[00:57.950 --> 00:59.050]  All right, everyone.
[00:59.310 --> 01:02.370]  Hello and welcome to our next talk here in Track 3.
[01:03.050 --> 01:04.250]  Glad to have you here again.
[01:04.410 --> 01:05.870]  I hope the conference is going well for you so far.
[01:05.970 --> 01:06.650]  Are you having a good conference?
[01:07.810 --> 01:08.250]  Excellent.
[01:08.630 --> 01:09.010]  All right.
[01:09.150 --> 01:11.510]  Thank you to all the wonderful speakers and you as a wonderful audience.
[01:11.710 --> 01:14.810]  And also thank you for wearing your mask consistently around the conference.
[01:14.910 --> 01:20.870]  It really helps us to continue to promote and follow our agreement and code of conduct.
[01:20.870 --> 01:22.590]  A couple of quick notes.
[01:23.530 --> 01:26.210]  This evening, there's a change in our schedule.
[01:26.550 --> 01:33.230]  There's a medical device security and privacy issues here in the same room at 10 p.m.
[01:33.230 --> 01:34.550]  That's different than we were going to have.
[01:34.630 --> 01:36.750]  It was going to be a talk on sonography.
[01:37.070 --> 01:38.870]  It's now about medical devices.
[01:39.230 --> 01:41.490]  So if you get the chance, come in and watch it.
[01:42.990 --> 01:45.810]  We need workshop helpers for today and tomorrow.
[01:46.010 --> 01:52.090]  So if anyone is interested, please head over to the InfoDesk or ask Mitch, either through the Matrix chat or if you run into the hallways.
[01:52.390 --> 01:54.230]  And they would love to have you come in and help out.
[01:54.350 --> 01:57.030]  And maybe they'll find a green shirt for you if they get the chance to help out.
[01:58.130 --> 02:01.830]  For this talk, please make sure you mute your cell phones and other devices.
[02:02.150 --> 02:05.090]  The speakers are quite sensitive and tend to pick them up relatively easily.
[02:05.690 --> 02:13.770]  With that, we are going to go on to the next talk with Nick Germain on secure cell phone communication, mission accomplished or popular delusion.
[02:14.070 --> 02:15.350]  So with that, take it away, Nick.
[02:16.990 --> 02:17.450]  Thank you.
[02:22.970 --> 02:27.290]  How many people have ever heard of a secure mobile phone?
[02:28.430 --> 02:30.350]  And I'm curious to learn.
[02:30.350 --> 02:40.750]  I basically brought together as much content as possible so that I could present it to you.
[02:41.610 --> 02:43.250]  There is more content.
[02:43.250 --> 02:47.830]  But there are many, many companies that claim that they have secure products.
[02:48.230 --> 02:54.330]  And I personally have not quite found one that completely checks out.
[02:57.290 --> 02:58.170]  Let's see.
[03:04.700 --> 03:23.040]  But even before I begin to get into the nuts and the bolts of the search for secure communication, I want to get a general idea of what the great value of secure communication would be for you all.
[03:23.040 --> 03:33.300]  What is missing from the equation now, during this period, that it's so hard to find communications that you can trust?
[03:34.120 --> 03:42.320]  And I'd like as much participation as you feel like giving.
[03:43.120 --> 03:45.800]  But this is question number one.
[03:46.020 --> 03:50.760]  What would you do with a secure telephone, a secure communication if you had it?
[03:50.760 --> 03:59.520]  Would you do anything different than if you're using a, what I like to call my eye-hole?
[04:02.160 --> 04:02.600]  Please.
[04:06.550 --> 04:10.450]  I don't want records that could be used against me in the future.
[04:10.590 --> 04:12.490]  And I don't even know how they could be used against me.
[04:12.970 --> 04:14.430]  So don't have the record.
[04:14.590 --> 04:17.610]  Don't have any of the observations that you can use.
[04:18.290 --> 04:18.890]  Right.
[04:19.710 --> 04:20.310]  Certainly.
[04:20.610 --> 04:21.850]  You're going to be on the record.
[04:22.030 --> 04:22.950]  It could be misused.
[04:23.490 --> 04:27.110]  Is that a reasonable way of explaining that?
[04:27.330 --> 04:27.470]  Yeah.
[04:27.790 --> 04:28.010]  Okay.
[04:28.430 --> 04:29.270]  And so...
[04:32.970 --> 04:56.730]  My concerns are, I do not want my personal information used possibly against me or possibly aggregated for me in the public in general, by app makers, by the phone operating system, they hear a manufacturer or by hacker, and for that, you know, I'm actually fairly extreme in that I don't have an evil phone at all,
[04:56.830 --> 04:59.470]  but I would have one if there was a secure one I could trust.
[05:00.630 --> 05:01.430]  Sounds good.
[05:03.650 --> 05:06.410]  What is the best thing to use your...
[05:06.410 --> 05:09.610]  What is the best thing to do with secure communication?
[05:09.930 --> 05:10.830]  We could be speculative.
[05:11.270 --> 05:20.250]  What can't we do now that we would like to do if we had some confidence that, well, we weren't getting bugged and we...
[05:20.910 --> 05:21.430]  Something?
[05:21.630 --> 05:39.670]  Well, yeah, actually, on the hardware level, things like the baseband or even having an insurance that when you, through the operating system, you know, turn off, like, you know, certain components, certain radios, that that is actually happening, but you don't have any physical issues.
[05:40.810 --> 05:41.370]  Right.
[05:41.690 --> 05:43.530]  I agree with you very much, of course.
[05:44.110 --> 05:57.930]  Basically, we want to be able to trust the microphone we're talking into, to be conveying the idea that we were trying to convey.
[06:03.090 --> 06:10.550]  However, I want to bring up this other point that seems to be disturbing.
[06:10.890 --> 06:12.030]  Oh, sir, one more?
[06:12.270 --> 06:17.270]  I think my concern would be that the phone's doing things like listening to me when I don't want it to.
[06:18.010 --> 06:27.070]  So the question for me is, can I have the phone with me all the time versus having to leave this behind so that I'm not observed?
[06:27.990 --> 06:39.110]  Because I can't trust that it's doing what I ask, which is what everyone's saying, but the fact that it can't, therefore, be with me is the one thing I want the phone to be is always with me.
[06:39.350 --> 06:40.630]  And I can't do that.
[06:41.250 --> 06:41.730]  Yes.
[06:42.890 --> 06:49.210]  You ask, what behavior would we engage in if we knew we were to do it?
[08:01.730 --> 08:04.090]  Vietnam was very unpopular.
[08:05.010 --> 08:10.790]  And they were sending American students to get chopped up in Vietnam.
[08:11.590 --> 08:18.250]  And this was a very early period in the history of television.
[08:18.250 --> 08:32.830]  And the reporters who were going out looking for stories, they felt that the most interesting thing going on in the streets of many, many cities was that people were demonstrating.
[08:33.250 --> 08:34.610]  And that was good TV.
[08:35.130 --> 08:54.770]  And so the 50s didn't see a lot going on as far as not a great deal of, what would we call this, public sentiment getting into the public eye.
[08:55.070 --> 08:57.890]  And so television began to mature.
[08:58.250 --> 09:05.650]  And they began to show the reaction to the opposition to government activities.
[09:06.190 --> 09:09.430]  And that war came to an end.
[09:09.690 --> 09:13.410]  And this is a remarkable piece of history.
[09:14.410 --> 09:28.470]  It came to an end because people got up and spoke and they, sure, they were beat up in a lot of places and they ran into opposition from the authorities, but they managed to get a point across.
[09:29.070 --> 09:35.290]  And it was a major turning point in the United States history.
[09:41.890 --> 09:52.670]  I'm not sure if that can happen again today in the same manner because the TV doesn't cover it and it doesn't get to as many people as it did.
[09:53.430 --> 10:02.510]  And I dare say the quality of journalism has deteriorated drastically since that period.
[10:02.510 --> 10:16.030]  And actually, the topic of what is an authoritative source for information came up a couple of times in the big room.
[10:16.150 --> 10:28.630]  One in the opening conversation, the young woman who spoke about exposing psychological operations.
[10:28.630 --> 10:44.570]  And it just came up once again because the keynote speaker is talking about when she was working at Facebook, Facebook had a couple of these sponsored, we could call them psychological operations.
[10:44.570 --> 11:04.930]  One in Azerbaijan and one in Honduras where false information was put onto Facebook and presented as honest information and it threw the election to the authoritarian figures that sponsored this.
[11:05.810 --> 11:18.590]  And one thing that the young lady said yesterday morning when I asked her, well, what do you consider a legitimate source for news?
[11:18.590 --> 11:32.130]  And she mentioned the New York Times and I think anybody who read the Rolling Stone in 1977, October, there was a story by Carl Bernstein that exposed the New York Times once and for all.
[11:32.250 --> 11:39.270]  You don't have to read two stories after you read that one about, I think the title of it was the CIA and the media.
[11:39.270 --> 11:56.550]  It addressed the Times but it also addressed CBS and basically most of the big outlets are not to be trusted according to this source and Bernstein was good at that moment for some reason.
[11:56.750 --> 12:01.570]  He really, he did a good job back in 77.
[12:01.570 --> 12:01.750]  77.
[12:02.070 --> 12:07.510]  So the question really is what are the legitimate sources?
[12:07.890 --> 12:21.910]  And so if we're trying to both have people speaking, standing up on their hind legs and expressing themselves, it's very hard to do when you're under surveillance.
[12:21.910 --> 12:33.830]  And there's a special kind of surveillance when you're carrying it around in your, in your, what's a polite word for the back pocket?
[12:33.950 --> 12:36.370]  I guess the back pocket would be a polite word for it.
[12:37.550 --> 12:39.410]  Or in your front pocket.
[12:42.630 --> 13:03.090]  And you may have heard these stories about how when, when the, when the Facebook pings a noise on your phone, your endocrine system kicks in and you have an adrenaline rush and et cetera, et cetera.
[13:03.270 --> 13:06.970]  This is, this is messing with the human animal quite a bit.
[13:06.970 --> 13:17.830]  And to know that there's somebody watching you or listening to you all the time also has a major effect.
[13:18.130 --> 13:24.210]  And this is, this was pointed out in a, in a, in a talk by Glenn Greenwald.
[13:24.890 --> 13:27.650]  Geez, I don't know how many years ago this was at Carnegie Hall.
[13:27.650 --> 13:37.250]  Uh, but I thought it was very, very, um, very, very valuable, uh, that he, um, that he, uh, pointed this out.
[13:37.510 --> 13:47.530]  Um, he said that, um, when you want to, when you want to summon up the courage to go and stand up and say, no, this is not right.
[13:47.530 --> 14:01.390]  And to express yourself and to do all those things that the American flag is associated with, like, uh, trying to protect your neighbors, your country, and, uh, honoring truth, justice, and the American way.
[14:03.790 --> 14:07.870]  And to summon up that courage, you need to be alone.
[14:08.090 --> 14:09.950]  You need to have a little space.
[14:10.150 --> 14:13.110]  And if somebody is watching you, you're not alone.
[14:13.430 --> 14:15.830]  And it's very hard to get the guts to do it.
[14:16.030 --> 14:27.770]  And that, the memory that somebody is on top of you at that moment that you're trying to summon up that courage is often going to make it impossible to summon up that courage.
[14:27.770 --> 14:35.810]  So, there, there is a, it is a very, very powerful thing that we're walking around with these cell phones now.
[14:36.030 --> 14:56.330]  And so, um, uh, I'm, I'm trying to remember how long ago, um, I, I, I guess I should just ask and get a show of hands if I may, um, how many people try to protect their security, uh, and I, we don't have any ink here.
[14:56.330 --> 15:01.790]  I, uh, basically on a, on a, um, on a measure of like one to five.
[15:02.490 --> 15:09.050]  If five meaning you are absolutely secure and you trust the communications, uh, venues that you use.
[15:09.270 --> 15:12.410]  And one being you give it a shot, ah, a hard throw.
[15:12.690 --> 15:13.350]  Thank you.
[15:14.270 --> 15:14.750]  All right.
[15:14.990 --> 15:16.350]  Well, backhand is not that easy.
[15:16.350 --> 15:17.550]  Um,
[15:26.160 --> 15:34.120]  um, one meaning, one meaning you try a little bit and five meaning you think you've got it nailed.
[15:34.340 --> 15:49.200]  And I, I'm just curious about how many people just try at least a minimum amount, uh, to, to, to, um, to be, to secure their communications, be it on the Internet, on the, uh, on the telephone, et cetera.
[15:49.500 --> 15:51.020]  Do we have very many people?
[15:51.060 --> 15:51.280]  Okay.
[15:51.480 --> 15:52.440]  There's a little bit.
[15:52.600 --> 15:55.980]  There's just about a half dozen, I would say.
[15:57.040 --> 16:04.900]  Um, how many people put some effort into it, put their shoulder to the grindstone and, and really give it a good, a good push?
[16:05.140 --> 16:05.820]  All right.
[16:05.980 --> 16:06.760]  That's about 10.
[16:07.340 --> 16:15.040]  And, um, how many people spend a lot of time trying to get to sleep at night trying to fix this problem?
[16:15.420 --> 16:17.720]  I mean, who really care about this?
[16:17.920 --> 16:20.700]  And that's even more than the previous.
[16:23.120 --> 16:34.480]  And how many think they got the, uh, the devil on the run here, that they're, we are within reach of possibly, uh, securing our communication if we do everything in our power?
[16:35.160 --> 16:37.160]  And that's about one.
[16:38.660 --> 16:45.440]  And so, I don't even want to go to five because I think we might have a negative, uh, integer up there.
[16:46.240 --> 17:06.340]  Um, so, um, basically, uh, I also am interested in, um, in trying to figure out the best way the, the way to be most secure and, um, and it is, it is very, very hard.
[17:06.620 --> 17:18.380]  And, uh, the, the hardware that we deal with that appears to be the most, uh, the most important, uh, device, uh, more so than the computer.
[17:18.500 --> 17:23.220]  You could put different, uh, tools and antiviruses and all kinds of things.
[17:23.240 --> 17:26.040]  You could, you have a little bit more control over the computer.
[17:26.040 --> 17:29.160]  But this little monster, you have a lot less control.
[17:30.180 --> 17:38.700]  And, um, and so, um, let me, let me return to my notes over here.
[17:39.440 --> 17:54.620]  Um, uh, and forgive me, I, I, I'm, uh, I, I prefer to do these things interactively with you all, and so returning to my notes is not as much, not as much fun.
[17:55.200 --> 18:03.400]  Uh, uh, uh, uh, uh, well, let me go back to the, to the earlier part of the equation.
[18:03.520 --> 18:05.020]  We want to be safe.
[18:05.180 --> 18:06.880]  We don't want false information.
[18:06.880 --> 18:34.300]  However, it, it, it, it appears to me, uh, judging from the level of, uh, political activity, that is to say, protest, uh, and questioning of authority in American culture at this time, that, um, there appears to be, uh, uh, a, a very low level, uh, for anybody who was aware of or alive during these sixties and even the seventies.
[18:34.460 --> 18:49.120]  And so, um, it would occur to me that probably one of the most valuable things you could do if you, if, if you were secure in your identity and secure in your ability to speak is to probably get up there and speak now.
[18:49.900 --> 19:02.980]  Um, uh, we see every day in the papers that, uh, corporations have attained more and more power, uh, every day of, uh, every day for the past many, many years.
[19:03.220 --> 19:10.380]  And so, uh, we wonder whether there is even politics in the United States.
[19:10.380 --> 19:15.180]  And if the people who win elections, we're not sure if they just throw them to the other side.
[19:15.360 --> 19:26.600]  We don't, you know, the, the, the, uh, the level of, um, sincerity of the system seems to be at an all-time low.
[19:26.600 --> 19:35.980]  And so, um, it does occur to me that if people felt safer, there would be, uh, there would be, uh, opposition.
[19:35.980 --> 19:41.780]  There would be more like, more than one point of view that was, uh, in charge of the country.
[19:42.320 --> 19:46.760]  Um, uh, so
[19:53.480 --> 20:02.000]  we kind of are at a period where the population is, I, I dare say the population is much, much weaker than it was in the past.
[20:02.120 --> 20:03.660]  And it, it, it's not gradual.
[20:03.900 --> 20:07.840]  It's been, it's been, um, decreasing quite a bit for a long time.
[20:08.060 --> 20:13.440]  And again, I don't know if anyone, if, if, if, if this is obvious to you all or not.
[20:13.440 --> 20:15.100]  Uh, but I'm, I'm very curious.
[20:15.260 --> 20:19.540]  I, I, I've been to many countries and I observe the politics in many countries.
[20:19.540 --> 20:29.460]  And there's very few that have, uh, such a, a limited level of, um, of, uh, support from the public, uh, to my, to my knowledge.
[20:29.460 --> 20:34.460]  But actually, I, I, one thing I really appreciate is somebody disagreeing with me.
[20:34.860 --> 20:37.800]  And, um, uh, that's what I'm hoping for.
[20:37.980 --> 20:40.000]  And it's, it's, it's quite welcome.
[20:40.180 --> 20:47.550]  It's, it's, uh, it's the, the, the best, uh, the best response is to get, uh, more of a, a dialogue.
[20:48.280 --> 20:52.980]  There's no reason to believe me unless I present sufficient evidence of it.
[20:53.160 --> 20:57.740]  And, uh, uh, to be challenged on it is, is a good way to acquire that.
[20:57.740 --> 20:58.880]  Let's see.
[20:59.160 --> 20:59.300]  Um,
[21:02.880 --> 21:05.600]  so the question of if we had, oh, please.
[21:06.300 --> 21:20.710]  Just, just to make sure I'm hearing you're right, you're saying that in your observation, and based on those observations, your opinion, is that we seem to be entirely without protest.
[21:21.100 --> 21:22.040]  Without protest.
[21:22.260 --> 21:23.620]  Not zero, but...
[21:23.620 --> 21:25.380]  But not, but not significant.
[21:26.010 --> 21:29.000]  It's remarkably low level.
[21:29.340 --> 21:34.840]  I mean, uh, what, if we compare it, you go back to the Iraq war, there were, there were demonstrations.
[21:35.200 --> 21:45.140]  But, um, uh, you go back to the sixties and, um, there was less than 1% of the population on the streets in the sixties.
[21:45.140 --> 21:48.180]  But it, it, it succeeded in bringing an end to the war.
[21:48.320 --> 21:52.300]  That and a very well organized, uh, country called Vietnam.
[21:52.760 --> 22:00.120]  Um, but, um, uh, I mean, I'm, I'm, I'm curious.
[22:00.560 --> 22:11.140]  Do people consider the present level of participation of the population of the United States to be highly significant or moderately or low?
[22:11.140 --> 22:14.360]  And why don't we go back to this concept here?
[22:14.560 --> 22:15.340]  One, two, and three.
[22:15.660 --> 22:24.320]  How many people consider the level of, um, political participation to be substantial in the United States?
[22:25.600 --> 22:28.680]  Uh, that's three people.
[22:28.680 --> 22:39.600]  And, uh, I want to ask if, uh, how, uh, who feels that it's, it's unusually low for, uh, a population of, uh, uh, large primates?
[22:41.200 --> 22:41.680]  C.
[22:41.980 --> 22:43.780]  This is, this is my observation too.
[22:43.900 --> 22:46.660]  And I, I appreciate that you're sharing that with me.
[22:47.180 --> 22:54.340]  Um, if you've seen many, many different examples, many, many different societies, it's much easier to judge.
[22:54.340 --> 23:05.740]  It's, it's very hard to judge when you're here and you, you, you've just heard it, uh, and you just get what is available on the, uh, on the TV and the radio and the Internet.
[23:06.440 --> 23:22.560]  Um, and so, um, I believe also when it comes to these devices, this has a very significant level of effect on, uh, silencing the population.
[23:22.560 --> 23:26.520]  And this is, this is a very powerful psychological tool.
[23:27.260 --> 23:27.660]  Like
[23:30.720 --> 23:34.900]  you guys, for this question, the Black Lives Matter process?
[23:35.380 --> 23:36.180]  Please say that again.
[23:37.380 --> 23:46.200]  Um, the Black Lives Matter process, looking from the outside, Europe, it seemed like you guys had really big engagement with that.
[23:46.460 --> 23:48.940]  And that's what triggered the rest of the world to sort of policy.
[23:49.600 --> 23:51.940]  That's, this is a very interesting case.
[23:51.940 --> 23:58.520]  Um, and, uh, it's, it's, it's actually an excellent, uh, point right at this point of the, uh, dialogue.
[23:59.380 --> 24:21.520]  Um, I remember, uh, shortly before the, uh, uh, Black Lives Matter became well known or et cetera, uh, there was, there was this thing going around the Internet that said that every 24 hours, uh, the police, the American, an American police officer shot an unarmed black man.
[24:22.180 --> 24:26.840]  And I dug into it, and actually, it's hard to get these statistics.
[24:27.180 --> 24:33.140]  I had to, I had to use the FBI reports, uh, and, and that's the source of this.
[24:33.280 --> 24:39.100]  But they said every 72 hours, an unarmed black man is shot by police in the United States.
[24:39.100 --> 24:42.360]  All right, well, that's, that, that's huge too.
[24:42.700 --> 24:47.620]  Just like 24, 72 is pretty high for shooting, uh, unarmed people.
[24:47.940 --> 24:52.240]  And so, um, uh, things move along.
[24:52.600 --> 24:58.940]  Uh, uh, uh, my view of this country is through, uh, uh, the lens of New York.
[24:58.940 --> 25:04.540]  And there are really constantly these cases, uh, uh, one after the other.
[25:05.240 --> 25:13.880]  And, um, uh, and finally, the event in, uh, was it West St. Louis?
[25:14.080 --> 25:18.280]  Is that the name of the town where, um, where that, uh, took place?
[25:18.280 --> 25:18.640]  Yes.
[25:18.960 --> 25:20.200]  I think it was West St. Louis.
[25:20.400 --> 25:22.080]  It's right next to St. Louis.
[25:22.080 --> 25:35.400]  And, um, and, uh, it ignited, uh, a lot of actions all over the country because it was so blatant that it, it, it was, it's almost like they were trying to get a, get attention.
[25:36.160 --> 25:46.640]  Um, and, um, and that was my first, uh, the first time that Black Lives Matter came to a very high level of, uh, visibility in the United States.
[25:46.640 --> 25:57.560]  Um, uh, I'm, I'm wondering, uh, how effective, uh, how much things have changed since.
[25:57.800 --> 26:12.240]  I don't know the numbers of unarmed black men being executed by police, but, um, but it may be, it may be a very good example of, uh, the positive side.
[26:12.240 --> 26:21.500]  The fact that, uh, there were people beginning to stand up and be more aggressive in opposing what is, uh, it's beyond outrageous.
[26:21.780 --> 26:24.680]  It's, it's medieval what's going on out there.
[26:25.520 --> 26:41.400]  Um, uh, however, uh, however, um, that also brought, like, a high point to something they call, um, uh, identity politics.
[26:42.440 --> 26:52.240]  This is, uh, this is another, another thing that gets, that is very popular, especially on the, on the, um, on the Internet and et cetera.
[26:52.540 --> 26:58.440]  And I, I, I wonder how many people, um, are familiar with this, with this concept.
[26:58.580 --> 27:03.680]  Is identity politics, everybody know that term or may I, shall I explain it?
[27:04.140 --> 27:06.300]  Even one person I can explain it for.
[27:07.080 --> 27:08.840]  Um, I'm happy to.
[27:09.820 --> 27:10.640]  Oh, please.
[27:22.180 --> 27:22.700]  Absolutely.
[27:23.060 --> 27:23.460]  Absolutely.
[27:23.980 --> 27:39.520]  Um, well, basic, I, I'll try to do it in one sentence, but, um, unfortunately, when we protect one identity, we divide, we divide the class that is, that is being taken advantage of.
[27:39.520 --> 27:47.080]  And it, it kind of, um, costs, costs us in, in the, uh, in the overall realm.
[27:47.300 --> 27:50.280]  So, uh, there are positives and negatives to this stuff.
[27:50.660 --> 27:58.200]  The pro, the problem is people are not getting together and doing what used to happen and happens in almost every other country.
[27:58.200 --> 28:21.460]  If we look at the news, the, um, I, I think, uh, a good, a good measurement, uh, actually, I remember one of my, one of my colleagues, um, he pointed out that, uh, when COVID first came out, um, uh, people lost their jobs in the United States, but, um,
[28:21.760 --> 28:24.280]  they didn't lose their jobs in Europe.
[28:24.280 --> 28:37.000]  Uh, because, uh, as he put it, if, uh, the government said, you're all gonna lose your jobs, uh, instead of what the government's actually said, which was, uh, you, you're gonna keep your job, you're just not going in.
[28:37.160 --> 28:39.840]  So, when this is over, you're gonna come back, you still have a job.
[28:40.560 --> 28:51.880]  Um, if, if they did, if they did what they did in the United States, uh, in Europe, uh, they would have, the plazas would have been filled with people, they wouldn't have let it go by.
[28:51.880 --> 28:56.280]  Anyway, there is a different, a different dynamic in the United States than in Europe.
[28:56.800 --> 28:59.140]  Um, all right, all right.
[28:59.600 --> 29:00.640]  The, uh...
[29:00.640 --> 29:01.260]  Is it better
[29:08.740 --> 29:11.520]  in the United States that we have lower political involvement?
[29:11.700 --> 29:13.600]  Because that seems to be what I hear you saying.
[29:14.080 --> 29:15.600]  It has that effect.
[29:15.820 --> 29:22.680]  However, uh, cell phones, just having traveled to Europe before, they have them there.
[29:24.200 --> 29:24.660]  Yes.
[29:24.660 --> 29:25.860]  So, how do you
[29:34.540 --> 29:39.020]  even increase the cell phone or the insecurity of cell phones to get this as a whole life phenomenon?
[29:39.840 --> 29:42.380]  Well, it's not, that's not the only reason.
[29:42.540 --> 29:46.180]  There, there may be 50 reasons or a dozen reasons, but...
[29:46.180 --> 29:46.240]  But...
[29:47.840 --> 29:48.300]  Yes.
[29:49.140 --> 29:58.300]  Um, but, uh, it's a lot easier to get a secure telephone if you're in, if you're in Europe than if you're in the United States.
[29:58.300 --> 30:00.440]  That's, that's an interesting phenomenon.
[30:00.900 --> 30:08.340]  Um, and that's, that's probably the cue to get back to the, uh, to get back onto...
[30:23.640 --> 30:34.040]  Communism, and that's the really, like, Europe was still divided at that time, and it's coming out, while the United States has centered its, you know, it's the imperial capital.
[30:34.620 --> 30:35.580]  Um, yeah.
[30:36.920 --> 30:38.460]  That's, I'm on, sorry, I don't want to rant.
[30:38.540 --> 30:41.320]  I feel like that's the difference between Europe and America.
[30:42.100 --> 30:43.500]  Like, respect to the little black people.
[30:43.940 --> 30:52.000]  That, uh, Americans kind of got along with the government because, uh, the, Washington won the court.
[30:52.000 --> 30:53.120]  The old war, did I get you right?
[30:53.760 --> 30:59.100]  There's a, there's like a realism of capital, like, that becomes, it's like...
[31:01.740 --> 31:09.380]  Like, people can't imagine a world saying, this is just with respect to capitalism, where capitalism doesn't exist.
[31:09.820 --> 31:12.040]  It's become this supposed reality.
[31:12.320 --> 31:14.880]  I think this is reflected not just on Nazis in
[31:20.570 --> 31:26.590]  the United States, but it's not so much, like, radical, it's not as radical as it was historically.
[31:27.210 --> 31:37.810]  It's, like, you don't have, like, things comparable to, say, the Black Panther Party today in the United States, which is, like, explicitly Marxist-Leninist, explicitly trying to overcome the United States.
[31:38.410 --> 31:43.890]  While we do have a lot of more liberal political movements today in the United States.
[31:43.890 --> 31:51.030]  And that's because they, there's like, the reality of liberalism is in French.
[31:51.190 --> 31:52.550]  Forgive me, a reality of what?
[31:52.750 --> 31:53.080]  Liberalism.
[31:54.850 --> 32:07.350]  Do you think the political activity today compares to the political activity in the United States, compares to the political, the level of political sophistication in Europe?
[32:08.010 --> 32:08.450]  Sure.
[32:10.800 --> 32:11.320]  If I can do it.
[32:11.420 --> 32:11.760]  Okay.
[32:12.160 --> 32:13.320]  Well, your point is well taken.
[32:13.500 --> 32:20.460]  And basically, I kind of wanted to ask, what would you do if you had a secure phone?
[32:21.480 --> 32:35.960]  And the question of if you had more security, if you had more privacy, if you were a little more, if you were 150% more protected by not having somebody watch you 24-7.
[32:35.960 --> 32:47.700]  And let's see, I sat down with a book a couple of weeks ago called Future Crimes.
[32:48.040 --> 32:50.020]  Author is a guy named Mark Goodman.
[32:50.020 --> 33:13.000]  And what he did was he, in one of the chapters, he listed all of the things that really that Google does that capture pretty much our thoughts and our behavior and how many steps we take and all of this kind of thing.
[33:14.240 --> 33:22.500]  And it's actually rather scary to see how invasive this particular company is.
[33:22.700 --> 33:25.840]  It parallels with Apple as well.
[33:27.200 --> 33:28.560]  I mentioned steps.
[33:28.600 --> 33:37.960]  I look on this and I see how many steps I took and I never programmed it to ask how many steps I took in a given day or where those steps were taken.
[33:37.960 --> 33:41.760]  But it does remind you that you're not alone.
[33:46.950 --> 33:54.870]  And so, basically, my intent was to line up all of this before I go into the nuts and the bolts of telephones.
[33:59.530 --> 34:00.770]  All right.
[34:01.110 --> 34:08.890]  I have an article that asks, can I buy a phone that doesn't use anything from Google or Apple?
[34:09.450 --> 34:15.110]  And the question stands, is anybody aware of a phone that doesn't use Google or Apple?
[34:15.110 --> 34:16.270]  Pine phone.
[34:16.430 --> 34:17.370]  Say it again?
[34:17.550 --> 34:18.450]  Pine phone.
[34:19.450 --> 34:20.870]  The Pine phone.
[34:21.190 --> 34:21.870]  Pine.
[34:22.210 --> 34:22.530]  Pine.
[34:22.530 --> 34:22.930]  P-I-N-E.
[34:23.070 --> 34:23.330]  Correct.
[34:23.750 --> 34:40.730]  Excellent answer because if you want a phone that has very few, I don't want to say tracking devices, but if I'm correct, what I read about Pine phone is that
[34:43.970 --> 34:47.990]  are you using email on Pine phone or is it just a phone?
[34:48.490 --> 34:50.030]  Just a Linux phone?
[34:50.770 --> 34:51.230]  Sir?
[34:51.550 --> 34:52.450]  It's a
[34:55.890 --> 34:57.330]  new Linux operating system?
[34:57.590 --> 34:58.070]  Uh-huh.
[35:04.520 --> 35:09.220]  In any case, there is a phone that probably is the most secure phone that's accessible.
[35:09.220 --> 35:13.600]  It's about 150 bucks, maybe 200 bucks, and it's called a Pine phone.
[35:13.600 --> 35:25.400]  However, these are not widely used because they don't have access to the many apps that people seem to be interested in.
[35:25.860 --> 35:37.440]  The public has become used to having many different functions of their phone, much like an eyehole.
[35:39.360 --> 35:48.320]  And so unfortunately, it appears to be a very limited number of people who are getting into specifically something like the Pine phone.
[35:48.460 --> 35:50.340]  And it's unfortunate.
[35:50.340 --> 35:50.700]  Sir?
[35:51.300 --> 35:58.460]  Is it tracking you no matter how secure you make your phone if you attach it to the cell phone network?
[35:58.760 --> 35:59.420]  That's true.
[36:00.140 --> 36:04.480]  And any unencrypted data coming off the phone is all being tracked by your carrier?
[36:04.480 --> 36:10.780]  Your carrier has a bit more power than most people know, correct.
[36:14.100 --> 36:19.420]  There is the obvious trail that you leave.
[36:19.600 --> 36:27.260]  When you turn on your phone, the towers know exactly where you are, and you're picked up, and your location is identifiable.
[36:28.560 --> 36:36.760]  However, what you're talking about is the carrier itself has some ability to communicate directly to your phone.
[36:37.160 --> 36:39.220]  Do you remember the term for that?
[36:39.520 --> 36:39.980]  The...
[36:39.980 --> 36:41.220]  The baseband modem?
[36:41.420 --> 36:42.400]  Baseband modem.
[36:43.260 --> 36:43.900]  Baseband...
[36:43.900 --> 36:44.380]  Motor.
[36:44.860 --> 36:45.800]  They call it a motor.
[36:45.920 --> 36:46.440]  Oh, okay.
[36:46.620 --> 36:47.520]  The baseband.
[36:47.720 --> 36:54.460]  There is a baseband in your phone that is controlled by the networks themselves.
[36:56.580 --> 37:04.620]  I just learned this yesterday from a gentleman who was sitting at the table of the Free Software Foundation.
[37:06.300 --> 37:09.280]  And we're looking into it a little more deeply.
[37:12.360 --> 37:15.980]  But there is also something called a Nokia phone.
[37:16.080 --> 37:17.040]  Oh, please.
[37:24.870 --> 37:26.030]  Say that again, please.
[37:26.030 --> 37:30.370]  So, the Pine phone is the only modem in a commercial cell phone that you're able to flash.
[37:31.270 --> 37:33.730]  It's the only cell phone that can...
[37:33.730 --> 37:37.830]  The modem in the cell phone for controlling the communications is the only...
[37:37.830 --> 37:41.870]  The modem from the... that the carrier can access.
[37:43.390 --> 37:43.910]  No.
[37:44.510 --> 37:46.810]  The modem that you connect the carrier with.
[37:47.090 --> 37:48.570]  And you can flash it?
[37:48.650 --> 37:49.450]  Is that the right word?
[37:49.650 --> 37:51.150]  In other words, you could turn it off.
[37:52.130 --> 37:53.930]  There's a hardware kill switch.
[37:54.130 --> 37:54.810]  You can turn it off.
[37:54.950 --> 37:55.610]  That's no problem.
[37:55.830 --> 37:58.990]  But you can also flash it and control the software on it as well.
[37:59.890 --> 38:00.290]  Interesting.
[38:00.790 --> 38:01.650]  Well, thank you for that.
[38:01.810 --> 38:04.670]  Again, most of this...
[38:04.670 --> 38:10.130]  A lot of this stuff requires a group like this to actually learn a little bit more about it.
[38:11.490 --> 38:26.450]  I'm going to bring up the Nokia because the most popular handsets that have ever been manufactured, I believe three or four of the most popular, were manufactured by Nokia.
[38:26.730 --> 38:29.670]  And this is a very simple phone.
[38:30.390 --> 38:37.650]  To be honest, I've never operated it, but it's mostly communicating back and forth.
[38:37.650 --> 38:40.530]  Has anyone ever used this level of technology?
[38:41.230 --> 38:48.190]  Oh, sir, would you be kind enough to inform us what apps are on a Nokia phone?
[38:48.190 --> 38:50.930]  I know you have things like a radio, but you could...
[38:50.930 --> 38:51.630]  They aren't on.
[38:51.890 --> 38:52.790]  No apps.
[38:53.050 --> 38:53.810]  No apps.
[38:53.970 --> 38:55.410]  So all you're doing is talking.
[38:55.790 --> 38:58.280]  It's a frickin' app.
[38:58.660 --> 38:59.520]  Thank God.
[38:59.760 --> 39:00.220]  Thank God.
[39:00.380 --> 39:07.380]  This is basically what I understood to be the case, but I wanted to get a source better than the one that I used.
[39:09.500 --> 39:10.020]  Boom.
[39:10.500 --> 39:11.560]  So you could talk on this.
[39:11.820 --> 39:12.340]  Now...
[39:12.340 --> 39:13.160]  That's quite true.
[39:13.220 --> 39:13.460]  Uh-oh.
[39:13.460 --> 39:14.000]  Forgive me.
[39:17.580 --> 39:19.980]  Nokia phones, you could put on apps.
[39:20.880 --> 39:29.540]  Before there was Android or iPhone or anything like that, in low resource countries, a lot of people did use apps on their Nokia phones.
[39:29.540 --> 39:30.380]  It's very simple.
[39:32.440 --> 39:40.540]  I'm forgetting the name of the protocol, but it's the same protocol that they used for WAP that's basically like a long SMS protocol.
[39:41.760 --> 39:55.160]  I used to work for a company called Fring that had a Nokia app so that you could send text messages and even have phone calls using the Internet data over WAP.
[39:55.560 --> 40:00.300]  So you could actually have apps on those old phones.
[40:00.680 --> 40:01.240]  Okay.
[40:01.600 --> 40:02.400]  Optional.
[40:03.820 --> 40:07.080]  It seems consistent with what the gentleman pointed out.
[40:11.080 --> 40:14.180]  However, this technology is a G2.
[40:14.180 --> 40:18.660]  I don't believe we can access...
[40:19.780 --> 40:23.380]  I don't believe we can access G2 anymore outside.
[40:26.600 --> 40:28.540]  And there we have that.
[40:28.760 --> 40:31.200]  Let me bring up this topic.
[40:31.460 --> 40:35.060]  This is basically a device, a BlackBerry, that you could use for texting.
[40:36.140 --> 40:38.300]  Many of these did not have microphones.
[40:38.560 --> 40:41.280]  You can't be spied upon without a microphone.
[40:41.280 --> 40:47.180]  And so these were considered secure for quite a long time.
[40:47.700 --> 40:54.700]  And CEOs and guys with excessive amounts of money were using these for their business communications.
[40:55.400 --> 40:57.300]  That's the reputation they have.
[40:57.700 --> 41:02.460]  Again, this company is not doing very well anymore.
[41:02.600 --> 41:04.960]  I'm not even sure if they're manufacturing anymore.
[41:05.240 --> 41:08.480]  But there was a period of time when people relied on these.
[41:10.060 --> 41:17.160]  I'm going to name a few other choices.
[41:18.860 --> 41:21.600]  I mentioned Ubuntu earlier.
[41:21.820 --> 41:24.360]  That's a Linux operating system.
[41:24.560 --> 41:27.580]  Again, Linux is not Apple and it's not Android.
[41:27.760 --> 41:30.940]  That is to say, it's not Apple and it's not Google.
[41:30.940 --> 41:33.880]  And so it is a different language.
[41:34.120 --> 41:46.080]  And so you're going to have a considerable amount, much more privacy in dealing with something that is Ubuntu or Linux in general.
[41:51.720 --> 41:52.700]  Let's see.
[41:53.880 --> 42:02.460]  And then there are the very expensive phones that started coming out.
[42:02.520 --> 42:21.820]  And what they tend to do is put apps on top of the operating system, such as the kill switches on certain phones where you could turn off the battery, turn off the microphone, turn off anything at the moment you wish to.
[42:21.820 --> 42:30.840]  And it can't be hacked by outside sources.
[42:33.410 --> 42:40.760]  I picked up a piece addressing the best secure smartphones of 2022.
[42:41.960 --> 42:45.960]  There's the Syrin Labs Finney U1.
[42:46.160 --> 42:48.760]  And these are extremely expensive products.
[42:49.140 --> 42:52.460]  There is something that Boeing makes for the intelligence community.
[42:52.460 --> 42:54.660]  I believe it's called the Boeing Black.
[42:55.060 --> 42:57.820]  And there is a Bitumtuff Mobile 2.
[42:58.160 --> 43:02.840]  And a third one of these very expensive phones.
[43:02.840 --> 43:05.180]  There's the Purism Librem.
[43:05.280 --> 43:08.760]  That's the one with the kill switches.
[43:09.140 --> 43:10.480]  Interesting technology.
[43:10.860 --> 43:15.080]  But at the end of the day, something that is...
[43:15.080 --> 43:23.820]  The question really arises, what can possibly begin to compete with the big carriers?
[43:23.820 --> 43:31.860]  And I thought that I had found it when I discovered a company in Germany called Vola.
[43:34.520 --> 43:41.660]  And this is a phone that's based on an Android system that claims to have been...
[43:41.660 --> 43:45.420]  To have all the Google apps removed from it.
[43:45.900 --> 43:46.640]  Excuse me.
[43:47.260 --> 43:47.920]  Yeah, exactly.
[43:48.100 --> 43:49.740]  An Android without the Google.
[43:50.060 --> 43:52.560]  Which I found hard to comprehend.
[43:52.940 --> 43:54.700]  But there is something to comprehend.
[43:55.040 --> 43:55.400]  Please.
[43:58.890 --> 44:00.090]  I can't hear you.
[44:03.810 --> 44:05.290]  I still can't hear you.
[44:05.490 --> 44:08.230]  You may need to drop the mask for just a moment.
[44:08.730 --> 44:10.550]  That's what we do at Calyx.
[44:10.730 --> 44:13.170]  We also do Android without Google.
[44:13.690 --> 44:17.210]  And you can do that because Android is open source.
[44:17.370 --> 44:21.970]  So you can just take whatever you want, remove whatever you want, and build an end product.
[44:22.670 --> 44:38.730]  And one of the things I would like to add is the beauty of Android using even a Google Pixel is that if you manage to hack a Pixel, or if you manage to hack one of the Android phones, Google will literally pay you a million dollars if you can prove it to them.
[44:38.970 --> 44:45.210]  So there are incentives on them and on others to keep that phone secure.
[44:45.490 --> 44:49.630]  You may not have that with a lot of other smaller companies or other smaller phones.
[44:50.010 --> 44:50.930]  Very interesting.
[44:50.930 --> 44:59.070]  And the beauty of having an Android device is that you can still download...
[45:00.990 --> 45:11.390]  This company will introduce you to the apps that are similar to the Google apps but without the Google condition.
[45:13.270 --> 45:17.950]  Unfortunately, these things are not made for the United States, and this is a shortcoming.
[45:17.950 --> 45:28.950]  And with a little bit of hacking, these things can be adapted to U.S. networks.
[45:30.830 --> 45:32.970]  I believe this at this point.
[45:32.970 --> 45:40.150]  I've only run into one person who claimed to have been using it in the United States.
[45:40.370 --> 45:45.130]  However, I believe it is within reach because of that one person.
[45:45.330 --> 45:52.510]  And it would be within reach if a community of people were working on it and et cetera.
[45:54.410 --> 45:56.270]  How do they block that from...
[45:56.270 --> 45:57.090]  Say that again?
[45:57.270 --> 45:58.150]  How do they block it?
[46:00.170 --> 46:00.630]  Oh.
[46:01.090 --> 46:06.050]  Well, actually, I experimented with this myself.
[46:06.050 --> 46:14.130]  I tried to get it online, and the company said, let's see, T-Mobile and another carrier called Mint.
[46:14.570 --> 46:19.150]  Both can be accessible, but they could not provide the instructions on how to do it.
[46:19.150 --> 46:23.450]  So I kind of... I'm in doubt about that.
[46:25.510 --> 46:32.590]  When asked to document that anybody is operating one in the United States, they failed to...
[46:32.590 --> 46:34.550]  They couldn't come up with one.
[46:35.510 --> 46:38.410]  It could be the frequency selection of the phone isn't...
[46:38.410 --> 46:48.490]  It could be the frequency selection of the phone isn't particularly compatible with what the carriers in the U.S. have in different countries.
[46:48.490 --> 46:50.690]  And then there's another part of this.
[46:51.990 --> 47:06.230]  The company didn't invest in an FCC license in the United States, which is not going to block you from using the phone if you can move around and if you're good with programming of these things.
[47:07.210 --> 47:15.890]  However, it actually looks like it has some potential if a large group of people were to purchase these things
[47:19.070 --> 47:25.610]  and try to work things out and share their advances in putting this to use.
[47:26.090 --> 47:36.110]  And actually, I thought that was... the possibility of that seemed to me to be about the best news that we've had in a long time.
[47:36.110 --> 47:42.350]  And because it would be really helpful if a lot of people had phones that they could trust.
[47:42.630 --> 47:55.450]  And that's why I tried to discuss the whole point of how dangerous it is to have a whole population walking around with a spy in their pants.
[47:58.270 --> 48:01.290]  So, that's pretty much the extent of this discussion.
[48:01.290 --> 48:03.790]  I hope there may be another question or two, if not.
[48:07.030 --> 48:14.670]  I actually... I'm wondering if this sounds like an interesting possibility.
[48:16.110 --> 48:45.650]  I was hoping to see if there's a handful of people who are interested in investing in one of these handsets and working with the people out there who are programming these things and try to program them so that they work on one of the networks, at least until the company in Germany is in a position to invest a little bit more and catch up.
[48:46.090 --> 48:51.190]  Otherwise, it may take quite a long time.
[48:51.330 --> 48:55.750]  A number of years before these things are actually marketed in the United States.
[48:56.350 --> 48:56.910]  Are
[49:00.880 --> 49:01.440]  you doing that?
[49:01.700 --> 49:02.560]  Are you doing this?
[49:02.860 --> 49:03.140]  Yeah.
[49:14.100 --> 49:17.260]  We have the phones available at our booth.
[49:18.300 --> 49:19.860]  It's free and open source.
[49:19.860 --> 49:23.560]  So, if you have a supported phone, you can just go on the website and install it.
[49:25.320 --> 49:27.540]  Well, that is a good result.
[49:27.800 --> 49:29.020]  I'm very happy to hear that.
[49:29.100 --> 49:35.560]  Would it be okay if the people who are interested in that sign up and...
[49:35.560 --> 49:37.440]  Yeah, we have a booth right up there.
[49:37.500 --> 49:37.900]  You're right.
[49:38.660 --> 49:39.860]  Are you in Calyx?
[49:40.100 --> 49:40.420]  Yeah.
[49:41.580 --> 49:42.020]  God.
[49:42.380 --> 49:43.580]  How did I miss that booth?
[49:43.800 --> 49:45.020]  And there's not just Calyx.
[49:45.020 --> 49:49.120]  There's GrapheneOS, Lineage OS, E, Replicant.
[49:49.380 --> 49:53.200]  There's a whole lot of de-Googled Android operating systems.
[49:53.460 --> 49:57.220]  And do these look like they will solve the problem that we've been discussing?
[49:57.820 --> 49:58.780]  They're not...
[49:58.780 --> 50:00.500]  You can't find them in the store.
[50:00.640 --> 50:06.360]  But you can get a Google Pixel phone and download software and all the tutorials.
[50:06.460 --> 50:06.760]  All right.
[50:06.760 --> 50:10.660]  I want to get that risk from you, so let me come up and do that.
[50:10.820 --> 50:11.740]  But in any case...
[50:11.740 --> 50:13.760]  You can see my talk yesterday...
[50:14.460 --> 50:14.760]  Oh.
[50:15.500 --> 50:16.540]  No, I want to...
[50:16.540 --> 50:17.260]  The horse is not.
[50:17.280 --> 50:18.320]  I've got to get it directly.
[50:21.500 --> 50:22.920]  In any case...
[50:25.000 --> 50:29.400]  My intention was to try to introduce people to this.
[50:29.540 --> 50:34.100]  If I didn't know it without being here today, hopefully a few other people heard about it.
[50:34.100 --> 50:50.720]  And what is really needed is that people start using these things and they start competing with the other companies that pretty much have a kind of a shared...
[50:52.360 --> 50:54.520]  Almost a monopoly on the market.
[50:54.520 --> 51:00.740]  So, I have a piece of paper down here.
[51:00.820 --> 51:12.420]  If anyone wants to be involved in some kind of dialogue so that we can get these kind of phones, please come down and scribble your name or a nickname.
[51:12.420 --> 51:17.340]  If you have any comments and refer to an email that is not Gmail.
[51:17.980 --> 51:36.140]  And we will continue in dialogue until the majority of the country actually refuses to be spied upon every morning when they get up 15 minutes after they awaken.
[51:36.140 --> 51:36.220]  Thank you.
[51:36.660 --> 51:37.300]  All right.
[51:37.540 --> 51:37.740]  Well...
[51:37.740 --> 51:38.400]  Thank you very much.
[51:38.500 --> 51:39.660]  Thank you very much for the talk.
[51:39.840 --> 51:41.160]  Thank you for the audience for participating.
[51:45.430 --> 51:50.030]  Our next talk in 10 minutes will be the ransomware protection full of holes.
[51:50.210 --> 51:51.630]  So, please come back and attend.
[51:51.630 --> 51:51.710]  I shall try again.
[51:52.450 --> 51:52.690]  That's okay.