[00:03.290 --> 00:05.060]  This is not a technical talk.
[00:05.740 --> 00:09.090]  There's nothing here that should frighten even the most technophobic people.
[00:10.190 --> 00:20.150]  Rather, I intend to present an overview of a number of trends which are coming together mostly out of the public eye to change how you use your computer, to change how you can use your computer.
[00:21.450 --> 00:24.560]  One definition of digital rights management goes like this.
[00:25.020 --> 00:29.580]  Digital rights management is a systematic approach to copyright protection for digital media.
[00:30.430 --> 00:32.180]  I disagree with that definition.
[00:33.150 --> 00:35.860]  DRM, in fact, has little to do with copyright protection.
[00:36.730 --> 00:41.320]  Copyright protections, under the laws of the United States and of any other country, are inherently limited.
[00:42.350 --> 00:44.460]  Copyright lasts for a limited period of time.
[00:45.000 --> 00:51.680]  The copyright holder's ability to prevent people from using his work is strongly limited in a number of different ways, such as the Fair Use Doctrine.
[00:52.350 --> 00:55.320]  Here's a section straight out of Title 17 of the U.S.
[00:55.440 --> 00:55.700]  Code.
[00:56.860 --> 01:12.200]  Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 106 and 106A, the Fair Use of a Copyrighted Work, including such use by reproduction, in copies or phono records, or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
[01:12.460 --> 01:19.180]  teaching, including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
[01:20.300 --> 01:28.900]  What the law says in black and white is that you can make copies of copyrighted works without the copyright holder's permission, under a wide variety of circumstances.
[01:29.720 --> 01:33.320]  Criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.
[01:33.500 --> 01:36.620]  Making copies for any of these reasons is not an infringement of copyright.
[01:37.520 --> 01:38.960]  Admittedly, there are gray areas.
[01:39.240 --> 01:44.820]  But in the broad strokes, copyright law is intended to prohibit only bulk, for-profit copying.
[01:45.760 --> 01:54.600]  And this is why I take issue with the term rights and the phrase DRM, and with the definition of it as a systematic approach to copyright protection for digital media.
[01:55.240 --> 02:00.340]  DRM is not intended to stop people from doing things prohibited by the copyright laws.
[02:00.540 --> 02:04.700]  It is intended to stop people from doing things that are allowed by the copyright laws.
[02:05.560 --> 02:13.120]  For instance, on Amazon.com right now, you can buy yourself a copy of the United States Constitution for only $2.99.
[02:14.050 --> 02:17.180]  It's an electronic copy, an e-book, for your PDA.
[02:17.440 --> 02:19.880]  And it comes in two different flavors of DRM.
[02:20.280 --> 02:25.680]  You can choose between Microsoft's DRM, which doesn't allow you to print it or copy it at all.
[02:25.680 --> 02:34.400]  Or you can choose Adobe's DRM, which doesn't allow you to copy it, but it does allow you to print it, and I quote, up to two full copies per year.
[02:34.760 --> 02:36.600]  Two full copies per year!
[02:36.960 --> 02:39.980]  You can print the Constitution, Bill of Rights, everything.
[02:40.400 --> 02:41.380]  What munificence!
[02:42.180 --> 02:42.840]  The U.S. Constitution, as you might expect, is not a work protected by copyright.
[02:46.920 --> 02:47.480]  U.S. government works are not protected by copyright at all.
[02:50.900 --> 02:52.620]  U.S. laws are not protected by copyright.
[02:52.620 --> 02:58.060]  And even if the document were protected by copyright, it would have expired almost 200 years ago.
[02:58.480 --> 03:08.680]  We don't even have to look at all the exceptions carved out of copyright law by the Fair Use Doctrine, because there isn't even the slightest question of whether this document has any copyright protection at all.
[03:08.880 --> 03:09.680]  It doesn't.
[03:10.080 --> 03:11.980]  But the DRM is a different matter.
[03:12.500 --> 03:21.580]  The DRM on this version of the Constitution will prevent you from making copies or printing it, except for your two full copies per year, even though you have the absolute right to do so.
[03:21.580 --> 03:28.220]  It is enforcing a right which the publishers do not actually have, and taking away a right that you do have.
[03:29.120 --> 03:36.020]  The choice the publisher of this DRM document made to allow you to print two full copies per year could have been a different one.
[03:36.200 --> 03:39.360]  The choice could have been to let you print it a hundred times, or none.
[03:39.940 --> 03:42.260]  It is not a choice based in copyright law.
[03:42.500 --> 03:48.840]  It's a choice the publisher could exercise due to the power granted by the DRM system, and for no other reason.
[03:49.560 --> 03:59.380]  When copyright law is made, in theory at least, there is a balancing conducted by our elected representatives, where they determine what is the best set of laws for the country.
[03:59.920 --> 04:05.620]  When these restrictions were placed by the publisher of this DRM file, there was no balancing act.
[04:05.800 --> 04:17.230]  The publisher chose the ability to print two full copies per year, because they believed that that will allow them to sell more copies, than letting buyers print one copy per year, or letting them print three copies per year.
[04:17.470 --> 04:22.730]  The publisher was the sole determiner of what you can do with the file after you have allegedly purchased it.
[04:23.710 --> 04:27.770]  The ideas behind DRM are simple economics, supply and demand.
[04:28.180 --> 04:33.600]  When the supply of anything goes down, while demand stays the same, the price must go up.
[04:33.890 --> 04:38.450]  When you're dealing with the real world with physical items, supply and demand works reasonably.
[04:38.450 --> 04:45.420]  In the electronic world, where infinite copies can be made of any property, supply and demand doesn't work well.
[04:45.920 --> 04:48.710]  There's an infinite supply of anything you might want.
[04:49.850 --> 04:56.060]  DRM is intended to reduce the supply of works, so that publishers can demand higher prices for them, and make more money.
[04:56.730 --> 04:59.620]  It's hard to reduce the supply of copies of the Constitution.
[04:59.980 --> 05:05.060]  The text of that document is available on any number of websites, including ones run by the U.S.
[05:05.180 --> 05:05.390]  government.
[05:05.390 --> 05:14.210]  So even though this is a lengthy document full of interesting clauses that is used in thousands of ways every single day, and ought to be read by every single U.S.
[05:14.300 --> 05:18.040]  citizen, the publisher can only demand $2.99 for it.
[05:18.180 --> 05:20.040]  There's just too much competition out there.
[05:20.680 --> 05:23.590]  There are similar problems when selling any copyrighted work.
[05:24.120 --> 05:28.710]  Many people don't buy books because they can borrow them, at no charge, from their local library.
[05:29.330 --> 05:32.830]  Nowadays, the libraries are getting into the music and video business, too.
[05:32.830 --> 05:37.650]  Would you believe that videos are actually more popular than books in most libraries today?
[05:38.710 --> 05:40.400]  DRM eliminates libraries.
[05:40.650 --> 05:43.060]  Eliminates the very idea of lending and borrowing.
[05:43.740 --> 05:45.680]  Many people don't buy new books.
[05:45.830 --> 05:47.770]  They buy used ones from a used bookstore.
[05:48.280 --> 05:50.120]  DRM eliminates used bookstores.
[05:50.340 --> 05:52.390]  Eliminates the very idea of resale.
[05:53.100 --> 05:57.800]  So all the people who use libraries, is there a better word?
[05:58.620 --> 05:59.160]  Pirates.
[06:00.450 --> 06:04.900]  And all the people who buy books from used bookstores, we can call them pirates, too.
[06:05.220 --> 06:07.390]  They're all out of luck in a DRM world.
[06:07.650 --> 06:14.080]  And that means that everyone has to pay full retail price if they want access to a particular copyrighted work.
[06:14.270 --> 06:15.770]  And publishers love that.
[06:16.660 --> 06:20.100]  You may have heard about a speech given recently by Cory Doctorow.
[06:20.880 --> 06:24.420]  If you haven't, I'm going to give you a pointer to it in the new modern fashion.
[06:24.710 --> 06:28.000]  Not a uniform resource locator, but something easier.
[06:28.220 --> 06:31.710]  Google for Doctorow DRM and click I feel lucky.
[06:32.980 --> 06:37.220]  Doctorow spoke to a group of Microsoft developers and he had a number of good points to make.
[06:37.450 --> 06:39.960]  The first he made was that DRM doesn't work.
[06:40.180 --> 06:41.770]  In fact, that DRM can't work.
[06:43.150 --> 06:45.330]  Doctorow is a bright guy, but he's wrong.
[06:45.960 --> 06:47.270]  DRM can work.
[06:48.370 --> 06:49.710]  Let me step back a second.
[06:50.160 --> 06:55.100]  Those of you who live in New York City may be vaguely aware of a long-standing debate about firefighters.
[06:55.920 --> 07:00.100]  New York City has been around for a long time, and for most of that time, it was something of a death trap.
[07:00.870 --> 07:09.280]  Bucket brigades, horse-drawn pump wagons, and now the modern and professional New York Fire Department, the history of New York has been a history of battle against fire.
[07:09.980 --> 07:12.080]  Today, however, the battle has been won.
[07:12.500 --> 07:15.210]  Building codes require fire-resistant materials.
[07:15.420 --> 07:16.770]  They require sprinklers.
[07:17.210 --> 07:21.400]  And today, there are far, far fewer fires in New York City than there once were.
[07:21.540 --> 07:23.840]  And those fires are much easier to put out.
[07:24.580 --> 07:28.840]  Probably half of the firefighters working in New York City today are unneeded.
[07:29.630 --> 07:33.020]  They're unneeded because the infrastructure of the city has changed.
[07:33.020 --> 07:38.060]  The city has changed from a fire-promoting to a fire-inhibiting environment.
[07:38.480 --> 07:40.300]  And this is a tremendous change.
[07:40.660 --> 07:42.420]  This doesn't mean there are no fires.
[07:42.920 --> 07:47.210]  But the systemic risk from fire is much, much lower than it once was.
[07:47.560 --> 07:51.660]  There's no such thing anymore as a giant fire that consumes half the city.
[07:52.240 --> 07:56.100]  It took many years because there just isn't that much turnover in buildings.
[07:56.100 --> 07:59.800]  The change still isn't complete, of course, and won't be for many years.
[08:00.020 --> 08:03.240]  But the tide has turned, and it's all downhill from here.
[08:04.220 --> 08:09.980]  Dr. Rowe's statement that DRM doesn't work is true, but only in the current computing environment.
[08:10.420 --> 08:19.210]  If the infrastructure changed from a DRM unfriendly to a DRM-friendly environment, Dr. Rowe's statement would change from being true to untrue.
[08:19.210 --> 08:26.040]  And the infrastructure can change, and it can change in the same way and for the same reasons that New York City changed.
[08:26.680 --> 08:31.660]  Regulations can change the way that new buildings or new hardware enters the system.
[08:32.600 --> 08:37.430]  This laptop's construction was affected by literally thousands of different rules and regulations.
[08:37.860 --> 08:44.100]  It has seals from CE, the FCC, Underwriters Laboratory, CIB, VCI.
[08:44.450 --> 08:47.310]  There are a couple I don't even recognize on the bottom of this machine.
[08:48.110 --> 08:54.450]  If any one of those rule sets had included DRM, this laptop would include DRM as well.
[08:55.220 --> 08:57.140]  How old are your computers at home?
[08:57.550 --> 08:58.330]  One year?
[08:58.520 --> 08:58.670]  Two?
[08:58.950 --> 08:59.170]  Three?
[08:59.480 --> 09:01.280]  Probably not more than four or five.
[09:01.460 --> 09:04.380]  After five years, the PC starts to be pretty dated.
[09:05.050 --> 09:12.050]  The computing world is one on which almost every piece of software, almost every piece of hardware, is less than five years old.
[09:12.430 --> 09:16.120]  There's a nearly complete turnover in five years, every five years.
[09:16.120 --> 09:27.100]  If Underwriters Laboratory adds a requirement that all personal computers have to be bondy blue in color, within five years, almost every PC in use will be bondy blue.
[09:28.330 --> 09:33.430]  It took New York City many decades to change from a fire-promoting city to a fire-inhibiting one.
[09:33.570 --> 09:34.570]  But it changed.
[09:34.840 --> 09:42.240]  If the laws change regarding DRM, it will be only a few years before the whole infrastructure of the Internet changes along with those laws.
[09:42.860 --> 09:47.080]  How hard do you think it will be to get a law passed mandating DRM in your hardware?
[09:48.070 --> 09:53.760]  If you've seen Michael Moore's new movie, you see Representative Conyers say, Sit down, my son.
[09:53.760 --> 09:56.050]  We don't read most of the bills that we vote on.
[09:56.930 --> 10:06.240]  There have been laws proposed as early as 2001, 2001, that would make DRM mandatory on all computer systems in the United States.
[10:07.170 --> 10:19.430]  Senator Hatch has a bill before Congress right now that would effectively mandate DRM in every single device you can buy, because it would make hardware companies liable for any copyright infringement that occurs with the devices they manufacture.
[10:20.290 --> 10:23.710]  So far, those laws have been fought and haven't passed Congress.
[10:24.120 --> 10:26.900]  It's very doubtful that that will continue to be true.
[10:26.900 --> 10:38.780]  And when, not if, DRM is mandated, it will be only a few years before it is spread throughout the entire computing environment, because all of your hardware and software gets replaced within a few years.
[10:39.840 --> 10:44.120]  And then Doctorow's statement that DRM can't work becomes untrue.
[10:44.340 --> 10:49.810]  The current DRM systems are mostly based in software running on general purpose computing systems.
[10:49.810 --> 10:59.060]  As it turns out, when you expose a DRM in software to the entire world, somewhere, there will be someone bright enough to deconstruct your software and crack your system.
[10:59.420 --> 11:03.060]  And once it's cracked, they'll write their own software and put it on a website.
[11:03.880 --> 11:06.700]  That doesn't mean your DRM system is worthless, however.
[11:08.000 --> 11:09.860]  How many of you own a DVD player?
[11:11.880 --> 11:12.340]  Anyone?
[11:12.840 --> 11:18.320]  How many of you have used Jon Johansen's code to play a DVD on Linux or to copy a DVD?
[11:21.670 --> 11:24.750]  So that's maybe, I don't know, 20%.
[11:25.670 --> 11:29.710]  So about 20% of you have made use of that DRM hack.
[11:29.990 --> 11:34.370]  The rest of you have been bound by the same DVD restrictions as the rest of us.
[11:34.870 --> 11:42.870]  Even though the hack exists, you've been content to just go with the flow and accept the restrictions imposed by the people who created the DVD encryption scheme.
[11:43.730 --> 11:46.610]  Because it's extra work to route around it.
[11:46.610 --> 11:51.770]  You have to find some extra code on the Internet somewhere, download it, make it work on your system.
[11:52.050 --> 11:54.430]  It's easier to go with the flow, if at all possible.
[11:54.810 --> 12:00.870]  So the existence of a hack makes the DVD DRM system weaker, but it doesn't make it entirely useless.
[12:01.550 --> 12:09.970]  I absolutely guarantee that the DVD DRM system has been substantially successful from the point of view of the movie industry.
[12:10.510 --> 12:14.870]  Most people cannot just pop a DVD into their computer and burn a copy of it.
[12:15.410 --> 12:19.690]  And thus most people do indeed buy a second copy of the DVD if they need to.
[12:20.130 --> 12:26.410]  Even if they need the second copy for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.
[12:26.890 --> 12:30.730]  Most people can't even get a screen capture or video segment from a DVD.
[12:30.730 --> 12:33.750]  They can't even use one single picture from that disc.
[12:34.550 --> 12:44.470]  The digital rights management system in DVDs has been mostly, almost entirely successful in reducing the supply of the copyrighted works covered by it.
[12:44.690 --> 12:47.430]  Despite the existence of a hack for that system.
[12:48.310 --> 12:52.210]  This is a DRM system that was weak because it was implemented in software.
[12:52.570 --> 12:54.530]  And it wasn't backed by specialized hardware.
[12:55.050 --> 12:57.930]  Hardware is vastly harder to hack than software is.
[12:58.510 --> 13:03.350]  If you watch the previous presentation, you saw him, you saw some of the specialized equipment.
[13:03.530 --> 13:05.410]  The infrared analyses and so on.
[13:06.450 --> 13:07.910]  It's not at all impossible.
[13:08.590 --> 13:15.030]  This crowd is aware of all sorts of fancy schmancy techniques to figure out what's going on inside a tiny computer chip.
[13:15.550 --> 13:19.830]  No hardware is completely hack proof or at least no compute consumer hardware is.
[13:20.210 --> 13:21.830]  There's a cost problem you see.
[13:22.450 --> 13:23.770]  It can't cost too much.
[13:23.930 --> 13:27.410]  So the really crazy hardware anti-hacking techniques can't be used.
[13:27.410 --> 13:34.670]  But even the weakest systems implemented in hardware are ten or a hundred times harder to crack than systems implemented only in software.
[13:35.310 --> 13:40.890]  The number of people able to attack hardware systems is much, much fewer than the number able to attack software.
[13:41.350 --> 13:46.370]  And best of all, you can make hardware systems so that a hack of one of them doesn't spread to others.
[13:46.370 --> 13:54.270]  So that there is no one set of code on the Internet to download to fix your DRM system so that it stops interfering with you.
[13:54.470 --> 13:57.630]  And you have to be skilled with a soldering iron, not a keyboard.
[13:58.870 --> 14:03.130]  Once DRM is rooted in hardware, it has a real chance of working quite well.
[14:04.110 --> 14:07.270]  So let's talk about DRM coming to hardware near you.
[14:08.910 --> 14:11.490]  Microsoft has been a major driver behind this.
[14:11.670 --> 14:13.930]  There are many other companies on board as well.
[14:14.170 --> 14:15.890]  So please don't think it's only Microsoft.
[14:16.790 --> 14:22.010]  What Microsoft and others are working on is called, by them, trusted computing.
[14:22.510 --> 14:24.310]  Doesn't that sound all warm and fuzzy?
[14:24.310 --> 14:26.250]  Who wouldn't want a trusted computer?
[14:26.650 --> 14:27.710]  Trust the computer.
[14:27.850 --> 14:28.890]  The computer is your friend.
[14:29.410 --> 14:34.130]  The warm and fuzzy name of trusted computing is actually a deep piece of misdirection.
[14:35.310 --> 14:42.970]  Trust, in the sense they're using it, means that remote corporations get to trust your computer to do something or not to do something.
[14:43.210 --> 14:51.370]  And it means that when their desires about doing something or not doing something conflict with the desires of you, the owner of the computer, their desires win.
[14:52.090 --> 14:54.710]  That's trust in the sense they're using the word.
[14:54.970 --> 14:58.350]  It's the exact opposite of the sense that you or I would use the word.
[14:58.570 --> 15:03.770]  A trusted computer is literally and exactly one that you the owner cannot trust.
[15:04.950 --> 15:14.450]  The kind of desires that they would want to override, at least at first, would be things like copy this MP3 file or download that copy of Star Wars Episode 6.
[15:15.150 --> 15:21.890]  In a very real sense, there's absolutely no difference between a computer that has been hacked into and a trusted computer.
[15:22.350 --> 15:25.950]  Both computers will probably do what you want most of the time.
[15:26.370 --> 15:34.470]  But both computers have a third party somewhere out there who can override your desires and take control of your PC for their purposes when it suits them.
[15:36.010 --> 15:39.890]  Microsoft has called their trusted computing plans by the code name of Palladium.
[15:40.470 --> 15:46.350]  When Palladium got a lot of bad press, they changed the name to Next Generation Secure Computing Base.
[15:46.350 --> 15:48.750]  It doesn't matter what the name is.
[15:49.310 --> 15:56.190]  Microsoft plans to include it in their next operating system release and to retrofit it to some extent to current Windows XP systems.
[15:56.570 --> 15:59.730]  So if you use Windows, you'll be using Palladium pretty soon.
[16:00.070 --> 16:02.790]  That takes care of one level of trusted computing.
[16:03.670 --> 16:06.410]  But trusted computing is an all-encompassing plan.
[16:06.410 --> 16:12.370]  I'm going to briefly cover some parts of your computer that have trusted computing coming to them in the near future.
[16:14.070 --> 16:15.610]  Step one is the BIOS.
[16:15.830 --> 16:18.670]  The basic input-output system is the heart of the computer.
[16:18.830 --> 16:24.550]  A small bit of software that effectively bootstraps the computer from inert chunk of hardware into a living, breathing machine.
[16:25.430 --> 16:28.890]  The major manufacturers of BIOS's are Phoenix and AMI.
[16:29.350 --> 16:34.090]  Most PC-compatible computers have a BIOS from one of these two companies.
[16:34.090 --> 16:38.590]  Both companies have already developed BIOS's with digital rights management built-in.
[16:39.250 --> 16:41.370]  Those BIOS's are available for commercial sale.
[16:42.010 --> 16:44.410]  So the next computer you buy will probably have one.
[16:45.190 --> 16:46.730]  Step two is the CPU.
[16:47.330 --> 16:51.530]  Both AMD and Intel are working on DRM built into your computer's CPU.
[16:52.050 --> 16:54.210]  Both of them have been criticized for it.
[16:54.410 --> 16:56.650]  And that has sort of slowed their rollout of it.
[16:56.990 --> 17:02.590]  But please rest assured that they're basically waiting for Microsoft's next operating system to come out in a few years.
[17:02.590 --> 17:11.030]  As soon as Microsoft is selling operating systems that fully support Palladium, AMD and Intel will both be selling CPUs that support it as well.
[17:12.350 --> 17:13.990]  Step three is the hard drive.
[17:15.070 --> 17:19.830]  All the data stored on your computer is stored on the hard drive, so that's a natural choke point.
[17:20.330 --> 17:25.650]  There was a fairly substantial fight a few years ago about this particular aspect of trusted computing.
[17:25.650 --> 17:29.450]  And the standards committee working on it rejected a standard that was proposed.
[17:29.950 --> 17:33.530]  This slows down, but does not at all stop this area of development.
[17:34.830 --> 17:42.390]  What it appears is that the drive manufacturers are building in the capability secretly, instead of in the semi-public standards process.
[17:43.050 --> 17:50.570]  The lesson they learned from the previous outcry was not, don't do this, but instead, don't let people know that we're doing this.
[17:51.350 --> 17:54.930]  Several hard drives are being marketed right now with DRM built in.
[17:55.150 --> 17:59.350]  These are mostly small portable drives intended for MP3 players and the like.
[17:59.610 --> 18:06.450]  But there's no reason that the same DRM abilities couldn't be included in hard drives intended for desktop computers and notebooks.
[18:07.410 --> 18:14.630]  Step four is all the other devices that interact with the computer, particularly ones that allow large amounts of data to enter or exit the machine.
[18:15.070 --> 18:17.110]  Your monitor displays images.
[18:17.110 --> 18:19.010]  That's data exiting the computer.
[18:19.010 --> 18:20.970]  Your sound card plays sounds.
[18:21.210 --> 18:22.730]  That's data exiting the computer.
[18:23.030 --> 18:25.210]  Your sound card can also record sounds.
[18:25.370 --> 18:26.170]  That's data entering.
[18:26.510 --> 18:33.570]  And of course, all the little USB and FireWire and similar ports are designed to move large amounts of data in or out of the computer.
[18:34.070 --> 18:36.970]  Each of these is covered by some sort of DRM plan.
[18:38.050 --> 18:39.030]  Monitors are covered.
[18:39.390 --> 18:48.550]  In the near future, you can expect that when your monitor receives an image to display, it will check and make sure you have permission to actually view that image before it shows it to you.
[18:48.550 --> 18:50.410]  This sounds a little crazy.
[18:50.610 --> 18:52.050]  I am completely serious.
[18:53.010 --> 18:59.810]  Google for DVI DRM and you'll see that the next generation digital monitors will all have DRM built in.
[19:00.010 --> 19:02.990]  In a few years, you won't be able to buy a monitor without it.
[19:04.150 --> 19:05.530]  Sound cards are covered.
[19:06.090 --> 19:12.430]  In a few years, your sound card will recognize watermarks embedded in music files that you're trying to play or trying to record.
[19:12.430 --> 19:15.010]  And they'll refuse to do so if you aren't authorized.
[19:16.110 --> 19:19.470]  Watermarks are extra inaudible sounds embedded in the music file.
[19:19.690 --> 19:23.290]  Just like paper watermarks that are only visible when the paper is held up to the light.
[19:23.990 --> 19:29.550]  So if you're trying to record the latest Madonna song off the radio, it will have these inaudible watermarks in it.
[19:29.770 --> 19:34.410]  And when you try to plug the radio into your computer and record, your sound card won't let you.
[19:35.970 --> 19:37.450]  USB, FireWire, etc.
[19:37.650 --> 19:38.850]  are most definitely covered.
[19:39.070 --> 19:42.390]  There's a current specification called USB mass storage.
[19:42.610 --> 19:47.050]  Digital cameras, flash drives, and so on are typically USB mass storage devices.
[19:47.590 --> 19:51.090]  This is going to be replaced with the media transfer protocol.
[19:51.390 --> 19:56.070]  Which is, as you might expect if you've been following this talk, fully DRM enabled.
[19:56.670 --> 20:06.170]  Each time you transfer files onto or off of your digital camera, the USB port you plug it into will be checking to make sure you aren't transferring DRM restricted files.
[20:07.310 --> 20:09.790]  I don't want to cover each and every item specifically.
[20:10.710 --> 20:18.030]  But the trusted computing people have a DRM specification for each and every possible way to move data onto or off of a computer.
[20:18.510 --> 20:24.810]  Each and every way will check and make sure you are allowed to move the particular data in question before it permits you to do so.
[20:25.190 --> 20:29.210]  A lot of thought, a lot of man hours have gone into this.
[20:29.210 --> 20:32.190]  And do not underestimate it.
[20:33.670 --> 20:36.850]  Every other computing related device is also covered.
[20:37.170 --> 20:47.050]  The creators of this trusted computing architecture realize that computers and many other gadgets around your home are going to interact now or in the near future.
[20:47.330 --> 20:48.430]  And they have planned for that.
[20:48.830 --> 20:51.930]  There's a specification for trusted network connections.
[20:52.190 --> 20:58.170]  Where computers are only permitted to connect to a network if they are trusted and if they prove that fact.
[20:58.170 --> 21:01.010]  Think about the possibilities of that for a minute.
[21:01.230 --> 21:06.450]  That network could be a corporate network or it could be your high-speed Internet access providers network.
[21:07.770 --> 21:10.310]  Digital television will have DRM built in.
[21:10.930 --> 21:15.110]  Some of you probably already have digital high definition televisions.
[21:15.110 --> 21:24.050]  Those televisions and the next generation digital video recorders like TiVo will respect the DRM codes that will be sent with digital television programming.
[21:24.470 --> 21:34.890]  When NBC doesn't want you to be able to record the Sunday night movie, they'll just set a flag in their broadcast studio and your television and your TiVo will refuse to record it.
[21:35.550 --> 21:36.110]  Refuse.
[21:36.350 --> 21:46.350]  Even though you told the TiVo to record it, even though it's completely legal for you to record it according to the Supreme Court, your TiVo that you own will refuse to obey your desires.
[21:46.830 --> 21:54.650]  That TiVo will be a system that is trusted in the perverse sense that we've been talking about by the television and cable networks.
[21:54.650 --> 21:56.990]  Since they trust it, you cannot.
[21:58.570 --> 21:59.870]  Let me wrap up.
[22:00.630 --> 22:08.370]  Within a few years, and certainly immediately after the release of Microsoft's next operating system, DRM is going to be everywhere.
[22:08.930 --> 22:15.470]  Although I have considerable respect for the hacking abilities of the global Internet community, hardware is much harder to hack.
[22:15.710 --> 22:19.590]  And the hacks that are discovered probably won't be easy for everyone to use.
[22:19.590 --> 22:27.650]  Even where hacks are available, most people, almost everyone, far more than 99.9%, won't use them.
[22:27.870 --> 22:32.030]  Because they're hard, and going with the DRM flow is relatively easy.
[22:32.750 --> 22:43.690]  What this inexorably leads to is a world where companies like Microsoft and AOL Time Warner have a considerable degree of control over everyone's computers and how those computers are used.
[22:44.230 --> 22:48.890]  Effectively, the companies pulling the DRM strings will have root on everyone.
[22:49.990 --> 22:53.210]  And there is, frankly, very little you can do about it.
[22:53.870 --> 22:59.050]  You can build hardware that doesn't have DRM, but you may not be able to communicate with anyone else.
[22:59.170 --> 23:03.030]  And you probably won't be able to sell that hardware in the United States legally.
[23:03.890 --> 23:12.230]  Maybe we'll get some help from China and Taiwan, who may find it economically profitable to continue to produce non-DRM compliant hardware.
[23:12.230 --> 23:16.030]  But that hardware can be stopped at the borders by U.S. customs.
[23:17.010 --> 23:21.790]  You can try to fight against it in Congress, but Hollywood has a lot more money than you do.
[23:22.430 --> 23:26.530]  I wish I could end on a happier note, but I don't think that I can.
[23:27.030 --> 23:31.190]  The best I can suggest is that you dust off your hardware hacking skills.
[23:31.190 --> 23:36.310]  Those of you who figured out how to mod an Xbox so that it could boot Linux, we need more of you.
[23:36.770 --> 23:40.790]  Your efforts won't really make much difference in what happens to most of the world.
[23:41.110 --> 23:45.710]  Your efforts will generally be illegal under laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
[23:45.850 --> 23:51.610]  But the ability to rebel, even if it's not mainstream, is an important ability to retain.
[23:51.610 --> 23:56.530]  You'll be the ones with ancient computers and OGG files without DRM.
[23:56.710 --> 24:04.130]  And hopefully, you'll be able to keep the vision of unfettered computing alive long enough for this DRM fad to pass.
[24:04.470 --> 24:11.030]  And long enough for the general public to return to this golden age of unrestricted Turing machines owned by everyone.
[24:12.010 --> 24:12.670]  Thank you.
[24:24.220 --> 24:25.950]  I don't really... Jay.
[24:30.870 --> 24:32.350]  We're Yorkers for fair use.
[24:32.630 --> 24:39.250]  And let me say that with regard to how bad the situation is, Michael has stated it.
[24:39.350 --> 24:40.910]  If anything, he's understated it.
[24:41.050 --> 24:42.210]  It is that bad.
[24:42.570 --> 24:43.130]  Absurd.
[24:43.830 --> 24:48.290]  Though it seems Disney is building Big Brother's infrastructure.
[24:48.590 --> 24:48.730]  Okay.
[24:48.890 --> 24:52.570]  Now, let me say how strongly I disagree with the last few lines.
[24:53.470 --> 24:55.270]  Let me ask the following question.
[24:56.410 --> 25:00.090]  How many of you have spoken to your congress person or your senator?
[25:00.530 --> 25:01.610]  And I want an honest answer.
[25:01.750 --> 25:02.650]  I mean spoken to them.
[25:02.830 --> 25:03.170]  How many?
[25:04.230 --> 25:04.630]  Okay.
[25:05.210 --> 25:06.510]  Yes, about this, of course.
[25:06.690 --> 25:07.090]  How many?
[25:08.630 --> 25:09.310]  To them.
[25:10.090 --> 25:10.950]  To their office.
[25:11.610 --> 25:12.690]  How many have written letters?
[25:12.790 --> 25:13.330]  How many letters?
[25:13.850 --> 25:14.990]  How many have gone down?
[25:15.090 --> 25:15.530]  Okay, how many?
[25:15.710 --> 25:15.850]  Seriously.
[25:16.230 --> 25:17.230]  Okay, this is ridiculous.
[25:17.630 --> 25:18.590]  This is the elite.
[25:18.770 --> 25:20.050]  We're the ultimate fighters.
[25:20.670 --> 25:22.670]  Upon us, the future of the world depends.
[25:23.650 --> 25:25.670]  Let's go to Washington within the next month.
[25:25.870 --> 25:27.350]  Every single person in this room.
[25:27.990 --> 25:30.370]  We've already got appointments with several people.
[25:30.610 --> 25:31.550]  Several senators.
[25:32.410 --> 25:33.630]  Several congress folk.
[25:33.970 --> 25:37.110]  Let's call for joint hearings of several committees.
[25:37.330 --> 25:39.290]  New Yorkers for fair use will shortly announce this.
[25:39.990 --> 25:41.950]  But New Yorkers for fair use is a tiny organization.
[25:42.750 --> 25:44.130]  What we need is everybody.
[25:44.130 --> 25:48.810]  If you can't spend the time, you're agreeing to give up your computers.
[25:49.210 --> 25:50.650]  I'm sorry, I could go on for a long time.
[25:51.310 --> 25:53.110]  New Yorkersforfairuse.org.
[25:53.270 --> 25:53.590]  What is it?
[25:53.810 --> 25:54.210]  I've forgotten.
[25:54.790 --> 25:55.750]  NYfairuse.org.
[25:55.990 --> 25:57.030]  NYfairuse.org.
[25:57.270 --> 25:57.330]  Okay.
[25:57.770 --> 25:59.930]  But the answer is, if you're not going to...
[25:59.930 --> 26:02.610]  I mean, we're here and we're wasting our time today.
[26:02.790 --> 26:03.610]  Everybody knew.
[26:03.810 --> 26:04.150]  I'm sorry.
[26:05.070 --> 26:05.750]  Okay?
[26:06.130 --> 26:06.470]  Seriously.
[26:07.110 --> 26:07.450]  And...
[26:12.430 --> 26:13.870]  Jay's absolutely right.
[26:14.310 --> 26:19.790]  I mean, he's more optimistic than I am in our ability to affect the views of Congress.
[26:20.110 --> 26:23.430]  I mean, Congress does understand some things.
[26:23.590 --> 26:23.790]  Okay?
[26:24.090 --> 26:25.210]  I mean, this is not...
[26:26.090 --> 26:29.510]  Don't think that Congress is purely venal.
[26:30.050 --> 26:32.130]  They do understand some things.
[26:32.130 --> 26:35.350]  I mean, for example, new cars.
[26:35.610 --> 26:36.030]  Okay?
[26:36.250 --> 26:39.270]  New cars are computers nowadays.
[26:39.670 --> 26:47.870]  I mean, I have a Toyota Prius out back in Brooklyn that has something like 73 microprocessors in it.
[26:48.450 --> 26:53.010]  I mean, it's more computers than everything else in my house put together.
[26:53.590 --> 27:01.050]  And the auto manufacturers looked for a little while as if they were going to make car repair a proprietary thing.
[27:01.050 --> 27:17.570]  That they were going to completely eliminate the idea of the independent car repair shop by simply not providing to the general public, you know, to anyone except Toyota dealers, the ability to read the codes from the car's computer and find out what was wrong with it and repair it.
[27:17.570 --> 27:23.930]  Congress understands the idea of getting gouged on car repairs by the dealer.
[27:24.750 --> 27:35.490]  And so Congress is in the process of passing laws to make that sort of gouging, not gouging in general illegal, but just withholding the codes illegal.
[27:35.490 --> 27:50.490]  So independent car repair shops will continue to exist because Congress is able to relate that to a very simple idea that they already understand, which is the dealer charges more than the guy on the corner, you know, the dealer is gouging you.
[27:51.310 --> 28:02.330]  I am not aware of a similar simple idea that we could use to relay, you know, ideas about DRM and computers to Congress.
[28:02.330 --> 28:21.390]  If there is something simple like that, that we could beat them over the head with, that even, like, 70-year-old congressmen who only use typewriters, you know, and dictate to their secretaries when they need to send email, if there is some simple meme that we can use to relay the problems,
[28:21.390 --> 28:24.190]  then maybe there is some hope for getting them to understand.
[28:28.430 --> 28:31.050]  Okay, I have had the following experience ten times.
[28:31.610 --> 28:40.950]  I have been speaking to a congressman, or a senator, or a staffer, or a member of the staff of a committee, and I and several other people.
[28:41.070 --> 28:46.350]  At the end of it, what they do is they look at us and say, you know, we wondered what the issue was.
[28:46.350 --> 28:48.190]  Because we couldn't see the issue.
[28:49.870 --> 28:52.310]  Because all they hear is from the other side, and there is no issue.
[28:52.710 --> 28:56.850]  Nobody is for massive copyright infringement, except for a few visionaries.
[28:58.830 --> 29:03.590]  Nobody is for depriving artists of their bread and butter and starving their children.
[29:03.770 --> 29:09.730]  So they couldn't understand even why they were being lobbied by the MPAA and the RIA, okay?
[29:10.110 --> 29:15.490]  And when we spoke to them, oft times the response was, thank you, and we got a few converts.
[29:15.490 --> 29:31.330]  Let me tell you, the USA would probably already have enacted, by regulatory fiat, things much worse than what they've already done, if there hadn't been actual meetings, which are not publicized, between some of us and the Department of Commerce.
[29:31.870 --> 29:32.890]  Okay, I'm sorry, I went on too long.
[29:32.990 --> 29:35.830]  But don't be defeatist.
[29:35.990 --> 29:36.830]  They do listen.
[29:37.590 --> 29:40.290]  You know, when you talk to one and he doesn't listen, that's interesting.
[29:40.450 --> 29:40.910]  Report it.
[29:41.010 --> 29:42.170]  Because they always listen.
[29:42.270 --> 29:45.510]  They may not vote the way you want, but they're so ignorant.
[29:46.050 --> 29:50.570]  But they're intelligent, and they're educated, and most of them are interested in doing the right thing.
[29:50.650 --> 29:50.930]  That's all.
[29:50.930 --> 29:52.210]  So, I won't speak anymore.
[29:54.130 --> 29:54.850]  Who else?
[29:55.150 --> 29:55.570]  Just pick.
[29:56.230 --> 29:59.330]  If you want to speak, you could come up here and grab the microphone.
[29:59.890 --> 30:00.050]  Hi.
[30:00.610 --> 30:12.350]  I wanted to know, I definitely believe that lobbying government is important in this issue, but could another avenue of possible solution is, could it possibly be making alliances within the computer industry?
[30:12.350 --> 30:18.110]  Finding computer companies who are going to take a stand against DRM within the United States?
[30:18.350 --> 30:20.050]  Like, I came in a little late.
[30:20.150 --> 30:24.270]  I don't know if you mentioned Apple Computer, but do you know what their stance on DRM is?
[30:26.010 --> 30:28.790]  Apple's sort of straddling the fence at the moment.
[30:29.730 --> 30:35.950]  They're both... I mean, iTunes, for example, is a DRM-restricted music service.
[30:37.150 --> 30:47.370]  They were probably... Apple probably wouldn't have been able to make the deals that they did with the music industry if they hadn't restricted the music with DRM.
[30:47.570 --> 30:51.750]  So, you know, since they wanted to have this music service, they agreed.
[30:52.370 --> 30:57.070]  And that's sort of the position that a lot of the computer companies are put in, I think.
[30:57.070 --> 31:04.710]  I mean, it's sort of... From their point of view, if they're... It doesn't matter if they're...
[31:04.710 --> 31:23.810]  You know, even if they know that putting out a DRM-restricted product is, you know, a worse product for the customer than a non-DRM-restricted product, you know, what happens is that these companies that are trying to sell DRM, the Hollywood and so on,
[31:23.810 --> 31:30.330]  come to them and they say, we're going to get everybody on board, so nobody else will be making a product that's better than yours.
[31:30.550 --> 31:32.570]  You know, there won't be any feature differentiation.
[31:33.610 --> 31:40.150]  You know, and iTunes does well because it's sort of one of the least restrictive DRM things, right?
[31:40.290 --> 31:44.070]  I mean, it doesn't... But they're not... They don't have to compete if they're...
[31:44.070 --> 31:49.930]  I don't know if I'm making my point here, but it's... The hardware companies are...
[31:49.930 --> 31:55.510]  You know, they do business with these other companies, and the other companies are urging them, put in DRM to your stuff.
[31:55.730 --> 31:59.710]  You know, and the general public doesn't know or care.
[31:59.970 --> 32:01.850]  So, it's sort of... It's a hidden thing.
[32:02.010 --> 32:09.150]  I mean, you can buy products today, you know, music CDs that come loaded up with DRM, and they have, you know, no markings.
[32:09.350 --> 32:16.830]  I mean, it's not like it has a big label on it that says, warning, this CD is much less useful to you than this CD over here.
[32:17.590 --> 32:23.570]  So, you don't know, you know, and they're both the same price, and they're sitting side by side in the display case.
[32:24.010 --> 32:31.350]  So, there's no way for people to sort of put their purchasing power into making that differentiation.
[32:31.930 --> 32:35.710]  You know, people buy products that are organic because they're prominently labeled, right?
[32:36.630 --> 32:39.830]  But the DRM things are not prominently labeled.
[32:40.690 --> 32:50.070]  And so, you know, even if you want to spend your dollar on something that isn't, you know, supporting this DRM fad, it's very... It's hard to do so.
[32:50.130 --> 32:51.250]  You have to do a lot of research.
[32:52.430 --> 32:52.910]  There.
[32:54.250 --> 32:54.730]  Ingrid.
[32:56.470 --> 32:58.270]  A couple of real quickies.
[32:59.270 --> 33:08.330]  If you want to tape something that they don't want you to tape, I assume you'll be able to get analog out and you can tape it on your current VCR.
[33:09.410 --> 33:10.090]  You can...
[33:10.090 --> 33:11.230]  What else can this stuff do?
[33:11.470 --> 33:13.610]  For instance, can it keep you from reading the Guardian?
[33:14.550 --> 33:18.610]  Things... What else is in there that they haven't... You haven't managed to find out?
[33:18.790 --> 33:20.190]  What rumors do you hear?
[33:20.190 --> 33:23.450]  And what is Sun doing, as well as Apple?
[33:23.590 --> 33:26.450]  Sun, Spark, and all that.
[33:27.030 --> 33:31.490]  The analog hole, so to speak, is sort of rather well known.
[33:31.770 --> 33:48.250]  And so, for things like digital television, for example, where you might receive digital TV from your cable provider, and then your television has several different outputs, for example, on the back, they're not going to let you send that out in analog.
[33:48.810 --> 33:53.630]  I mean, the best you might be able to do is sort of record it with a camcorder or something like that.
[33:55.190 --> 33:56.190]  What is Sun doing?
[33:56.350 --> 33:56.710]  I don't know.
[33:56.830 --> 33:59.970]  I think Sun's kind of an irrelevant, failing company at this moment.
[34:00.150 --> 34:01.650]  I would look more at Apple.
[34:03.070 --> 34:09.290]  Apple, you know, you might be able to get people, you know, like Steve Wozniak, who sort of understand.
[34:10.490 --> 34:13.330]  But they're, you know, Apple's a business, like anyone else.
[34:13.390 --> 34:17.810]  And if the dollars are to be made in building DRM stuff, then Apple will build DRM stuff.
[34:19.930 --> 34:23.650]  Yeah, you had mentioned one site in your...
[34:23.650 --> 34:27.850]  Or one thing to Google on the DVI DRM.
[34:28.370 --> 34:44.950]  Is there a website anywhere, or has anyone built like a database where people can record lists of what products are currently using DRM, what processors in the future that are being developed now are using DRM and things like that, so that we can be more aware of what products.
[34:45.050 --> 34:52.750]  Because like you said, if things are being done secretly or being done under the table, the people who are first going to probably find out about them are the people in this room.
[34:52.750 --> 34:57.330]  So, it would be nice for us to have like a central place where we could put the information.
[34:58.530 --> 35:00.870]  I don't know if there's a central database.
[35:01.130 --> 35:09.810]  I mean, because there are just, I mean, there are basically an infinite number of different hardware devices and computing gadgets that are produced every day.
[35:10.410 --> 35:14.170]  So, I don't think there's any central database that anybody has constructed.
[35:14.470 --> 35:17.070]  I mean, you know, you could be the one.
[35:18.150 --> 35:22.050]  There, you know, there's one, something Chucks or something that was...
[35:22.050 --> 35:23.070]  Fat Chucks.
[35:24.470 --> 35:29.230]  Fat Chucks has a database of CDs that have DRM on them.
[35:29.710 --> 35:35.950]  You know, CDs from the major RIIA members that are coming out with DRM on the CDs.
[35:36.210 --> 35:38.430]  And so, they keep a database of these corrupt CDs.
[35:38.670 --> 35:41.070]  But, you know, that's just one part of the overall...
[35:51.240 --> 35:55.080]  You mentioned, for example, Intel and AMD both had processors...
[35:55.080 --> 35:55.520]  Sure.
[35:55.740 --> 35:56.520]  ...with DRM in them.
[35:56.640 --> 36:04.840]  I mean, if you remember a few years back, there was a big uproar because the Pentium 3, I think it was, had a serial number that was being embedded in the processor...
[36:05.420 --> 36:08.340]  Yeah, that was like version 0.01 of the...
[36:08.340 --> 36:08.480]  Right.
[36:08.620 --> 36:09.500]  ...the coming DRM.
[36:09.620 --> 36:10.300]  And people...
[36:10.300 --> 36:13.360]  Yeah, no, but my point is that people raised such a ruckus about it that...
[36:13.360 --> 36:16.080]  They had to make it be able to be disabled in the BIOS.
[36:16.300 --> 36:16.620]  Mm-hmm.
[36:16.720 --> 36:19.640]  And we find out later, of course, it could be still red even when it was off.
[36:19.800 --> 36:22.520]  But the point is that...
[36:22.520 --> 36:23.580]  I mean, is...
[36:26.080 --> 36:26.440]  Is...
[36:26.440 --> 36:27.480]  Like what...
[36:27.480 --> 36:30.780]  I guess the idea is what versions of these things are what...
[36:31.560 --> 36:32.060]  You're right.
[36:32.160 --> 36:33.960]  I mean, it will be useful to know.
[36:34.180 --> 36:38.920]  You know, especially when you're trying to make a difference by buying, you know, non-DRM stuff.
[36:39.420 --> 36:41.560]  And I don't know of any database.
[36:41.560 --> 36:42.380]  I mean, that's...
[36:42.380 --> 36:45.640]  You're talking about a lot of information and a lot of effort to collect it.
[36:45.760 --> 36:47.680]  I mean, I don't have the time, for example.
[36:48.360 --> 36:49.780]  I don't know who would.
[36:49.920 --> 36:51.260]  But hopefully someone will.
[36:52.360 --> 36:58.880]  Yeah, just out of curiosity, is this in any way going to slow down or entirely stop the...
[36:58.880 --> 37:06.300]  really big commercial piracy by, you know, by Russians and the Chinese and others?
[37:06.680 --> 37:09.180]  I mean, I don't see them being affected.
[37:09.480 --> 37:09.860]  Mostly...
[37:09.860 --> 37:10.660]  Mostly no.
[37:10.940 --> 37:11.360]  See?
[37:11.580 --> 37:12.640]  Because the...
[37:12.640 --> 37:13.520]  You know, what...
[37:13.520 --> 37:19.300]  They use commercial DVD or CD stamping machines that just makes a bit-for-bit copy of what they...
[37:19.300 --> 37:21.580]  You know, you buy one in Los Angeles.
[37:21.580 --> 37:23.960]  You put it on FedEx out to Russia.
[37:24.440 --> 37:26.420]  The FedEx guy, you know, you take it off...
[37:26.420 --> 37:27.780]  The FedEx guy hands it to them.
[37:27.860 --> 37:28.440]  They open it up.
[37:28.500 --> 37:29.300]  They put it in the machine.
[37:29.300 --> 37:31.260]  It makes bit-for-bit exact duplicates.
[37:31.820 --> 37:32.980]  I feel like...
[37:32.980 --> 37:38.360]  If they put out a commercial disc that runs on your machine, the pirated disc will be exactly identical.
[37:38.560 --> 37:49.540]  I feel like we're being penalized because Microsoft software and the music industry is being wholesale pirated by these, you know, mobs in these countries.
[37:49.820 --> 37:52.680]  I don't see why we should have to be persecuted for it.
[37:52.800 --> 38:01.080]  Because the amount of where's piracy in this country is substantially, you know, smaller than in these other countries.
[38:01.780 --> 38:02.260]  Yeah.
[38:02.420 --> 38:04.420]  Well, I mean, you're right.
[38:04.620 --> 38:07.260]  It really has nothing to do with commercial piracy.
[38:07.300 --> 38:11.720]  Although, that is, you know, one of the justifications that they will trot out.
[38:11.880 --> 38:13.240]  But it really has nothing to do with it.
[38:15.020 --> 38:20.040]  Commercial piracy is basically a totally different entity that DRM is not intended to cure.
[38:20.720 --> 38:22.000]  And it won't.
[38:22.960 --> 38:24.300]  So, who else?
[38:24.480 --> 38:24.720]  Anybody?
[38:25.100 --> 38:25.620]  Or somebody?
[38:27.720 --> 38:32.820]  I want to say first that the DirecTV has a DRM and downresing clause.
[38:33.140 --> 38:39.220]  If you're not using DVI in an HDCP configuration, they can downres the broadcast.
[38:39.220 --> 38:40.360]  It is in the clauses.
[38:41.040 --> 38:49.360]  Second of all, I want to say that DVI in its current implementation has been cracked by third parties, but could not release the results by predicting the algorithm.
[38:50.080 --> 39:02.940]  The other thing is, the DRM CDs that are out there, do you believe that the algorithm should force DRM onto machines as per newer CDs with Cactus, Midbar, or is that in our rights to sue for software?
[39:04.140 --> 39:05.840]  I should make myself a little clearer.
[39:05.840 --> 39:07.340]  Is it within our rights to sue?
[39:07.640 --> 39:08.120]  Is that what you're saying?
[39:08.140 --> 39:18.220]  Yeah, because if you drop some of the newer CDs into a machine, into a Windows environment, it silently installs the Cactus, Midbar, TTRMD, ARM software, and that's questionable.
[39:18.220 --> 39:21.920]  I would think that you would have a legal claim for something like that.
[39:22.380 --> 39:25.960]  Nobody has brought that lawsuit yet, but somebody may.
[39:26.180 --> 39:29.840]  I mean, I know that the EFF has been looking at this.
[39:30.060 --> 39:33.160]  The BC Boy CD is the big implementation of it.
[39:33.240 --> 39:34.380]  Cactus, Midbar, silent.
[39:35.420 --> 39:35.860]  Yeah.
[39:36.280 --> 39:36.720]  Here.
[39:37.060 --> 39:37.340]  Thank you.
[39:38.740 --> 39:40.300]  Maybe this orange here.
[39:43.060 --> 39:43.500]  Yeah.
[39:43.660 --> 39:43.760]  Hi.
[39:43.860 --> 39:45.080]  I don't know if you...
[39:45.080 --> 39:57.360]  I don't know if maybe I have the facts or aren't straight away, or if you just strayed away from it or something, but doesn't the trust computing platform, in addition to being a brainchild of Microsoft and Intel and whatnot, also have...
[39:57.360 --> 40:02.080]  Like, isn't there a, like, Department of Justice interest in that as well?
[40:03.800 --> 40:05.320]  Not so far as I know.
[40:06.300 --> 40:20.820]  The trusted computing group is just an assortment of hardware manufacturers, for the most part, that have, you know, gathered together to build some hardware to a common set of specifications.
[40:20.820 --> 40:23.160]  It's not really driven by the Justice Department.
[40:23.900 --> 40:36.280]  Although, I mean, you could say that it's...that it...you know, there's clearly, like, an environment where they sort of sense that DRM is coming, and so they want to build some kind of common standard so that all their things will interoperate.
[40:37.140 --> 40:46.700]  You know, in that sense, they're...they sort of feel it coming, and that the decision to even participate in that group might be driven by the, you know, the political scheme in Washington.
[40:46.700 --> 40:51.140]  But it's mostly hardware companies doing it to ourselves.
[40:51.380 --> 40:55.880]  I mean, it's not...they could...they could stand up and refuse.
[40:56.180 --> 41:07.720]  I mean, if nobody...if all of the hardware companies who build DVD players had stood up to Hollywood and said, we're not going to build DVD players that will read encrypted DVDs.
[41:07.720 --> 41:23.960]  If we demand that you only produce DVDs that have unencrypted movies on them, and we're only going to make DVD players that will play those kind of unencrypted movies, we would have a very different, you know, laser disc system currently.
[41:24.760 --> 41:28.700]  You know, we would...we wouldn't have these problems at all, but they didn't.
[41:29.200 --> 41:33.180]  And so we have a very different...you know, we have encrypted DVDs.
[41:34.600 --> 41:35.640]  Who's next?
[41:36.420 --> 41:37.420]  On the end there?
[41:41.070 --> 42:03.150]  In reference to the last question, while the Department of Justice doesn't have a specific, you know, stated stake in there, most of the large companies, there are published things about, you know, if there was legislation mandating DRM, that, you know,
[42:03.230 --> 42:15.170]  the company stating that, of course, since the government was so nice to mandate it, that all that information would be available to, you know, FBI, DOJ, etc.
[42:16.850 --> 42:21.470]  Yeah, I didn't really touch on the privacy aspect, but, you know, one of the...
[42:21.470 --> 42:26.690]  Because I was, again, I was trying to make this non-technical and not terribly confusing and accessible.
[42:28.610 --> 42:36.170]  There is a substantial privacy problem, which may or may not turn out to be really severe.
[42:36.970 --> 42:44.030]  Because, you know, the idea of the DRM system is that you have to limit your copy of an electronic work to only be usable by you.
[42:44.270 --> 42:49.770]  And so that implies some sort of identity where they can check and verify that it's you that's using it.
[42:50.390 --> 43:02.530]  And if the DRM systems are created such that, you know, a lot of your personal information ends up being held by other companies, there's a real privacy debacle in the works.
[43:03.010 --> 43:08.570]  I think that there's enough political pressure that it's not going to go that way.
[43:10.170 --> 43:20.550]  That companies sort of sense that, that people will have a visceral objection if all of their personal information is being stored by, you know, AOL Time Warner.
[43:21.970 --> 43:24.450]  So I think that it's not really going to go that way.
[43:24.450 --> 43:29.650]  And it'll sort of be, you know, just generic universal ID, you know, numbers, right?
[43:29.650 --> 43:31.710]  Just a long serial number will be you.
[43:31.810 --> 43:38.270]  And it won't necessarily be linked with, you know, the fact that you're John Brown and that you live on 123 Main Street.
[43:40.150 --> 43:44.790]  So I don't think that DRM is really going to be a major privacy hazard.
[43:44.950 --> 43:50.110]  But the reason that it's not is because there has been a lot of this political pressure applied to Congress.
[43:50.290 --> 43:54.930]  And they, you know, they have gotten some sense that that's something that people do object to.
[43:58.290 --> 44:20.070]  And I have one other thing that was actually my original thing is actually, I'm not sure what your comment on this is, but I see as, you know, one of the greatest hopes against this is that once it becomes mandated, then the cartel mentality will take hold of it in full effect.
[44:20.070 --> 44:41.330]  And in the same way that, you know, in this country, you know, certain, say, certain firearms and, you know, certain chemical substances are, you know, various shades of highly illegal, yet are, you know, pretty commonly available to anybody with the,
[44:41.450 --> 44:44.730]  you know, want or need to find them.
[44:44.730 --> 44:45.510]  Mm-hmm.
[44:45.930 --> 45:04.170]  That, you know, at the point that this becomes, DRM becomes mandated, there will be a large monetary interest in, you know, selling conveniently, you know, non-compliant computers.
[45:04.170 --> 45:12.610]  Well, yeah, that may be, but I don't want to be, you know, risking arrest for buying a non-DRM computer.
[45:13.870 --> 45:25.310]  Maybe that's just me, but I don't, you know, I don't want to worry that the guy I'm buying it from is an undercover cop in, you know, in the park over here or something.
[45:25.910 --> 45:29.390]  Maybe one of these people who came down there, like, in the middle right there.
[45:44.280 --> 45:44.740]  Sure.
[45:45.580 --> 45:49.220]  Just to let you know, the 5C is the copy protection for AV.
[45:49.560 --> 45:49.620]  Sure.
[45:49.620 --> 45:51.300]  It's over FireWire and DVI.
[45:51.680 --> 45:51.900]  Mm-hmm.
[45:51.900 --> 45:54.160]  It's being pushed towards a proprietary interface.
[45:54.160 --> 45:55.920]  It's five corporations.
[45:56.120 --> 46:01.320]  I believe Sony, Panasonic, Masusha, and Mitsubishi are the five that are leading the standard.
[46:01.500 --> 46:07.180]  And some of the products have it already, such as the XA9000ES and the TA9000ES.
[46:07.760 --> 46:09.860]  SCCD over at 1394 encrypted.
[46:10.800 --> 46:11.100]  Yep.
[46:11.700 --> 46:13.160]  Yeah, he's talking about...
[46:13.800 --> 46:15.860]  Go ahead and give the mic back to the guy.
[46:16.740 --> 46:17.220]  He's...
[46:17.220 --> 46:19.480]  No, no, the bald guy there.
[46:20.820 --> 46:22.840]  Number zero razor cut there.
[46:23.640 --> 46:33.080]  He's talking about the standards for DRM in consumer electronics, which have all of the major consumer electronics manufacturers on board.
[46:33.840 --> 46:37.540]  That's, you know, an outgrowth of what's happening with the computers.
[46:37.880 --> 46:44.280]  I don't consider it as important as what's happening with personal computers, because personal computers, you know, are it.
[46:44.400 --> 46:46.220]  That's the alpha and the omega.
[46:46.740 --> 46:53.140]  You know, to some extent, I don't care whether you can copy your DVDs from a DVD player, or something.
[46:53.300 --> 47:01.800]  But I do care whether you can use your personal computer for anything you want it to use, anything you want to do, or whether that has DRM applied to it.
[47:02.800 --> 47:03.200]  So...
[47:03.200 --> 47:03.320]  Go ahead.
[47:04.360 --> 47:06.060]  I think you made an excellent point.
[47:07.120 --> 47:11.240]  During your speech, you brought up how the U.S.
[47:11.340 --> 47:13.860]  Constitution has been protected by DRM.
[47:13.860 --> 47:15.040]  Obviously, something...
[47:15.040 --> 47:17.020]  Buy it on Amazon right now, $2.99.
[47:17.640 --> 47:18.360]  Great deal.
[47:20.780 --> 47:21.700]  Yeah, wonderful.
[47:21.920 --> 47:22.400]  Wonderful deal.
[47:22.780 --> 47:37.540]  And obviously, I'm sure there's a lot of other things out there in the public domain that may fall under the same DRM stuff, and that's one point of it, and something that could be affected by legislation.
[47:37.740 --> 47:46.640]  However, current copyright works, things that are coming out now, how much of that can actually be affected by legislation?
[47:47.200 --> 47:47.880]  I mean, isn't that...
[47:47.880 --> 47:50.860]  I mean, I read Slashdot, so I am not a lawyer.
[47:51.900 --> 47:54.140]  And I don't know if there is any here.
[47:54.400 --> 47:55.920]  If a lawyer reads Slashdot...
[47:55.920 --> 48:02.680]  Yeah, but maybe there's one in the room, but how much of the new things are coming...
[48:02.680 --> 48:05.260]  Wouldn't that be more a function of a contract law?
[48:05.720 --> 48:14.220]  That, you know, you're a buyer, you're a seller, and hey, if you want to buy this thing for me, this is how you buy it, and that's how I'm releasing it.
[48:14.340 --> 48:17.360]  And that's, you know, I'll choose not to buy it.
[48:17.460 --> 48:20.860]  But, you know, that's the question in my mind.
[48:21.500 --> 48:27.840]  Yeah, that's how it has been perceived, certainly to date, as a contract issue.
[48:27.980 --> 48:31.600]  You know, you signed the contract to give me your firstborn child.
[48:31.600 --> 48:33.400]  You know, you signed it, right?
[48:33.540 --> 48:34.600]  I mean, it's your fault.
[48:35.260 --> 48:38.820]  If you didn't want to make that deal, you shouldn't have signed in blood on the dotted line.
[48:41.460 --> 48:47.980]  That's... Congress does have the idea, you know, that the laws are supposed to be made with the public interest in mind.
[48:48.180 --> 48:57.400]  And so, Congress could, for example, pass a law saying that anything that is protected by DRM isn't... is no longer protected by copyright.
[48:58.340 --> 49:10.300]  You know, so then they would have a choice of choosing between the protections of traditional copyright law or between whatever electronic protections they thought they could get from DRM systems.
[49:11.160 --> 49:13.520]  You know, Congress could make that choice.
[49:13.520 --> 49:22.240]  And that would sort of make explicit the idea that there are trade-offs in this system and that Congress wouldn't be then supporting...
[49:22.780 --> 49:24.480]  You know, the DRM doesn't expire.
[49:24.840 --> 49:26.260]  It won't expire ever.
[49:26.520 --> 49:27.220]  You know, even if...
[49:27.220 --> 49:28.440]  Maybe they could legislate...
[49:28.800 --> 49:28.980]  Maybe they could legislate...
[49:28.980 --> 49:29.340]  And so on.
[49:29.600 --> 49:35.680]  Maybe they could, in fact, legislate something to say that, okay, 14 years or whenever...
[49:35.680 --> 49:40.040]  You know, however old Mickey Mouse is or whatever it is, that's the current age of...
[49:40.040 --> 49:41.900]  of how long a copyright lasts.
[49:42.980 --> 49:49.040]  Maybe they could legislate something to say, okay, DRM, you can't have it go but this far.
[49:49.300 --> 49:55.020]  But to that point, within the 14 years or whatever, you really can do...
[49:55.020 --> 50:01.320]  You can sell, you know, your CD for $10,000 or you can sell it, you know, just on 8-track or whatever.
[50:01.320 --> 50:05.340]  You know, it's up to you as the composer of the work.
[50:05.520 --> 50:12.100]  And that's why I'm saying I don't know how much legislation can affect a lot of the things that you're speaking of.
[50:12.300 --> 50:13.760]  Well, you can, but you can.
[50:14.220 --> 50:17.280]  Your statement is correct as a statement of current law.
[50:17.500 --> 50:18.800]  But you don't have to be.
[50:20.200 --> 50:28.380]  Just as a for example, I mean, it was common at one point in time to make so-called restrictive covenants on the sale of land.
[50:28.380 --> 50:35.260]  And the idea was that you would have a bunch of white people in a community and they would put restrictive covenants on their land.
[50:35.420 --> 50:41.860]  So that even if they sold it, the person who bought it could not then resell it to a black person.
[50:42.620 --> 50:45.200]  The restrictive covenants were mostly about race.
[50:46.380 --> 50:54.100]  And so in this way, the land would acquire a sort of permanent lock that prevented it from ever being sold to a black person.
[50:54.760 --> 50:57.900]  The courts have ruled that those are unenforceable.
[50:58.300 --> 51:03.580]  So this contract provision, even if it's written in your contract, is completely unenforceable.
[51:04.600 --> 51:17.200]  New York City tenant laws, rent regulations, have tons of things that have been found to be unenforceable where you can't set certain restrictions on what the conditions that tenants rent an apartment under.
[51:17.200 --> 51:22.940]  Because the courts have found that it's in the public interest not to allow some contract provisions to be enforced.
[51:23.760 --> 51:25.580]  So that could happen with DRM too.
[51:25.820 --> 51:30.780]  You know, it doesn't have to be the way that you're saying where the copyright holder gets a permanent lock on things.
[51:30.960 --> 51:35.480]  And the courts could hold differently or Congress could set things up differently.
[51:36.720 --> 51:37.200]  Alrighty.
[51:37.200 --> 51:38.760]  Thank you all for coming here tonight.
[51:38.760 --> 51:38.940]  Thank you so much.
[51:43.170 --> 51:43.930]  This is all.