[00:48.940 --> 00:50.500]  How are we doing today?
[00:52.440 --> 00:53.400]  I'm John Chacko.
[00:53.600 --> 00:58.560]  I'm here emceeing this room today and I appreciate you got everyone coming.
[00:59.160 --> 01:05.310]  Just want to remind everyone that during the talks we want to keep our phones on stun or vibrate.
[01:05.640 --> 01:10.660]  We want to make sure that we are hydrated so we don't want anybody passing out on us.
[01:10.660 --> 01:15.400]  But right now I have the pleasure of introducing our first talk of the day.
[01:15.620 --> 01:21.680]  It is about the Secrets of Social Media PsyOps or Psychology Warfare by BSI Labs.
[01:28.970 --> 01:30.030]  Hello everyone!
[01:30.290 --> 01:31.190]  Happy HOPE!
[01:31.470 --> 01:32.710]  Glad to see everyone here.
[01:32.850 --> 01:34.690]  Glad it's finally back in person.
[01:34.690 --> 01:36.230]  I was waiting for this one.
[01:36.450 --> 01:38.130]  And let's get started.
[01:38.990 --> 01:40.890]  Secrets of Social Media PsyOps.
[01:40.950 --> 01:47.370]  A look into how social media has been weaponized for psychological warfare with yours truly, BSI Lab.
[01:48.130 --> 01:50.570]  First off, who am I?
[01:50.810 --> 01:52.290]  I'm a 15-year-old girl.
[01:52.470 --> 01:55.190]  I was the youngest speaker here at HOPE a few years ago.
[01:55.630 --> 01:57.850]  I'm a five-time speaker at DEFCON.
[01:58.330 --> 02:03.210]  I've also spoken internationally on election security at DEFCAMP in Romania.
[02:03.690 --> 02:06.230]  I'm the founder and CEO of Girls Who Hack.
[02:06.470 --> 02:10.330]  Our motto is teaching girls the skills of hacking so that they can change the future.
[02:10.330 --> 02:17.050]  I have also started building my own end-to-end election system called Secure Open Vote.
[02:17.510 --> 02:23.850]  My election hacking from DEFCON was highlighted at a congressional hearing on election security.
[02:25.490 --> 02:29.010]  Let's start off with a definition and then a little history.
[02:30.010 --> 02:40.630]  PsyOps is short for Psychological Warfare Operations, which are military operations usually aimed at influencing the enemy's state of mind through non-combative means.
[02:41.070 --> 02:48.750]  These techniques are used by military and political forces to influence the beliefs, emotions, and behaviors of citizens.
[02:49.450 --> 02:51.950]  At the end of the day, it's all marketing.
[02:51.950 --> 02:55.090]  But instead of a product, they are selling you an ideal.
[02:57.050 --> 02:58.530]  Now for some history.
[02:59.110 --> 03:05.350]  It was the year 329 BC, and Alexander the Great was conquering empires all around.
[03:05.350 --> 03:09.370]  He quickly took over large parts of Europe and the Middle East.
[03:09.970 --> 03:22.230]  As his army started taking over more and more land, the number of soldiers he had to defend those lands started to dwindle, causing Alexander to wonder if he could keep all this newfound territory to himself.
[03:22.950 --> 03:29.710]  That's when Alexander the Great had a brilliant idea that would intimidate the enemy without having to do much work at all.
[03:32.070 --> 03:40.810]  After conquering a new city, Alexander had his armies leave behind large pieces of armor that would fit a seven-foot-tall giant.
[03:41.170 --> 03:46.610]  When the enemy soldiers passed by, they would see massive chest plates, helmets, and boots.
[03:46.890 --> 03:54.550]  This surely intimidated the enemy, making them wonder if they could ever defeat Alexander the Great's army of giants.
[03:57.130 --> 04:03.550]  Years later, Genghis Khan also proved that the power of intimidation can go a long way.
[04:03.870 --> 04:10.370]  Before attacking a city, he would send messengers ahead to tell of the horrible huge army that was coming to attack.
[04:10.650 --> 04:17.350]  When this presumably huge army came, all you could see was a massive dust storm coming your way.
[04:17.350 --> 04:27.810]  This wasn't caused by the soldiers in the army, but rather by rocks and heavy objects dragged behind the horses, creating the illusion of a large army.
[04:29.210 --> 04:34.890]  His archers also shot arrows that would whistle in the wind, further intimidating the enemy.
[04:36.810 --> 04:40.750]  Now, we will jump ahead to World War I and World War II.
[04:41.250 --> 04:45.910]  Back in 1914, the Germans were the first to send pamphlets to the enemy troops.
[04:45.910 --> 04:53.050]  After observing how well this tactic worked, the United States decided to jump in and make some propaganda of their own.
[04:53.490 --> 05:00.270]  These leaflets had topics such as how successful the American troops were and how poorly the German troops were doing.
[05:01.910 --> 05:06.250]  Each nation used propaganda on their own citizens as well.
[05:06.710 --> 05:12.470]  Their goal was to get them to enlist in the military or to have them send money and supplies to help the troops.
[05:14.510 --> 05:16.750]  In the Vietnam War, the U.S.
[05:17.130 --> 05:24.630]  military played a soundtrack called Ghost Tape Number 10 in the Vietnamese jungles at night to persuade the troops to surrender.
[05:27.650 --> 05:32.910]  U.S. forces hoped that the operation, codenamed Wandering Soul, would prey on the fears of many Vietnamese.
[05:33.830 --> 05:39.950]  The Vietnamese culture includes beliefs and rituals that show respect for the dead.
[05:40.230 --> 05:45.950]  They believe if a person is not properly buried, they will wander the earth as a wandering soul.
[05:47.630 --> 05:56.610]  In the Gulf War, psychological tactics were successful because they threatened consequences to those who did not abide by the coalition's rules.
[05:58.190 --> 06:06.250]  The American military also promised the Iraqi troops that no harm would come to them and they would be treated very well if they surrendered.
[06:07.290 --> 06:11.590]  These messages were delivered by air dropping pamphlets over the battlefield.
[06:13.550 --> 06:16.990]  Many Iraqi troops surrendered, holding that pamphlet.
[06:19.510 --> 06:27.330]  Messages were also delivered by radio, as it was one of the few options soldiers in the field had to distract themselves from the war.
[06:27.330 --> 06:35.530]  The Arabs also tried some psyops tactics on the coalition forces using a broadcaster by the name of Baghdad Betty.
[06:35.930 --> 06:43.410]  She told the soldiers that while out were, their wives were at home sleeping with celebrities such as...
[06:43.970 --> 06:49.970]  Mel Gibson, Tom Cruise, and this is the best one... Bart Simpson.
[06:51.350 --> 06:56.990]  This illustrates why you need to do research on your target audience before launching a campaign.
[06:57.630 --> 07:08.730]  You may be wondering how a tiny piece of paper or radio message can make soldiers give up all they have already sacrificed, and how warning messages intimidate entire armies.
[07:09.110 --> 07:13.950]  To answer these questions, let's take a deeper look into the prior examples.
[07:13.950 --> 07:21.910]  Before any psyops attack is used on the enemy, they're usually tired, hungry, stressed, and even depressed.
[07:23.810 --> 07:30.950]  Additionally, all propaganda typically ties into one or more of the seven deadly sins.
[07:32.470 --> 07:40.290]  Lust, gluttony, pride, sloth, wrath, greed, and envy.
[07:41.010 --> 07:45.310]  These seven deadly sins are the greatest desires known to humankind.
[07:45.510 --> 07:50.270]  So avoiding these feelings in such a horrible condition is virtually impossible.
[07:50.650 --> 07:58.950]  They also play on the strong human emotions of anger, fear, and hate.
[07:59.370 --> 08:02.990]  These emotions are also the easiest to stir up in an individual.
[08:03.570 --> 08:09.590]  With that in mind, let's look back on Alexander the Great and why he left behind those large pieces of armor.
[08:10.150 --> 08:14.870]  Keep in mind, back then the average height was much shorter than people these days.
[08:15.810 --> 08:23.490]  Picture yourself as one of these soldiers, tracking down Alexander's army, and finding pieces of armor that are twice the size of yours.
[08:23.710 --> 08:25.750]  That would definitely strike fear in your heart.
[08:26.990 --> 08:32.390]  Genghis Khan used the power of false numbers to his advantage as he stormed through cities and towns.
[08:32.390 --> 08:40.470]  This time, imagine yourself as a soldier in a city near a dusty plain, as far as the eye can see.
[08:41.050 --> 08:45.250]  Suddenly, you hear what you believe to be thousands of horse hooves in the distance.
[08:45.550 --> 08:54.770]  A huge cloud of dust appears as you watch your certain doom approaching, practically engulfing your seemingly tiny army by comparison.
[08:55.210 --> 08:57.330]  Again, fear was the emotion used here.
[08:59.550 --> 09:12.150]  In times of World War I and World War II, you would see propaganda everywhere in your town or city, coming in forms such as posters, billboards, newspaper ads, and pamphlets.
[09:12.150 --> 09:17.490]  These posters including sayings such as, I want you for the U.S.
[09:17.650 --> 09:19.110]  Army, which plays on pride.
[09:19.370 --> 09:20.590]  And in this one.
[09:20.690 --> 09:23.350]  He volunteered for some marine service.
[09:23.670 --> 09:24.930]  Which plays on lust.
[09:25.390 --> 09:27.710]  That covers things back home.
[09:27.870 --> 09:30.870]  But what about campaigns on the front lines?
[09:32.790 --> 09:41.410]  Because of the British blockade, getting food to Germany was virtually impossible, leaving the German troops with little rations.
[09:41.410 --> 09:49.070]  This gave the British the idea to send out leaflets with pictures of their soldiers eating great food and smiling brightly.
[09:49.610 --> 09:53.670]  Many men went to sleep hungry that night holding that leaflet.
[09:54.250 --> 09:58.550]  This is a perfect example of gluttony in a psyops campaign.
[10:00.070 --> 10:06.990]  Now, picture yourself as a Vietnamese soldier walking through a dark, damp jungle in the middle of the night.
[10:06.990 --> 10:12.550]  You're tired, hungry, and just want to go back home to your family, who you haven't seen in weeks.
[10:12.770 --> 10:17.530]  When suddenly, you hear the sound of your fellow soldiers who have died.
[10:17.890 --> 10:20.410]  Their souls wandering through the jungle forever.
[10:20.690 --> 10:26.950]  And the eerie sounds of Buddhist funeral music, screaming, crying, and the sounds of ghosts and spirits.
[10:27.810 --> 10:28.930]  Let's take a listen.
[11:02.660 --> 11:04.100]  Pretty freaky, huh?
[11:05.060 --> 11:07.600]  I would just run away right then and there.
[11:09.020 --> 11:11.640]  At the time of the Gulf War, the U.S.
[11:11.740 --> 11:19.660]  sent pamphlets out to the Arabian soldiers, telling them that if they surrendered, they would treat them very well and no harm would come to them.
[11:19.660 --> 11:25.400]  These pamphlets were designed with the help of cooperative Iraqi prisoners of war.
[11:25.740 --> 11:33.740]  They advised against using the color red and featured soldiers with bowls of fruits, including bananas, as you can see here to the left.
[11:34.640 --> 11:36.830]  Bananas are a delicacy to the Arabians.
[11:36.980 --> 11:39.820]  This played on the sins of greed and gluttony.
[11:42.580 --> 11:53.180]  Back then, they put propaganda wherever a large number of people would see it every day, like posters at a grocery store or an ad in a newspaper.
[11:53.820 --> 11:58.600]  These days, what is a widely used means of sharing opinions and information?
[11:59.420 --> 12:02.520]  That's right, social media!
[12:03.440 --> 12:05.180]  82% of U.S.
[12:05.280 --> 12:07.280]  citizens have a social media profile.
[12:07.520 --> 12:09.380]  Most likely, you have one, too.
[12:11.140 --> 12:17.700]  Propaganda used to be a blunt tool that had to be tailored to appeal to a large general audience.
[12:19.460 --> 12:25.320]  With social media, ads can be targeted directly to a specific demographic.
[12:26.400 --> 12:33.180]  There are many social media platforms, but today we will be focusing on two big ones.
[12:33.380 --> 12:36.760]  I don't know if you've heard of these, but Facebook and Twitter.
[12:39.180 --> 12:44.800]  Have you ever noticed that your social media ads seem to be targeting you?
[12:45.120 --> 12:54.320]  The other day, you were looking up cupcake recipes, and suddenly, Facebook feed is recommending the baking topic in ads for mixers?
[12:54.320 --> 13:04.820]  That is because the algorithm is targeting you by tracking your likes, searches, who you follow, and who you interact with.
[13:07.180 --> 13:16.480]  You also have a digital fingerprint that ties in all your devices, searches, apps, and pretty much everything you do online together.
[13:17.660 --> 13:20.740]  Facebook and Twitter know you better than you know yourself.
[13:21.140 --> 13:26.080]  The data from the algorithm helps them recommend topics and advertisements to you.
[13:26.740 --> 13:32.840]  If you have already done some research in modern psyops, this name will be no surprise to you.
[13:34.340 --> 13:35.780]  Cambridge Analytica.
[13:36.380 --> 13:38.600]  I love the one person that chuckled.
[13:40.360 --> 13:48.520]  Cambridge Analytica was a political consulting firm that used large data sets to target and change the minds of voters.
[13:50.480 --> 13:57.960]  Though the parent company was located in Great Britain, they saw a huge opportunity in the United States.
[13:58.280 --> 14:09.280]  Back in 2016, consultants working for the Donald Trump's presidential campaign saw out Cambridge Analytica to help him and his campaign team.
[14:09.280 --> 14:16.560]  Trump's campaign spent over $44 million to run 5.9 million Facebook ads.
[14:16.960 --> 14:23.520]  At its peak, Cambridge Analytica was spending over $1 million a day on Facebook ads alone.
[14:24.080 --> 14:29.960]  Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton's campaign spent $28 million on 66,000 ads.
[14:32.000 --> 14:36.300]  It all starts with Facebook personality surveys.
[14:36.300 --> 14:43.940]  Jane Baumbauer, professor of law at the University of Arizona, best describes how these surveys started out.
[14:44.400 --> 15:00.920]  In 2014, Alexander Kogan, a young professor of law at Cambridge University, made a personality quiz called, This is your digital life, that attempted to categorize these people who took it into a set of psychometric profiles.
[15:00.920 --> 15:14.120]  Almost everyone who took the quiz agreed to let him access not only their public account information, but all of it, including every like, dislike, follow, but also the profiles of their friends.
[15:14.600 --> 15:21.040]  That's how a few hundred thousand survey takers grew into a database of 87 million people.
[15:21.040 --> 15:39.760]  And even though only those few hundred thousand took the personality quiz that mapped out their psychometric profile, The researcher could use the results to build a statistical model that could then predict the psychometric profiles of the other 86 million Facebook users.
[15:40.660 --> 15:51.460]  The profiles were then provided to the researchers' company, Cambridge Analytica, which used them as assets to try to get political consulting clients like Donald Trump.
[15:51.980 --> 16:00.540]  In 2015, Facebook changed its policies to restrict how third-party companies collect information from Facebook users.
[16:00.540 --> 16:07.400]  By the time the change was implemented, Cambridge Analytica had already received the data.
[16:09.360 --> 16:14.940]  They used these Facebook personality surveys to sort people into a few main categories.
[16:15.280 --> 16:21.280]  The survey, coupled with other Facebook data, created what is known as an Ocean Score.
[16:21.280 --> 16:31.520]  Ocean, also known as the Big Five, stood for openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.
[16:32.000 --> 16:37.700]  Depending on your Ocean Score, they would determine if you are a persuadable.
[16:38.040 --> 16:38.940]  A.k.a.
[16:39.360 --> 16:42.340]  someone whose political views could be easily changed.
[16:44.400 --> 16:48.200]  They didn't target their ads at all the persuadables.
[16:48.200 --> 16:51.140]  They only focused on the swing states.
[16:51.640 --> 16:55.240]  Florida, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan.
[16:55.840 --> 17:00.100]  They knew that if they flipped these few states, they would win the election.
[17:00.340 --> 17:04.920]  In order to swing the persuadables, they created ad campaigns.
[17:07.280 --> 17:13.920]  One example of an ad campaign that Cambridge Analytica created was the Crooked Hillary campaign.
[17:13.920 --> 17:20.360]  Their logo included handcuffs as the O's, and their slogan was Lock Her Up.
[17:21.900 --> 17:27.800]  Their art department would create many uncredited images and post them to Facebook.
[17:28.340 --> 17:36.940]  People who received these ads would not only like and share the ad, but would screenshot it and share it to other social media platforms.
[17:37.700 --> 17:39.680]  Effectively, free advertising.
[17:40.480 --> 17:48.840]  Cambridge Analytica created the spark, and social media became the flame, ending with the explosive 2016 election results.
[17:49.280 --> 17:59.360]  It is likely we will never again have free and fair elections, where candidates are chosen by their platform and ideas instead of lies and fake advertising.
[17:59.360 --> 18:10.420]  As you can see, these ads use childish bullying tactics, such as name-calling, as well as playing with wrath, fear, and pride.
[18:13.490 --> 18:26.070]  Cambridge was at its high point following the 2016 elections, when whistleblowers like Brittany Kaiser and Chris Wiley decided to take a stand against the company.
[18:26.070 --> 18:40.550]  After pleading guilty for taking people's personal data and refusing to give it back, this might be a shocker, the company declared bankruptcy and shut down for good.
[18:40.550 --> 18:44.110]  But this can't be the end of the story.
[18:44.430 --> 18:46.030]  What happened to all that data?
[18:46.470 --> 18:48.950]  I'm sure it wasn't simply deleted.
[18:49.470 --> 18:57.590]  It's no surprise that their business closing opened up a new era of disinformation for hire.
[18:58.930 --> 19:12.290]  Social media has the tools to sow disinformation at scale to affect anything from a small local government election to spreading disinformation about COVID vaccines or even upsetting a country's elections.
[19:13.950 --> 19:21.430]  This can be seen today as Spanish language anti-vaccine ads are pushed on Facebook, as shown here.
[19:21.430 --> 19:28.330]  It really makes you wonder where this disinformation is coming from and what their goal is.
[19:30.900 --> 19:38.920]  An example of influencing elections, Cambridge Analytica was able to flip the elections in Trinidad and Tobago.
[19:38.920 --> 19:53.300]  They were hired by the majority, Indian United National Congress Party, to defeat the incumbent People's National Movement, which primarily attracts Afro-Trimbangonian voters.
[19:53.820 --> 19:58.560]  They researched both audiences and decided to target the young voters.
[19:58.560 --> 20:04.400]  They knew the young Indian UNC voters would do what their parents told them to do and go vote for the UNC.
[20:04.980 --> 20:21.360]  So they focused their efforts on the Afro-Trimbangonian voters, creating a campaign called Do So to increase apathy towards voting and politics in general, encouraging them not to vote.
[20:21.700 --> 20:23.260]  Did this tactic work?
[20:24.260 --> 20:25.540]  Yes, it did.
[20:25.900 --> 20:29.200]  The United National Congress Party won the election.
[20:29.520 --> 20:32.260]  In case you are thinking, this is recent news.
[20:32.460 --> 20:39.680]  This happened back in 2010, meaning that this sort of election manipulation has been going on for a long time.
[20:40.500 --> 20:48.100]  Besides creating campaigns and posting to social media, these private firms offer the ultimate power in a disinformation campaign.
[20:49.620 --> 20:50.300]  Deniability.
[20:52.240 --> 21:01.640]  Governments and political figures can contract these disinformation companies to do their dirty work, making it very difficult to trace the source.
[21:02.280 --> 21:13.480]  Content farms produce thousands of legitimate-looking accounts, complete with an untraceable, unique profile picture and a posting history.
[21:13.480 --> 21:28.340]  The bonus is real people spread these conspiracies and lies by sharing and reposting on multiple platforms, giving a huge return on a relatively small investment.
[21:31.600 --> 21:38.020]  If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.
[21:40.220 --> 21:44.540]  Donald Trump has been doing this even before he was out of office.
[21:44.840 --> 21:54.260]  He told his constituents that if he didn't win the election, it was rigged, conditioning his followers to rise up if he did not win the election.
[21:54.260 --> 22:06.060]  Once the election results were in, and were certified that Joe Biden was declared the winner, Trump started claiming the election was rigged, stirring up wrath in his followers.
[22:06.060 --> 22:10.120]  Leading to the January 6th attack on the Capitol.
[22:10.680 --> 22:16.640]  Trump still tells this lie that the election was rigged, despite the total lack of evidence.
[22:17.000 --> 22:18.840]  Yet, his followers believe it.
[22:20.820 --> 22:27.880]  The underlying message to his followers is, if you don't win something, it's because it was stolen from you.
[22:31.030 --> 22:37.450]  Believe it or not, Cambridge Analytica wasn't the only one persuading voters in the U.S.
[22:37.910 --> 22:42.830]  Russian actors also used social media to cause havoc and divide the country.
[22:43.490 --> 22:45.610]  Why in the world would Russia do this?
[22:45.990 --> 22:51.270]  Unlike Cambridge Analytica, they are not out to gain money, but rather power.
[22:52.090 --> 22:57.970]  Soviet Premier Khrushchev said, We do not have to invade the United States.
[22:58.210 --> 23:00.350]  We will destroy you from within.
[23:01.030 --> 23:03.550]  That is exactly what Russia is doing.
[23:03.770 --> 23:06.510]  Dividing the country so it destroys itself from within.
[23:07.310 --> 23:12.830]  I wonder why everyone tries to gain power by belittling others instead of bettering themselves.
[23:13.150 --> 23:18.670]  If the world was in friendly competition with each other, we could have made so much more progress as a society.
[23:20.390 --> 23:30.110]  The Russian actors created Facebook accounts and groups, as well as Twitter bots, all impersonating U.S. citizens and organized groups.
[23:31.190 --> 23:36.230]  One example of this is South United.
[23:37.670 --> 23:45.190]  As you can see here, this ad was paid for in... rubles!
[23:47.550 --> 23:51.470]  You can also see the interest tags they use.
[23:51.910 --> 23:52.910]  Let's read some of these.
[23:53.390 --> 23:54.610]  Fox News Channel.
[23:55.110 --> 23:55.910]  Christianity.
[23:56.550 --> 23:57.730]  Bill O'Reilly.
[23:58.210 --> 23:58.870]  Let's see.
[23:59.010 --> 23:59.810]  Mike Pence.
[24:00.150 --> 24:02.510]  Donald Trump Jr. Politics.
[24:03.190 --> 24:03.390]  Yeah.
[24:04.630 --> 24:07.050]  Pretty obvious what their demographic is.
[24:07.990 --> 24:12.090]  People who follow these accounts also like and repost the content.
[24:12.090 --> 24:18.610]  One of the ad tools on Facebook allows you to send ads to friends and people you follow.
[24:19.310 --> 24:24.870]  You can then pick from thousands of different keywords targeting even more interest groups.
[24:25.670 --> 24:31.830]  The Russians also make fake news websites that appear to be real news sources but are actually fake.
[24:31.830 --> 24:33.230]  Here are some examples.
[24:36.490 --> 24:44.050]  When Bob goes on Facebook and reads an article on how Hillary's crooked, he probably won't check where it came from.
[24:44.210 --> 24:48.590]  But he will like and repost to all his friends so they can do the same.
[24:48.770 --> 24:50.470]  And so on and so forth.
[24:52.270 --> 24:56.050]  The younger audience may be thinking, yeah, of course it's fake.
[24:56.210 --> 24:57.150]  I can tell that.
[24:57.390 --> 25:04.270]  But you have to understand that the older audience was brought up believing all news sources are fully fact checked.
[25:04.630 --> 25:08.690]  They have applied this belief to all modern delivery platforms.
[25:09.310 --> 25:12.450]  After all, Facebook is where I connect with my friends and family.
[25:12.630 --> 25:14.070]  Why would Facebook lie to me?
[25:14.770 --> 25:19.290]  This news article must be real because the site it's on looks real.
[25:19.930 --> 25:27.830]  Turns out this newspaper's mailing address is in a shopping mall between Forever 21 and Claire's.
[25:28.290 --> 25:31.050]  There is also a building in Washington, D.C.
[25:31.270 --> 25:32.690]  full of mailboxes.
[25:32.870 --> 25:42.230]  This gives any blogger living in his parents' basement the ability to list a legitimate-sounding physical address on the bottom of his news site.
[25:44.410 --> 25:50.810]  An interesting fact is that the Russians target both sides, not just one like Cambridge did.
[25:51.270 --> 25:54.230]  This way, they can divide and conquer.
[25:54.730 --> 26:01.730]  In the U.S., Russian influence reached over 126 million people through Facebook alone.
[26:03.530 --> 26:11.370]  They created fake Black Lives Matter memes that when you clicked on them, you were taken to pages inviting you to a protest.
[26:11.370 --> 26:24.990]  At the same time, they were targeting adversary groups like Blue Lives Matter with similar fake pages, inviting them to a protest at the same location on the same day.
[26:25.610 --> 26:32.050]  The Russian government is organizing face-to-face protests in order to get us to fight with each other and divide the country.
[26:32.930 --> 26:35.490]  So far, we have talked about Facebook.
[26:35.850 --> 26:40.870]  But when you think about political discussions, your mind goes straight to...
[26:42.150 --> 26:42.790]  Twitter!
[26:43.850 --> 26:50.510]  Just like Facebook, Twitter is used by Russians and other groups, so disinformation to the American populace.
[26:50.830 --> 26:53.970]  Many using the same techniques that are used on Facebook.
[26:53.970 --> 26:58.610]  One big problem with Twitter is the low bar for entry.
[26:59.150 --> 27:04.330]  This allows groups to use tools that create many bot accounts very quickly.
[27:04.910 --> 27:08.110]  These accounts then go and tweet the same things.
[27:08.470 --> 27:13.190]  Once the bot gets caught and blocked, they simply create a new batch of accounts.
[27:15.190 --> 27:23.410]  The Twitter bots also retweet other bots' tweets as is shown in this beautiful graphic by Daniel Gallagher.
[27:23.970 --> 27:26.250]  It's just like turtle bots all the way down.
[27:26.450 --> 27:28.050]  I hope some of you got that reference.
[27:29.310 --> 27:31.690]  And at this moment, I want to take a pause.
[27:32.970 --> 27:35.950]  And, like they said earlier, take a water break.
[27:36.090 --> 27:38.090]  I don't want anyone passing out during my talk.
[27:38.290 --> 27:39.550]  Or falling asleep.
[27:39.850 --> 27:41.210]  Yes, I'm looking at you in the back.
[27:54.360 --> 27:55.500]  And let's continue.
[27:57.080 --> 28:00.040]  Going back to the seven deadly sins in Lust.
[28:00.340 --> 28:04.320]  These bot accounts frequently feature beautiful young women.
[28:04.440 --> 28:07.900]  Because the target audience is primarily male voters.
[28:07.900 --> 28:14.860]  I'd like to take a second to show the beautiful Photoshop quality of some of their profile pictures.
[28:15.100 --> 28:21.580]  As you can see, the girl in the top left, they didn't even Photoshop the words to actually fit around the curve of her hat.
[28:21.700 --> 28:24.440]  They just, like, pasted it in and thought, oh, good job.
[28:24.960 --> 28:25.140]  You know.
[28:28.340 --> 28:30.440]  Take this account, for example.
[28:31.120 --> 28:36.080]  These photos were stolen off a Colombian Instagram influencer's account.
[28:36.940 --> 28:41.440]  If you look over there, you can see her name is obviously not in English.
[28:41.800 --> 28:44.880]  You can see some of the tags, like, God bless America.
[28:45.400 --> 28:46.000]  Conservative.
[28:47.980 --> 28:49.120]  Trump 2020.
[28:49.620 --> 28:50.880]  Sisters by Trump.
[28:51.200 --> 28:51.520]  Etc.
[28:51.900 --> 28:55.200]  But if you look at location, Estados Unidos.
[28:55.640 --> 28:57.420]  That's the United States, but not in English?
[28:57.900 --> 29:00.360]  Wait, how many languages are going on over here?
[29:00.360 --> 29:02.420]  High quality.
[29:02.620 --> 29:03.000]  High quality.
[29:03.720 --> 29:03.900]  High quality.
[29:04.180 --> 29:07.040]  You've had some history and some examples.
[29:07.300 --> 29:10.500]  Now, let's walk through a PsyOps campaign together.
[29:10.960 --> 29:14.760]  There are six basic steps to a PsyOps campaign.
[29:16.340 --> 29:17.260]  Plan.
[29:17.740 --> 29:18.920]  Target audience.
[29:19.400 --> 29:20.560]  Series development.
[29:21.040 --> 29:22.080]  Product design.
[29:22.760 --> 29:23.460]  Dissemination.
[29:23.460 --> 29:24.520]  And evaluation.
[29:26.000 --> 29:30.760]  For our example, I will be combining some of these steps together.
[29:32.960 --> 29:35.200]  First step is planning.
[29:35.560 --> 29:39.900]  In this phase, you determine your goal and who your target audience is.
[29:40.480 --> 29:46.920]  For our example, the objective will be convincing Bob that unicorns are real.
[29:46.920 --> 29:50.880]  So let's call this Operation Twilight.
[29:52.200 --> 29:57.620]  For any operation, it helps to give your target audience an individual identity.
[29:58.000 --> 30:01.480]  This makes the series development and product design so much easier.
[30:01.660 --> 30:03.960]  That's why we have created Bob.
[30:04.260 --> 30:06.020]  I'm sorry to anyone named Bob in the audience.
[30:06.180 --> 30:07.080]  I'm not targeting you, I swear.
[30:08.880 --> 30:11.520]  Next, we refine our target audience.
[30:11.780 --> 30:14.940]  We chose Bob, but who is Bob?
[30:14.940 --> 30:19.520]  We picked Bob because he does many Facebook personality surveys.
[30:20.000 --> 30:22.760]  And through those, we found out he is a persuadable.
[30:23.100 --> 30:27.460]  He is also very active online with his friends.
[30:27.720 --> 30:30.880]  This will be a force multiplier to our operation.
[30:31.560 --> 30:37.800]  Now that we have our objective and our target audience, let's move on to...
[30:39.000 --> 30:42.120]  Series development and product design.
[30:43.000 --> 30:48.040]  I put these two together because they happen hand in hand in a campaign.
[30:49.040 --> 30:55.460]  Though it seems logical, we can't just make an ad that says, Unicorns are real!
[30:55.800 --> 30:56.360]  And be done.
[30:56.880 --> 30:59.420]  Bob will just laugh at it and move on.
[30:59.620 --> 31:01.640]  It has nothing to do with his interests.
[31:02.660 --> 31:11.020]  What we need to do is slowly pull Bob through a series of targeted ads and psyops that convince him unicorns are real.
[31:16.130 --> 31:23.570]  First, we'll send out some articles from our fake online newspaper that is made to look like a legitimate popular site.
[31:23.770 --> 31:26.690]  Scary to think that some people might actually believe this is real.
[31:27.370 --> 31:38.670]  The article talks about how scientists have managed to splice the DNA of a narwhal with the DNA of a horse, causing horses to start growing a horn.
[31:40.990 --> 31:54.050]  This article will have links to our scientific journal with more articles on how this DNA splicing works, complete with a case study of the unicorn gene splicing.
[31:54.050 --> 31:59.130]  We can also add legitimate sounding scientists' names and quotes.
[32:02.500 --> 32:06.380]  Soon after these, similar articles will be posted.
[32:06.720 --> 32:13.300]  One being how scientists have managed to manipulate the DNA to determine its length of the horn.
[32:13.560 --> 32:16.900]  Allowing our unicorns to have a more normal looking horn.
[32:18.440 --> 32:22.600]  Next, our art department will generate pictures of unicorns.
[32:22.720 --> 32:31.800]  And since Bob is a bit of a conspiracy nut, we will make them look as if the pictures come from surveillance camera footage and hidden camera shots.
[32:31.800 --> 32:35.940]  Bob will love this and share these photos with his friends.
[32:36.260 --> 32:39.540]  His friends, who share similar interests, believe him.
[32:39.880 --> 32:42.360]  But others are more skeptical.
[32:42.760 --> 32:52.020]  When these friends laugh at him, he will simply share the links to our newspaper and scientific journals, causing many of them to join Bob as a unicorn convert.
[32:55.470 --> 32:56.150]  Dissemination.
[32:56.930 --> 33:01.630]  Dissemination has been happening through Facebook ads that look like legitimate news articles.
[33:01.630 --> 33:07.690]  We can also create a scientific podcast, interviewing the scientists who made the unicorn.
[33:08.050 --> 33:16.690]  This podcast will be supported by the numerous fake Instagram and Twitter accounts we are using to spread photos of our unicorn.
[33:19.130 --> 33:22.790]  Finally, we evaluate our operation.
[33:23.030 --> 33:25.010]  Turns out, it worked.
[33:25.450 --> 33:35.030]  Not only did we convince Bob that unicorns are real, He also used our propaganda to convince his friends that they were real.
[33:35.270 --> 33:40.450]  As a bonus, Bob started a blog about unicorns, further spreading our message.
[33:40.970 --> 33:44.360]  He also put together the theory that scientists could add...
[33:45.510 --> 33:46.210]  Wings!
[33:47.350 --> 33:54.290]  Now that Bob is the admin of unicornsareal.com, he and his friends are pulling in others.
[33:54.490 --> 34:02.570]  All pointing, pun intended, at our original products from our serious development and product design phase.
[34:03.230 --> 34:06.930]  This operation has taken on a life of its own.
[34:06.930 --> 34:12.730]  If we wanted to, we could create more surveillance footage of an alicorn in our lab.
[34:12.950 --> 34:19.590]  And for you uncultured folks, an alicorn is a pegasus and a unicorn together, as seen in this picture here.
[34:20.850 --> 34:24.130]  Well, that was a successful psyops operation.
[34:25.030 --> 34:32.750]  If we wanted to keep this going, we could revisit all the steps and expand on our operation to include more and more people.
[34:32.750 --> 34:35.870]  But I think we've done enough damage for today.
[34:38.030 --> 34:43.510]  Today, you got some history, some psychology, and a heavy dose of reality.
[34:43.950 --> 34:49.230]  Here are a few examples of how you can protect yourself against social media psyops.
[34:49.850 --> 34:52.790]  One, install an ad blocker.
[34:53.010 --> 34:56.770]  This way, you only get feed and not targeted information.
[34:57.230 --> 35:02.330]  One I highly recommend is Piehole, which blocks ads on an entire network.
[35:04.470 --> 35:08.010]  Two, don't take any online quizzes or surveys.
[35:08.350 --> 35:14.070]  I know it's tempting to find out what ice cream flavor you are, but it's best not to give out personal information.
[35:14.350 --> 35:16.790]  No matter as minor as it may seem.
[35:18.410 --> 35:25.490]  Three, when reading an article, always, always, always, always check the sources and who wrote it.
[35:25.790 --> 35:30.190]  Don't forget to compare it to other articles from trusted sites.
[35:30.190 --> 35:33.190]  And, last but not least...
[35:33.770 --> 35:39.070]  Four, always make sure to fact check everything you see and read online.
[35:39.530 --> 35:46.290]  Never base your opinion on just one thing and learn what both sides have to say before forming an opinion.
[35:49.600 --> 35:55.720]  Even though social media can be a scary place, it can also be an educational one and a ton of fun.
[35:55.720 --> 35:58.020]  You just need to balance it with reality.
[35:58.280 --> 36:01.580]  Go outside and get some fresh air once in a while.
[36:02.460 --> 36:04.220]  And on that, I am BSI Lab.
[36:04.360 --> 36:07.460]  And you can follow me on these social media platforms.
[36:08.620 --> 36:09.280]  Thank you.
[36:20.480 --> 36:21.280]  Oh, on that?
[36:21.820 --> 36:22.180]  Where?
[36:22.320 --> 36:22.540]  Which one?
[36:22.580 --> 36:22.800]  This one?
[36:22.800 --> 36:23.160]  Anyone.
[36:23.460 --> 36:28.500]  So, if you have any questions, you can put them in the matrix or you can come up and ask the question.
[36:30.280 --> 36:30.880]  Yep.
[36:31.140 --> 36:57.320]  So, um, you were describing the Trump campaign in South Korea, I believe it was 2003, and then subsequently where the intelligence that they should have had at least 400 people simply texting back and forth to the Korean voters' perspective.
[37:12.710 --> 37:16.930]  It turned the election toward the right-wing candidate.
[37:17.850 --> 37:19.890]  Did you ever hear about this?
[37:20.090 --> 37:20.930]  No, I didn't.
[37:21.010 --> 37:22.110]  Do you know the name of the campaign?
[37:22.330 --> 37:23.190]  I'd like to research it.
[37:23.430 --> 37:28.150]  Well, the dictator's daughter also got elected through the same process.
[37:28.150 --> 37:30.810]  But this was back in 2003.
[37:30.950 --> 37:33.730]  It was the presidential election, et cetera, et cetera.
[37:34.430 --> 37:38.330]  I'm sure I reported on it at some point a long time ago.
[37:39.870 --> 37:41.350]  But there was one other thing.
[37:41.670 --> 37:55.490]  So, basically, when I saw that take place back almost 20 years ago, I realized that it appeared to be a test run for what you're describing that is much more sophisticated.
[37:56.370 --> 38:03.970]  And, um, there's not much of a separation between the United States government and the South Korean government.
[38:04.430 --> 38:06.250]  Basically, it's almost one and the same.
[38:06.530 --> 38:14.150]  But, um, oh, the last thing you said was to always fact-check the content that you run into online.
[38:14.150 --> 38:17.990]  And I encourage people to do that all the time.
[38:18.210 --> 38:21.290]  And a lot of people say, okay, I'll Google it.
[38:21.410 --> 38:23.530]  And I said, no, don't Google it.
[38:23.770 --> 38:24.650]  Fact-check it.
[38:24.830 --> 38:32.410]  And, um, I would give them some instruction to help them, uh, fact-check without using Google.
[38:32.410 --> 38:39.910]  But I would ask, what would your advice to somebody who was ready to push the Google button, but we don't want them to.
[38:40.030 --> 38:43.230]  We want them to actually fact-check it with something more legitimate.
[38:43.430 --> 38:47.110]  What is the generic means of fact-checking that you'd suggest?
[38:47.850 --> 38:54.210]  Well, the best source to get information from, if it's about something a person said, is to see what they actually said.
[38:54.470 --> 39:13.190]  So, if you see an article saying that Pinkie Pie said so-and-so about Rainbow Dash, go and see if she actually said it, whether that being in, like, in her Twitter posts, like her actual legitimate account, or if she said something in an actual interview and she verbally said it,
[39:13.850 --> 39:19.830]  um, see what she said from her, from the direct account of her own voice.
[39:19.830 --> 39:30.850]  But just more generally, um, if we're going to check a fact that is not important, what search engines or other sources would you recommend?
[39:32.210 --> 39:33.210]  Official sources.
[39:33.590 --> 39:45.050]  Just like I said, even though my example is a personal source, that also works for broad sources and, like, actual newspapers that are a bigger deal.
[39:45.050 --> 39:54.610]  Because if you find some newspaper that looks, like, kind of sketchy, I would check and see if any other, like, big newspaper, um, New York Times...
[39:54.610 --> 39:56.710]  I don't read newspapers, I'm not that old.
[39:57.210 --> 40:09.100]  New York Times... New York Times and, like, big things that have been around forever, see what they're saying, and obviously see both sides and see what they're saying as well.
[40:10.040 --> 40:11.960]  I'd like to add to that.
[40:12.300 --> 40:17.480]  Um, so, if you notice, a lot of news channels are actually swayed one way or the other.
[40:17.760 --> 40:21.120]  Uh, when I'm watching the elections, I actually watch BBC.
[40:21.880 --> 40:27.020]  Um, try and get a, a, a non-partisan, uh, act to that.
[40:27.600 --> 40:32.400]  Um, so, uh, outside of, uh, and this is a question that's coming in through Matrix.
[40:32.400 --> 40:39.800]  Um, is there a difference between a political ad and a PSYOP, uh, like, uh, Cambridge Analytic, uh, had run?
[40:40.420 --> 40:42.400]  Um, there is kind of a difference.
[40:42.640 --> 40:47.700]  One of them, the political ad, is meant for... to be a political ad.
[40:47.880 --> 40:52.860]  To get somewhere with, um, an election, like, to either make someone lose or make someone win.
[40:53.380 --> 40:59.120]  A PSYOPs attack can be spreading information about anything, like I mentioned before, vaccines.
[41:00.220 --> 41:06.500]  Um, are there any, uh, uh, specific sites to ensure that news sources are trustworthy?
[41:07.880 --> 41:15.560]  Uh, like mentioned, BBC, but I can't really say, like, this side or this side, because all news is sided.
[41:15.860 --> 41:17.100]  Everyone has their own opinion.
[41:17.240 --> 41:24.140]  People writing the news articles are people and will mention things that they want to mention, not everything that a person has said.
[41:24.380 --> 41:25.100]  We have a live question.
[41:26.920 --> 41:28.280]  Uh, yeah, Bia, sorry.
[41:28.280 --> 41:29.580]  Uh, outstanding presentation.
[41:29.740 --> 41:30.220]  Very well done.
[41:30.400 --> 41:31.280]  Just wanted to make you aware.
[41:31.440 --> 41:34.420]  There is a series now that just got released a month or two ago on Netflix.
[41:34.760 --> 41:36.080]  It's called Web of Make Believe.
[41:36.260 --> 41:37.060]  It's six episodes long.
[41:37.240 --> 41:37.940]  You will love it.
[41:38.220 --> 41:39.080]  Okay, got it.
[41:39.200 --> 41:40.540]  And you should all check that out too.
[41:40.680 --> 41:41.060]  It sounds cool.
[41:41.080 --> 41:41.160]  Yeah, of course, for everybody.
[41:41.280 --> 41:41.960]  Web of Make Believe.
[41:42.220 --> 41:43.180]  It is right up your alley.
[41:44.680 --> 41:45.800]  So another question.
[41:46.120 --> 41:56.760]  Um, given the war in Ukraine and Russia, or between Ukraine and Russia, um, there's been a lot about what, um, uh, Putin has been saying to his own people internally.
[41:56.760 --> 42:04.220]  Have you done any research on that or looked into that and see, uh, how he's using psychological warfare internally against his own people?
[42:04.420 --> 42:06.000]  I have looked at some things.
[42:06.180 --> 42:11.060]  I didn't add anything in this talk since the war is still present and going on as we speak.
[42:11.060 --> 42:15.360]  So I'd rather do a talk on it in the future once I know the full story.
[42:15.980 --> 42:22.140]  Um, of course, Putin has his own opinions and information that he's telling his followers.
[42:22.420 --> 42:26.120]  And, of course, they believe it because it's their head of the board.
[42:26.720 --> 42:31.600]  Um, so they might not get access to outside information and think that what he's doing is right.
[42:31.600 --> 42:34.540]  But opinions are very different.
[42:34.820 --> 42:38.020]  Like, depending on what side of things you're on, you think you're right.
[42:38.140 --> 42:42.700]  You think you're the good guy, even though the other side might think you're the bad guy and vice versa.
[42:43.040 --> 42:43.440]  Great.
[42:43.520 --> 42:44.620]  We have another question right over here.
[42:45.280 --> 42:49.120]  What tools do you recommend to somebody trying to run their own psyops campaign?
[42:51.280 --> 42:51.800]  Okay.
[42:52.180 --> 42:55.560]  Uh, as long as you don't do anything, like, really bad.
[42:56.140 --> 43:03.220]  Uh, of course, uh, there's, with a psyops campaign in general, there's the news articles and stuff.
[43:03.380 --> 43:05.240]  Like I said, everyone uses social media.
[43:05.320 --> 43:07.220]  So implement social media.
[43:07.420 --> 43:09.660]  Make an account on all the big things.
[43:09.980 --> 43:14.760]  Uh, make sure everything you make looks realistic, unlike those poorly Photoshopped things.
[43:14.940 --> 43:18.680]  Even though people still believe that, they'll believe something that's more well thought out.
[43:19.340 --> 43:28.740]  And like in the psyops campaign that we made together here with the unicorns, they had different sources like a podcast and a news article and social media.
[43:28.740 --> 43:32.740]  They're using other forms so that it seems more backed up than just one account.
[43:33.400 --> 43:34.540]  We have a question right here.
[43:34.860 --> 43:34.960]  Yep.
[43:35.720 --> 43:51.920]  Uh, just wanted to know if you had heard about the, uh, election that took place in the Philippines, which was, uh, basically, they used, the, the winning, uh, candidate was the son of the former dictator for, uh, Marcos.
[43:52.080 --> 44:03.540]  And his son, Bongbong Marcos, that's his real name, uh, won because he did, he did post an extreme number of lies using social media.
[44:03.540 --> 44:14.140]  But it was largely directed to the younger generation, mostly, which was not a lot, mostly were born after his, uh, born after the father's dictatorship.
[44:14.480 --> 44:28.980]  So there were lies, for example, that during his father's, um, during his father's administration, Philippines, uh, Philippines had the highest growth in GDP during that time, except for Japan, which is absolutely absurd.
[44:29.240 --> 44:41.380]  Uh, so I just wanted to point out that it's not just an older generation, but also it, it was targeted to the young, the massive younger voters, uh, and they pretty much bought it.
[44:41.660 --> 44:43.920]  And he did win the election overwhelmingly.
[44:44.220 --> 44:50.520]  The thing with that is the older voters tend to just do what they've done their whole lives and they're not easily changed.
[44:50.660 --> 44:52.260]  They're like, my way is the right way.
[44:52.460 --> 44:57.880]  Ah, but the younger voters are still trying to figure themselves out and figure out what their opinions are.
[44:58.060 --> 44:59.420]  So they end up being the persuadable.
[44:59.620 --> 45:03.820]  So they're pretty smart to target the young generation, especially at a young age.
[45:04.020 --> 45:07.480]  So that's already like put in their brain as they grow up and develop.
[45:07.700 --> 45:08.560]  It's pretty scary.
[45:12.400 --> 45:12.880]  Okay.
[45:13.460 --> 45:16.120]  So, uh, it's my turn.
[45:16.280 --> 45:16.400]  Yeah.
[45:16.660 --> 45:16.820]  Okay.
[45:16.980 --> 45:35.960]  So on the note of fact checking everything, as you mentioned, I just wanted to point out that the report of an era of an Iraqi Baghdad bug tea who told GIs that Bart Simpson was seducing their wives was actually a joke made up by Johnny Carson that was incorrectly reported by a number of news outlets.
[45:36.380 --> 45:36.880]  Okay.
[45:37.100 --> 45:37.380]  Got it.
[45:42.410 --> 45:53.070]  I wanted to address the issue of fact checking because, um, as a former educator, I would say, go to the source wherever possible.
[45:53.410 --> 45:56.930]  And that's a lot easier than most people think.
[45:56.930 --> 46:07.330]  I mean, there are lots of statistics online that there are newspapers, but if you don't feel comfortable with newspapers, always go to the source.
[46:07.630 --> 46:09.370]  So I'm going to just give an example.
[46:09.810 --> 46:16.990]  For some reason in this country, people act like, for example, the constitution is some type of secret document that nobody can read.
[46:18.210 --> 46:23.550]  And, uh, one day I was teaching government and we were talking about who's qualified to be president.
[46:24.590 --> 46:29.230]  And a young lady in my class said, well, it says there in the constitution, you have to be Christian.
[46:29.330 --> 46:30.710]  I said, no, honey, it doesn't say that.
[46:32.290 --> 46:35.990]  And I said, listen, I'm not going to argue with you, but here's this.
[46:36.170 --> 46:36.770]  We have books.
[46:37.070 --> 46:38.850]  There's a copy of the constitution.
[46:39.930 --> 46:42.590]  Look in, you know, look in article three yourself.
[46:43.010 --> 46:46.750]  And she looked at it and she said, you know, it doesn't say that.
[46:46.950 --> 46:48.970]  And I said, well, let this be a lesson for you.
[46:49.110 --> 46:50.090]  Check for yourself.
[46:50.770 --> 46:54.590]  Don't rely, especially if you have a document that you can go to stop.
[46:54.810 --> 46:57.490]  I don't know why, where people get some of their ideas from.
[46:58.530 --> 46:58.930]  Exactly.
[46:59.110 --> 47:01.990]  That's, that's a really good point that you put up.
[47:02.530 --> 47:14.030]  And another thing with that is when reading a news article, you can kind of spot if it's opinionated, like if it's in a certain person, the way that the author is writing it.
[47:14.130 --> 47:15.950]  It's like, I think that blah, blah, blah.
[47:16.590 --> 47:19.830]  Or if he even says like, he thinks that he's so cool.
[47:20.450 --> 47:21.890]  You don't know what he thinks.
[47:22.130 --> 47:28.110]  Just try to see if it's more solid facts or if it's the author saying his or her own opinion.
[47:28.690 --> 47:30.150]  So I have a question on matrix.
[47:30.150 --> 47:33.690]  And thank you for the online folks who are engaging with these questions.
[47:33.930 --> 47:37.390]  On the slide showing the ad campaigns, demographic targets, and payment information.
[47:37.590 --> 47:38.970]  Where did that information come from?
[47:39.050 --> 47:43.410]  Was that from Facebook, Twitter, official disclosure, or other intelligence sources open or closed?
[47:43.550 --> 47:47.670]  Do you have recommended sources for researching and ad campaign financials?
[47:47.970 --> 47:49.550]  Ad campaign financials?
[47:49.610 --> 47:51.510]  I'm not sure about the financial side of it.
[47:54.410 --> 47:56.390]  But I need to reread that question.
[47:56.550 --> 47:56.870]  Is that okay?
[48:03.830 --> 48:06.370]  All the information that I talked about is open.
[48:06.490 --> 48:13.770]  There are Supreme Court cases that have talked about it between Cambridge and Facebook themselves that you can look up and watch.
[48:14.230 --> 48:16.390]  There's a bunch of different documentaries on it.
[48:16.490 --> 48:17.490]  I think it was on Netflix.
[48:17.490 --> 48:24.030]  It's like a six-hour documentary that I sat through that's really good and talks about all of Cambridge and how it started and how it ended.
[48:24.270 --> 48:29.190]  And it also focuses on the whistleblowers and their experience within the company.
[48:30.390 --> 48:31.510]  So, I would look into that.
[48:31.690 --> 48:35.250]  As for payment and financial stuff, I'm definitely no expert in that.
[48:35.330 --> 48:36.230]  And I would do research.
[48:37.390 --> 48:38.450]  Do you have a live question?
[48:38.650 --> 48:38.910]  All right.
[48:39.050 --> 48:45.810]  So, you had said that the older generation tends to be more gullible in believing news sources and news websites that are not true.
[48:46.110 --> 48:51.050]  And like, well, you know, a lot of people in this room may not believe it, but you know, your grandma may believe that news source.
[48:51.050 --> 49:00.170]  And how would you square the circle with the fact that that is often the same demographic that will say, this is fake news, I don't believe this, or just believe virtually any...
[49:00.590 --> 49:03.570]  Say, I'm not going to believe this because this seems very establishment.
[49:03.790 --> 49:12.250]  And how much of this has to do with, like, not just tricking people into believing something, but just telling them what they wanted to believe already and them just accepting it, regardless of how it was delivered?
[49:12.450 --> 49:18.830]  The thing is that with the older voters, their mindset has already pretty much been made since they were younger.
[49:18.830 --> 49:24.550]  Once they were persuadable and someone told them about one side, they're like, yes, Pinkie Pie is it.
[49:24.730 --> 49:25.530]  She's the one.
[49:25.650 --> 49:26.230]  She's the good one.
[49:26.390 --> 49:41.270]  So, if someone makes a news article about something that Pinkie Pie said that is fake, they might still believe it because if it's goes with their values and their beliefs, they'll believe it.
[49:41.410 --> 49:46.770]  If it goes against their values and beliefs, they're also going to believe that that person said it.
[49:46.770 --> 49:48.990]  Like, well, Pinkie Pie is always right.
[49:49.250 --> 49:50.930]  So Twilight Sparkle is the bad one.
[49:51.010 --> 49:58.930]  So if I see an article that Twilight Sparkle is going to start a thing that raids the Capitol, then it's going to happen, you know?
[50:00.390 --> 50:01.570]  We have a question over here.
[50:01.710 --> 50:24.470]  Yeah, so for the people who have firmly believed that, you know, Hillary is truly a critical, that unicorns are real, how do you recommend, like, if they have someone like that in your life, or even, like, just a stranger, what is the best way that you found to convince that person that this belief that he or she has,
[50:24.670 --> 50:29.470]  you know, in his or her mind is not true, is not real?
[50:29.470 --> 50:35.750]  What is the best way to give real information to change this person's mind?
[50:36.510 --> 50:40.250]  When approaching them, definitely don't, like, seem like you're attacking them.
[50:40.370 --> 50:43.070]  Like, well, that's wrong, you know, or anything like that.
[50:43.070 --> 50:51.670]  Make sure you just say, like, hey, but I saw this and this, and point them towards the actual source, like we were talking about before.
[50:52.710 --> 50:59.930]  That, like, in this interview, they said, and I quote, and I can send you the video, that unicorns are real.
[51:00.650 --> 51:07.270]  So just point them to the direct source and just kind of open it like, hey, but I thought, you know, instead of being like, well, that's wrong.
[51:07.270 --> 51:09.110]  I have a follow-up question.
[51:09.370 --> 51:17.290]  And on a larger level, as, like, citizens of, you know, this country, all of the world, what is the best way we can do to just stop this?
[51:17.350 --> 51:19.750]  Because it seems like this is going to scale.
[51:20.070 --> 51:24.270]  Like, every country, every politician is already looking into this and doing this.
[51:24.890 --> 51:27.370]  And this, it seems unsustainable.
[51:27.630 --> 51:30.210]  But, you know, they probably don't care.
[51:30.350 --> 51:30.770]  They don't care.
[51:30.970 --> 51:33.110]  What can we do on a larger level?
[51:34.410 --> 51:41.450]  There, this is scary, but there's no way to stop at this point, as long as social media and computers and the Internet is a thing.
[51:41.630 --> 51:50.490]  But one way we can do this to prevent it is educating people, like I have done here, explaining, like, there are fake news sites.
[51:50.650 --> 51:59.150]  And just, like, older generation, younger generation making posts about how to stay safe online, how to fact check things, and to fact check things.
[51:59.150 --> 52:05.230]  Just educating people to do their own research and information finding, that's the way to do it.
[52:05.670 --> 52:06.110]  Cool.
[52:06.250 --> 52:07.150]  So we're out of time.
[52:07.330 --> 52:12.690]  If you have other questions, BiaSciLab will be outside to answer any questions in person.
[52:12.910 --> 52:13.530]  Thank you so much.
[52:13.590 --> 52:13.690]  Okay, perfect.
[52:13.850 --> 52:15.210]  Thank you so much for having me.
[52:15.370 --> 52:16.410]  Have a great HOPE.
[52:16.670 --> 52:17.450]  Thank you.