[00:00.000 --> 00:03.560]  How many people in here have volunteered at some point throughout the conference?
[00:04.860 --> 00:11.800]  Alright, I just want to let you guys know that there are a lot of people who have made their 10-hour commitment, who have not yet picked up their t-shirts.
[00:12.420 --> 00:16.460]  And so, a lot of you, a lot of volunteers are really, really close.
[00:16.800 --> 00:23.220]  And if you haven't volunteered, just like Greg said, we have a really big need for teardown today and tomorrow.
[00:23.420 --> 00:25.800]  Even if you have to take off, you can do little things.
[00:25.800 --> 00:35.660]  If you see a little cup or a bottle or some piece of trash or chairs that aren't right, you can help clean up and help make teardown a much easier process by doing your little part.
[00:35.780 --> 00:45.820]  And if you can, stick around for as long as you can to help us get everything done so that guys like me who haven't really slept in three, four days can actually take it easy tonight.
[00:46.200 --> 00:52.000]  And just on that note, give a huge round of applause for the volunteers who have been working so, so hard to bring this to you.
[00:57.700 --> 01:02.040]  Literally, without them, a conference like this could not be possible.
[01:02.670 --> 01:04.560]  Also, I have a couple of other announcements.
[01:04.960 --> 01:07.600]  One, the Club-Mate cases, $60.
[01:08.820 --> 01:10.560]  You'll hear when it's time to do that.
[01:11.220 --> 01:14.460]  Let's bring out the first three panelists for today.
[01:14.860 --> 01:16.280]  Emmanuel Goldstein.
[01:23.710 --> 01:26.470]  Please join me in welcoming Kevin Mitnick.
[01:32.890 --> 01:35.290]  We'd like to also welcome Bernie S.
[01:43.110 --> 01:43.490]  Oh, he's gone.
[01:43.830 --> 01:44.010]  Okay.
[01:44.930 --> 01:45.510]  Bye, Greg.
[01:45.810 --> 01:46.130]  Thank you.
[01:46.970 --> 01:47.750]  Greg Newby, everybody.
[01:52.530 --> 01:58.350]  All right, we have a couple more people that will be showing up on stage, but this is enough to start off with right now.
[01:58.950 --> 02:04.590]  This talk is called Informants, Villains, or Heroes.
[02:05.230 --> 02:14.570]  And we all have stories in our lives as to how informants have played a part one way or another.
[02:15.910 --> 02:17.850]  None of us are informants, are we?
[02:18.550 --> 02:19.190]  Not I.
[02:19.450 --> 02:22.170]  Well, the thing is, in the hacker world, the odds are...
[02:22.170 --> 02:23.330]  What is it, one in four?
[02:23.530 --> 02:24.150]  One in five?
[02:24.790 --> 02:32.850]  It's a ridiculous percentage, but the number of people who become informants or who are working for two different sides at the same time.
[02:32.850 --> 02:34.110]  It's extraordinarily high.
[02:34.230 --> 02:35.270]  This has always been the case.
[02:35.390 --> 02:44.190]  From the very beginning, back in the 1960s and 70s with phone phreaks, you could bet that one in a handful of people would be ratting their friends out.
[02:44.610 --> 02:48.190]  And the question that I think we need to ask you today is, why do people do this?
[02:48.330 --> 02:49.190]  Why does this happen?
[02:49.190 --> 02:50.990]  What gets into someone's head?
[02:51.150 --> 02:52.530]  They'll do something like this.
[02:52.750 --> 02:55.230]  And what would you do in a similar situation?
[02:55.590 --> 03:00.250]  And can you judge somebody that you have not been in their shoes?
[03:00.930 --> 03:04.770]  Very quickly, I'll tell my story, and then these two will tell theirs.
[03:05.650 --> 03:16.130]  Back when I got into trouble in the mid-'80s, hacking into NASA and the White House and various other things via GTE's Telenet system.
[03:17.490 --> 03:26.510]  The unfortunate aftermath of that was that federal agents descended on the radio station that I worked at at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
[03:27.010 --> 03:37.290]  And that caused all kinds of confusion because, well, first of all, I didn't own a computer at the time, so I wasn't seen to be a suspect.
[03:37.290 --> 03:41.110]  So I had to actually tell the federal authorities who the suspect was.
[03:41.110 --> 03:42.970]  It wasn't the guy on the computer.
[03:43.170 --> 03:44.710]  It was the guy who was actually using the computer.
[03:45.150 --> 03:46.890]  So, you know, send your subpoenas this way.
[03:48.350 --> 03:55.290]  After that happened, I noticed people started acting kind of strange because, well, when federal agents are lurking about, people get scared.
[03:55.410 --> 03:58.250]  People have all kinds of unpredictable reactions.
[03:58.590 --> 04:00.250]  And the thing I noticed most...
[04:00.250 --> 04:01.910]  Well, first of all, a lot of people stopped talking to me.
[04:02.010 --> 04:08.690]  And I guess that's something that happens whenever you're under investigation by some kind of law enforcement agency.
[04:08.690 --> 04:15.410]  People kind of freak out and they say, I don't want to be seen with him because I could be busted for something else or guilt by association and whatnot.
[04:16.450 --> 04:18.270]  So there are those people who stopped talking to me.
[04:18.350 --> 04:24.410]  But then there was one person that I found out later because other people didn't know to keep their mouth shut.
[04:24.670 --> 04:42.430]  I found out that this guy had gone to the university legal people and volunteered information, volunteered things that he had heard me say that might make me somewhat suspect and maybe I'm up to something more because the federal authorities were very interested in who I was,
[04:42.430 --> 04:43.050]  what I was doing.
[04:43.450 --> 04:46.410]  And at the time, I was floored.
[04:46.410 --> 04:47.690]  How could somebody do this?
[04:47.770 --> 05:00.990]  Why would somebody who's not under investigation themselves voluntarily go to somebody and turn in evidence or what they think is evidence or suspicion or gossip or whatever without any reason to?
[05:01.070 --> 05:01.870]  I mean, we were friends.
[05:02.030 --> 05:04.410]  This was somebody I talked to, somebody I saw every day.
[05:04.790 --> 05:10.870]  And again, the only reason I found out was because some idiot in the university office told somebody else and it got back to me.
[05:11.510 --> 05:18.430]  And yeah, I was pissed off as hell when this happened because this guy is screwing me over for no reason and never did anything to him.
[05:18.430 --> 05:20.170]  And it's like a witch hunt now.
[05:20.430 --> 05:22.150]  I mean, I was very open about what I did.
[05:22.350 --> 05:26.290]  I even went to the feds and told them so that somebody else wouldn't get in trouble for it.
[05:26.630 --> 05:29.030]  And here are people looking to make it even worse.
[05:29.970 --> 05:33.030]  It was very, very hard for me to understand this at the time.
[05:34.450 --> 05:35.830]  Afterwards, I tried.
[05:36.050 --> 05:52.790]  I tried hard to put myself in their shoes and understand what they must have been thinking when they did this and how scared somebody can be just at the sight of a cop, at the sight of a federal agent, and who knows what demons they have lurking in their closet.
[05:53.290 --> 05:54.150]  People panic.
[05:54.450 --> 05:58.230]  People panic and do things that we don't understand why they do it.
[05:58.350 --> 06:00.450]  And the authorities count on this.
[06:00.550 --> 06:09.570]  The authorities live for this kind of thing so that they get as much information, they get all of us telling other people about other people.
[06:09.570 --> 06:17.970]  This is how every authoritarian government in history has worked, by getting their citizens to spy on each other and report to the authorities, and then more people do it to them.
[06:19.210 --> 06:29.770]  So without the dialogue, and that's what I hope we accomplish here today, the dialogue where we actually try and understand where we're all coming from, maybe we can prevent this kind of thing from continuing to happen.
[06:29.870 --> 06:37.030]  But right now, and as you'll hear with some of the stories today, this is a part of our community that has always been there.
[06:37.030 --> 06:51.530]  The amount of people who turn into informants, the amount of people who turn people in, the amount of people that you think you can trust with information that you really can't, that has always been with us and likely will be for quite some time.
[06:52.190 --> 06:53.510]  Kevin, what do you have?
[06:53.990 --> 06:58.130]  Yeah, I had issues with informants as well.
[06:59.910 --> 07:00.590]  Did you?
[07:00.650 --> 07:01.570]  A lot of issues, yeah.
[07:02.730 --> 07:07.110]  First of all, the way the federal authorities work is it's a divide and conquer.
[07:07.490 --> 07:17.850]  So what they want to do is if they could find more than one person involved in a case, what they'll do is they'll try to turn the other person to what they call a cooperator.
[07:18.630 --> 07:23.230]  And the benefit of that, obviously, is the person gets a reduced sentence.
[07:23.630 --> 07:28.690]  Or under the federal sentencing guidelines, they get what they call acceptance of responsibility.
[07:30.110 --> 07:41.510]  So, in essence, what the informant or the snitch is actually getting paid with, you know, not money, but less time in exchange for their testimony.
[07:41.790 --> 07:54.230]  Which I have a problem with because if a jury found out that somebody was paid $10,000 to testify, or they were paid with one year less in prison, to me it's the same.
[07:54.230 --> 07:56.630]  So they actually get paid for their testimony.
[07:56.930 --> 08:12.270]  In my personal experience, when I first hacked, and this is right out of high school, I was 17 years old, I became involved with this group of guys, and they knew much more about the RISTC operating system.
[08:12.370 --> 08:16.570]  In fact, they actually were the administrators of the system for the Los Angeles Unified School District.
[08:16.570 --> 08:18.950]  And at the time, I was into phone phreaking.
[08:19.070 --> 08:21.370]  I didn't really care much about hacking.
[08:21.590 --> 08:26.870]  I was more... I had a very passionate feeling towards telephony.
[08:28.850 --> 08:30.810]  And I wanted to join this group.
[08:31.790 --> 08:36.010]  So, what they did is they had their initiation was like an impossible task.
[08:36.350 --> 08:42.590]  They had a colleague that actually worked for Digital Equipment Corporation on the RSTS/E development team.
[08:42.930 --> 08:48.270]  And they told me that for me to be able to join their group, I had to break into RSTS/E development at DEC.
[08:48.990 --> 08:50.370]  And I said, well, how can I do that?
[08:50.450 --> 08:52.010]  Well, we're going to give you the dial-up number.
[08:53.030 --> 08:54.750]  So, they gave me the dial-up number.
[08:55.830 --> 09:01.030]  And at the time, you know, the only thing you could do is either guess passwords or use social engineering at that point.
[09:01.230 --> 09:03.030]  So, I actually used social engineering.
[09:03.030 --> 09:03.970]  I was able to get in.
[09:03.970 --> 09:11.370]  And then what these guys did is they immediately went down to an office that actually had faster modems.
[09:11.570 --> 09:13.150]  You know, like 1,200 baud.
[09:13.310 --> 09:15.530]  Because back then, we're at 110, 300 baud.
[09:15.750 --> 09:18.770]  So, they went down to their office, 1,200 baud.
[09:18.890 --> 09:22.870]  And they were actually copying the source code to the RSTS/E operating system.
[09:23.150 --> 09:25.230]  And I was kind of watching them do this.
[09:25.430 --> 09:33.610]  And then I found out later, after they finished this task, they actually called Digital Equipment Corporation and told them, I'm the one that hacked in.
[09:34.630 --> 09:36.410]  After they stole all their source code.
[09:37.210 --> 09:42.810]  Fortunately, I was a juvenile at the time and nothing actually happened to me.
[09:42.950 --> 09:44.410]  I was never approached by the authorities.
[09:44.990 --> 09:48.510]  But later on in life, I chose bad hacking partners.
[09:49.030 --> 09:52.990]  And there was a guy named Lenny DeCicco.
[09:53.210 --> 09:57.030]  And he and I always had contests against each other.
[09:58.210 --> 10:00.810]  So, I worked at a company, he worked at a company.
[10:00.810 --> 10:02.050]  And we'd have a challenge.
[10:02.210 --> 10:07.750]  If we could hack into each other's systems, like capture the flag, we would...
[10:07.750 --> 10:10.050]  The reward would be 200 bucks.
[10:10.950 --> 10:14.970]  So, I kept getting into his system at work, but he could never get into mine.
[10:15.330 --> 10:16.430]  And he got angry.
[10:16.670 --> 10:18.210]  And then one time...
[10:18.210 --> 10:23.370]  And then it ended up becoming a situation where he actually went to the...
[10:23.370 --> 10:28.750]  I did some pranks because we had a little falling out over this.
[10:29.130 --> 10:35.330]  And he actually went to the FBI and told them all the hacking we were doing in Digital Equipment Corporation.
[10:35.330 --> 10:38.230]  Because at that time, we were copying the VMS source code.
[10:38.530 --> 10:44.470]  So, here's a guy that wasn't even under investigation or anything at that point.
[10:44.470 --> 10:50.710]  And because he was angry with me, went to the federal authorities and became an informant.
[10:51.050 --> 10:58.410]  But because he didn't get a lawyer or discuss this with an attorney, what had happened is he actually ended up getting himself convicted of a felony.
[10:59.670 --> 11:00.110]  Yeah.
[11:00.270 --> 11:01.210]  Which was really stupid.
[11:01.410 --> 11:03.170]  He was just so angry he...
[11:03.170 --> 11:04.550]  You know, he ended up...
[11:04.550 --> 11:05.810]  Now he has a felony on his record.
[11:05.810 --> 11:10.010]  So then later on, you know, then I got involved with another guy.
[11:10.290 --> 11:11.970]  And he was in the Fugitive Game.
[11:12.490 --> 11:16.050]  Probably for those that have read the book, there's a guy named Lewis De Payne.
[11:16.230 --> 11:19.170]  He and I were hacking partners for over 20 years.
[11:20.730 --> 11:31.170]  And in the Fugitive Game, because John Littman got input from him and not really the authorities, when they went and searched his apartment.
[11:31.810 --> 11:40.850]  In the book, it's portrayed as he was one up on the FBI, that he was not being cooperative at all.
[11:41.030 --> 11:43.570]  And he was being antagonistic.
[11:43.850 --> 11:47.430]  And that he knew all about their operation, which he knew a lot about their operation.
[11:49.750 --> 11:53.870]  But in the book, it appeared he was like non-cooperative and a smart ass to the government.
[11:53.870 --> 12:04.950]  But in reality, when I got my discovery, what they call FBI 302s, this is when somebody interviews with an FBI agent, they fill out these FBI 302 forms.
[12:05.010 --> 12:12.230]  When I got that in my pretrial discovery, after four years, by the way, I found out that that really wasn't the case.
[12:12.430 --> 12:23.090]  That was that as soon as they got into... searched his apartment, he immediately offered cooperation if the government could provide him protection, like I was going to do something.
[12:24.270 --> 12:24.790]  But...
[12:26.750 --> 12:33.890]  So, in all my cases, except for the last one, Tsutomu Shimomura, they all involved informants.
[12:35.770 --> 12:39.950]  And in one case, it was a guy that had a vendetta against me.
[12:40.030 --> 12:44.010]  The second case was a guy who was under investigation with me.
[12:46.870 --> 12:51.210]  Myself, when I was going... when I was sitting in custody, there was the Free Kevin movement.
[12:52.170 --> 13:01.930]  I was offered to cooperate, you know, because what happens is how the government wants to work the cases is they want somebody to be able to testify against the other.
[13:02.170 --> 13:05.690]  And they want to divide and conquer both, you know, all the parties in the conspiracy.
[13:06.110 --> 13:15.230]  But at the time, I refused to cooperate because I felt it was against my ethic and moral fiber to reduce my sentence to hand it off to somebody else.
[13:15.230 --> 13:17.190]  I just felt really uncomfortable.
[13:23.510 --> 13:29.150]  So I sat in prison much longer than I normally would if I would have had to cooperate.
[13:29.150 --> 13:33.490]  But I feel good today knowing that I didn't hurt somebody else.
[13:33.630 --> 13:38.090]  I didn't try to reduce my sentence to harm another individual.
[13:38.690 --> 13:44.090]  And it even got to the point where the government said, O.K., you don't have to cooperate against somebody else, but we want to debrief you.
[13:44.270 --> 13:46.770]  And I even refused to allow the government to debrief me.
[13:46.770 --> 13:51.830]  So what ended up happening is I actually served out, like, the full sentence.
[13:51.850 --> 13:56.110]  I didn't get any points for acceptance or responsibility or anything of that sort.
[13:57.510 --> 14:02.490]  But I think what's also interesting, there's a way to detect formants in the federal system.
[14:02.890 --> 14:08.390]  There is a computer system called PACER, Public Access Court Electronic Records.
[14:08.650 --> 14:14.770]  And this allows you to look up dockets, the docket reports of people that have been charged with federal crimes.
[14:14.770 --> 14:16.630]  Also civil, you have bankruptcy there.
[14:17.330 --> 14:30.270]  So in knowing how the system works, because I was inside the system for quite some time, I could look at a docket and kind of get a good sense of whether that person is cooperating against another individual.
[14:30.570 --> 14:32.490]  And let's look up an example.
[14:32.690 --> 14:40.110]  I'm not saying this particular person's an informant, but it's highly suspicious some of the circumstances in their docket.
[14:40.110 --> 14:41.150]  All right, so let's take a quick look.
[14:41.630 --> 14:43.990]  Can you bring it up on the projector?
[14:46.610 --> 14:48.290]  Yeah, bring up my...
[14:50.050 --> 14:50.770]  It's under...
[14:50.770 --> 14:52.110]  Is this somebody who's in prison now?
[14:52.970 --> 14:53.290]  No.
[14:53.670 --> 14:53.910]  Okay.
[14:54.590 --> 14:56.490]  I don't want somebody getting shanked because of something we say.
[14:57.050 --> 14:57.470]  Where is it?
[14:57.790 --> 14:58.650]  Right here, right here.
[14:58.830 --> 14:59.310]  Right here, right here.
[14:59.430 --> 15:00.330]  You're too cute, don't worry.
[15:01.150 --> 15:01.630]  All right.
[15:02.250 --> 15:03.130]  So here's...
[15:03.770 --> 15:07.750]  Here's a docket report off PACER, and anybody can sign up for PACER and analyze these things.
[15:08.130 --> 15:10.030]  So I just picked just a random guy.
[15:10.550 --> 15:11.150]  This guy...
[15:11.150 --> 15:13.150]  This guy's named Gregory D. Evans.
[15:14.510 --> 15:14.950]  Okay.
[15:15.710 --> 15:17.870]  And let's analyze the docket here.
[15:17.990 --> 15:19.030]  What does that mean, terminated?
[15:19.610 --> 15:20.830]  That means the case...
[15:20.830 --> 15:21.870]  It doesn't mean he's terminated.
[15:21.970 --> 15:23.850]  It means the case was...
[15:23.850 --> 15:24.450]  I don't know the...
[15:24.450 --> 15:24.670]  Finished.
[15:26.890 --> 15:28.350]  If all our problems were that easy.
[15:28.610 --> 15:30.890]  So this is the case with the Central District of California.
[15:30.890 --> 15:34.210]  Now, let's look at some, like, suspicious things you could see in a docket.
[15:34.590 --> 15:40.350]  Well, first of all, we see that this individual was sentenced to 24 months on the right-hand side under the disposition.
[15:41.090 --> 15:42.130]  But let's go down.
[15:43.350 --> 15:48.110]  Now, in the news media reports, I actually Googled this guy, and this guy actually had a co-defendant.
[15:48.430 --> 15:51.250]  What's suspicious is the co-defendant's not on the same docket.
[15:51.830 --> 15:58.010]  In a normal federal case, when they prosecute an individual, they have to try them together if they're part of the same conspiracy.
[15:58.430 --> 16:03.030]  So if they're not on the same docket, that means there's something as strange as going on.
[16:03.110 --> 16:06.250]  But let's look further, because that's not conclusive by itself.
[16:08.230 --> 16:09.210]  So if we look...
[16:09.210 --> 16:14.270]  We look that he was charged with an information, and these are numbered, and I'll go through the numbers.
[16:14.470 --> 16:16.970]  One, he was charged with an information.
[16:17.330 --> 16:19.570]  Then he was indicted on number four.
[16:20.450 --> 16:20.930]  Okay?
[16:21.010 --> 16:23.930]  And he was assigned to this judge named Dick Trevisian.
[16:23.930 --> 16:24.970]  Okay?
[16:25.450 --> 16:29.670]  In number eight, the government requested detention.
[16:29.670 --> 16:32.970]  What that means is they want to hold this person without bail.
[16:33.510 --> 16:34.110]  Okay?
[16:34.190 --> 16:36.950]  Because they're either a flight risk or a danger to the community.
[16:37.370 --> 16:43.590]  So if we go down a little bit further, in number nine, he immediately decided to plead guilty.
[16:43.590 --> 16:51.430]  That means there's no presumption of evidence that he is actually guilty of some of the charges in the indictment or the information.
[16:52.550 --> 17:00.510]  So then, we go down a little further, and if you look at number 17, there's a notice of filing under seal by his attorney.
[17:00.510 --> 17:08.930]  Meaning that this is not for public consumption, and the government could obviously see it, but it's a notice filing under seal.
[17:09.310 --> 17:12.590]  And then immediately after this under seal filing...
[17:12.590 --> 17:13.410]  Okay?
[17:13.470 --> 17:14.570]  And there's several of them.
[17:15.470 --> 17:18.730]  In number 28, all of a sudden, he's getting bail.
[17:19.570 --> 17:21.610]  They're allowing him to bond out of prison.
[17:22.210 --> 17:24.070]  Now, that doesn't make sense.
[17:24.070 --> 17:33.730]  If you haven't been found guilty by a trial or pled guilty, right, the government didn't want him out.
[17:33.990 --> 17:35.450]  They basically wanted to detain him.
[17:35.490 --> 17:37.810]  Now, the guy pleads guilty.
[17:38.110 --> 17:41.690]  There are several under seal filings, and all of a sudden, he's getting bail?
[17:42.510 --> 17:43.630]  I mean, what do you think?
[17:44.490 --> 17:44.930]  No.
[17:45.270 --> 17:46.250]  It's not conclusive.
[17:46.710 --> 17:47.610]  So there's the securities.
[17:47.830 --> 17:49.630]  There's the property he's putting up.
[17:49.630 --> 17:57.190]  And now, if you look at 33 down this whole list, it's all in-camera, under-sealing filings by the defense.
[17:58.390 --> 17:58.930]  Right?
[17:59.390 --> 18:01.490]  So usually what this...
[18:01.490 --> 18:08.030]  I'm not sure in this particular guy's case, but in a lot of cases, it's when the attorney...
[18:08.030 --> 18:12.030]  You know, they're talking about the cooperation that person is doing with the government.
[18:13.070 --> 18:18.950]  So, another thing to look for is long delays after pleading guilty or being...
[18:18.950 --> 18:19.950]  Well, pleading guilty.
[18:20.170 --> 18:21.530]  Before that, in sentencing.
[18:21.670 --> 18:22.950]  If there was a many...
[18:22.950 --> 18:25.430]  Several months in between, it's usually normally 90 days.
[18:25.610 --> 18:28.070]  Because in a federal criminal case, they have to do...
[18:28.070 --> 18:28.730]  The U.S.
[18:28.810 --> 18:31.150]  Probation Office has to do what they call a pre-sentence report.
[18:31.550 --> 18:34.990]  In the pre-sentence report, the probation department recommends a sentence.
[18:35.610 --> 18:36.930]  That's a 90-day period.
[18:36.930 --> 18:40.630]  But when it goes on for months, what that means...
[18:40.630 --> 18:41.590]  Well, it could likely mean...
[18:41.590 --> 18:43.430]  Look at all these under-seal filings.
[18:43.610 --> 18:50.110]  What that means is there's a reason why there's a delay between adjudication of guilt and sentencing.
[18:50.150 --> 18:55.390]  And that usually indicates that that person may be cooperating against another defendant.
[18:55.390 --> 18:56.570]  Or more than one defendant.
[18:57.170 --> 19:00.010]  So, it's kind of interesting because in my personal case...
[19:00.010 --> 19:05.950]  I don't know if you know this, there was a guy named Justin Tanner Peterson who under the name of Agent Steele.
[19:07.270 --> 19:15.630]  And what this guy was doing is he was actually committing credit card frauds.
[19:15.870 --> 19:18.870]  And he was involved in the Kevin Poulsen case.
[19:19.030 --> 19:20.230]  He ran off to Texas.
[19:20.370 --> 19:22.170]  He got busted again for fraud.
[19:22.330 --> 19:31.250]  As soon as he ended up in jail, he calls Pacific Bell and the FBI in Los Angeles and offers to become an informant against the hacker community.
[19:31.450 --> 19:40.790]  And his job was to get the bust or to acquire evidence against as many people as he possibly can.
[19:40.910 --> 19:43.250]  And I became one of the large targets.
[19:43.510 --> 19:52.990]  After he was able to help the government get Kevin Poulsen's computer in the prosecution against Kevin Poulsen, his next target was made.
[19:53.530 --> 20:00.510]  So, if you looked at his docket on PACER, it essentially has the same pattern.
[20:00.790 --> 20:03.130]  Numerous under seal filings by the defense.
[20:04.010 --> 20:06.970]  Bonding out after pleading guilty.
[20:07.650 --> 20:11.230]  Long delays between adjudication of guilt and sentencing.
[20:11.550 --> 20:16.250]  So, you can kind of work out just by kind of a traffic analysis who's an informant or not.
[20:16.250 --> 20:17.490]  So, I think that's quite interesting.
[20:19.410 --> 20:20.770]  I don't know what else to say.
[20:20.990 --> 20:25.810]  You know, I had issues with people informing against me in several instances.
[20:26.090 --> 20:31.850]  I never became an informant against people in my federal cases.
[20:31.950 --> 20:34.510]  Because again, I felt that that was the wrong thing to do.
[20:36.230 --> 20:39.470]  And I think in some cases, you have to look to what the person is doing.
[20:39.590 --> 20:45.390]  If you knew your next door neighbor was killing children and burying them in the backyard, would you inform against that person?
[20:45.970 --> 20:46.450]  Probably.
[20:47.110 --> 20:47.290]  Right?
[20:47.990 --> 20:49.570]  You know, somebody's killing people, right?
[20:49.950 --> 20:51.250]  But I think there's...
[20:51.250 --> 20:51.270]  Probably?
[20:52.310 --> 20:52.790]  Probably.
[20:53.070 --> 20:53.770]  Yeah, probably.
[20:54.050 --> 20:55.470]  Like, for sure.
[20:55.830 --> 20:56.230]  Yeah.
[20:56.450 --> 21:02.830]  So, I mean, you've got to look at, well, what is that person really doing?
[21:03.150 --> 21:04.250]  I think it's very subjective.
[21:05.610 --> 21:07.350]  And then how do you handle...
[21:07.350 --> 21:13.630]  If you go and inform against the serial killer neighbor, and you go off...
[21:13.630 --> 21:23.370]  And your intention is just to do it to, for example, read about the situation in the media or something like that, maybe that's the wrong reason.
[21:23.710 --> 21:31.270]  Maybe if the reason was really to protect other kids from being victimized by this fictitious serial killer, you know, maybe that's a better reason.
[21:31.850 --> 21:36.470]  One of the best reasons, you know, maybe, is if you have to protect yourself.
[21:36.850 --> 21:49.830]  For example, if I were to come to you, for example, and admit that I just robbed the bank across the street, technically, if the government found out that I told you and you had knowledge of that, you're what they call an accessory after the fact.
[21:49.990 --> 21:52.790]  Or misprison of a felony.
[21:52.790 --> 22:00.950]  Which means you could be prosecuted and sentenced for the same behavior as what you attempted to conceal.
[22:01.150 --> 22:01.470]  Okay.
[22:01.710 --> 22:02.690]  I hate to break in...
[22:02.690 --> 22:03.110]  On to Bernie.
[22:03.230 --> 22:04.230]  We have a lot of ground to cover.
[22:04.330 --> 22:08.490]  We have a 90-minute panel today, which is great, but we have so much to cover and so many people to talk to.
[22:08.770 --> 22:09.870]  Just joining us is Phiber Optik.
[22:10.490 --> 22:11.390]  Some of you may remember him.
[22:11.890 --> 22:12.250]  Yeah.
[22:17.090 --> 22:18.530]  And there's more coming, too.
[22:18.990 --> 22:25.170]  But right now, Bernie, if you could briefly give some slight presentation here, and we'll keep moving.
[22:26.970 --> 22:27.610]  What's that?
[22:27.910 --> 22:29.030]  Oh, that's the...
[22:29.030 --> 22:32.330]  There's part of our federal government called the United States Sentencing Commission.
[22:32.530 --> 22:38.930]  And they come up with deciding how long people should be locked up for various deeds.
[22:39.930 --> 22:42.350]  And it's all broken down into a formula.
[22:42.630 --> 22:46.510]  It's amazing what an infrastructure we have for this sort of thing.
[22:46.570 --> 22:47.510]  But that's a sentencing table.
[22:47.710 --> 22:51.170]  And if you look further down, you'll see that...
[22:51.890 --> 22:59.350]  Well, along the vertical axis of the sentencing table, you see a base offense level, which is a number from one up to...
[22:59.350 --> 23:00.930]  I think it goes up to like 43.
[23:01.430 --> 23:11.410]  And then along the horizontal axis of the chart is a criminal history score, depending on your prior offenses, whether misdemeanors or felonies, that's scored as well.
[23:11.510 --> 23:16.890]  And where they intersect is a range of months that the federal government will put you in prison.
[23:16.890 --> 23:19.310]  You can see the low end is like zero to six months.
[23:19.550 --> 23:26.150]  And then at the high end, you have, you know, 210 to 262 months.
[23:26.510 --> 23:38.990]  Or in the lower right-hand corner, you see a bunch of things that have letters in them, like 360 months, which is like 30 years, to dash L-I-F-E, 30 to life.
[23:40.150 --> 23:42.710]  I spent a bunch of time in U.S.
[23:42.850 --> 23:46.890]  Marshal's custody while waiting for go-to-court hearings in the federal building in Philadelphia.
[23:47.250 --> 23:49.030]  And guys would come back from their trials or whatever.
[23:49.350 --> 23:51.090]  And, you know, everybody would ask, well, what'd you get?
[23:51.390 --> 23:52.110]  And they'd come back.
[23:52.110 --> 23:52.730]  I got letters.
[23:53.090 --> 23:59.750]  And that meant, you know, this young guy you're just talking to, 20 years old, and you just found out he was going to spend the rest of his life in prison for whatever.
[23:59.930 --> 24:02.270]  You don't ask what they did or are accused of.
[24:02.450 --> 24:03.250]  It's not polite.
[24:03.490 --> 24:04.690]  It's not in bad form.
[24:04.690 --> 24:07.330]  But it has an impact on you.
[24:07.430 --> 24:09.770]  You just meet a young person who just said they got letters.
[24:10.390 --> 24:13.850]  So, anyway, this is what the federal government hands out to people.
[24:14.050 --> 24:23.170]  And when people know they're facing this sort of thing, what you think you normally would do in a situation sometimes goes out the window.
[24:24.710 --> 24:26.290]  So, that's the sentencing guidelines.
[24:28.050 --> 24:34.050]  When people are facing that, they also sometimes will get what's called a proffer letter.
[24:34.050 --> 24:46.150]  The federal government will, let me open this thing up here, send you a letter saying, hey, we maybe not have in charge you yet, but you're a person of interest.
[24:46.330 --> 24:51.490]  And if you tell us some information here, we will give you various kinds of immunity.
[24:51.870 --> 24:54.970]  So, you won't get prosecuted for things as long as you tell us about everything.
[24:54.970 --> 25:03.050]  And if someone's looking at letters or smaller numbers, but significant numbers locked in a cage, you might consider doing that.
[25:03.310 --> 25:06.730]  I'm not suggesting that, but I'm just saying that's the kind of pressure that people can be under.
[25:06.950 --> 25:10.470]  And here's a copy of a proffer letter from the Department of Justice to somebody.
[25:10.570 --> 25:13.070]  This was one I found at random at Google.
[25:14.210 --> 25:19.710]  And I also wanted to show what the federal government...
[25:21.590 --> 25:23.530]  There's a... bear with me here a second.
[25:25.030 --> 25:27.370]  There's a... there it is, 5K1.1.
[25:30.150 --> 25:31.010]  Here we go.
[25:31.790 --> 25:32.710]  Downward departures.
[25:32.950 --> 25:34.670]  In the federal sentencing...
[25:34.670 --> 25:39.970]  I call this all part of the informant infrastructure of our government, our country.
[25:39.970 --> 25:46.590]  You see something called Substantial Assistance to Authorities, or 5K1.1.
[25:47.270 --> 25:49.370]  And basically, it says...
[25:49.370 --> 25:52.130]  And you can go into all the details here.
[25:52.230 --> 25:55.810]  You can look up 5K1.1 under USSG, United States Sentencing Guidelines.
[25:56.010 --> 26:04.350]  Basically, it says your sentence will be less, often considerably less, if you provide substantial assistance to authorities.
[26:05.230 --> 26:09.990]  In my own case, or cases, I had a state misdemeanor case and then a federal felony case.
[26:10.850 --> 26:12.730]  And they were sort of... they were tied together.
[26:14.070 --> 26:16.970]  I was... I was initially charged with the tampering with evidence.
[26:17.210 --> 26:20.970]  And that was allegedly removing batteries from a Touch-Tone dialer.
[26:22.190 --> 26:23.850]  And... I know, pretty serious.
[26:24.170 --> 26:24.470]  Bad, bad, bad.
[26:24.850 --> 26:30.870]  And also, having something to do with the disappearance of an instruction sheet that explained how to use a tone dialer.
[26:31.470 --> 26:33.430]  And I was with... with myself.
[26:33.690 --> 26:36.590]  We were at a ham radio flea market, actually, myself and two people I knew.
[26:36.670 --> 26:38.490]  Actually, one person I knew and his friend came along.
[26:41.910 --> 26:46.550]  And... the car was... the car was parked in a place that the police, like, wondered why this car is parked.
[26:46.590 --> 26:47.930]  And the car just sort of searched the car illegally.
[26:48.250 --> 26:50.330]  The police just searched the car because there was a broken window.
[26:50.390 --> 26:51.630]  They thought it was a stolen car.
[26:51.690 --> 26:52.150]  It wasn't.
[26:52.290 --> 26:56.970]  But they searched through it and they found... they found a couple of tone dialers in the car.
[26:56.970 --> 26:59.830]  And they were like... so then they were like this... what is this?
[27:00.010 --> 27:01.150]  So they did some investigation.
[27:01.410 --> 27:03.710]  They took back the police station once we came back to get the car.
[27:04.390 --> 27:11.250]  And... we were in... in a holding area waiting for them to decide what they were going to figure out, charge us with, if anything.
[27:12.290 --> 27:18.230]  And... that's when the batteries disappeared from a tone dialer and the instruction sheets also disappeared.
[27:18.230 --> 27:23.170]  And ironically, the tone dialer in question... it wasn't my tone dialer.
[27:23.390 --> 27:28.430]  And... the instruction sheet was... did not go into my underwear.
[27:28.610 --> 27:29.530]  It went into somebody else's underwear.
[27:31.350 --> 27:33.890]  But... I kept my mouth shut about any of that.
[27:34.470 --> 27:39.590]  But I was... unwilling to testify against anyone else.
[27:39.930 --> 27:43.010]  And... I was the person whose car it was.
[27:43.090 --> 27:43.730]  So they charged me.
[27:43.850 --> 27:47.810]  They said, if you don't even tell who was involved with this, then you're going to be charged.
[27:47.810 --> 27:50.390]  And they... they came up with some misdemeanor that was going to...
[27:50.390 --> 27:57.890]  Like... there's some Pennsylvania misdemeanor that says, if you possess something that could be used to commit telephone fraud, then that's a... that's a misdemeanor.
[27:58.030 --> 28:01.450]  But they... but they couldn't charge me with... they couldn't prove you could do that.
[28:01.570 --> 28:04.010]  So they just charged me with the... tampering with evidence.
[28:04.170 --> 28:05.710]  Because I wasn't going to say, well, he did that.
[28:05.810 --> 28:07.870]  He took the batteries out and he put the instructions down as short.
[28:07.970 --> 28:08.690]  So I kept my mouth shut.
[28:08.790 --> 28:09.250]  It was my car.
[28:09.390 --> 28:10.110]  So I took the charge.
[28:11.390 --> 28:13.730]  Ironically, one of the guys... well, I don't know if it's ironic, but one of the guys...
[28:13.730 --> 28:18.650]  My friend's friend was a co-defendant in Phiber Optiks' case.
[28:18.750 --> 28:24.310]  I didn't know that at the time, but he did tell me he was under probation or parole or something, so I didn't want him to get in trouble.
[28:24.890 --> 28:26.810]  So, in any case...
[28:26.810 --> 28:29.230]  And that friend later turned out to be an informant.
[28:29.370 --> 28:29.610]  Yeah.
[28:29.810 --> 28:35.770]  I didn't know... I just knew he was this hacker guy, but I didn't know he was a significant informant in this case.
[28:35.870 --> 28:42.530]  That happened actually before he informed in Mark on Phiber's case before this thing happened with me.
[28:42.530 --> 28:43.990]  But I didn't know that they were connected.
[28:44.470 --> 29:04.850]  In any case, a year or so went by, and then this thing of the Secret Service came up with me, and to make a long story short, after I was arrested for possessing hardware and software that could be misused, according to government, for the unauthorized access to telecommunication services,
[29:05.130 --> 29:12.510]  a newspaper article appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer, which alerted someone who I was here with at the very first time.
[29:12.530 --> 29:14.270]  First HOPE conference, who...
[29:14.270 --> 29:28.310]  He and I went in on a deal where I would purchase a bunch of quartz crystals, and he would purchase a bunch of really small tone dialers, and he sold the tone dialers on that end of this room, and I sold crystals on this side of the room, and then people built red boxes with these parts.
[29:29.290 --> 29:29.690]  And...
[29:29.690 --> 29:31.670]  Another page of history in the Hotel Pennsylvania.
[29:31.670 --> 29:31.750]  Yeah.
[29:31.890 --> 29:32.410]  Right in this room.
[29:32.490 --> 29:34.310]  I was, like, right here, where...
[29:34.310 --> 29:35.410]  We didn't have the stage right here.
[29:35.550 --> 29:35.770]  We had...
[29:35.770 --> 29:37.270]  This was, like, a big expo room for the first HOPE.
[29:37.710 --> 29:39.210]  But anyway, sold a lot of crystals.
[29:39.410 --> 29:43.410]  Like, it cost for, like, a dollar, and it was just basically as a community service to the...
[29:43.410 --> 29:45.390]  to the packing community here.
[29:45.490 --> 29:50.530]  But, in any case, many months later, when this article appeared in the Inquirer, he saw this, and he freaked out.
[29:51.210 --> 29:51.850]  He called...
[29:51.850 --> 29:52.810]  And what he was doing...
[29:52.810 --> 29:54.490]  He was actually building and selling red boxes.
[29:54.650 --> 29:55.230]  I was never...
[29:55.230 --> 29:57.390]  I had never sold a red box to anybody.
[29:57.550 --> 29:59.330]  I was never charged with selling a red box to anybody.
[29:59.390 --> 30:01.730]  I wasn't even charged with using a red box, but besides the point.
[30:01.910 --> 30:04.170]  The point is, when he saw that, he freaked out.
[30:04.370 --> 30:07.750]  He called the police, and they said the Secret Service was involved, so then he called the Secret Service.
[30:08.890 --> 30:13.810]  And despite him having sold a bunch of red boxes to, like, co-workers...
[30:13.810 --> 30:14.490]  He was a school...
[30:14.490 --> 30:15.970]  Philadelphia public school teacher.
[30:16.110 --> 30:18.010]  He sold them to all his co-workers, that sort of thing.
[30:18.010 --> 30:37.630]  Despite that level of culpability, the Secret Service, who had motivation to punish me for things that had nothing to do with toned dollars, had to do with distributing surveillance photos of some other undercover agents, and this comes from my prosecutor who told my lawyer that this is the real reason I was locked up.
[30:37.690 --> 30:42.670]  In any case, they gave them enough information to put a case together.
[30:43.370 --> 30:49.470]  It's one thing when a law enforcement agency can figure out what's going on, but they have to prove it, you know?
[30:49.610 --> 30:57.410]  And it's helpful when they have someone testify against you that that's much stronger evidence than they can say, well, obviously he was doing this and this because he had this.
[30:58.470 --> 31:01.790]  Do you think that person was afraid of what they were doing?
[31:02.090 --> 31:07.650]  They were selling red boxes, you said, so they came forward so that they wouldn't get in trouble and fingered you.
[31:07.910 --> 31:08.310]  Absolutely.
[31:08.310 --> 31:15.430]  And you were the bigger enemy because you were actually teaching people things and speaking out and being a lot more intelligent than just a common criminal.
[31:15.430 --> 31:16.110]  Yeah, I wasn't hiding this.
[31:16.130 --> 31:23.210]  I was publicly showing people here how to rebuild red boxes at the first HOPE conference and at 2600 meetings and other stuff.
[31:23.210 --> 31:30.970]  So, he, knowing that I was now locked up, was afraid that I was going to rat him out.
[31:31.030 --> 31:33.130]  Like you said, it's a divide and conquer thing.
[31:33.230 --> 31:35.050]  People are afraid who's going to rat who out first.
[31:35.290 --> 31:43.350]  So, I was just taking responsibility for my own actions and I was not about to name anybody else even though I got a powerful letter later on and all this.
[31:43.950 --> 31:45.610]  I take responsibility for my own actions.
[31:46.150 --> 31:51.710]  But he decided he wanted to relieve himself from punishment.
[31:51.950 --> 32:00.490]  And I got an apology letter from him a year later saying, I hope you understand what I did and I'm sorry but, you know, I've got a wife and kids and a job and I hope you understand.
[32:00.910 --> 32:03.090]  And then he went on just like small talk after the letter.
[32:03.190 --> 32:04.370]  I'm like, what the hell is this letter?
[32:04.370 --> 32:06.830]  You know, it's like, it's like, go away.
[32:07.010 --> 32:08.290]  I don't want nothing to do with you anymore.
[32:08.950 --> 32:12.350]  So, these people, they seem to just justify why they do this.
[32:12.530 --> 32:24.950]  But, as a result of him doing that, he got absolutely no, he got complete immunity even though his actions were, he was more culpable in committing criminal offenses than I was.
[32:25.070 --> 32:26.490]  But he got, he got nothing.
[32:26.830 --> 32:33.230]  So, I don't begrudge him getting nothing but I do have a problem with how he arrived at that, at that result.
[32:34.730 --> 32:36.510]  Let's see, I just want to make one more point.
[32:38.370 --> 32:39.050]  No victims.
[32:39.590 --> 32:44.670]  Oh, yeah, the federal government and the state government in both my state misdemeanor and the federal felony cases.
[32:44.870 --> 32:49.510]  In both cases, there was, they put in writing that there were no victims in my offenses.
[32:50.750 --> 32:56.630]  Yet, you know, you can still, despite there's no victim in your case, you can still spend serious time in prison.
[32:56.810 --> 32:58.710]  You became a victim for well over a year.
[32:59.230 --> 33:06.010]  Well, I mean, not technically a victim, but I, you know, I spent, you know, a good year and I went through a lot of trauma and so forth.
[33:06.150 --> 33:10.810]  But, you know, it's kind of ironic, you know, and you're standing before a judge and you have to apologize.
[33:11.370 --> 33:14.830]  Typically, you're expected to apologize to the judge for the people that you harmed.
[33:15.510 --> 33:17.690]  And I was like really short on words.
[33:17.810 --> 33:22.670]  Like, what, what do you want me to say that the government, government said I didn't do anything.
[33:22.790 --> 33:24.030]  But they don't, I just don't want to hear that.
[33:24.030 --> 33:25.710]  You know, you have to look humble and whatever.
[33:25.910 --> 33:28.650]  So, and I don't want to say, well, I'm the victim, but whatever.
[33:28.910 --> 33:30.230]  So this kind of stuff happens.
[33:30.350 --> 33:44.790]  But it's, it's funny that our, I'm amusing that our cases, Phiber's and mine were indirectly linked because a, someone who was culpable in a case that I was involved in ended up prior being an informant in Phiber's case.
[33:44.950 --> 33:46.950]  Well, Phiber, I'd like for you to tell your story quickly.
[33:46.950 --> 33:50.350]  And it's because we have a lot of ground to cover and Phiber Optik.
[33:51.210 --> 33:51.730]  Thanks.
[33:52.570 --> 33:56.830]  With, with due respect to Condor, I bet you haven't been called Condor in a while.
[33:57.470 --> 34:04.790]  And Bernie S. for pointing out a lot of the legalese that we've been obliged to learn for our own protection.
[34:05.330 --> 34:19.450]  I want to take a few moments to rewind a little bit and speak on behalf of our rules that we lived by in our community long before the FBI and Secret Service succeeded in infiltrating our community.
[34:22.010 --> 34:25.910]  Probably, these things probably aren't spoken aloud very much anymore.
[34:26.170 --> 34:36.010]  And at the risk of sounding cliche, I won't refer to them as the hacker ethic, since that's become something of a, of a, of something in a movie script.
[34:36.010 --> 34:45.170]  Um, what I will say is this, is that, um, we've always, uh, spoken of the, the quest for knowledge as being most important in our pursuits.
[34:45.770 --> 34:49.370]  That, um, this was, uh, always a, a noble cause.
[34:49.810 --> 35:00.270]  That, uh, the destruction of systems, uh, crashing systems was always, uh, something that we avoided doing at all costs, whether by accident or, uh, as a joke.
[35:00.530 --> 35:02.310]  It was something that was always frowned upon.
[35:02.310 --> 35:15.210]  Um, the, uh, the fact that, uh, information, uh, about technology should be freely available, uh, was something that we always, uh, held to be of, uh, of great importance.
[35:15.490 --> 35:30.190]  Uh, we always frowned upon companies who charged information, uh, sorry, who charged money for, uh, technical documentation and, uh, information about operating systems, which was very hard to find, uh, in the 1980s, for example.
[35:30.190 --> 35:36.350]  Um, which is why, uh, trashing and things of that nature were so popular.
[35:36.570 --> 35:42.870]  A lot of the times was to find manuals on how to use the systems, uh, that, that we were getting access to.
[35:43.430 --> 35:52.670]  Um, and then probably, uh, above all else, uh, there was the notion of trust, um, which was extremely important.
[35:52.670 --> 35:58.950]  When you consider the fact that, uh, at those times, uh, at that time, there wasn't any Internet to speak of.
[35:59.110 --> 36:01.330]  We were communicating via bulletin boards.
[36:01.570 --> 36:06.550]  In most cases, uh, bulletin board systems with a single phone line with a single modem.
[36:06.550 --> 36:10.110]  Um, that we were sort of competing with each other to get through busy signals.
[36:10.510 --> 36:13.770]  Just to get in, read some messages, and respond to some messages.
[36:14.210 --> 36:19.810]  Um, that was basically how we communicated with each other, um, back in the, uh, in the 1980s.
[36:19.810 --> 36:35.130]  Um, the things that we were doing, while a lot of them originally were not illegal, they would become illegal, um, through the modification of laws, uh, due to the complaints of big business to the government to crack down on, on hacking.
[36:35.710 --> 36:44.390]  Um, many of these laws were enacted around 1986, and, uh, but they wouldn't really be tried, um, officially until a few years later.
[36:44.390 --> 37:00.870]  Um, but this, the trust that we always assumed was existent between, uh, our fellow man, obviously, as you can see from the stories of, of Kevin and, uh, and Bernie, uh, was not the case.
[37:01.110 --> 37:05.590]  And certainly would, uh, kind of fall apart over time.
[37:05.590 --> 37:11.510]  As the government became more involved in, uh, in hackers and, uh, in prosecuting hackers.
[37:12.210 --> 37:14.650]  Um, hackers are human beings as well.
[37:14.870 --> 37:19.970]  And, uh, we began to see this, our, our trust model basically fall apart.
[37:20.590 --> 37:29.690]  Um, since we were hacking using, I mean, the reason why we had these handles in the first place was not because we were playing cloak and dagger games.
[37:29.810 --> 37:34.830]  It was because we were doing things that were illegal and we needed to protect our personal identity.
[37:34.830 --> 37:38.510]  And this was mutually respected between hackers.
[37:39.290 --> 37:47.750]  For, for a hacker to, uh, even to divulge the identity of another hacker to other hackers was frowned upon.
[37:48.610 --> 37:59.050]  Um, so certainly to, uh, to give information about what a hacker was doing, uh, to the feds, to volunteer this information was, was unheard of.
[37:59.050 --> 38:16.310]  Um, the fact that it's, uh, so easily done today, uh, for personal gain or, uh, to, uh, avoid prosecution is really, uh, uh, self-serving behavior that, uh, simply didn't exist back then.
[38:16.650 --> 38:21.150]  Um, and it's unfortunate that things have changed to this, to this degree.
[38:21.150 --> 38:27.970]  Um, there have been many people who have come about over the years, uh, who were wholly self-serving.
[38:28.350 --> 38:34.110]  Um, Kevin's example of, uh, Justin Peterson is, uh, uh, is a prime example.
[38:34.290 --> 38:37.230]  And unfortunately, he's not here to defend himself because he's dead.
[38:38.290 --> 38:42.590]  Um, Justin Peterson actually died, uh, a couple of months ago, wasn't it?
[38:42.590 --> 38:43.070]  Yeah, recently.
[38:43.250 --> 38:43.350]  Yeah.
[38:44.010 --> 38:48.830]  Um, I'm not dancing on his grave or anything, but, uh, other people might.
[38:48.830 --> 38:54.990]  Um, Justin actually used to, uh, I knew Justin from BBSs, uh, in the, uh, late 1980s.
[38:55.470 --> 38:59.690]  And, um, he used to call me up quite frequently and we used to discuss hacking switches.
[39:00.110 --> 39:10.070]  Um, the only reason I can imagine, and I knew he was, uh, on the run supposedly and, um, doing things of a questionable nature.
[39:10.070 --> 39:14.750]  I didn't know that he was informing on people, uh, least of all Kevin or Kevin Poulsen.
[39:15.590 --> 39:23.450]  Um, when I met the, uh, California hackers in the, uh, early 90s and we, uh, we sat down and discussed exactly what it is Justin did.
[39:23.450 --> 39:25.790]  It became apparent to me what, what had happened.
[39:26.290 --> 39:40.130]  But, um, much of what, uh, Justin knew and did with, um, switches in, uh, in and around California and, I guess, uh, elsewhere when he was on the run, um, I hesitate to say he learned from me.
[39:40.570 --> 39:46.910]  Um, the only reason I can imagine he didn't inform on me personally is because I was such a good source of information to him.
[39:47.670 --> 39:54.530]  Um, which is unfortunate because had I known, uh, what he was doing, certainly I would have, uh, hesitated to, to talk to him.
[39:54.610 --> 40:02.750]  But again, uh, I knew him from, uh, bulletin board systems and had no reason to, to doubt, uh, the veracity of what it is, uh, that he was telling me.
[40:03.390 --> 40:09.450]  Um, how many people here are familiar with the gang war in cyberspace, LOD versus MOD?
[40:10.770 --> 40:11.570]  Wow, look at that.
[40:11.730 --> 40:12.430]  Oh, look at that.
[40:12.490 --> 40:12.670]  Okay.
[40:12.910 --> 40:13.770]  Um, never happened.
[40:14.310 --> 40:17.730]  Would it surprise you to find that out, that it never happened?
[40:17.970 --> 40:19.970]  There was no war in cyberspace.
[40:20.010 --> 40:22.350]  There was never a war between LOD and MOD.
[40:22.550 --> 40:23.770]  It was a complete fabrication.
[40:24.050 --> 40:25.130]  But it was in the mass media.
[40:25.350 --> 40:25.810]  That's true.
[40:25.810 --> 40:26.630]  It was in the mass media.
[40:26.690 --> 40:27.790]  That means it must be true, right?
[40:27.790 --> 40:28.570]  I read it in the newspapers.
[40:28.890 --> 40:29.010]  Yeah.
[40:29.070 --> 40:30.170]  All these guys read it.
[40:33.310 --> 40:42.250]  Um, it was a fabrication by the U.S. Attorney's Office, uh, and the media people that I was friends with when I was indicted, uh, thought it was completely ludicrous and didn't report it as such.
[40:42.250 --> 40:51.370]  Um, other journalists of, let's say, uh, lesser journalistic integrity latched onto the story because it made great print.
[40:51.690 --> 40:53.090]  Gang war in cyberspace.
[40:53.370 --> 40:56.510]  It was like literally the West Side story of, of the hacker underground.
[40:57.130 --> 41:02.350]  We got, we got the rich kids in Texas versus the inner city kids in, in New York.
[41:02.350 --> 41:04.370]  I mean, what better story to tell?
[41:04.530 --> 41:13.450]  Let's write some books, print some articles, write some, some magazine articles too, and, you know, do some photo spreads and, you know, it makes for great copy.
[41:14.410 --> 41:18.470]  Um, unfortunately, uh, that's not what happened.
[41:19.110 --> 41:34.250]  Um, what I will say is that there was a great amount of disagreement and dissension within LOD, uh, in the, uh, late 1980s because of the fact that there was informing going on.
[41:34.390 --> 41:43.030]  Um, several people, several members of the Legion of Doom had gotten, uh, busted under mysterious, let's just say mysterious circumstances.
[41:43.030 --> 41:55.490]  Um, people that we knew, people that we were affiliated in other countries, uh, for example, a hacker group in Australia, uh, were busted under, uh, suspicious, uh, circumstances.
[41:55.870 --> 42:13.790]  Um, which all led to, uh, a certain individual that we all, uh, know and love in Texas who, um, had started one of the first, uh, hacker consultancies, uh, under the auspices of, uh, gaining clout, uh, with the FBI and telco security.
[42:14.010 --> 42:18.650]  Uh, the person I'm referring to is, is Erik Bloodaxe, in case it wasn't clear to anyone in the audience.
[42:19.190 --> 42:24.970]  Um, he actually, uh, was, uh, a member of LOD.
[42:25.510 --> 42:31.930]  Um, LOD was, uh, one of the first, uh, organized hacker groups in a very disorganized computer underground.
[42:32.170 --> 42:48.510]  And the main purpose of LOD initially was, um, to take information, primarily that was found trashing at, uh, telco central offices, uh, and type it in, uh, and make it available in what were, what were known as LOD tech journals, which were available online,
[42:48.510 --> 42:51.990]  uh, in text file sections of, of bulletin board systems.
[42:52.230 --> 42:54.570]  So-called elite bulletin board systems.
[42:55.050 --> 43:00.470]  Uh, that required, uh, a certain amount of trust to, uh, to gain access to.
[43:01.170 --> 43:06.310]  Um, I see some people in the audience that were involved during those times that remember this.
[43:06.790 --> 43:09.710]  Um, but, um...
[43:09.710 --> 43:10.170]  Don't worry.
[43:10.330 --> 43:11.050]  We won't rat you out.
[43:11.290 --> 43:11.450]  Yeah.
[43:11.830 --> 43:12.050]  Thanks.
[43:13.730 --> 43:23.170]  Uh, what happened towards the, the late 1980s when, um, there were things like Operation Sun Devil, which had nothing to do with, uh, LOD directly.
[43:23.750 --> 43:27.430]  Um, there was, uh, uh, EFF was formed.
[43:27.550 --> 43:32.570]  EFF got involved, uh, in my case, in, um, some of the other hacker cases at the time.
[43:32.570 --> 43:38.330]  Um, there, uh, there was a lot more government involvement in the hacker underground in general.
[43:38.350 --> 43:41.430]  And, uh, because of that fact, uh, two things happened.
[43:41.550 --> 43:46.250]  A lot of people, uh, who had not gotten in trouble yet didn't want to risk anymore.
[43:46.430 --> 43:49.730]  They were already older, particularly the older generation of hackers.
[43:50.190 --> 44:02.470]  Uh, some guys that I knew who started LOD, for example, uh, withdrew from, uh, the hacker underground, uh, simply didn't want to risk getting in trouble anymore, now that the, the climate had changed so much.
[44:03.130 --> 44:24.890]  Um, other hackers, uh, a few, let's say, um, thought that it might be good to go in the other direction and attempt to, uh, gain clout with the government and telco security by inviting them onto a bulletin board that was set up, uh, under the auspices of,
[44:25.090 --> 44:34.170]  Um, creating a dialogue between hackers and, uh, security people and, uh, the FBI and Secret Service.
[44:34.590 --> 44:45.950]  Well, um, it might sound a little ridiculous to think about, but, um, the FBI thought it was great because it gave them a chance to, uh, uh, chat with hackers and then arrest them.
[44:45.950 --> 44:51.150]  Um, so it was really convenient for, uh, for everyone involved.
[44:51.750 --> 44:55.910]  Um, go straight to jail.
[44:55.970 --> 44:56.830]  One stop shopping.
[44:57.090 --> 44:57.510]  Exactly.
[44:57.730 --> 45:14.410]  Um, I, I personally had a big problem with this, uh, not only with the security consultancy that was set up in Texas, but also with the fact that, um, uh, Erik Bloodaxe thought it would be a really great idea to try to, uh, bring back LOD, uh, for what it was.
[45:14.410 --> 45:29.290]  In the absence of any real leadership in the group anymore, because anyone who mattered anymore had withdrawn, um, he basically appointed himself leader of the group, uh, which is why whenever you read old stories in the media, it says, uh, uh, LOD versus MOD.
[45:29.970 --> 45:36.750]  Um, a lot of that was bolstered by he himself in addition to the media and the government later.
[45:36.750 --> 45:54.550]  Well, Phiber, uh, we do need to move this along, but, uh, just to summarize, you had a situation where, um, this member of LOD, um, uh, narked on, on various people in New York, uh, because, according to him, his, he felt his business was in danger and he had to do something.
[45:54.550 --> 45:58.530]  And, um, uh, I think he later said he was sorry that you got caught up in all that.
[45:58.650 --> 45:59.030]  Is that right?
[45:59.110 --> 45:59.110]  Yeah.
[45:59.230 --> 46:17.750]  I mean, to make a long story short, um, it became known to even other LOD members who were wondering if I had heard anything about, uh, Erik Bloodaxe because, so they were concerned for their own safety, uh, when they heard about what happened with some hackers in Australia and others and suspected that he was involved.
[46:18.010 --> 46:24.710]  But he was trying to gain clout with the government, uh, to bolster his business, uh, and in doing so was turning in hackers.
[46:25.330 --> 46:34.570]  Um, when hackers found out he was doing this, they began harassing him and his business and so on, which is, you know, what hackers do in general.
[46:34.570 --> 46:41.170]  And certainly someone who's informing on other hackers is, is, uh, is going to earn the wrath of, of other hackers.
[46:41.790 --> 46:59.390]  Um, so he decided that I was responsible for this based on some previous, uh, disagreements we had had, and, uh, decided that he was going to inform on me and various of my friends here in New York, um, by giving information to the FBI about us and so on and so forth.
[47:00.210 --> 47:16.030]  Um, ultimately, as, as, uh, as Emmanuel said, and which is interesting because it goes in line with, with what Bernie said, is that, uh, after some time passes, and I guess these people have a guilty conscience, they, they try to contact you and, and clear their, their conscience by, by apologizing.
[47:18.430 --> 47:21.550]  There is no apology for sending me to prison for a year.
[47:21.690 --> 47:23.390]  I'm sorry, but there just isn't.
[47:28.600 --> 47:31.620]  And, interesting, uh, interesting footnote to all of this.
[47:31.860 --> 47:40.500]  After, after that whole escapade within your own, uh, loosely organized group, Masters of Deception, MOD, you had not one but two informants.
[47:40.740 --> 47:47.960]  Yeah, so as things, as things fell apart, um, EFF was, uh, was supporting us to go to trial.
[47:47.960 --> 47:52.420]  Um, they felt that we were not guilty of what the U.S. Attorneys were saying we did.
[47:54.040 --> 48:12.000]  There was even at least one attempt by one of the complainants in the case, uh, British Telecom Tymenet, wanting to actually interview us, which, uh, if we were given the opportunity, would have, uh, shown cooperation and would have given us the opportunity to tell them exactly what we did.
[48:12.000 --> 48:14.560]  We would have met the engineers that built the network.
[48:14.760 --> 48:16.940]  They were interested how we defeated their security.
[48:17.220 --> 48:18.140]  Sounds like a movie.
[48:18.600 --> 48:20.240]  But, unfortunately, the U.S. Attorney's Office did not allow them to do this.
[48:23.040 --> 48:25.960]  So we were never given the opportunity to clear our name.
[48:26.140 --> 48:28.160]  So we were basically treated like criminals.
[48:28.540 --> 48:42.440]  And due to that fact, uh, one by one, the, uh, the, uh, my friends, the guys that were, uh, named in the indictment, um, decided to plead guilty, uh, until, uh, I was the only one remaining.
[48:42.440 --> 48:47.180]  And it's, you know, the typical cliche of the last guy standing without a chair when the music stops.
[48:47.180 --> 49:03.100]  And what happened was, um, uh, two guys, uh, some people familiar with, uh, Julio and, and, uh, Alan, who was the person that Bernie was referring to, um, decided to, uh, testify against me.
[49:03.720 --> 49:07.580]  And, uh, as a result, uh, they never did any time.
[49:07.740 --> 49:15.180]  They never did any time in prison to this day, which is ironic because in the indictment itself, they're among the people that are named the most.
[49:15.180 --> 49:16.640]  This is typical.
[49:16.820 --> 49:17.340]  It is typical.
[49:17.460 --> 49:25.680]  This is typical because, um, I'm personally, I'm a, I'm a well-known, uh, personality.
[49:25.740 --> 49:29.040]  I guess some would say, uh, some kind of celebrity status.
[49:30.200 --> 49:36.720]  The U.S. Attorney's office wanted to, uh, use that fact to, uh, take advantage of that fact.
[49:36.740 --> 49:37.460]  To set an example.
[49:37.560 --> 49:40.320]  To set an example, as the judge said in the case.
[49:40.320 --> 49:57.900]  And, um, as a result, they were willing to deal with the people who had the most to lose, uh, in the indictment, who were charged with the most counts in the indictment, in order to use me as the, the scapegoat, and succeed in prosecuting somebody to make the corporations happy.
[49:58.260 --> 50:03.760]  Well, no, we have, I think, three of the most interesting stories in hacker history right up here on stage.
[50:03.760 --> 50:05.760]  I don't think you've ever all been on stage at the same time.
[50:05.940 --> 50:07.380]  So that's, that's an amazing thing right there.
[50:07.580 --> 50:09.120]  Dr. Phiber, I just want to ask a quick question.
[50:09.240 --> 50:09.300]  Yeah.
[50:09.380 --> 50:21.040]  Did you, did you, were you given an opportunity by the federal government to, uh, provide, uh, substantial assistance, or any kind of assistance to them in providing information about others they would, might want to prosecute?
[50:21.300 --> 50:24.020]  No, actually, I refused to cooperate with the government completely.
[50:24.140 --> 50:24.300]  Right.
[50:24.400 --> 50:24.820]  And I was actually...
[50:24.820 --> 50:27.680]  What I'm saying is, did they, did they send you a proffer letter or anything like that?
[50:27.840 --> 50:34.120]  No, they never, they never sent me a letter or anything like that because I made it clear early on through my attorney that I was not willing to cooperate.
[50:34.380 --> 50:37.520]  And my sentence was actually longer because of that fact.
[50:37.700 --> 50:37.880]  Yeah.
[50:37.880 --> 50:38.840]  I was willing to accept that.
[50:38.980 --> 50:40.360]  I got a proffer letter as well.
[50:40.760 --> 50:42.780]  Uh, and I just did not respond to it.
[50:42.900 --> 50:45.040]  I just, I'll take responsibility for my own actions.
[50:45.100 --> 50:47.700]  I will not speak for or about anyone else.
[50:47.960 --> 50:48.320]  It's...
[50:48.320 --> 50:51.720]  And they, they, they take venge, they're vengeful about that.
[50:51.840 --> 50:53.240]  When you refuse, they take that personally.
[50:53.360 --> 50:55.440]  It's, it's a lot of pressure to put on people.
[50:55.760 --> 50:57.660]  And, uh, obviously a lot of people crack.
[50:57.800 --> 50:58.580]  We've seen that happen.
[50:58.600 --> 51:00.960]  And that's why there are so many informants in the, in the community.
[51:00.960 --> 51:03.420]  Uh, I wish we had given this panel two hours.
[51:03.580 --> 51:05.760]  We have another 30 minutes, but we have so much ground to cover.
[51:06.100 --> 51:18.560]  Uh, I'm sure you've all heard of the latest, uh, case, which, uh, probably, uh, many of you are here for, uh, concerning the, uh, the keynote speaker here at, um, at HOPE, uh, Julian Assange of WikiLeaks.
[51:18.940 --> 51:32.640]  An interesting story that, that, um, is behind that, where, uh, um, this, this kid in the army, uh, was, uh, allegedly releasing, um, classified information, including, uh, videotapes that were very damning to, uh, to the U.S. military.
[51:33.880 --> 51:51.660]  Um, and, um, what wound up happening, according to a report in Wired, uh, is that, uh, this particular person in the army befriended somebody within the hacker community and proceeded to tell him all kinds of interesting things and, um, that person in the hacker community,
[51:51.880 --> 51:55.520]  um, felt compelled to turn him in.
[51:55.840 --> 52:03.820]  Now, I've been told by many, many people that it's insane to dive into this.
[52:04.160 --> 52:18.460]  That even though this is happening right here at HOPE, that we have, uh, the keynote speaker, uh, running WikiLeaks involved in this, we have the person who, uh, who turned in the, uh, the person who leaked the information.
[52:19.120 --> 52:19.880]  The alleged, yes.
[52:20.220 --> 52:21.540]  Uh, well, no, he did turn him in.
[52:21.760 --> 52:23.760]  Oh, no, you turned in the, and you were about to...
[52:23.760 --> 52:24.880]  I was getting to the alleged, yes.
[52:25.300 --> 52:26.420]  We have to use alleged all the time.
[52:26.420 --> 52:27.400]  I'm not a lawyer.
[52:28.100 --> 52:31.840]  Uh, so, um, we have that person, uh, who has been attending the conference.
[52:32.220 --> 52:36.160]  Um, should we avoid the controversy or should we dive right into it?
[52:36.440 --> 52:38.260]  I say, of course, we dive right into it.
[52:38.300 --> 52:39.600]  We confront this thing head on.
[52:40.280 --> 52:40.640]  Right?
[52:45.100 --> 52:47.280]  But, it involves a leap of faith.
[52:47.280 --> 53:02.480]  And I, I have that faith in you guys, being civil, listening, coming to your own conclusions, letting people who we disagree with, we may disagree with severely, have their say, so that we can, uh, judge for ourselves.
[53:02.720 --> 53:06.040]  And not just based on what we're told by our friends, what we're told in the mass media.
[53:06.480 --> 53:12.400]  Uh, I, I get into arguments with people on both sides of the spectrum, because I don't like being told how I should feel, what I should say.
[53:12.580 --> 53:12.960]  All right?
[53:12.960 --> 53:14.280]  I want to reach that conclusion myself.
[53:14.540 --> 53:17.640]  And that's going to involve asking questions of everybody.
[53:18.760 --> 53:24.160]  So, do we all agree that, uh, we're going to let this guy have his say in a civil manner?
[53:30.390 --> 53:42.050]  And I think we also need to acknowledge it takes a lot of balls to show up in a crowd that's potentially very hostile and stand your ground, no matter what you think of what he stands for, what he did.
[53:42.430 --> 53:42.590]  All right?
[53:42.710 --> 53:43.450]  Do we agree on that, too?
[53:43.950 --> 53:44.610]  All right.
[53:47.610 --> 53:55.330]  With that, I'd like to introduce Adrian Lamo, and, uh, we'll let him, uh, say his piece, ask some questions, and hopefully learn something.
[53:55.850 --> 53:56.330]  Adrian.
[53:57.770 --> 53:58.810]  All right, you can vote.
[53:58.930 --> 53:59.190]  Go ahead.
[54:04.910 --> 54:05.550]  Let's go.
[54:12.110 --> 54:15.530]  Good day, friends, neighbors, and opponents.
[54:15.530 --> 54:23.730]  Uh, although I would say from the get-go, I don't feel that I'm the opponent of anybody in this crowd.
[54:24.110 --> 54:28.770]  You may feel differently, uh, and I respect your right to do so.
[54:29.650 --> 54:44.810]  Um, but before I dive in to the WikiLeaks-related controversy, I want to go back to a story that is very similar to one, to several of the ones that have been told here just now.
[54:45.350 --> 54:50.530]  Um, in 2003, I was arrested by the FBI.
[54:50.530 --> 54:55.450]  I was given, basically, the same, uh, talk.
[54:55.750 --> 54:57.730]  Hey, you know what would really be cool?
[54:57.910 --> 55:01.870]  If you add, if you added all of your friends to us as being career criminals.
[55:02.730 --> 55:04.750]  And I, I did not do that.
[55:05.010 --> 55:17.730]  You, you can, you, you can hop onto PACER, and you can get the court transcripts, and what, what you will find is that I allocated responsibility because I believe people own their actions.
[55:18.450 --> 55:25.090]  Um, some of you may have been here last night for the screening of the film Hackers Wanted.
[55:25.090 --> 55:37.870]  And what I was doing at that time is what I do believe, um, private first class Manning was doing, which is acting one's conscience.
[55:38.270 --> 55:57.750]  Uh, in my case, I wanted to set a precedent whereby hackers could approach corporations and have the outcome be positive, have the outcome be one where corporations walked away saying, hey, you know what, that wasn't so bad.
[55:58.290 --> 56:01.050]  These, these hacker people can actually help us.
[56:01.190 --> 56:02.670]  They're not all out to get us.
[56:03.070 --> 56:07.050]  Um, the New York Times Corporation disagreed.
[56:07.450 --> 56:10.770]  Um, they pressed charges, as I always said that I did.
[56:11.030 --> 56:13.830]  I plead guilty because I was guilty.
[56:14.230 --> 56:17.430]  Um, and that was my acceptance of responsibility.
[56:18.530 --> 56:22.290]  Um, fast forward a couple of years.
[56:23.010 --> 56:31.130]  Um, one and one of the other, a long series of people sent me a random instant message saying, hey, have a look at what I did.
[56:31.290 --> 56:34.570]  And I was like, yeah, cool, whatever, I'll get to that.
[56:34.790 --> 56:43.170]  Because a lot of people do approach me with information about their ongoing computer hacking.
[56:43.810 --> 56:51.470]  When that hacking involves things that are actually genuinely cool and interesting, I'll say, hey, sure, yeah, sure, tell me more.
[56:51.470 --> 56:52.050]  I'm interested.
[56:52.850 --> 57:09.530]  When it involves, uh, crimes, be they financial or otherwise hurtful to actual individuals in the real world, but not life-threatening, I'll tell them, hey, shut the hell up and let me put you in touch with this attorney I know.
[57:09.530 --> 57:19.410]  Uh, in this case, I didn't really have either of those two choices because, um, the die was already cast.
[57:19.410 --> 57:34.050]  Uh, I was made aware that over a quarter million documents had been allegedly leaked, uh, that were classified State Department cables.
[57:34.610 --> 57:36.850]  Uh, they had been sent to WikiLeaks.
[57:37.130 --> 57:39.510]  WikiLeaks had a presence here at this conference.
[57:39.510 --> 57:42.570]  I think that they gave, uh, an interesting talk.
[57:43.070 --> 57:46.890]  Um, but conspicuously, they didn't mention those cables.
[57:48.210 --> 57:53.430]  And I can't really say what, why, why that is.
[57:53.550 --> 57:55.730]  I'm operating on about three hours of sleep.
[57:56.010 --> 58:02.050]  And I didn't know up until right before this was happening that I was going to be talking.
[58:02.050 --> 58:04.930]  So please forgive me if I come off a little bit rough.
[58:05.750 --> 58:19.750]  Um, the information that was allocated to me via instant messenger was that, um, information had been downloaded to cables.
[58:20.090 --> 58:24.070]  Essentially a whole fracking lot of cables, more cables.
[58:24.530 --> 58:30.150]  Uh, cables in this case being an anachronism for the diplomatic version of email.
[58:30.150 --> 58:36.190]  Had been downloaded onto a computer in Iraq.
[58:37.590 --> 58:43.610]  That had then used another route to submit them to WikiLeaks.
[58:44.010 --> 58:44.090]  Uh,
[58:47.930 --> 59:01.550]  is there anybody here in this audience that thinks that they could go through 250,000 multi-page documents that contain classified information about diplomacy throughout the world and say for certain that it's not going to cost anybody's life?
[59:03.330 --> 59:03.770]  Anyone?
[59:11.990 --> 59:15.390]  I, I don't see any hands, but the lights are kind of bright.
[59:18.740 --> 59:23.120]  In that case, I felt compelled.
[59:24.280 --> 59:26.800]  Compelled, I don't believe, is too strong a word.
[59:31.540 --> 59:33.540]  What did you feel, what did you feel compelling?
[59:33.760 --> 59:36.180]  What, in what way did you feel people would put at risk?
[59:38.100 --> 59:42.220]  There are a number of ways in which that information could put people at risk.
[59:42.460 --> 59:47.700]  The State Department is involved in a number of intelligence operations throughout the world.
[59:47.960 --> 59:52.740]  Um, they're not supposed to be, but they're looking out for the interests of Americans.
[59:53.500 --> 59:53.900]  And...
[01:00:00.530 --> 01:00:02.710]  The State Department activity put other people...
[01:00:02.710 --> 01:00:03.670]  Okay, y'all have your say.
[01:00:03.790 --> 01:00:04.210]  Y'all have your say.
[01:00:04.290 --> 01:00:04.850]  We'll take some questions.
[01:00:05.050 --> 01:00:06.670]  I'll be open for, for a Q and A.
[01:00:06.830 --> 01:00:06.870]  Yeah, let me finish.
[01:00:06.870 --> 01:00:10.450]  And I think the Q and A is, is probably the most important thing.
[01:00:10.790 --> 01:00:14.430]  Because you guys know better than I do what you want to know.
[01:00:14.570 --> 01:00:17.010]  We'll be handing out darts and bows and arrows, so don't worry.
[01:00:18.030 --> 01:00:23.350]  Also, if anybody thought to bring pitchforks and maybe some torches, that, that'd be cool, too.
[01:00:24.330 --> 01:00:27.910]  If people want to ask questions, they can line up behind the second microphone there.
[01:00:28.150 --> 01:00:29.150]  The second microphone.
[01:00:30.210 --> 01:00:31.470]  And leave your weapons behind.
[01:00:32.850 --> 01:00:34.390]  But, let Adrian finish first.
[01:00:34.930 --> 01:00:46.110]  As I was stating, State Department operations throughout the world involve both American intelligence citizens' activities and the activities of American tourists and travelers abroad.
[01:00:47.050 --> 01:00:55.130]  If you assume the most innocent possible scenario, that it would do nothing but make the U.S.
[01:00:55.290 --> 01:01:09.710]  look bad in countries abroad, that would still leave people sitting high and dry if they needed consular assistance, if they were arrested abroad by a country that suddenly decided that they weren't too friendly with the U.S.
[01:01:09.870 --> 01:01:10.190]  anymore.
[01:01:10.650 --> 01:01:28.710]  If you approve... if you assume the worst possible scenario, that it actually does expose to the identities of people involved in intelligence operations, or even have the appearance of being involved in intelligence operations by being employees of consulates,
[01:01:29.070 --> 01:01:37.090]  missions, and embassies abroad, then you have the very real possibility that lives will be lost.
[01:01:37.090 --> 01:01:38.910]  Adrian, can I ask you a question?
[01:01:39.170 --> 01:01:48.970]  If it had just been the video, just the video that had been released a few months ago, and not the 260,000 classified documents, what would you have done then?
[01:01:50.050 --> 01:01:50.930]  Absolutely not.
[01:01:51.110 --> 01:01:54.390]  And I'm not going to win any friends in the federal government by saying this.
[01:01:56.450 --> 01:01:56.890]  But...
[01:01:56.890 --> 01:01:58.650]  You wouldn't have turned him in, you're saying?
[01:01:58.910 --> 01:01:59.550]  Say again?
[01:01:59.650 --> 01:02:01.850]  You wouldn't have turned him in based on just the video.
[01:02:01.850 --> 01:02:08.350]  When I knew about the video, I did not contact anybody regarding his activities.
[01:02:08.870 --> 01:02:12.430]  I didn't think that there was anything to be gained by it.
[01:02:12.690 --> 01:02:33.850]  When it was the documents, I thought that there was a possibility that they could be recovered, or at the very least, that there could be a reduced probability that they would be released if the government had the opportunity to take prompt action.
[01:02:34.070 --> 01:02:38.010]  And I know that this isn't a crowd that's always friendly towards the government.
[01:02:38.230 --> 01:02:40.630]  Hell, I haven't always been friendly towards the government.
[01:02:40.630 --> 01:02:45.470]  To this day, I'm not friendly towards all arms of the government.
[01:02:49.230 --> 01:02:50.310]  Thank you.
[01:02:54.510 --> 01:03:22.270]  And I explicitly requested that no FBI agents that were involved in investigating hackers, that nobody that was involved in anything except for investigating computer crimes, being classified national security systems, be involved in the investigation.
[01:03:22.630 --> 01:03:24.030]  Those are my terms.
[01:03:24.290 --> 01:03:29.190]  That was the only way that I was going to sit down with any investigators and talk to them.
[01:03:31.630 --> 01:03:33.870]  And they're like, that's it?
[01:03:34.030 --> 01:03:34.630]  Well, sure!
[01:03:40.690 --> 01:03:49.850]  And it was a surprisingly pleasant undertaking in the sense that I was never coached when I didn't remember something from the logs.
[01:03:50.170 --> 01:03:53.210]  Nobody said, well, are you sure it couldn't have been this way?
[01:03:53.330 --> 01:03:54.810]  Are you sure it couldn't have been that way?
[01:03:54.810 --> 01:03:58.330]  They simply said, okay, we're going to redact that from the affidavit then.
[01:03:59.250 --> 01:04:06.270]  I think that the government behaved themselves better than a lot of people would give them credit for.
[01:04:07.930 --> 01:04:11.990]  To set the record clear, I'm not an informant.
[01:04:12.130 --> 01:04:14.010]  I'm a witness in a criminal case.
[01:04:18.450 --> 01:04:29.450]  It's not that different, in my eyes, from being a witness in any other case that could involve potential loss of life.
[01:04:29.710 --> 01:04:36.710]  Adrian, though, let me say it's been a pleasant experience for you working with the government on this, I guess.
[01:04:36.710 --> 01:04:47.730]  But Bradley Manning, the alleged leaker, is currently sitting in prison in Kuwait, I believe, and he could be locked up for the rest of his life.
[01:04:47.830 --> 01:04:48.610]  How do you feel about that?
[01:04:51.550 --> 01:04:57.770]  I think that it's a little bit ludicrous to say that Bradley Manning is going to be tortured.
[01:04:57.770 --> 01:05:01.670]  We don't do that to our citizens.
[01:05:06.430 --> 01:05:08.430]  That's still open to debate, let's put it that way.
[01:05:08.450 --> 01:05:10.130]  And it depends on your definition of torture.
[01:05:11.030 --> 01:05:12.790]  Let him answer the question.
[01:05:13.010 --> 01:05:18.610]  How do you feel about whatever state you think he's in right now because of your actions?
[01:05:19.410 --> 01:05:29.510]  He's not far from where he was to begin with when he signed up for an all-volunteer army, signed the forms indicating that he would handle classified material appropriately.
[01:05:30.330 --> 01:05:44.690]  He took, even if you're just talking about the video, the colloquially called collateral murder video, he took it from a JAG, the Judge Advocate General's officer's computer.
[01:05:45.050 --> 01:05:50.330]  That indicates that they were investigating it most likely at that time.
[01:05:50.470 --> 01:05:52.590]  And he could have compromised that investigation.
[01:05:52.590 --> 01:06:00.730]  So if there was a war criminal involved here, they could walk free because evidence was compromised as a result of Mr. Manning's actions.
[01:06:02.350 --> 01:06:04.190]  I'm not sure what people are applauding for.
[01:06:04.190 --> 01:06:07.050]  They're war criminals walking free or... I don't know.
[01:06:10.050 --> 01:06:10.450]  Adrian...
[01:06:10.450 --> 01:06:10.990]  People...
[01:06:10.990 --> 01:06:12.790]  Okay, listen, no shouting out.
[01:06:12.890 --> 01:06:14.650]  If you want to ask a question, step up to the microphone.
[01:06:14.770 --> 01:06:15.930]  No one's at the microphone now.
[01:06:16.070 --> 01:06:18.110]  People on the panel, ask Adrian whatever you want.
[01:06:18.110 --> 01:06:19.290]  Yeah, I'd like to interject for a second.
[01:06:19.630 --> 01:06:27.970]  There's one thing that I'm not really understanding that I'm dying to know, and I'm sure many people in the audience are dying to know, is why you're a witness.
[01:06:27.970 --> 01:06:34.650]  A person that in my estimation is of no particular import to this case whatsoever.
[01:06:35.270 --> 01:06:38.530]  Why did this soldier approach you with this information?
[01:06:38.670 --> 01:06:39.530]  That's what I'm not understanding.
[01:06:40.230 --> 01:06:43.730]  I think only Mr. Manning can really answer that question.
[01:06:43.970 --> 01:06:47.850]  I don't know what was going through his mind necessarily.
[01:06:48.310 --> 01:06:50.470]  He indicated that...
[01:06:51.610 --> 01:06:53.710]  Well, I'm going to backtrack a little bit again.
[01:06:53.710 --> 01:06:58.570]  Didn't he contact you because you were in Wired Magazine and he saw you and thought that you'd be a friend to him?
[01:06:59.190 --> 01:06:59.710]  He...
[01:06:59.710 --> 01:07:05.690]  He indicated that he had seen my name in a search on Twitter for WikiLeaks.
[01:07:05.890 --> 01:07:11.710]  And the reason for that is that I have been a longtime supporter of WikiLeaks and am to this day.
[01:07:12.290 --> 01:07:14.590]  I believe that the mission is important.
[01:07:15.310 --> 01:07:18.570]  I think that they should continue to go forward.
[01:07:18.990 --> 01:07:23.530]  And I think that they should focus on oppressive regimes throughout the world that...
[01:07:27.110 --> 01:07:29.470]  Is anyone in this room being oppressed right now?
[01:07:31.550 --> 01:07:32.810]  Well, not by us, I hope.
[01:07:33.510 --> 01:07:33.930]  Alright.
[01:07:34.370 --> 01:07:35.970]  We have some audience questions.
[01:07:36.130 --> 01:07:36.890]  Let's start with the first one.
[01:07:36.970 --> 01:07:38.270]  Then please, no speeches.
[01:07:38.510 --> 01:07:40.010]  Make it short, succinct.
[01:07:40.170 --> 01:07:41.370]  Let's try not to shout anybody down.
[01:07:41.490 --> 01:07:42.050]  Let's hear what we have to say.
[01:07:42.130 --> 01:07:42.290]  Go ahead.
[01:07:42.290 --> 01:07:42.330]  Alright.
[01:07:43.110 --> 01:07:43.550]  I...
[01:07:43.550 --> 01:07:47.310]  So, I appreciate your willingness to stand up in front and talk to us.
[01:07:47.590 --> 01:07:49.570]  But the stuff that I'm hearing you say...
[01:07:49.570 --> 01:07:51.830]  And I'm talking to Adrian here, in case that wasn't clear.
[01:07:52.090 --> 01:07:55.950]  The stuff that I'm hearing you say has a lot of American exceptionalism in it.
[01:07:56.110 --> 01:08:03.030]  Like, you seem to think that American lives are worth more than the lives that, for example, were being taken in the collateral murder video.
[01:08:04.750 --> 01:08:06.650]  I want to know how you justify that.
[01:08:07.910 --> 01:08:09.970]  Actually, I haven't said that at all.
[01:08:09.970 --> 01:08:13.870]  What I've said is that there may have been war criminals involved.
[01:08:14.110 --> 01:08:15.690]  Those being the helicopter pilots.
[01:08:15.970 --> 01:08:17.210]  I wasn't there.
[01:08:17.410 --> 01:08:18.590]  I can't say for sure.
[01:08:18.890 --> 01:08:25.070]  But that there was apparently an investigation going on based on the fact that there...
[01:08:25.070 --> 01:08:30.510]  The video was found in the computer of an officer of the judicial branch of the military.
[01:08:31.270 --> 01:08:34.290]  And that that investigation may have been compromised.
[01:08:34.290 --> 01:08:44.290]  So if anything, I'm saying that there were Americans involved who may have been involved in misconduct based on looking at the video.
[01:08:45.010 --> 01:08:50.170]  I would encourage people throughout the audience to look at it in its full unedited form.
[01:08:50.330 --> 01:08:55.970]  But nevertheless, even in its unedited form, it does appear somewhat damning.
[01:08:57.530 --> 01:09:14.090]  You're not answering my question about why you think that the potential American lives, say, tourists in other countries who might have, you know, might feel worse or might be more scared because people think Americans are jerks because our actual activities are being exposed.
[01:09:15.370 --> 01:09:17.630]  All right, we're not listening to you.
[01:09:19.050 --> 01:09:19.710]  You're not.
[01:09:19.810 --> 01:09:26.830]  My question is, why you thought those were privileged above the lives that we are taking every day in Iraq and Afghanistan?
[01:09:27.530 --> 01:09:30.950]  Why are you willing to privilege those lives, the lives of...
[01:09:30.950 --> 01:09:36.390]  Because those are the lives that I have the opportunity to try to affect positively.
[01:09:40.350 --> 01:09:43.150]  I am not holding a machine gun.
[01:09:43.350 --> 01:09:44.730]  I'm not sitting in Afghanistan.
[01:09:45.250 --> 01:10:01.390]  I'm not shooting at people that are in their own hearts and minds trying to follow their own conscience, be it a misguided or be it a correct action.
[01:10:01.570 --> 01:10:03.390]  I don't have standing to say.
[01:10:05.050 --> 01:10:19.350]  There's a very good quote that a friend of mine, who of all things is a little league umpire, uses very often when one of his calls is questioned.
[01:10:19.530 --> 01:10:26.470]  And that's, well, okay, I appreciate your input, but what did you see from where I was standing?
[01:10:28.570 --> 01:10:33.430]  And, generally speaking, the answer is not a damn thing, because they were in the bleachers.
[01:10:34.330 --> 01:10:35.750]  Alright, let's move on to the next question.
[01:10:35.970 --> 01:10:44.190]  Okay, so I'm pretty much like stepping up as a follow-up, because I do not think that you understood what my, the guy before me asked.
[01:10:44.190 --> 01:10:52.770]  The problem is that your political viewpoint, your viewpoint on why you acted like you acted, is highly U.S. centric.
[01:10:53.450 --> 01:10:54.010]  That's the point.
[01:10:54.230 --> 01:10:55.430]  It's not about that you want to, whatever.
[01:10:55.570 --> 01:10:56.110]  It's U.S. centric.
[01:10:56.870 --> 01:10:57.750]  It's, I'm from Europe.
[01:10:57.910 --> 01:10:59.850]  I do not care a shit about the U.S. government.
[01:11:00.270 --> 01:11:02.050]  And actually, I do not care...
[01:11:05.830 --> 01:11:10.610]  And I don't give a shit about my government, because I think that nation states are crap, okay?
[01:11:12.050 --> 01:11:18.790]  And we should not in any way support nation states in whatever they do in their bullshit, okay?
[01:11:18.990 --> 01:11:20.510]  I mean, we are a community of hackers.
[01:11:20.850 --> 01:11:22.890]  We are internationalists, okay?
[01:11:22.890 --> 01:11:30.090]  And we should work together and cooperate, and not just, like, blame some guy because he actually really did the right thing.
[01:11:30.650 --> 01:11:34.770]  The right thing means, I mean, we didn't start the stupid war here.
[01:11:34.970 --> 01:11:37.030]  Come on, it's their shit they did, okay?
[01:11:37.990 --> 01:11:38.570]  All right, all right.
[01:11:39.230 --> 01:11:39.830]  Quiet back there.
[01:11:39.890 --> 01:11:49.910]  So, I might sound a little bit naive here, but I think that we should focus on an international point of view, and not about what's good for the United States, okay?
[01:11:52.010 --> 01:11:55.270]  All right, next question, so more people get a chance.
[01:11:55.410 --> 01:12:10.150]  I'm going to respond briefly to that, and say, I don't support every action that the United States takes, and you know what, that's my right as a citizen of this country to do.
[01:12:10.350 --> 01:12:13.990]  And in a lot of countries, that would get you a bullet to the head.
[01:12:19.590 --> 01:12:29.190]  If I seem like I'm focusing on the United States, that might have something to do with the fact that I'm an American citizen.
[01:12:29.410 --> 01:12:30.650]  My dad's a dual national.
[01:12:30.870 --> 01:12:38.550]  I've lived overseas, but we're sitting in a hotel that, last time I checked, was located in the United States of America, and a lot of people in Canada.
[01:12:38.550 --> 01:12:50.570]  It's a great relationship that has afforded us the opportunity to have this conference, even though a lot of people in the government don't really understand what we're about, and somehow see us as a threat.
[01:12:51.230 --> 01:13:01.490]  And despite that, we have the freedom to hold this conference, to have talks about things that, that to the uninformed observer would sound threatening.
[01:13:01.990 --> 01:13:04.810]  And that's not something that you get in a lot of places.
[01:13:04.810 --> 01:13:10.470]  So I think that that's pretty darn cool to have as an opportunity in this country.
[01:13:10.650 --> 01:13:11.450]  Okay, next question.
[01:13:14.630 --> 01:13:15.230]  Go ahead.
[01:13:15.510 --> 01:13:16.190]  Hi, Adrian.
[01:13:18.630 --> 01:13:23.050]  I'm under the impression that you could be culpable.
[01:13:23.050 --> 01:13:33.550]  If it came back, you know, somehow they got... if they realized that this person was doing it by other means, they would have figured it out eventually, possibly, through other investigations.
[01:13:33.930 --> 01:13:42.070]  And then they would have seen a chat log to you, and then you could have been culpable, you know, criminally for this also, it seems to me.
[01:13:42.710 --> 01:13:45.230]  Was that a part of your thinking?
[01:13:45.570 --> 01:13:48.050]  You know, I'm not a jurist.
[01:13:48.050 --> 01:13:49.170]  I'm not an attorney.
[01:13:49.670 --> 01:13:50.830]  I'm not a judge.
[01:13:51.170 --> 01:13:59.110]  I don't have the legal background to be able to say whether or not that would have been the case.
[01:13:59.750 --> 01:14:06.570]  My first reaction and my main reaction was, holy fracking crap, 260,000 documents.
[01:14:06.790 --> 01:14:24.530]  You think that you could look through those and say that they're not going to cause anybody's life to be lost or our ability to try and make the world a better place, which we do in a lot of ways.
[01:14:24.530 --> 01:14:26.230]  We provide aid to other countries.
[01:14:26.530 --> 01:14:29.830]  We also make the world a worse place in some ways.
[01:14:29.970 --> 01:14:32.610]  But we're not a perfect nation.
[01:14:32.790 --> 01:14:33.970]  No nation is perfect.
[01:14:34.270 --> 01:14:37.890]  We actually have something on the screen right now that is amazingly appropriate here.
[01:14:38.090 --> 01:14:41.030]  Bernie, you want to explain what this misprison, whatever word that is?
[01:14:41.210 --> 01:14:42.390]  Misprision of a felony.
[01:14:42.730 --> 01:14:46.070]  It's United States criminal statute.
[01:14:46.070 --> 01:14:47.670]  I wanted to ask you, Adrian.
[01:14:47.950 --> 01:14:49.190]  I'm sorry to interrupt the next speaker here.
[01:14:49.350 --> 01:15:09.130]  But was your decision to do what you did influenced in any way by your potential risk liability for not telling the government what you learned because you could be criminally liable for not divulging what you were aware of?
[01:15:10.590 --> 01:15:14.810]  Again, I don't have a JD and I'm not a jurist.
[01:15:15.130 --> 01:15:21.030]  But before all of this happened, I had never heard the term that's hard to pronounce.
[01:15:21.170 --> 01:15:22.890]  It's on the screen behind me.
[01:15:25.870 --> 01:15:26.430]  I...
[01:15:26.430 --> 01:15:28.610]  Well, you heard of cover your ass before, though.
[01:15:32.030 --> 01:15:34.970]  Yeah, I think most people in this audience have.
[01:15:34.970 --> 01:15:37.030]  Or accessory after the fact?
[01:15:38.990 --> 01:15:46.190]  But again, my main reaction was, holy frack and crap, 260,000 documents.
[01:15:46.630 --> 01:16:00.930]  And I think that there's a reason that the keynote yesterday totally ignored that, and that's because that's much harder to get an emotional rise out of the audience when you...
[01:16:00.930 --> 01:16:03.770]  It's easy to say, I'm against murder.
[01:16:03.930 --> 01:16:05.010]  Who's with me on that?
[01:16:05.190 --> 01:16:06.630]  Yeah, no, I'm on murder.
[01:16:07.030 --> 01:16:15.810]  It's harder to say, I'm for releasing over a quarter million diplomatic documents related to the United States and U.S.
[01:16:15.910 --> 01:16:16.290]  citizens.
[01:16:16.290 --> 01:16:17.270]  Who's with me?
[01:16:21.800 --> 01:16:22.900]  I saw that coming.
[01:16:23.380 --> 01:16:24.120]  Next question.
[01:16:24.840 --> 01:16:27.380]  Well, thank you for establishing that you're opposed to murder.
[01:16:27.560 --> 01:16:28.040]  That's great.
[01:16:28.040 --> 01:16:30.580]  But there's something that I was unclear on.
[01:16:30.760 --> 01:16:35.660]  How long has it been since you've had an active restraining order against you for abusing a girlfriend?
[01:16:36.660 --> 01:16:38.060]  I met your ex-girlfriend.
[01:16:38.220 --> 01:16:40.860]  She is a lovely human being, and she told me awful things about you.
[01:16:40.880 --> 01:16:46.040]  This might be delving into the personal world a little bit, but I don't know if you'd choose to answer that, Adrian.
[01:16:47.360 --> 01:16:52.240]  I have never been served with a restraining order, and there's never been one that's been active against me.
[01:16:52.780 --> 01:16:54.540]  All right, let's move on.
[01:16:54.880 --> 01:16:57.400]  Kind of too bad that that got cut off, but...
[01:16:58.280 --> 01:17:02.180]  Adrian, I do take to heart what your umpire said.
[01:17:02.940 --> 01:17:05.640]  I do believe in it, too, that I couldn't...
[01:17:05.640 --> 01:17:10.520]  I think you were in a very difficult position, and that if I were in that position...
[01:17:11.040 --> 01:17:13.120]  Well, I don't feel I would have made the same decision.
[01:17:13.720 --> 01:17:17.080]  But knowing that you did, I can accept that you did.
[01:17:18.660 --> 01:17:29.160]  But I really, really hope that you can actually make some good choices coming up in the future to repair some of the damage that you have caused.
[01:17:31.280 --> 01:17:40.300]  Before you walk away from the mic, apart from Mr. Manning's criminal case, could you clarify a little bit on that damage briefly?
[01:17:40.600 --> 01:17:42.540]  Because I'm not clear on where...
[01:17:42.540 --> 01:17:46.040]  From my perspective, I see what you have done is treason.
[01:17:51.740 --> 01:17:53.140]  All right, next question.
[01:17:54.260 --> 01:17:55.360]  Hi, Adrian.
[01:17:56.640 --> 01:18:08.420]  Digital communication seems to allow us these days the possibility, although perhaps not easily, to take our identities and to separate them.
[01:18:08.800 --> 01:18:11.720]  They start to spread apart.
[01:18:12.380 --> 01:18:14.040]  We can take that option.
[01:18:14.300 --> 01:18:19.460]  We can take the option to be different people, different people, to act different ways.
[01:18:19.460 --> 01:18:20.780]  They all see us differently.
[01:18:21.460 --> 01:18:28.620]  You have identified with a broader social American identity.
[01:18:28.960 --> 01:18:38.900]  I was wondering, what do you think about ethics, morals, guiding principles for your identity?
[01:18:39.200 --> 01:18:40.880]  Does it need to be cohesive?
[01:18:41.100 --> 01:18:42.080]  Does it need to be singular?
[01:18:44.440 --> 01:18:47.540]  I don't believe that I have standing to speak to that.
[01:18:47.680 --> 01:18:50.940]  I also don't necessarily know that I understand the question.
[01:18:51.200 --> 01:18:53.380]  Could it trouble you to very briefly rephrase it?
[01:18:53.960 --> 01:18:54.180]  Very briefly.
[01:18:54.220 --> 01:19:05.880]  Hypothetically, if you could imagine someone like you that had heard this, could you imagine a part of yourself that would have had the choice not to tell?
[01:19:06.860 --> 01:19:07.900]  Yes, I can.
[01:19:08.560 --> 01:19:09.080]  I...
[01:19:09.080 --> 01:19:09.940]  It's...
[01:19:10.760 --> 01:19:20.000]  I'll admit that it's unabashedly selfish of me to say this, given what I've said, but I wish to hell that Bradley Manning had never said a word to me.
[01:19:22.040 --> 01:19:23.320]  It's been...
[01:19:23.320 --> 01:19:31.940]  I mean, obviously, it's been much worse for him, but it's certainly been no picnic for me.
[01:19:32.140 --> 01:19:45.800]  And I knew from the get-go that it was going to be a low point in my interactions with the community.
[01:19:47.660 --> 01:19:48.100]  And...
[01:19:48.100 --> 01:19:48.760]  I'll...
[01:19:48.760 --> 01:19:49.860]  Yet you could have ignored him.
[01:19:50.040 --> 01:19:53.960]  When he first contacted you, you were not obliged to ever answer him.
[01:19:53.980 --> 01:19:55.940]  You could have simply ignored him, none of this ever would have happened.
[01:20:01.870 --> 01:20:10.390]  And Mr. Manning could have ignored the diplomatic cables, and he could have ignored the collateral murder video, but he followed his conscience as I did mine.
[01:20:10.910 --> 01:20:11.730]  Yeah, I have a question.
[01:20:12.130 --> 01:20:15.790]  Adrian, in what capacity do you think...
[01:20:15.790 --> 01:20:22.450]  Well, obviously, Bradley Manning came to you with this information and confidence, I believe.
[01:20:22.670 --> 01:20:23.870]  It seems logical anyway.
[01:20:24.210 --> 01:20:28.890]  In what capacity do you think he felt that he could tell you these things in confidence?
[01:20:29.010 --> 01:20:31.510]  Did he feel that he was speaking to a journalist?
[01:20:32.030 --> 01:20:33.210]  Or why do you think...
[01:20:33.210 --> 01:20:34.150]  He doesn't know you, right?
[01:20:34.290 --> 01:20:36.490]  So why do you think he trusted you?
[01:20:36.490 --> 01:20:44.930]  And what do you feel about your actions in respect to betraying that trust?
[01:20:46.630 --> 01:20:55.530]  Well, as I allocated just now, I feel that in terms of betraying his trust, I was a bad friend.
[01:20:58.390 --> 01:21:02.530]  And I think that he approached me as a friend and...
[01:21:04.050 --> 01:21:05.130]  Not as a journalist?
[01:21:05.790 --> 01:21:06.690]  Absolutely not.
[01:21:07.470 --> 01:21:08.390]  And I...
[01:21:08.390 --> 01:21:10.530]  Did you make that clear to him that you were not...
[01:21:10.530 --> 01:21:14.650]  He was not speaking to you like as a source to a journalist?
[01:21:15.570 --> 01:21:28.390]  Without going into personal details about Mr. Manning, he spoke to me about a broad variety of things that were intensely personal to him, most of which I haven't made public because they serve no public interest.
[01:21:28.730 --> 01:21:43.510]  They were about his personal life, about how he likes to live his life, or how life has elected to take him.
[01:21:43.510 --> 01:21:55.930]  And I wish that I still had the full logs minus the classified sections.
[01:21:55.930 --> 01:21:56.650]  I don't.
[01:21:59.270 --> 01:22:09.070]  But I believe that it's fairly clear to anybody reading them that it was an interaction between...
[01:22:13.090 --> 01:22:20.910]  someone that perceived another individual as a friend, and an individual who's trying to figure out what the hell to do.
[01:22:21.290 --> 01:22:21.770]  All right.
[01:22:21.930 --> 01:22:23.550]  We're very, very low on time.
[01:22:23.710 --> 01:22:28.130]  I would like to have one last audience member, and then if you guys have any final words, but we don't want to run over.
[01:22:28.390 --> 01:22:29.450]  Final question from the audience.
[01:22:29.450 --> 01:22:29.810]  Very, very quick.
[01:22:29.810 --> 01:22:39.830]  Adrian, you've had a lot of people put a lot of actions that you are not responsible for on your plate in terms of U.S.
[01:22:39.990 --> 01:22:45.830]  foreign policy, in terms of our perception in the world, and the things the United States has done bad.
[01:22:46.070 --> 01:22:47.810]  People have sort of put that on you.
[01:22:50.050 --> 01:22:53.110]  Why do you feel that suddenly all of these things...
[01:22:53.110 --> 01:22:57.230]  You sort of said before that it's easy for someone to go, yeah, murder's bad.
[01:22:57.950 --> 01:22:59.970]  At its core, what do you think is going on?
[01:23:00.050 --> 01:23:01.850]  Why is it that all these U.S.
[01:23:01.950 --> 01:23:05.990]  policy things and everything are getting attributed to your actions, and those things are getting connected?
[01:23:08.390 --> 01:23:09.270]  Does that make sense?
[01:23:09.270 --> 01:23:19.950]  It makes sense, but it's hard for me to speak to, simply because I, again, can't see what these people see from where they are standing.
[01:23:20.450 --> 01:23:25.150]  And I obviously respect the right to have an opinion.
[01:23:25.470 --> 01:23:34.610]  I haven't told anybody to shut the heck up when they have elected to disagree with me, but...
[01:23:34.610 --> 01:23:51.630]  Along those lines, I would say one thing is that anyone who, particularly from a podium, says that they believe in peace and freedom and justice and whatnot, and in the identities of people, be it people who are foreign throughout the world, trying to say that someone should not have an identity,
[01:23:51.770 --> 01:24:00.010]  and they should have their name taken away, and that they should not be recognized as a human being because you disagree with their actions, is actually just as bad.
[01:24:00.690 --> 01:24:01.310]  All right.
[01:24:01.530 --> 01:24:03.830]  Kevin, you're going to have the final question.
[01:24:05.050 --> 01:24:09.710]  Please make it fast, because Guise is coming up next, and he has a skillet, I believe.
[01:24:12.050 --> 01:24:19.090]  My quick question is, when you decided to inform against Manning, why did you have to go to the media?
[01:24:19.250 --> 01:24:24.710]  Why didn't you just do it and keep it a secret and not seek any type of media exposure?
[01:24:32.380 --> 01:24:40.220]  Primarily the same reason, because I support WikiLeaks, because I believe in transparency, and I believe...
[01:24:40.220 --> 01:24:40.780]  No, no, no.
[01:24:41.520 --> 01:24:49.560]  Why didn't you just go to the law enforcement agencies and just keep it quiet and not go to Wired and tell them the story?
[01:24:49.660 --> 01:24:53.640]  Why did you have to go and talk to the media about this case?
[01:24:54.080 --> 01:24:55.540]  Why was that important to you?
[01:24:55.540 --> 01:24:58.020]  Why do people here support WikiLeaks?
[01:24:58.220 --> 01:25:00.240]  Because they believe in a public's right to know.
[01:25:00.460 --> 01:25:02.100]  Why do I support WikiLeaks?
[01:25:02.200 --> 01:25:06.720]  Because I believe that in the majority of cases, the public has a right to know.
[01:25:07.020 --> 01:25:20.220]  I believe in this case, especially as much as it affects people in this room, people on the street who have never even f*cking heard of it, they would have a right to know.
[01:25:21.320 --> 01:25:31.600]  So they would have the right to know about Manning's activities, so you wanted to expose Manning through the press rather than just go to law enforcement?
[01:25:33.440 --> 01:25:40.600]  Ultimately, there would have been a press release regarding Manning's activities from the...
[01:25:40.600 --> 01:25:41.260]  Arrest?
[01:25:42.040 --> 01:25:42.920]  Come again?
[01:25:43.080 --> 01:25:44.040]  From the arrest?
[01:25:44.620 --> 01:25:45.240]  Yes.
[01:25:45.600 --> 01:25:46.820]  But that came much later.
[01:25:46.940 --> 01:25:51.080]  There was so much media about this, and then later he was arrested.
[01:25:51.220 --> 01:25:51.840]  So much media.
[01:25:52.040 --> 01:25:56.460]  You know, I was just curious of why you had to go to the media and why you couldn't keep it quiet.
[01:25:56.980 --> 01:25:58.260]  I was just curious.
[01:26:00.860 --> 01:26:01.780]  That's a good question.
[01:26:07.820 --> 01:26:22.480]  I went initially to a journalist who I knew to be ethical, Kevin Lee Poulsen, who is known to many of you here.
[01:26:27.560 --> 01:26:32.800]  And I gave him background on the case.
[01:26:33.000 --> 01:26:35.360]  I didn't tell him, go ahead and run with this.
[01:26:35.540 --> 01:26:36.760]  It was only after Manning...
[01:26:37.320 --> 01:26:38.720]  But why did you call him?
[01:26:38.840 --> 01:26:39.340]  Like, why?
[01:26:39.920 --> 01:26:41.700]  Why didn't you just keep it a secret?
[01:26:42.100 --> 01:26:45.760]  Well, I believe that I've answered that question...
[01:26:45.760 --> 01:26:46.940]  Because the public's right to know.
[01:26:46.940 --> 01:27:13.620]  And especially because WikiLeaks is so intimately tied to the community that we have here, and to many communities that believe in freedom of information, that they would also have a right to know, form their own decisions, if they chose to do so, establish legal defense funds,
[01:27:13.920 --> 01:27:17.360]  because everyone has a right to be represented to the best of their ability.
[01:27:19.960 --> 01:27:35.560]  And the same reason that I went to Kevin with my arrest, because I felt that as a former hacker himself, he could represent the story better than the Washington Post or the Wall Street Journal.
[01:27:35.700 --> 01:27:38.460]  No offense to anyone in the audience from there.
[01:27:39.200 --> 01:27:40.040]  All right.
[01:27:40.580 --> 01:27:45.980]  Guides has very graciously allowed us a couple of minutes to go over, so he's not going to attack us with his cooking utensils just yet.
[01:27:47.080 --> 01:27:51.500]  So I'd like to just... the three people who are standing now, and the fourth person, you can sit down.
[01:27:51.680 --> 01:27:53.900]  Now, the three people, you get to ask questions really quickly.
[01:27:54.020 --> 01:27:54.780]  No one else.
[01:27:54.940 --> 01:27:56.300]  We have to end this at some point.
[01:27:56.380 --> 01:27:57.720]  I know we're all having such fun here.
[01:27:58.960 --> 01:28:00.200]  So, one, two, and three.
[01:28:00.300 --> 01:28:01.000]  Try to make it quick.
[01:28:01.220 --> 01:28:02.060]  And Adrian, also.
[01:28:02.560 --> 01:28:17.540]  You speak about supporting WikiLeaks and transparency, and this is the first time that we might have had actual transparency into what the Army was doing, and current transparency that might have changed the policy, that might have ended the war, saved lives over there in Iraq,
[01:28:17.540 --> 01:28:22.960]  and brought back the lives of those people that would be involved in those missions.
[01:28:23.520 --> 01:28:25.940]  So, you say you're trying to prevent them from dying.
[01:28:26.160 --> 01:28:27.520]  This is the best way to do it.
[01:28:27.940 --> 01:28:29.280]  So, why don't you turn them in?
[01:28:29.280 --> 01:28:31.660]  I have to disagree in the strongest possible terms.
[01:28:31.920 --> 01:28:45.980]  I don't believe that there is anything that Mr. Manning released that would have resulted in troops pulling out of Iraq, pulling out of Afghanistan, and our intervention overseas ending in any way.
[01:28:49.320 --> 01:28:54.140]  It may have caused change, but it would not have been positive change in my estimation.
[01:28:54.460 --> 01:28:54.920]  Okay.
[01:28:55.060 --> 01:28:55.980]  We have room for two more...
[01:28:55.980 --> 01:28:57.140]  I see more than two people standing.
[01:28:57.140 --> 01:28:59.380]  So, if your number is higher than two, please do not stand.
[01:29:01.500 --> 01:29:02.240]  Person number one.
[01:29:02.340 --> 01:29:02.520]  Go ahead.
[01:29:02.680 --> 01:29:04.000]  I was just wondering...
[01:29:04.000 --> 01:29:11.580]  I saw in an article that you were diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome when you were 29, and I know a lot of people in the community have it, including me.
[01:29:11.700 --> 01:29:13.960]  I was just wondering what your experience was with that.
[01:29:14.100 --> 01:29:15.480]  I know it's kind of a little unrelated.
[01:29:17.760 --> 01:29:22.580]  I'll be brief, because that's a little bit off-topic, but it was eye-opening for me.
[01:29:22.580 --> 01:29:45.480]  I didn't really understand, to some extent, why I approached the world as much as I did, why I suffered from anxiety as much as I did, and talking to qualified medical professionals about it was very helpful.
[01:29:45.880 --> 01:29:51.600]  I feel a lot better about my life now than I did before I had a real proper diagnosis.
[01:29:52.880 --> 01:29:53.460]  All right.
[01:29:53.600 --> 01:29:54.200]  Next question.
[01:29:54.380 --> 01:29:56.180]  And, you know, there's two people still standing after that.
[01:29:56.280 --> 01:29:57.260]  I have to admire your courage.
[01:29:57.400 --> 01:29:57.560]  Okay.
[01:29:57.640 --> 01:29:58.700]  We'll let you speak as well.
[01:29:58.820 --> 01:29:59.460]  But that's it.
[01:29:59.560 --> 01:30:00.140]  Nobody else.
[01:30:01.880 --> 01:30:02.660]  Nobody else.
[01:30:04.220 --> 01:30:05.540]  And quickly, please.
[01:30:06.180 --> 01:30:06.300]  All right.
[01:30:06.500 --> 01:30:08.400]  First, about the cables.
[01:30:11.420 --> 01:30:15.240]  I trust WikiLeaks' judgment of what to release and what not to release.
[01:30:15.500 --> 01:30:23.280]  I think they've had an excellent record so far, and I trust WikiLeaks' judgment a lot more than I trust the government's judgment of what should be released and what should not be.
[01:30:28.850 --> 01:30:34.190]  Secondly, I think that it's pretty clear what's resulted from all of this so far.
[01:30:34.370 --> 01:30:34.770]  Right?
[01:30:35.210 --> 01:30:40.290]  Manning is in a brig in Kuwait somewhere facing huge charges.
[01:30:40.750 --> 01:30:41.790]  Assange is underground.
[01:30:42.470 --> 01:30:46.190]  The ultimate release of these cables is in question.
[01:30:46.190 --> 01:30:47.610]  Who knows what's going to happen with this?
[01:30:47.610 --> 01:30:55.550]  And I think we need to be clear about what's acceptable to do and what's not acceptable to do.
[01:30:55.630 --> 01:30:57.190]  And I think you've f*cked it up huge.
[01:31:01.370 --> 01:31:01.930]  All right.
[01:31:01.950 --> 01:31:02.370]  Next question.
[01:31:03.790 --> 01:31:07.310]  I respect your opinion, but that's not actually a question.
[01:31:07.330 --> 01:31:09.410]  So it's not something I can respond to directly.
[01:31:09.770 --> 01:31:09.990]  Okay.
[01:31:09.990 --> 01:31:10.510]  Next question.
[01:31:11.670 --> 01:31:15.810]  As a Vietnam veteran, I think Manning did the right thing.
[01:31:15.810 --> 01:31:19.230]  Anybody that thinks in his right mind that the U.S.
[01:31:19.350 --> 01:31:23.030]  government is doing the right thing has to be in a mental institution.
[01:31:23.330 --> 01:31:25.350]  And what you did, you have to live with it.
[01:31:28.910 --> 01:31:32.390]  And what you did is worse than treason.
[01:31:32.970 --> 01:31:34.790]  I think you belong in Guantanamo.
[01:31:35.890 --> 01:31:36.090]  Whoa.
[01:31:36.650 --> 01:31:36.850]  Okay.
[01:31:37.310 --> 01:31:38.030]  Thank you.
[01:31:39.270 --> 01:31:41.010]  And the final question here.
[01:31:41.090 --> 01:31:41.770]  Not a question.
[01:31:42.750 --> 01:31:43.190]  Hi.
[01:31:43.290 --> 01:31:53.750]  I just wanted to point out and ask a question that your premise is that you're saving lives potentially by trying to prevent the release of these documents.
[01:31:54.130 --> 01:31:57.350]  But I just want to ask you about...
[01:31:57.350 --> 01:31:59.130]  I consider that it's pure speculation.
[01:31:59.130 --> 01:32:00.930]  You don't know that it's necessarily going to do anything.
[01:32:01.110 --> 01:32:04.730]  And I could equally speculate that, especially given the track record of the U.S.
[01:32:04.830 --> 01:32:10.410]  military and United States State Department throughout the world, that by not releasing these documents, you are going to harm people's lives.
[01:32:10.590 --> 01:32:11.750]  They're just not going to be American lives.
[01:32:11.990 --> 01:32:13.190]  And can you respond to that?
[01:32:14.890 --> 01:32:21.190]  Or I guess my question is, how do you know that not releasing these documents is going to save more lives than releasing them?
[01:32:24.490 --> 01:32:25.910]  I can't say for certain.
[01:32:26.530 --> 01:32:26.970]  I...
[01:32:27.450 --> 01:32:27.890]  I'll...
[01:32:27.890 --> 01:32:27.970]  I'll...
[01:32:27.970 --> 01:32:29.230]  Then why did you make that decision?
[01:32:31.270 --> 01:32:40.510]  I made that decision based on the information that I had access to, the portions of the logs that are not public and most likely will not be.
[01:32:41.790 --> 01:32:42.350]  And...
[01:32:42.350 --> 01:32:49.250]  I acted my conscience, just as I believe Manning acted his conscience, just as I believe Julian Assange is acting his conscience.
[01:32:51.410 --> 01:32:51.970]  I...
[01:32:52.510 --> 01:32:57.150]  Understand that there are people that are always going to disagree with my choice.
[01:32:57.630 --> 01:32:59.830]  And yeah, I have to live with that choice.
[01:33:00.290 --> 01:33:01.370]  And you know what?
[01:33:01.370 --> 01:33:02.170]  I...
[01:33:03.870 --> 01:33:06.770]  I feel bad about the predicament that Manning is in.
[01:33:07.330 --> 01:33:10.010]  I was in a similar one...
[01:33:10.010 --> 01:33:10.530]  That's not my question.
[01:33:11.730 --> 01:33:14.090]  Well, this is my answer.
[01:33:14.350 --> 01:33:14.690]  Okay.
[01:33:15.870 --> 01:33:20.930]  At 22, I was in shackles for acting on my conscience.
[01:33:20.930 --> 01:33:23.290]  I was facing 15 years in prison.
[01:33:24.630 --> 01:33:25.270]  And...
[01:33:25.270 --> 01:33:28.950]  I didn't send him off to some fate that I had no comprehension of.
[01:33:29.890 --> 01:33:30.950]  You were correct, you did.
[01:33:31.830 --> 01:33:32.810]  Real quick question.
[01:33:33.390 --> 01:33:34.090]  There's two of them real quick.
[01:33:34.290 --> 01:33:36.530]  Did you see any of the classified cables?
[01:33:36.890 --> 01:33:37.690]  Did you see one of them?
[01:33:38.830 --> 01:33:40.530]  Of those 250,000?
[01:33:40.790 --> 01:33:41.930]  Did he show you any of them?
[01:33:43.570 --> 01:33:44.530]  No, he did not.
[01:33:44.850 --> 01:33:46.610]  So how do you really know he had them?
[01:33:46.690 --> 01:33:47.930]  He could have been braggdocious.
[01:33:49.170 --> 01:33:50.210]  I mean, did you...
[01:33:50.210 --> 01:33:51.530]  I mean, how did you really know?
[01:33:51.730 --> 01:33:56.110]  Maybe he was exaggerating because he wanted to become your friend or something.
[01:33:56.250 --> 01:33:57.290]  I mean, it was just a bullshit.
[01:33:57.290 --> 01:33:58.730]  So did...
[01:33:58.730 --> 01:34:03.590]  I mean, are you saying that by exaggerating, you think he had fewer?
[01:34:03.830 --> 01:34:04.290]  Was it five?
[01:34:04.290 --> 01:34:05.410]  No, I don't know if he had any.
[01:34:05.590 --> 01:34:06.530]  You know, I just really don't know.
[01:34:06.650 --> 01:34:07.170]  How did you know?
[01:34:08.570 --> 01:34:13.950]  Well, I can say that he revealed classified information to me during the course of our conversation.
[01:34:14.650 --> 01:34:15.030]  Okay.
[01:34:15.030 --> 01:34:21.990]  And that, to me, made it clear that he would have been very willing to reveal it to others.
[01:34:22.210 --> 01:34:24.730]  Was that from the cables or just something totally separate?
[01:34:26.290 --> 01:34:34.450]  Related to ongoing U.S. counterintelligence operations.
[01:34:35.250 --> 01:34:35.610]  Okay.
[01:34:35.890 --> 01:34:36.170]  All right.
[01:34:36.350 --> 01:34:38.810]  And I heard one question from the audience that you didn't get to answer.
[01:34:38.930 --> 01:34:40.670]  Do you regret what you did?
[01:34:43.960 --> 01:34:46.860]  I regret not being a better friend to Manning.
[01:34:46.940 --> 01:34:50.960]  I wish that there was some way that it could have been done both ways.
[01:34:50.960 --> 01:34:57.080]  I wish so much that he had told me, I'm planning on doing this.
[01:34:57.360 --> 01:35:04.740]  It's not, I've already done this and that they're out there and that there might still be a possibility to interdict them.
[01:35:04.960 --> 01:35:14.780]  I can't express in words how much I wish that he had said he was planning it and that I could have told him, dude, you're going to f*ck your life up.
[01:35:15.380 --> 01:35:17.040]  I'd like to say something in closing.
[01:35:17.380 --> 01:35:20.140]  And I'm not here in any kind of capacity to pass judgment.
[01:35:20.140 --> 01:35:22.280]  I leave that up to our esteemed audience to do.
[01:35:23.460 --> 01:35:31.560]  What I will say is this, is that as long as the hacker underground has existed, we've always held in very high regard our neutrality.
[01:35:31.940 --> 01:35:37.080]  And as our European colleague had pointed out, we're internationalists and we should remain so.
[01:35:37.400 --> 01:35:43.020]  As soon as you make up your mind to choose a side, politically speaking, you cease to be a hacker.
[01:35:45.520 --> 01:35:49.620]  May I pose a question in response to that also?
[01:35:49.620 --> 01:35:54.220]  In closing, why have you not renounced your citizenship?
[01:35:54.880 --> 01:35:56.000]  Well, why should I?
[01:35:57.840 --> 01:35:59.200]  Because that's a side.
[01:36:00.180 --> 01:36:02.960]  I was born in this country and my citizenship is automatic.
[01:36:03.500 --> 01:36:08.680]  It's automatic, but you're splitting that hair mighty thin there.
[01:36:08.680 --> 01:36:11.140]  I think you're changing the subject rather easily.
[01:36:11.400 --> 01:36:15.640]  The point I was trying to make was that you had a choice and you made the wrong choice.
[01:36:16.100 --> 01:36:18.740]  You could have simply walked away and none of this would have happened.
[01:36:18.740 --> 01:36:22.360]  I could have, but I wouldn't have been able to live with myself.
[01:36:24.100 --> 01:36:24.960]  I disagree.
[01:36:26.160 --> 01:36:28.500]  All right, the two of you can continue this discussion backstage.
[01:36:30.340 --> 01:36:37.960]  Closing, I just want to thank you guys for really standing up and being a great audience, dealing with a difficult subject, a very controversial issue.
[01:36:37.960 --> 01:36:44.960]  You know, most people thought this wasn't possible, that we couldn't possibly have this kind of a dialogue and a civil tone and listen to opposing sides.
[01:36:45.300 --> 01:36:46.460]  And I knew you'd come through.
[01:36:46.600 --> 01:36:48.220]  So thank you very much for doing that.
[01:36:56.910 --> 01:36:58.810]  And the story doesn't end here.
[01:36:58.930 --> 01:37:06.370]  We're going to keep following this and all kinds of other stories in the future, hopefully at future hopes and all kinds of other things like that.
[01:37:07.270 --> 01:37:09.110]  We have a few more talks left.
[01:37:09.630 --> 01:37:12.970]  So please stick around, have fun, and we'll see you next time.
[01:37:13.370 --> 01:37:13.690]  Good night.