[00:01.200 --> 00:03.460]  Well, thanks for everybody that did show up.
[00:03.620 --> 00:05.420]  I think it's a really important topic.
[00:05.620 --> 00:11.740]  I wish that a lot more people would have shown up, because I do this presentation periodically at different groups.
[00:12.140 --> 00:20.900]  And I really appreciate being invited to do it at HOPE, because the right kind of people that I'm really addressing are really the people that have come to HOPE.
[00:24.140 --> 00:25.340]  I'm John Straux.
[00:26.980 --> 00:30.280]  Just by way of background, I started out at the CIA.
[00:30.640 --> 00:32.240]  I was in the clandestine service.
[00:33.160 --> 00:36.220]  For anybody that would know the difference, I was a CT.
[00:37.500 --> 00:49.880]  And then after that, I had about 23 years of running an engineering firm, security and fire protection engineering, and we designed security all over the place, including the security for the World Trade Center after the 93 bombing.
[00:52.900 --> 00:56.560]  Topics I'm going to cover are convergence of communities, obviously.
[00:56.940 --> 00:59.060]  To some extent, I'm preaching to the choir on that.
[00:59.740 --> 01:05.500]  The cost of security, which most people don't know, even though they sometimes think they do.
[01:06.380 --> 01:09.140]  An urgent need to triage, and I'll explain that.
[01:09.880 --> 01:12.960]  Some of the new threats, problems at Homeland Security.
[01:13.520 --> 01:15.120]  And that's preaching to the choir.
[01:15.460 --> 01:17.740]  And then issues of privacy and civil liberty.
[01:19.420 --> 01:22.520]  So why a security presentation at a hackers conference?
[01:22.700 --> 01:23.540]  Well, there are a lot of reasons.
[01:25.240 --> 01:30.640]  One is because security and CT, IT, are converging.
[01:30.980 --> 01:32.440]  Most people know what's happening.
[01:33.100 --> 01:39.560]  But most people aren't paying attention to what the convergence is and what the effect is having on both sides, particularly on security, though.
[01:41.840 --> 01:46.220]  I'm here because there's something about security community you should know.
[01:46.600 --> 01:47.940]  You need to know what's happening.
[01:48.720 --> 01:50.760]  You may know a lot less than you think you do.
[01:52.020 --> 01:57.780]  Because CT and IT are driving security today, sometimes in the leadership position.
[01:58.100 --> 02:02.960]  And neither community, security or CT, IT, is paying attention to that.
[02:05.200 --> 02:13.080]  Because CT, IT, people in general, including people at HOPE, know a lot less about security than they think they do.
[02:15.800 --> 02:24.540]  And maybe more importantly, because security knows very little about CT, IT, and a big part of the security community doesn't want to know.
[02:27.500 --> 02:32.590]  And because security leadership is at least faltering, possibly failing.
[02:34.670 --> 02:42.850]  Because the security community needs people from CT, IT, and maybe they need it urgently.
[02:44.730 --> 02:47.710]  Security needs new eyes, fresh blood.
[02:49.050 --> 02:50.850]  And we need smart people.
[02:51.070 --> 02:53.970]  And that's certainly something that HOPE represents.
[02:54.290 --> 02:55.890]  I mean, there's a ton of smart people here.
[02:59.450 --> 03:04.670]  The impact of everything that I'm talking about and everything that's changed started with 9-11.
[03:04.670 --> 03:08.670]  Not so much with the bombing of Oklahoma City or, for that matter, even Waco.
[03:08.790 --> 03:11.750]  Although, in some ways, I think Waco is far more tragic.
[03:12.490 --> 03:17.170]  But 9-11 changed everything in the United States and in the ripple effect around the world.
[03:18.230 --> 03:20.770]  America is no longer the same after 9-11.
[03:23.330 --> 03:29.530]  There was a time after 9-11 when Homeland Security would hire and did hire anybody that had a pulse.
[03:31.350 --> 03:36.810]  Anybody, for example, that couldn't get a job with any of the federal law enforcement agencies could probably get a job.
[03:37.210 --> 03:41.730]  At first, they went to the Air Marshals Program and then, ultimately, they went to Homeland Security.
[03:41.950 --> 03:42.950]  And they were all hired.
[03:46.480 --> 03:48.100]  There's something called Kaplan's Law.
[03:48.120 --> 03:52.400]  This is a Ukrainian philosopher that published a lot in the 60s.
[03:52.400 --> 03:59.160]  And he said, give small boy a hammer and, pretty soon, everything he finds requires pounding.
[04:02.290 --> 04:04.490]  My variation is Strauch's Law.
[04:04.790 --> 04:09.990]  Ask for advice from security people and, soon, everything looks like terrorist activity.
[04:13.200 --> 04:15.700]  That's my friend Osama there in the booth, guard booth.
[04:17.700 --> 04:20.820]  And for the contrarians that aren't convinced, just think.
[04:20.960 --> 04:22.780]  I mean, my best example is Cat Stevens.
[04:23.800 --> 04:25.120]  The guy's a musician.
[04:25.740 --> 04:30.640]  He, unfortunately, from his point of view, I guess, or America's point of view, decided to become a Muslim.
[04:32.920 --> 04:37.520]  You know, believed in the Islamic faith and was put on the no-fly list.
[04:38.380 --> 04:41.760]  As if we had to fear Cat Stevens.
[04:42.240 --> 04:45.020]  Can't find Osama, but we sure found where he was.
[04:47.960 --> 04:53.840]  The Department of Homeland Security was established in 2002, not long after 9-11.
[04:54.760 --> 04:56.460]  Activated, really, in January 3.
[04:57.360 --> 05:05.080]  Last year, I don't know what the current budget is because there's a lot of controversy about what the numbers are, but $44.6 billion budget last year.
[05:06.060 --> 05:07.680]  208,000 employees.
[05:08.380 --> 05:12.560]  And an absorbed FEMA, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
[05:12.580 --> 05:13.540]  They have new names now.
[05:14.040 --> 05:17.420]  Customs, TSA, and the Coast Guard.
[05:17.880 --> 05:19.780]  That's a big organization now.
[05:22.000 --> 05:35.460]  When DHS was building, the thinking was, and still is, that anybody with a prior experience in law enforcement or the military, particularly chiefs of police and admirals and generals, were security experts.
[05:36.360 --> 05:37.220]  And they're not.
[05:37.460 --> 05:40.660]  And the reason they're not, is not that they're not smart people.
[05:40.740 --> 05:42.020]  Many of them are very smart people.
[05:42.200 --> 05:54.460]  But simply, there's nothing in their job, in their employment of what they used to do, teaches them anything about security, whether you're talking about operational security, or the mindset, or certainly not technical.
[05:55.400 --> 06:06.780]  One of the great advantages, if there is an advantage of coming out of the CIA for security business, is that it's the only agency that teaches you to be the adversary, to be the attacker, to be the aggressor.
[06:07.360 --> 06:14.280]  And the only way you deal with security, in terms of solving security problems, is you've got to think like the bad guy.
[06:14.840 --> 06:19.400]  Because if you can think like them, then you know what they might do, and you can do counter planning.
[06:19.400 --> 06:29.840]  Well, generals, and admirals, and judges, the head of the Department of Homeland Security is a judge, with absolutely no security experience, whatsoever.
[06:31.260 --> 06:41.180]  Now, there are some people in Homeland Security, I don't want to sweep where they're too broad of a brush, that are very smart, very competent, and know a lot about security.
[06:41.520 --> 06:43.560]  But there are only a handful, here and there.
[06:43.940 --> 06:50.240]  There are a lot of people in Homeland Security, and other parts of the security organization, that fundamentally have no background.
[06:50.480 --> 06:56.740]  And a lot of the wacky things, particularly you're seeing, and you're going to know it's not going to pick on TSA a lot today, this morning.
[06:57.020 --> 06:59.080]  But anybody know what TSA stands for?
[07:01.080 --> 07:02.420]  No, no, no.
[07:02.840 --> 07:04.200]  Thousands standing around.
[07:10.190 --> 07:13.150]  They have a mindset problem, and they illustrate that problem.
[07:13.150 --> 07:17.130]  And I'm not picking on them to be critical in a destructive way.
[07:17.210 --> 07:19.850]  I'm picking on them to be critical in a constructive way.
[07:20.230 --> 07:23.250]  Because if we understand the problem, you can solve a problem.
[07:23.390 --> 07:30.430]  But if you don't pay attention, or act like there's no problem, nothing gets, you know, all progress occurs through conflict.
[07:31.470 --> 07:39.750]  An LAX terminal, TSA employee at Los Angeles Airport, tripped over a power cord.
[07:40.090 --> 07:42.210]  She was interviewed afterwards.
[07:42.370 --> 07:44.130]  I mean, all the details of what happened are very clear.
[07:44.730 --> 07:54.150]  Now, for reasons I still can't explain, nobody noticed for quite a while, I don't know what a while is, that the walkthrough metal detector wasn't working anymore.
[07:56.050 --> 08:01.930]  I think you'd be pretty obvious, you know, because there's a little lights on there that tell you what the sensitivity is.
[08:02.690 --> 08:07.150]  They're almost always tuned to be able to pick up five nickels stacked.
[08:07.790 --> 08:11.730]  Nickels being non-ferrous, five nickels, that's the sensitivity they strive for.
[08:13.130 --> 08:20.570]  Anyway, somebody in a supervisory position saw that all of a sudden the metal detector hadn't been working for a while, so they cleared the entire terminal.
[08:21.650 --> 08:22.890]  Made everybody leave.
[08:23.410 --> 08:25.370]  Everybody had to come back through security again.
[08:25.590 --> 08:26.650]  Huge lines outside.
[08:26.930 --> 08:28.110]  It was on the local news.
[08:29.730 --> 08:31.650]  And hundreds of people missed their flights.
[08:31.850 --> 08:34.390]  I mean, I don't know what the effect on America was, the economy.
[08:34.590 --> 08:35.870]  People missed meetings and so forth.
[08:36.690 --> 08:46.030]  With the theory, with the thinking, that somehow a terrorist might have caused this woman to accidentally trip on a power cord and pull out the power cord.
[08:46.350 --> 08:49.670]  Somehow, I don't know, mind control, or I don't know what they're thinking was.
[08:50.630 --> 08:58.730]  The problem was that they don't think about judgment.
[08:59.710 --> 09:09.510]  Government process, and I'm talking about not just American government, almost any government in the world, the process is people are instructed, demanded to follow rules.
[09:10.910 --> 09:14.050]  They're discouraged and sometimes even punished for applying judgment.
[09:14.690 --> 09:20.590]  And the problem was that at the LAX terminal, nobody wanted to apply the judgment of saying, this is ridiculous.
[09:21.050 --> 09:23.170]  Plug it back in and just keep on going.
[09:23.430 --> 09:24.270]  They wouldn't do that.
[09:25.470 --> 09:32.710]  Another example of the mindset problem is I hear a lot of people tell me all the time that, well, you know, we've got some really good people in place.
[09:32.710 --> 09:37.070]  Like I said, there are some really top-notch people in the organizations that know what they're doing.
[09:37.310 --> 09:38.190]  They'll fix it.
[09:38.850 --> 09:43.730]  Well, my counter to that is if anybody here has ever thought about the airline airplane toilet.
[09:45.010 --> 09:49.930]  It's one of the worst designs, particularly for a toilet, anywhere on the planet.
[09:50.930 --> 09:56.050]  And the airplane toilet has been like that since airplanes were used to carry people.
[09:56.610 --> 09:57.790]  And it still is.
[09:57.890 --> 09:59.690]  And there's no sign it'll ever change.
[10:02.870 --> 10:06.890]  So given enough time, don't count on the fact that everything will be done right.
[10:07.850 --> 10:11.810]  I'm not going to spend a lot of time on the convergence because most of you know what the convergence is.
[10:11.810 --> 10:16.650]  But just to refresh everybody's memory, and this is that tiny list compared to the convergence.
[10:17.610 --> 10:19.310]  Everything's obviously going to digital.
[10:19.870 --> 10:23.290]  IP networking, particularly for video, is...
[10:23.290 --> 10:28.970]  In fact, when you buy a video camera today, whether you're going to IP network it or not, it's ready for IP networking.
[10:29.130 --> 10:30.390]  It's built-in standard.
[10:30.870 --> 10:35.970]  In fact, a lot of the sensors now are IP or at least networkable connections.
[10:37.610 --> 10:40.390]  Internet-based service, for example, is very common.
[10:40.390 --> 10:42.170]  Video resolution is going up and up.
[10:42.550 --> 10:45.510]  Facial recognition, for example, is still not ready for prime time.
[10:45.690 --> 10:46.650]  Pretty close, probably.
[10:46.950 --> 10:49.570]  It's really a degree of resolution.
[10:51.110 --> 11:00.650]  Security probably uses fuzzy logic and analog-type thinking of processing signals, probably more than almost any other sector in industry.
[11:02.550 --> 11:08.930]  Because a digital analysis of a situation doesn't help you as much as a fuzzy logic way.
[11:09.070 --> 11:15.770]  And that is, you know, if you know certain conditions, the computer can say, okay, this is probably a false alarm.
[11:15.910 --> 11:20.130]  Not that you definitively know, but you base it on probability, and so forth.
[11:20.130 --> 11:21.150]  Anyway, RFID.
[11:21.310 --> 11:26.750]  In fact, my brilliant daughter is doing a presentation tonight at 8 p.m.
[11:27.250 --> 11:28.170]  on RFID.
[11:28.530 --> 11:29.930]  Tiffany Strauch's read.
[11:30.150 --> 11:33.510]  If anybody wants to sit on her presentation.
[11:34.610 --> 11:35.870]  BACnet, LONWORKS.
[11:35.950 --> 11:46.210]  LONWORKS, in particular, very, very important in security because if you apply LONWORKS, and it's basically really intelligent multiplexing, you can save wire and conduit costs up to 40%.
[11:46.210 --> 11:48.730]  Maybe even higher, as high as 60% some time.
[11:49.630 --> 11:50.690]  Nanotechnology and on and on.
[11:50.910 --> 11:52.810]  You know this stuff, but this is the convergence.
[11:54.010 --> 11:55.510]  What are the costs of security?
[11:55.650 --> 11:57.190]  Well, who knows, to some extent.
[11:58.070 --> 11:59.850]  Costs are buried in odd budgets.
[12:00.870 --> 12:02.410]  They overlap constantly.
[12:03.310 --> 12:10.330]  Some state and local organizations don't report a lot of their security costs, and I'll give you some examples of sometimes why they don't.
[12:10.710 --> 12:12.870]  No one really knows what security spending is.
[12:12.870 --> 12:22.810]  Now, if you have a property, a commercial property, you put up a fence, is that a security expenditure or simply a need for you to demarcate a legal boundary?
[12:23.510 --> 12:24.290]  It's hard to say.
[12:24.370 --> 12:26.150]  It depends a little bit on how the fence is used.
[12:27.650 --> 12:32.790]  Overseas figures, even though I made a stab at estimating them, are very hard to get because they're not shared.
[12:32.790 --> 12:42.570]  And then a lot of sectors, in particularly private security, banking industry, for example, hides their security and criminal problems for fear of liability.
[12:43.510 --> 12:52.310]  The lawsuits from the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center were just finally settled last fall, after all these years.
[12:55.830 --> 12:59.810]  In 1990, I published a book, along with Bill Cunningham.
[13:00.530 --> 13:14.250]  It was probably the first seminal work on understanding the size of private security, that is, law enforcement and private, public sector and private sector security, based on original source data.
[13:14.250 --> 13:22.850]  And that is, we went back as much as possible, couldn't always do it, of getting the real data rather than anecdotal information and reports of other things.
[13:23.670 --> 13:29.350]  We needed, today, a vital requirement to update the information, because we really don't...
[13:29.350 --> 13:33.450]  Since 9-11, we have no idea what the size of security or law enforcement is.
[13:34.190 --> 13:42.970]  But based on our earlier work, one thing we found out was that nobody knew that, in 1977, there was a crossover.
[13:42.970 --> 13:46.890]  And that is, private security suddenly became more expensive.
[13:47.190 --> 13:50.290]  More expenditures were made in private security than public law enforcement.
[13:50.610 --> 13:51.650]  Nobody realized that.
[13:51.930 --> 14:00.230]  And by the time it ended to the year 2000, private security was double the size of public law enforcement.
[14:01.090 --> 14:04.550]  Until the book came out, nobody had a clue that was happening.
[14:05.550 --> 14:07.450]  But that was year 2000.
[14:07.870 --> 14:09.230]  9-11 came along.
[14:09.230 --> 14:12.870]  This is...we don't...I don't know what happened, for sure.
[14:13.110 --> 14:14.450]  This is what I think happened.
[14:14.750 --> 14:16.630]  I think it crossed over again.
[14:17.750 --> 14:27.590]  And public spending for security, and I'm using the broadest term for security, has probably crossed over and is higher than private security again.
[14:27.730 --> 14:29.490]  And maybe much, much higher.
[14:33.020 --> 14:35.440]  The Congressional Budget Office made these estimates.
[14:35.500 --> 14:37.200]  I think they're extremely low.
[14:37.380 --> 14:40.020]  And again, they're confused, because there's an overlap problem.
[14:41.480 --> 14:46.440]  White House recently, as of, I think, last year, estimated the U.S.
[14:46.480 --> 14:48.940]  is spending $100 billion a year on Homeland Security.
[14:49.100 --> 14:55.380]  Well, I know that can't be true, because our own book, our own study, we determined it was $103 billion in the year 2000.
[14:55.380 --> 14:58.400]  So it doesn't make sense, it's only $100 billion today.
[14:59.140 --> 15:01.380]  What I think the figure is, is this.
[15:01.700 --> 15:03.660]  And this is a conservative estimate.
[15:04.880 --> 15:09.020]  I think it's at least $300 million a year, billion dollars a year.
[15:09.400 --> 15:13.200]  It could very easily be $400 billion or $500 billion.
[15:14.460 --> 15:17.820]  Nobody has done an analysis yet of those costs.
[15:20.340 --> 15:25.220]  The bottom line is, right now, nobody knows what the cost is, except that it's really, really high.
[15:27.180 --> 15:30.420]  Right now, and I think these are astounding figures.
[15:30.760 --> 15:41.260]  If you're talking about our legacy, particularly to our kids, right now, we're at a rate of spending $1 trillion every 3.3 years on security, if you consider the global war on terrorism.
[15:42.240 --> 15:45.980]  With Iraq, we're spending a trillion dollars every two and a half years.
[15:46.740 --> 15:47.540]  A trillion dollars.
[15:51.090 --> 16:04.130]  And another way of looking at it, for example, if you get away from the macroeconomics and look at microeconomics, typical office, federal office building for years and years, costs somewhere between $102 to $116 a square foot.
[16:05.330 --> 16:08.550]  State Department facilities have been running and still run.
[16:08.630 --> 16:12.210]  They actually ran higher, but they brought it back down, $450 a square foot.
[16:13.090 --> 16:14.650]  But the recent U.S.
[16:14.930 --> 16:24.930]  Congress Visitor Center, which took into account 9-11 and all the post-9-11 security thinking and bomb protection and all that, ran up to $950 a square foot.
[16:26.630 --> 16:29.630]  CIA headquarters wouldn't have been $950 a square foot.
[16:29.790 --> 16:32.070]  A prison is not $950 a square foot.
[16:34.840 --> 16:38.580]  We don't have enough money to do everything that needs to be done.
[16:38.580 --> 16:41.260]  There will always be places that are unprotected.
[16:41.380 --> 16:46.080]  And as PLO leader Habash said, why attack lions when there are so many sheep?
[16:49.170 --> 16:51.570]  We have an urgent need to triage.
[16:52.310 --> 16:53.790]  So what is triage?
[16:54.770 --> 17:00.310]  Well, most people credit it having been developed as a concept in World War I.
[17:00.310 --> 17:05.350]  One, when there weren't enough medical supplies, not enough doctors, there are three rules.
[17:05.730 --> 17:08.630]  You do not treat a soldier who will die even if you treat him.
[17:09.550 --> 17:13.470]  You do not treat a soldier who's going to survive even if he's not treated.
[17:14.030 --> 17:19.610]  You only use the medicine and the doctors for those soldiers who wouldn't survive if they weren't treated.
[17:20.510 --> 17:32.230]  Now, that's not a humane way of doing it, but if you think about it, if you don't have enough medicine, don't have enough doctors, and you can't wish it to be otherwise, you've got to do something.
[17:32.390 --> 17:37.790]  And that is, make the most of what you have available and help the most with the least amount.
[17:38.590 --> 17:46.810]  The reality is, no matter whether you believe in triage or not, it doesn't matter, because sooner or later, the United States is going to have to triage.
[17:48.350 --> 17:59.030]  Now, I will say, I've been pitching this presentation, this speech, for a couple of years now, and as far as I know, I've never convinced anybody with decision-making authority about this concept.
[18:00.350 --> 18:05.850]  But like I said also, it doesn't matter, because whether they agree with it or not, sooner or later, you're going to have to do it.
[18:06.050 --> 18:08.090]  Unfortunately, if it's later, it's more difficult.
[18:08.790 --> 18:15.590]  The new triage is, do not expend security resources to protect venues that cannot be effectively protected.
[18:16.570 --> 18:18.970]  Now, that doesn't mean you don't do anything.
[18:18.970 --> 18:19.990]  I'm not saying that.
[18:20.150 --> 18:22.470]  What I'm saying is, don't spend a lot of resources.
[18:22.850 --> 18:25.470]  Don't spend tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.
[18:25.930 --> 18:28.610]  What's an example of a venue that cannot be protected?
[18:28.790 --> 18:29.430]  Mass transit.
[18:31.790 --> 18:33.950]  Subways, buses, trains.
[18:35.190 --> 18:40.450]  If you start, you know, you point everybody through x-rays and metal detectors, you're going to kill the industry.
[18:41.670 --> 18:45.370]  You might, you know, might as well go out, get some horse and buggies.
[18:46.470 --> 18:49.250]  Mass transit cannot survive, that kind of scrutiny.
[18:49.490 --> 18:51.130]  You're going to have to accept some risk.
[18:51.850 --> 18:56.150]  Do not expend resources to protect venues that can reasonably survive anyway.
[18:56.150 --> 18:57.890]  What's an example of that?
[18:58.790 --> 18:59.310]  Reservoirs.
[19:00.030 --> 19:05.990]  We're spending hundreds of millions of dollars protecting reservoir, water reservoir systems across America.
[19:06.050 --> 19:09.450]  And again, I'm going to repeat, I'm not saying don't do anything at reservoirs.
[19:09.530 --> 19:11.170]  You should meet some minimum security.
[19:11.450 --> 19:15.630]  But reservoirs have the advantage of being protected by dilution to extinction.
[19:15.630 --> 19:32.610]  There have been at least seven documented cases of criminals poisoning reservoir systems, particularly in Louisiana several times, with arsenic and all kinds of chemicals to extort money out of the government saying we're going to put even more in.
[19:32.810 --> 19:40.970]  It would take tens of truckloads of arsenic into a reservoir system for anybody to even notice it.
[19:42.370 --> 19:45.130]  And yet, we're spending hundreds of millions of dollars protecting...
[19:45.130 --> 19:53.270]  And in fact, there are ideas that certain cities, larger cities in America, where they actually want to put a cover on top of the reservoir.
[19:54.530 --> 19:59.830]  Now, you could do it like the Superdome, but in fact, it's about three times the size of the Superdome.
[20:00.010 --> 20:03.770]  You could do it, but first of all, what's the problem?
[20:03.970 --> 20:07.550]  I mean, that's not where I'm going to attack the system anyway.
[20:07.670 --> 20:20.870]  If I'm going to attack the system, I'm going to do it like in New York City, where I'll just rent an apartment someplace, like down in Greenwich Village, and I'll put a 55-gallon drum of some nasty stuff in the basement, I'll tap into the city water main,
[20:20.930 --> 20:21.650]  and I'll back pump.
[20:21.910 --> 20:22.490]  And why?
[20:22.630 --> 20:26.250]  Because all older city systems have no backflow preventers.
[20:26.670 --> 20:29.090]  They didn't exist when these water systems were put in.
[20:29.830 --> 20:36.550]  So all you do is have more pressure than the city pressure, and the stuff will go into the water main and be distributed downstream.
[20:37.710 --> 20:39.910]  You wouldn't have ever attacked a reservoir.
[20:41.030 --> 20:45.090]  Do not expend resources to protect venues that are unlikely to be attacked.
[20:45.870 --> 20:47.390]  I'll get back to that in a minute.
[20:47.530 --> 20:52.390]  That's a real one, because we're spending hundreds of millions of dollars on that one.
[20:53.150 --> 21:00.010]  Only expend resource to protect venues that will not survive without them, and the probability of attack is reasonably high.
[21:01.990 --> 21:05.370]  By the way, anybody who has questions, interrupt me at any time.
[21:05.370 --> 21:06.870]  It doesn't bother me one iota.
[21:08.430 --> 21:11.730]  I think it's critical to match the countermeasures to the threat.
[21:11.950 --> 21:14.010]  Use a scalpel, not a meat axe.
[21:14.190 --> 21:17.650]  Right now, so far since 9-11, we take a meat axe approach to everything.
[21:17.810 --> 21:20.070]  Again, TSA is probably the best example.
[21:20.070 --> 21:28.130]  I don't know how many millions and millions of Bic propane lighters they confiscated until they changed the policy.
[21:28.670 --> 21:30.390]  You know why they changed the policy?
[21:30.490 --> 21:31.290]  Decided it's okay?
[21:34.160 --> 21:34.740]  Pardon?
[21:37.610 --> 21:39.150]  No, no, no, no.
[21:39.470 --> 21:40.730]  You're getting too sinister now.
[21:42.170 --> 21:45.010]  The reason was they cannot find matches.
[21:45.590 --> 21:47.430]  They can't find paper matches.
[21:48.330 --> 21:52.390]  So if you can't find a paper match, why are you worried about the Bic lighter?
[21:52.750 --> 21:54.870]  I mean, they both have little flames.
[21:56.370 --> 22:02.230]  The other thing is, and I don't want to oversimplify it because I am oversimplifying.
[22:02.990 --> 22:04.750]  But I've talked to TSA people.
[22:04.810 --> 22:07.290]  I know dozens and dozens of them, you know, very well.
[22:07.890 --> 22:13.390]  And like one of them, you know, I asked him, I said, have you ever seen C4 in your life?
[22:14.010 --> 22:14.830]  No, no.
[22:15.330 --> 22:17.550]  I said, well, what's the problem with butane lighters?
[22:17.570 --> 22:22.950]  He said, well, you know, the guy on the plane with his shoe, you know, he's going to try to light the C4 and, you know, blow up the plane.
[22:24.410 --> 22:31.770]  Well, in Vietnam, I used to take, you know, me and my buddies used to take claymore mines and peel them apart and pull out.
[22:31.870 --> 22:33.010]  It's like clay dough.
[22:33.470 --> 22:33.830]  Play dough.
[22:34.390 --> 22:35.810]  Pull that C4 out.
[22:37.030 --> 22:44.470]  And then we take a big hunk of it and roll it up in the ball and we put it on the ground and we light it and it burns with an intense blue flame.
[22:44.650 --> 22:46.530]  And we could cook an entire meal on it.
[22:47.430 --> 22:52.370]  It takes a lot of energy, a lot of accelerant energy for C4 to turn into a real explosive.
[22:52.550 --> 22:54.390]  Because if you light C4, it just burns.
[22:54.890 --> 22:55.850]  It doesn't explode.
[22:56.730 --> 22:59.250]  Now, we would never do that in an electrical storm.
[22:59.250 --> 23:00.950]  You know, so...
[23:04.550 --> 23:06.750]  So, use a scalpel, not a meat axe.
[23:07.130 --> 23:10.030]  Consider probability rather than only consequences.
[23:10.390 --> 23:11.630]  And I'll get back to that.
[23:11.730 --> 23:16.450]  But that's a very, that's probably the biggest mistake as a nation we're making right now.
[23:16.570 --> 23:18.890]  Is we're looking at consequences ignoring probability.
[23:19.830 --> 23:21.550]  Understand what life cycle costs are.
[23:22.530 --> 23:23.830]  Most people have no idea.
[23:23.970 --> 23:28.750]  Life cycle costs is, what does something cost over a 20, 25 year period?
[23:30.130 --> 23:32.830]  The cost, if you want to build a big building.
[23:33.690 --> 23:37.370]  And you hire an architect and you design a building and you build it.
[23:37.830 --> 23:42.290]  That's probably 3 to 4 percent of the life cycle cost of that building over 25 years.
[23:43.210 --> 23:46.790]  And yet, government fixates on that 3 to 4 percent.
[23:46.970 --> 23:48.670]  You know, the architect and get everything right.
[23:48.870 --> 23:50.590]  And we've got to be green and we've got to do this and that.
[23:51.170 --> 23:57.730]  And yet, how the building operates, how the building works, is what determines the cost.
[23:58.250 --> 24:01.170]  And it's hardly ever paid attention when you're dealing with security.
[24:01.450 --> 24:01.870]  I'm sorry.
[24:02.270 --> 24:03.150]  Is there a fine for that?
[24:03.250 --> 24:03.590]  I don't know.
[24:07.110 --> 24:08.390]  You have to do it the same way.
[24:08.530 --> 24:12.270]  We have to look at what the life cycle costs of security are, not the capital outplay.
[24:12.430 --> 24:17.310]  Sometimes you have to spend a lot of money in the beginning to save a huge amount of money later.
[24:18.150 --> 24:19.230]  And we don't do that.
[24:19.790 --> 24:20.330]  Hardly ever.
[24:20.330 --> 24:23.650]  And finally, common sense, which is a really rare thing these days.
[24:26.130 --> 24:27.930]  I believe in Occam's razor.
[24:29.390 --> 24:33.290]  If you see hoof prints in the sand, they're probably from a horse and not a zebra.
[24:33.970 --> 24:37.750]  If you find an egg in your refrigerator, it's probably from a chicken, not a peacock.
[24:38.530 --> 24:43.530]  The simplest explanations in life are probably the best and the most reliable explanations.
[24:44.390 --> 24:46.410]  Occam's razor is a very good rule.
[24:48.490 --> 24:50.030]  And for the contrarians.
[24:51.790 --> 24:52.710]  This is true.
[24:53.030 --> 24:54.910]  Associated Press, October of last year.
[24:56.430 --> 24:59.590]  They, in New Jersey, they went nuts over gumball machines.
[24:59.750 --> 25:02.410]  Now, first of all, I think there's still gumball machines out there.
[25:02.510 --> 25:04.830]  I can't remember seeing one for a long time.
[25:05.430 --> 25:09.270]  But I guess there's some places that they want to get rid of your change in your pocket.
[25:09.430 --> 25:09.890]  They put them out.
[25:10.930 --> 25:17.230]  How many other better ways, if you're a terrorist, to attack America than to poison our gumball machines?
[25:19.630 --> 25:22.250]  And yet, they passed that resolution.
[25:25.570 --> 25:26.230]  Oh, yeah.
[25:26.410 --> 25:27.590]  My children's a holy cow.
[25:28.210 --> 25:30.690]  I wish it would have been the same thing with the set at Waco.
[25:32.570 --> 25:34.770]  Bomb attacks remain significant.
[25:35.610 --> 25:37.130]  Now, this is... I love Maine.
[25:37.250 --> 25:38.130]  My daughter lives in Maine.
[25:38.730 --> 25:40.490]  I've raved about Maine so many...
[25:40.490 --> 25:43.610]  You know, I live in Virginia, but about so long...
[25:43.610 --> 25:47.790]  I went there for my own mental therapeutic therapy after Vietnam.
[25:48.350 --> 25:49.510]  I just love the state.
[25:50.270 --> 25:55.030]  Anyway, I was shocked to see Susan Collins, the Senator for Maine, publishing a local paper.
[25:55.190 --> 25:57.850]  I actually, last year, I ran a security blog for a while.
[25:58.510 --> 26:01.150]  And I finally dropped it for lack of general interest.
[26:01.630 --> 26:03.830]  I wrote a big blog on this one.
[26:04.330 --> 26:15.330]  Was that, in her bill, she got money for little places in Maine to get bomb squad materials and all this anti-terrorism crap.
[26:18.910 --> 26:23.710]  And my last point is, if you're going to kill yourself for God, are you going to do it in Fort Kent, Maine?
[26:24.570 --> 26:25.850]  Or are you going to do it in Manhattan?
[26:26.510 --> 26:28.870]  You know, considering you only have one life to give up.
[26:30.670 --> 26:32.950]  And how many here know where Fort Kent is?
[26:33.590 --> 26:35.050]  Anybody know where Fort Kent is?
[26:35.230 --> 26:36.070]  All right, one person.
[26:36.130 --> 26:37.510]  It's right on the Canadian border.
[26:37.930 --> 26:39.830]  Just got terrible floods there recently.
[26:40.670 --> 26:44.650]  No terrorist is going to go to Fort Kent, Maine, to blow them up.
[26:44.850 --> 26:46.630]  It's a huge waste of money.
[26:46.830 --> 26:51.630]  I wouldn't give Senator Collins a nickel for anything in Maine, with one exception.
[26:51.970 --> 26:55.750]  Terrorists did go through Portland Airport before they started 9-11.
[26:56.090 --> 27:00.170]  And maybe the jet port in Portland, I'd make their security a little better.
[27:01.270 --> 27:01.710]  But...
[27:01.710 --> 27:04.350]  Poor prioritization from Homeland Security.
[27:04.530 --> 27:06.870]  I mean, it's... you can read for yourself.
[27:07.130 --> 27:08.330]  It's legion.
[27:09.630 --> 27:11.330]  It makes no sense at all.
[27:11.490 --> 27:14.430]  I mean, to this day, some of my... all my data is about a year old.
[27:14.650 --> 27:16.150]  Unfortunately, it's hard to get new data.
[27:16.430 --> 27:17.810]  It doesn't make any sense.
[27:19.110 --> 27:26.070]  Right now, at least as of a year ago, they had identified 77,000 targets in America.
[27:28.350 --> 27:32.150]  In reality, I could probably narrow that list down to 20.
[27:34.010 --> 27:37.550]  If you think about it, put yourself, again, in the shoes of the terrorists.
[27:38.030 --> 27:39.330]  Particularly if you're going to die.
[27:39.570 --> 27:41.050]  You're willing to die for it.
[27:41.410 --> 27:42.770]  What are you willing to die for?
[27:42.830 --> 27:48.030]  You're going to die for a symbolic target, like hitting the New World Trade Center.
[27:48.890 --> 27:51.370]  Or something out of the spectacular Sears Tower.
[27:52.310 --> 27:55.130]  Someplace, you know, where you're going to kill a lot of people and do something.
[27:56.030 --> 28:00.230]  But, you know, chemical plants.
[28:00.410 --> 28:04.990]  I mean, chlorine is not going to kill a huge lot of people.
[28:05.070 --> 28:05.730]  It'll kill people.
[28:05.750 --> 28:08.110]  But not the kind of numbers that they're looking for.
[28:08.550 --> 28:09.310]  I have a question.
[28:09.510 --> 28:10.090]  Yes, ma'am.
[28:10.590 --> 28:10.910]  Sir.
[28:12.310 --> 28:13.410]  Oh, I can't see.
[28:17.560 --> 28:19.620]  We've seen evidence of it in other countries.
[28:19.800 --> 28:20.200]  Yeah, yeah.
[28:20.280 --> 28:21.000]  Japan, yeah.
[28:21.600 --> 28:23.260]  That was a local homegrown group.
[28:23.740 --> 28:24.880]  It didn't work well.
[28:25.000 --> 28:26.080]  I'm not saying it didn't work well.
[28:26.080 --> 28:26.540]  Yeah.
[28:27.500 --> 28:31.600]  What I'm saying is that no matter what you try to do, it's not going to do much good.
[28:32.540 --> 28:34.780]  Again, I don't say don't do anything.
[28:35.040 --> 28:40.420]  I think the patrolling that NYPD and Port Authority police do in New York is outstanding.
[28:41.240 --> 28:41.900]  And they...
[28:41.900 --> 28:47.100]  But the thing is, if they catch a terrorist or prevent a terrorist act, I guarantee it'll be serendipity.
[28:48.840 --> 28:50.560]  Now, I'm not saying they shouldn't try.
[28:50.840 --> 28:51.520]  They should try.
[28:51.700 --> 28:52.840]  They should have these patrols.
[28:52.900 --> 28:54.000]  And maybe they'll get lucky.
[28:54.180 --> 28:56.320]  But if they stop it, it'll be because they're lucky.
[28:56.320 --> 29:03.740]  Not because anything they did specifically is going to give them any kind of probability of stopping a terrorist attack.
[29:04.140 --> 29:06.600]  Too many ways to attack a public transit system.
[29:06.720 --> 29:07.560]  Too many locations.
[29:07.880 --> 29:08.860]  Too many stations.
[29:09.080 --> 29:10.300]  Too many people with backpacks.
[29:11.260 --> 29:14.780]  And if you screen everybody, you're going to kill the system.
[29:14.780 --> 29:14.980]  Right.
[29:15.620 --> 29:18.580]  But the last two attacks in New York were for transportation.
[29:18.860 --> 29:19.060]  Yeah.
[29:19.220 --> 29:19.300]  Yeah.
[29:19.400 --> 29:19.660]  London.
[29:20.660 --> 29:20.740]  Yeah.
[29:21.340 --> 29:21.860]  And Madrid.
[29:23.000 --> 29:26.920]  What I'm saying is then, tell me what they should have done to prevent those attacks.
[29:28.060 --> 29:29.840]  I'm not saying the attacks won't occur.
[29:30.280 --> 29:32.320]  I'm not saying they won't attack that target.
[29:32.580 --> 29:36.940]  I'm saying, don't spend hundreds of millions of dollars that won't do any good anyway.
[29:37.660 --> 29:40.260]  If they have any questions, can they line up to the mic?
[29:40.320 --> 29:40.780]  Oh, yeah.
[29:40.920 --> 29:41.580]  Can you go to the mic?
[29:41.700 --> 29:42.960]  Because I think they're recording this too.
[29:44.260 --> 29:47.640]  If you have a question, just go to the mic, please, because I think they're recording.
[29:49.500 --> 29:51.800]  So, let me go a little quicker now.
[29:52.900 --> 29:58.480]  Here again, Indiana had 50% more terrorist targets than New York City.
[30:00.220 --> 30:01.800]  Twice as many as California.
[30:02.920 --> 30:07.300]  And Hollywood is a potential terrorist target, as is Disneyland.
[30:09.040 --> 30:19.300]  Because Indiana had targets included old McDonald's petting zoo, an Amish popcorn factory, and a sweet water flea market.
[30:20.280 --> 30:21.800]  This is all verifiable.
[30:21.800 --> 30:24.960]  In fact, it's in the Homeland Security Inspector General's report.
[30:27.280 --> 30:28.600]  I have a question.
[30:28.780 --> 30:29.080]  I'm sorry.
[30:29.360 --> 30:29.960]  Yes, sir.
[30:29.980 --> 30:38.080]  What efforts have been done within government to kind of open up this list of security concerns and have citizens help reprioritize?
[30:38.080 --> 30:38.520]  Yes.
[30:38.520 --> 30:38.660]  Yes.
[30:39.340 --> 30:41.040]  I wish I had more current data.
[30:41.180 --> 30:41.540]  I don't.
[30:41.620 --> 30:43.320]  But there's been an outcry.
[30:44.060 --> 30:49.340]  Senator Schumer, for example, for other reasons, particularly I didn't like the way he handled Waco.
[30:49.780 --> 31:02.560]  He's not my favorite senator, but he's doing a really, really good job of putting Homeland Security feet to the fire, particularly complaining about the fact that Manhattan and New York, for that matter, is not getting more money.
[31:02.860 --> 31:04.060]  So there is pressure.
[31:04.260 --> 31:05.200]  It has improved.
[31:05.760 --> 31:07.740]  Homeland Security is cutting down that list.
[31:07.840 --> 31:10.220]  I don't think the number is nearly as high as it is.
[31:10.680 --> 31:15.120]  But there's a lot of pork barrel politics still going on.
[31:15.760 --> 31:17.500]  I'm not accusing Senator Collins.
[31:17.600 --> 31:22.660]  I think what she intended to do was naive and ignorant, but she did it with good intentions.
[31:23.020 --> 31:24.260]  It's constitutional growth.
[31:24.260 --> 31:25.200]  Yeah, yeah.
[31:25.340 --> 31:27.160]  I don't think in her case it was pork barrel either.
[31:27.320 --> 31:29.100]  I think she really believes what she's saying.
[31:29.380 --> 31:31.240]  She just happens to be totally wrong.
[31:32.880 --> 31:50.000]  No, but that's an important distinction, because there are some people out there that know what's right and still do the wrong thing for pork barrel reasons, just to get money for their local constituency, like Bird out of West Virginia was probably the king of that stuff.
[31:50.900 --> 31:53.400]  He got federal agencies built in West Virginia.
[31:53.400 --> 31:57.120]  It's costing people a fortune now with gas prices high to commute.
[31:59.660 --> 32:03.660]  But anyways, Senator Schumer has done a really, really, really good job, and others.
[32:03.900 --> 32:04.900]  And it is improving.
[32:04.900 --> 32:08.380]  And they are taking the Amish popcorn factory off the list and so forth.
[32:08.640 --> 32:09.540]  So, you know.
[32:11.540 --> 32:14.600]  I'm not going to run out of time, so I'm not going to go through quickly.
[32:14.600 --> 32:17.160]  But for example, police dogs in Ohio had Kevlar vests.
[32:17.600 --> 32:19.600]  You know, they had bulletproof dogs.
[32:20.380 --> 32:24.500]  Mason County, Washington bought radios that were incompatible with all the other frequencies they were using.
[32:24.820 --> 32:26.200]  That, by the way, is still a problem.
[32:26.900 --> 32:27.220]  D.C.
[32:27.340 --> 32:32.740]  government used Homeland Security money to tow cars, because big source of their income is parking fines.
[32:35.060 --> 32:36.240]  All right, what are the new threats?
[32:36.480 --> 32:41.020]  I'm just going to touch on these, because here again, I think I'm preaching to the choir, certainly in the latter part of this.
[32:41.180 --> 32:43.520]  But I'm a big believer.
[32:43.900 --> 32:45.220]  This is one of my favorite books.
[32:45.360 --> 32:47.100]  It was written 500 years B.C.
[32:48.700 --> 32:49.740]  Sun Tzu Wu.
[32:49.980 --> 32:51.520]  You know the enemy, know yourself.
[32:51.700 --> 32:54.080]  You need not fear the result of 100 battles.
[32:54.240 --> 32:58.100]  If you know yourself, not the enemy, every victory gained, you will also suffer defeat.
[32:58.400 --> 33:02.480]  If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
[33:03.460 --> 33:09.220]  And we need to think about the art of war when we're developing some kind of concept of Homeland Security.
[33:11.000 --> 33:12.620]  We need to understand risk.
[33:13.460 --> 33:18.260]  I testified several times at Congress.
[33:19.040 --> 33:21.580]  This particular case was about closing at Pennsylvania Avenue.
[33:21.740 --> 33:22.420]  I was against it.
[33:22.600 --> 33:25.220]  I was testifying to keep Pennsylvania Avenue open.
[33:26.060 --> 33:27.000]  Secret Service won.
[33:27.000 --> 33:27.540]  I lost.
[33:28.440 --> 33:36.980]  But I was sitting next to the head of the Secret Service, and he was explaining to the committee all the things they were doing to protect the building we were in at that moment.
[33:37.520 --> 33:41.460]  And they were in progress, so they had fixed up two of the four sides.
[33:41.460 --> 33:45.560]  And then, Senator McCain, maybe President McCain, stopped him.
[33:45.840 --> 33:47.320]  I mean, he stopped him mid-sentence.
[33:47.400 --> 33:54.000]  He says, no, you're not going to try to tell me about protecting two of the four sides that you've reduced my risk by 50%, are you?
[33:55.780 --> 33:57.700]  Because that's where he was going.
[33:59.100 --> 34:02.840]  In other words, he's saying the security is much better now in this building.
[34:02.840 --> 34:03.620]  No, it's not.
[34:03.800 --> 34:06.720]  Until you've finished a job, it's like you never did it at all.
[34:07.180 --> 34:10.520]  Because who's to say, I'm going to attack those two sides.
[34:10.520 --> 34:12.000]  I'll attack the other two sides.
[34:13.400 --> 34:22.980]  We have to think about the unthinkable because generals, in particular generals, plan everything based on the last great war they can remember.
[34:22.980 --> 34:35.000]  And almost all that anti-terrorist, counter-terrorist activity today is based on truck bombs, fertilizer bombs, and airplanes crashing.
[34:37.200 --> 34:50.560]  And yet, the standards we're using, because the bombs can be made so large, I don't want to identify it for various reasons, but the standard we're using for the size of the bomb we designed to is so small, it's insignificant.
[34:50.960 --> 34:52.940]  I mean, the countermeasures are insignificant.
[34:54.920 --> 34:56.340]  The bombs are too big.
[34:58.880 --> 35:04.900]  Terrorists probably won't, next time, next 9-11, it's probably not going to be explosives or crashing airplanes.
[35:05.520 --> 35:08.460]  They're going to change our tactics to meet our countermeasures.
[35:11.000 --> 35:14.300]  A terrorist attack in America cannot be prevented.
[35:16.200 --> 35:21.240]  All we can do is sometimes have some influence on where it occurs, and maybe when.
[35:21.800 --> 35:23.560]  But we cannot prevent it.
[35:27.240 --> 35:31.120]  I was, I wrote all the capers in sneakers.
[35:31.340 --> 35:33.480]  Anybody, I don't know if you ever liked, we'll saw that movie.
[35:36.680 --> 35:42.460]  And by the way, there's nothing in sneakers, if you copy, that will work.
[35:45.540 --> 35:59.900]  But Lasker and Parks, who also did war games before sneakers, got such heat from Silicon Valley for war games being inaccurate, in terms of technology, that they, you know, they got me to collaborate with them and we did sneakers.
[36:02.260 --> 36:06.560]  I bring this up because this is the heart of some of the new threats.
[36:07.380 --> 36:08.380]  See if this works?
[36:08.840 --> 36:12.160]  The world isn't run by weapons anymore, or energy, or money.
[36:12.380 --> 36:14.620]  It's run by little ones and zeros, little bits of data.
[36:14.620 --> 36:16.640]  It's about who controls the information.
[36:17.040 --> 36:19.800]  What we see and hear, how we work, what we think.
[36:19.940 --> 36:21.620]  It's all about the information.
[36:24.260 --> 36:26.220]  I think sneakers is still a great movie.
[36:26.580 --> 36:30.900]  You know, I just, every time I go out to Hollywood, I still have friends out there.
[36:31.280 --> 36:32.940]  I keep talking about sneakers, too.
[36:32.940 --> 36:35.580]  The problem is everybody, River Phoenix is dead.
[36:37.320 --> 36:39.300]  Robert Redford is getting pretty darn old.
[36:40.300 --> 36:40.740]  So...
[36:42.620 --> 36:51.560]  But cyber terrorism, obviously, and again, I'm preaching to the choir, so I'm not going to spend a lot of time on here, but Al-Qaeda is already using the Internet as a part of their transnational operations.
[36:52.460 --> 37:02.260]  Tax on SCADA can be devastating because no SCADA system in the United States, because no new SCADA system has been developed, were ever designed for a lot of protection.
[37:02.260 --> 37:05.400]  Everything is kind of kludged on the back, hammered on the back.
[37:05.560 --> 37:07.160]  It's not part of the original design.
[37:08.720 --> 37:14.960]  I'm not going to read, but in fact, there are presentations on botnets here, either today or tomorrow, that are going to cover this.
[37:15.020 --> 37:18.380]  I'm not going to get into it, but it's a huge threat, potentially.
[37:20.620 --> 37:21.660]  Who's paying attention?
[37:21.960 --> 37:29.080]  Well, according to this quote, a quarter of all computers on the Internet may be used by cyber criminals right now.
[37:33.210 --> 37:40.450]  Beyond, you know, computers and so forth, CBR agents, chemical warfare, biological agents, radiological agents.
[37:40.910 --> 37:43.050]  It's a serious, serious problem.
[37:43.530 --> 37:48.810]  There is a fiction, for example, that there's only two places in the world that smallpox exist.
[37:48.810 --> 37:53.490]  One is at the CDC in Atlanta, and I designed the security, actually, for that building.
[37:53.710 --> 37:55.690]  And the other is in Russia.
[37:58.530 --> 38:09.410]  When smallpox were regarded as no longer being a world threat in 1957-58, there was a huge outbreak of smallpox in the Middle East, I believe in Iran at the time.
[38:10.370 --> 38:19.730]  And everybody, every doctor, every hospital system around the Middle East went there and got samples of it, because this was a very virulent form of smallpox resistant to treatment.
[38:23.710 --> 38:25.210]  Everybody kept those samples.
[38:26.230 --> 38:29.410]  And it wasn't for chemical warfare reasons.
[38:29.530 --> 38:34.710]  It was, if there was another outbreak that needed the samples, they could work on some kind of antibody for it.
[38:34.710 --> 38:36.690]  Well, those samples are still out there.
[38:37.090 --> 38:43.850]  If you wanted to kill a lot of people with smallpox, all you do is infect somebody and send them into Manhattan and have them walk around for a while.
[38:44.850 --> 38:50.090]  Everybody they touch, everybody they brush by, every place they've been, they're going to get smallpox.
[38:51.190 --> 39:02.970]  The Native American population in the United States, 50% of the population was killed off when Columbus and subsequently people arrived in the New World, mainly from disease, including smallpox.
[39:04.930 --> 39:08.210]  Our best defense is an aggressive and vibrant intelligence service.
[39:08.390 --> 39:12.090]  The only way you can stop terrorists is to know their intentions.
[39:13.030 --> 39:26.610]  And while technical intelligence is wonderful, I believe as a speaker, Bob Steele, yesterday I heard him say, he said 4%, I say 2% of all intelligence that's useful comes from technical intelligence.
[39:26.970 --> 39:30.910]  Everything else is derived from human intelligence, called HUMINT.
[39:30.910 --> 39:36.050]  And that is, the only way you know what the intentions of the adversary are is for the adversary to tell you.
[39:36.290 --> 39:38.170]  Or you're with them and you hear it.
[39:40.810 --> 39:43.710]  The next crippling attack may be in cyberspace.
[39:44.270 --> 39:46.530]  Our weakest defense is hardening against it.
[39:46.610 --> 39:48.770]  And I'm not advocating don't do anything.
[39:49.290 --> 39:50.970]  Do everything you reasonably can.
[39:52.010 --> 39:55.890]  But it's the weakest possible defense we have for terrorism in the United States.
[39:57.490 --> 40:02.790]  Problems of Homeland Security, well, I'm here, I'm going to be preaching for the choir, but I call it the Brownie Syndrome.
[40:02.970 --> 40:03.850]  That's one big problem.
[40:05.430 --> 40:10.490]  Most have little or no prior security experience, including the head of Homeland Security, the judge.
[40:11.930 --> 40:18.290]  As of last year, July of last year, again, I don't have more current figures, 24% of the executive positions Homeland Security are vacant.
[40:18.810 --> 40:21.090]  One reason there aren't, a lot of people don't want the job.
[40:21.610 --> 40:22.050]  Why?
[40:22.310 --> 40:24.630]  Because you can't do it and look good.
[40:26.950 --> 40:28.530]  No one wants to be Brownie.
[40:30.530 --> 40:34.510]  Of the technical positions, which I think are vital, 10% were still vacant.
[40:35.270 --> 40:43.170]  And of the technical positions, the head of that whole department is a marine biologist, which is a very smart guy.
[40:43.530 --> 40:45.090]  But what does he know about terrorism?
[40:45.410 --> 40:47.070]  Either technology or operations.
[40:49.930 --> 41:10.110]  An example of this is probably what a lag we have, is that if a dirty bomb was detonated, let's say in Manhattan, right now, today, it would take four years, for all the people who are possibly contaminated by the dirty bomb, to have lab results come back and tell them whether they're sick or not.
[41:11.730 --> 41:15.890]  And the reason is, there are 13 possible isotopes in a typical dirty bomb.
[41:16.710 --> 41:20.670]  Right now, we can only test for six of the 13.
[41:22.430 --> 41:25.810]  And there's only a handful of labs in the country that can do the testing at all.
[41:27.070 --> 41:31.450]  So a dirty bomb was detonated right now in lower Manhattan.
[41:32.550 --> 41:36.450]  We couldn't get a clean bill of health for four years.
[41:37.310 --> 41:40.570]  And that's because there's a lack of talent.
[41:42.630 --> 41:43.910]  Privacy and civil liberty.
[41:44.670 --> 41:45.850]  I'm big on this.
[41:46.110 --> 41:47.090]  I know hope is.
[41:49.090 --> 41:53.410]  By the way, I love Amy's work.
[41:53.550 --> 41:58.290]  I mean, she has the most brilliant mind, the most kind of little devious brilliant mind.
[41:58.670 --> 42:03.510]  But she puts everything in a nutshell that bothers you, you know.
[42:06.830 --> 42:11.710]  In the United Kingdom right now, and by the way, this information is one week old.
[42:11.710 --> 42:12.670]  So it's very good.
[42:13.130 --> 42:17.210]  There are 4.2 million network TV cameras in England.
[42:18.970 --> 42:22.250]  One camera for every 14 people in the United Kingdom.
[42:24.430 --> 42:31.350]  A Londoner walking around London, on an average, every day, is going to be on camera 300 times.
[42:33.690 --> 42:40.150]  Manhattan right now has about 4,200 private and public cameras.
[42:41.150 --> 42:43.050]  Not all of them are networked, by the way.
[42:43.530 --> 42:47.970]  NYPD is probably going to add 3,000 by the year 2008.
[42:49.670 --> 42:53.090]  Now, it doesn't come close to what England or London have done.
[42:53.370 --> 42:56.590]  But it's certainly something that worries me.
[42:58.030 --> 43:01.710]  Because even though I'm in the security industry, I came out of the CIA.
[43:02.210 --> 43:03.390]  I believe in what I did.
[43:03.510 --> 43:04.350]  I liked what I did.
[43:04.370 --> 43:05.030]  It was a good thing.
[43:05.770 --> 43:08.410]  I don't like the idea of...
[43:09.110 --> 43:15.890]  I mean, if I can catch someone not picking up their dog poo on the street, and they get a fine for it because they're on camera, that's wonderful.
[43:16.690 --> 43:22.150]  But I don't want them second-guessing what I'm doing because they got a picture of me coming out of a bar.
[43:22.690 --> 43:23.730]  Maybe I didn't take a drink.
[43:23.870 --> 43:24.290]  Maybe I did.
[43:24.930 --> 43:28.690]  I mean, I don't want this to become 1984.
[43:29.710 --> 43:32.410]  Which, by the way, is 24 years ago.
[43:35.310 --> 43:40.550]  Is there any knowledge of what they're doing with the cameras in London?
[43:40.830 --> 43:42.630]  I mean, do they have people that are actually...
[43:42.630 --> 43:45.130]  Yeah, that's the most common question there is.
[43:47.070 --> 43:50.490]  They do have a policy of not retaining it for a long time.
[43:50.610 --> 43:54.730]  But when that policy was developed, it was because they could not retain it a long time.
[43:55.310 --> 43:56.610]  Storage was a real problem.
[43:56.790 --> 43:58.650]  And retrieval was almost impossible.
[43:59.130 --> 44:03.070]  I don't need to tell you now that we're talking about terabytes of storage, easily done.
[44:03.650 --> 44:06.450]  Not only that, but you can network storage banks together.
[44:07.030 --> 44:08.890]  Retrieval and indexing has gotten better.
[44:08.890 --> 44:13.430]  And right now, despite what people are saying, they are keeping it for a long time.
[44:14.790 --> 44:19.410]  They, in fact, apprehended terrorists as a result of all these cameras.
[44:20.690 --> 44:27.290]  But keep in mind that in England, with all these 4.2 million cameras, they never prevented a terrorist incident from happening.
[44:28.210 --> 44:34.730]  All the value of it came as a result of post-incident investigations, which I'm not saying is unimportant.
[44:34.730 --> 44:35.470]  It is important.
[44:35.470 --> 44:37.750]  But it didn't prevent a terrorist act.
[44:38.130 --> 44:39.370]  And it's unlikely to.
[44:39.550 --> 44:45.370]  And the reason is, a human being can't monitor more than 9 to 12 monitors at one time.
[44:46.610 --> 44:52.130]  And yet, in some of these new centers, I've seen over 100 monitors on a wall.
[44:52.390 --> 44:54.330]  Now, granted, a lot of them are event-activated.
[44:54.590 --> 44:57.170]  That is, they cue the observer.
[44:59.230 --> 45:04.430]  But that, and of course, like I said earlier, facial recognition systems have not worked at all.
[45:04.430 --> 45:08.970]  I mean, every city that's put them in has pulled them back out, because they just don't work at all.
[45:09.070 --> 45:12.810]  But I'm concerned, because I think the storage is there.
[45:12.810 --> 45:14.890]  I don't think they're going to get rid of it.
[45:15.610 --> 45:17.490]  You know, as long as they can keep the images.
[45:18.030 --> 45:20.850]  And right now, I mean, I think London's keeping them for about a year.
[45:24.980 --> 45:26.360]  Any other questions?
[45:28.320 --> 45:30.220]  I just wanted to make a comment.
[45:30.380 --> 45:31.940]  You were talking about the movie Sneakers.
[45:32.240 --> 45:34.920]  And you mentioned that nothing in that movie works.
[45:35.140 --> 45:35.380]  Yeah.
[45:35.380 --> 45:49.400]  And if you listen to Phone Losers or America Radio, you'd know that there's a Canadian telecom that, when you log on and decide you want to change how you're being billed or whatever, they actually use a voice as your password authentication system.
[45:49.660 --> 45:56.220]  And it is vulnerable to the little attack, even if you have lots of different voice levels or anything like that.
[45:57.020 --> 45:59.240]  You know, let me give you an example, though.
[46:00.380 --> 46:04.580]  When they contacted me to work on Sneakers, I said, I don't want to make a training film for little criminals.
[46:04.580 --> 46:05.420]  You know.
[46:06.540 --> 46:14.660]  So, for example, there's one scene when Robert Redford's going to sneak into this one room and take some stuff.
[46:15.300 --> 46:17.920]  And he walks really, really, really slow, you know.
[46:18.160 --> 46:21.780]  Well, it's never quite clear in a scene what kind of sensor is being used.
[46:22.060 --> 46:24.600]  There's a presumption it might be a passive infrared sensor at all.
[46:25.180 --> 46:29.360]  What you're actually seeing on screen is one half of a microwave, active microwave sensor.
[46:30.060 --> 46:38.660]  But anyway, River Phoenix is down in the basement bringing the room heat up so that it matches body heat, if any of you remember the movie, you know.
[46:38.820 --> 46:40.640]  And he's talking to Redford all over the phone.
[46:40.640 --> 46:44.860]  He said, okay, 98.6, match, match, you know.
[46:45.520 --> 46:49.440]  Well, if you think about it, what does the passive infrared sensor see if it was on the wall?
[46:49.580 --> 46:50.980]  Is it see 98.6?
[46:52.260 --> 46:53.840]  That's internal body temperature.
[46:55.360 --> 46:58.040]  And if you're doing an autopsy, you might get 98.6.
[46:58.740 --> 47:01.540]  But the proper temperature would have been 89 to 91 degrees.
[47:02.220 --> 47:04.780]  So I made it deliberately hotter.
[47:05.280 --> 47:09.680]  But the interesting thing is we tried to premiere it at the American Society of Industrial Security Convention.
[47:10.380 --> 47:11.680]  It was coming up in September.
[47:12.460 --> 47:15.020]  And they showed it there for free, anybody that wanted to see it.
[47:15.140 --> 47:16.160]  All these security people.
[47:16.360 --> 47:20.880]  And I had a dozen of security people came up to me and said, John, you shouldn't have done it, you know.
[47:21.880 --> 47:23.180]  Gave away all those secrets.
[47:23.180 --> 47:24.520]  Well, I didn't say anything.
[47:25.040 --> 47:26.740]  But my mind is saying, you idiot.
[47:27.080 --> 47:27.200]  You know.
[47:28.880 --> 47:29.280]  So.
[47:30.740 --> 47:32.100]  Anyway, any other questions?
[47:32.480 --> 47:34.720]  But if not, I'd appreciate it.
[47:34.800 --> 47:36.340]  Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity.
[47:37.000 --> 47:37.540]  Thank you.