[00:00.000 --> 00:02.360] ...outsourcing research of the cyber intelligence complex. [00:02.800 --> 00:03.940] Ladies and gentlemen, give it up. [00:10.280 --> 00:11.240] Hey everyone, thanks for coming. [00:11.700 --> 00:12.720] My name is Kevin Gallagher. [00:12.860 --> 00:15.240] I also run the Barrett Brown Legal Defense Fund. [00:15.600 --> 00:19.460] Barrett Brown is the person who originally created this thing called Project PM. [00:21.120 --> 00:39.060] When he had this idea called Project PM originally in 2009, what he was seeing was the failure of the media, and he was looking for ways to improve it, and he was really upset with mainstream pundits like Thomas Friedman, and Charles Krauthammer, who don't know what they're talking about most of the time. [00:39.640 --> 00:46.120] But, you know, and also Barrett, as a skeptic, is interested in a scientific form of journalism. [00:47.140 --> 01:00.200] And so at the beginning, it was all very theoretical, but, you know, on the occasion of the Arab Spring, and the activity with Anonymous being involved in Optinesia, and the hack of H.B. [01:00.280 --> 01:04.280] Gary, it kind of completely evolved into this whole new thing. [01:05.440 --> 01:21.080] where he created this wiki site, and he's soliciting volunteers to go through, you know, open-source intelligence, things that are available in the public domain, and also, you know, emails that have been hacked by Anonymous out of security firms. [01:21.220 --> 01:27.500] Try to figure out what they're up to, and see what is in there that may be of journalistic import. [01:30.260 --> 01:34.720] So, I mean, with that, I mean, so everyone knows how a wiki works. [01:34.720 --> 01:40.220] It's just media wiki software that anybody can post and edit to and collaborate on. [01:40.220 --> 01:58.000] And so the express purpose of Project PM here is to provide a centralized, actionable data set regarding the intelligence contracting industry, the PR industry's interface with totalitarian regimes, the mushrooming info six slash cybersecurity industry, [01:58.060 --> 02:05.440] and other issues constituting threats to human rights, civic transparency, individual privacy, and the health of democratic institutions. [02:05.700 --> 02:10.780] I think that's the angle that all of us are, with which all of us are approaching the subject today. [02:10.780 --> 02:21.300] But this all might seem very innocuous and innocent and very First Amendment protected, like, research activity that anyone might do. [02:21.540 --> 02:28.480] But, so actually, the FBI served a search warrant on him in March 2012. [02:28.920 --> 02:36.900] And right down there, on number eight, they listed the actual URL of the wiki, which they were seeking records for. [02:39.780 --> 02:48.300] Yeah, somehow they're interested in this wiki that's exposing the, you know, surveillance complex, and the private contractors who work in collusion with the government. [02:49.800 --> 02:59.460] And a year after that, you have a subpoena that served to Cloudflare to get all the information behind the domain that's hosting this wiki. [02:59.700 --> 03:03.000] So clearly, it's viewed as some kind of threat to the government. [03:03.000 --> 03:10.460] The fact that journalists and researchers and volunteers who were involved in this were putting together this information in one place. [03:13.700 --> 03:18.420] Well, before I introduce this slide, I like to introduce it by saying this is the face of evil. [03:18.600 --> 03:22.900] But I don't mean any offense to any people who may work for any of these companies. [03:24.760 --> 03:29.260] But this is what we're talking about, is this massive industry... [03:29.260 --> 03:29.360] Excuse me, Kevin. [03:29.540 --> 03:30.040] I'm sorry. [03:30.260 --> 03:30.500] What's that? [03:30.500 --> 03:36.720] But as long as you're going to be talking about the slides, could someone see if we can get the projector working so the people in the crowd can see the slides? [03:37.280 --> 03:39.520] Oh, are we going with no slides at all? [03:40.240 --> 03:43.900] Unless they can fix the projector really quickly, which I believe they can, correct? [03:44.900 --> 03:45.600] Hack it! [03:46.920 --> 03:49.580] Yeah, I was completely talking based on my slides. [03:50.880 --> 03:52.460] Let's get that fixed really quickly. [03:52.760 --> 03:53.380] We can talk fast. [03:53.420 --> 03:53.700] Please. [03:56.650 --> 03:59.630] Or if like everyone can come up and just gather around us. [04:00.350 --> 04:06.150] Here comes the... here comes the... there's a Calvary out there and they're coming to fix the projector. [04:06.350 --> 04:07.990] This is rather essential to our talk. [04:10.470 --> 04:15.450] Is there like a good hashtag we can use to get like a help tech support? [04:15.730 --> 04:16.010] Yeah. [04:19.320 --> 04:20.960] That might make it more interesting. [04:21.380 --> 04:22.940] We can interrogate them. [04:25.340 --> 04:28.600] Is there anyone with AV or support in the room? [04:32.260 --> 04:32.820] Cool. [04:35.180 --> 04:36.520] I think we can... [04:36.520 --> 04:38.840] I apologize for the technical inconvenience. [04:39.580 --> 04:39.800] We'll see. [04:39.800 --> 04:42.740] Is there a volunteer, a HOPE volunteer in the audience? [04:42.920 --> 04:43.680] Just yell out yes. [04:44.240 --> 04:44.720] Yes. [04:45.060 --> 04:45.320] Okay. [04:45.460 --> 04:46.740] Can you go find whomever? [04:49.300 --> 04:49.780] Cool. [04:51.680 --> 04:55.360] Find the person with the most power to make this happen as quickly as possible. [04:55.480 --> 04:56.260] Your girlfriend has an adapter. [04:57.180 --> 04:57.380] Oh, yeah. [04:59.820 --> 05:01.160] We got something. [05:01.800 --> 05:03.100] We could solve it ourselves. [05:03.440 --> 05:04.100] Self-governance. [05:07.040 --> 05:07.880] Do we need it? [05:10.740 --> 05:12.000] Can you put the slides online? [05:17.720 --> 05:20.840] I had been told that this was tested and working. [05:21.140 --> 05:21.780] I think it's that. [05:22.620 --> 05:23.760] That's the projector, right? [05:24.480 --> 05:24.700] Yeah. [05:27.720 --> 05:28.580] Help is coming. [05:28.680 --> 05:29.220] The Calvary. [05:29.420 --> 05:29.980] Can you hear them? [05:30.100 --> 05:30.760] I can hear them. [05:33.840 --> 05:35.040] What a disaster. [05:35.440 --> 05:36.360] We're going to start over. [05:36.400 --> 05:47.960] Well, it actually fits into the crowdsourcing paradigm that things can get kind of messy when you have a bunch of citizen journalists rocking the town, you know, rocking the intelligence agencies and everything. [05:48.600 --> 05:55.100] Sometimes it's not as pretty clean as, you know, the more swank outfits. [05:59.960 --> 06:01.120] We got this. [06:05.960 --> 06:06.580] All right. [06:09.320 --> 06:15.020] Well, can we just, like, can we just talk about shit, you know, rather than us just waiting? [06:15.660 --> 06:16.640] You're exactly set. [06:16.920 --> 06:17.260] You're exactly set. [06:20.700 --> 06:21.260] You're... [06:22.180 --> 06:22.740] Yeah. [06:23.060 --> 06:23.420] I can see. [06:25.860 --> 06:26.600] Detecting it. [06:27.540 --> 06:28.100] Yeah. [06:29.360 --> 06:29.820] No. [06:30.860 --> 06:32.140] This looks like progress. [06:32.420 --> 06:33.100] Plug it in now. [06:33.720 --> 06:33.880] All right. [06:43.010 --> 06:46.090] This would be so disappointing if, like, it was actually a good slideshow. [06:46.410 --> 06:47.430] Which it is. [06:48.830 --> 06:50.030] Maybe your part. [06:51.570 --> 06:52.090] Like... [06:52.090 --> 06:52.750] Can I see? [06:53.570 --> 06:53.670] Yeah. [06:59.300 --> 07:03.140] So, I think in the meantime, perhaps Joe, do you have any questions? [07:03.380 --> 07:03.480] Yeah. [07:03.580 --> 07:21.960] Well, while we finish this up, one of the big things that Barrett found during Arab Spring was that a lot of these tech firms were, like, helping out dictators in the Middle East monitor all of their citizens under total surveillance. [07:22.200 --> 07:24.280] And you were watching this from your front row seat, right? [07:24.520 --> 07:42.320] Well, this was, like, you know, I'm just, like, sitting at home and just knowing what these firms are up to and, like, seeing that they could just scrape up every GPS coordinate of everybody in the Middle East who has a Facebook profile and where they could just go target, [07:42.480 --> 07:43.500] arrest, beat, torture. [07:44.320 --> 07:45.620] They did this in Egypt. [07:45.620 --> 07:46.600] They did this in Syria. [07:46.720 --> 07:48.980] They're doing this right now in Gaza as we speak. [07:49.520 --> 07:51.940] And this is what we figured out. [07:52.320 --> 07:54.660] And, you know, it's been a trip. [07:54.660 --> 07:56.540] And it's harrowing. [07:56.580 --> 08:10.540] It's really, like, to see this happening, to see people like, you know, Zuckerberg and, like, other people and, like, tech giants who just really don't give a f*ck about people's privacy and safety, you know. [08:10.640 --> 08:11.100] Keep going, Joe. [08:13.070 --> 08:15.140] It's really harrowing, I think. [08:15.340 --> 08:24.000] And it's, like, we see so much of what's happened in the Middle East, I feel like, could have been prevented if we weren't selling stuff to these regimes. [08:24.000 --> 08:31.020] We weren't just giving them, like, zero days back doors and just handing people's entire lives on a silver platter. [08:31.020 --> 08:35.840] And you saw that with IRC channels with, right, like, in IRC? [08:36.170 --> 08:47.100] Um, this is just generally, like, on Twitter and just at Facebook and, like, literally just, like, compiling research from every single corner of the web and just noticing these little things. [08:47.220 --> 08:54.550] And then connecting the information to the right people so the crowdsourcing happens and funnels it up to people who get it to a wider audience. [08:54.550 --> 09:00.280] The best way to do it, we were just blasting stuff out on Twitter and everybody else was seeing it happen at the same time. [09:00.450 --> 09:01.880] Everybody was coming to a consensus. [09:02.100 --> 09:04.880] Our little bubble of hacker people. [09:05.160 --> 09:12.340] And, you know, we try to tell this to, you know, people that aren't really as technologically savvy and they're just like, huh? [09:12.340 --> 09:13.060] You know? [09:13.060 --> 09:13.480] You know? [09:14.580 --> 09:14.800] Yeah. [09:14.860 --> 09:15.180] All right. [09:16.000 --> 09:29.980] To start off from where I lost video, Barrett's really unique innovation was to recognize the power of the Internet for collaboration and the fact that there were thousands upon thousands of these emails and no one knows what's in them. [09:30.220 --> 09:32.680] So, yeah, let's solicit people to go through them. [09:33.020 --> 09:34.380] Yeah, this is a picture of the wiki. [09:34.660 --> 09:37.220] I told you what its stated purpose was. [09:37.220 --> 09:44.220] And this is the search warrant that was served by the FBI against his residence in his mom's house. [09:44.740 --> 09:46.830] Explicitly names the URL of that wiki. [09:47.620 --> 09:54.640] A year later, they also served the subpoena to Cloudfair, trying to figure out who was running the domain. [09:55.080 --> 10:02.840] If they had followed that up with multiple subpoenas, they could have figured out more potentially, like, you know, who is actually editing and contributing to it. [10:03.670 --> 10:06.710] And, yeah, and this is the axis of evil, I suppose. [10:07.980 --> 10:11.950] We're here to talk about firms like Palantir, H.B. [10:12.020 --> 10:18.680] Gary, Strafford, Booz Allen Hamilton, Raytheon, Mantech, Gamma, Endgame Systems, Cubic. [10:18.680 --> 10:32.840] This is the privatized side of the surveillance apparatus that does not get as much discussion as, like, the NSA does, but yet it constitutes over 70% of the U.S. intelligence budget. [10:34.240 --> 10:35.330] It's going... [10:35.330 --> 10:36.460] What percent? [10:36.980 --> 10:40.380] At least 70% of the U.S. intelligence budget is going to contractors. [10:42.980 --> 10:45.710] There's very little accountability for it all. [10:46.360 --> 10:49.180] You can't send them Freedom of Information Act requests, for example. [10:49.830 --> 10:57.740] Yeah, like the NSA, all those, you know, crazy acronym government agencies, you know, they're doing a lot of, like, crazy stuff. [10:57.740 --> 11:00.940] We all know that, but they're not necessarily doing all of it. [11:01.120 --> 11:13.460] They're going to, you know, the private sector, and, you know, random dudes in Northern Virginia are going to work and going to these companies and doing jobs, like, as, like, a proxy for Uncle Sam. [11:13.640 --> 11:15.580] And there's not the same kind of oversight, so... [11:15.580 --> 11:21.600] They don't have PR spokespeople that you can call, at least not that'll definitely answer the phone and give you something, at least. [11:21.820 --> 11:22.500] It does not sound like idiots. [11:22.880 --> 11:25.460] Yeah, and these guys have a profit motive, too. [11:25.600 --> 11:25.860] Right. [11:25.860 --> 11:27.200] More over than anything. [11:27.460 --> 11:38.280] So when the whole industry is just mushrooming, it's like, how much stuff could you guys possibly vacuum up and then put into your little tables and convert? [11:38.540 --> 11:40.800] And what are you guys getting out of all of this? [11:40.860 --> 11:43.640] What are you doing with all of our taxpayer money? [11:44.880 --> 11:51.200] I'm not a fan of the U.S. government, but the fact is that intelligence community research was meant to benefit the public good, and now it's being run by the profit motive. [11:51.200 --> 11:53.560] So how does the profit motive and the public good mix? [11:53.580 --> 11:54.120] It doesn't. [11:54.120 --> 12:01.300] Yeah, so here are some examples of stories that, you know, captivated Project PM's attention. [12:02.740 --> 12:07.840] This first one is an exclusive report that was filed by Project PM and Barrett Brown. [12:08.800 --> 12:09.860] Within the H.P. [12:09.900 --> 12:12.820] Gary emails, he had discovered a program called Romance Coin. [12:13.340 --> 12:16.600] And it was due to be replaced with a program called Odyssey. [12:17.020 --> 12:24.740] It basically entailed mass surveillance against the Arab world, leveraging, like, sophisticated mobile phone software. [12:25.020 --> 12:31.820] And a lot of things we don't understand, like linguistics and semantics and stuff like that. [12:31.820 --> 12:34.500] They were looking for people that are experts in these things. [12:36.740 --> 12:48.800] And, obviously, some of you may be familiar with the Team Themis scandal, another thing that came out of this, where people were hired to go after opponents of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and, in particular, WikiLeaks and Glenn Greenwald. [12:54.040 --> 13:00.200] A whole consortium of these firms, basically, Palantir, Barraco, HPBGary were among them. [13:02.670 --> 13:15.300] They were formulating this plan to, I mean, you see it here, feed disinformation, create messages to sabotage or discredit the opposing organization, submit fake documents, and then call it the error. [13:16.080 --> 13:18.060] This was all being discussed. [13:19.080 --> 13:19.940] And if this is... [13:19.940 --> 13:20.220] Those were tactics. [13:20.440 --> 13:22.770] Those were leaks. [13:23.090 --> 13:23.650] Right. [13:23.810 --> 13:27.810] These are tactics that they were considering to deploy against WikiLeaks. [13:27.910 --> 13:29.730] None of that's defensive, either. [13:29.750 --> 13:31.210] That's all offensive tactics. [13:32.410 --> 13:32.970] Like... [13:32.970 --> 13:34.390] It's not... Yeah. [13:34.650 --> 13:34.770] Yeah. [13:34.770 --> 13:37.830] Between the offensive and the defensive here is... [13:37.830 --> 13:41.870] What did they... Are they trying to block these off of all computer networks? [13:42.010 --> 13:45.410] Are they trying to figure out who's reading all of these cables? [13:45.410 --> 13:46.910] Who's gaining this knowledge? [13:47.330 --> 13:49.850] Who, in the government, shouldn't be reading it? [13:50.030 --> 13:50.650] Like, we... [13:50.650 --> 13:51.510] There's... [13:51.510 --> 13:53.530] There's so many programs going on. [13:53.670 --> 14:00.930] Our government and our congressmen can't even possibly keep track of any of them, let alone if they, you know, actually gave a shit. [14:01.150 --> 14:02.490] Can everybody hear in the back? [14:03.570 --> 14:04.010] No. [14:04.010 --> 14:05.670] Okay, speak closer to the microphones, everyone. [14:05.870 --> 14:06.670] Don't film the microphone. [14:08.880 --> 14:10.140] So, here's another one. [14:10.140 --> 14:27.280] Back in 2012, this DOD information operations contractor called Leone Industries was basically caught in a smear campaign against a group of journalists at USA Today who had written critically of that same firm. [14:27.580 --> 14:29.200] And they had to apologize. [14:29.600 --> 14:32.920] But, yeah, this is the type of stuff that goes on. [14:33.040 --> 14:38.120] And I think activists and journalists are, of course, the prime targets for these firms. [14:38.120 --> 14:41.300] Project PM research fed into these articles that... [14:41.300 --> 14:43.060] That's absolutely correct, yeah. [14:43.660 --> 14:44.960] This is another thing. [14:45.840 --> 14:49.340] U.S. government software creates fake people to spread messages via social networking. [14:49.660 --> 15:06.560] This is a thing called persona management that entails the ability for one intelligence analyst to control multiple fake sock puppets that are basically indistinguishable from regular people, or at least the average person wouldn't be able to tell because it's replete with, [15:06.560 --> 15:08.900] like, background and history and fake friends. [15:09.520 --> 15:20.680] And they're using these things to spread disinformation, to gather information on a target, to discredit people, and do things like that. [15:21.640 --> 15:26.740] Similarly, there's a lot of monitoring of social media going on by the private sector. [15:27.040 --> 15:29.240] Raytheon's riot program is one example. [15:29.240 --> 15:32.080] This was reported by Ryan Gallagher in The Guardian. [15:33.400 --> 15:35.240] There's a company called Bright Planet. [15:35.480 --> 15:39.300] They advertise this project called... sorry, this program called Blue Jay. [15:39.600 --> 15:43.720] It bills itself as a law enforcement Twitter... [15:45.300 --> 15:46.340] Star Wars. [15:47.460 --> 15:49.620] Did you just get blasted? [15:49.700 --> 15:50.220] Just keep going. [15:50.780 --> 15:52.720] All these things are marketed to law enforcement. [15:52.980 --> 15:56.140] And so this is a law enforcement Twitter crime scanner. [15:56.320 --> 16:05.420] And they're going to be scanning Twitter and, you know, collecting massive data sets to try to predict suspicious behavior and when a crime might happen. [16:05.620 --> 16:12.440] And these slides you're seeing are Project PM research that fed up to wider audiences with the mainstream media. [16:13.800 --> 16:15.690] Another example is Intrepid. [16:16.560 --> 16:18.060] It has a thing called Tartan. [16:18.400 --> 16:26.640] It boasts the ability to identify ranks of influence within human networks and uncover hidden or missing relationships. [16:26.640 --> 16:29.880] What that basically means is it can de-anonymize people. [16:30.140 --> 16:32.760] You point this software at a group of people. [16:33.820 --> 16:38.440] Applications listed, national security, federal law enforcement, and so on. [16:38.440 --> 16:44.380] In their brochures for this, they explicitly mentioned Occupy Wall Street as a target. [16:46.140 --> 17:00.960] And as Joe mentioned, another one of the huge issues with this is that the firms in the West have no qualms about selling these things to authoritarian regimes or dictatorships in third world countries. [17:02.980 --> 17:09.080] And that's what happened is this firm, Amesis, sold spyware that was used by Gaddafi. [17:10.020 --> 17:14.600] Spyware which allowed them to, you know, probably detain, kill people. [17:14.600 --> 17:25.980] More than just spyware and hacking, just a fully diversified machine of public relations to just say the same bullshit line over and over again. [17:26.060 --> 17:30.240] We found this with the firm called Corvus in Bahrain. [17:30.600 --> 17:44.420] While they have a very large PR contract to basically just write articles for like PR Newswire to say, Hey guys, like the regime, the royalty is making baby steps to reform all the time. [17:44.600 --> 17:48.340] And they've had this uprising going on for the past four years. [17:48.460 --> 17:51.620] And we don't even pay attention to it. [17:51.640 --> 17:57.640] Our government really just is kind of shooted off because we have a military base there. [17:57.800 --> 17:59.680] The Fifth Fleet is based out of there. [17:59.680 --> 18:10.000] And only recently, I think the other day when one of our top diplomats went over there and they got kicked out of the country for meeting with opposition leaders. [18:10.200 --> 18:14.240] So it's like, at what point are you guys going to keep continuing this madness? [18:14.900 --> 18:19.260] So I just have a few more slides and I'm going to turn it over to the rest of our panel. [18:19.540 --> 18:22.380] I'm going to introduce each of these people. [18:23.220 --> 18:26.500] Finn Fisher, Gamma International. [18:26.880 --> 18:31.700] This program was discovered being used against Egyptian activists and journalists. [18:33.080 --> 18:40.480] It's a total, like, it's a RAT, which is a remote access program that allows total control over the target's computer. [18:41.100 --> 18:48.620] This is just a screenshot of Palantir's software that, you know, they can map out networks. [18:50.620 --> 18:55.800] And, yeah, basically identify foci of influence. [18:56.560 --> 19:01.900] And another issue that is significant for Project PM is the subject of zero-day exploits. [19:02.120 --> 19:07.820] And no one's really figured out what the solution is as far as, like, regulating this. [19:08.020 --> 19:23.820] I mean, I know there is a campaign to coalition against the unlawful surveillance exports because most of the surveillance tech is developed in the West and it's used for repression and oppression in other countries. [19:25.640 --> 19:28.500] So with that, I think... is it Joe? [19:28.780 --> 19:28.980] Yeah. [19:29.240 --> 19:30.280] Yeah, so... [19:30.280 --> 19:31.080] I'll start off. [19:31.380 --> 19:33.180] I'm going to jump ahead a little bit. [19:33.380 --> 19:35.700] Be sure to talk to the mic, like, really close to it. [19:35.960 --> 19:36.420] Volume is low. [19:36.660 --> 19:36.720] Testing. [19:37.380 --> 19:38.040] All right. [19:38.400 --> 19:45.380] So I'm going to jump ahead a little bit towards the end of Jeremy Hammond's trial. [19:45.720 --> 19:46.600] Or not even trial. [19:46.760 --> 19:48.480] Just discovery phase. [19:48.480 --> 19:52.920] Hey, let's keep him in a hole for, like, 18 months while we try to, like... [19:52.920 --> 19:56.840] The government's trying to avoid having to tell everybody that the original... [19:56.840 --> 20:07.140] There was an original hacker of Stratfor that zero-dayed his way into their entire database email server and gave this exploit to Cebu. [20:07.860 --> 20:09.100] We had this... [20:09.100 --> 20:17.720] We... they had... the government had to admit this in a filing that this actually happened and that he, in turn, gave the exploit to Jeremy. [20:18.160 --> 20:22.220] So they were working in tandem, essentially, without... [20:22.220 --> 20:24.240] Sabu was an FBI informant hacker. [20:24.240 --> 20:29.440] For anybody that does it, has been living under a rock here, with LulzSec... [20:29.440 --> 20:34.380] Yeah, so without the FBI informant's help, there's no... [20:34.380 --> 20:37.140] Like, they probably wouldn't even have been hacked in the first place. [20:37.660 --> 20:42.240] Interestingly enough, Stratfor is involved with Mantec with a... [20:42.240 --> 20:45.760] They had a contract for irregular warfare services. [20:46.060 --> 20:51.920] And to conceptualize for the military how they would do these operations abroad. [20:51.920 --> 20:57.860] And they were just... they haven't really said what they were doing with it. [20:57.920 --> 21:03.080] But regular warfare is basically your non-kinetic firing weapons at each other. [21:03.240 --> 21:05.300] It's maybe more like subversion. [21:05.940 --> 21:10.280] Maybe like, I don't know, sending hookers to a politician you want to take down or something like that. [21:10.400 --> 21:13.680] But it could encompass a lot of things that it's been around since... [21:13.680 --> 21:16.920] As long as humans have been beating the shit out of each other. [21:16.920 --> 21:18.820] And what about the... [21:18.820 --> 21:19.120] Anyway... [21:19.120 --> 21:21.140] Acquisition of HBGary by Mantec? [21:21.140 --> 21:23.320] That was also very curious too. [21:24.240 --> 21:39.480] Mantec acquired... just acquires HBGary, and they're able to go and say like, Hey, we're not responsible... we're buying your company, but we're not buying your responsibilities for all the stuff that you might have been on the hook for. [21:41.580 --> 21:48.540] Going even further back, Sabu is involved in hacking Mantec and looting and pillaging. [21:48.680 --> 21:49.680] I think that was like, what? [21:49.800 --> 21:51.240] F*ck FBI Friday 1 or 2? [21:51.420 --> 21:52.100] It was one of those? [21:53.760 --> 21:54.240] So... [21:54.240 --> 21:55.580] FBI is involved. [21:55.700 --> 21:57.380] Basically, we called them hacking themselves. [21:58.080 --> 22:00.300] I had to like suspend disbelief. [22:00.300 --> 22:03.880] I thought I had been seeing this for like months and years on end. [22:03.880 --> 22:08.320] And then finally, it's like... seemed like a pretty legit hypothesis. [22:09.000 --> 22:12.360] You know, I didn't want to... I felt like I was a conspiracy theorist. [22:12.500 --> 22:13.960] And finally, it's like... [22:13.960 --> 22:14.620] It's been confirmed. [22:16.140 --> 22:20.260] So, then I have to ask myself, why did they allow... did they allow this to happen? [22:20.400 --> 22:21.340] Was this incompetence? [22:21.360 --> 22:24.480] Or did they really want to take Stratfor down a peg? [22:26.800 --> 22:29.480] Like, reading a lot of the Stratfor emails, I... [22:29.480 --> 22:31.500] I maybe think the latter. [22:32.140 --> 22:32.500] There's a lot... [22:32.500 --> 22:33.600] There's a lot of... [22:33.600 --> 22:34.280] The most plausible. [22:34.400 --> 22:42.380] There's a lot of stuff that Stratfor's doing and have their hands in that I would probably say that it... that's likely as well. [22:42.880 --> 22:49.160] They had a hedge fund... they were starting a hedge fund called StratCap that was events futures trading. [22:49.300 --> 22:52.120] So, it's like a... it was like a... another reversion of in-trade. [22:53.240 --> 23:09.860] So, they would basically have this computer that would trade on algorithms and, you know, while they're doing this other irregular warfare thing, there's just all of these other things that Stratfor's... or Stratfor's doing that would combine into, like, [23:09.940 --> 23:11.400] their one mission. [23:11.620 --> 23:11.740] So... [23:11.740 --> 23:15.520] They were setting up StratCap with a Goldman Sachs guy, so it's no small fry. [23:15.860 --> 23:16.180] Right. [23:16.700 --> 23:17.140] So... [23:17.780 --> 23:19.940] So, next we're gonna have Andrew Blake. [23:20.160 --> 23:21.500] He's a reporter with RT. [23:21.500 --> 23:23.140] He's covered many of these things. [23:24.280 --> 23:25.780] I have your slides here. [23:26.760 --> 23:27.060] Hello. [23:27.900 --> 23:28.520] Thanks. [23:29.180 --> 23:29.760] So, yeah. [23:30.100 --> 23:30.660] Hi. [23:31.480 --> 23:31.790] My... [23:32.100 --> 23:33.880] My role here... [23:33.880 --> 23:36.570] I was kind of in a really particular place when... [23:37.440 --> 23:40.340] when Project PM was doing a lot of really important stuff. [23:40.340 --> 23:42.720] And to go back... [23:42.720 --> 23:46.500] One thing in particular that we found out is this thing called TrapWire. [23:47.100 --> 23:47.760] But... [23:47.760 --> 23:49.360] To back up a little bit... [23:49.360 --> 23:55.600] Like, if you're not following, if you weren't following the whole thing that actually happened with these Stratfor emails was... [23:55.600 --> 23:57.340] Stratfor is another one of these... [23:57.340 --> 24:00.340] It's a geopolitical consulting... [24:01.380 --> 24:02.040] Like... [24:02.040 --> 24:02.260] Yeah. [24:02.640 --> 24:03.040] Jerks. [24:03.040 --> 24:03.880] Private CIA. [24:03.980 --> 24:04.300] Yeah. [24:04.540 --> 24:05.480] Private CIA. [24:05.880 --> 24:06.260] And... [24:06.260 --> 24:08.000] So, they were hacked by... [24:08.000 --> 24:10.200] As Joe was saying, by the FBI actually. [24:10.580 --> 24:11.040] But... [24:11.040 --> 24:11.880] Anyway, so... [24:11.880 --> 24:12.160] It's true. [24:12.160 --> 24:12.600] Yeah. [24:12.600 --> 24:13.620] Basically, if... [24:13.620 --> 24:16.600] An FBI informant steering Jeremy Hammond... [24:17.160 --> 24:18.640] Who had the technical expertise. [24:19.000 --> 24:23.620] And this isn't like setting up a fake bomb for somebody to go... [24:23.940 --> 24:25.080] Be raided later. [24:25.300 --> 24:25.840] This is... [24:25.840 --> 24:26.080] Like... [24:26.080 --> 24:26.880] Hacking's real. [24:28.380 --> 24:33.800] So, if you go back two and a half years ago to late 2012, Stratfor was hacked by... [24:33.800 --> 24:34.860] The FBI... [24:34.860 --> 24:36.040] Anonymous... [24:36.040 --> 24:38.940] And a couple thousands of emails were... [24:38.940 --> 24:40.340] Were pilfered and... [24:40.340 --> 24:40.580] Five million. [24:40.580 --> 24:41.160] Five million. [24:41.320 --> 24:41.380] Okay. [24:41.580 --> 24:41.800] Thank you. [24:42.140 --> 24:45.100] And eventually, those actually got published by WikiLeaks. [24:45.220 --> 24:48.680] And you can go on WikiLeaks and you can read these millions of emails sent from... [24:49.580 --> 24:50.740] People within Stratfor. [24:51.000 --> 24:52.340] The vice presidents, presidents... [24:52.340 --> 24:53.790] And they're all like old CIA cronies. [24:54.360 --> 24:54.700] Like... [24:54.700 --> 24:56.520] And some of them still affiliated, obviously. [24:56.740 --> 24:58.160] Kind of that culture like... [24:58.160 --> 24:58.760] Exists there. [24:59.560 --> 25:00.020] So... [25:00.020 --> 25:02.980] You start going through these emails and you start just catching keywords. [25:03.240 --> 25:06.100] WikiLeaks actually, after a while, built a great search function. [25:06.280 --> 25:07.660] And you can go to... [25:07.660 --> 25:08.160] I think... [25:08.160 --> 25:11.840] GIFILES.Wikileaks.org And, you know, type in... [25:11.840 --> 25:12.420] You know, whatever. [25:13.200 --> 25:13.680] I have definitely... [25:13.680 --> 25:15.040] Type in raghead. [25:15.220 --> 25:15.580] Oh, yeah. [25:16.200 --> 25:17.340] Anybody wants to go. [25:17.360 --> 25:21.820] The vice president of intelligence at Stratfor, Fred Burton, is notorious for racial slurs. [25:22.240 --> 25:22.560] Yeah. [25:23.360 --> 25:27.260] So, one of the things that we found one day was this thing called Trapwire. [25:27.260 --> 25:34.900] And it was reported for a little while in the press a few months after Stratfor was hacked. [25:35.240 --> 25:39.480] So, a few months later, we start seeing that these guys from Stratfor were sending emails to each other. [25:39.640 --> 25:43.180] Pretty much saying like, okay, there's this thing called Trapwire and we're... [25:43.180 --> 25:44.580] Stratfor is trying to sell it to people. [25:44.580 --> 25:46.520] But we were seeing all these inter-office emails. [25:46.780 --> 25:52.400] And it turns out that it's a surveillance system that's being sold, or at least touted around. [25:52.480 --> 25:53.800] It was sold to a bunch of different agencies. [25:53.840 --> 26:02.500] But we started seeing that this surveillance system was being sold and given to Washington, D.C. [26:02.500 --> 26:05.600] New York PD was alleged to be using it. [26:05.680 --> 26:07.840] The Texas Department of Public Safety. [26:09.120 --> 26:10.240] And, like, dozens. [26:11.040 --> 26:11.980] All over the world. [26:12.160 --> 26:17.440] And what the company was saying this thing was, was, alright, we use existing, like, pan-to-tilt cameras. [26:17.700 --> 26:18.940] Like, the infrastructure is already there. [26:19.060 --> 26:24.380] We're just going to combine, you know, normal CCTV with facial recognition technology. [26:24.640 --> 26:26.280] And we're going to combine that with... [26:26.280 --> 26:28.400] To identify supposedly suspicious behavior. [26:28.620 --> 26:28.940] Yeah. [26:29.160 --> 26:30.260] Predict terror attacks. [26:30.460 --> 26:30.720] Predict. [26:30.720 --> 26:30.820] Predict. [26:31.340 --> 26:31.540] Yeah. [26:32.240 --> 26:35.320] So, you know, just creepy Orwellian surveillance stuff. [26:35.380 --> 26:38.340] You know, this was, you know, before Snowden revelation and stuff like that. [26:38.900 --> 26:44.540] But, so, you know, you can see here that, you know, this is what, this is what it looks like if you go onto WikiLeaks. [26:44.640 --> 26:45.420] And you can go through the emails. [26:45.580 --> 26:49.340] And you can see guys from Stratfor telling one another, like, oh, let's try to sell this. [26:49.420 --> 26:49.960] This is awesome. [26:50.040 --> 26:50.720] We already got it here. [26:50.820 --> 26:51.220] We got it here. [26:51.360 --> 26:54.440] And this is a system that's going to make people, like, you can watch them. [26:54.780 --> 26:55.840] And it's super creepy, whatever. [26:56.560 --> 26:58.000] A lot of it is probably hyperbole. [26:58.000 --> 27:00.740] Like, we know it was, it's installed in places. [27:01.080 --> 27:03.620] But, you know, it's creepy. [27:03.800 --> 27:04.700] But like, yeah, come on. [27:04.760 --> 27:06.100] It's probably not that creepy. [27:06.200 --> 27:06.600] But it might be. [27:06.640 --> 27:06.960] You never know. [27:07.120 --> 27:08.940] They like to upsell. [27:09.120 --> 27:10.720] Stratfor likes to upsell some of their stuff. [27:11.360 --> 27:15.760] But, so, my role here is, you know, at the time, I'm hanging out. [27:15.900 --> 27:16.680] I'm writing stories. [27:16.840 --> 27:18.820] And I'm researching a bunch of stuff. [27:19.160 --> 27:21.160] And I start going through these emails. [27:21.380 --> 27:29.520] And the more I see about, the more from the Stratfor emails I see about Treblower, the more there's just lots and lots and lots of pieces. [27:29.520 --> 27:37.420] And that's kind of where I ended up at Project PM because I could go online and I can hop in an IRC channel. [27:37.520 --> 27:39.700] Or I can send out a tweet. [27:39.960 --> 27:42.140] Or I can send, you know, just a... [27:42.140 --> 27:43.320] The Internet's a really cool place. [27:43.360 --> 27:45.780] You can do a lot of talking with a lot of people about a lot of things. [27:45.780 --> 27:47.780] Those are all basic crowdsourcing tools. [27:48.060 --> 27:48.120] Yeah. [27:48.680 --> 27:53.060] And what Project PM was doing was just, like, open-source investigating these things. [27:53.220 --> 28:00.200] Going onto Google and just typing in the right words in the right places, you can find just, like, really, really frightening stuff. [28:00.780 --> 28:01.260] Yeah. [28:01.460 --> 28:10.220] So, like, the more we started researching Trapwire, the more we put these pieces of the puzzle together. [28:10.920 --> 28:18.380] Where, you know, not only was Stratfor trying to sell these, the service, but, you know, it was really, really creepy. [28:19.780 --> 28:22.680] And, you know, this is to play off the whole tinfoil hat thing. [28:22.780 --> 28:31.600] When WikiLeaks first published the Trapwire email specifically, because they were just publishing in, like, handfuls at times, they were DDoS'd for, like, two days. [28:31.980 --> 28:33.880] You know, probably just a coincidence, whatever. [28:34.060 --> 28:35.860] But, you know, it was a big story. [28:36.020 --> 28:36.700] Like, this was happening. [28:36.820 --> 28:39.020] They were publishing information, evidence. [28:42.720 --> 28:43.040] Yeah. [28:43.200 --> 28:43.480] Oh, yeah. [28:43.740 --> 28:43.860] So... [28:44.580 --> 28:51.700] As, as, as attention start focuses, not just on Stratfor, but on Trapwire, people start going, like, okay, well, who's running Trapwire? [28:51.760 --> 28:54.840] And we start going through, like, the chain of command of people that are involved with this. [28:55.000 --> 29:00.520] And you realize that the company that's running Trapwire is also running, like... [29:00.520 --> 29:01.000] Abraxis. [29:01.200 --> 29:03.660] Yeah, this company Abraxis, this company Intrepid. [29:03.880 --> 29:08.620] And they were doing pretty much everything else in, like, the creepy surveillance world. [29:08.620 --> 29:10.660] Like, they were actually, like... [29:12.140 --> 29:13.280] If you're familiar... [29:13.280 --> 29:16.810] If you're familiar with, like, Aleister Crowley, you'll recognize the name Abraxis. [29:17.460 --> 29:19.680] They have all these weird mystical names, you know. [29:20.140 --> 29:20.380] Yeah. [29:21.060 --> 29:21.800] Creepy stuff. [29:22.220 --> 29:23.820] You know, Total Analysis Corporation. [29:24.520 --> 29:25.360] Asymmetric Solutions. [29:25.600 --> 29:26.860] It sounds like stuff out of Philip K. [29:26.980 --> 29:27.500] Dick novels. [29:28.540 --> 29:30.700] They would deny that they were... [29:30.700 --> 29:32.040] They would lie. [29:32.300 --> 29:32.540] They would lie. [29:32.540 --> 29:32.740] Yeah. [29:33.060 --> 29:33.900] Barrett would call them up. [29:33.980 --> 29:34.320] Be like, wait. [29:34.720 --> 29:35.860] Barrett would call them up. [29:36.600 --> 29:37.360] They would lie. [29:37.760 --> 29:37.980] Yeah. [29:38.140 --> 29:44.660] People were actually going, like, to outside these buildings' headquarters and taking pictures because they want to know more about these things. [29:44.760 --> 29:47.640] They were like, there's companies that are doing really creepy things and we don't know about it. [29:47.840 --> 29:48.760] Let's figure it out. [29:49.100 --> 29:50.320] You know, sure, we can go on Google. [29:50.480 --> 29:54.160] We can go try to find some PDFs of whatever you can. [29:54.160 --> 29:59.600] You know, it's really awesome if someone wants to go and hack something and publish five million emails with, like, a bunch of crazy evidence. [29:59.740 --> 29:59.980] That's... [29:59.980 --> 30:02.520] I'm not advocating that because I think that could get me droned. [30:02.680 --> 30:04.300] But you want to, like... [30:04.300 --> 30:05.940] You know, you can do that. [30:06.080 --> 30:06.180] Yeah. [30:06.620 --> 30:09.200] But so, on top of this whole, like, yeah, it's creepy. [30:09.200 --> 30:10.480] It's probably overblown. [30:10.600 --> 30:10.740] Whatever. [30:10.920 --> 30:11.880] This was a couple years ago. [30:11.940 --> 30:15.620] And when it came out, there were, like, it was picked up in the Times. [30:15.940 --> 30:20.560] It was pretty much every major newspaper, like, in the West had a story about Trapwire. [30:20.840 --> 30:22.300] Like, for... [30:22.300 --> 30:22.500] What's that? [30:22.520 --> 30:23.000] Not the Atlantic. [30:23.000 --> 30:23.660] Not the Atlantic. [30:23.740 --> 30:26.220] It's because the Center for National... [30:26.220 --> 30:26.740] New Atlantic. [30:27.020 --> 30:27.580] Center for New... [30:27.580 --> 30:27.940] Center for New... [30:27.940 --> 30:28.220] Center for New American... [30:28.220 --> 30:29.280] Center for... [30:29.280 --> 30:30.720] Do you want the mic? [30:31.120 --> 30:31.340] Yeah, yeah. [30:31.340 --> 30:32.860] I'm trying to remember the Center for New American Security. [30:33.580 --> 30:34.540] Just keep going. [30:34.800 --> 30:35.020] Keep going. [30:35.100 --> 30:35.780] Okay, okay. [30:35.860 --> 30:36.220] Yeah, yeah, yeah. [30:36.240 --> 30:36.680] We're on timing. [30:36.860 --> 30:36.960] Yeah, yeah. [30:37.180 --> 30:39.380] So, anyways, super creepy, right? [30:40.120 --> 30:42.200] The point here, though, is, like, this stuff does exist. [30:42.320 --> 30:54.080] And even if it's hyperbole, even if it is really, really overblown, just recently, Chicago, I believe around a year ago, started using facial recognition technology, the CPD, the Chicago Police Department. [30:55.440 --> 30:59.180] Last year, they actually caught someone using that facial recognition technology. [30:59.740 --> 31:02.080] And someone was just sentenced to 22 years in prison. [31:02.080 --> 31:05.000] I'm pretty sure you, like, killed a guy, or, like, robbed a store. [31:05.120 --> 31:09.220] You know, it's like, you should be in prison, probably, you know, if you think that prisons should exist. [31:09.540 --> 31:12.720] But, regardless, you know, this stuff does exist. [31:12.860 --> 31:22.060] And we just saw, just last week, I believe, a police agency in the UK is now using facial recognition technology. [31:22.260 --> 31:30.740] They're using something called NeoFace, which I believe comes out of Hong Kong and is all over the East, and it's all sorts of creepy stuff. [31:32.300 --> 31:42.380] So, governments, agencies, all over the world are using really, really creepy tools, and you can't easily get information about it. [31:42.500 --> 31:43.740] So, that's where Project PM came in. [31:43.800 --> 31:47.920] That's when I started to go and hang out in chat rooms and be like, oh, has anyone seen this document? [31:48.240 --> 31:48.860] Oh, cool. [31:49.060 --> 31:50.420] Well, that brought me to this document. [31:50.580 --> 31:52.780] And then someone else will say, oh, well, it's got me that document. [31:52.960 --> 31:57.460] And then someone else will say, oh, hey, why doesn't someone go and hack something else and get all those emails? [31:58.260 --> 32:00.280] And, you know, don't necessarily do anything illegal. [32:00.500 --> 32:14.360] But when you start talking to one another, and you can use the Internet as this collaborative tool, you know, it's more than just like, well, you realize this, you're a bunch of nerds, but like, you know, you can find some pretty interesting stuff that should be disclosed. [32:14.520 --> 32:16.180] People are spying on you. [32:16.260 --> 32:19.100] And there's no oversight there, you know, very little oversight. [32:19.100 --> 32:27.240] And if you can find a way to elaborate on this information and bring it to the public's eye, it gets picked up. [32:27.400 --> 32:29.300] It will, people are going to write about it. [32:29.360 --> 32:32.620] It is going to end up on the New York Times front page if it's important enough. [32:32.620 --> 32:42.040] So, if you are in that infrastructure, if you're in those companies, or you know someone who is, just totally just leak all of that. [32:42.620 --> 32:43.500] Because it's... [32:43.500 --> 32:48.840] Follow the Twitter handle P-R-O-J-P-M for Project PM and send what you find there. [32:49.040 --> 32:49.540] Exactly. [32:49.780 --> 32:54.240] We'll organize it and crowdsource, help the crowdsource crowd get into it more. [32:54.240 --> 33:08.840] So, I think, I mean, what we kind of want to do now is kind of show a demonstration of, like, how this was all organized, how Project PM worked, how Barrett conducted his journalism and solicited volunteers to go through documents and find stuff. [33:09.020 --> 33:11.020] So, we have Douglas Lucas. [33:11.300 --> 33:17.020] He's a Texas-based freelance writer, researcher, and journalist, mostly known for covering Barrett Brown's case. [33:17.220 --> 33:18.880] He has been to many of the hearings. [33:18.880 --> 33:29.700] And for turning the Austin headquartered private spy firm Stratfor emails published by WikiLeaks into national security stories at Who What Why? [33:31.660 --> 33:38.980] With a focus on U.S. secret involvement in and counterinsurgency approach to the Mexican drug war. [33:39.200 --> 33:39.580] Right. [33:39.720 --> 33:47.440] So, I thought that since a lot of this Project PM stuff was historical, it would be nice for us to unveil some documents that have barely been noticed before. [33:48.640 --> 33:49.420] Slide one. [33:49.640 --> 33:50.500] Yeah, those documents. [33:50.860 --> 33:51.280] Okay. [33:51.480 --> 33:55.960] So, the documents connect with both Barrett and Stratfor. [33:56.560 --> 34:00.320] And I'll tell you how and why Project PM can and should crowdsource research into them. [34:00.700 --> 34:06.640] Last week, Who What Why published my piece on frequent Mexican military aircraft and helicopter incursions into U.S. airspace. [34:07.780 --> 34:18.120] As part of our investigative partnership, WikiLeaks has added to the top of its list of Stratfor releases by Who What Why article, which was based on these intelligence products that you see right there on the screen. [34:18.400 --> 34:21.480] There are 2011 border control reports from Texas. [34:21.820 --> 34:23.580] We'll shortly show you one of them. [34:24.020 --> 34:26.620] Stratfor obtained at least 34 of them in that year. [34:26.760 --> 34:29.400] I organized them there on that page on the projector you see. [34:30.520 --> 34:35.040] So, Stratfor obtained at least 34 of them, which meant they ultimately ended up at WikiLeaks. [34:35.040 --> 34:39.300] But nobody really noticed them because not many people dig into the Stratfor files. [34:39.500 --> 34:39.960] I do. [34:41.100 --> 34:42.560] So, let me tell you about the documents. [34:42.840 --> 34:43.460] Slide one. [34:43.900 --> 34:48.120] The Austin Headquartered Border Security Operations Center created them. [34:48.860 --> 34:55.080] This here is a picture coming up of the Austin Center, the inside of it. [34:55.440 --> 34:58.440] As of about 2011, we're getting back to the picture, don't worry. [34:59.600 --> 35:07.980] They oversaw nearly 3,000 intelligence analysts and hundreds of live-safe surveillance cameras around the clock. [35:08.540 --> 35:13.420] Cameras pointed at the Texas-Mexico border, which is the largest section of the US-Mexico border. [35:13.620 --> 35:16.200] So, obviously, all this has national security implications. [35:16.200 --> 35:20.900] Just think of Obama's recent request for 3-point-whatever billion in emergency border funds. [35:21.160 --> 35:22.040] My next slide. [35:22.040 --> 35:28.200] This is Aaron Grigsby, then head of the Border Security Operations Center, who is one of Stratfor's sources. [35:28.540 --> 35:35.980] He's a Texas cop, specifically a Texas Ranger, which is the state police division overseeing the Austin Border Security Operations Center. [35:36.180 --> 35:45.100] I surprised interviewed him and got him to acknowledge he emailed with Stratfor VP of Intelligence, Fred Burton, the guy who says raghead all the time, in the emails. [35:45.100 --> 35:59.440] Okay, so, what was once Aaron Grigsby's center has six outlying offices called Joint Operations and Intelligence Centers, despite being law enforcement entities, that's the name, straight out of the Pentagon Glossary, militarization of police. [35:59.920 --> 36:17.940] Okay, so I found the El Paso Outlying Office, the El Paso Joint Operations and Intelligence Center, and surprised interviewed the border liaison officer there, who did some of the forwarding of the intelligence products to Stratfor. [36:18.240 --> 36:23.060] And I surprised interviewed the Stratfor analyst who was receiving some of those El Paso office emails. [36:23.340 --> 36:30.040] I got her to acknowledge she had access to the Austin Center's intelligence products in 2011, which is when she was at Stratfor. [36:30.240 --> 36:39.320] And about the time I reminded her on the phone that the intelligent products are law enforcement sensitive and thus meant only for cop eyes only, she muttered at me, f*ck you, motherf*cker. [36:40.840 --> 36:52.860] I'll report more on that quid pro quo relationship between the El Paso office in Stratfor and a who-what-why piece to come soon that I hope Project PM can contribute to by doing additional research into these intelligence documents. [36:53.620 --> 37:06.120] So, because Project PM studies the quid pro quo relationships and revolving doors between government security entities and private security intelligence contractors, really, control is a better word than security because, as Thomas Drake said yesterday, [37:06.680 --> 37:11.480] all this surveillance is ultimately about population control, taking away our individual sovereignty. [37:12.620 --> 37:27.620] These documents have personal data about us, and it gets sprayed out of places like that El Paso office's Texas DPS email address to private spies like Stratfor, possibly in violation of the law, and thankfully WikiLeaks gets a hold of them. [37:27.620 --> 37:30.920] Okay, so let me tell you now a little bit about the documents. [37:31.580 --> 37:32.940] First one, page one. [37:33.520 --> 37:34.360] Yeah, okay. [37:34.960 --> 37:39.940] So, these are called Border Operations Sector Assessments, or BOSAs for short. [37:40.580 --> 37:42.440] Stratfor obtained at least 34 of them. [37:44.560 --> 37:45.440] Where am I? [37:47.400 --> 38:01.740] You'll know, the first page of it, you can see the Texas flag there because it's created under the auspices of the Texas State Police, namely the Rangers, that Aaron Grigsby guy, but it's actually military contractors who were creating these. [38:02.840 --> 38:05.820] It was Abrams, Learning and Information Systems. [38:06.800 --> 38:09.460] F*ck you, motherf*cker, that's what I refer to her as short. [38:09.700 --> 38:11.840] In 2010, she was creating these. [38:11.960 --> 38:12.760] She told me so. [38:12.960 --> 38:14.620] I'm kind of tricky when I interview people. [38:15.500 --> 38:22.040] And then she later moved to Stratfor a year later and started receiving a bunch of them from the El Paso office. [38:23.280 --> 38:29.000] So, you'll note the document on page one is marked Controlled Unclassified Information. [38:29.300 --> 38:31.140] It's elsewhere marked as Law Enforcement Sensitive. [38:31.280 --> 38:32.580] Now, page 78. [38:37.330 --> 38:37.930] Right. [38:38.190 --> 38:41.210] So, this is the slide for anonymous versus Los Zetas. [38:41.530 --> 38:48.150] The caption says, quote, mask worn by anonymous members and supporters, known as the Guy Fawkes mask, unquote. [38:48.770 --> 38:49.590] Ain't that cute? [38:50.330 --> 38:58.590] Slide's first two sentences, quote, it appears that the online hacker collective anonymous has decided to take on Mexico's most violent drug cartel, Los Zetas. [38:59.070 --> 39:04.850] Speculation about the scope of the conflict abounds, fueled by several conflicting reports about the hacktivist group's intentions, unquote. [39:05.210 --> 39:07.250] Then the slide details the conflicting reports. [39:07.350 --> 39:13.350] You can see why this stuff leads to the Department of Justice saying, in Barrett Brown's case, that anonymous is trying to overthrow the government. [39:13.570 --> 39:21.070] Because you have these understaffed, under-resourced, complete idiot intelligence analysts doing stuff like this. [39:21.210 --> 39:24.910] And it gets funneled up to the higher level people, ultimately, like DOJ. [39:25.190 --> 39:28.330] Haven't proved that entirely, but that's the basic gist of how it works. [39:29.750 --> 39:29.830] Okay. [39:29.990 --> 39:35.710] So, indeed, Texas Border Control Intelligence was monitoring Op Cartel, which was primarily a creation of Anons in Mexico. [39:35.710 --> 39:37.830] Barrett was involved in that operation. [39:38.030 --> 39:39.190] His Op Cartel was underway. [39:39.790 --> 39:44.090] Ex-military contractors associated with Tom Ryan posted Barrett's street address online. [39:44.330 --> 39:50.070] They stated the address was, quote, for the Zetas, so they can have the right Barrett Brown address, unquote. [39:50.530 --> 39:54.710] The Zetas were initially Mexican Special Forces who had been trained with U.S. funds. [39:55.670 --> 39:59.570] Brown fled here to New York City and was mocked by the mainstream media for all of it. [40:03.130 --> 40:10.030] But note that today, also largely ignored by the U.S. mainstream media, auto defenses, self-defense groups, have sprung up in Mexico for good or ill to fight back against the narcos. [40:10.330 --> 40:15.510] So those are sort of decentralized groups, just as crowdsourcing research is decentralized. [40:16.370 --> 40:20.730] Whatever the drawbacks of Op Cartel and the auto defenses, Barrett was ahead of his time, as usual. [40:21.210 --> 40:22.110] People mocked him. [40:22.270 --> 40:35.030] When he was first raided in 2012, the FBI lead agent on his case, none other than the aptly named Agent Smith, did not publicize the warrant and affidavit claiming the Bureau wanted to protect Brown from the Zetas. [40:35.270 --> 40:38.530] So the secrecy made that first raid on Barrett harder to prove. [40:38.790 --> 40:40.130] People didn't believe Barrett. [40:40.410 --> 40:45.010] So these documents will be for great justice when we research them. [40:45.830 --> 40:48.810] Now I'll show you what some of the BOSAs typically contain. [40:49.110 --> 40:50.050] Page two, please. [40:51.670 --> 40:52.250] Okay. [40:52.890 --> 40:55.010] I see here a key event and finding. [41:00.590 --> 41:11.490] Quote, The largest single marijuana seizure occurred in the Rio Grande Valley sector, where U.S. Border Patrol agents seized 132 bundles of marijuana, totaling 3,262.05 pounds, concealed within a load of produce from a 1999 Kentworth truck. [41:11.910 --> 41:12.290] Unquote. [41:12.290 --> 41:19.130] So the Rio Grande Valley is where one of those joint operations and intelligence center outlying offices is. [41:19.350 --> 41:21.750] Now page 47, it says, has the details. [41:21.930 --> 41:28.490] Let's look at page 47 because this is how you would crowdsource research into it if you want to help Project PM, which everybody can do. [41:29.190 --> 41:42.850] So here we see that the weed, not weave, but weed, the pot, was, quote, commingled in a load of produce, unquote, and, importantly, that the incident happened at the Falfurius Border Patrol checkpoint. [41:43.250 --> 41:47.250] We know the document is reporting between October 26th and November 2. [41:47.530 --> 41:53.050] So now we can send a Freedom of Information Act request to Customs and Border Protection for this very incident. [41:53.170 --> 41:58.330] Hell, for all incidents and all 34 of the intelligent products, ultimately we can all organize them and put them on Project PM. [41:58.330 --> 42:00.310] They're not going to like that, but we will. [42:02.210 --> 42:07.990] Then, last thing, Stratfor also obtained daily and weekly products from the six outlying offices. [42:08.190 --> 42:16.230] So once we organize those, we can drill down to an even more granular level in the history of 2011 National Security Border Control from the point of view of the spies. [42:16.510 --> 42:31.830] These other data in the BOCES, there have statistics on kidnapping of migrants, quote, unquote, apprehension of legal immigrants, data on cartel movements, data on the hunt for mythical terrorists, supposedly crossing the border, and much more, including tons of pictures. [42:32.070 --> 42:37.130] Grinning Texas cops in cowboy hats photographed next to trucks with drugs they seized. [42:37.750 --> 42:42.670] Finally, let me show you the last thing that we've organized so far at the Project PM website. [42:46.010 --> 42:46.910] One sec. [42:49.760 --> 42:56.120] You'll note that the title of it is 2011 Texas Border Security Intelligence Products. [42:56.120 --> 43:00.760] So far, we've only organized the Border Operations Sector Assessments, the BOCES. [43:01.160 --> 43:11.320] You know, the one that we found a smoking gun between the border liaison officer, Lloyd Chuck, at the El Paso office, sending one of these BOCES to Victoria J. Allen, a.k.a. f*ck you, motherf*cker. [43:16.920 --> 43:23.000] So, yeah, 2011 Texas Border Security Intelligence Products, the one we've organized so far, the 34 BOCES. [43:23.160 --> 43:26.340] And we're going to continue organizing the daily and weekly reports. [43:26.340 --> 43:31.160] And we'll have a whole map, a whole history of 2011 border control in Texas. [43:31.180 --> 43:34.960] And we can do that with photographs, we can make maps, we can make visualizations. [43:34.960 --> 43:39.680] And you'll note here, the intelligence products, we've got the dates, so it's set up like a calendar. [43:39.960 --> 43:41.800] We've got the dates that the reports cover. [43:42.180 --> 43:45.300] The direct links to the intelligence products at WikiLeaks Press. [43:45.520 --> 43:46.760] Thanks for that, WikiLeaks Press. [43:46.960 --> 43:48.820] Or the bin links at WikiLeaks. [43:48.940 --> 43:52.620] And the link to the Stratfor email at the WikiLeaks website where the product was attached. [43:53.140 --> 43:59.140] So finally, now you have the organization that you need to begin researching these products on your own, all of us together. [43:59.140 --> 44:05.400] There's something, you know, 80 pages times 34 documents, there's going to be enough to go around for everybody until the end of time. [44:06.240 --> 44:12.020] Read them, Google what you find, send FOIA requests, surprise interview people, they'll say fun things. [44:12.500 --> 44:19.920] We can do... and then just tweet your findings to me, at Douglas Lucas, or to Project PM, at P-R-O-J-P-M. [44:20.100 --> 44:26.360] That way we can better understand the public-private intelligence complex, which is ruining so much, including Barrett Brown. [44:27.100 --> 44:37.160] And I do recommend Douglas' latest article because it talks about Mexican military incursions over the border that are apparently, according to Stratfor, happening regularly. [44:37.520 --> 44:48.680] Yeah, last Arizona's... last month's Arizona incursion, where a Mexican police helicopter flew into Arizona airspace and shot near U.S. Border Patrol agents, is no fluke. [44:50.700 --> 44:58.320] These intelligence products, these BOSAs, show examples of Mexican military helicopters doing this sort of stuff frequently. [44:58.580 --> 44:59.540] And that's just one thing. [44:59.940 --> 45:02.400] Helicopters, okay, so let's find, you know, what are we gonna find next? [45:02.480 --> 45:05.760] Let's find Zeta cartel members crossing the bridges, they do that. [45:06.260 --> 45:12.060] But what was the comment of the head Stratfor exec, when asked about this? [45:16.000 --> 45:16.880] Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. [45:18.020 --> 45:21.200] That was Fred Burton, again, the guy who says raghead all the time. [45:22.160 --> 45:22.880] He was... [45:23.520 --> 45:24.280] Yeah, he does. [45:24.480 --> 45:25.820] He's a one-of-a-kind character. [45:25.820 --> 45:28.540] You couldn't invent him for a novel, unless you were Philip K. [45:28.720 --> 45:28.820] Dick. [45:28.820 --> 45:33.580] So what he said about these helicopter incursions is that they happen all the time. [45:34.220 --> 45:44.240] And don't tell Alex Jones or Glenn Beck, because people will freak out once they realize what I found, which is that Mexican military aircraft are crossing the border all the time. [45:44.420 --> 45:55.920] I actually combined my Stratfor research with the Freedom of Information Act request that showed Mexican military aircraft entered something like 94 times between 2010 and 2012, entered U.S. airspace. [45:56.100 --> 46:03.260] And you can find all of that on whowhatwhy.com or at the wikileaks.org slash GI files list of releases. [46:03.260 --> 46:05.860] It's at the very top due to our investigative partnership. [46:06.460 --> 46:07.020] Excellent. [46:07.380 --> 46:16.600] And so our last speaker we're going to hear from, and I'm not sure if there will be time for questions, is Lauren Pespiza. [46:16.960 --> 46:29.040] She works with Transparency Toolkit, and she's kind of working on tools that can improve crowdsourcing, improve the analysis of large data sets, and the visualization of these things, and so on. [46:29.260 --> 46:30.120] So tell us about that. [46:30.400 --> 46:33.320] Yeah, well, I mean, I was in Project PM during, like, 2011. [46:36.100 --> 46:36.740] Oh, okay. [46:36.900 --> 46:48.260] So I was in Project PM around all this time, all this stuff was happening, and I was seeing how it was, in a way, somewhat tedious to go through all these emails and documents, and we were all doing it sort of by hand. [46:48.420 --> 46:58.400] And yeah, you know, you had searched on WikiLeaks, you'd search for keywords and stuff, but there really wasn't too much, you know, analytics software that we could use to put all this stuff together real fast. [46:58.760 --> 47:13.200] So it made it sort of a sub, a sort of small group of really interested people that were passionate about it to begin with, you know, like making fun of NSA contractors and embarrassing them is just something that is one of my favorite pastimes. [47:13.540 --> 47:17.400] So, and especially with a lot of other people in Project PM felt that way too. [47:18.620 --> 47:19.520] And it was... [47:20.160 --> 47:20.600] Speak up a little bit. [47:20.700 --> 47:21.240] Speak up more? [47:21.380 --> 47:21.480] Okay. [47:21.820 --> 47:22.320] It was fun. [47:22.460 --> 47:23.940] We've got to transfer it too quick up there. [47:24.060 --> 47:24.520] Oh, okay. [47:24.620 --> 47:28.420] Yeah, I don't want to go too far into it, because we need to have an actual release and stuff. [47:28.740 --> 47:37.620] But this is sort of what we've been working on, what I've been working on with my founder, Shadash, for the past, like, six months or so, and he's been working on it longer. [47:37.620 --> 47:50.980] And it's a data analytics platform that connects to a lot of different data sets, like OpenGov stuff, Sunlight Foundation, WikiLeaks, and will enable people to sort of visualize stuff better. [47:51.120 --> 47:56.880] There's like timeline tools and, you know, table generation. [47:56.880 --> 48:02.420] You can chain tools together to make even more interesting comparisons and network graph, actually. [48:03.320 --> 48:04.800] Yeah, it's just more effective. [48:04.800 --> 48:08.620] It's what, you know, this is what like most startups do now is like analytic stuff. [48:08.840 --> 48:17.260] It's, it's pretty, it's, it's, if we had had this when Project PM was going on, we would have, we would have been, you know, releasing three times the amount of, like, discoveries. [48:17.560 --> 48:22.540] And it would have been a lot more, maybe, maybe Barrett would have, you know, gotten a lot more credit. [48:22.620 --> 48:32.060] Because I know that when, before Snowden's leaks came out, or Revelations came out, Barrett was sort of, you know, still, you know, sort of like a conspiracy theorist. [48:32.060 --> 48:34.820] Like, you know, all those weird people at Project PM finding this stuff. [48:34.960 --> 48:37.200] Like, it was, this was stuff published by major media organizations. [48:37.200 --> 48:39.260] But people still didn't really take Barrett seriously. [48:39.300 --> 48:44.060] And then we were really vindicated when Edward Snowden came forward with all the revelations about the surveillance technology. [48:44.240 --> 48:45.260] Like, oh yeah, we told you. [48:46.300 --> 48:47.820] We've known this for a long time, guys. [48:48.360 --> 48:49.040] Absolutely right. [48:49.380 --> 48:49.460] Yeah. [48:49.460 --> 48:51.660] So, what is this, Lauren? [48:51.980 --> 48:55.760] Oh yeah, that's our network graph of the NSA contractors on LinkedIn. [48:56.080 --> 49:04.080] We scraped LinkedIn searching for all the acronyms and secret programs that, you know, like Prism and stuff like that. [49:04.660 --> 49:11.420] And found that most of them, a lot of these contractors post their secret programs they're working on to their public LinkedIn profile. [49:11.740 --> 49:17.260] So, you know, we can easily generate a network graph to show, like, the connections and how big these programs are and how many people work on them. [49:18.020 --> 49:21.960] And it's kind of embarrassing to them, which is always fun. [49:23.260 --> 49:32.380] I did see once, actually, a couple of cops on LinkedIn decide to put, like, I'm an expert in network exploitation. [49:32.780 --> 49:37.560] Which, of course, like, just, like, is, it's shown to everybody on the Internet. [49:37.640 --> 49:43.000] And then later he's hacked and, like, run out of the entire state. [49:43.800 --> 49:45.840] And he does no idea why. [49:46.640 --> 49:46.760] You know? [49:46.960 --> 49:56.240] And it's like, well, if you put on your LinkedIn that you're a cop and you're exploiting people's computers, it's gonna, like, the whole world is gonna come at you. [49:56.440 --> 49:57.240] Oh, like Aaron Barr? [49:57.580 --> 49:57.780] Yeah. [49:57.940 --> 49:58.980] No, no, he's a different guy. [49:59.080 --> 50:01.840] I forget his name, but this was a case I saw. [50:02.220 --> 50:11.380] So I think we've illustrated quite aptly why this Project PM thing in the wiki was viewed as a threat to the FBI and the powers that be. [50:11.380 --> 50:14.460] I think we have time for just one question. [50:15.980 --> 50:19.340] And, you know, there's a microphone just right over there, I believe. [50:24.120 --> 50:26.780] Two questions if you run really fast up there. [50:26.780 --> 50:37.200] I just want to ask if there's some place that all of this is going to be easily comprehended and published anytime soon. [50:37.340 --> 50:39.140] Do you have any plan to do that? [50:40.220 --> 50:44.660] Well, so there is the Project PM wiki, which you can still visit. [50:44.800 --> 50:50.220] However, some of its information is outdated because the founder has been in jail and hasn't been so active. [50:50.460 --> 50:54.640] But I've written a few articles where you can catch up on what all this work was. [50:55.840 --> 50:57.340] My name is Kevin Gallagher. [50:57.860 --> 51:00.300] Just look, I have a couple on Huffington Post. [51:00.540 --> 51:06.720] There's one on Daily Dot that just covers the issues that Project PM was into, particularly the private intelligence contractors. [51:07.220 --> 51:08.220] You can also help. [51:08.960 --> 51:09.360] Yeah. [51:09.540 --> 51:10.280] You can also help us, Corey. [51:10.300 --> 51:10.840] We're in... [51:11.260 --> 51:12.460] You can also help yourself. [51:12.700 --> 51:13.360] Anyone can help. [51:13.520 --> 51:13.700] Anybody can join us. [51:13.720 --> 51:14.620] This is the whole point. [51:14.620 --> 51:16.640] You don't have to be all pretty and nice. [51:16.660 --> 51:18.740] You can, like, directly do this yourself, too. [51:18.940 --> 51:20.860] You can jump in and join Project PM. [51:21.280 --> 51:23.400] It more spreads the legal liability around. [51:24.680 --> 51:28.800] Then you can check out my Who, What, Why latest report this week. [51:28.800 --> 51:30.440] It's my pinned tweet. [51:30.500 --> 51:33.380] And you can check out the forthcoming one I'm going to have. [51:34.820 --> 51:38.220] And I'll get that f*ck you motherf*cker transcript out one way or another. [51:38.720 --> 51:39.380] Oh, man. [51:41.440 --> 51:42.060] Hey, guys. [51:42.220 --> 51:46.000] I posted this question to Snowden before on Twitter, but... [51:46.000 --> 51:46.840] Did he answer you? [51:47.120 --> 51:47.420] No. [51:47.640 --> 51:49.800] I mean, there was no answering from... [51:49.800 --> 51:51.280] No questioning him at all. [51:51.460 --> 51:53.720] But I want to ask this to you, Andrew, actually. [51:54.020 --> 51:54.460] Particularly. [51:54.660 --> 52:10.080] How do you guys as well feel about your activist work against one civilian state and against one repressive colored state is used to whitewash the reputation of another actively military aggressive state? [52:10.780 --> 52:12.660] I'm talking about your work with RT. [52:12.940 --> 52:18.100] I'm talking about Snowden's work on other Russian media. [52:18.560 --> 52:19.280] And, yeah. [52:19.500 --> 52:21.000] Just want to hear your opinion about it. [52:21.000 --> 52:24.200] I just think that everything that's happening... [52:24.600 --> 52:25.680] I don't like secrets. [52:26.060 --> 52:31.140] And if you're doing anything to anyone anywhere in any part of the world, other people should know. [52:32.140 --> 52:32.980] Everyone, everywhere. [52:33.180 --> 52:35.040] Especially the bad things, you know? [52:35.040 --> 52:35.840] I don't think it's... [52:35.840 --> 52:52.820] The problem is that, for example, on RT, being one of the voices, main voices of Russia to the rest of the world right now, your credible and substantial interesting work is put next to the blatant lies and blatant Russian propaganda. [52:53.040 --> 52:55.080] He's the most credible person at the network. [52:55.300 --> 52:56.820] It's all just different jurisdictions. [52:57.140 --> 52:58.540] There's a Russia jurisdiction. [52:58.760 --> 53:00.380] There's an Al Jazeera English jurisdiction. [53:00.420 --> 53:01.580] You can publish stuff wherever. [53:01.880 --> 53:02.580] I'm a freelancer. [53:02.580 --> 53:05.280] Work with whatever jurisdiction is going to get your info out. [53:05.660 --> 53:11.560] I say, guys, your work is used to whitewash the reputation of Russia's aggression. [53:11.800 --> 53:12.040] Okay. [53:12.120 --> 53:13.080] How do you feel about it? [53:13.240 --> 53:13.540] All right. [53:13.700 --> 53:15.440] Can we go to the next question? [53:17.320 --> 53:20.800] You can talk to me about that when I'm not on stage. [53:21.020 --> 53:22.040] Everybody in the world... [53:22.040 --> 53:25.740] Everybody in the world can read websites from any jurisdiction. [53:26.040 --> 53:27.480] So there's a global audience. [53:27.480 --> 53:29.300] You can say that... [53:29.300 --> 53:35.560] Barrett was a big proponent of going after, in particular, what Russia has been doing. [53:36.340 --> 53:36.800] Absolutely. [53:36.800 --> 53:44.300] The fact that he's in jail right now and not here on this stage, like, just trashing Vladimir Putin is an absolute travesty. [53:44.460 --> 53:46.960] And we'd like him back, like, now. [53:47.140 --> 53:48.220] Him and Jeremy, too. [53:48.420 --> 53:48.680] Yeah. [53:48.680 --> 53:50.420] And Wormer, and Kahuna. [53:50.420 --> 53:52.380] PayPal 14, all the other political prisoners. [53:52.640 --> 53:52.940] And PayPal 14. [53:53.600 --> 53:54.840] Our political prisoners. [53:55.160 --> 53:55.980] You know... [53:55.980 --> 53:56.520] And Chelsea. [53:56.800 --> 53:58.060] If you guys... [53:58.060 --> 53:58.820] Chelsea Manning. [53:58.960 --> 54:08.420] We want to fight this menace, but when our government is locking up our own hackers and our own best and brightest people, it's just, like, it's a heresy. [54:08.880 --> 54:10.960] So I do... [54:10.960 --> 54:12.480] Like, our research doesn't... [54:12.480 --> 54:16.840] I would like to think it does not help whitewash Russia's abuses, because... [54:16.840 --> 54:17.460] Next question. [54:17.460 --> 54:17.960] We know. [54:18.060 --> 54:19.180] We know what they know. [54:19.500 --> 54:21.560] We're over time, so please keep it quick. [54:21.740 --> 54:22.020] All right. [54:22.120 --> 54:23.420] Just to be brief, I just want to... [54:23.420 --> 54:28.380] We've just heard from Edward Snowden, and the revelations that you revealed is that we're being spied on, right? [54:28.620 --> 54:33.360] But what you're talking about is a relentless campaign of cyber warfare, essentially. [54:33.560 --> 54:35.620] Some of it against U.S. citizens. [54:35.740 --> 54:43.440] How does it make you feel that the narrative currently in the media surrounding cyber warfare and this stuff is about, we are being spied on? [54:43.520 --> 54:45.840] Something that many of us have sort of known for a while. [54:45.840 --> 54:49.640] Whereas what you're talking about is essentially domestic cyber warfare. [54:50.020 --> 54:52.380] Yeah, we need to look at the state and local levels. [54:52.600 --> 54:59.380] We need to look at the private security contractors that work within the US, often on the state and local levels, sometimes on the national levels. [54:59.380 --> 55:08.440] It's not just the U.S. intelligence community's 16 agencies, it's also state police departments, stuff like that, that get ignored in favor of the global coverage. [55:09.320 --> 55:09.780] Yeah. [55:10.460 --> 55:11.520] One last thing. [55:12.300 --> 55:22.460] All of the emails I've read at Stratfor, I think would be put together nicely as a very dark sitcom, like a true detective or American dad, except like really racist. [55:23.560 --> 55:24.080] Go. [55:24.160 --> 55:24.780] Go for it. [55:24.960 --> 55:26.520] Beau Wilmon, let's make that happen. [55:27.580 --> 55:28.320] Thank you everyone. [55:33.000 --> 55:35.700] All right, you guys were talking about how... [55:37.620 --> 55:38.940] All right, I got it. [55:38.940 --> 55:39.020] All right, you guys will try it fine. [55:39.100 --> 55:39.900] You have to and what?