[00:00.000 --> 00:00.500]  Pause, please.
[00:00.660 --> 00:00.940]  Thank you.
[00:05.180 --> 00:05.680]  Oh, great.
[00:05.780 --> 00:12.780]  My speaker just ran off, so now I have to talk a little bit more about what's going on on the second floor.
[00:13.300 --> 00:15.500]  Have you guys checked out the hammocks on the second floor yet?
[00:16.420 --> 00:18.020]  How many of you slept there last night?
[00:19.880 --> 00:20.240]  Okay.
[00:20.780 --> 00:24.020]  I saw a lot more bodies than one in there, so I know you guys are lying.
[00:24.240 --> 00:24.620]  Okay, two.
[00:24.700 --> 00:26.200]  We have two honest people in the audience.
[00:26.600 --> 00:26.960]  Huh?
[00:27.200 --> 00:29.580]  How many people are planning on crashing in the hammocks tonight?
[00:32.820 --> 00:33.180]  Okay.
[00:34.320 --> 00:39.140]  How many people have not... How many people don't know where they're crashing tonight and don't care that they don't know?
[00:41.540 --> 00:43.880]  Okay, a reasonable majority there.
[00:44.140 --> 00:44.660]  All right.
[00:44.820 --> 00:49.280]  Also, I just... if I may announce something of mildly personal importance.
[00:49.980 --> 00:55.520]  Coming up in the room next over, in the next two hours, we're going to be talking about hackerspaces.
[00:56.140 --> 01:01.780]  One very important talk that... an earlier version of the talk which launched NYC Resistor and HacDC.
[01:01.780 --> 01:08.520]  And also, if you guys are missing anything, you need a charger, batteries, things like that, visit the Hacker's Mart.
[01:08.840 --> 01:10.140]  We've been taking care of people.
[01:10.300 --> 01:13.300]  Has anyone in here gotten a special request fulfilled by the Hacker's Mart yet?
[01:15.220 --> 01:15.620]  Okay.
[01:15.820 --> 01:16.940]  Well, there's still more time left.
[01:17.180 --> 01:21.000]  And so, without any further ado, this is something that's very important.
[01:21.240 --> 01:26.120]  Everybody should know how to FOIA anything that they can get their hands on.
[01:26.300 --> 01:30.360]  The government is supposed to give you this information, and Phil's going to show you exactly how to do it.
[01:30.420 --> 01:31.380]  Give him a round of applause, everybody.
[01:31.880 --> 01:32.520]  Thank you.
[01:41.900 --> 01:42.540]  Okay, good.
[01:42.700 --> 01:45.380]  I'm tethered to within a five-foot radius of this point.
[01:45.720 --> 01:52.920]  My name is Phil Lapsley, and for the last several years, I've been working on a book and a website on the history of phone phreaking.
[01:54.300 --> 01:59.120]  And as part of that, one of my big tools has been using the Freedom of Information Act.
[01:59.120 --> 02:07.580]  And it has turned into a long odyssey, a sometimes bizarre odyssey.
[02:07.580 --> 02:23.660]  And I've become a little bit of a reluctant expert in the Freedom of Information Act, so I wanted to talk a little bit about FOIA, but I also wanted to present it from a hacker's perspective, because I've been spending a lot of time thinking about phone phreaks and hackers and how they view the world.
[02:23.660 --> 02:27.400]  And that turns out, of course, to be how I view the world, being a phone phreak and a hacker.
[02:29.020 --> 02:31.320]  And so I tend to view FOIA that way as well.
[02:31.480 --> 02:34.060]  So I wanted to look at it from that perspective.
[02:34.180 --> 02:36.020]  I'd like to start with a little historical quiz.
[02:39.970 --> 02:41.930]  So, does anyone remember this?
[02:42.770 --> 02:44.910]  Hammer Rabbi, I beg to report to you.
[02:45.050 --> 02:46.770]  In year one, nine people starved.
[02:46.870 --> 02:47.890]  Thirteen came to the city.
[02:48.090 --> 02:49.590]  Population is now 106.
[02:49.830 --> 02:53.890]  There should really be clattering of a teletype, and this should be on yellow paper, right?
[02:54.210 --> 02:56.170]  So, who played Hammer Rabbi?
[02:56.290 --> 02:56.490]  Anybody?
[02:56.730 --> 02:57.850]  We got three, four hands.
[02:58.830 --> 03:02.370]  Okay, the thing which was cool, Hammer Rabbi is a very simple game.
[03:02.490 --> 03:06.430]  It was written in 1969, written in basic, I would assume.
[03:07.990 --> 03:12.090]  And, you know, you have a simple set of decisions as leader of this country.
[03:12.330 --> 03:13.710]  You know, how many acres do I plant?
[03:14.030 --> 03:15.870]  You know, how much food do I make?
[03:15.950 --> 03:16.410]  This sort of thing.
[03:17.330 --> 03:21.650]  But there's something that was really unique about it, which was, it didn't come with a manual.
[03:22.390 --> 03:25.090]  You ran the program, and then you had to figure it out.
[03:25.370 --> 03:28.550]  So, okay, well, I'm going to plant, you know, 100 acres.
[03:28.790 --> 03:32.090]  Oh, well, 2,000 people starved, and there were only 1,000 people to begin with.
[03:32.270 --> 03:33.690]  So, you know, bad news, Hammer Rabbi.
[03:33.870 --> 03:34.770]  I beg to report.
[03:35.910 --> 03:38.150]  So, you know, you had to play around with it.
[03:38.590 --> 03:44.550]  And that, a friend observed that this is exactly what phone phreaks do.
[03:44.650 --> 03:45.870]  It's exactly what hackers do.
[03:46.030 --> 03:48.410]  And I would suggest it's exactly what foyer researchers do.
[03:48.550 --> 03:49.950]  It's the joys of a black box.
[03:50.150 --> 03:54.930]  And when I say black box, I mean in the engineering sense of the word, not in the phone phreak sense of the word black box.
[03:55.290 --> 04:09.470]  But in all cases, if you have a black box, like a hacker with a computer, or a phone phreak with a switch and network, you've got this thing, right, that you can poke at, you can prod at, you can see what it does, you can see how it reacts, and it's fun to do that.
[04:09.930 --> 04:17.050]  And, you know, several phone phreaks that I talked to in interviews said, well, gosh, you know, the phone system was really this mystery to me.
[04:17.170 --> 04:22.110]  It was this, this pair of wires that came into the phone, and there was no real documentation about it.
[04:22.510 --> 04:24.390]  And I was really curious about it.
[04:24.570 --> 04:25.130]  Like, how does it work?
[04:25.230 --> 04:29.170]  I mean, I know the wires go up to the telephone poles, but beyond that, it's just a big black box.
[04:29.470 --> 04:32.190]  And I'd listen, and I'd hear these tones, and what are those tones?
[04:32.350 --> 04:33.770]  And maybe, what if I make these tones?
[04:33.910 --> 04:38.010]  And you start doing things, and, you know, pretty soon you hear kercheep, and, you know, you're off to the races.
[04:39.410 --> 04:40.770]  And foyer is much the same way.
[04:40.870 --> 04:42.050]  There's documentation on foyer.
[04:42.130 --> 04:44.130]  You can go and download the Department of Justice manual.
[04:44.270 --> 04:54.530]  It's, you know, 400 pages long, and you almost learn nothing from it, partially because it's 400 pages long, partially because it was written by lawyers, but also because it's not so much a how-to thing.
[04:54.830 --> 05:00.090]  It's almost about the theory of foyer, as opposed to what agencies actually do, which varies really widely.
[05:03.150 --> 05:08.150]  So, given a black box, a hacker's first thought tends to be, how does it work?
[05:08.290 --> 05:10.510]  What are the rules, if I'm playing Hammer Rabbi, right?
[05:10.630 --> 05:12.570]  Play around with it until I understand how it works.
[05:13.110 --> 05:16.230]  The hacker's second thought tends to be, well, how do I exploit the rules?
[05:16.290 --> 05:16.930]  How do I win?
[05:17.390 --> 05:20.470]  And so that's what I'd like to talk to today.
[05:20.650 --> 05:28.810]  So I'd like to talk first about what are the rules of the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, which gets used both as a noun and a verb, and also how you go about exploiting them.
[05:30.910 --> 05:35.870]  So the Freedom of Information Act, it's a United States law, it's a federal law.
[05:36.450 --> 05:39.970]  It was passed in 1966, and it's been amended a bunch of times since then.
[05:40.650 --> 05:45.730]  And, you know, like any law, it's lengthy and has all sorts of, you know, sub parts and whatever.
[05:45.950 --> 05:55.550]  But boiled down, in its simplest form, it says that an agency must make records promptly available to any person, doesn't even have to be a U.S.
[05:55.630 --> 05:57.470]  citizen, given just two things.
[05:57.630 --> 06:03.370]  One is that the records are reasonably described, and two is that the requests are made in accordance with published rules.
[06:03.630 --> 06:05.930]  And each agency gets to publish its own rules.
[06:06.130 --> 06:08.250]  So, you know, you need to send the request to this address.
[06:08.670 --> 06:15.130]  You know, I suppose they could say things like, it needs to be on lavender-colored paper with five by seven margins, but for the most part, they don't do that.
[06:16.250 --> 06:20.030]  So it's really fundamentally a pretty simple thing, but of course, the devil is in the details.
[06:20.770 --> 06:26.690]  And so, if you look at some of the fine print on this, well, first off, because it's a federal law, it doesn't apply to the courts.
[06:27.350 --> 06:30.610]  And it doesn't apply, sorry, excuse me, because it's a federal law, it doesn't apply to the states.
[06:31.070 --> 06:35.330]  And because it's a federal law for the executive branch, it doesn't apply to the courts or the Congress.
[06:35.630 --> 06:47.290]  So it really just applies to You know, the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal Farm Administration, any of these kinds of federal agencies.
[06:49.090 --> 06:50.490]  Agencies can charge fees.
[06:50.670 --> 06:52.970]  It's not necessarily free, although it frequently is.
[06:54.610 --> 06:57.170]  They have 20... well, we'll talk more about fees.
[06:57.530 --> 07:03.010]  They have 20 business days to, and I underline this, to acknowledge your request.
[07:03.670 --> 07:05.830]  Yes, Mr. Lapsley, we got your request.
[07:05.970 --> 07:06.570]  Thank you very much.
[07:06.690 --> 07:07.610]  We'll get right on that.
[07:09.310 --> 07:11.770]  The only other time limit is that they have to do it promptly.
[07:11.950 --> 07:12.950]  Well, what does promptly mean?
[07:13.090 --> 07:14.650]  Well, that ends up being argued in the courts.
[07:15.550 --> 07:18.830]  There are certainly FOIA requests that have been out for more than 10 years at this point.
[07:18.970 --> 07:23.010]  I'm happy to say none of mine have, although I've only been working on the project for three years.
[07:23.450 --> 07:25.470]  One of my requests has been out for two and a half years.
[07:26.670 --> 07:30.670]  But I have some data on how quickly at least one agency responds.
[07:31.390 --> 07:33.330]  And it's generally a lot less than that.
[07:33.890 --> 07:38.730]  Now, if you're familiar with the way laws get written, they tend to come in one of two varieties.
[07:39.130 --> 07:44.910]  Variety one is you must do this thing except when you can't.
[07:45.050 --> 07:48.770]  And variety two is you can't do this thing except when you can.
[07:48.770 --> 07:52.750]  So this is one of these you, the agency, must do these things.
[07:52.870 --> 07:54.290]  You must give people these documents.
[07:55.450 --> 07:56.750]  Except for a few cases.
[07:59.010 --> 08:00.670]  So what are these cases?
[08:00.930 --> 08:02.890]  These are called the exemptions to FOIA.
[08:03.630 --> 08:06.430]  And you'll see these little B1, B2, B3.
[08:06.550 --> 08:11.810]  These are the actual subsections of the Freedom of Information Act that govern these different categories.
[08:11.810 --> 08:16.450]  And just like FOIA is a word, B1, B2, B3, etc.
[08:16.810 --> 08:18.790]  You'll hear that, oh, I got B6'd on that.
[08:18.930 --> 08:19.490]  Oh, that's too bad.
[08:20.390 --> 08:21.790]  So what is exempt?
[08:22.250 --> 08:23.390]  National defense information.
[08:23.630 --> 08:29.230]  You can file a Freedom of Information Act with the Department of Energy asking for its latest and greatest nuclear warhead design.
[08:29.350 --> 08:31.770]  Preferably the small one that fits in an artillery shell.
[08:32.130 --> 08:35.570]  And you're perfectly, it's perfectly valid for you to request that.
[08:35.570 --> 08:39.290]  And they will simply say the entire thing is denied on grounds of B1, national security.
[08:40.530 --> 08:43.610]  Internal personal rules and practices of an agency.
[08:43.870 --> 08:47.010]  So, you know, you want to know what the cafeteria menu is or something like that.
[08:47.290 --> 08:48.690]  You might be able to get that, you might not.
[08:49.370 --> 08:51.310]  Exempt from disclosure because of another law.
[08:51.730 --> 08:55.630]  So in the U.S., federal grand jury testimony and transcripts are secret.
[08:55.910 --> 09:01.390]  So even if the FBI had one, they can't give it to you under FOIA because there's another law that says it can't be given out.
[09:01.930 --> 09:02.790]  Trade secrets.
[09:03.290 --> 09:04.510]  You see a lot of this.
[09:05.850 --> 09:12.330]  Maybe I have a company that has a DARPA contract and as part of my contract I've revealed some trade secrets to the government.
[09:12.770 --> 09:15.170]  You, a competitor of mine, can't FOIA my trade secrets.
[09:16.770 --> 09:19.150]  Interagency memos not available except by litigation.
[09:19.910 --> 09:21.210]  I don't know what the hell that is.
[09:22.390 --> 09:24.750]  I've actually never gotten that objection to any of my requests.
[09:25.210 --> 09:26.470]  Personnel and medical files.
[09:26.610 --> 09:27.810]  B6 happens a lot.
[09:27.990 --> 09:29.430]  A lot of names will get blanked out.
[09:29.430 --> 09:31.190]  Law enforcement records.
[09:31.370 --> 09:31.790]  B7.
[09:32.410 --> 09:36.510]  B7C is probably the biggest one, which is unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
[09:36.730 --> 09:42.250]  So if it's an FBI file and your name is mentioned in it, your name tends to get blacked out unless you're requesting your own file.
[09:43.190 --> 09:46.730]  And then B8, which is probably relevant to the current banking crisis.
[09:47.330 --> 09:53.970]  Examination or supervision of financial institutions is for some reason exempt from FOIA, presumably because they don't want to cause runs on particular banks.
[09:54.530 --> 09:56.790]  And then geological data concerning wells.
[09:57.010 --> 10:00.230]  I don't know who got paid for that, but somebody must have.
[10:01.450 --> 10:02.870]  Oh, and one other thing.
[10:03.010 --> 10:03.730]  I'm sorry, I forgot.
[10:04.070 --> 10:05.930]  Separate law, which maybe you can't see down there.
[10:06.130 --> 10:11.630]  The operational files of the CIA, NSA, National Reconnaissance and Defense Intelligence Agency.
[10:12.070 --> 10:16.330]  Now, that doesn't include historical files, and it doesn't include administrative files.
[10:16.510 --> 10:20.490]  But, you know, you can't ask for, you know, hey, tell me all the black projects that you're doing right now.
[10:20.490 --> 10:23.010]  I mean, rather, technically, you can't ask for that.
[10:23.150 --> 10:23.690]  They'll just say no.
[10:25.890 --> 10:34.370]  Now, the thing which is really cool about FOIA is it really is as simple as four sentences sent in an email, a fax, a letter.
[10:34.770 --> 10:35.170]  Right?
[10:35.390 --> 10:39.270]  It's, dudes, oh my god, this is totally a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
[10:39.490 --> 10:39.750]  Right?
[10:39.850 --> 10:40.610]  That's sentence one.
[10:40.710 --> 10:42.410]  You must state that it's a FOIA request.
[10:42.750 --> 10:47.290]  I request that you provide me with a copy of any and all records regarding blah-de-blah-de-blah-de-blah.
[10:47.290 --> 10:47.610]  Right?
[10:47.710 --> 10:50.150]  You have to describe accurately the records you're looking for.
[10:50.530 --> 10:56.170]  Three, you have to tell them who you are, not as an individual, but who you are as a class of person.
[10:56.290 --> 10:59.170]  And the reason this is important is it determines what fees they can charge you.
[10:59.330 --> 11:03.170]  So, I am an individual requesting this information for non-commercial purposes.
[11:03.990 --> 11:06.190]  So, that tells them what fee category to put you in.
[11:06.330 --> 11:09.530]  And fourth, I am willing to pay up to X amount of money for this.
[11:09.610 --> 11:18.710]  And you have to say that because if you don't, since they're allowed to charge fees, they could just bounce the request back and say, well, you know, you didn't say that you were willing to pay anything, so we're not going to process this until you do.
[11:18.870 --> 11:20.430]  So, it's really those four things.
[11:20.690 --> 11:21.530]  That's all it is.
[11:21.690 --> 11:22.730]  And it can be a simple email.
[11:22.870 --> 11:32.910]  You know, if you go out on the web and you search for, like, FOIA templates, you'll see, you know, all sorts of, you know, four-page monstrosities with all sorts of legalese and stuff like that.
[11:33.050 --> 11:34.570]  It really doesn't need to be that complicated.
[11:34.770 --> 11:38.350]  There are some nuances to it, but it really doesn't need to be much more than this.
[11:39.030 --> 11:46.110]  And at this point, every... so every agency accepts by letter, obviously, and also by fax.
[11:46.790 --> 11:48.630]  Most agencies accept by email.
[11:48.910 --> 11:51.690]  And it's simply, you know, it's typically like FOIA at FCC.gov.
[11:51.870 --> 11:52.790]  It's really that simple.
[11:52.890 --> 11:53.710]  You just fire off an email.
[11:55.350 --> 11:58.690]  Okay, so that's what it looks like in terms of what the request is.
[11:59.070 --> 12:00.810]  And now, so how does the process go?
[12:01.810 --> 12:11.330]  So you start by sending in your request, and some, unfortunately, low-paid clerk is going to look at it and file it, log it, and send you an acknowledgement letter.
[12:11.990 --> 12:13.190]  Then it gets put in a queue.
[12:13.830 --> 12:20.230]  At some point, a slightly higher-paid clerk is going to take your thing and look at it and say, okay, we have to search for these records.
[12:20.410 --> 12:27.910]  So Mr. Lapsley said he wanted information on, you know, whatever it is, a phone phreak incident that occurred in Miami in 1969.
[12:28.590 --> 12:29.110]  Okay.
[12:29.590 --> 12:36.170]  Now, imagine this clerk, and he or she is sitting in front of the FBI's record system.
[12:36.450 --> 12:38.230]  Now, the FBI has two record systems.
[12:38.470 --> 12:41.210]  There's what they call the manual index and the automated index.
[12:41.350 --> 12:44.910]  The automated index is on computer, and it's everything from 1973 on.
[12:45.290 --> 12:48.470]  And it mostly is keyed by subject's first and last name.
[12:49.130 --> 12:50.310]  That's the automated index.
[12:50.450 --> 12:56.130]  The manual index consists of 65 million 3x5 index cards.
[12:57.150 --> 12:58.630]  You think I'm joking, but I'm not.
[12:59.910 --> 13:01.290]  Also keyed by last name.
[13:01.890 --> 13:07.470]  So, our hypothetical clerk looks at this and says, blue box incident, Miami, 1969.
[13:07.970 --> 13:08.210]  Hmm.
[13:08.630 --> 13:10.290]  I wonder if blue box is a last name.
[13:11.630 --> 13:12.670]  Nope, not there.
[13:13.610 --> 13:14.690]  Nope, not there either.
[13:15.710 --> 13:16.450]  No records.
[13:17.810 --> 13:20.050]  It's not quite that bad, but it's almost that bad.
[13:20.210 --> 13:21.150]  And this gets to...
[13:21.710 --> 13:25.210]  And that, by the way, that's not really, you know, I can't really blame the FBI for that.
[13:25.210 --> 13:29.110]  They've designed their filing system to be responsive to the kinds of things they deal with.
[13:29.250 --> 13:34.810]  Probably the vast majority of stuff they deal with, at least they used to deal with, was around names of suspects, right?
[13:34.930 --> 13:36.950]  So, it makes sense you're going to optimize your index that way.
[13:37.470 --> 13:40.510]  They do have some things as subjects, but not many.
[13:40.690 --> 13:42.490]  And a lot of agencies are like that.
[13:43.490 --> 13:51.150]  So, we'll touch on this later, but it becomes very important to understand how the index system of the agency you're dealing with is structured.
[13:51.150 --> 13:53.990]  Because that tells how you're going to send in your request.
[13:54.470 --> 13:58.890]  But let's just say, hypothetically, that our clerk had found some documents regarding this incident.
[14:00.030 --> 14:03.850]  They then take these documents, let's say it's three or four files, and they put it in a stack.
[14:05.250 --> 14:06.610]  And it goes into another queue.
[14:07.270 --> 14:16.290]  And later, some higher paid clerk is going to look at that and is going to say, ah, okay, there were four files here, and three of them have to do with blue teddy bears, and one has to do with a blue box.
[14:16.490 --> 14:19.690]  And so we're going to take the blue teddy bears and put those over here, because they're not relevant.
[14:19.910 --> 14:25.050]  And the blue box one, we're going to go through and we're going to redact out a bunch of stuff, like names and whatnot.
[14:25.510 --> 14:26.950]  And then we're going to send the documents.
[14:27.050 --> 14:29.550]  And that's assuming, by the way, that the documents were unclassified.
[14:29.570 --> 14:37.590]  If the documents are classified, it goes into a different queue where people who actually have classification clearance go through and say, Okay, this part is unclassified, this part is classified.
[14:37.890 --> 14:46.490]  So, as you can see there on the left-hand side, there's a timeline which says possibly die of old age while this is happening.
[14:47.290 --> 14:51.290]  But eventually you get either a no records response or some goodies.
[14:52.910 --> 14:54.510]  Now, how long does it take?
[14:54.990 --> 15:02.330]  This is real 100% bona fide genuine data lovingly extracted out of hundreds of FOIA requests that I filed.
[15:03.330 --> 15:04.590]  This is all for the FBI.
[15:05.590 --> 15:08.950]  And the top chart is for cases where I got no records.
[15:09.370 --> 15:17.270]  Now, you would expect that no records responses come back quicker than records responses because somebody didn't have to go through these piles of paper and redact them and this sort of thing.
[15:18.310 --> 15:22.850]  Now, on this top chart, you'll see there that it's calibrated in weeks.
[15:23.370 --> 15:26.030]  And this is the number of requests that I got back in that time.
[15:26.030 --> 15:29.150]  So, on average, it takes, if you get no records, seven to eight weeks.
[15:29.290 --> 15:29.950]  So, a couple months.
[15:30.150 --> 15:32.250]  The fastest one I got back was in 11 days.
[15:32.550 --> 15:34.710]  And the longest was 185 days.
[15:35.390 --> 15:37.590]  So, why 185 days?
[15:37.710 --> 15:41.610]  Well, it could be because they lost the request, which does happen.
[15:41.770 --> 15:45.110]  I'd find about 5% of my requests end up getting misrouted or misfiled.
[15:45.570 --> 15:47.850]  It could be because they were just being super diligent.
[15:47.850 --> 15:53.610]  And they were looking for it and, you know, they sent it out to one of their field offices to search for it and they couldn't find anything.
[15:53.810 --> 15:54.850]  So, you don't really know.
[15:56.110 --> 16:05.730]  Now, when they find records, which is the lower graph, the average time is about six to seven months to get documents back from when you send it in.
[16:05.730 --> 16:12.430]  The fastest I've ever gotten was 59 days, which, by the way, was Joe Engressia, Joybubbles FBI file.
[16:13.410 --> 16:15.610]  And the slowest was 16 months.
[16:15.770 --> 16:18.630]  I should say that's the slowest that I've actually gotten documents back.
[16:18.950 --> 16:22.590]  Like I said, I have one request outstanding for two and a half years with NSA.
[16:24.030 --> 16:27.310]  Note that I've changed the scale here on the lower graph.
[16:27.390 --> 16:28.330]  So, it's months, not weeks.
[16:36.330 --> 16:40.590]  Now, how much it costs to file a FOIA request... Well, actually, filing FOIA request is free.
[16:40.670 --> 16:43.610]  How much it costs to get documents depends on who you are.
[16:44.150 --> 16:57.650]  If you are a commercial researcher, so if you are, you know, somebody who wants to know what your competitors are up to, and this happens a lot with the FCC, right, if you're, you know, Verizon, you're constantly filing FOIA requests to find out what the other phone companies are up to,
[16:57.810 --> 17:00.490]  you have to pay for search time and copying costs.
[17:00.490 --> 17:10.150]  If you are a member of the news media, if you're a member of an educational institution like a student, if you are a non-commercial scientific researcher, so like a non-profit science house.
[17:10.790 --> 17:15.490]  Search time is free, but you have to pay copying costs, but they'll toss in 100 pages for free.
[17:15.990 --> 17:26.710]  For all other requesters, which is probably a lot of us, certainly it's me, you have to pay for search time and copying costs, but you get two hours of search time for free, and you get 100 pages for free.
[17:26.710 --> 17:29.270]  Now, what's that worth to you?
[17:29.370 --> 17:34.250]  Well, it depends an awful lot on what the agency is, what their policies are, and how their files are organized.
[17:34.410 --> 17:46.710]  So, for example, at the FBI, because they have this fairly concise system, other than the 65 million 3x5 cards, you know, two hours of search time is all you'll ever need.
[17:46.850 --> 17:49.290]  So you're never going to get charged for search time, at least I never have.
[17:49.990 --> 17:56.650]  And then 100 pages, they'll actually send you more like 180 pages, because they figured there's some threshold below which it's not worth billing somebody for $2.
[17:56.650 --> 17:59.990]  and hunting them down to get them to send you a check, even if they are the FBI.
[18:03.110 --> 18:04.830]  So, for the FBI, it's pretty simple.
[18:04.930 --> 18:06.710]  On the other hand, another example is the NSA.
[18:06.890 --> 18:16.990]  I asked the NSA for files relating to a military phone system called Otto Vaughn, which some of you may be familiar with, and they came back and said, sure, we'd be happy to do that.
[18:17.090 --> 18:29.490]  We think it's going to be, I think it was 10 hours of search time at $80 an hour, but, you know, we'll, or maybe, I guess it was 12 hours of search time at $80 an hour, but we'll throw in two hours free, so, you know, $800, and, oh, by the way, we'd like that up front.
[18:30.090 --> 18:32.730]  And I demurred at that point and said it wasn't worth it.
[18:34.310 --> 18:44.870]  Conversely, with the FBI, I've also gotten letters back saying, you know, we did the search, it was great, we found 10,000 pages, you get 100 pages free, so, you know, you're going to have to send us a check for $990.
[18:46.290 --> 18:51.050]  So, and when it's a, when it's a big number of pages, they'll ask for payment up front, generally speaking, they don't.
[18:52.910 --> 19:05.470]  Okay, so, given that what we've seen here is, it's really easy to request a FOIA thing, but, they're going to redact the hell out of your documents, some they're going to withhold entirely, it's going to cost you some money, and it's going to take seemingly forever.
[19:05.910 --> 19:07.350]  Is it even worth bothering?
[19:08.790 --> 19:11.670]  And that depends, of course, on who you are and what your temperament is.
[19:11.670 --> 19:17.370]  I'm a historian type guy, I view it as panning for gold, and occasionally you get some nuggets.
[19:18.390 --> 19:20.310]  I don't know how well you can read this.
[19:20.570 --> 19:22.970]  This is a letter from J.
[19:23.070 --> 19:25.410]  Edgar Hoover to the honorable John D. Ehrlichman, the counsel to the president, that is the president's attorney, in the White House in 1969.
[19:32.050 --> 19:39.810]  And this is regarding Joybubbles, Joe Engressia, and another phone phreak whose name is redacted out, it's that first blank you see there.
[19:40.150 --> 20:01.770]  And it's saying that, on August 27th, 1969, this bureau's Kansas City office, Kansas City, Missouri, was confidentially advised that Southwestern Bell Telephone Company had developed information that blank and Joseph Engressia, Miami, Florida, allegedly have discovered a means to intercept telephone calls transmitted over the Defense Communication Agency's Automatic Voice Network,
[20:01.870 --> 20:08.110]  or Audubon, and the Wide Area Telephone Service, or WATS, 800 numbers.
[20:09.710 --> 20:11.970]  So, it goes on to describe Audubon.
[20:12.470 --> 20:19.850]  According to the source of this information, it is not known whether blank or Engressia actually intercepted telephone calls on either Audubon or WATS.
[20:19.890 --> 20:22.570]  However, both allegedly stated that they can do so if need be.
[20:22.890 --> 20:25.350]  The Secretary of Defense and the Director of the U.S.
[20:25.430 --> 20:27.930]  Secret Service have also been advised as to the foregoing.
[20:27.930 --> 20:29.050]  Sincerely yours, J.
[20:29.170 --> 20:29.590]  Edgar Hoover.
[20:30.470 --> 20:32.190]  Now, I kind of think that's cool.
[20:32.330 --> 20:40.150]  And you might have seen, there was a thing in Slashdot recently about another guy who's a professor of anthropology who also had gotten this file and wrote a little article about it.
[20:40.190 --> 20:40.790]  And it's kind of neat.
[20:40.910 --> 20:42.010]  It's a neat little slice of life.
[20:42.190 --> 20:53.270]  Although, I have to tell you that were I to be John Ehrlichman, or the former Secretary of Defense or Director of the Secret Service, I don't really know what I'd make of this, really.
[20:53.710 --> 20:54.530]  It's like, yeah, okay.
[20:55.070 --> 20:56.190]  Thanks, I think.
[20:58.470 --> 20:58.870]  What?
[20:58.870 --> 21:04.210]  And so it makes you... it also, to me, it is an interesting thing to see, like, what was the FBI up to?
[21:04.290 --> 21:05.030]  What were they thinking?
[21:05.350 --> 21:07.770]  Why was this a useful way of communicating?
[21:07.950 --> 21:10.510]  And to me, it's a little bit of history that you wouldn't get.
[21:12.290 --> 21:14.930]  Now, another example, another little nugget that comes up.
[21:17.410 --> 21:20.770]  So, this conference is, of course, sponsored by 2600 magazine.
[21:21.030 --> 21:28.570]  Many of you know that before 2600, there was a magazine called TAP or YIPL, the Technological American Party or the Youth International Party Line.
[21:28.670 --> 21:29.790]  It changed its name a couple times.
[21:30.030 --> 21:32.290]  So I had requested their FBI file.
[21:33.490 --> 21:36.610]  So it turns out, Tap had the bomb.
[21:36.850 --> 21:37.250]  Who knew?
[21:37.830 --> 21:38.450]  The bomb!
[21:38.810 --> 21:39.410]  Right?
[21:39.710 --> 21:49.130]  So this letter, which used to be classified as secret, it's subject, Technological American Party, and the category of violation is Atomic Energy Act.
[21:50.050 --> 21:56.490]  Enclosed for New York are two copies each of Department of Energy assessments of material previously submitted.
[21:56.670 --> 22:01.590]  New York office, note classification of enclosed material, i.e., secret, see the big stamp, secret?
[22:02.510 --> 22:02.810]  Okay.
[22:03.270 --> 22:08.270]  The Department of Energy has requested FBI investigation in view of the enclosed assessments.
[22:08.870 --> 22:12.850]  New York initiate atomic energy investigation to identify source of documents.
[22:13.110 --> 22:14.390]  Okay, I'm going to skip a page here.
[22:15.850 --> 22:18.050]  This was a cover note on that.
[22:18.370 --> 22:23.950]  This matter was initiated in April 1979 on receipt of information from an individual who attended a TAP meeting.
[22:24.110 --> 22:28.190]  At the meeting, individuals discussed procedures for defeating alarm systems and making atomic bombs.
[22:31.270 --> 22:34.450]  Leaflets were passed out that were concerned with the making and use of pipe bombs.
[22:35.210 --> 22:36.630]  Atomic bombs, pipe bombs.
[22:37.650 --> 22:42.310]  At a subsequent meeting, a purported dissertation on the making of an atomic bomb was furnished.
[22:42.450 --> 22:46.250]  On 5-14-79, this document was furnished to the Department of Energy for technological assessment.
[22:46.510 --> 22:55.450]  By letters on July 27th and August 13th, DOE's response reflected a conclusion that, quote, there is a possibility that such a device could give a nuclear yield, unquote.
[22:56.410 --> 23:00.130]  DOE's evaluation concludes that the documents contain secret or restricted data.
[23:01.010 --> 23:04.470]  So, again, for me, that's just a fascinating kind of thing.
[23:04.570 --> 23:07.750]  And I do hope that Cheshire Catalyst is in the audience someplace.
[23:08.830 --> 23:09.350]  Maybe?
[23:10.070 --> 23:15.710]  He was the editor of TAP at this time, and he was the guy who ran the THC-79 meeting, so.
[23:17.150 --> 23:17.590]  Okay.
[23:17.890 --> 23:21.490]  So those are a pair of goodies that you can get from this.
[23:22.290 --> 23:26.830]  Now, I'd like to talk a little bit about some common hurdles that you run into when you file FOIA requests.
[23:27.850 --> 23:29.630]  The first one is privacy.
[23:29.910 --> 23:30.970]  And I think this is really...
[23:30.970 --> 23:40.090]  This is a problem both for you as a requester and legitimately for the government as an agency interested at some level in protecting its citizens' privacy.
[23:40.930 --> 23:42.130]  And it's kind of a spectrum.
[23:42.430 --> 23:44.630]  So on the left-hand side, there's no problem.
[23:44.870 --> 23:50.170]  If you want to request files on yourself, that's easy, because you've given your permission by the request.
[23:50.310 --> 23:55.470]  Unless my footnote says you have multiple personality disorder, in which case you probably need notarized statements from all of your personalities.
[23:56.290 --> 24:02.690]  If you want to request information on organizations, on dead people, or on living people with their permission, again, no problem.
[24:02.790 --> 24:05.630]  And you just include the permission slip, basically.
[24:06.190 --> 24:08.250]  They always told you in high school permission slip was important.
[24:09.670 --> 24:14.170]  On the far right-hand side, the privacy problem is living people without their permission.
[24:15.250 --> 24:17.010]  So if, for example, I want to...
[24:17.010 --> 24:21.730]  Say you want to file a FOIA request for Phil Lapsley, and say the FBI has a file on me.
[24:22.230 --> 24:23.690]  You request Phil Lapsley.
[24:24.050 --> 24:26.550]  It goes through those queues and piles of documents that we talked about.
[24:26.670 --> 24:33.130]  But at some point, they get a file, and they look at it, and they say, wow, well, there's no evidence to say that Lapsley's dead, number one.
[24:33.230 --> 24:37.670]  And number two, the requester didn't submit, like, a copy of an obituary or something like that.
[24:39.590 --> 24:39.930]  So...
[24:40.270 --> 24:43.310]  Sorry, as I'm saying obituary, I'm looking at this coffin, but...
[24:44.350 --> 24:46.630]  So, you know, I don't think we can really do this.
[24:46.690 --> 24:48.270]  I don't think we can give this file out.
[24:49.830 --> 24:51.630]  So that becomes a problem.
[24:51.670 --> 24:53.490]  And I think from a...
[24:53.490 --> 24:59.950]  And then the FBI actually goes one step further, which is they say, gosh, you know, even the fact that Lapsley...
[24:59.950 --> 25:04.370]  It would be one thing to respond to you and say, Phil Lapsley has an FBI file, but we can't show it to you.
[25:04.890 --> 25:11.210]  But then they said, well, but even the fact that Phil has an FBI file, that might be not a good thing to reveal about him.
[25:11.330 --> 25:16.970]  People might assume that he's done something bad, when maybe it was just, you know, a background check for a security classification, and it's nothing ominous.
[25:17.590 --> 25:24.430]  So, in fact, we probably ought to respond to this with a thing saying, we can either confirm or deny, and we simply can't process this request.
[25:26.390 --> 25:30.830]  And what's interesting actually about that is, there's nothing in the law that says that that's a valid thing.
[25:30.990 --> 25:36.930]  There's nothing in the freedom of information law that says that an agency can neither confirm nor deny, but they do it routinely, and we'll talk about that in a second.
[25:38.050 --> 25:39.790]  Then there's a middle area.
[25:40.950 --> 25:44.050]  And the middle area is if you request something by file number.
[25:44.190 --> 25:48.430]  So say, for example, you request file 87-LA-1234.
[25:49.490 --> 25:55.350]  And say that because of some sleuthing you did that you happen to know that that is Phil Lapsley's FBI file.
[25:56.010 --> 26:02.290]  You got this from maybe some other file where that number wasn't blanked out, maybe somebody told you, you befriended an FBI agent, whatever.
[26:03.030 --> 26:10.430]  So now the FBI says, huh, well, he's just requesting this file, but it's about a living third person.
[26:10.530 --> 26:11.650]  We probably can't give this out.
[26:11.770 --> 26:21.610]  And they're going to send you that same letter saying, well, please tell us who the file is about, and we'll tell you, you know, and if you can prove to us that they're dead, we'll give you the file.
[26:21.850 --> 26:26.350]  And you say, gosh, I have no idea who the file is about.
[26:26.510 --> 26:27.650]  Maybe you fib a little bit there.
[26:28.570 --> 26:29.970]  I don't know who the file is about.
[26:30.190 --> 26:31.370]  You need to give it to me anyway.
[26:31.490 --> 26:32.590]  I'm requesting a file, right?
[26:32.710 --> 26:39.410]  I mean, again, going back to, you know, right here, records are reasonably described.
[26:39.670 --> 26:42.890]  That would be file 123-LA-4567, right?
[26:42.970 --> 26:44.530]  It doesn't get much more reasonable than that.
[26:45.450 --> 26:49.830]  So the FBI will say, no, we can't do it.
[26:50.290 --> 26:51.890]  And so what you will then do is appeal.
[26:52.150 --> 26:54.730]  And you'll appeal to the Department of Justice Appeals panel.
[26:54.870 --> 27:04.530]  And the Department of Justice Appeals panel, at least in my experience, has, in every case that this has come up, spanked the FBI and said, did you guys not read the FOIA thing?
[27:07.430 --> 27:15.810]  And so then they have to go and process the file, which is fascinating because you get back a file where names are blanked out, except perhaps that you already knew what the names were.
[27:16.050 --> 27:17.650]  And so you pretty much have a complete file.
[27:19.170 --> 27:21.470]  I'll tell you, I honestly don't know how I feel about that.
[27:21.590 --> 27:23.550]  I mean, as a researcher, I feel really good.
[27:25.130 --> 27:31.250]  But as a citizen, it's kind of like, okay, so you can kind of do an end run around this privacy thing, and it seems like that privacy thing is pretty good.
[27:31.970 --> 27:34.130]  And then I put on my researcher hat again, and I feel great.
[27:36.370 --> 27:40.570]  So that's one way to deal with the privacy problem, to jump around that roadblock.
[27:41.010 --> 27:43.750]  Another thing is, you should, I'm sad to say, become a ghoul.
[27:44.030 --> 27:52.270]  You should become very familiar with the Social Security Death Index and newspaper obituaries, because when you're requesting information on people, if you can show they're dead, then the FBI will turn it over.
[27:52.650 --> 27:58.230]  The FBI used to accept Wikipedia articles, but they don't anymore.
[28:05.200 --> 28:06.440]  So that's one problem.
[28:06.640 --> 28:09.620]  The second problem is what I call the no-records problem.
[28:12.380 --> 28:19.040]  And what this chart is showing here, the blue line is showing for the FBI how many requests they've gotten over the last ten years.
[28:19.280 --> 28:29.000]  So it peaked at around 27,000 requests in 1999, and it's been pretty much going downhill with one little dip, but now they get around 12,000, 13,000 requests every year.
[28:29.780 --> 28:34.260]  The red line shows what percent of those came back to the requester saying, no records.
[28:35.020 --> 28:39.260]  It started at about 36%, and now it's at about 72%.
[28:41.320 --> 28:42.520]  Why might this be?
[28:43.580 --> 28:48.180]  Well, the FBI's answer to this is two things.
[28:48.400 --> 28:56.200]  Number one, that all the people who had FBI files, who wanted them, have requested them.
[28:56.780 --> 29:06.800]  And so, of course, now, you know, all you punk kids are requesting your FBI files, and it was back in the 1950s that we kept files on people, but we really don't keep so many files anymore.
[29:06.980 --> 29:08.860]  And so, as a result, they're just really not there anymore.
[29:08.980 --> 29:11.580]  And so, of course, the no-records response rate is going to be that high.
[29:12.400 --> 29:24.440]  In addition, the FBI says, there was a website, which we're going to talk about, called getmyfbifile.com, and getgrandpasfbifile.com, which makes it very easy to request an FBI file.
[29:25.660 --> 29:32.680]  And they said, and that has tricked a whole bunch of people into thinking that they have FBI files, and so it's caused a giant slug of requests.
[29:33.460 --> 29:35.700]  You know, there's been a huge surge in requests.
[29:37.020 --> 29:40.320]  And as a result, these are all requests that don't actually... we don't actually have files.
[29:41.320 --> 29:50.260]  And you say, huh, okay, that's interesting, because you look at the blue line, and you watch it dip down in 2007, and so I don't see the huge spike in requests.
[29:50.740 --> 29:55.120]  And then, hey, wait a minute, that website didn't actually even launch until 2008.
[29:57.520 --> 30:01.940]  So, there's something else going on there, and, you know, it's hard to know exactly what it is.
[30:02.020 --> 30:04.760]  I think the answer is really two additional things.
[30:04.960 --> 30:08.320]  One is that the FBI is destroying documents.
[30:08.460 --> 30:14.000]  And I don't mean destroying documents in, like, for lack of a better word, a bad or an evil way.
[30:14.200 --> 30:15.420]  They have a lot of documents.
[30:15.560 --> 30:16.600]  They have too many documents.
[30:16.760 --> 30:18.440]  They don't need all of them, right?
[30:18.440 --> 30:20.820]  Not every file is of historical significance.
[30:21.080 --> 30:23.640]  And so, since the 1980s, they've been destroying things.
[30:23.760 --> 30:30.800]  And they worked with the National Archives to come up with what's called a document retention plan, which is, of course, also known as a document destruction plan.
[30:31.780 --> 30:33.620]  And so they're destroying records.
[30:34.220 --> 30:36.120]  And that's probably what they should do.
[30:36.220 --> 30:41.200]  But one of the side effects of that is that more and more you're going to get no records responses, because there just aren't as many records.
[30:41.360 --> 30:41.920]  That's number one.
[30:42.360 --> 30:56.140]  Number two is the FBI has a lot of odd policies that have changed over the last ten years that maybe make sense from their perspective, but they also serve to increase the odds that someone is not going to get the files they're looking for.
[30:56.340 --> 30:57.780]  I'll give you a couple of examples.
[30:58.780 --> 31:03.560]  The FBI has about 57 field offices, plus it has headquarters in Washington, D.C.
[31:04.120 --> 31:17.080]  So if I write to headquarters of the FBI, and I say, I would like information on the Technological American Party or the Youth International Party Line, an organization of phone phreaks in New York City in the 1970s, do you guys have any files on them?
[31:17.180 --> 31:18.500]  They say, no records.
[31:19.500 --> 31:20.260]  I say, really?
[31:20.880 --> 31:21.700]  That's hard to believe.
[31:22.220 --> 31:23.600]  And I write to the New York office.
[31:23.760 --> 31:25.600]  And they say, oh, yeah, no, they had the atomic bomb.
[31:25.720 --> 31:26.420]  Did you see that file?
[31:26.540 --> 31:27.080]  It was really interesting.
[31:28.580 --> 31:32.240]  And, you know, it's like, well, wait a minute.
[31:32.400 --> 31:34.880]  So then didn't New York correspond with headquarters?
[31:35.260 --> 31:36.100]  Well, absolutely.
[31:36.420 --> 31:37.420]  They absolutely did.
[31:37.560 --> 31:41.140]  And so the headquarters had a file on them at some point, but it got destroyed.
[31:41.880 --> 31:46.820]  And so unless you actually specifically wrote to the field office, you're not going to find that file.
[31:47.000 --> 31:50.000]  Now, most people, including myself when I started this, don't know that.
[31:50.560 --> 32:01.180]  So if you really wanted to check to make sure the FBI didn't have any files on you or wanted to get all the files on a particular topic, you need to write to headquarters and 57, you know, field offices.
[32:02.360 --> 32:07.420]  Now, remember I talked about the manual index and the automated index, the 65 million 3x5 cards?
[32:08.060 --> 32:16.140]  So the FBI has changed its policy, but it used to have a policy that unless you specifically said, look in the manual index, they wouldn't.
[32:16.660 --> 32:21.420]  So they'd type your term into their computer, and if it came back nothing, then they'd say no records.
[32:22.120 --> 32:28.740]  Even though the computer only went from 1973 on, so if you were talking about something that happened in 1972, it just wasn't in the computer.
[32:31.520 --> 32:36.440]  Finally, the FBI records things only by what they call main subject.
[32:36.720 --> 32:42.720]  So Phil Lapsley, if I had a file, would... if there was a file on me specifically, I would be a main subject.
[32:42.900 --> 32:52.180]  However, if I was simply mentioned in somebody else's file, I would be in what's called a cross or a C index, but I would not be in a main subject index.
[32:52.640 --> 32:58.380]  They won't search cross or C references until they've done a main file search and sent you back something saying no records.
[32:58.560 --> 33:04.220]  So when you get no records, you have to know that you should respond back to the FBI and say, no, I'd like you to look in the cross or C indices.
[33:05.100 --> 33:10.700]  And these have all things that have changed over time, and as a result, you get more and more no records.
[33:19.900 --> 33:24.400]  So the question was, are they also farming out the documents so they can say we have no records?
[33:24.560 --> 33:26.200]  If they are, I'm not aware of that.
[33:27.600 --> 33:32.400]  And I think you might run into some legal problems making that argument, although not a lawyer.
[33:33.040 --> 33:43.420]  What the FBI actually is doing at the moment is they are building a giant central records complex in Winchester, Virginia, and they're actually moving all of those field office files into one place.
[33:43.580 --> 33:49.560]  And so the claim is by 2010 you won't have to go through the shenanigans of writing to 57 different field offices.
[33:49.900 --> 33:59.040]  And then the public relations person who told me that this morning added quickly the proviso, if our budgets aren't cut, and if this, and if this, and if this.
[33:59.560 --> 34:00.720]  But maybe by 2010.
[34:02.360 --> 34:03.620]  So what do you do about this?
[34:03.720 --> 34:08.400]  Well, one of the things you do is you do all those tricks that we just talked about.
[34:09.160 --> 34:16.320]  You request by file number, because it's harder to say no records when you're asking for a file number that is specifically mentioned, although it does happen.
[34:17.300 --> 34:21.880]  You talk to people at the agency or form people who used to be at the agency.
[34:22.060 --> 34:24.640]  You spend a lot of time trying to study how they file things.
[34:25.180 --> 34:28.620]  You request the same or similar topic in different ways.
[34:28.920 --> 34:30.620]  So you try and come at it from different angles.
[34:33.040 --> 34:37.540]  And the final one, we talked about this a little bit, but it's not as common as the other two.
[34:37.840 --> 34:45.160]  But, you know, aficionados of any spy movie are familiar with the phrase, we can neither confirm nor deny the existence of whatever it is.
[34:46.080 --> 34:48.940]  And that's in FOIA speak called a Glomar response.
[34:49.120 --> 34:53.260]  And that's in honor of a 1975 FOIA case with the CIA.
[34:53.820 --> 34:55.860]  If you're not familiar with it, it's kind of fascinating.
[34:56.600 --> 35:01.000]  The CIA and Hughes, Howard Hughes, built this ship called the Glomar Explorer.
[35:01.360 --> 35:09.260]  And in 1974 it went out, and it was built for a single purpose, which was to go out and lift a Soviet sub that had sunk off the bottom of the ocean.
[35:10.440 --> 35:13.880]  And the sub, unfortunately, broke in half on the way up.
[35:14.120 --> 35:14.720]  But that's okay.
[35:14.820 --> 35:17.140]  Half a sub is better than none, as they say in the CIA.
[35:17.140 --> 35:27.380]  And so they got from that, they got, you know, Soviet sub-launched ballistic missiles, they got nuclear warheads, they got crypto keys, they got all sorts of good things.
[35:27.680 --> 35:32.140]  That story eventually broke in 1975 or so.
[35:32.640 --> 35:35.860]  And a bunch of journalists then filed FOIA requests to find out about it.
[35:36.000 --> 35:39.100]  And the CIA responded saying, can neither confirm nor deny.
[35:39.700 --> 35:41.360]  And that went to court.
[35:41.520 --> 35:47.000]  And even though it's not in the FOIA laws, the courts agreed that, yeah, that's probably actually a reasonable response.
[35:47.540 --> 35:51.080]  And it probably is, from an intelligence perspective.
[35:51.840 --> 35:55.840]  The problem, of course, with it is, with all things, it starts to mutate a little bit.
[35:55.980 --> 35:59.700]  And so now, more and more agencies are starting to use Glomar-style responses.
[36:02.780 --> 36:03.220]  Okay.
[36:03.580 --> 36:04.600]  So, a few hints.
[36:06.980 --> 36:09.900]  File early, file often, file broad, file narrow.
[36:10.180 --> 36:14.200]  And what I mean by that is, it takes so long, you better file sooner rather than later.
[36:14.200 --> 36:17.060]  If you have an idea of something you want to file a request on, file it today.
[36:17.500 --> 36:21.260]  Because if you file it two months from now, I guarantee you, it will take two more months to get it, right?
[36:21.880 --> 36:22.600]  File often.
[36:23.500 --> 36:30.300]  A friend of mine said, who is a frequent FOIA requester, and when one of his requests got denied, I said, oh, gosh, that's too bad, Mike.
[36:30.400 --> 36:30.780]  That sucks.
[36:31.040 --> 36:36.140]  And he said, you know, I try not to care too much about any particular request, and I try to make it up in volume.
[36:36.680 --> 36:36.940]  So...
[36:38.820 --> 36:40.140]  File broad and file narrow.
[36:40.420 --> 36:42.940]  If you know the file number, that's absolutely great.
[36:42.940 --> 36:45.120]  File a request for this particular file number.
[36:45.320 --> 36:50.640]  But also file a general subject request, because maybe there are three other files you don't know the number of.
[36:51.680 --> 36:52.940]  You should expect delays.
[36:53.260 --> 37:00.340]  If you are trying to complete your PhD in history, you know, next week, and you suddenly decided that FOIA is a good approach, it's not.
[37:00.460 --> 37:01.200]  Let me warn you off.
[37:02.480 --> 37:04.700]  Keep track of your requests and follow up on them.
[37:05.400 --> 37:14.300]  Like I said, about 5% of my requests get lost or mislaid, especially requests to field offices for the FBI, because the people at the field offices don't really deal with this so much.
[37:14.400 --> 37:17.340]  And so they're like, ah, FOIA request, we're supposed to send this to, you know, whatever.
[37:20.560 --> 37:24.140]  So you've got to keep track of what you've filed and make sure that they send you the stuff.
[37:26.140 --> 37:29.020]  Appeal some, many, or most denials, your choice.
[37:29.140 --> 37:33.080]  I don't think I'd appeal all denials, because I think that's obnoxious, and that gets to the next couple points.
[37:33.860 --> 37:35.540]  But I will say this.
[37:36.400 --> 37:40.100]  The Department of Justice used to have this really cool thing called the FOIA hotline.
[37:40.200 --> 37:44.540]  It was a FOIA counselor hotline, which I guess is sort of like a suicide hotline, except it's for FOIA.
[37:45.600 --> 37:49.620]  And they used to be, they're not so helpful today, but two years ago they were super helpful.
[37:49.920 --> 37:56.140]  And so I called this guy, I'm like, hey, you know, I submitted something to the FBI, and they said no records.
[37:56.480 --> 37:59.600]  And it was like talking to a grizzled veteran of the FOIA awards, right?
[37:59.980 --> 38:04.980]  He was just like, yeah, uh-huh, yeah, you got no records response from that, yeah, yeah, boy, gosh, I'm shocked.
[38:06.280 --> 38:09.760]  And then I said, well, so help me out here, should I appeal this?
[38:10.160 --> 38:12.560]  And he said, well, let me ask you two questions.
[38:12.840 --> 38:16.320]  And you could tell he wanted to say, let me ask you two questions, punk, but he didn't.
[38:16.780 --> 38:18.080]  He said, let me ask you two questions.
[38:18.260 --> 38:21.300]  He said, question one, do you want to get these documents?
[38:21.780 --> 38:23.080]  And I said, yeah.
[38:23.600 --> 38:26.840]  And he said, okay, question two, do you have the documents now?
[38:27.400 --> 38:29.040]  And I said, no.
[38:29.800 --> 38:32.280]  And he said, well, then I guess I'd appeal if I were you, wouldn't I?
[38:38.750 --> 38:43.290]  I don't think, I don't think the guy who answers the phone there today would say that, but, okay.
[38:43.750 --> 38:48.930]  And this actually, so, you know, in terms of appealing all denials, this gets to the last two points.
[38:50.730 --> 38:54.810]  Please, when you're dealing with these folks, be friendly, courteous, and reasonable.
[38:55.590 --> 38:57.330]  Talk to the people working on your requests.
[38:57.570 --> 38:58.770]  Treat them as human beings.
[38:59.910 --> 39:09.070]  You know, they are, they are, you know, it's easy to see them and to vilify them as, oh, they're bureaucrats and whatever, and they're incompetent and this and that, but they're not, actually.
[39:09.150 --> 39:10.870]  They are overworked people, right?
[39:11.030 --> 39:14.510]  These, these, all these agencies have huge FOIA requests.
[39:14.810 --> 39:18.210]  You know, the people who are dealing with the FOIA are not the highest paid people in the world.
[39:18.650 --> 39:19.810]  They're trying their best.
[39:20.010 --> 39:21.290]  My, my personal belief.
[39:22.510 --> 39:25.550]  And you get, you know, it's, you catch more flies with honey, right?
[39:25.750 --> 39:36.390]  It, uh, in, in just in talking to people, at one point I had a conversation with one of the FOIA analysts, and, and they don't, they're used to FOIA requesters being nutjobs, right?
[39:36.570 --> 39:36.930]  Seriously.
[39:37.270 --> 39:42.390]  You know, it's like, oh, yeah, and then the guy who requested 5,000, you know, times about UFOs or whatever, right?
[39:42.450 --> 39:44.930]  And so, as a result, they're really leery of talking to the public.
[39:45.130 --> 39:47.810]  And so, for the most part, you don't end up talking to them unless you call them.
[39:48.550 --> 39:58.530]  And, at one point, uh, this person who was handling my request said, well, Mr. Lapsley, you know, it's really, what you're asking for here is, it's just really pretty much impossible, and we can't do this.
[39:58.590 --> 40:01.330]  And I said, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, wait, what is it you think I'm asking?
[40:02.010 --> 40:04.350]  And, uh, she said, well, I think you, you want this, this, and this.
[40:04.490 --> 40:05.850]  I said, no, that's, that's insane.
[40:05.890 --> 40:06.750]  I would never ask that.
[40:06.850 --> 40:07.850]  That's a lot of work.
[40:08.270 --> 40:09.490]  And there's this pause.
[40:09.690 --> 40:10.730]  She's like, really?
[40:12.150 --> 40:13.350]  And I said, yeah.
[40:13.730 --> 40:18.010]  I said, look, but, but look, if I ever ask for something that's unreasonable, just call me and tell me.
[40:18.130 --> 40:19.250]  I don't know how your system works.
[40:19.250 --> 40:22.910]  If I'm asking for something that's dumb, I expect you to tell me, and we can figure something out.
[40:23.690 --> 40:25.750]  And, like, she's my best friend now, right?
[40:26.350 --> 40:33.110]  It's like, you know, and, and so, you know, again, it's, and it's just like working with any big organization, you have this.
[40:33.350 --> 40:36.570]  And that goes to the last point, which is keep your paranoia in check, right?
[40:36.770 --> 40:44.490]  It is so easy, especially given the kinds of people who tend to be in this particular room at this particular time, right?
[40:44.650 --> 40:52.330]  To say, like, oh, you know, the government has millions of files on this or that, or in particular on me, and when they say no records, they're just lying scum, and this and that.
[40:52.750 --> 40:55.950]  You know, A, I hate to break it to you.
[40:56.030 --> 40:57.290]  Maybe they don't have a file on you.
[40:57.390 --> 40:59.410]  Maybe they don't have a file on whatever it is you requested.
[40:59.710 --> 41:07.870]  But B, even if they do, and they're not giving it to you, and they say no records, it's probably just because it's not filed the way that your request allowed them to find it.
[41:07.950 --> 41:12.390]  It really probably, and I say probably, is not, you know, a conspiracy.
[41:12.830 --> 41:16.950]  I remember at one point talking to somebody about FOIA, and they said, it's a conspiracy.
[41:17.390 --> 41:19.950]  And I said, left wing or right wing?
[41:21.010 --> 41:24.650]  And missing the irony entirely, they responded instantly, overarching.
[41:25.670 --> 41:25.950]  So...
[41:29.350 --> 41:29.750]  Okay.
[41:30.530 --> 41:35.070]  So, a couple of, well, five, not a couple, FOIA hacks.
[41:35.250 --> 41:38.790]  And these are just some things that some people have come up with that I think are really particularly clever.
[41:38.930 --> 41:42.670]  They may or may not be useful to you, but I think they're, if nothing else, funny.
[41:44.190 --> 41:47.270]  Please send me copies of your agency's intranet homepage.
[41:47.950 --> 41:49.470]  Every page linked to the homepage.
[41:49.850 --> 41:51.790]  And every page linked to a page linked to the homepage.
[41:53.670 --> 41:56.750]  Now, and as, as, and just, it's kind of a fascinating thing, right?
[41:56.770 --> 42:02.930]  If you wonder, what, what do people at the defense intelligence agency see when they show up at work and log into their internal website every day?
[42:03.130 --> 42:07.330]  This is kind of an interesting thing, and it might give you some ideas for other documents you want to fish around at.
[42:08.550 --> 42:14.750]  It also illustrates an important thing, which is, there's a certain amount of negotiation that goes on back and forth between requesters and agencies.
[42:16.270 --> 42:21.530]  And, and, you know, so if you write your request in such a way that they say, gosh, that's a lot of work, we can't do that.
[42:21.670 --> 42:22.830]  Well, okay, what could you do?
[42:22.970 --> 42:27.310]  Well, we could give you a copy of our homepage and the pages that link to it, but not the next level down.
[42:27.590 --> 42:28.050]  Oh, okay.
[42:28.610 --> 42:28.830]  You know.
[42:30.850 --> 42:37.710]  Please send me copies of the first ten pages of files, 165HQ12341235, da-da-da-da-da, right?
[42:37.950 --> 42:43.890]  So, sort of a little, little core sample or gold panning expedition, just to see what's in them, get a sense of what's there.
[42:45.410 --> 42:48.070]  This, I think, is a great sort of meta FOIA hack.
[42:48.310 --> 42:50.410]  Please send me a copy of your FOIA request log.
[42:51.070 --> 42:51.430]  Right?
[42:52.730 --> 43:00.070]  When, every time you make a request under FOIA, you know, you show up in a request log, which is in itself FOIA-able, if that's a word.
[43:00.870 --> 43:12.170]  And, you know, I've occasionally been known to do a vanity Google and found my name in FOIA logs that are posted on the web, because some agencies will post them, and it's like, I'm branded as a nut job for life.
[43:15.090 --> 43:22.110]  Please send me a copy of all administrative records generated related to my previously submitted FOIA request number 12345.
[43:22.130 --> 43:28.210]  So, this would be in a case where they said, no, no records, and you didn't think that was quite right.
[43:28.210 --> 43:30.350]  Maybe you appealed, maybe you won, maybe you lost, whatever.
[43:30.870 --> 43:33.810]  But wouldn't it be interesting to see the email correspondence back and forth?
[43:34.050 --> 43:37.650]  Oh, yeah, it's that nut job Lapsley again asking about phone phreaks.
[43:38.010 --> 43:40.430]  And, I mean, literally, you see emails like that.
[43:41.830 --> 43:43.570]  Well, sorry, not literally.
[43:43.810 --> 43:44.730]  It didn't have my name in it.
[43:44.810 --> 43:46.110]  There was some other nut job we're talking about.
[43:47.550 --> 43:49.170]  This, I also think, is a good one.
[43:49.630 --> 44:00.530]  It's a little bit tortured, but please send me a copy of all documents that were initially considered to be potentially responsive to my previous request, but that were ultimately determined to be non-responsive.
[44:01.390 --> 44:08.310]  So, remember the example blue box, and I said there are four files, three of which have to do with blue teddy bears, and one has to do with a blue box.
[44:08.430 --> 44:09.710]  This gets you the blue teddy bears.
[44:13.620 --> 44:15.960]  All right, so that's the FOIA hacks.
[44:16.260 --> 44:25.500]  Now what I'd like to do is spend just a couple minutes talking about some interesting websites that have come up over the last year that are all FOIA-related in some way and which I think are cool.
[44:26.460 --> 44:29.080]  This is kind of neat, and it touches on an important point.
[44:29.220 --> 44:36.140]  So there's a website called airforcehistoryindex.org, and it's named, I think, in the same vein that shredded wheat is named.
[44:37.140 --> 44:44.860]  These guys aren't going to win awards for marketing, but it is a searchable database of 550,000 historical Air Force documents.
[44:45.120 --> 44:46.620]  And really, it's not actually the documents themselves.
[44:46.820 --> 44:48.000]  It's sort of like the card catalog.
[44:48.420 --> 44:50.020]  Now, how did they get this database?
[44:50.420 --> 45:03.480]  Well, they FOIA-ed in 2001 a copy of the Air Force Historical Agency, AFRA, Air Force Historical Research Agency, AFRA, a copy of their database.
[45:03.720 --> 45:12.080]  Now, and their database is basically, you know, this essentially electronic card catalog of all these 550,000 historical Air Force documents that this Air Force Agency maintains.
[45:12.920 --> 45:16.460]  Some of the documents are classified, but the actual index to the documents are not.
[45:17.120 --> 45:19.960]  Now, here's the thing which is really cool about FOIA and we didn't talk about.
[45:20.280 --> 45:35.260]  One of the things that an amendment to FOIA in 1996 said, it's called the eFOIA, electronic FOIA law, says that wherever reasonable to do so, the agency needs to give the requester the documents or the records in the form specified by the requester.
[45:35.460 --> 45:44.520]  So, for example, if the documents exist electronically, if it's an electronic database, you can FOIA an electronic database and say, hey, I'd like it on CD-ROM, please.
[45:44.920 --> 45:47.960]  And I'd like it in comma-separated values or whatever, right?
[45:48.120 --> 45:49.880]  I'd like searchable PDF, ideally.
[45:50.940 --> 45:52.380]  So that's what these guys did.
[45:52.460 --> 45:58.100]  And then another set of people who were more technically savvy than the original FOIA requester made this searchable thing.
[45:58.220 --> 45:58.700]  And it's really cool.
[45:58.820 --> 46:02.500]  So now you can do this searchable keyword index and see all sorts of amazing Air Force.
[46:02.620 --> 46:04.880]  You don't actually see the documents, but you can see the actual...
[46:04.880 --> 46:07.740]  You know, it's like a 1,500-character abstract of each document.
[46:07.900 --> 46:12.880]  It has everything to do with, you know, from Desert Storm to the Wright Brothers to everything.
[46:12.900 --> 46:16.720]  And it's just something that the public would not have access to if it were not for FOIA.
[46:19.580 --> 46:22.220]  This is one called TVShowComplaints.org.
[46:22.800 --> 46:24.920]  And it allows you to...
[46:24.920 --> 46:27.760]  It essentially is a letter generator, and actually it's an e-mail generator.
[46:28.060 --> 46:41.240]  So if you were to click on the big green arrow, it takes you to a page where you can either select from a drop-down list, here's the TV shows that I'm interested in, and it will then gin up an e-mail, and put it up in your e-mail program if you have it,
[46:41.280 --> 46:49.880]  or it will allow you to copy-paste it into your e-mail program, that you just send to FOIA at FCC.gov saying, please send me all the complaints that you've received regarding Desperate Housewives.
[46:50.640 --> 47:02.240]  And so it... you know, all this is doing is it's generating those four sentences that we talked about, but it's doing it for you in a way that you don't have to look up the address or anything else, it just goes and gins it up and sends it off.
[47:02.680 --> 47:05.380]  So it's sort of... it's a FOIA lubricant, if you will.
[47:07.720 --> 47:09.960]  Related to that, get my FBI file.
[47:10.240 --> 47:11.580]  Do you have an FBI file?
[47:11.700 --> 47:12.480]  Many people do.
[47:17.340 --> 47:23.180]  The... you know, you might have an FBI file if you ever... if you knew a guy named Joey the Horse and ever helped him take out any heavy garbage bags.
[47:23.600 --> 47:25.700]  But again, this is the same idea, right?
[47:25.800 --> 47:27.560]  Which is it just... it generates a letter to the FBI.
[47:27.700 --> 47:35.560]  One of the things which is cool about this is you just check the boxes for field offices, you can check all 57 if you want, and it goes and generates the letters that you need to mail off.
[47:36.340 --> 47:38.020]  Get Grandpa's FBI file.
[47:38.420 --> 47:45.420]  This is for... if you know the subject of your request is a deceased individual, and you can prove it, you can use this for... for that.
[47:47.460 --> 47:57.220]  WhatDidTheyKnow.com is... the UK recently... the United Kingdom recently did a... a Freedom of Information Act law, similar to the U.S. one, and this is a similar thing to that.
[47:57.400 --> 48:02.600]  It allows you to request it online, and what's cool is the responses get aggregated there, so you can see what are other people looking at.
[48:02.680 --> 48:06.020]  Not just what they're... what they're asking for, but also what the agency responded.
[48:07.640 --> 48:08.520]  Government Attic.
[48:09.380 --> 48:19.040]  This is rummaging in the government's attic is... is sort of their motto, but this is a catch-all place where people can submit the... kind of like the... that previous one about what do they know.
[48:19.660 --> 48:29.380]  It's a... here are all the documents that we got by FOIA, and we post them, and it's everything from FOIA logs to, you know, just all sorts of interesting, embarrassing, sometimes funny government documents.
[48:31.300 --> 48:33.860]  I want to acknowledge a couple people before I take questions.
[48:35.160 --> 48:43.920]  One guy, Michael Ravnitsky, if you were to Google him, you'd find out that he's one of the most prolific FOIA requesters, and he's actually the author of a lot of the hacks that I've presented here.
[48:44.160 --> 48:47.880]  Really bright, clever guy, always willing to help people if you have questions about FOIA.
[48:48.680 --> 48:56.960]  Scott Hodes, who is a... formerly with the Department of Justice as a FOIA attorney, and now in private practice, he has answered a number of questions for me.
[48:57.180 --> 49:03.760]  And then I want to thank the staff of the FBI FOIA department, which is called Records Information and Dissemination Service, RIDS.
[49:04.280 --> 49:08.120]  They've been extraordinarily helpful in teaching me what I know about FOIA.
[49:08.800 --> 49:10.000]  I'd love to take questions.
[49:12.660 --> 49:20.700]  So the question is, if you ask for your own file, do you get red flagged?
[49:21.880 --> 49:22.660]  I don't know.
[49:24.180 --> 49:29.140]  I believe the answer is no, and I'll tell you why I believe that, and then you can disbelieve me.
[49:30.620 --> 49:31.020]  The...
[49:33.500 --> 49:36.000]  Again, it comes down to sort of...
[49:36.700 --> 49:41.820]  The FOIA group is really very separate, like in the case of FBI, for example, which is what I know most about.
[49:42.400 --> 49:44.820]  They're very separate from the operational half of the FBI.
[49:44.960 --> 49:51.160]  I remember once saying, gosh, I'm sure you guys have better things to do than talk to me about FOIA, like catch terrorists.
[49:51.340 --> 49:53.940]  And she's like, oh, no, let me assure you, we don't catch terrorists here.
[49:54.160 --> 49:54.580]  You know.
[49:55.540 --> 49:56.540]  We're the FOIA group.
[49:57.260 --> 50:03.760]  So, I mean, it's conceivable, but they state that they do not, and there's sort of no real reason to think that they do.
[50:04.020 --> 50:13.320]  And I know that there have been people who have requested their file and then, you know, two years later requested it again to see if there's anything in there, like, hey, you requested this file two years ago.
[50:13.480 --> 50:15.620]  But this gets back to the paranoia hat, right?
[50:15.760 --> 50:19.400]  Which is, well, of course you'd expect that not to happen, right?
[50:19.540 --> 50:21.280]  Because if they were smart, they wouldn't tell you.
[50:21.620 --> 50:27.660]  So, you know, I can only tell you that they say that they don't, and I haven't seen any evidence that suggests that they do.
[50:27.900 --> 50:29.980]  That doesn't prove it because it's proving a negative.
[50:30.800 --> 50:32.220]  So, yeah.
[50:32.820 --> 50:33.200]  Sorry.
[50:33.300 --> 50:34.280]  The person at the microphone first.
[50:34.400 --> 50:34.560]  Go ahead.
[50:34.740 --> 50:34.900]  Sorry.
[50:35.380 --> 50:35.800]  Hi.
[50:36.480 --> 50:48.100]  I'm about to file a request in Massachusetts under a state law similar to FOIA, and I believe the records are likely kept in a backup database, but have been deleted from the database that's active by policy.
[50:48.100 --> 50:53.620]  So, my two questions were first, do you have any experience working with state under state laws?
[50:53.840 --> 50:57.300]  And second, is it reasonable to request records that are only kept in backups?
[50:57.620 --> 51:03.140]  So, let me answer the second question first, which is, it's totally reasonable to request that things are in backup.
[51:03.320 --> 51:05.680]  Again, if you can reasonably describe it.
[51:06.280 --> 51:15.780]  If, you know, if it was so archival that it was actually, like, you know, on, you know, petroglyph encrusted stone or something, they could say, gosh, that's too much work.
[51:15.900 --> 51:17.920]  But if it's just on backup tapes, absolutely.
[51:18.900 --> 51:22.940]  I do have experience working with some state stuff, but not Massachusetts.
[51:24.000 --> 51:29.860]  Most state laws are vaguely modeled on the federal FOIA, but only vaguely.
[51:30.040 --> 51:44.140]  There is a mailing list called FOI-L, and I think it's run out of Syracuse, but if you just Google for FOI-L mailing list, they're an incredibly helpful group of people, and if you post there and say exactly what you just said, you'll get three or four responses of people saying,
[51:44.160 --> 51:47.240]  oh, yeah, and the records clerk you want to talk to is Joe Blow.
[51:47.940 --> 51:48.100]  So...
[51:48.100 --> 51:48.420]  Thank you.
[51:48.580 --> 51:48.920]  Good luck.
[51:50.100 --> 51:51.700]  Person in the back, you.
[51:51.960 --> 51:52.060]  Yes.
[51:52.400 --> 51:53.480]  Great presentation.
[51:53.760 --> 51:54.040]  Thank you.
[51:54.120 --> 51:55.180]  It's such a huge record,
[51:59.120 --> 52:08.180]  67% of the CIA's National Planning Services, private contractors, private contracting companies, running our intelligence community.
[52:08.540 --> 52:10.100]  How does that affect...
[52:13.970 --> 52:22.270]  So the question was, given that so much of our government is being outsourced to private contractors, how does FOIA play into that, and can we get access to it?
[52:22.390 --> 52:26.190]  And I would answer that question, but it's a trade secret, and it's exempt under B4.
[52:26.750 --> 52:27.110]  So...
[52:27.110 --> 52:27.570]  No.
[52:27.730 --> 52:28.950]  Sorry, I don't mean to make light of that.
[52:29.270 --> 52:30.210]  It's a great question.
[52:30.210 --> 52:31.610]  I don't know what the answer is.
[52:31.690 --> 52:33.290]  It's just not something that I've dealt with.
[52:34.110 --> 52:36.890]  It's a one... I think it's a big concern.
[52:37.890 --> 52:43.130]  I share the concern, and it would be a great thing to post to the FOI-L mailing list to get a better answer.
[52:43.290 --> 52:45.850]  Could that be a reason why people are getting something directly?
[52:45.910 --> 52:46.950]  It certainly could be.
[52:47.370 --> 52:47.930]  I don't...
[52:47.930 --> 52:50.790]  And, you know, you asked about the question of, could it be outsourcing?
[52:51.730 --> 52:54.490]  You know, in the case of the FBI, I don't think it is.
[52:54.610 --> 52:57.670]  In the case of CIA or NSA or whatever, it might be.
[52:58.490 --> 53:02.110]  But in a lot of those cases, those are going to be exempt from disclosure for other reasons.
[53:03.410 --> 53:03.810]  So...
[53:03.810 --> 53:04.290]  Yes?
[53:04.610 --> 53:05.350]  On the page
[53:13.270 --> 53:14.250]  level, we're talking about...
[53:14.250 --> 53:16.110]  Oh, so what is a backup tape?
[53:16.110 --> 53:17.790]  Just on a computer, right?
[53:17.910 --> 53:18.990]  When you do your backup.
[53:19.350 --> 53:23.210]  If you're backing up your computer's hard drive, and you put it on a tape, right?
[53:23.310 --> 53:24.610]  Like on a magnetic tape or something.
[53:24.850 --> 53:25.830]  When did they do that?
[53:26.050 --> 53:29.170]  And what percentage of records go to that level?
[53:29.270 --> 53:30.330]  Or when did they go to that level?
[53:30.470 --> 53:32.550]  It's going to vary from one agency to another.
[53:32.810 --> 53:37.350]  In the case of the FBI, I don't... most of the FBI records are paper.
[53:38.090 --> 53:42.370]  Their computer system has been a well-documented debacle from, you know...
[53:42.370 --> 53:46.010]  So I don't think we have to worry about that just yet for the FBI.
[53:46.850 --> 53:47.230]  So...
[53:47.230 --> 53:47.970]  Yes?
[53:48.550 --> 53:54.290]  How much freedom do we have to redistribute and publish responses that we receive to FOIA requests?
[53:54.510 --> 53:58.110]  Like, you know, try to create some kind of database of the actual documents?
[53:58.530 --> 53:59.050]  Things like that.
[53:59.270 --> 54:00.870]  As long as it's for a non-commercial purpose.
[54:01.110 --> 54:02.730]  Yeah, I think you have total freedom.
[54:03.510 --> 54:05.170]  It's the public's document.
[54:06.090 --> 54:06.530]  So...
[54:06.530 --> 54:06.990]  Good to hear.
[54:08.010 --> 54:09.410]  Another question here at the mic.
[54:09.650 --> 54:15.190]  So you mentioned that they review the documents that they go through before they destroy them.
[54:15.430 --> 54:17.770]  Do they do it by historical significance?
[54:18.110 --> 54:18.770]  Is there...
[54:18.770 --> 54:21.130]  Yeah, so you're saying review before destroy?
[54:21.650 --> 54:21.710]  Yeah.
[54:21.710 --> 54:22.230]  Before the retention?
[54:22.450 --> 54:22.590]  Yes.
[54:22.750 --> 54:24.050]  And so there is a...
[54:24.050 --> 54:28.010]  They created a document retention plan with the National Archives.
[54:28.030 --> 54:32.950]  And it says for different categories of documents, which one should be reviewed.
[54:32.950 --> 54:38.330]  And based on the subject, like for example, civil rights stuff, the FBI is going to retain because that's important.
[54:38.810 --> 54:40.890]  You know, garden variety fraud, not so much.
[54:41.090 --> 54:46.610]  There's a theory in document retention called the fat file theory, which is if a file is big, fat, and thick, it's probably important.
[54:47.570 --> 54:47.970]  So...
[54:47.970 --> 54:48.990]  But yeah, they do.
[54:49.250 --> 54:49.490]  Cool.
[54:49.650 --> 54:49.910]  Thanks.
[54:52.050 --> 54:57.030]  I wanted to ask, you were talking about, you know, the various categories that determine how you...
[54:57.030 --> 54:59.630]  How you get... how much you have to pay in a fee.
[54:59.630 --> 54:59.790]  Yes.
[54:59.790 --> 55:06.430]  I'm wondering, how hard is it to make... to get yourself considered credentialed as a part of the news media?
[55:06.630 --> 55:13.950]  Like, if you were commissioned to do an article for 2600, would then you be in the news media?
[55:14.170 --> 55:14.430]  Yes.
[55:14.430 --> 55:14.450]  Yeah.
[55:14.650 --> 55:17.870]  So, let me answer that in several different ways.
[55:18.090 --> 55:20.130]  The short answer is, I don't think it's that hard.
[55:20.190 --> 55:23.550]  And I think, for example, in the case of 2600, you'd have a pretty good shot at it.
[55:25.590 --> 55:28.610]  And I think it ends up getting handled on a case-by-case basis.
[55:28.790 --> 55:34.490]  Frequently, if you say I'm a member of the news media, you might include some additional stuff beyond that assertion, right?
[55:34.570 --> 55:38.250]  I write for 2600, here's a clipping of an article I've written, you know, something like that.
[55:38.550 --> 55:47.290]  The other thing I didn't mention, and I should have, is even if you are in one of the fee categories, you can request a fee waiver.
[55:47.290 --> 55:55.130]  So, you can say, yeah, yeah, I know I'm an individual, I know it's for non-commercial purposes, but let me tell you what I'm going to do with the data, and here's why I think you shouldn't charge me a fee.
[55:55.310 --> 55:59.530]  And if you type in FOIA fee waiver into Google, you'll find lots of good stuff about how to do that.
[56:00.270 --> 56:03.410]  So, but the answer is, it shouldn't, it's not that hard most of the time.
[56:03.910 --> 56:09.010]  So, why didn't you do that with the NSA when they said they were going to charge you 800 bucks?
[56:09.010 --> 56:20.690]  So, it's one of those things where, you know, you know, I probably could have ginned up some excuse, but it was the sort of a thing where, okay, you know, that's just more trouble and it's opportunity cost, I could be doing something else with my time,
[56:20.810 --> 56:21.230]  so.
[56:25.780 --> 56:26.880]  Can non-U.S.
[56:26.960 --> 56:28.040]  citizens do FOIA requests?
[56:28.260 --> 56:29.240]  Absolutely, non-U.S.
[56:29.600 --> 56:30.480]  citizens can do FOIA requests.
[56:30.720 --> 56:33.480]  Is there any other extra hurdles you must go through?
[56:33.780 --> 56:34.920]  I'm sorry, are there any...
[56:34.920 --> 56:35.540]  Are there hurdles?
[56:35.880 --> 56:36.080]  Nope.
[56:36.580 --> 56:36.720]  Cool.
[56:36.720 --> 56:37.400]  Just send in the request.
[56:37.400 --> 56:38.040]  Thank you.
[56:39.040 --> 56:40.720]  Okay, and I'm being told to stop.
[56:40.880 --> 56:41.880]  So, thank you very much.
[56:42.180 --> 56:43.200]  Come talk to me afterwards.