[00:01.750 --> 00:10.550]  What we were supposed to have next is a panel of people who have worked on 2600, but we lack the publisher.
[00:12.710 --> 00:14.930]  So we're thinking about delaying that for a little bit.
[00:29.850 --> 00:30.330]  Thanks.
[00:30.630 --> 00:37.310]  I actually expected I'd have about two more hours to finally get around to writing what I was going to say, but I'll just wing it anyway.
[00:37.930 --> 00:52.390]  I figured rather than bore you on a Saturday night in New York with exciting tales of how the Freedom of Information Act works, I'd tell you a little bit about what's going on in DC.
[00:53.190 --> 00:54.410]  It's not pretty.
[00:56.370 --> 01:03.210]  And there's a lot of disinformation put out by some of our friends in the media who don't know any better.
[01:04.850 --> 01:09.070]  As you're well aware, there's several different things floating around right now.
[01:09.410 --> 01:20.310]  One is the most recent thing to emerge is now the FBI's digital telephony proposal has finally been introduced in Congress, in both the House and the Senate.
[01:20.810 --> 01:36.570]  The bill still requires that all telecommunications providers, that's the phone companies, more specifically in this case, and the manufacturers and the people that support them, have to have built-in wiretap surveillance capabilities within, oh, three years.
[01:36.810 --> 01:40.390]  And to sweeten the pot, they get half a billion dollars to do it.
[01:41.630 --> 01:44.710]  The other thing that's still going on is Clipper.
[01:45.010 --> 01:50.570]  It's not dead, even with Matt Blaze's assistance.
[01:50.590 --> 01:56.230]  The thing is not dead, irregardless of what the New York Times seems to think.
[01:58.470 --> 02:01.750]  I guess I'll start first with what's going on with digital telephony.
[02:01.750 --> 02:10.970]  The bill has now been introduced by our former friends in the House and the Senate, Senator Leahy and Congressman Edwards.
[02:11.370 --> 02:17.830]  They have decided for political reasons that they have to introduce this thing, and they're trying to jam it through real quick.
[02:18.010 --> 02:19.970]  They expect to have it pass by next month.
[02:20.450 --> 02:23.690]  The only problem is that there's health care legislation going on.
[02:23.810 --> 02:25.390]  The crime bill is back in D.C.
[02:25.490 --> 02:26.650]  and hasn't been passed yet.
[02:26.650 --> 02:28.350]  There's appropriations bills.
[02:28.570 --> 02:31.470]  That means there is still a chance to kill this sucker.
[02:32.490 --> 02:42.270]  We can, if you have any kind of bill that they want to whip through quickly, and there's any kind of controversy related to it, they tend to want to slow things down.
[02:42.590 --> 02:44.290]  They've only had a month to do it.
[02:44.930 --> 02:50.790]  And if you start calling up and screaming at your senators and congressmen now, you can kill the thing.
[02:51.330 --> 02:55.110]  It's 202-224-3121 is their phone number.
[02:55.110 --> 03:01.850]  If everybody in this place were to call their senator or congressman, it might make a fairly good difference.
[03:04.790 --> 03:11.230]  I don't want to get into any sort of inner scene warfare about what the various public interest groups think about this bill.
[03:11.570 --> 03:15.350]  I'll just give you EPIC's position, which is we think it's a shitty bill.
[03:15.610 --> 03:16.810]  We don't like it.
[03:17.050 --> 03:24.830]  There's no way we're going to accept any kind of bill that requires anybody to have built-in surveillance capabilities as a legal requirement.
[03:25.150 --> 03:30.750]  That's just not the way this country should be working, and it sets really lousy precedents for everything else.
[03:31.370 --> 03:45.430]  It doesn't cover electronic networks at the moment, but you can bet your bottom dollar that five years from now, the FBI is going to come back and say, oh, we have this little minor technical correction we have to do, and now we want it to cover all your email and everything else,
[03:45.470 --> 03:49.270]  which they specifically left out this time to limit the criticism of it.
[03:50.810 --> 03:52.510]  So, call, scream.
[03:52.770 --> 03:56.750]  I can't remember the bill numbers off the top of my head, but get in touch with me later.
[03:56.750 --> 03:58.270]  I'll write them on the board.
[04:00.650 --> 04:06.010]  I think it's 25-37 in the Senate, I think.
[04:06.190 --> 04:07.450]  I don't know exactly.
[04:08.590 --> 04:10.850]  Now, the other thing that's going on is Clipper.
[04:12.010 --> 04:18.750]  And as everybody probably saw in the last couple of weeks, there was this flurry of activity related to that.
[04:18.950 --> 04:23.350]  There was claims made that Clipper is dead, that the government is backing off.
[04:23.350 --> 04:26.490]  In reality, they're just chugging right along.
[04:26.730 --> 04:31.370]  They're still buying those crappy little Tessera cards that they thought they would jam down our throats.
[04:31.610 --> 04:32.990]  They're still pushing it.
[04:33.190 --> 04:41.430]  The only thing that's worse now is that industry seems like they're somewhat willing to go along and have a software key escrow system.
[04:41.950 --> 04:43.390]  Now, what's the difference?
[04:43.730 --> 04:48.410]  I mean, you could argue about whether a secret algorithm or a public algorithm is better.
[04:48.530 --> 04:51.030]  But the fact is, is they get to keep the keys.
[04:51.030 --> 04:52.990]  And that is a bad thing.
[04:53.270 --> 04:54.530]  So this is not dead.
[04:54.670 --> 04:56.510]  Do not feel comfortable that this is dead.
[04:56.710 --> 04:58.970]  Keep on talking about it.
[05:00.890 --> 05:05.670]  I think it's probably better if I just open up the mic and let people ask questions.
[05:07.810 --> 05:08.330]  Yes?
[05:09.290 --> 05:10.230]  I have two questions.
[05:10.350 --> 05:23.790]  First is, I thought I had heard at some point about defect in the RSA chip that somebody had found in terms of being able to open up...
[05:24.630 --> 05:26.150]  Defect in the Clipper chip, you mean?
[05:26.390 --> 05:27.150]  Yeah, the Clipper chip.
[05:27.670 --> 05:42.950]  Well, Matt Blaze discovered a way of spoofing the Clipper chips or the Tessera card specifically so that it looked like you could send a fake message and they could... or you could send a message and then you could change the headers in such a way that they couldn't understand.
[05:43.350 --> 05:44.470]  They couldn't decrypt it.
[05:46.670 --> 05:47.110]  Right.
[05:48.250 --> 05:49.930]  And I know he's around here.
[05:50.090 --> 05:52.170]  If you want a technical description, get it from him.
[05:52.170 --> 05:54.110]  I'm not an engineer anymore.
[05:54.410 --> 05:58.050]  And the second question is on...
[06:00.860 --> 06:02.920]  I was just wondering...
[06:02.920 --> 06:07.740]  The Electronic Communications Progress Act of 1984?
[06:08.140 --> 06:09.260]  86, yeah.
[06:11.840 --> 06:13.200]  What is...
[06:13.200 --> 06:16.780]  What do you think the legal status of...
[06:16.780 --> 06:30.620]  in terms of when they start delivering one-to-one service rather than passing the signal from satellite to cable and distribute it out to the service?
[06:31.860 --> 06:53.360]  The way ECPA is designed, it covers pretty much anything that would be telephony except for specifically it exempts out things like ham radio things and also it specifically exempts out any kind of cordless telephone.
[06:57.530 --> 06:57.840]  Right.
[06:58.550 --> 06:59.720]  Any part of these devices...
[07:00.210 --> 07:00.770]  So your...
[07:02.070 --> 07:02.950]  So your...
[07:04.150 --> 07:06.710]  So your baby monitor can be intercepted too.
[07:12.800 --> 07:13.420]  Yes.
[07:13.420 --> 07:15.740]  Does the FBI now have that capability?
[07:16.120 --> 07:18.480]  If they monitor your phone calls?
[07:18.680 --> 07:20.940]  What they do, why is this going to help them more?
[07:21.060 --> 07:22.620]  I mean, why do they need this extra bill?
[07:23.820 --> 07:25.820]  Why do they need the digital telephony proposal?
[07:26.000 --> 07:29.420]  Right now, can they monitor your stuff from the phone company now?
[07:30.720 --> 07:31.480]  Pretty much.
[07:31.980 --> 07:36.120]  I mean, one of the key questions has always been, why do you need this?
[07:36.260 --> 07:38.840]  And they've never come out with a decent answer on this.
[07:38.840 --> 07:44.360]  In fact, we sued them last week to find out exactly why the hell they want this thing.
[07:44.780 --> 07:45.920]  They're not saying...
[07:45.920 --> 07:49.380]  They keep giving us the same fucking stories about pedophiles.
[07:51.680 --> 07:52.560]  Oh, excuse me.
[07:52.720 --> 07:54.400]  One story about pedophiles.
[07:58.020 --> 08:01.520]  Oh, and then they also keep talking about the El Rukan case.
[08:01.680 --> 08:11.820]  And actually, when I went around to looking up the El Rukan case, they have it down as they stopped a dangerous Libyan terrorist attempt to shoot down an airliner in Chicago.
[08:12.220 --> 08:17.300]  In reality, it was a scam by the FBI based on a scam by the El Rukan gang.
[08:17.720 --> 08:27.380]  They were taking credit for other people's criminal acts in Chicago and then sent a whole bunch of them to the Libyan saying, hey, look at all the dangerous things we're doing.
[08:27.480 --> 08:29.060]  Now send us a million bucks, please.
[08:32.140 --> 08:37.720]  Somehow that got translated into the greatest law enforcement save of all time.
[08:38.980 --> 08:40.220]  What's the medical story?
[08:41.580 --> 08:42.140]  It's...
[08:42.140 --> 08:55.040]  That's someone down in Richmond that they claim that they used a wiretap to stop some bullshit, but they have not given a single detail and nobody actually seems to know the details of this story.
[08:55.040 --> 08:55.420]  It's...
[08:55.720 --> 08:56.080]  It's...
[08:56.080 --> 08:56.780]  It's vaporware.
[08:58.100 --> 08:58.820]  Yeah.
[08:58.820 --> 08:59.120]  Vaporware.
[09:00.380 --> 09:00.740]  Yeah.
[09:01.720 --> 09:02.220]  Part of the...
[09:02.220 --> 09:02.880]  Part of the...
[09:02.880 --> 09:11.040]  The argument that was used by the CFP, the general counsel of the NSA, was that they had...
[09:12.320 --> 09:14.740]  A child molester had kept...
[09:16.600 --> 09:25.100]  And kept the list of the children that he had seduced encrypted on his computer using PGP.
[09:25.300 --> 09:26.260]  And that was...
[09:26.260 --> 09:27.320]  That was his argument.
[09:27.660 --> 09:28.320]  Well, that's...
[09:28.320 --> 09:29.400]  That's a different case.
[09:29.640 --> 09:36.600]  But, I mean, the fact is, is that neither Clipper nor Digital Telephony would help in that case because it's on the guy's hard drive.
[09:36.720 --> 09:41.360]  He isn't sending email with lists of his friends or whatever you want to call them.
[09:42.740 --> 09:43.660]  Maybe he was.
[09:43.840 --> 09:44.280]  I don't know.
[09:44.840 --> 09:46.380]  Presumably he was a little bit now.
[09:46.480 --> 09:46.760]  Yes.
[09:47.320 --> 09:59.220]  And an interesting fact of that one is, or I don't know a lot about the case, but it brings up a point that they got this guy using other sources, of course, and he's in jail.
[10:00.580 --> 10:07.660]  And they had the fact that he had encrypted this stuff with a PGP key, and they didn't try and force him to give it.
[10:08.660 --> 10:17.280]  Which I think brings up a real interesting legal point, which is, I don't think under the Fifth Amendment they can force you to give the key out if you encrypt something.
[10:18.380 --> 10:19.220]  I don't know.
[10:19.420 --> 10:22.800]  The Supreme Court's a little more wacky than I'd prefer.
[10:23.160 --> 10:30.560]  But I think the founding fathers would like us to think that you can tell them to go blow themselves if they want your key.
[10:32.660 --> 10:33.320]  Yeah?
[10:33.600 --> 10:57.880]  In terms of real policy, what, since the clipper can be fooled, or seems to demonstrate it, and the telephone doesn't seem to give any practical advantage to the powers that be, what is the reason for these two issues, and what are the pros and the cons in terms of everyday user,
[10:58.260 --> 11:04.900]  or everyday SSI board, can you go up and down the chain, and what the consequences are?
[11:06.040 --> 11:10.560]  In terms of why they want it, I wish we knew.
[11:12.000 --> 11:20.240]  My guess is, it's basically one of those immutable laws of bureaucracy, where guys somewhere down the line decided they wanted something.
[11:20.720 --> 11:30.000]  It doesn't matter how stupid it is, it doesn't matter that even the Defense Department says you can pull DES off a site in Germany within 30 seconds.
[11:30.340 --> 11:38.560]  They seem to think this is the best idea since sliced bread, even if it won't have a great deal of practical effects on a lot of people.
[11:39.160 --> 11:45.660]  It's important to note, though, is what they're trying to do is eliminate the routine use of encryption.
[11:46.200 --> 11:51.020]  And I don't have to go into the reasons why we think routine use of encryption is such a good idea.
[11:51.200 --> 11:53.240]  I think everybody here probably knows that.
[11:55.040 --> 11:56.460]  But they want to make it hard.
[11:57.020 --> 12:02.520]  It's not the PGP users who have to go through a variety of hoops to do it.
[12:02.680 --> 12:07.320]  It's they want the Lotus Notes users to stop having this, or not to have it.
[12:07.420 --> 12:13.340]  They don't want the CC, the mail CC stuff to have it, or Quick Mail, or any of those people.
[12:13.340 --> 12:21.840]  They want to make it as hard as possible, so they can keep whatever kind of spying apparatus they seem to think they have active.
[12:26.660 --> 12:28.520]  Sort of a two-fold question.
[12:28.740 --> 12:34.880]  First is, what exactly happened to Barbara Cantwell's bill?
[12:35.520 --> 12:36.440]  Maria Cantwell.
[12:40.700 --> 12:46.280]  Well, Maria Cantwell's bill has got a sort of long and nasty and torturous history.
[12:46.880 --> 12:53.400]  She introduced the thing last year, and was similar to something that had been introduced by a different Congress critter the year before.
[12:54.800 --> 12:58.080]  And it got passed by one of the House committees.
[12:58.280 --> 13:00.800]  It was either Banking or Foreign Affairs.
[13:01.080 --> 13:02.180]  Maybe both, I think.
[13:03.020 --> 13:06.540]  Then it got referred to the House Intelligence Committee.
[13:06.680 --> 13:11.560]  The House Intelligence Committee decided they were going to eliminate it and put in this very weak study.
[13:11.960 --> 13:13.780]  I mean, frankly, we don't need another study.
[13:13.860 --> 13:16.240]  We know that there's so much encryption out there.
[13:16.360 --> 13:21.720]  It doesn't take a rocket scientist to accept this, except for our friends in the fort.
[13:21.860 --> 13:23.200]  Nobody seems to accept this.
[13:24.380 --> 13:26.800]  But the Intelligence Committee got it eliminated.
[13:27.980 --> 13:34.540]  It went back to the Rules Committee, which is the people that decide how things are going to be voted on in Congress.
[13:34.840 --> 13:37.860]  And they decided to allow for an open vote.
[13:38.060 --> 13:49.920]  So somewhere on the House floor, when this vote was being discussed, and this was the General Export Control Bill, Maria Cantwell could have gone down there again, dropped her bill on the House floor, and started it up again.
[13:49.920 --> 13:54.640]  And the purpose was mainly to have some sort of debate.
[13:55.380 --> 13:58.540]  Finally, a decent House debate on encryption.
[13:58.840 --> 14:05.400]  And I know Congressman Brooks had a prepared statement, and all sorts of other people had prepared statements, and they were going to hammer on this.
[14:05.880 --> 14:11.420]  But for some reason, and I can't read Maria Cantwell's mind, she blinked.
[14:12.020 --> 14:18.400]  Somewhere at the last minute, she decided she was not going to introduce that bill back into Congress again.
[14:19.540 --> 14:21.240]  And Al Gore sent her a letter.
[14:21.900 --> 14:30.680]  And the letter, which probably all you have seen, says, basically, we're going to do the same old shit we're doing now, and tough.
[14:32.580 --> 14:37.600]  Maria, for some reason, decided that she was going to take credit now for her victory.
[14:37.940 --> 14:42.520]  And she sent out this press release saying, hey, they've now decided to back down on Clipper.
[14:42.520 --> 14:46.560]  However, the Business Software Alliance sent out a press release that said the same thing.
[14:47.640 --> 14:50.520]  And EFF sent out a press release that said the same thing.
[14:52.300 --> 15:01.380]  Unfortunately, somebody forgot to tell Al Gore about this, and he apparently called up Cantwell personally and chewed her ass out for putting words in his mouth that Clipper was dead.
[15:03.160 --> 15:12.900]  In addition, Senator Leahy said, wait a second, I'm an expert in this field, as anybody in Congress can possibly be, and I don't see any improvements in this either.
[15:15.060 --> 15:26.100]  So, and from what I hear, the people over in Justice and the people over in the Fort were laughing their asses off, going, wow, now we have half the population thinking the Clipper is dead.
[15:26.260 --> 15:26.640]  Hallelujah!
[15:27.220 --> 15:34.780]  There won't be any more, you know, 47,000 people signing petitions because half the people will have this block in their mind that it's dead.
[15:34.780 --> 15:36.120]  And it's not.
[15:36.820 --> 15:40.160]  The second half of the question is pure idle speculation.
[15:40.700 --> 15:47.180]  Do you see any connection between that and Microsoft's relative success in the Justice Department's antitrust suit?
[15:49.380 --> 15:52.100]  Let me ask, is there anybody here from Microsoft?
[15:52.640 --> 15:54.160]  From Seattle at all?
[15:56.340 --> 16:03.100]  If I were more of a conspiracy theorist, I would see a link between the two, given that they happened in the same week.
[16:05.260 --> 16:06.960]  However, I'm not.
[16:07.400 --> 16:10.380]  Or maybe I just don't feel like getting threatened by Microsoft.
[16:10.780 --> 16:16.280]  We already got threatened by Intel for putting out those, for sending out the Big Brother Inside sticker.
[16:17.060 --> 16:17.580]  So...
[16:24.240 --> 16:31.740]  As it turns out, they own 20% stake in VLSI, so they were responsible for those Big Brother Inside chips.
[16:33.280 --> 16:35.440]  They just sold that last week or something.
[16:37.380 --> 16:38.280]  I don't know.
[16:38.440 --> 16:48.780]  But I think another interesting facet is that the Business Software Alliance, which is basically Microsoft is their biggest member, came out and said, hey, Clipper is dead.
[16:48.980 --> 17:01.060]  And now we hear these rumors coming out of Seattle via the Cypherpunks list that maybe Microsoft is thinking about implementing software key escrow into their operating systems or into things.
[17:01.300 --> 17:06.380]  I don't know if it's true, but it certainly leads to interesting idle speculation.
[17:09.280 --> 17:27.840]  Just in terms of the digital to ethnic proposal, I remember hearing, when it originally came out, that one of their excuses for it was that they felt that the upcoming advent of digital telephone systems was going to somehow reduce their ability to wiretap.
[17:28.100 --> 17:32.500]  Now, we both know that that's BS, but that was the line I remember them giving out at the time.
[17:33.000 --> 17:33.480]  Right.
[17:33.840 --> 17:38.600]  One of the things they constantly harp on is, well, we can't tap ISDN.
[17:39.080 --> 17:46.440]  Well, according to their own documents, as far back as 1990, they were already testing devices to tap ISDN.
[17:46.620 --> 17:52.660]  So, like most of the other stuff that's coming out of Mr. Freeh's mouth, you've got to take it with at least a pound of salt.
[17:55.920 --> 18:02.260]  Do you see any current efforts on the part of the system?
[18:10.930 --> 18:17.530]  With the exception of Phil Zimmerman, I'm not aware of any investigations of any software export.
[18:18.270 --> 18:38.450]  I, however, did get a document right before I left on Thursday that was sent from the department, or from the NSA, saying that they, while they routinely approve the export of DES for financial institutions, they were never going to approve the export of triple DES,
[18:38.630 --> 18:45.670]  even for financial institutions, which arguably need it quite a bit and already have a proven track record of using DES.
[18:46.730 --> 18:49.370]  So, I don't see them softening at all on this.
[18:51.450 --> 18:52.050]  Yeah?
[18:52.990 --> 18:55.550]  Mr. Chris, what exactly does it look like?
[18:56.310 --> 19:02.270]  The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a non-profit public interest group.
[19:02.390 --> 19:07.710]  We're sponsored in part by CPSR, which is Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.
[19:08.090 --> 19:14.070]  And our main sponsor is the Fund for Constitutional Government, which is a civil liberties foundation.
[19:16.470 --> 19:20.830]  We mostly do research and a lot of writing.
[19:22.070 --> 19:27.050]  Some advocacy, and I guess you could call it lobbying, but we're, it's pretty small.
[19:27.130 --> 19:30.030]  There's only three of us, so we don't do a great deal of lobbying.
[19:31.190 --> 19:33.070]  More bomb tossing than lobbying.
[19:35.750 --> 19:36.190]  Yeah?
[19:36.670 --> 19:38.390]  Do you live in this little country?
[19:38.850 --> 19:40.110]  Do you live in D.C.?
[19:40.110 --> 19:42.830]  I live in the suburbs.
[19:42.830 --> 19:44.770]  Oh, like Virginia or Maryland?
[19:44.890 --> 19:45.210]  Maryland.
[19:45.850 --> 19:46.410]  Maryland.
[19:46.610 --> 19:51.010]  In D.C., my driver's license number is my social security number.
[19:51.250 --> 19:51.450]  Right.
[19:51.650 --> 19:56.850]  And I was told by motor vehicles that if I'm on a license, I have no choice.
[19:56.850 --> 20:02.510]  I'm just wondering if there's any legal resource like that to provide that.
[20:04.750 --> 20:17.490]  Unfortunately, well, under the 1974 Privacy Act, it specifically prohibited government agencies, both state, federal, and local, from asking for your SSN unless they had legal authorization to do it.
[20:17.490 --> 20:24.610]  Unfortunately, Congress turned around a year and a half later and gutted that by allowing it specifically for DMVs to use it.
[20:24.810 --> 20:27.370]  They don't have to use it, but they're allowed to use it.
[20:27.370 --> 20:35.450]  So there's not any great way of fighting it because they have congressional authorization to do it.
[20:40.340 --> 20:40.880]  Yeah?
[20:42.240 --> 20:50.500]  For someone who doesn't live in Washington, how would you suggest you guys about keeping track of the old stone and others?
[20:52.160 --> 20:55.360]  Well, there's a group based out of New York.
[20:55.480 --> 20:56.860]  I don't know, is Shabir here anywhere?
[20:57.940 --> 20:58.460]  Aha!
[20:59.120 --> 21:04.100]  Who is doing a... did a very good job of following what Cantwell was up to.
[21:06.340 --> 21:14.120]  Just recently on the House government information, Gopher now puts the full text of all House bills online.
[21:14.480 --> 21:18.580]  And you, through the Library of Congress, can follow how they're sort of weeding their way through.
[21:19.440 --> 21:24.840]  It still isn't real easy to track what's going on in D.C., even in D.C.
[21:25.060 --> 21:28.100]  It's because there's so much of it that's going on behind the scenes.
[21:28.340 --> 21:32.080]  There's, you know, smoke-filled rooms are still the way of D.C.
[21:33.640 --> 21:36.380]  But you can at least follow the public stuff that they've done.
[21:40.100 --> 21:40.540]  Yeah?
[21:41.020 --> 21:48.400]  I guess, if I understand correctly, the EFF is not the word of the New Lake version of Honeyville.
[21:50.220 --> 21:55.380]  Basically, I guess they consider it some sort of positive bargain if the best we could possibly do.
[21:57.380 --> 22:07.900]  Do you want to, or maybe it's a bad forum to speak to other organizations in the same room, but can you speak to EFF's position on this?
[22:10.360 --> 22:11.760]  I know what it is.
[22:12.800 --> 22:14.700]  I don't agree with it at all.
[22:14.820 --> 22:21.880]  But they seem to be under the belief that something is going to go through, and this is the best they can do.
[22:22.340 --> 22:26.140]  I personally think that's bullshit, and I think we can kill this sucker.
[22:26.700 --> 22:32.360]  So, your position is not like, I'm against it on principle, but rather, we can beat it.
[22:33.420 --> 22:35.120]  It's not the best we can do.
[22:35.120 --> 22:44.240]  No, I have a fundamental objection to law enforcement's belief that everything should be built with their easy access in mind.
[22:49.180 --> 22:55.900]  And so, my second part of that is, even if it were going to happen and I didn't have that fundamental thing, I think it's a lousy deal.
[22:59.140 --> 23:08.360]  Can you give an example of a common carrier, basically a bell company that doesn't have their networks already wiretap ready?
[23:09.820 --> 23:22.200]  Because it's fairly easy to set something up, as far as a state, local, and federal agency is concerned all right, to do their wiretap and registers, trapping traces.
[23:22.500 --> 23:26.540]  It's a matter of just sending a court order and you get the information the next day.
[23:26.780 --> 23:28.780]  It's not that difficult.
[23:28.780 --> 23:32.660]  Well, that's why we sued the FBI, because they're making these claims.
[23:32.760 --> 23:37.860]  And the claims move around faster than a Super Bowl in a zero-gravity room.
[23:38.060 --> 23:43.020]  It's just one day it's 180 and the next day it's 82 and the next day it's 200 or something.
[23:44.280 --> 23:49.140]  They've never provided any hard evidence that there's anybody out there that they can't do this to.
[23:49.140 --> 23:53.460]  But what they are asking for is a fundamental change in the principle of law.
[23:53.780 --> 23:57.740]  Giving them authority over how things are going to be designed in the future.
[24:00.060 --> 24:02.220]  That's the real problem with digital telephony.
[24:05.930 --> 24:06.530]  Yeah?
[24:07.030 --> 24:09.690]  Is there anything on the books on the hour?
[24:19.720 --> 24:20.020]  No.
[24:20.300 --> 24:24.660]  There's no laws that prevent you from using encryption for anything at all.
[24:25.540 --> 24:29.020]  And even the foreign laws are of some dubious nature.
[24:30.780 --> 24:34.420]  I read the French laws, and I don't read French that well.
[24:34.620 --> 24:37.140]  But as I read it, it doesn't prohibit encryption either.
[24:38.320 --> 24:44.580]  All it does is require that you register your algorithm and the fact that you're using it with the public telephone system.
[24:45.640 --> 24:50.680]  So I'm not even aware of any foreign countries that actually have a prohibition, though.
[24:50.680 --> 24:56.920]  Singapore has been trotted out as a shining example of a country that has such far-reaching policies.
[24:57.560 --> 25:02.100]  I guess if you use your encryption, you'll get caned or something like that.
[25:05.560 --> 25:06.120]  Yeah?
[25:06.300 --> 25:11.020]  I think I heard something about something last year from one of those magazines.
[25:11.280 --> 25:19.620]  They're talking about, in some countries, it's some sort of law that refers to life as a key to the government.
[25:20.440 --> 25:21.660]  I believe that's in the press.
[25:22.980 --> 25:36.600]  Well, that's the sort of story that's been rolling around, but everybody I've talked to, and from the law I've read, and industry people have checked up on this pretty vigorously, they do not require you to give your key in France.
[25:37.780 --> 25:44.260]  So, if somebody in France who's here wants to get busted, I'll retract that statement.
[25:44.260 --> 25:48.160]  But for the moment, I think, I think it stands pretty well.
[25:49.000 --> 25:58.980]  What do you think the social government is saying for, about this little implemented, increasing control over health operations?
[26:06.830 --> 26:11.310]  Well, this is really part of a larger mosaic of things that are going on.
[26:11.590 --> 26:18.330]  There's a great number of bills in Congress at the moment that give law enforcement easier access to a variety of things.
[26:18.330 --> 26:25.750]  There's been a major push to try and get, make law enforcement exceptions into a lot of major laws.
[26:26.030 --> 26:38.910]  To give you one example, the original Clinton health care bill that was introduced, specifically provided that the Attorney General should have online access to the health data network, and there was no requirements that he has to get a warrant.
[26:39.070 --> 26:43.110]  He could just, you know, one day decides he'll look up somebody and just look them up.
[26:43.410 --> 26:45.130]  No restrictions on it.
[26:45.130 --> 26:50.350]  They've also pushed through something that's passed in the Senate to make it easier for them to get credit reports.
[26:51.010 --> 27:04.550]  Instead of actually getting a warrant to get a credit report, they can send what they call a national security letter, which is basically something that some national security bureaucrat writes up and says, for national security reasons, we want this credit report,
[27:04.630 --> 27:07.270]  and you have to trust us that we're doing this in the right mode.
[27:07.790 --> 27:10.930]  But there's no oversight, so you'll just have to believe that we're right.
[27:12.170 --> 27:19.530]  There's a whole variety of bills out there like that, that are all sort of weeding their way through, because they are really powerful.
[27:20.270 --> 27:25.230]  And Clinton, even though I'll admit it, maybe I was wrong, but I voted for the guy.
[27:25.870 --> 27:29.070]  He has no goddamn spine on this stuff.
[27:34.630 --> 27:34.990]  Yeah?
[27:35.390 --> 27:39.230]  Is it true that the majority of the wiretaps that they do like that are illegal?
[27:39.630 --> 27:44.810]  That they do them just to like help them gather information, never use it in court, but just to give them an edge?
[27:46.990 --> 27:49.070]  What's the name for an illegal wiretap?
[27:50.010 --> 27:51.030]  Not on a source.
[27:51.410 --> 27:51.470]  Yeah.
[27:55.590 --> 28:08.090]  I do have, I've been collecting as I run through things like Lexis and Nexus and read various newspapers, I collect regularly places where they've caught cops doing illegal wiretaps.
[28:08.270 --> 28:16.910]  And just the ones they've caught that have been reported in press that is online available somewhere, I count well over a hundred cases in the last ten years.
[28:17.110 --> 28:27.030]  And that includes our friends at the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and a lot of state and local Barney Fife's who got a little overzealous and started doing it.
[28:28.370 --> 28:30.130]  So it's going on out there.
[28:30.270 --> 28:35.870]  And I'm sure there's a lot of cases where, a huge number of cases where it's an anonymous source.
[28:45.670 --> 28:47.630]  A list of all of the records?
[28:58.120 --> 29:00.060]  Well, there's two different things.
[29:00.260 --> 29:02.980]  There's pen registers and then there's toll records.
[29:03.540 --> 29:09.660]  Pen registers, they actually have to go to a court and ask for a list of, ask for a warrant.
[29:09.980 --> 29:12.800]  Unfortunately, the warrant is based on a very weak standard.
[29:13.040 --> 29:17.180]  It's, they have reason to believe that a crime is occurring or may have occurred at some time.
[29:17.800 --> 29:27.840]  In the ten years that pen registers have been legally covered, there's been probably well over 20,000 of them, and not a single one has ever been turned down.
[29:28.880 --> 29:38.180]  When I mentioned, when I was talking to pen registers to a friend of mine who's an ex-prosecutor the other day, and I mentioned to him the warrant requirement, he just started laughing.
[29:39.560 --> 29:42.320]  Toll records, on the other hand, are completely unprotected.
[29:42.320 --> 29:56.260]  Who you call, long distance, that Ma Bell, or whoever, marks down on your phone bill, is open season for any cop who has a pen and a rubber stamp.
[29:57.460 --> 29:59.560]  All they need is an administrative warrant.
[29:59.860 --> 30:07.260]  When I used to work for the State of Maryland as an investigator for the Public Defender's Office, I could file these things if I really wanted to.
[30:07.260 --> 30:20.120]  So it was, it's a zero standard, and it looks like in 92, and it's kind of hard to tell because each phone company regulates it in a different way, that there were about a million toll records pulled in 1992.
[30:22.720 --> 30:35.240]  Just on that note, a phone company also keeps records of all outgoing local calls in their durations, as well as all incoming calls and their durations on every line stores them indefinitely.
[30:38.080 --> 30:40.800]  If they are, that's pretty bad news.
[30:41.020 --> 30:48.600]  But the incoming calls, it's what's known as a trap-and-trace device, and they also have to get that same weak warrant that they get for pen registers.
[30:49.920 --> 31:00.000]  Are they applying into public phones like the old mob thing of bag-fueling hippos and taking long walks between numbers?
[31:00.380 --> 31:06.260]  Is that going to be a thing of the past as well in terms of the privacy of them?
[31:08.660 --> 31:17.680]  Those public phones have, for the phone numbers that are dialed from them, zero expectation of privacy in the law's mind.
[31:17.860 --> 31:20.560]  So, I'm sure they regularly collect them.
[31:20.640 --> 31:43.240]  In fact, I know that the FBI has some very sophisticated software out there now that automatically adds all the phone numbers dialed to databases, relationally links it with other information they have from various other investigations, so they can just punch in a phone number that they see of somebody and get a full profile of whatever they have on that person instantaneously.
[31:47.000 --> 31:51.200]  Whatever information they have, they punch into these computers.
[31:51.340 --> 31:53.700]  One is called the Organized Crime Information System.
[31:53.880 --> 31:57.060]  Another is called the Drug Information System.
[31:57.060 --> 32:04.940]  There's several intelligence systems out there that they keep on formerly Al Bayes' desk.
[32:05.200 --> 32:07.460]  He was one of the people also pushing digital telephony.
[32:12.550 --> 32:13.050]  Right?
[32:13.330 --> 32:13.650]  Yeah?
[32:14.250 --> 32:16.630]  I don't know if you noticed the little sheets here.
[32:18.370 --> 32:22.430]  There's a little note from the corner here about D&B records built on a state.
[32:22.670 --> 32:23.130]  Right.
[32:23.210 --> 32:23.850]  It's in Oregon.
[32:24.110 --> 32:24.390]  I was wondering.
[32:24.610 --> 32:26.710]  It says here personally legal, but I'm wondering if it's brilliant.
[32:27.770 --> 32:29.010]  The direction says.
[32:29.470 --> 32:31.090]  It depends on the state.
[32:31.490 --> 32:34.830]  California has some restrictions on Department of Motor Vehicle records.
[32:36.110 --> 32:42.270]  There was a federal law proposed which was in the crime bill that just got shot down last week.
[32:42.450 --> 32:44.250]  That would make it...
[32:44.250 --> 32:53.230]  If you went through all these hoops, you could actually have your name removed from any records that the DMV sold to people.
[32:53.430 --> 32:57.650]  But generally those are open public records and accessible by anybody with $2.
[32:57.650 --> 32:58.510]  Yeah.
[32:58.710 --> 33:01.470]  I work doing data entry for the RMB in Massachusetts.
[33:02.990 --> 33:05.290]  And for $10 you can get driving records.
[33:05.350 --> 33:09.350]  And every night I get a stack of 400 of these things to enter in and get sent to...
[33:09.350 --> 33:14.650]  This is all people from Massachusetts and they get sent to some information service GIS in Indianapolis.
[33:16.550 --> 33:20.130]  And I'm one of maybe five people who do this for this one company.
[33:20.750 --> 33:23.310]  Anybody with $10 can get anybody's driving records.
[33:24.550 --> 33:32.950]  And that, you can see people who have suspensions of 20 years and credit information, arrests for illegal possession of drugs.
[33:33.250 --> 33:34.030]  Everything is on that.
[33:34.530 --> 33:36.530]  And it's very available and very public.
[33:36.670 --> 33:37.510]  And I find that very scary.
[33:38.350 --> 33:45.130]  I think that's an incredible privacy thing that some public person may even do with $10 can get this record.
[33:45.630 --> 33:48.270]  That shouldn't be available to...
[33:50.310 --> 33:53.610]  I'm all for open access to government records.
[33:53.870 --> 33:59.510]  But I think the line is at the point where you get to know what the government is doing.
[34:00.710 --> 34:05.970]  Versus information that the government has coerced out of individuals that they couldn't possibly...
[34:06.250 --> 34:09.910]  You can't say, no, I'm not going to give you this information on where I live.
[34:10.110 --> 34:12.050]  And then turn around and sell that information.
[34:12.050 --> 34:19.790]  I think that's the kind of information that the Freedom of Information Act shouldn't allow to be disclosed.
[34:19.890 --> 34:21.630]  Because it doesn't give any kind of idea.
[34:21.650 --> 34:22.750]  I can't tell what the...
[34:22.750 --> 34:26.050]  How the Department of Motor Vehicles is operating if they...
[34:26.050 --> 34:29.290]  By pulling somebody else's report generally.
[34:31.590 --> 34:33.210]  That's just my pet peeve.
[34:33.250 --> 34:37.530]  And I know there's at least one person with a financial interest in here who disagrees with me.
[34:38.970 --> 34:39.570]  But...
[34:41.230 --> 34:42.390]  Yes?
[34:43.110 --> 34:46.290]  Do you see more selectivity in terms of abortion?
[34:54.220 --> 34:56.700]  I haven't been following it very closely.
[34:56.820 --> 35:08.040]  But it certainly seems like it's been a lot quieter, with the exception of the 2600 case, since Operation Sun Devil turned out to be such a debacle.
[35:08.580 --> 35:12.220]  I'm sure there's still a lot of stuff going on that's very quiet.
[35:12.220 --> 35:17.460]  Some guy doesn't want to admit that, you know, they came and kicked down his door and took his computer and all that.
[35:17.580 --> 35:22.700]  But there isn't the kind of idiotic high-profile things that our friends were doing before.
[35:22.700 --> 35:23.840]  I heard Lisa,
[35:36.950 --> 35:37.710]  call innocent.
[35:37.970 --> 35:38.770]  Send me innocent.
[35:38.970 --> 35:39.990]  They called this number.
[35:40.230 --> 35:42.510]  It dropped you right in there with no passports.
[35:43.370 --> 35:45.830]  And there was no warning that this was private or anything else.
[35:46.030 --> 35:47.910]  They just called it and it was a direct prompt.
[35:48.350 --> 35:52.070]  What happened, the FBI apparently has been actually knocking on people's doors.
[35:52.250 --> 35:54.770]  Because they called the 800 number with no password on it.
[35:55.150 --> 35:56.710]  I don't see that at the second court.
[35:56.930 --> 35:57.810]  That's right, they don't do anything.
[35:57.990 --> 35:58.890]  They're threatening you and leave.
[35:59.490 --> 36:00.330]  And you know why?
[36:00.390 --> 36:01.130]  They can't do anything.
[36:01.310 --> 36:03.070]  There's no claim in a warning banner.
[36:03.470 --> 36:05.530]  After that second court, you can't possibly.
[36:05.630 --> 36:06.170]  Am I right or wrong?
[36:09.210 --> 36:11.490]  They've pushed weaker cases in the past.
[36:12.210 --> 36:13.270]  Don't tell me it would stick.
[36:14.230 --> 36:17.570]  How are you anyway of knowing that it's anything under the legitimate dialogue?
[36:17.730 --> 36:19.590]  I don't want to do that dialogue with all three ones anyway.
[36:20.410 --> 36:21.950]  It's not something just so you know it wasn't.
[36:23.610 --> 36:24.690]  It's pretty, yeah.
[36:24.870 --> 36:31.550]  It's so damn questionable that I think most prosecutors are going to avoid trying to take those cases because they hate to lose them.
[36:31.550 --> 36:31.990]  Exactly.
[36:32.250 --> 36:34.690]  One guy who actually was on the net talking about it.
[36:34.850 --> 36:36.030]  He apparently got nothing.
[36:36.150 --> 36:37.530]  They knocked on his door to the FBI.
[36:38.010 --> 36:42.670]  And basically just told, you know, go and call this before.
[36:42.870 --> 36:43.650]  I would take it back.
[36:43.870 --> 36:44.830]  And they didn't do anything.
[36:45.550 --> 36:47.810]  But the assumption is they can look quick.
[36:47.910 --> 36:49.010]  I'm going to lots of headaches.
[36:49.190 --> 36:53.970]  It's certainly hard to prove intent when, if it's something random like that.
[36:54.050 --> 36:54.870]  Not even a banner.
[36:54.990 --> 36:56.530]  Not even like saying this is private.
[36:56.690 --> 36:58.130]  You don't belong here with nothing.
[36:58.730 --> 37:00.190]  This came right up with no problem.
[37:00.750 --> 37:05.450]  And that's the kind of brilliant computer security that we see in our government that...
[37:16.700 --> 37:20.580]  I'm glad our industry is as efficient as our government is.
[37:20.580 --> 37:21.140]  No.
[37:22.060 --> 37:23.760]  So you said they were going to talk to a doctor.
[37:24.460 --> 37:24.520]  Sure.
[37:25.480 --> 37:25.720]  No.
[37:26.000 --> 37:27.900]  What do you think of the national economy
[37:33.880 --> 37:35.780]  that makes $300 million?
[37:40.370 --> 37:42.810]  I'm a firm believer in government oversight.
[37:42.810 --> 37:48.130]  And I think that the intelligence budget should be declassified.
[37:48.270 --> 37:52.290]  And I think that each individual agency's budget should be declassified.
[37:52.410 --> 37:55.810]  Because I can't possibly imagine knowing that the NSA...
[37:56.590 --> 38:00.370]  Officially knowing that the NSA gets about $4 billion a year.
[38:00.550 --> 38:02.510]  It's going to hurt our national security.
[38:03.490 --> 38:06.130]  The justification they have for it is...
[38:06.130 --> 38:10.890]  Well, if the public hears that it's spending $4 billion on this...
[38:10.890 --> 38:13.490]  They're going to revolt against it and demand cuts.
[38:13.790 --> 38:19.530]  So basically they're just trying to save their own bureaucratic asses by hiding the figures on how much they're spending...
[38:20.330 --> 38:22.170]  And how much they're going to...
[38:22.170 --> 38:25.170]  You know, how much more they had from the previous year or how much less.
[38:25.170 --> 38:28.030]  And they don't want to justify what they're doing.
[38:28.970 --> 38:34.670]  And the lapdogs in the House and Senate Intelligence Committees are just pathetic.
[38:35.290 --> 38:39.470]  From what I understand, they didn't even know about Clifford until way after it was introduced.
[38:41.550 --> 38:47.950]  They are just... Government oversight by Congress is completely non-existent.
[38:50.470 --> 38:58.650]  To get back to the thing that you were talking about with the inadequate warrants, whatever, for seizures.
[38:58.950 --> 39:01.470]  What do you think about that Lansky case in Connecticut last year?
[39:01.630 --> 39:02.350]  Are you familiar with that?
[39:02.810 --> 39:03.850]  The ionizer?
[39:04.470 --> 39:07.790]  That's... that was the... was that the BBS that had the...
[39:07.790 --> 39:09.010]  The anarchy files?
[39:12.090 --> 39:14.150]  I thought that was completely pathetic.
[39:14.810 --> 39:15.030]  Yeah.
[39:15.770 --> 39:19.310]  Possibly one of the stupidest prosecutions I've seen in a long time.
[39:19.970 --> 39:22.590]  Done by people who wouldn't know any better.
[39:22.830 --> 39:23.730]  As I understood...
[39:23.730 --> 39:28.370]  This was a case in Connecticut where some kid had a BBS up.
[39:28.710 --> 39:32.870]  And it had some files that somebody else had typed in and put up on the BBS.
[39:33.090 --> 39:33.910]  You typed them in?
[39:34.070 --> 39:34.870]  One, I was 15.
[39:35.090 --> 39:35.970]  A long time ago.
[39:38.070 --> 39:39.110]  And I guess...
[39:39.110 --> 39:40.430]  Well, you'd know better than me.
[39:40.570 --> 39:44.130]  But did you say at the end of them, screw you, feds, or something like that?
[39:44.130 --> 39:44.310]  Thank you very much.
[39:44.810 --> 39:47.430]  You see all the disclaimers on anarchy files.
[39:47.550 --> 39:49.570]  And when I was 15, you know, it's the abuse and butt-head thing.
[39:49.830 --> 39:50.130]  You see a...
[39:51.110 --> 39:53.110]  You know, this is for information purposes only.
[39:53.210 --> 39:54.110]  I decided that was a crime.
[39:54.390 --> 39:56.050]  So I did something that was like a...
[39:56.050 --> 39:57.850]  Note to law enforcement agencies.
[39:58.330 --> 40:01.270]  This is intended to promote general havoc and anarchy.
[40:01.690 --> 40:03.050]  Fuck off pigs or something.
[40:03.050 --> 40:04.110]  That was a mistake.
[40:06.810 --> 40:07.850]  What they did in the case...
[40:07.850 --> 40:09.170]  Well, you certainly pissed them off.
[40:09.410 --> 40:09.570]  Yeah.
[40:09.770 --> 40:14.850]  Well, in the case, they actually labeled that as a direct threat against the lives of police officers.
[40:15.390 --> 40:18.490]  I think because in another one I said, you're going to be the first ones up against the wall.
[40:18.490 --> 40:19.990]  And then it made a mistake.
[40:20.210 --> 40:21.230]  They labeled that as...
[40:21.230 --> 40:21.650]  It was 50.
[40:21.990 --> 40:24.310]  They labeled that as a direct threat against police officers.
[40:25.150 --> 40:26.910]  But, uh, I think the...
[40:26.910 --> 40:28.430]  Ionize was now in jail for 28 months.
[40:28.430 --> 40:28.870]  He was sentenced.
[40:29.610 --> 40:30.990]  Um, he pled...
[40:30.990 --> 40:31.110]  He...
[40:31.110 --> 40:34.810]  He did a plea bargain in response to pleading in...
[40:34.810 --> 40:38.130]  I mean, to them dropping the two charges related to my files.
[40:38.330 --> 40:42.510]  He pled guilty to two unrelated probation violation charges.
[40:42.930 --> 40:44.210]  Um, that was a chronic.
[40:44.370 --> 40:44.810]  I mean, I...
[40:44.810 --> 40:46.510]  I was involved with his lawyer somewhat.
[40:46.810 --> 40:48.530]  And his lawyer told me...
[40:48.530 --> 40:49.850]  I believe this is an exact quote.
[40:49.950 --> 40:51.670]  I don't want to get involved in the First Amendment.
[40:51.870 --> 40:53.410]  And I was like, what are you talking about?
[40:53.470 --> 40:54.370]  That's your entire case.
[40:54.630 --> 40:56.750]  I mean, this is information that...
[40:56.750 --> 40:58.130]  This is a clear-cut case of...
[40:58.130 --> 41:04.790]  They're not understanding that freedom, um, press, you know, applies as much to electronic information as printed media.
[41:05.150 --> 41:09.830]  All of these things I got from either something like the Anarchist's Book Book or from my high school chemistry book.
[41:10.050 --> 41:11.450]  This was not secret information.
[41:11.450 --> 41:12.050]  I mean, a lot...
[41:12.050 --> 41:13.570]  And they weren't even, like, offensive devices.
[41:13.750 --> 41:14.450]  These are things that...
[41:14.450 --> 41:16.650]  You can go out to any Army-Navy storm by the...
[41:16.650 --> 41:19.250]  The CIA Field Operations Manual or whatever.
[41:19.410 --> 41:20.230]  Improvise munitions.
[41:20.630 --> 41:21.130]  This is...
[41:21.130 --> 41:21.930]  This was not something big.
[41:22.010 --> 41:22.830]  This was...
[41:23.390 --> 41:24.510]  A miscarriage of justice.
[41:24.630 --> 41:25.310]  I mean, he's in jail.
[41:25.530 --> 41:26.310]  And he...
[41:26.310 --> 41:26.510]  For...
[41:26.510 --> 41:29.630]  For nothing more than, you know, hundreds of...
[41:29.630 --> 41:29.810]  Thousands...
[41:29.810 --> 41:31.630]  I mean, thousands of people have these files around.
[41:31.950 --> 41:33.250]  He didn't even know they were on his VBS.
[41:33.410 --> 41:33.650]  He had...
[41:33.650 --> 41:35.610]  His VBS was 1.8 gigabytes.
[41:36.250 --> 41:37.070]  You know, expecting...
[41:37.070 --> 41:39.070]  Expecting him to know every sentence of every file.
[41:39.070 --> 41:39.790]  On that is expecting...
[41:39.790 --> 41:45.750]  Like, expecting the librarian at the Library of Congress to know every sentence for every book in the Library of Congress.
[41:46.050 --> 41:47.010]  You know, it's ridiculous.
[41:47.310 --> 41:48.190]  It's a double standard.
[41:48.510 --> 41:49.350]  What do you think about?
[41:49.610 --> 41:50.010]  What...
[41:50.010 --> 41:51.990]  Can you tell us a little bit more about that?
[41:52.130 --> 41:52.370]  What?
[41:56.450 --> 41:59.470]  Well, I'm not legally responsible because I didn't do anything that was illegal.
[41:59.950 --> 42:04.570]  I simply wrote the files when I was 15, publishing information that was already publicly available.
[42:05.430 --> 42:05.870]  He...
[42:05.870 --> 42:08.910]  The way that happened is they got a 14-year-old to download...
[42:08.910 --> 42:15.710]  The police got a 14-year-old informant to download the file and then charged him with making this information available to minors somehow.
[42:15.710 --> 42:18.950]  Of course, any minors can walk in and get it from any library.
[42:19.610 --> 42:20.070]  Yeah.
[42:20.270 --> 42:26.410]  I was also following this case because I'm a member of the IIRG, which...
[42:27.030 --> 42:29.430]  Ionizer was a member of him before he went to jail.
[42:30.170 --> 42:30.950]  Um, and...
[42:30.950 --> 42:31.770]  What's the IIRG?
[42:31.990 --> 42:34.330]  The International Information Retrieval Guild.
[42:34.550 --> 42:38.110]  Um, we promote, you know, spreading information around.
[42:38.430 --> 42:38.770]  You know?
[42:39.170 --> 42:41.030]  We think information's a good thing.
[42:41.550 --> 42:43.670]  And, uh, he was charged with...
[42:43.670 --> 42:44.330]  Endanger...
[42:44.330 --> 42:46.790]  With, uh...
[42:46.790 --> 42:47.710]  Endangering a minor.
[42:48.630 --> 42:50.470]  And, um...
[42:50.470 --> 42:55.850]  They were basically harassing him, um...
[42:57.410 --> 42:59.290]  The 14-year-old, what they did?
[42:59.830 --> 43:04.670]  The story we got was that they brought the student in the room, had him push one button, and had him leave.
[43:05.050 --> 43:05.410]  Yes.
[43:05.570 --> 43:06.630]  And that was his involvement.
[43:06.850 --> 43:09.450]  He was pushing one button, and the rest of the, uh...
[43:09.450 --> 43:12.090]  operation was operated by, uh, police officers.
[43:12.850 --> 43:13.230]  He was led.
[43:14.250 --> 43:16.790]  So, it was just, it was a total deep rock.
[43:17.530 --> 43:19.070]  I mean, it was completely illegitimate.
[43:19.350 --> 43:20.090]  That's, that's the...
[43:20.090 --> 43:21.290]  That's since I got my talk to Blake.
[43:21.490 --> 43:22.430]  I mean, how familiar is in prison.
[43:22.530 --> 43:33.430]  I cooperated with his, his defense lawyer, such as he was, by, you know, the police were trying to convince the prosecutor that he had written these files, so basically, you know, I got a notarist statement saying that I had written them.
[43:33.850 --> 43:36.470]  And, you know, oh, I'm sorry, I was 15, whatever.
[43:37.090 --> 43:40.670]  But, uh, his lawyer was involved, and I think that's why he's in jail now.
[43:42.050 --> 43:57.110]  He was originally supposed to be getting in touch with some people in the EFF, and I think his lawyer told them to piss off or something, because it never, they never got involved with it, and so he got screwed.
[43:57.710 --> 44:01.910]  His lawyer basically told them, I'll handle this, uh, we're not interested in your opinion.
[44:02.650 --> 44:05.530]  Um, that's, that's, that's what I got.
[44:05.870 --> 44:09.430]  Uh, since I got legal malpractice.
[44:09.990 --> 44:17.510]  Well, that's one of the major problems with, uh, with the system right now is, there's nobody out there that understands it.
[44:17.830 --> 44:21.210]  I mean, there's a few lawyers out there who understand this.
[44:21.410 --> 44:24.910]  Probably, uh, probably no more than a couple dozen.
[44:24.910 --> 44:30.510]  Um, and then a few of those are probably on the wrong side, so we wouldn't want them to understand it anyway.
[44:31.250 --> 44:32.290]  Uh, no judges.
[44:32.610 --> 44:37.870]  I mean, most judges still use typewriters or have their secretaries type in stuff.
[44:38.250 --> 44:40.850]  Um, they wouldn't recognize one computer from another.
[44:41.110 --> 44:45.970]  And then on the other hand, you have generally a bunch, the prosecutors are a zealous bunch of people.
[44:46.190 --> 44:47.310]  They go for the win.
[44:47.830 --> 44:52.450]  I mean, I used to work for the Public Defender's Office, and I know how prosecutors work.
[44:52.450 --> 44:57.030]  And their, their idea of, of, uh, doing justice is the win.
[44:57.250 --> 45:00.870]  Not whether it's right or not, but the glory of the win.
[45:00.990 --> 45:01.510]  It's a game.
[45:10.050 --> 45:11.730]  All right, well, if I, oh, okay.
[45:11.930 --> 45:15.290]  Do you think that kid had a chance for legal malpractice students in jail?
[45:17.850 --> 45:19.230]  It's certainly possible.
[45:19.430 --> 45:34.410]  Those are pretty hard to prove, and, uh, the people who'd be, the lawyers that'd be sitting on the board looking into the legal malpractice, uh, also probably don't know how to use computers either, so it wouldn't, uh, they'd go, well, you know, this was a good,
[45:34.410 --> 45:37.990]  good case of, uh, so-and-so and, uh, things.
[45:38.110 --> 45:45.910]  Probably in all fairness, one of the, since he got nailed on the probation violations, those are almost impossible to contest.
[45:46.250 --> 45:50.270]  Uh, if you're on probation and you screw up, you're screwed.
[45:52.950 --> 46:04.230]  I think another major point, it's not just lawyers, there aren't, there's not that many law enforcement, like, you know, Sheriff Jim Bob Smith doesn't know a computer from, you know, asshole.
[46:04.730 --> 46:06.570]  They, these, they don't, they know what's going on.
[46:06.790 --> 46:21.810]  And with that, they have to be educated just as much as anyone else to know that, um, the double standard, you know, it's not the double standard that they have to be learned through either case courses where it's proven, or whatever, that they can't keep doing this.
[46:21.890 --> 46:26.650]  They can't keep going to this guy's house, having a 14-year-old do it, whatever, that can't continue.
[46:26.970 --> 46:46.530]  Right, I mean, when you have, uh, probably asking, probably asking to get sued here, but when you have, uh, people like Gail Thackeray, who, uh, seemingly has no concept of, of, uh, most basic practices of law, uh, and she's supposedly the computer expert.
[46:47.290 --> 46:52.130]  Uh, most of them are, are pretty zealous because they're a pretty small group of people.
[46:58.300 --> 46:59.260]  Gee, thanks.
[47:00.000 --> 47:01.740]  Best clap I got all night.
[47:04.520 --> 47:07.020]  All right, is there anybody else who I haven't insulted yet?
[47:08.140 --> 47:08.660]  Yes.
[47:09.080 --> 47:16.540]  Uh, if some law enforcement agency does come knocking on our door and wants to take our computers away, what's a few simple tips on how to protect ourselves?
[47:19.480 --> 47:23.000]  Um, make sure they have a warrant.
[47:23.220 --> 47:24.700]  Make sure the warrant's signed.
[47:25.120 --> 47:27.280]  Uh, call your lawyer immediately.
[47:28.100 --> 47:34.700]  And, uh, have him rush down and, uh, and basically get in their way.
[47:34.840 --> 47:38.160]  Because if you get in their way, then you can get nailed for obstruction of justice.
[47:38.160 --> 47:44.240]  Which is even worse if they're just coming down there on some sort of general BS kind of thing.
[47:44.500 --> 47:47.640]  Is it true they don't have to charge you with anything to confiscate the equipment?
[47:48.760 --> 47:57.600]  They can do it for an investigation and, and then if, God forbid, the investigation not pan out, like Operation Sun Devil certainly never panned out.
[47:57.740 --> 48:04.680]  There are magical 23,000 disks that they collected and I think they got one plea bargain out of the entire thing.
[48:04.680 --> 48:07.380]  It was a pretty pathetic turnover for them.
[48:07.620 --> 48:11.120]  Once you take your stuff back, there's no guarantee it's going to be a deconition.
[48:11.900 --> 48:13.480]  You often don't even get it back at all.
[48:13.620 --> 48:21.160]  Or a bullet at the point, there's no guarantee you're not going to take all the password, all the user's file, user, user name lists off of it and possibly harass them.
[48:21.420 --> 48:22.500]  So it's not that simple.
[48:22.780 --> 48:29.040]  There has been some perhaps slight improvement in law enforcement's acknowledgement of this.
[48:29.040 --> 48:37.020]  I've seen some stuff recently where they're suggesting making copies of the hard drives and providing the equipment back and things like that.
[48:37.420 --> 48:39.960]  I haven't seen it actually used in practice yet.
[48:39.960 --> 48:43.680]  But if, if they're actually doing that, that would be a good improvement.
[48:44.880 --> 48:48.240]  I mean, if, there's no reason for them to keep a laser printer.
[48:48.420 --> 48:52.700]  And yes, I know you can slip two lines of code somewhere in a laser printer somewhere.
[48:52.700 --> 48:55.940]  And that will be your Swiss bank account or something.
[48:56.660 --> 49:00.240]  But, but otherwise, you know, forget it.
[49:00.280 --> 49:01.460]  Post script cartridge, you know?
[49:01.500 --> 49:01.800]  Yes.
[49:02.920 --> 49:03.100]  Uh-huh.
[49:03.580 --> 49:07.360]  Is there any limit to the length of the investigation that they do?
[49:10.050 --> 49:12.270]  In terms of how long they can do it?
[49:12.590 --> 49:12.790]  Yeah.
[49:13.330 --> 49:18.150]  Well, there's usually a statute of limitations which varies from statute to statute.
[49:18.510 --> 49:20.970]  Three to seven years is pretty standard for that.
[49:20.970 --> 49:27.870]  So really, they could come in, take your equipment on the basis of saying, we're doing this investigation, saving for years.
[49:28.310 --> 49:31.410]  Well, they have to have probable cause that they have to prove to a judge.
[49:31.630 --> 49:37.850]  But, you know, there hasn't been a single wiretap turned down by a judge in over seven years now.
[49:38.250 --> 49:41.690]  And only 28 in the last 25 years.
[49:42.070 --> 49:46.090]  So, judges aren't too hard to convince about probable cause.
[49:47.210 --> 49:53.330]  Well, my opinion on the best way to keep your, uh, to protect yourself in a seizure case is the Steve Jackson defense.
[49:53.530 --> 50:08.090]  If you've ever written a text file on anything on your system and distributed it, even just to two of your friends, you're a publisher, you've published something, and your system is, you're legally guaranteed non-seizure of your equipment that you use to publish it.
[50:08.650 --> 50:11.750]  Make signs, put them on your equipment, make sure they know about it.
[50:11.750 --> 50:14.630]  Because they can always claim afterwards that you didn't let them know.
[50:15.730 --> 50:26.490]  Well, that's, uh, that's something that perhaps after the fact is a good legal argument, but I don't think it's going to save many people's, uh, computers from actually getting taken away.
[50:27.570 --> 50:29.770]  Unless you're, it's like the New York Times, really.
[50:29.930 --> 50:32.430]  You know, there's freedom of the press if you're the New York Times.
[50:34.130 --> 50:38.050]  The big thing for me is that, um, not only do they seize it, I mean, that's bad enough, but...
[50:38.050 --> 50:38.630]  What?
[50:42.970 --> 50:43.510]  Go on.
[50:44.070 --> 50:48.550]  The big thing for me is that, not only do they seize it, they often never see it again, or it's broken.
[50:48.750 --> 50:53.810]  I mean, of the people I know have had their equipment seized, most of them, when it got back, it was non-functional.
[50:53.950 --> 50:56.210]  It was broken, it was, pieces were missing.
[50:56.430 --> 51:02.910]  And I mean, they seize everything from your computer to, like, your laser printer to your answering machine, your telephone, your stereo, they take everything.
[51:04.010 --> 51:11.190]  I mean, within the case of Doctor Who, who was probably in this room somewhere, they took his videotapes that were labeled Doctor Who, which were all the episodes of Doctor Who.
[51:12.930 --> 51:14.230]  And he never got that back.
[51:15.630 --> 51:20.030]  And like, like you said, his only consolation was that somewhere a Secret Service agent had to watch all those videos.
[51:21.690 --> 51:23.290]  Hey, I wouldn't mind that full collection.
[51:23.670 --> 51:35.510]  There was a, there was a case in Texas where a, um, a BBS was seized, um, on a trumped-up charge of distributing pornography because New Elgo Sheriff's Department wanted a computer system.
[51:36.450 --> 51:36.930]  Oh!
[51:40.090 --> 51:41.990]  That's, uh, not too surprising.
[51:42.230 --> 51:46.550]  And if, if anybody can actually prove that in court, they would be in a great deal of trouble.
[51:47.050 --> 51:54.190]  I see a lot of parallels between the computer seizure, things like this, and the seizures for the drug, suspected drug traffickers.
[51:54.190 --> 51:56.950]  If you suspect they can seize your house, whatever.
[51:57.230 --> 51:59.610]  I mean, this is, there's a lot of parallels I see there.
[52:00.050 --> 52:10.570]  Certainly the drug war has led to a lessening in, in the real fundamental belief that there are fundamental blockages to what law enforcement can do.
[52:10.570 --> 52:19.170]  I mean, when they're stopping cars on a regular basis for whatever reason, and they're seizing property for, for drug things.
[52:19.330 --> 52:31.170]  It certainly lessens everybody's, uh, rights, whether you're, uh, whether you're one of the drug people, or whether they're investigating you for computer crime, or whether they just sort of generally pissed at you for some reason or another.
[52:32.270 --> 52:32.710]  Yeah.
[52:33.170 --> 52:35.010]  Um, two things.
[52:35.110 --> 52:48.570]  We have people in Holland get arrested, and then, uh, they didn't want to talk to me, or, or any regular press, because they were told that talking to the press is bad, talking to the press is only going to make things worse, it's not going to help you.
[52:48.570 --> 52:58.190]  Uh, whereas in my experience, the only people that, that ever get a break, get off things, and get, and get really worried are the people that talk to the press.
[52:58.350 --> 53:03.910]  And it's always the police and, and the prosecutor telling them that they should not talk to the press.
[53:04.010 --> 53:10.630]  And I think that's because that's the only thing they really fear, is people that are good at voicing what, what they're really doing and telling it to the press.
[53:11.170 --> 53:12.910]  So that's one thing I wanted to share.
[53:13.010 --> 53:21.250]  And the other thing is, if you don't want your equipment confiscated for them to use, just make it so that only a hacker can use it.
[53:21.590 --> 53:25.290]  Paint it pink, have no coverage on anything...
[53:26.310 --> 53:28.970]  Spray paint feds are cool across the side of it.
[53:41.370 --> 53:44.110]  It's been a very mixed bag of media.
[53:44.310 --> 53:48.030]  I mean, some have even learned from their mistakes.
[53:48.870 --> 53:58.810]  Joe Abernathy, when he was just starting out, wrote some just god-awful articles about porn on the net and how that was going to destroy the fabric of society as we know it.
[53:59.610 --> 54:05.170]  But after getting enough flamage, he finally learned his lesson as somewhat better as a reporter now.
[54:06.490 --> 54:19.210]  Just on that issue about the media, I think the problem is the reason the media has always nailed hackers as being evil is because the only people who are talking to them are Bell and AT&T, et cetera, et cetera.
[54:19.430 --> 54:25.770]  If some of us would go out and be willing to tell our stories, at least there would be another side out there.
[54:25.770 --> 54:29.350]  I mean, you know, and I agree because sometimes it has helped.
[54:29.550 --> 54:43.030]  And if you don't put out your side of the story, it gives, you know, I mean, if you're in trouble or whatever, that's just not much better for people who are trying to nail you because it's a one-sided story that nobody knows your side.
[54:44.090 --> 54:46.090]  The media sees hackers as war games.
[54:46.330 --> 54:49.490]  I mean, so that has, you know, everybody's seen war games the same.
[54:49.770 --> 54:52.330]  Oh, computer hackers, those are the ones that are going to start World War III.
[54:52.470 --> 54:53.670]  They're breaking the NORAD or whatever.
[54:54.670 --> 54:56.830]  And that's because they don't know what's going on.
[54:56.950 --> 54:57.530]  They're not guided.
[54:57.710 --> 54:59.050]  They're not informed.
[54:59.410 --> 55:00.530]  Ignorance is our biggest enemy.
[55:00.530 --> 55:07.250]  And a lot of them are, especially in the smaller papers, are fairly lazy, to put it generously.
[55:07.730 --> 55:11.130]  They take what a prosecutor gives to them and runs with it.
[55:12.630 --> 55:19.070]  And on cases like this, where we can articulate some issues, they eventually learn their lesson.
[55:19.350 --> 55:22.330]  But a lot of them continue to just go on.
[55:22.810 --> 55:25.250]  Just one last question, do you have any journalists you know?
[55:27.170 --> 55:29.610]  As friends or overall?
[55:31.650 --> 55:33.050]  Probably over a thousand.
[55:37.310 --> 55:42.710]  People that I have regular contact with through... I mean, I get hundreds of press calls a week.
[55:43.950 --> 55:50.010]  A lot of them are follow-up ones, so I get to talk fairly with a lot of the people.
[55:50.170 --> 55:57.130]  But if they're willing to call and talk to me for long periods of time, that indicates that they do have a willingness to learn about this.
[55:57.130 --> 56:02.930]  So they are a little better than the ones that just sort of blindly run things.
[56:03.870 --> 56:04.290]  Yeah.
[56:04.890 --> 56:06.170]  You can go ahead.
[56:06.810 --> 56:09.850]  Just a totally unrelated legal question.
[56:11.490 --> 56:17.690]  If you implant things in your body, nobody can't do anything about that because they can't touch the body, right?
[56:18.550 --> 56:19.210]  Sometimes.
[56:20.990 --> 56:29.430]  The court case law on that is whether it's too intrusive for them to dig into you, to yank the thing out.
[56:31.410 --> 56:36.070]  And there's no bright line that you can say, well, if I stick it up here, it'll be alright.
[56:36.290 --> 56:37.870]  But if I do this, it won't be.
[56:38.230 --> 56:39.310]  Does it taste like chocolate?
[56:42.470 --> 56:42.870]  Yeah.
[56:43.370 --> 56:43.630]  Yeah.
[56:43.630 --> 56:47.010]  Do you want to wipe out in the cartons so that they can reach complete things?
[56:47.250 --> 56:49.550]  Levels of scale that they have, they can become the data anyway.
[56:51.370 --> 56:55.270]  Well, there's probably more technical people in here that can answer that than me.
[56:55.350 --> 56:55.770]  I don't know.
[56:56.090 --> 56:56.690]  I'm only one.
[56:56.850 --> 56:57.510]  What was the question?
[56:57.910 --> 57:00.710]  Oh, I was wondering if I were to wipe over the hard drive.
[57:00.710 --> 57:05.850]  I was wondering if somebody was saying that you can be completely rebel for certain times.
[57:06.010 --> 57:10.810]  The second time they write off the water, it's signaling that they're going to be part of the police, right?
[57:11.010 --> 57:14.670]  So, with me, a lot of times, you know what's already going to be.
[57:14.770 --> 57:15.210]  Yeah, I know.
[57:15.330 --> 57:16.670]  The question is to put me up behind to that.
[57:16.910 --> 57:17.750]  It's a lot.
[57:17.790 --> 57:18.450]  It takes a lot of time.
[57:18.870 --> 57:20.690]  I heard there was some...
[57:20.690 --> 57:21.510]  Respect your heart drive.
[57:21.550 --> 57:24.270]  I think Jews and China would get them in fact.
[57:24.470 --> 57:24.830]  Absolutely.
[57:26.370 --> 57:27.350]  I've got the question.
[57:27.530 --> 57:27.630]  Hello.
[57:36.710 --> 57:38.510]  Take a flamethrower, you know.
[57:39.230 --> 57:43.610]  Every person should have a small amount of thermite inside their hard drives.
[57:44.250 --> 57:46.770]  And you can get that anarchy file.
[57:46.890 --> 57:48.370]  You probably typed the thing in.
[57:50.350 --> 57:52.290]  And with that, you can...
[57:55.430 --> 57:55.810]  Yeah.
[57:59.110 --> 58:03.050]  Of course, you don't want to use your microwave again, but they probably would have confiscated that anyway.
[58:05.650 --> 58:06.030]  Yeah.
[58:06.450 --> 58:13.230]  Just to get back on the press now, I think while they are getting better, I think a lot of press people out there just simply have no morals.
[58:13.430 --> 58:17.450]  I mean, look at the case in the Olympics where they hacked into the skater's email account.
[58:17.450 --> 58:18.230]  I mean...
[58:18.230 --> 58:21.570]  Well, that did have the nice sweet sniff of hypocrisy there.
[58:22.730 --> 58:23.170]  But...
[58:23.170 --> 58:23.890]  What the hell?
[58:24.730 --> 58:27.750]  But, you know, that's pretty overgeneralizing.
[58:27.890 --> 58:31.950]  But hey, you could say maybe many of the people in this room don't have the morals either.
[58:31.950 --> 58:32.550]  But...
[58:32.550 --> 58:33.830]  Otherwise, we wouldn't be here.
[58:37.430 --> 58:38.550]  I'll sue me already.
[58:39.950 --> 58:42.170]  The press can take a very adversarial attitude.
[58:42.410 --> 58:43.810]  I was interviewed by Dateline NBC.
[58:44.110 --> 58:47.950]  And they did not ask me the questions that they said they were going to.
[58:48.150 --> 58:51.250]  And the reporter took a very adversarial attitude about the whole landscape.
[58:51.450 --> 58:53.530]  And she was, you know, don't you feel responsible?
[58:54.270 --> 58:57.590]  Don't you, you know, don't you feel that this is a bad thing?
[58:57.650 --> 58:58.130]  It should be illegal?
[58:58.250 --> 58:58.970]  Don't you feel responsible?
[58:58.970 --> 58:59.070]  Don't you feel responsible?
[58:59.670 --> 59:01.610]  And it was hard for me, I mean, to keep up.
[59:02.170 --> 59:02.890]  You know, I did.
[59:03.030 --> 59:03.770]  But I was flustered.
[59:04.070 --> 59:08.010]  I mean, what I should have said is, this is not what we agreed to talk about.
[59:08.250 --> 59:09.030]  I have to end the interview.
[59:09.250 --> 59:11.130]  But I was unprepared for it.
[59:11.170 --> 59:11.570]  Now I know.
[59:11.850 --> 59:15.150]  But at the time, the press can take...
[59:15.150 --> 59:18.830]  There's certainly a lot of tabloid TV increasing out there.
[59:18.830 --> 59:21.970]  And if somebody calls you, be careful.
[59:22.790 --> 59:27.210]  Craig Neidorf can certainly tell us about how well a journalist Geraldo is.
[59:29.110 --> 59:31.510]  I mean, there's respectable ones out there.
[59:31.790 --> 59:40.610]  And watch the show before you say anything and make up your own mind whether you think they're going to convey it accurately or not.
[59:40.610 --> 59:45.310]  Just as a side note, is it you interviewed by the same reporter who did the exploding pickup truck for Dave on NBC?
[59:47.350 --> 59:50.790]  I should have just been like, well, you know a little bit about explosives, don't you?
[59:53.490 --> 59:54.170]  Yeah.
[59:56.010 --> 01:00:15.270]  Now that this law is becoming much more of an important issue, what can a young lawyer or an old lawyer who is interested in this area do to become fully acquainted enough to become reasonably adept in handling the case like that?
[01:00:15.270 --> 01:00:23.310]  I mean, I don't really, I mean, usually they have copyright law in some, you know, classes and there's a few electronic law things.
[01:00:23.570 --> 01:00:29.670]  But it really doesn't deal with internet and all the other issues we're talking about today.
[01:00:30.190 --> 01:00:33.670]  Is there some source or some sort of a kit or class?
[01:00:35.970 --> 01:00:37.350]  Not that I'm aware of.
[01:00:37.370 --> 01:00:43.390]  I had the advantage of using computers for about 12 years before I went to law school.
[01:00:44.250 --> 01:00:46.810]  And I've known some of you that long, if you know what I mean.
[01:00:48.670 --> 01:00:50.650]  So I didn't need much training.
[01:00:51.070 --> 01:01:00.790]  In terms of how they can learn, certainly talking to somebody in this room would be really helpful for a lot of them.
[01:01:02.410 --> 01:01:14.350]  And a lot of the principles, I think, work that we've developed over 200 years apply fairly well, if you can understand some of the technical issues that underlie them.
[01:01:15.950 --> 01:01:24.450]  Well, like search and seizure and the Fifth Amendment and the First Amendment, I think, fit fairly well into cyberspace.
[01:01:24.630 --> 01:01:30.130]  Now we just need to convince judges and legislatures that those should have that kind of protection.
[01:01:31.010 --> 01:01:33.170]  And in some cases, they have said they haven't.
[01:01:37.000 --> 01:01:39.400]  How many people would like to expose them?
[01:01:40.240 --> 01:01:41.580]  Not that I'm aware of.
[01:01:43.640 --> 01:01:48.860]  There's been some... I've seen some drafts of books, but I don't think they're actually in publication yet.
[01:01:50.160 --> 01:01:50.600]  Yeah?
[01:01:58.290 --> 01:01:58.830]  Right.
[01:01:59.270 --> 01:02:00.470]  That one's not bad.
[01:02:00.630 --> 01:02:05.610]  I mean, there's... there's one... there's more in the First Amendment realm than anywhere else.
[01:02:07.190 --> 01:02:09.230]  Very little in the search and seizure realm.
[01:02:11.730 --> 01:02:12.270]  Yeah?
[01:02:12.710 --> 01:02:14.770]  And back to the legal decisions.
[01:02:15.730 --> 01:02:17.130]  How viable is it?
[01:02:19.270 --> 01:02:19.450]  How viable is it?
[01:02:19.450 --> 01:02:20.750]  Can you just take the client visits?
[01:02:22.130 --> 01:02:24.610]  RICO is an extremely powerful tool.
[01:02:25.190 --> 01:02:36.430]  And just recently, the Supreme Court enhanced its abilities dealing with, I guess it was, clinics and abortion bombings or something of that sort.
[01:02:36.710 --> 01:02:38.550]  And gave it even more power.
[01:02:38.750 --> 01:02:44.870]  I am not aware of it ever being used in a computer crime case, but I'm sure it's not far off.
[01:02:45.690 --> 01:02:46.250]  Yeah?
[01:02:54.050 --> 01:02:54.370]  Right.
[01:02:57.370 --> 01:02:58.010]  Yeah?
[01:03:07.460 --> 01:03:09.220]  Well, money is always nice.
[01:03:14.460 --> 01:03:15.080]  Yes.
[01:03:15.080 --> 01:03:15.240]  Yes.
[01:03:16.160 --> 01:03:18.460]  Make sure it's... it's good.
[01:03:18.720 --> 01:03:19.960]  Real, non-punny.
[01:03:20.780 --> 01:03:21.920]  Non-play money.
[01:03:26.200 --> 01:03:30.780]  Besides that, I mean, there's certainly a lot of things people can do.
[01:03:30.780 --> 01:03:36.140]  Also, they can... expressing outrage when something stupid is done.
[01:03:36.420 --> 01:03:44.820]  Like calling your congressman and saying, I think the digital telephony proposal is the most stupid thing I've ever heard, and I'm going to give money to your opponent if you...
[01:03:46.140 --> 01:03:47.700]  Well, you don't have to...
[01:03:47.700 --> 01:03:50.620]  You don't have to actually send it to them, but you can threaten it.
[01:03:54.840 --> 01:04:03.500]  Keeping aware, making good media contacts with people that are interested in these issues and offering your help is good.
[01:04:04.340 --> 01:04:09.620]  Forming local groups to have a focus within a small community.
[01:04:11.660 --> 01:04:19.220]  I don't know how well they're working out, but there's, you know, a number of these electronic frontiers groups out there that are somewhat forming.
[01:04:19.340 --> 01:04:24.780]  And then there's SEA here in New York and EFF Austin.
[01:04:26.600 --> 01:04:27.840]  Join a local group.
[01:04:28.180 --> 01:04:36.920]  I mean, usually, there's little or no fees involved, and you can get together, you can discuss things, you can educate the public, you can educate the press.
[01:04:37.340 --> 01:04:39.160]  They're a great opportunity.
[01:04:41.540 --> 01:04:41.840]  Yeah.
[01:04:42.580 --> 01:04:49.040]  And of all the different laws, countries from the world you've looked at, which countries would say, in short ways, not for personal privacy?
[01:04:52.260 --> 01:04:57.040]  There's a variety of different ways that different countries have protected privacy.
[01:04:59.280 --> 01:05:10.500]  In terms of just pure laws, not in terms of pure reality, countries like France and Germany have the strongest legal protections of personal privacy.
[01:05:10.760 --> 01:05:19.100]  They've created privacy commissioners, who are actually advocates within the government, who are only concerned about the privacy.
[01:05:19.780 --> 01:05:22.700]  You know, we know that law enforcement has their agenda and whatever.
[01:05:22.700 --> 01:05:25.120]  These are people that counterbalance it.
[01:05:25.880 --> 01:05:38.300]  In France, the privacy commissioner beat back a number of proposals for a national ID card for putting it in electronic form, for putting it on a smart card, for several years.
[01:05:38.600 --> 01:05:40.000]  So those are the kind of thing.
[01:05:40.120 --> 01:05:42.100]  We don't have anything like that here in the U.S.
[01:05:42.100 --> 01:05:45.880]  And it's really a desperate need for one, in my view.
[01:05:47.520 --> 01:05:48.040]  Yeah?
[01:05:48.320 --> 01:05:49.320]  What's in France?
[01:05:51.300 --> 01:05:54.240]  That basically bans any kind of encryption by the public?
[01:05:54.980 --> 01:06:06.240]  Well, as I mentioned before, from reading the laws and talking to people in industry and people over there who are involved in this, they don't ban the use of encryption.
[01:06:06.420 --> 01:06:10.900]  At most, they may require the registration of what kind of algorithm they're going to use.
[01:06:19.560 --> 01:06:21.560]  So I'll tell them I'm using PGP.
[01:06:21.740 --> 01:06:23.780]  Good luck having them read it, you know?
[01:06:23.860 --> 01:06:26.620]  You don't want the details, just the algorithm.
[01:06:27.620 --> 01:06:27.940]  Alright.
[01:06:28.260 --> 01:06:28.640]  Yeah.
[01:06:32.140 --> 01:06:39.540]  Yeah, Rop isn't here right now, but the Netherlands have proposed a ban on encryption.
[01:06:40.080 --> 01:06:44.300]  And they somewhat backed off, but they're still pushing forward on it.
[01:06:44.400 --> 01:06:47.820]  They're probably going to try and do it administratively now rather than criminally.
[01:06:47.920 --> 01:06:49.840]  So it won't look quite as insidious.
[01:06:50.080 --> 01:06:52.600]  But at some point, they're definitely moving in that direction.
[01:06:52.880 --> 01:06:56.140]  Their plan was somehow extended beyond their borders, didn't it?
[01:06:56.920 --> 01:06:58.080]  Not that I'm aware of.
[01:06:58.620 --> 01:06:59.060]  Not that I'm aware of.
[01:06:59.160 --> 01:07:03.200]  But there was quite a fervor over there that surprised them quite a bit.
[01:07:03.420 --> 01:07:05.240]  And they backed down, at least temporarily.
[01:07:05.960 --> 01:07:09.760]  Until they can develop another sneakier way of doing it that nobody will notice.
[01:07:09.760 --> 01:07:09.800]  Yes.
[01:07:14.470 --> 01:07:14.810]  Yeah.
[01:07:19.360 --> 01:07:25.340]  The most recent thing that has happened, there's two different phases of this.
[01:07:25.500 --> 01:07:29.900]  One is a Freedom of Information Act case that we've been litigating.
[01:07:30.080 --> 01:07:36.200]  And the other was a potential civil case against the government and against them all.
[01:07:36.200 --> 01:07:40.540]  The civil case, for a variety of reasons, didn't come about.
[01:07:40.840 --> 01:07:44.300]  And I can't really actually get into it because I'm one of the lawyers.
[01:07:44.520 --> 01:07:48.120]  And all that lawyer confidentiality crap keeps me from saying anything like that.
[01:07:48.520 --> 01:07:52.840]  The Freedom of Information Act request case has been fairly successful.
[01:07:52.840 --> 01:07:55.140]  We proved that the Secret Service was involved.
[01:07:55.500 --> 01:08:01.240]  And just about three weeks ago, a federal judge ordered the Secret Service to disclose the documents to us.
[01:08:01.340 --> 01:08:04.880]  And rejected the Secret Service's arguments that they shouldn't give them to us.
[01:08:05.100 --> 01:08:06.240]  Now, they've appealed it.
[01:08:06.320 --> 01:08:09.080]  And we're waiting to hear what the judge is going to say on that.
[01:08:10.700 --> 01:08:13.320]  So it's possible we could get something in the near future.
[01:08:13.320 --> 01:08:18.500]  But it's more likely that it's going to take quite a bit more legal wrangling before we get anything out of them.
[01:08:22.640 --> 01:08:25.940]  They supposedly returned almost everything the day after.
[01:08:26.220 --> 01:08:27.840]  Or within a couple days after.
[01:08:32.200 --> 01:08:32.540]  Yeah?
[01:08:32.680 --> 01:08:34.560]  Can you receive any reactor crack evidence?
[01:08:37.100 --> 01:08:38.760]  It's certainly feasible.
[01:08:39.060 --> 01:08:49.760]  Though they've been so embarrassed by the last couple they've done that they may think twice about doing it unless they have really solid cases.
[01:08:49.760 --> 01:08:51.220]  against people.
[01:08:51.340 --> 01:08:54.600]  I doubt we'll ever see anything on the scale of Sun Devil again.
[01:08:54.760 --> 01:08:58.060]  That was just really stupid on their part.
[01:08:58.860 --> 01:09:04.240]  Based mostly appears out of ignorance and an inability to understand what was going on.
[01:09:08.330 --> 01:09:10.310]  Jeez, this is worse than a Congressional hearing.
[01:09:10.690 --> 01:09:11.490]  Yes, Senator!
[01:09:11.890 --> 01:09:12.370]  No!
[01:09:14.470 --> 01:09:15.570]  Anything else?
[01:09:16.470 --> 01:09:17.730]  I'm getting grilled here.
[01:09:18.290 --> 01:09:19.990]  Do you do impressions of Jerry Burpins?
[01:09:23.450 --> 01:09:25.970]  Give me some money and I'll do whatever you want me to do.
[01:09:28.730 --> 01:09:29.130]  Happy?
[01:09:31.950 --> 01:09:33.190]  Got a deal for you, bud.
[01:09:36.110 --> 01:09:36.270]  No.
[01:09:38.470 --> 01:09:39.250]  Anything else?
[01:09:41.990 --> 01:09:42.390]  Okay.
[01:09:42.770 --> 01:09:43.810]  Well, thank you very much.
[01:09:43.990 --> 01:09:46.190]  If you have any private things, come around.
[01:09:56.460 --> 01:09:58.380]  But you're the damn person who's listening.
[01:10:02.260 --> 01:10:03.160]  I'll lose you.