day of the trial.
[17:59.320 --> 18:05.020]  And it was just, like, kind of surreal to have had this impression that you had, like, spent...
[18:05.020 --> 18:06.680]  Was it six weeks, I think?
[18:07.220 --> 18:08.120]  How long was the trial?
[18:08.560 --> 18:09.040]  Oh...
[18:09.040 --> 18:09.780]  A month.
[18:10.120 --> 18:10.880]  Yeah, three weeks.
[18:10.880 --> 18:13.960]  Like, hearing, like, all the facts about this case.
[18:14.600 --> 18:15.080]  And...
[18:15.080 --> 18:19.440]  And then, after everything is over, you...
[18:19.440 --> 18:22.180]  Only then, like, these indictments come out.
[18:22.300 --> 18:25.540]  And you learn that you guys had had to sit on all this really...
[18:25.540 --> 18:25.720]  Really?
[18:25.800 --> 18:27.920]  I actually remember that...
[18:27.920 --> 18:28.320]  I met...
[18:28.320 --> 18:29.640]  I met up with you, like, one time...
[18:30.180 --> 18:30.420]  I don't...
[18:30.420 --> 18:31.480]  We got lunch one day and, like...
[18:31.480 --> 18:32.200]  Was that before the...
[18:32.200 --> 18:34.200]  No, it was right after that stuff came out.
[18:34.280 --> 18:35.240]  And you were just, like...
[18:35.240 --> 18:36.180]  I don't know how...
[18:36.180 --> 18:38.220]  Like, how could you, like, keep that a secret?
[18:38.360 --> 18:38.900]  How do you not...
[18:38.900 --> 18:39.840]  How does it not come out?
[18:40.120 --> 18:40.160]  Right.
[18:40.160 --> 18:44.320]  And, I mean, obviously, we were, you know, precluded from using it.
[18:44.440 --> 18:45.420]  But, yeah, I mean...
[18:45.420 --> 18:45.880]  Well, I can...
[18:45.880 --> 18:55.280]  The lead defense attorney, Joshua Draytel, on the case, I could see that he was kind of, like, just boiling over with frustration as the trial went on.
[18:55.540 --> 18:57.580]  And that certainly helps to explain why.
[18:57.720 --> 18:59.560]  And he did call for a mistrial, how many times?
[18:59.660 --> 19:00.600]  Like, five or six?
[19:00.720 --> 19:01.740]  A few times.
[19:02.060 --> 19:05.840]  So, you know, we'll see where this appeal goes.
[19:05.980 --> 19:12.580]  But it does seem like there is an unusual amount of stuff that could be a foothold for an appeal.
[19:12.620 --> 19:13.900]  But I am not a lawyer.
[19:14.040 --> 19:14.580]  I have no idea.
[19:14.580 --> 19:15.400]  It's...
[19:15.400 --> 19:16.060]  I...
[19:16.060 --> 19:23.620]  It seemed like in every step of the legal... of the trial, the initial trial, the government just won every argument.
[19:23.920 --> 19:25.360]  In the pre-trial, as well.
[19:25.500 --> 19:26.140]  You know, there was this...
[19:26.140 --> 19:30.400]  As Alex mentioned, there was a controversy over how did the government's...
[19:30.400 --> 19:35.580]  How did the FBI find the Silk Road server despite the fact that it was a Tor hidden service?
[19:36.260 --> 19:42.000]  And that wasn't a very interesting, like, series of disclosures from them.
[19:42.160 --> 19:47.240]  They first said, oh, it was just like a leaky CAPTCHA on the site that revealed its IP address.
[19:47.400 --> 19:47.620]  Right.
[19:47.800 --> 19:50.820]  And that wasn't enough information, certainly.
[19:51.320 --> 19:51.720]  So...
[19:51.720 --> 19:54.000]  It was enough that nobody in the tech community bought it, but...
[19:54.000 --> 19:54.200]  It was...
[19:54.200 --> 19:56.820]  It was like a... just a very weird explanation.
[19:57.180 --> 19:57.340]  Yeah.
[19:57.460 --> 19:58.500]  So they...
[19:59.400 --> 19:59.800]  In...
[20:00.260 --> 20:01.320]  In connection with...
[20:01.320 --> 20:03.480]  You know, we were raising a lot of questions about how...
[20:03.480 --> 20:07.840]  I mean, just like Andy said, obviously, the Silk Road was hosted as a Tor hidden service.
[20:08.500 --> 20:13.360]  And, you know, their explanation was how we discovered it through a leaky CAPTCHA, essentially.
[20:13.560 --> 20:15.560]  You know, I was visiting...
[20:15.560 --> 20:19.060]  There was an FBI agent who is no longer with the FBI.
[20:19.060 --> 20:20.860]  His name is Chris Tarbell.
[20:21.460 --> 20:32.180]  And he submitted, like, it's called a declaration, along with the government's motions saying that, yeah, this is how we discovered the Silk Road server.
[20:32.320 --> 20:34.000]  You know, I went on the Silk Road.
[20:34.380 --> 20:38.800]  There was a CAPTCHA that you needed to type in...
[20:38.800 --> 20:42.220]  You know, you needed to get through a CAPTCHA to get onto the Silk Road site.
[20:42.380 --> 20:51.660]  And so he went onto that CAPTCHA and typed in, you know, a bunch of stuff, essentially like fuzzing type of, you know, thing.
[20:52.740 --> 21:04.680]  And ultimately, he had... there were some packets that were spit back from the Silk Road server that contained the true IP address of this server that was hosted as a Tor hidden service.
[21:05.420 --> 21:10.340]  And, you know, as Andy mentioned, nobody in the tech world actually, you know, bought that.
[21:10.340 --> 21:12.080]  I was just like, well, that's ridiculous.
[21:14.360 --> 21:26.080]  So, having actually, like, looked at, you know, looked at the configuration files from the servers themselves, and then...
[21:29.700 --> 21:32.900]  The explanation that they gave was just, you know, it wasn't credible.
[21:33.560 --> 21:35.820]  And that was, you know, largely...
[21:36.420 --> 21:37.880]  I mean, so one of the things that I...
[21:37.880 --> 21:39.440]  And you said as much in your response.
[21:39.620 --> 21:39.980]  Right.
[21:40.140 --> 21:45.420]  And their response to your saying that, well, this doesn't really make sense, was even better.
[21:45.500 --> 21:46.840]  Which was just, okay, fine.
[21:46.840 --> 21:48.040]  So, just...
[21:48.040 --> 21:48.680]  Just...
[21:48.680 --> 21:50.360]  Let's say we did just hack the servers, okay?
[21:50.760 --> 21:51.580]  Let's just...
[21:51.580 --> 21:53.720]  Even if we did, that's not illegal, right?
[21:54.060 --> 21:54.460]  Because...
[21:55.860 --> 21:57.120]  Because all of these...
[21:57.120 --> 21:58.860]  Because reasons, including...
[21:58.860 --> 22:03.640]  Like, the server is in a foreign country, and so we can do whatever we want.
[22:03.800 --> 22:05.200]  By the way, without a warrant.
[22:05.440 --> 22:06.020]  With no warrants.
[22:06.960 --> 22:08.360]  Which is a complete...
[22:08.360 --> 22:10.840]  I mean, this entire area of the law is very...
[22:12.960 --> 22:13.680]  It's shifting.
[22:13.940 --> 22:15.980]  I mean, there's new cases, you know...
[22:15.980 --> 22:19.220]  I'm not gonna get into other cases, but this...
[22:19.220 --> 22:19.460]  You know...
[22:20.060 --> 22:24.760]  The government's saying, yeah, we can hack into, you know, this computer because it's located abroad.
[22:24.760 --> 22:26.300]  I mean, you know, in the future.
[22:27.040 --> 22:28.660]  You know, those things are going to be challenged.
[22:29.520 --> 22:29.680]  Right.
[22:30.180 --> 22:33.920]  I mean, they didn't actually know where the server was, because that's the whole idea of a door hidden service.
[22:34.100 --> 22:37.140]  So they said it's in a foreign country, so we can do what we want.
[22:37.180 --> 22:38.200]  Yeah, it was a backwards argument.
[22:38.340 --> 22:40.100]  But they can't have known that until they...
[22:40.100 --> 22:40.180]  Exactly.
[22:40.840 --> 22:41.200]  So...
[22:41.200 --> 22:41.840]  And then...
[22:41.840 --> 22:48.720]  But then the argument that actually won the day for them was, well, how can this be a violation of Ross's Fourth Amendment rights if he's not...
[22:48.720 --> 22:49.780]  If he's saying this isn't his server.
[22:50.160 --> 22:54.460]  So for him to, like, actually have any privacy for the server, he has to admit that it's his.
[22:54.880 --> 22:55.020]  Yeah.
[22:55.100 --> 22:56.260]  So is this your server, Ross?
[22:56.400 --> 22:56.840]  Yes or no?
[22:56.980 --> 23:01.380]  And that essentially was the catch-22 that I think forced...
[23:01.380 --> 23:01.480]  Yeah.
[23:01.480 --> 23:02.420]  I mean, you know better.
[23:02.580 --> 23:04.940]  But forced the defense to drop that line of defense.
[23:04.940 --> 23:07.200]  It was a little chilling, again, from the outside.
[23:07.320 --> 23:08.820]  Because it just felt...
[23:08.820 --> 23:13.900]  It was a very draconian way to play their hand.
[23:13.900 --> 23:14.780]  Which is to say...
[23:14.780 --> 23:18.020]  Because you're supposed to be innocent until proven guilty, and you're supposed to have rights.
[23:18.700 --> 23:30.260]  So, you know, one of the things that I battled with while I was making the film with various people, including certain members of the press, was that this was a rights...
[23:30.260 --> 23:35.600]  It wasn't wholly a rights-oriented story, but there was a very big rights component to this story.
[23:35.840 --> 23:38.740]  And that it was a precedent-setting case.
[23:38.840 --> 23:42.420]  And people would argue that it wasn't because you're dealing with drugs and other forms of contraband.
[23:42.420 --> 23:45.880]  And my counter-argument to that is that's exactly why it's precedent-setting.
[23:45.960 --> 23:50.380]  Because it's exactly the type of case that the government would use to set precedent because it isn't unassailable.
[23:50.560 --> 23:51.520]  Because it isn't easy.
[23:51.720 --> 23:53.080]  Because it will...
[23:53.080 --> 23:56.360]  The whiff of crime will send most people away.
[23:56.580 --> 23:59.660]  And, you know, you won't get covered by a lot of the major media outlets.
[23:59.700 --> 24:00.800]  Or they won't cover it thoroughly.
[24:01.280 --> 24:04.480]  And news cameras won't be down at the courthouse for Ross.
[24:04.660 --> 24:06.720]  And, you know, it's not the Aaron Swartz case.
[24:06.840 --> 24:10.100]  It's not, you know, as easily and immediately unassailable.
[24:10.100 --> 24:12.560]  That's exactly the type of case you can set precedent on.
[24:12.680 --> 24:13.960]  Because you can do whatever you want to do.
[24:14.080 --> 24:15.040]  You can slip it under the radar.
[24:15.040 --> 24:16.020]  The guy gets sentenced.
[24:16.180 --> 24:16.540]  And you're done.
[24:16.720 --> 24:17.640]  And those...
[24:17.640 --> 24:20.600]  The implications of that just get dismissed.
[24:22.300 --> 24:26.700]  And, you know, the notion of not granting the rights to...
[24:26.700 --> 24:28.260]  I mean, if the evidence...
[24:28.260 --> 24:32.380]  The primary evidence being used against this person was illegally obtained.
[24:32.380 --> 24:39.520]  Well, you know, the way the law works and that renders that case and his case inadmissible.
[24:40.160 --> 24:41.340]  So, that was a big...
[24:41.340 --> 24:43.360]  It was very frustrating to watch from the outside.
[24:43.580 --> 24:48.000]  It was a sort of like kind of labyrinthine logic they used to not allow that to get introduced.
[24:48.200 --> 24:49.440]  And it still has never been addressed.
[24:49.660 --> 24:49.900]  There was...
[24:49.900 --> 24:54.420]  No one ever had to get on a stand during that trial and explain how they got to the servers.
[24:54.420 --> 24:57.100]  And, you know, you guys are all intact.
[24:57.180 --> 24:57.720]  So, you get it.
[24:57.840 --> 24:59.800]  It's the same as somebody opening the door of your house.
[24:59.920 --> 25:00.500]  Walking into your house.
[25:00.640 --> 25:01.880]  And stealing everything you have.
[25:02.100 --> 25:03.360]  And all of your files.
[25:03.540 --> 25:04.520]  And all of your medical records.
[25:04.640 --> 25:05.380]  And all of your photographs.
[25:05.660 --> 25:07.340]  And taking your kids and your blankets.
[25:07.960 --> 25:08.720]  Without a warrant.
[25:08.880 --> 25:09.740]  I mean, it's your whole life.
[25:10.000 --> 25:12.360]  So, it matters, I think.
[25:12.560 --> 25:16.280]  And it's one of the frustrations that I've had of watching this case go down.
[25:16.340 --> 25:17.780]  Can I just add one...
[25:17.780 --> 25:19.620]  Justice, I think was it two weeks ago?
[25:20.100 --> 25:20.660]  Their final...
[25:20.660 --> 25:21.880]  Oh, the Microsoft thing?
[25:21.980 --> 25:22.260]  Yeah, right.
[25:22.260 --> 25:27.960]  So, I think that the Silk Road trial should have been a kind of precedent-setting trial.
[25:28.000 --> 25:29.840]  But I'm not sure that it did set any precedents.
[25:29.840 --> 25:32.280]  Because the government just got its way with everything.
[25:32.540 --> 25:33.760]  Well, except the wrong precedent.
[25:34.560 --> 25:35.320]  Maybe, yeah.
[25:35.440 --> 25:42.300]  The precedent's going to be set at the Second Circuit when they go along with our arguments and our appeal brief.
[25:42.860 --> 25:43.680]  Very possibly.
[25:43.980 --> 25:51.220]  But the precedent that has been set already now was this other ancillary case.
[25:51.940 --> 25:56.000]  One of the Silk Road staffers...
[25:56.000 --> 25:57.200]  What was his name?
[25:57.320 --> 25:57.920]  Gary Winick?
[25:58.200 --> 25:58.300]  Davis.
[25:58.760 --> 25:59.080]  Right?
[25:59.300 --> 25:59.620]  Yeah, sorry.
[25:59.700 --> 26:00.180]  Gary Davis.
[26:00.660 --> 26:01.800]  An Irish guy.
[26:03.260 --> 26:05.680]  So, we've only recently learned...
[26:06.220 --> 26:08.980]  Basically, the FBI wanted...
[26:08.980 --> 26:15.360]  The Department of Justice wanted Microsoft to cough up some emails from their Irish data center.
[26:15.880 --> 26:17.920]  Microsoft said, that's in a foreign country.
[26:18.040 --> 26:19.280]  It's out of your jurisdiction.
[26:19.280 --> 26:21.500]  We're not going to give it to you, even with your search warrants.
[26:21.820 --> 26:22.800]  And they fought that.
[26:22.940 --> 26:23.400]  They lost.
[26:23.440 --> 26:24.180]  And they went to appeal.
[26:24.200 --> 26:25.240]  And now they just won.
[26:25.300 --> 26:30.180]  And we've only recently also learned that that was another Silk Road case, actually.
[26:30.180 --> 26:32.220]  That was Gary Davis, this Irish guy.
[26:32.420 --> 26:32.540]  Yeah.
[26:32.680 --> 26:34.480]  Very high up moderator of Silk Road.
[26:34.620 --> 26:42.260]  That was a precedent setting thing that now we know that the Department of Justice, even with a search warrant, cannot take a foreigner's data out of.
[26:42.440 --> 26:42.640]  Yeah.
[26:42.640 --> 26:45.880]  Even an American company's foreign subsidiary data center.
[26:46.560 --> 26:47.660]  So, that's a big deal.
[26:47.860 --> 26:48.000]  Yeah.
[26:48.440 --> 26:48.640]  Yeah.
[26:48.640 --> 26:50.280]  It was a Silk Road related case.
[26:50.400 --> 26:52.040]  And they were eager to extradite him here.
[26:52.260 --> 26:54.340]  I'm sorry, but I interrupted you saying something else.
[26:54.960 --> 26:56.000]  No, I just...
[26:56.000 --> 27:02.920]  Well, back to the point of, like you mentioned about submitting this affidavit or not submitting.
[27:03.040 --> 27:10.400]  I mean, I'm not, you know, commenting on any strategic, you know, decisions that were made by the defense.
[27:10.440 --> 27:29.560]  But the, at least as it stands right now, you know, the law in the Second Circuit, which is where, you know, the Southern District of New York is, it's very bad for criminal defendants in any case involving, you know, standing and Fourth Amendment issues.
[27:30.460 --> 27:37.160]  And, you know, that's kind of the card that the government, you know, got to play in this case.
[27:38.960 --> 27:57.000]  But, you know, I think that that's why it's...it's so important for, you know, people like myself and, you know, other, you know, committed defense attorneys to, you know, push back on these types of issues because, you know, just because that's the way it is today doesn't mean that that's the way it should be or will be,
[27:57.080 --> 27:59.140]  you know, 5 years from now, 10 years from now.
[28:00.020 --> 28:08.320]  And, you know, it's kind of a call to arms for any other, you know, defense attorneys that might be in this room listening to, you know, just keep fighting.
[28:09.440 --> 28:18.340]  Yeah, I mean, the case just hit such an extraordinary bullseye of various modern issues that hadn't usually been all wrapped up in one case.
[28:19.380 --> 28:39.820]  So there's a lot here worth studying, you know, from those, you know, even if you're interested in Bitcoin and cryptocurrency, it's just the implications here regarding Bitcoin were strong and the implications regarding the punitive nature, you know, with which the government is dealing with cyber-related cases right now and the level of fear and the desire to sort of wrap them up neatly and
[28:39.820 --> 28:40.120]  quickly.
[28:41.300 --> 28:54.380]  You know, Forrest was clear in her sentencing that she was making an example out of Ross, and that was one of the reasons for the harsh sentence was not just for what she felt he had done, but what she felt other people were doing or may do down the road.
[28:56.900 --> 29:00.880]  So that was kind of a stunning thing to hear admitted, even though that's what we all assumed she was thinking.
[29:02.360 --> 29:04.560]  So, I mean, there is a lot of fear.
[29:04.700 --> 29:09.400]  I mean, there's a lot of cultural, institutional fear around technology, where it's going, what the power of it is.
[29:09.440 --> 29:11.140]  And it's not a black and white thing.
[29:11.340 --> 29:26.840]  You know, as I was doing the film, I met a lot of really amazing people in law enforcement who very much disagreed with the notion of complete transparency and being able to break into everybody's technology and felt very strongly that the more the Internet gets weakened,
[29:26.960 --> 29:38.000]  and the more vulnerable citizens become, which, of course, is pretty accurate from a technological standpoint, but not really understood, I don't think, by a lot of people in sort of the institutional community.
[29:38.240 --> 29:45.240]  So the case really strikes at the heart of a lot of that, and I think we'll be seeing a lot more of that type of thing as time goes on now.
[29:46.120 --> 29:49.380]  And I think it's really the beginning of something and not the end of something.
[29:49.560 --> 29:53.580]  I think we're going to begin to see a lot more of this type of action.
[29:53.580 --> 29:54.360]  I agree with Josh.
[29:54.560 --> 30:05.540]  It's like it's really important to see people get up and fight these cases and try to get at least as much nuance and clarity into them as possible, whatever side you fall on.
[30:06.080 --> 30:11.820]  I have to say, personally, I was pretty down the middle until the sentencing.
[30:11.820 --> 30:16.260]  The sentencing was... it was really hard for me to sit there and stay unbiased.
[30:16.360 --> 30:20.140]  Thankfully, my movie was... we literally aired the day of the sentencing, it was just crazy timing.
[30:20.700 --> 30:28.380]  And I remember saying to my network, it's like, it's a good thing we did, because had we not, I would have, like, recut the whole movie and made it just a flat-out piece of advocacy, which wouldn't have been a good thing.
[30:29.020 --> 30:38.560]  And that really wasn't how I felt until the sentencing was just so completely extreme, and her language was so political and damning.
[30:38.920 --> 30:46.400]  And it just seemed so, you know, not, especially considering it's in federal system, it's life without parole.
[30:46.580 --> 30:49.900]  So it's, you know, that's that until you go through appeal.
[30:49.960 --> 30:52.420]  And obviously, you know, they're going to continue fighting until they get him out.
[30:52.580 --> 30:55.720]  But it was very, I was very unprepared.
[30:55.720 --> 31:02.960]  And I have to say, being in the courtroom around people who were of all stripes, because I was there with other journalists, friends of mine, some of whom were very anti-Silk Road.
[31:03.120 --> 31:05.440]  And they don't, you know, have any sympathies towards it at all.
[31:05.580 --> 31:13.540]  But there wasn't anyone in the room on the day of the sentencing that wasn't very stunned by the sentence and by the language that was used in the sentence.
[31:13.740 --> 31:17.020]  I think even the prosecution had not asked for anything that extreme.
[31:17.520 --> 31:20.540]  They had asked for something, I think they said...
[31:20.540 --> 31:21.120]  Thirty years, maybe?
[31:21.540 --> 31:24.720]  I think the language they said was just significantly beyond the mandatory minimum.
[31:25.180 --> 31:26.620]  Right, which was 20 years?
[31:26.840 --> 31:27.820]  What was the mandatory minimum?
[31:27.820 --> 31:29.060]  20 years.
[31:29.300 --> 31:29.660]  That's what I thought.
[31:30.120 --> 31:49.820]  Just on the notion of sentencing, there's, you know, a few, it's basically, there are a few words that, you know, you should, the, there are all these rules, you know, they're set forth and statutes and that kind of guide how a judge is supposed to sentence.
[31:50.340 --> 31:54.000]  And, you know, the key words are sufficient, but not greater than necessary.
[31:57.910 --> 32:17.010]  The thing that kind of, like, struck me as unjust about the sentencing was this explicit deterrence effect that Judge Forrest was trying to, that she actually said, I'm not just sentencing you to life because of your actions, but because you have started something new.
[32:17.190 --> 32:23.110]  This, like, your legacy is that you've shown people how to do this, and I have to prevent future people from doing it.
[32:23.250 --> 32:28.310]  And that, I mean, first of all, deterrence, deterrence, with harsh sentences doesn't work.
[32:28.430 --> 32:32.950]  I think we know from studies, but also, it hasn't worked in this case.
[32:33.110 --> 32:40.150]  I mean, they're, the dark web drug markets are, like, an order of magnitude bigger at this point.
[32:40.330 --> 32:46.770]  They're, you know, the Silk Road was the first of its kind in a way, and then there are now more than a dozen of these markets.
[32:46.770 --> 33:00.310]  I think, I think, I don't remember, like, what the revenue numbers for the Silk Road were, but, like, a study a year ago, and it's only grown since then, said that there's, like, a hundred million dollars of revenue moving through these markets at least a year.
[33:00.750 --> 33:08.750]  So, and another thing to note is that these new markets have none of the political ideals of the Silk Road.
[33:08.870 --> 33:15.130]  I mean, even if you disagree with what the Silk Road was trying to do, it was, it had ideals.
[33:15.130 --> 33:19.170]  And, you know, you couldn't buy stolen goods.
[33:19.770 --> 33:23.190]  You couldn't buy even, like, stolen credit card information.
[33:23.950 --> 33:26.290]  Child pornography, things like that.
[33:26.870 --> 33:29.230]  They sold guns for a little while, but then they stopped.
[33:29.790 --> 33:40.750]  The sites that have taken over, like, well, there's Evolution, now, like, Alpha Bay, are actually run by real cyber criminals who have none of those ethics.
[33:40.750 --> 33:56.970]  They do, they just function as cyber criminal marketplaces with tons of, you know, the fruits of data breaches just being sold on a daily basis with none of this kind of ethos of, like, only victimless crime that the Silk Road tried to instill in people.
[33:56.970 --> 34:14.070]  So, it's, you know, it's, I don't know, it kind of reminds me of, like, The Wire when, like, you take out one drug kingpin and he's just replaced with someone far nastier and there's this, this, you know, the dark web just gets darker as with this attempt at deterrence.
[34:14.890 --> 34:24.370]  I just, you know, talking about the, like, talking about the sentencing in the abstract is really, you know, it's not, like, the sentencing.
[34:24.810 --> 34:28.430]  It's, you know, sentencing of a human being, of a person.
[34:28.770 --> 34:39.210]  And the, I mean, the, honestly, the thing for me that, you know, really kind of drives it home is, like, seeing Ross' mother, you know, today.
[34:39.350 --> 34:40.590]  I haven't seen her in a while.
[34:42.770 --> 34:55.390]  But, you know, that's, this is the, and, you know, for, this happens to people in criminal, you know, federal criminal cases across the country every single day.
[34:55.630 --> 34:58.390]  I mean, people's lives are completely destroyed by this system.
[34:59.970 --> 35:22.350]  And, you know, I mean, I think it's, like, this, this case, you know, I, I hope, calls some attention to, and it does, I mean, I think, obviously, people are aware of, you know, the implication, like, just the, the impact of this sentence, on, you know,
[35:22.590 --> 35:25.270]  Ross' family, and, you know, on Ross himself.
[35:26.490 --> 35:37.410]  You know, I mean, he, the first, like, my, everyone kind of talked about their initial involvement in this case, like Andy covering the case as a journalist, or Alex, you know, making the, the movie.
[35:38.110 --> 35:49.610]  You know, my initial involvement in the case was, you know, the first time that I went to MDC Federal Prison, in, which is located in Brooklyn, you know, to visit, to meet Ross.
[35:50.990 --> 36:02.130]  And, you know, my, my initial impression of him was, like, had I met this guy on the, on the outside, like, this is a guy that I would, like, hang out and drink a beer with, probably, like, he's, you know.
[36:02.130 --> 36:16.710]  You know, and, it's just, yeah, I mean, this, this happens, it happens a lot, in, you know, many, many cases.
[36:17.570 --> 36:34.380]  And, you know, I, I, as I said, I just think, you know, it's, I hope, I don't know, I hope that there will be some, you know, some reform in how, you know, criminal justice is meted out in this country.
[36:43.590 --> 36:44.430]  Should we take questions?
[36:44.550 --> 36:45.350]  Yeah, should we open it to questions?
[36:45.350 --> 36:46.590]  Yeah, you guys want to, do you have any questions?
[36:49.700 --> 36:58.100]  Uh, I'm not, I'm not going to, you know, get into any, any, uh, thing related to that, but I, I do appreciate your question, though.
[36:59.820 --> 37:17.960]  Uh, yeah, so, there's a number of cases that have been coming up since the 90s, and I'm sure it happens in other areas as well, where you have evidence that's of an extraordinary technical nature, and you have a jury deciding, uh, what the outcome of that is.
[37:17.980 --> 37:35.020]  that evidence should, should be, and, uh, there's, so far as I know, there's, there's no process of ensuring that someone on that jury has some idea of what the, the implication of that, that evidence is, right, or, of vetting it, and so I'm just wondering,
[37:35.460 --> 37:44.460]  uh, apart from experts that are, um, and, I can hear you, um, excuse me, sorry, I was being interrupted.
[37:44.460 --> 37:57.220]  Uh, so I'm just wondering, what, as a defense attorney, uh, are you able to do to ensure that the jury is properly educated about this, um, apart from having experts just in the courtroom?
[37:57.460 --> 37:57.840]  Yeah.
[37:57.840 --> 37:59.760]  Because that's, that's also very politicized, right?
[37:59.840 --> 38:00.000]  Sure.
[38:00.060 --> 38:04.860]  Like, you have the, the defendants and the plaintiffs, experts, they come in, and it's whoever the jury decides to trust.
[38:04.860 --> 38:21.180]  I mean, that's, uh, that's one of the biggest challenges that we run into in, you know, I mean, I, you know, frankly, like, I've given talks to groups of criminal defense lawyers, like, you can, you could spend, like, months and months and months talking about this,
[38:21.220 --> 38:39.040]  um, but, you know, it's a, it's a huge, uh, challenge in, um, um, you know, litigating any, you know, technically complex case, um, and, you know, I mean, you can't necessarily ensure that anyone on your jury is going to end up, you're going to end up with,
[38:39.180 --> 38:41.560]  you know, a single technical person, and...
[38:41.560 --> 38:43.520]  They were required to prevent that, don't they, on the other side?
[38:44.000 --> 38:47.180]  It, I mean, there, there's no, uh...
[38:47.180 --> 38:50.240]  I didn't see any lights going on in anyone's eyes on that jury when they were talking about Bitcoin.
[38:55.760 --> 39:00.760]  Yeah, I mean, there's no, you know, there's a million different factors that, you know, are at play.
[39:00.880 --> 39:04.780]  It's like, okay, well, this one person is a technical juror, you know, are they with us?
[39:04.840 --> 39:05.560]  Are they against us?
[39:05.640 --> 39:08.220]  You know, how do we want to present this information to them?
[39:08.840 --> 39:29.040]  Um, there's no, you know, there's no simple answer to that question, uh, basically, but I, I think, you know, in terms of helping jurors understand, I mean, you just want to, you know, kind of break, break things down into, you know, some bite BYTE size pieces that,
[39:29.160 --> 39:31.600]  you know, they'll be able to, to digest.
[39:32.320 --> 39:45.500]  And, you know, you may want to do that through experts or, um, yeah, it's a complex question though, but it certainly, you know, I appreciate the, uh, I guess the gravity of that question.
[39:45.500 --> 39:55.440]  It felt on a, again, as an observer that what was really missing on the Silk Road case was a willingness on the part of the judge to allow there to be communication to the jury as to what, how this stuff worked.
[39:55.860 --> 40:06.900]  Because I don't think that you can make the presumption that people will understand this stuff, especially in a case like Silk Road, which is genuinely complicated, um, that the jury will understand it.
[40:06.900 --> 40:18.300]  And it's really incumbent upon the court to make sure that the jury, um, has gotten enough information in hand to have a grasp of what happened to the best of anyone's ability before they come to any kind of conclusion.
[40:19.340 --> 40:21.460]  I was speaking as an, as the non-lawyer here.
[40:22.880 --> 40:23.280]  So...
[40:24.380 --> 40:29.820]  I was just gonna say there, I mean, there was a lot of really, um, powerful evidence against Ross in the case.
[40:29.820 --> 40:34.500]  Like, I, I think we just have to admit that, that they did seize his laptop with a ton of stuff on it.
[40:34.780 --> 40:42.840]  Um, but, there was also Tor and Bitcoin and PGP involved in, like, those things had to be explained to the jurors.
[40:42.960 --> 40:49.800]  And they, and they, you know, they had to get a crash course in, like, three days, uh, on all that stuff, as well as all the facts of the case.
[40:49.800 --> 40:58.300]  And they came to a conclusion in, like, three and a half hours, which is, was just a little, like, trouble, disturbingly fast for a, uh, a case this complex.
[40:58.720 --> 41:14.140]  So, you get, you got the impression that, like, with that short a timeframe, they probably were thinking a little more about, like, the murder accusations than they were about, you know, um, the, the chain of custody of the, the logs that had been, you know.
[41:14.140 --> 41:25.880]  And I think, you know, had they, had the opportunity to hear, you know, some semblance of the, you know, again, astounding level of government corruption involved in this investigation, you know.
[41:26.240 --> 41:32.120]  Um, I think things, you know, would have turned out differently, could have turned out differently.
[41:32.120 --> 41:48.700]  Yeah, and I just think that with the, given the gravity of the, the issue that I had was, was, regardless of, of the preponderance of evidence, given the gravity of the, of the, the potential sentencing, I just felt it was, it was, you're dealing with a human life,
[41:48.800 --> 41:49.440]  as Josh said.
[41:49.440 --> 42:06.720]  So, you know, it really requires the, the, the clarity of, of explaining to that jury what the, what the full level of, of, of, uh, the, the machinations of how the Silk Road worked, and how Bitcoin works, and how encryption works, and what they genuinely did and didn't know.
[42:07.220 --> 42:13.980]  Because otherwise, which of course is the aim of the prosecution, rightfully for the prosecution, because that's their job, it just gets boiled down to this hyper simplistic thing.
[42:14.120 --> 42:20.700]  And if you sentence someone on that, and you're talking about their entire life without the possibility of parole, then that's, that's what's questionable.
[42:21.280 --> 42:31.260]  So, it's, uh, that was what felt frustrating to me, just personally, was, okay, fine, let's just say for the sake of argument, which is actually not what I believe, but let's just say for the sake of argument that all these charges were completely valid.
[42:31.820 --> 42:37.040]  All right, well, let's find a, let's find a sentence for that that's commensurate with that, but I don't feel that that's actually what happened.
[42:37.800 --> 42:42.980]  And that, I think, was largely due to the fact that nobody on that jury had any idea what anybody was talking about most of the time.
[42:43.160 --> 42:48.700]  And it got boiled down to this extremely hyper generalized idea, and then he was sentenced on that idea.
[42:49.400 --> 42:56.860]  Um, and because of the, the severity of the sentence, that, um, I've, I felt was, was a problem.
[42:57.100 --> 43:00.560]  And I think we have, looks like we have a few people lined up, so, next question.
[43:00.560 --> 43:01.400]  That's just such a good question.
[43:01.660 --> 43:01.660]  Anyway.
[43:02.040 --> 43:03.180]  Mine's just a simple question.
[43:03.400 --> 43:07.960]  Um, from the movie, um, was he actually arrested in the Bay Area in California?
[43:08.140 --> 43:10.340]  And if so, why was he tried in New York?
[43:10.440 --> 43:11.760]  Was he a resident of New York?
[43:11.840 --> 43:13.360]  Or I'm wondering how they made that distinction.
[43:13.620 --> 43:14.940]  Well, I'll let the lawyer answer that.
[43:15.380 --> 43:17.200]  Uh, so one of the...
[43:19.140 --> 43:21.640]  I, this is a tough question to answer.
[43:21.740 --> 43:23.080]  There are several ways to answer it.
[43:23.080 --> 43:27.080]  Um, I mean, I think...
[43:27.540 --> 43:32.740]  So, in a criminal prosecution, you need to, as the government needs to establish venue.
[43:33.040 --> 43:39.900]  Um, meaning that, you know, there's some connection between, you know, the jurisdiction in which the case is being tried, and, you know, the charged crimes.
[43:40.420 --> 43:48.580]  Um, it's actually a pretty, you know, a major, I think, an important issue in a lot of cybercrime prosecutions.
[43:49.020 --> 43:54.260]  Um, but, you know, I'm not gonna, I suppose, get into all that.
[43:54.400 --> 43:57.560]  But, uh, I mean, arguably...
[43:57.560 --> 43:57.940]  How much do you know about?
[44:00.620 --> 44:02.860]  It didn't come from me, but...
[44:03.560 --> 44:05.120]  No, I mean, the...
[44:08.180 --> 44:14.830]  I mean, I think that the Southern District of New York Prosecutor's Office, you know, they, uh, you know, they...
[44:16.350 --> 44:18.920]  They, they like to prosecute, you know, big cases here.
[44:19.120 --> 44:23.710]  And, um, I think also the FBI cyber squad that's located...
[44:23.710 --> 44:26.640]  I mean, they have, like, a major, major presence here in New York City.
[44:26.980 --> 44:30.100]  Um, they have a huge office at the top of...
[44:30.100 --> 44:33.200]  I don't know if it's at the top, but wherever, in 26 Federal Plaza.
[44:33.990 --> 44:35.540]  Um, they have a lot of agents there.
[44:35.730 --> 44:39.420]  And so, you know, they have, they have a lot of resources here, uh, that they may...
[44:41.920 --> 44:47.920]  I mean, I don't know what the U.S. Attorney's Office out in San Francisco looks like in terms of their resources for investigating and prosecuting cyber crime cases here.
[44:48.290 --> 44:58.730]  But, uh, you know, having worked on this case and several other cyber crime cases, uh, prosecuted in the Southern District of New York, um, yeah, they have a major, major presence here.
[44:58.850 --> 44:59.500]  But it seems like...
[44:59.500 --> 45:02.640]  It's such a high-profile case, that probably, I'm sure, had a lot to do with it.
[45:02.640 --> 45:08.790]  It seems like the, the, the thing is that the Internet is in New York, and it's in the Bay Area, and it's everywhere.
[45:09.060 --> 45:17.580]  So they get to choose where to prosecute someone, uh, when, for something like the Silk Road, that is like a, um, that has, you know, users, buyers, sellers, all over the place.
[45:17.790 --> 45:25.700]  And so, it was just like, the New York prosecutors were the most ambitious about policing the Internet, and, and in this case, and in others.
[45:26.020 --> 45:28.560]  So that's why it was, it happened here, right?
[45:29.120 --> 45:29.680]  Thank you.
[45:31.680 --> 45:37.040]  How, you don't know how they found the server in Iceland, and the server in some other country.
[45:37.230 --> 45:40.210]  But how do they find the Bernal Heights Public Library?
[45:40.440 --> 45:40.980]  Do you know that?
[45:42.750 --> 45:46.250]  The, do you mean, the, when they arrested Ross Ulbricht in the library?
[45:47.810 --> 45:48.810]  How do they find him there?
[45:49.000 --> 45:50.310]  How do they know to go there?
[45:52.140 --> 45:59.270]  Well, uh, working backwards, they, they, they established, like, physical surveillance of him, and were watching him, the, on the grounds.
[45:59.270 --> 46:00.330]  They'd already identified.
[46:00.520 --> 46:00.790]  Oh, yeah.
[46:00.980 --> 46:01.060]  Right.
[46:01.270 --> 46:01.640]  I see.
[46:01.880 --> 46:02.000]  Yeah.
[46:02.160 --> 46:03.350]  They were preparing a...
[46:03.350 --> 46:06.660]  He was a person of interest because of the ID issue, or?
[46:07.810 --> 46:08.210]  No.
[46:08.310 --> 46:10.750]  And so, so there was a, um...
[46:10.750 --> 46:11.620]  It actually wasn't those.
[46:11.620 --> 46:12.200]  A whole chain of events.
[46:12.380 --> 46:15.520]  I think that actually began with an IRS agent named Gary Alford...
[46:15.520 --> 46:15.680]  Exactly.
[46:15.810 --> 46:18.000]  ...doing a Google search that led to some...
[46:18.000 --> 46:18.710]  It wasn't the IDs.
[46:19.000 --> 46:21.900]  ...OPSEC mistakes that gave them Ross Ulbricht's name.
[46:21.900 --> 46:24.230]  And then they, they got, like, a pen...
[46:24.230 --> 46:25.230]  I mean, I'm gonna screw this up.
[46:25.230 --> 46:25.600]  Apologies.
[46:25.980 --> 46:28.640]  But they got a pen register for his Gmail account and stuff.
[46:28.850 --> 46:36.210]  And, um, and then eventually that led, that led to them, with a guy on the ground, following him with binoculars or whatever.
[46:36.620 --> 46:39.250]  And, um, you know, seeing him go into a cafe.
[46:39.420 --> 46:40.080]  The cafe's busy.
[46:40.160 --> 46:40.980]  He goes into the library.
[46:40.980 --> 46:42.420]  They set up a sting.
[46:42.790 --> 46:45.730]  They, like, are able to grab his computer before he can close it and encrypt it.
[46:45.830 --> 46:46.210]  Got it.
[46:46.400 --> 46:46.790]  That whole thing.
[46:46.900 --> 46:49.500]  And you failed to get delays in this process?
[46:49.500 --> 46:52.920]  Because most federal trials take place in years.
[46:53.660 --> 46:55.060]  Did you, did you say...
[46:55.060 --> 46:55.790]  You failed...
[46:55.790 --> 47:05.710]  You, the defense, failed to get delays in the trial to allow the other, uh, proceedings to stretch out and be adjudicated?
[47:07.140 --> 47:07.620]  Uh...
[47:07.620 --> 47:12.960]  I'll just say that, as a general matter, uh, federal criminal trials, you know, when the...
[47:13.350 --> 47:18.770]  I think contrary to, you know, you said that sometimes these cases go on for years.
[47:19.120 --> 47:25.400]  Um, that's not typically, uh, you know, the way that it works in federal criminal prosecutions.
[47:25.540 --> 47:30.310]  I mean, they set a date for trial and, you know, you're going to trial on that date, so you better be ready.
[47:30.750 --> 47:31.060]  Okay.
[47:31.580 --> 47:33.580]  And they didn't use the MLAT for the Irish guy?
[47:33.750 --> 47:34.680]  Why didn't they do that?
[47:35.040 --> 47:36.810]  Instead of going after Microsoft, a U.S. corporation.
[47:37.810 --> 47:39.560]  I, I can't speculate about that.
[47:39.710 --> 47:39.960]  I don't know.
[47:40.270 --> 47:40.380]  Okay.
[47:42.290 --> 47:46.020]  I think that they, they just don't want to use an MLAT because it's slow and hard.
[47:46.400 --> 47:46.440]  Yeah.
[47:46.500 --> 47:47.330]  So they were like, let's...
[47:47.330 --> 47:49.080]  Same thing with the Iceland server.
[47:49.330 --> 47:50.660]  It was also the same issue with the MLAT.
[47:51.310 --> 47:51.500]  Right.
[47:51.620 --> 47:53.000]  They, they did use an MLAT for...
[47:53.000 --> 47:53.140]  Yeah.
[47:53.270 --> 47:54.880]  ...for the, for the, the Silk Road server.
[47:55.180 --> 47:55.330]  Maybe.
[47:55.420 --> 47:56.480]  But for the Irish guy, they didn't.
[47:56.680 --> 48:01.920]  And they, they're trying to just like, they're trying to get precedent to do this the easy way, uh, the easier way.
[48:01.920 --> 48:03.310]  And they lost.
[48:03.520 --> 48:08.100]  So now they're, that the result is that they have to get an MLAT, which is a mutual legal assistance treaty.
[48:08.480 --> 48:08.580]  Yeah.
[48:08.640 --> 48:12.330]  Meaning like, work with the actual government that has jurisdiction over that server.
[48:12.520 --> 48:13.710]  And that can be very slow.
[48:14.080 --> 48:15.980]  And that's why they didn't want to have to do that.
[48:17.480 --> 48:18.250]  Uh, hi.
[48:18.440 --> 48:18.900]  Oz Salton.
[48:19.100 --> 48:21.290]  I'm with, uh, Techonomy and Independent Journal Review.
[48:21.500 --> 48:23.250]  Oh, I'm sorry.
[48:23.600 --> 48:24.400]  Go, go ahead.
[48:24.600 --> 48:24.980]  My apologies.
[48:25.310 --> 48:25.900]  Uh, hi, Oz.
[48:26.000 --> 48:27.960]  I'm with, uh, Techonomy and Independent Journal Review.
[48:28.250 --> 48:28.980]  Um, great panel.
[48:29.100 --> 48:30.290]  I've been following this for some time.
[48:30.700 --> 48:32.060]  Had a couple of questions.
[48:32.420 --> 48:42.080]  Um, the first being the Oracle case in California had a lot of precedent setting work in terms of actually getting levity to explain things to jurors.
[48:42.080 --> 48:48.290]  Was that something that factored in, in terms of just case material that you used, um, here?
[48:48.520 --> 48:51.380]  And secondarily, do you think that this was a case of jury nullification?
[48:55.910 --> 49:05.250]  Um, so the, the first, if I understand your first question correctly, it's, uh, the Oracle, are you talking about like the Oracle?
[49:05.250 --> 49:08.730]  I'm just talking about the, the death to which you're going to have to explain some of these issues.
[49:08.730 --> 49:15.680]  I mean, they literally took the jurors out and they took the judge out for three to five hours just to explain JavaScript to them.
[49:16.020 --> 49:16.100]  Right?
[49:16.500 --> 49:28.640]  And what I'm hearing and, or what I'm hearing from a lot of the reporting of this is that things like Bitcoin, very complicated technical issues weren't necessarily covered to the best of ability, uh, in explaining them to the jurors.
[49:28.810 --> 49:30.560]  Is that correct to assume?
[49:30.560 --> 49:35.230]  Um, that, I'm sorry, I was, you said...
[49:36.710 --> 49:42.120]  Is, is it relatively correct to assume that the technical explanations weren't sufficient for the jurors?
[49:42.540 --> 49:44.380]  Um, I wouldn't, I wouldn't say that.
[49:44.710 --> 49:54.200]  Um, I think that, you know, there, I mean, for, I mean, let me take a step back from that.
[49:54.200 --> 50:04.290]  So one of the issues, uh, that we're raising on appeal, we had two, uh, defense experts that we, you know, wanted to put on one, uh, explaining Bitcoin.
[50:04.580 --> 50:21.900]  Um, and especially in the context of, uh, some of the testimony that the government was permitted to put on, um, with an expert that they, you know, hired in the middle of the trial to conduct this complex Bitcoin forensic analysis.
[50:22.310 --> 50:40.560]  Um, and, you know, we were essentially like, I would say maybe 24 hours before that given notice that this person was going to be testifying and what the, and, you know, received thousands of pages of spreadsheet information about the, I mean, they did a pretty complex analysis of,
[50:40.560 --> 50:43.310]  uh, like Bitcoin forensics.
[50:44.440 --> 50:50.600]  Um, anyway, we were precluded from putting on either one of the experts that we, you know, intended to call.
[50:50.710 --> 51:03.680]  And so, um, yeah, in that context, I think that the explanation that we were able to provide to the jury was, was insufficient, um, because we were not able to call the experts that we wanted to.
[51:04.560 --> 51:09.100]  And do you, I mean, this is obviously conjecture, but do you think it was a case of jury nullification?
[51:10.640 --> 51:21.940]  Uh, I mean, jury nullification is typically where, you know, like a jury, they hear, you know, all of the evidence in a case and they say, okay, well, we're just going to quit no matter what.
[51:22.140 --> 51:24.140]  Um, and you know, it, it didn't happen here.
[51:24.140 --> 51:31.980]  So it's not a case for, where nullification, you know, took effect.
[51:33.020 --> 51:33.980]  Should we take one more?
[51:33.980 --> 51:38.620]  Uh, I know, it seems like Lynn had a comment she wanted to raise.
[51:39.140 --> 51:40.180]  It's just a point.
[51:40.850 --> 51:45.400]  Um, I just want to say, no, they did not have an MLAT.
[51:45.750 --> 51:46.880]  Oh, it's this one.
[51:49.580 --> 51:51.140]  They did not have an MLAT.
[51:51.270 --> 51:54.940]  They lied about having an MLAT to, um, different magistrate courts.
[51:54.940 --> 51:59.580]  And then in a footnote, which apparently I'm told by our lawyer, they do this footnote.
[52:00.020 --> 52:00.200]  Whoops.
[52:00.400 --> 52:00.620]  Sorry.
[52:00.730 --> 52:01.770]  We were wrong about that MLAT.
[52:02.350 --> 52:03.500]  This is in September.
[52:04.100 --> 52:04.560]  Oh gosh.
[52:04.790 --> 52:05.750]  It's in a footnote.
[52:05.960 --> 52:08.330]  Um, I think it's in September of, uh, 14.
[52:08.930 --> 52:09.730]  Not positive.
[52:10.310 --> 52:15.200]  But anyway, no, they did not have an MLAT and they lied about having an MLAT so they could get warrants.
[52:15.200 --> 52:16.790]  I guess I missed that.
[52:17.020 --> 52:17.660]  So, thanks, Lynn.
[52:18.880 --> 52:19.060]  Okay.
[52:19.520 --> 52:24.700]  Um, so it sounds like some of their evidence, they lied about pieces of it.
[52:25.120 --> 52:30.920]  How is it, shouldn't that, like, get the evidence thrown out or get them hit up for perjury?
[52:32.330 --> 52:33.290]  Yes, it should.
[52:35.020 --> 52:35.540]  Next.
[52:37.810 --> 52:46.160]  I mean, I was, it's, we know that they, it seems like they, at the very least, obscured the truth about how they got the evidence.
[52:46.310 --> 52:50.120]  I'm not sure we can say that they, that we know that they faked any evidence.
[52:50.420 --> 52:50.500]  Exactly.
[52:50.810 --> 52:53.960]  Uh, but that doesn't mean it's not, like, pretty sketchy.
[52:54.880 --> 53:01.700]  Do you think that the Silk Road is gonna, or websites like it are gonna end the drugs war, or as Graham Hancock calls it, the war on consciousness?
[53:02.250 --> 53:09.500]  There's, there's no doubt that, that, that over the next 10, 20 years, there will be more and more drug-related sites.
[53:09.620 --> 53:17.060]  They will eventually become regulated and it will eventually have some impact on the drug war, which is waning and gonna have to get phased out anyway.
[53:17.660 --> 53:20.770]  Um, I think most people in law enforcement know that its days are numbered.
[53:21.580 --> 53:24.210]  Um, so, I think yes.
[53:24.560 --> 53:34.600]  I think we will see, there will be very different types of services and some of them will just be straight up regulated drug services, but drugs on the Internet will absolutely be a, a fundamental part of our future.
[53:35.640 --> 53:37.560]  We have to cut it, we have to cut it off now.
[53:37.830 --> 53:38.330]  Uh, sorry.
[53:38.730 --> 53:44.310]  But, these, these, uh, panelists will be outside if you want to talk to them outside the room.
[53:44.730 --> 53:47.060]  If you can catch them, see them walking around the conference.
[53:47.060 --> 53:48.330]  And, uh...
[53:48.330 --> 53:48.560]  Thank you.
[53:48.850 --> 53:48.880]  And, uh...