[00:00.000 --> 00:06.580] ...of security for drinking water because I come out of a background as a water commissioner for 13 years in Massachusetts. [00:07.520 --> 00:18.360] My day job is doing IT tech support and so on, and my non-day job that would be nice to turn into a day job is security research, quote-unquote. [00:19.080 --> 00:23.140] I was a former lobbyist for an environmental agency and an environmental group. [00:23.900 --> 00:29.380] I've been giving talks here and at DEFCON, Black Hat, and this year I was on the road. [00:29.380 --> 00:31.540] This is my seventh talk this year, God help me. [00:32.840 --> 00:34.100] Speaking, yeah. [00:34.480 --> 00:41.940] Spoke on drinking water infrastructure security at three locations, a wireless water meter at two locations. [00:41.940 --> 00:44.700] A talk I gave originally at DEFCON and Black Hat last year. [00:45.300 --> 00:50.720] And I gave an earlier version of this talk at THOTCON in Chicago, but this is the much improved version. [00:52.640 --> 00:58.840] And I've written some articles based upon my water department experience in the Journal of the New England Water Works Association. [00:59.620 --> 01:21.360] And my Black Hat white paper on wireless water meters, actually the part of it that was on general drinking water security, was published in the book, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, Second Edition, which came out earlier this year, which is used as a textbook at University of Lowell and I think also at West Point. [01:22.140 --> 01:27.000] So I'm trying to... I'm developing my expertise in writing on these matters. [01:27.300 --> 01:30.560] So this talk actually came out of my research originally. [01:30.880 --> 01:32.100] I was talking to someone earlier. [01:32.260 --> 01:37.140] I gave a talk at DEFCON in 2010 on general drinking water infrastructure security. [01:37.920 --> 01:47.200] And that led to my talk last year on wireless water meter security, or lack thereof, and hackability of wireless water meters when they become prevalent. [01:47.440 --> 01:55.520] And that led to this talk, which is sort of a further fine-grained way of finding out how you use water in your home and other activities in your home. [01:59.660 --> 02:04.240] So, the outline basically is... I have to mention... I did some research on the telescreen. [02:04.640 --> 02:07.200] Now, I look for a picture from the original show. [02:07.500 --> 02:10.900] This is sort of an inside joke to the prisoner. [02:11.200 --> 02:22.660] It's Patrick McGowan playing a former secret agent, for those who don't know, who, when he resigns, he's sort of kidnapped and brought to the village, which is this beautiful little town in an island or somewhere. [02:22.820 --> 02:23.980] No one really knows where it is. [02:23.980 --> 02:25.620] And it's like a gilded cage. [02:25.840 --> 02:26.220] It's beautiful. [02:26.380 --> 02:27.600] Everyone's dressed nicely. [02:27.880 --> 02:29.000] There's pleasant activities. [02:29.340 --> 02:35.700] But there's 24-hour, around-the-clock total surveillance, just like right now in the U.S. [02:37.020 --> 02:40.640] But his... I tried to find a photo of this, but this artist was the only thing that had it. [02:40.720 --> 02:51.780] So, for his private residence, quote-unquote, it says private, which, of course, it isn't, because they can see and hear everything he does and everything, you know, and everything he, you know, and everyone else. [02:51.780 --> 02:54.140] So, that was sort of just the inside joke. [02:55.540 --> 02:57.560] Number six, I'm not a number. [02:57.680 --> 02:59.120] I'm a free man, et cetera. [02:59.500 --> 03:09.380] So, before I get to infrastructure-mediated sensing, the actual topic of the talk, I wanted to give some brief introduction on privacy. [03:09.380 --> 03:13.220] And I'll warn you that that's sort of sort of take over because... [03:13.220 --> 03:18.140] And there's a lot of other talks that might go into more detail over threats to privacy these days. [03:18.220 --> 03:24.380] But I'm going to hit a couple key things to look at, outside the home, what privacy do we have and what threats there are. [03:24.480 --> 03:27.720] And then I'll talk about this technology, which is inside the home. [03:29.560 --> 03:34.380] So, the telescreen, this is from the movie, War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength. [03:34.980 --> 03:39.500] As you may know from the book and the movie, the telescreen is a two-way video. [03:39.920 --> 03:42.920] They didn't really explain in the book what the technology was, it didn't really matter. [03:45.100 --> 03:51.820] Which you can see everything in Winston Smith's home, but he found this little corner where he thought they couldn't see him and hear him. [03:51.820 --> 03:54.980] He found out later, of course, that they, of course, saw everything he was doing. [03:56.020 --> 03:57.940] So, the telescreen has been developed. [03:58.880 --> 04:00.380] Apple has a patent for it. [04:00.520 --> 04:01.720] I won't read every slide. [04:03.220 --> 04:08.160] Of course, I mean, how is that different than a video screen on a laptop with a camera? [04:08.320 --> 04:10.180] Well, it's the real video screen. [04:10.180 --> 04:17.500] So, they've got the viewable, you know, the video receiver is integrated in with the output. [04:18.120 --> 04:20.860] So, you don't know there's a camera with these. [04:22.080 --> 04:28.040] And my understanding is that Sharp is coming out with some that are similar to that as well. [04:28.440 --> 04:32.360] So, I couldn't find information that Apple was actually coming out with it. [04:32.420 --> 04:34.140] We know that Apple TV might be coming. [04:34.580 --> 04:36.440] I don't know whether it's this same thing. [04:36.900 --> 04:44.660] So, the point is that, you know, from George Orwell sort of coming up with it without trying to design it or actually say it would happen. [04:44.860 --> 04:46.240] It was a device in the book. [04:47.300 --> 04:50.440] It's something that is on its way, but it's not here already. [04:52.560 --> 04:54.320] So, privacy is under attack. [04:54.580 --> 04:56.540] So, here's number six being chased by Rover. [04:56.920 --> 05:05.800] So, in the village where there's cameras everywhere and microphones everywhere, whenever you do something that you're not supposed to, Rover appears out of nowhere. [05:05.800 --> 05:09.120] And they don't explain what Rover is, but it's a weather balloon. [05:09.920 --> 05:11.440] But it has a life of its own. [05:11.560 --> 05:13.100] Is it alive or is it... [05:13.100 --> 05:13.780] I mean, what is it? [05:13.840 --> 05:14.580] Or is it in charge? [05:15.500 --> 05:20.340] Then it smothers you and you wake up in a real jail cell and God knows, you know, then they really start to work on you. [05:20.340 --> 05:22.340] So, and there's another... [05:22.960 --> 05:26.060] Again, there's a lot of talks at this conference about privacy. [05:26.060 --> 05:29.980] So, I'm glad to add to that total weight of discussion on it. [05:30.180 --> 05:34.360] I'm going to hit some things, the high points, before I get to the main topic of the talk. [05:34.360 --> 05:38.140] But who was watching, who isn't watching is a good question. [05:38.540 --> 05:41.760] So, I just threw out this Newspeak definition. [05:42.080 --> 05:46.180] Of course, in the Newspeak dictionary, there would be no word privacy, the last one, number five. [05:47.420 --> 05:57.620] But it's interesting, you read privacy disclosures on some websites and some of them actually say that it includes collecting data on you. [05:57.760 --> 06:00.380] Or that you're agreeing that data will be collected. [06:03.600 --> 06:12.900] So, the definition of privacy that institutions and businesses are coming up with certainly could be different than what most people think of it. [06:14.040 --> 06:14.520] Cameras. [06:14.720 --> 06:18.240] Now, I was in Chicago for THOTCON a few months ago and I didn't see lots of cameras. [06:18.420 --> 06:27.460] But according to a study by ACLU, they have 10,000 or they're working on getting 10,000 that are wall-to-wall all through the city. [06:29.320 --> 06:31.880] And the objective is to cover the city from one end to the other. [06:33.340 --> 06:33.860] So, that's... [06:35.080 --> 06:35.840] So, above... [06:35.840 --> 06:38.700] This is a generic picture I found on the Internet of surveillance cameras. [06:38.940 --> 06:41.900] And this is one of the cameras in the village. [06:43.220 --> 06:44.420] I'm going to be popped... [06:44.420 --> 06:46.500] The village references will be popping in and out here. [06:47.440 --> 06:49.900] It's my favorite sort of analogy to... [06:49.900 --> 06:51.560] I mean, we all live in the village, right? [06:52.900 --> 06:57.060] So, there's many other cities that are covering cameras wall-to-wall. [06:57.220 --> 07:03.600] And you can't go almost anywhere without a surveillance camera around a 7-Eleven or a school or an institution or a police station. [07:04.480 --> 07:07.320] And you're in private facilities and there's a camera. [07:08.480 --> 07:09.920] And so, you see... [07:09.920 --> 07:10.660] So, in public... [07:10.660 --> 07:16.080] In popular movies, you see a lot of places where they hack into the camera and they find you and they can follow you around. [07:17.420 --> 07:18.800] Which probably can happen. [07:19.240 --> 07:22.480] But the point is, all this visual information is being collected. [07:23.080 --> 07:27.220] And some of them may write over the information or not store it. [07:27.340 --> 07:28.620] But some of them may. [07:30.720 --> 07:31.200] Drones. [07:31.620 --> 07:33.020] Now, this is really something. [07:33.200 --> 07:36.860] So, I'm looking at outside your home, what's the threats to privacy? [07:37.180 --> 07:42.120] So, there's a lot of activity coming out on the web about drones. [07:42.120 --> 07:46.960] That there are a number of facilities being conceptualized in the U.S. proposed for drone bases. [07:49.120 --> 07:54.080] And it could either be these big drones or these baby drones. [07:55.420 --> 07:59.780] And some really small ones are coming out that are like fireflies that are hard to see. [08:00.560 --> 08:01.540] And then the U.S. Army has blimps, of course. [08:02.660 --> 08:04.060] So, anything aerial. [08:05.160 --> 08:10.300] And some hackers have developed their own versions being presented to Black Hat and DEFCON in the last year. [08:11.300 --> 08:13.200] But there's a possibility. [08:13.420 --> 08:20.520] So, a lot of governments and local law enforcement can apply to use drones. [08:20.720 --> 08:22.760] And they have to get clearance from the FAA. [08:23.160 --> 08:26.660] But drones are becoming more pervasive. [08:28.580 --> 08:29.340] Your car. [08:30.060 --> 08:38.180] So, I believe there's a bill in Congress, I don't know if it's passed, to require black boxes, like in an airplane, to be in your car. [08:38.320 --> 08:39.740] And a lot of cars still have them. [08:39.860 --> 08:40.640] They have them now. [08:41.700 --> 08:46.760] So, that records data on where you travel, how fast you're going, things like that. [08:47.060 --> 08:49.180] Which is very useful in an accident investigation. [08:50.200 --> 08:53.320] So, it would be useful to know if the car you're driving has a black box. [08:53.320 --> 08:59.220] The National Vehicle Locator Service keeps a database of pictures of license plates. [09:00.300 --> 09:09.420] So that when the government or the DEA or the FBI is looking for someone, that's one of the sources they can tap into to try to locate someone. [09:10.660 --> 09:11.780] GPS locators. [09:12.100 --> 09:18.140] I think it was a circuit court decision, which may or may not be nationwide. [09:18.200 --> 09:21.260] But there was a decision saying you can't be placed without a permit. [09:21.920 --> 09:24.280] Don't worry, they'll try to find a way around that. [09:27.340 --> 09:30.240] And personal ads in geolocation, like in Minority Report. [09:30.520 --> 09:34.100] I was going to do a theme of what movie were we in, but it's hard to say. [09:34.220 --> 09:35.280] They all sort of overlap. [09:35.580 --> 09:41.520] But in Minority Report, he's walking through with the fake eyes, after he had his eyes replaced. [09:42.320 --> 09:49.580] And they're responding to the retinal scan, and they're giving him personalized ads based upon who the eyes usually used to belong to. [09:50.280 --> 09:51.800] And those are under development. [09:52.540 --> 10:07.040] Immersive labs, embeds cameras and displays, and there are some retail locations now that have networks where they find your cell phone, they get your MAC address, and they can link it to who you are. [10:08.100 --> 10:13.060] And then give you personalized ads based upon a database of where you've been in your shopping. [10:13.840 --> 10:16.900] And French billboards, I'm told, call your cell phone. [10:17.020 --> 10:21.760] So I'm not trying to get in depth on a lot of these things, but the point is there's a lot of things chipping away. [10:22.620 --> 10:24.160] It's for the government. [10:25.080 --> 10:27.100] It's marketers trying to sell you something. [10:29.160 --> 10:30.700] It's all of the above. [10:33.220 --> 10:34.540] Secret code and color printers. [10:34.600 --> 10:35.580] I just had to mention this. [10:35.580 --> 10:42.500] I learned about this by watching Mikko Hykonen in the TED Talks. [10:43.140 --> 10:53.480] He said, you know, for example, in 1980s, during the Cold War, Eastern Germany, every owner of a typewriter had to register it so that the government could find out, you know, and then give a sample. [10:53.500 --> 10:58.480] So if he wrote something critical of the government or something they didn't like, they could find out who typed it. [10:58.480 --> 11:14.020] Well, the EFF, and I think Marcia Hoffman's here, I don't know if she's here now, but EFF is here, has done a study where they try to document the secret codes that are now in laser printers or many laser printers so that the government can do the same thing now. [11:14.260 --> 11:17.500] Now, maybe not to suppress free speech, of course. [11:18.160 --> 11:19.240] Why would they do that? [11:20.500 --> 11:29.700] But if they want to identify where a document came from, it's possible with these secret codes that are in, like, light-colored yellow or green or something you can't obviously see. [11:30.580 --> 11:37.100] So check the EFF website for documentation on some of the codes they've been able to decode. [11:39.620 --> 11:44.940] So Miko, in his talk, he was surprised, said, people should know about this. [11:45.000 --> 11:46.600] He's surprised how many people don't know this. [11:46.660 --> 11:50.880] And I didn't know it, so I figured I'd throw it in because that's a serious invasion of privacy. [11:50.880 --> 12:00.220] You type something up, you print it out, you make copies, and somebody, either the government or someone else who knows the code, can figure out which machine it was and maybe track it back to you. [12:02.280 --> 12:06.640] So there's really no end to this sort of chipping away at doing something privately. [12:08.580 --> 12:09.380] Warrantless eavesdropping. [12:09.540 --> 12:16.840] Again, I won't read everything, but it's, you know, started with Bush, and Obama's been keeping it going. [12:17.720 --> 12:18.700] But don't worry. [12:18.860 --> 12:20.740] As long as you're not a terrorist, you have nothing to worry about. [12:22.940 --> 12:24.640] So it's only international. [12:24.800 --> 12:31.040] They sure it's only international, and they won't listen to anyone who's not talking about something with a foreign address. [12:31.600 --> 12:40.000] But we all should be worried because, again, it's thousands or millions of phone calls and data that's being collected. [12:43.610 --> 12:44.890] People with cell phones. [12:45.430 --> 12:47.430] So, again, it's ourselves. [12:47.690 --> 12:50.430] So there's people everywhere taking a picture or a video. [12:51.930 --> 12:55.910] Google Glasses, if they take off, and that's a picture right there. [12:56.470 --> 12:57.590] What's the threat there? [12:57.810 --> 12:59.370] Well, it's, again, it's developing data. [12:59.370 --> 13:05.570] So you walk around Google Glasses, and it's developing a database at Google, which, of course, remembers everything. [13:06.090 --> 13:15.050] They have servers going back to the beginning of Google that record everything that, you know, and every search you've ever done, anything that anyone's ever done on their pages. [13:15.370 --> 13:20.530] So it adds to that total database that, of course, is very useful to marketers and maybe other parties. [13:23.150 --> 13:36.410] And I ran into an interesting web page that sort of joked, or maybe it's not a joke, saying, hey, the government really succeeded in getting people to voluntarily disclose what they're doing, which is what a lot of people do on Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, [13:38.050 --> 13:39.010] MySpace. [13:39.290 --> 13:40.170] I don't know if that's still around. [13:41.110 --> 13:49.090] But a lot of people, I think mostly teenagers and high school students, just tell people everything they're doing. [13:49.090 --> 13:49.950] And then they're shocked. [13:50.110 --> 13:53.410] They're shocked that people are, you know, talking about what they do. [13:55.350 --> 13:59.310] And Jeff Fox from Consumer Reports was here that he did a story on it earlier this year. [14:00.470 --> 14:08.290] It is also a threat, though, even if you're not on Facebook, people can talk about what you're doing on Facebook, and information about you can still leak out. [14:09.390 --> 14:12.450] And, of course, Facebook has monetized that into the billions. [14:12.550 --> 14:20.470] And so it's a useful tool with its millions of points of data being collected from marketers and God knows who else. [14:22.190 --> 14:24.890] So it's ourselves, POGO, you know. [14:25.630 --> 14:27.530] We've seen the enemy, and it's ourselves. [14:28.370 --> 14:31.090] And, of course, I just saw this a couple days ago. [14:31.550 --> 14:37.850] So airports, invasion of privacy as we enter, you know, get on a flight. [14:38.510 --> 14:43.250] There are new laser scanners, which 50 meters away can see everything. [14:44.830 --> 14:49.430] Ten million times faster and one million times more sensitive than a current available system. [14:50.330 --> 14:51.690] And you don't have to be in line. [14:52.090 --> 14:55.930] Of course, they're talking about it for airports, but why not anywhere else, you know? [14:57.850 --> 15:00.050] So that's the headline from Gizmodo. [15:00.270 --> 15:01.890] So the stories in Gizmodo. [15:02.730 --> 15:11.670] I'll give credit to the Genia Photonics Pico Second Programmable Laser Scanner. [15:11.930 --> 15:14.330] You can look at you and find... [15:14.330 --> 15:14.890] So... [15:15.490 --> 15:15.990] Sorry. [15:16.050 --> 15:16.770] Right at the bottom there. [15:17.210 --> 15:18.090] The Genia? [15:18.390 --> 15:18.830] Genia? [15:19.110 --> 15:19.310] Genia? [15:19.310 --> 15:19.490] Genia. [15:20.670 --> 15:21.190] So... [15:21.190 --> 15:21.230] So... [15:21.230 --> 15:22.190] This is not... [15:22.190 --> 15:26.770] This is not intended to be a thorough discussion of erosion of privacy outside the home. [15:26.930 --> 15:31.910] But it covers some major issues that I've seen so far. [15:33.090 --> 15:36.830] So, the big question is, do the walls of a home protect privacy anymore? [15:37.130 --> 15:54.630] So, Chris Desmond, a master's thesis candidate, looking at some...he was a law school in Canada, I believe, looked at this question and had this great quote, the walls that have maintained the privacy of a man's affairs for thousands of years have been made obsolete by his technological advances. [15:55.430 --> 16:02.330] So, it wasn't that long ago that, you know, you're inside your home and you're safe from privacy...from being snooped on. [16:03.470 --> 16:05.070] Of course, that's a real class home. [16:05.470 --> 16:10.470] I don't know if anybody lives in it, but it's a conceptual design by an Italian design team. [16:11.710 --> 16:22.670] So, some of the well-known technologies, there's Tempest Attack outside the home, can read the electronic signature of electronic emissions from a monitor, at least from a CRT. [16:24.090 --> 16:26.610] I presume also from an LCD, but I'm not sure. [16:27.630 --> 16:30.970] And there's a way to read what you're typing on the monitor. [16:30.970 --> 16:34.250] TV viewing can be revealed by a smart electric meter. [16:34.410 --> 16:44.310] There was a paper that came out in Germany last year where they can correlate sort of the timing of when they know that the TV's on and they can detect the channel. [16:45.670 --> 16:48.870] You can just match that up with the schedule and you can find out what someone's watching. [16:50.030 --> 16:51.110] Electric meter signals. [16:51.130 --> 17:07.310] There was a talk at DEFCON last year, I think David Kennedy, on how through the electric meter, just, again, reading the fluctuations in electric electric use, you can determine what's going on inside the house from electric activity. [17:07.550 --> 17:10.510] And that comes close to what I'll be talking about in the bulk of the talk. [17:10.990 --> 17:15.790] Of course, tapping and eavesdropping on computers is no mystery. [17:16.510 --> 17:17.930] And your Internet activity. [17:18.750 --> 17:23.190] But we're going to another level in this talk on that. [17:24.630 --> 17:26.070] And then, of course, the smart grid. [17:26.250 --> 17:34.930] So I gave a talk last year, actually early this year, twice, and last year at Black Hat and DEFCON on smart water meters, wireless water meters. [17:36.350 --> 17:40.930] And when I did the research, I didn't realize at the beginning that the major concern would be privacy. [17:42.270 --> 17:49.430] So, right now, your water department presumably has a mechanical meter in most places in the U.S. [17:49.530 --> 17:54.610] that is read quarterly because they have to pay someone to go out, knock on the door, go down the basement, read the meter. [17:58.270 --> 18:05.370] About 7% of U.S. homes have smart meters that go beyond that, that are, well, wireless meters, anyway, that send a signal out. [18:06.490 --> 18:16.130] And the advantage of sending the signal out or having it received from someone driving by the home or received at a central facility for billing is that you can change the frequency. [18:16.130 --> 18:25.770] Since you don't have to pay for people to go out and read the meters, you can check on the frequency of water use every hour, every day, every five minutes. [18:26.350 --> 18:31.490] Which is very useful to the water department to determine leaks, to determine if people are using water when they're not supposed to. [18:32.070 --> 18:39.750] But it also gives you a very fine-grained, detailed information of water use that you can use to determine what's going on in the home. [18:40.090 --> 18:59.910] So, this is just one piece from my talk on wireless water meters, where, from an online newspaper called the Cary Watchman, from Cary, North Carolina, that the right to be concerned about the information or private lives that the town staff will be able to collect from the AquaStar AMI water meter system is implemented. [19:01.770 --> 19:05.870] And they give a quote from a technology futurist and keynote speaker at a conference. [19:07.010 --> 19:10.450] They can tell when to take a shower or when to take a... And this is just from the water meter. [19:10.610 --> 19:15.210] I'll get into techniques that are even more useful than that to finding out what you're doing. [19:16.330 --> 19:19.730] I gave my wireless water meter talk in Madison, Wisconsin, yesterday. [19:20.470 --> 19:30.030] And after I gave the talk, I talked to some people from the University of Wisconsin, where I gave the talk in the city, where I found out that the city of Madison, Wisconsin, just bought... [19:30.030 --> 19:34.630] Well, just signed a contract to install, you know, tens of thousands of wireless water meters throughout the city. [19:34.950 --> 19:36.570] And like most of them, they're not encrypted. [19:36.570 --> 19:45.170] They use something called frequency hopping spread spectrum, which, you know, is thought of as encryption, which came out of World War II, but it's obscurity. [19:45.350 --> 19:51.430] So every packet is sent out with a different frequency that presumably only the sender and the receiver know. [19:51.710 --> 19:57.310] The trouble is that's not really encryption, and there are fairly easy ways to break that. [19:58.770 --> 20:17.150] But in any event, whether or not the water department is going to be sinister and use the information somehow based upon what you do at your home, I don't think, as a former water commissioner, I really doubt that a lot of them are going to do that unless there's some personal thing going on and someone in the water department wants to get it, [20:17.230 --> 20:18.870] someone based upon the data. [20:19.070 --> 20:23.650] The trouble is that data is created, and it lives forever, and where is it going to go? [20:24.370 --> 20:32.670] So privacy is the biggest question you see out there, mostly for the smart grid for electricity, for gas, and for water. [20:34.370 --> 20:35.350] Okay, here we go. [20:35.970 --> 20:37.910] Infrastructure-mediated single-point sensing. [20:37.970 --> 20:39.810] I like having the long technical term. [20:41.010 --> 20:43.230] Infrastructure sensing is my shorthand for it. [20:43.930 --> 20:46.210] So it's the use of existing home infrastructure. [20:46.770 --> 20:55.730] So this is a way, without having to chip you, put a chip on you or a transmitter or a microphone or have cameras in the home. [20:56.310 --> 20:57.690] Find out what you're doing in the home. [20:57.910 --> 21:01.930] And I'll get into why anybody would want to do that in a good sense. [21:03.390 --> 21:05.410] It can accurately determine human activity. [21:06.810 --> 21:09.590] So eliminate the need for sensors or chips. [21:10.330 --> 21:12.190] Work with other sensor devices and methods. [21:13.130 --> 21:21.610] This is not the same thing as a smart home, which we've been reading about in science fiction for many years, but still hasn't come to fruition. [21:22.910 --> 21:28.130] And I read an article in the smart home a while ago, and the main reason might be people, why do people, why would you need it? [21:28.390 --> 21:42.750] Though there are applications out there that are similar to the smart home, where you have a home area network where you can have central control over appliances, which is good for controlling electricity use, if you want to lower your electric bill. [21:44.990 --> 21:53.410] So these devices and this research comes primarily out of the Ubiquitous Computing Research Lab, Ubicomp, at the University of Washington. [21:54.370 --> 21:57.590] It's called pervasive computing or ubiquitous computing. [21:57.750 --> 21:59.090] Ubiquitous means everywhere. [22:00.370 --> 22:05.750] These are not in production yet, but there's a lot of research and a number of papers on the web about this. [22:06.070 --> 22:20.250] So sustainability to reduce use of natural resources like water, natural gas, fossil fuels for the most part that power electricity, and it's used for health sensing. [22:22.790 --> 22:26.870] And so these are some of the purposes that they propose for it. [22:28.030 --> 22:33.130] So hydrosense, this is how I got into it in looking at wireless water meters. [22:33.130 --> 22:34.890] I've read about hydrosense. [22:35.470 --> 22:39.850] And this is very... technically this is very sophisticated, but very simple. [22:41.930 --> 22:47.770] So you want to find out what... so with this device... let me back up. [22:47.850 --> 22:51.610] With this device, it's a very simple small device that doesn't cost much. [22:51.870 --> 22:54.190] You attach it to any piece of plumbing in the house. [22:55.950 --> 22:59.650] And after being calibrated, it has a little wireless transceiver on it. [23:00.370 --> 23:08.110] After being calibrated, it can tell which fixture was turned on or off at any particular time and how much water was used. [23:08.450 --> 23:12.570] And you can develop a very precise database of water use. [23:12.570 --> 23:18.250] So toilet, faucet, shower, tub, kitchen. [23:19.150 --> 23:20.450] I mean, everywhere. [23:21.430 --> 23:25.370] And it uses something called Poissell's Law. [23:25.590 --> 23:25.910] Blah. [23:26.650 --> 23:28.070] Which I won't read. [23:28.650 --> 23:33.850] But these graphs give you the idea of how it works is that the open event... [23:33.850 --> 23:34.950] When you... [23:34.950 --> 23:35.290] When you... [23:35.290 --> 23:43.170] I know from my experience in water, you know, when you open or close a valve, you create a water hammer, which creates a sound and a vibration. [23:43.470 --> 23:46.990] And so this reads it and it can tell the difference between an open and a close. [23:49.830 --> 23:50.290] Um... [23:50.290 --> 23:51.490] So screw on device. [23:52.750 --> 23:53.210] Um... [23:53.210 --> 23:54.290] This is a change in pressure. [23:55.010 --> 23:55.470] Uh... [23:55.470 --> 23:56.210] And sent to wireless. [23:56.990 --> 23:57.860] And there are... [23:58.490 --> 23:58.950] Um... [23:58.950 --> 23:59.430] So there's... [23:59.430 --> 24:01.330] It's battery powered, but there's a... [24:01.330 --> 24:02.670] But they've really been working on it. [24:02.790 --> 24:05.290] And there's one that actually powers itself from the water going... [24:05.290 --> 24:07.030] The vibration of the water going through the pipe. [24:07.930 --> 24:08.330] Uh... [24:08.330 --> 24:08.910] So there... [24:08.910 --> 24:09.630] There's... [24:09.630 --> 24:11.810] There's a lot of development work going in this. [24:11.850 --> 24:12.970] These are not in production yet. [24:13.130 --> 24:15.610] None of the ones I'm talking about now are in production yet. [24:15.870 --> 24:16.270] But... [24:16.270 --> 24:17.130] They may. [24:17.330 --> 24:18.150] And I'll talk about why. [24:19.110 --> 24:19.870] Gas sense. [24:20.170 --> 24:23.710] So this is attached to where the gas enters the house. [24:25.430 --> 24:25.830] Uh... [24:25.830 --> 24:26.450] Uh... [24:26.450 --> 24:27.470] And it uses sound. [24:30.430 --> 24:31.230] So it... [24:31.230 --> 24:33.230] The natural gas entering the house. [24:33.390 --> 24:36.750] It's used for hot water, heating, stove, furnace, fireplace, clothes, dryers. [24:37.750 --> 24:38.650] So those are the things that don't... [24:38.650 --> 24:40.130] Most of those don't use water. [24:40.130 --> 24:41.270] So that covers... [24:42.350 --> 24:42.750] Uh... [24:42.750 --> 24:43.030] Uh... [24:43.030 --> 24:43.790] Some different bases. [24:44.730 --> 24:45.130] Um... [24:45.130 --> 24:47.250] So there are a couple studies that I quoted from here. [24:47.590 --> 24:47.790] Uh... [24:47.790 --> 24:51.130] So calibrated by turning gas appliances on or off from recording the sounds. [24:51.610 --> 24:53.070] So it's not that these are... [24:53.070 --> 24:54.390] Can be put in surreptitiously. [24:54.990 --> 24:55.390] Uh... [24:55.390 --> 24:56.550] And suddenly, uh... [24:56.550 --> 24:57.350] Figure these things out. [24:57.530 --> 24:59.350] Although, I'm sure someone could figure that out. [24:59.350 --> 25:01.450] But at this point, you have to put it on. [25:01.630 --> 25:02.070] So this... [25:02.070 --> 25:03.410] It's still being studied. [25:03.650 --> 25:04.510] You put it on. [25:04.650 --> 25:05.630] You do the calibration. [25:06.010 --> 25:07.950] And you can do the same thing that you do with HydroSense. [25:08.050 --> 25:09.730] You can determine what's been turned on or off. [25:09.830 --> 25:10.930] And how much gas is used. [25:12.470 --> 25:12.830] Um... [25:12.830 --> 25:13.410] So... [25:13.410 --> 25:13.910] So that... [25:13.910 --> 25:14.630] So they... [25:14.630 --> 25:18.230] The success is it helps provide a complete picture of whole home's human activity. [25:18.450 --> 25:19.390] You know, what you're doing in the house. [25:19.410 --> 25:20.390] Along with the water use. [25:21.230 --> 25:25.010] New ecofeedback device to help users monitor and perhaps reduce their natural gas usage. [25:25.290 --> 25:26.610] So that's a beneficial use, right? [25:26.790 --> 25:28.150] To reduce the natural gas. [25:28.510 --> 25:32.210] You get the same benefit out of the natural gas, but you're using less and you're paying less. [25:32.990 --> 25:34.050] So that's good, right? [25:34.750 --> 25:35.170] ElectroSense. [25:36.950 --> 25:37.790] So, um... [25:37.790 --> 25:44.690] So the switch mode power supplies, which are in most appliances, emits a high frequency electromagnetic pulse. [25:45.830 --> 25:50.610] And, uh, it has a signature specific to a device and it defects it. [25:50.710 --> 25:52.450] But electricity is easy in that sense. [25:52.750 --> 25:53.170] Um... [25:53.170 --> 25:54.650] Because, uh... [25:55.330 --> 25:55.870] So that can... [25:55.870 --> 25:57.910] So that's everything else in the house is electrical. [25:58.610 --> 25:59.490] Location sensing. [25:59.710 --> 26:01.170] And this is just a part of the picture. [26:01.490 --> 26:02.270] So they can... [26:02.270 --> 26:04.110] There are devices you can put... [26:04.110 --> 26:05.790] If you've got a, uh... [26:06.610 --> 26:07.130] Um... [26:07.130 --> 26:07.390] Uh... [26:07.390 --> 26:08.290] Air conditioning system. [26:08.410 --> 26:10.470] HVAC system in the house or building. [26:11.070 --> 26:11.510] Um... [26:11.510 --> 26:15.370] And most houses may not have that in New England anywhere I live or in the eastern U.S. [26:15.470 --> 26:17.390] But maybe other parts of the country do. [26:17.550 --> 26:20.570] And, of course, apartments, condos, um... [26:20.570 --> 26:23.190] Government facilities, private facilities have them as well. [26:25.150 --> 26:25.590] Um... [26:25.590 --> 26:29.590] So a single sensor can detect the disruption in air flow. [26:30.330 --> 26:30.530] Uh... [26:30.530 --> 26:33.490] 75% to 80% accurate can determine where's... [26:33.490 --> 26:37.110] You know, one or two people, where they're going, what their activities are in the house. [26:38.170 --> 26:38.490] Uh... [26:38.490 --> 26:40.310] Smart floors, that's an easier way to do it. [26:40.470 --> 26:43.090] So they're pressure sensors in a grid in the house. [26:43.790 --> 26:45.050] And you can, uh... [26:45.050 --> 26:47.550] Calibrate it so you know who's walking and who... [26:47.550 --> 26:48.430] And where they're walking. [26:49.350 --> 26:49.650] Uh... [26:49.650 --> 26:50.050] And... [26:50.050 --> 26:50.530] And... [26:50.530 --> 26:51.190] And... [26:51.190 --> 26:53.290] And you get a database of exactly what's going on there. [26:53.930 --> 26:55.170] Power line positioning. [26:55.610 --> 26:56.030] Uh... [26:56.030 --> 26:56.250] This... [26:56.250 --> 26:57.870] This means you have to have something on you. [26:58.090 --> 26:58.610] Like a... [26:58.610 --> 26:58.890] A... [26:58.890 --> 26:59.810] A chip or a... [26:59.810 --> 27:01.170] A microphone or something. [27:02.430 --> 27:02.950] Um... [27:02.950 --> 27:03.470] So these... [27:03.470 --> 27:03.970] So... [27:03.970 --> 27:06.530] So you've got water, gas, electric... [27:07.310 --> 27:07.670] Um... [27:07.670 --> 27:08.130] Location. [27:10.130 --> 27:10.490] So... [27:10.490 --> 27:12.690] They can find out what you're doing in the house. [27:13.430 --> 27:13.790] Uh... [27:13.790 --> 27:14.910] And again, these aren't... [27:15.410 --> 27:17.230] I'm not saying this is done surreptitiously. [27:17.510 --> 27:19.130] Someone's installing it so that you're knowing it. [27:19.170 --> 27:20.550] That would be very hard in most of these. [27:20.850 --> 27:22.510] But that's not what the idea is. [27:23.930 --> 27:24.290] Um... [27:24.290 --> 27:24.790] So the... [27:24.790 --> 27:25.410] The... [27:25.410 --> 27:26.750] The acronym is ADL. [27:26.930 --> 27:28.090] Activities of daily life. [27:28.610 --> 27:29.750] So who went where? [27:30.050 --> 27:30.570] Who did what? [27:31.490 --> 27:31.930] Uh... [27:31.930 --> 27:32.690] Behavioral information. [27:33.250 --> 27:34.430] So this is a... [27:34.430 --> 27:35.150] Um... [27:35.150 --> 27:36.690] I tried to find some more examples of this. [27:36.790 --> 27:37.750] But this is the best one. [27:37.930 --> 27:38.150] So... [27:38.150 --> 27:40.590] So you get a pattern from these different sensors. [27:41.070 --> 27:43.290] And this pattern says, ah, they're having breakfast. [27:45.550 --> 27:45.990] Um... [27:45.990 --> 27:46.770] So it looks at... [27:46.770 --> 27:48.290] I think it was primarily water. [27:48.430 --> 27:50.930] But you get water and gas and location. [27:51.290 --> 27:52.230] They're in the kitchen. [27:52.230 --> 27:54.150] The kitchen faucet's on. [27:54.670 --> 27:55.150] Uh... [27:55.150 --> 27:55.670] The stove. [27:56.610 --> 27:57.090] Um... [27:57.090 --> 27:59.290] You know, there's enough water to put tea in the kettle or... [27:59.290 --> 27:59.790] Or make... [27:59.790 --> 28:00.130] Make... [28:00.130 --> 28:00.770] Make... [28:00.770 --> 28:01.010] Coffee. [28:01.470 --> 28:03.050] So they're having breakfast. [28:03.670 --> 28:04.110] Uh... [28:04.110 --> 28:05.310] There's a different pattern for... [28:05.310 --> 28:05.750] For dinner. [28:06.050 --> 28:06.910] Might be similar. [28:07.230 --> 28:08.490] Different pattern for going to bed. [28:08.890 --> 28:09.310] Different... [28:09.310 --> 28:11.410] Different pattern for other things you're doing. [28:12.210 --> 28:12.690] So... [28:12.690 --> 28:18.230] If you don't have the location sensors, they can find out from the water and gas and electricity what rooms people are doing things in. [28:18.950 --> 28:21.430] And the more sensors you add, uh... [28:21.430 --> 28:22.490] The more information you get. [28:23.430 --> 28:23.870] Uh... [28:23.870 --> 28:24.650] Behavioral information. [28:25.270 --> 28:26.110] Health status. [28:26.430 --> 28:27.930] That's one of the beneficial uses. [28:28.770 --> 28:29.210] Uh... [28:30.810 --> 28:31.250] Um... [28:31.250 --> 28:32.570] And correlated with other information. [28:33.810 --> 28:34.250] Um... [28:34.250 --> 28:35.710] So there are a lot of studies on this. [28:36.090 --> 28:36.510] Um... [28:36.510 --> 28:37.470] There's a mass of studies. [28:37.870 --> 28:38.190] Uh... [28:38.190 --> 28:40.450] Where actually the research is trying to find out now. [28:40.630 --> 28:43.430] So if we put all these sensors in, um... [28:43.970 --> 28:45.030] They run into a couple problems. [28:45.290 --> 28:48.830] Like running out of electrical outlets for some of them that need power on their own. [28:48.830 --> 28:52.610] You run into electrical interference from ones that use similar frequencies. [28:52.990 --> 28:54.330] So they're working that out though. [28:54.510 --> 28:54.850] Don't worry. [28:54.990 --> 28:55.710] They're working that out. [28:55.850 --> 28:56.790] And, um... [28:56.790 --> 28:57.470] And... [28:57.470 --> 29:01.170] So it can be easier and simpler to build a house, uh... [29:01.170 --> 29:05.190] Or a condo or a government facility where they can track everything you're doing. [29:07.110 --> 29:08.150] I mean... [29:08.150 --> 29:08.370] Why not? [29:08.630 --> 29:09.070] Okay. [29:09.390 --> 29:10.650] So health monitoring in the home. [29:11.910 --> 29:12.330] Uh... [29:12.330 --> 29:13.950] Elderly and assisted living facilities. [29:15.090 --> 29:15.650] Uh... [29:15.650 --> 29:17.110] Those are two sort of similar things. [29:17.410 --> 29:19.370] So looking at water use. [29:20.550 --> 29:21.110] Um... [29:21.110 --> 29:21.670] Mobility. [29:23.010 --> 29:23.570] Uh... [29:23.570 --> 29:23.850] Uh... [29:23.850 --> 29:25.050] You can get health indications. [29:26.010 --> 29:26.570] Um... [29:26.570 --> 29:31.870] And there's a lot of fine-grained analysis that's been done for many years at elderly home. [29:32.090 --> 29:33.090] Elderly, uh... [29:33.090 --> 29:33.490] Elderly, uh... [29:33.490 --> 29:34.810] And assisted living facilities. [29:35.310 --> 29:37.110] Where, you know, uh... [29:37.110 --> 29:38.290] There's an aide in the home. [29:38.430 --> 29:39.270] Or visits the home. [29:39.610 --> 29:40.910] Or there are cameras. [29:41.130 --> 29:42.230] Which is intrusive. [29:42.230 --> 29:42.990] So we... [29:42.990 --> 29:43.290] So... [29:43.290 --> 29:44.970] This is a way of doing it without cameras. [29:45.270 --> 29:47.170] So you can see a reduction in mobility. [29:48.010 --> 29:48.490] Uh... [29:48.490 --> 29:49.910] The toilet isn't used as much. [29:50.310 --> 29:50.490] Uh... [29:50.490 --> 29:51.450] They're not drawing water. [29:51.870 --> 29:53.090] They're not doing something. [29:53.310 --> 29:53.610] That... [29:53.610 --> 29:54.410] That's a health issue. [29:55.310 --> 29:55.790] Um... [29:55.790 --> 29:57.150] That's the easy one to figure out. [29:57.290 --> 29:58.550] There are many others, uh... [29:58.550 --> 29:59.390] That, uh... [29:59.390 --> 30:02.330] Years of assisted living research, uh... [30:02.330 --> 30:05.030] Can correlate with some of these things to look at health. [30:05.510 --> 30:06.650] So that's a good thing. [30:07.010 --> 30:08.810] So you have an assisted living facility. [30:08.810 --> 30:12.130] And instead of paying for an aide to be in each... [30:12.130 --> 30:13.530] With the person all the time. [30:13.650 --> 30:14.210] Or visit a... [30:14.210 --> 30:15.770] You probably want to visit once in a while. [30:16.030 --> 30:17.370] You can set these things up. [30:17.630 --> 30:19.270] And set it up on the computer. [30:19.630 --> 30:22.650] And, you know, have a flag go off if certain things happen. [30:23.250 --> 30:24.110] So that's... [30:24.110 --> 30:24.590] That's a... [30:24.590 --> 30:25.810] A positive, uh... [30:26.390 --> 30:27.030] Intent of it. [30:28.150 --> 30:28.630] Um... [30:28.630 --> 30:29.850] Resource and water conservation. [30:30.930 --> 30:31.410] Um... [30:31.410 --> 30:34.010] So it can help people who want to conserve resources. [30:34.530 --> 30:36.030] Water, gas, uh... [30:36.550 --> 30:36.910] Electricity. [30:37.150 --> 30:40.150] Because they can get fine-grained information on their use. [30:40.690 --> 30:49.970] So if they want to reduce their electric bill, they can get a report daily, weekly, monthly, annually, whatever, to say, okay, this is your bill. [30:50.150 --> 30:52.310] This is what you used during this time. [30:52.510 --> 30:54.110] And so you voluntarily... [30:54.110 --> 30:55.970] This is the positive so far. [30:56.190 --> 30:58.950] You can voluntarily say, oh yeah, I don't really need to use that as much. [30:58.950 --> 30:59.910] I'll reduce that. [31:00.090 --> 31:01.210] And will the bill save money? [31:01.330 --> 31:02.110] Same thing with water. [31:02.710 --> 31:03.630] Don't leave the... [31:03.630 --> 31:04.910] You know, don't leave the faucet running. [31:06.390 --> 31:06.870] Um... [31:06.870 --> 31:07.330] Take a shot. [31:07.450 --> 31:08.650] Take a bath instead of a shower. [31:08.970 --> 31:09.930] Or use a... [31:09.930 --> 31:10.770] You know, there's... [31:10.770 --> 31:12.410] There's all sorts of little rules you can follow. [31:12.510 --> 31:14.370] And this is a way of helping you, uh... [31:14.370 --> 31:16.410] Follow those rules to, um... [31:16.410 --> 31:18.170] Achieve micro-sustainability. [31:18.490 --> 31:21.090] Meaning for your little home, um... [31:21.090 --> 31:22.910] To be sustainable in terms of, uh... [31:22.910 --> 31:24.030] Conserving natural resources. [31:24.770 --> 31:26.070] And improve their lives. [31:26.830 --> 31:28.810] So what's wrong with improving your life, right? [31:29.470 --> 31:30.530] Home health monitoring. [31:30.530 --> 31:33.670] So there's a lot of stuff on this that's not what I'm talking about specifically. [31:33.950 --> 31:35.750] But there's wearable medical sensors. [31:36.030 --> 31:37.150] Embedded medical sensors. [31:37.390 --> 31:38.350] That's a whole other talk. [31:40.190 --> 31:40.670] Um... [31:40.670 --> 31:41.610] They can't be hacked, right? [31:41.970 --> 31:42.650] Of course they can. [31:43.450 --> 31:43.930] Um... [31:43.930 --> 31:46.570] There's a lot of research on that as well on hacking pacemakers. [31:47.010 --> 31:47.530] And, um... [31:48.310 --> 31:48.750] Uh... [31:48.750 --> 31:49.670] In implantable defibrillators. [31:50.570 --> 31:51.010] Uh... [31:51.010 --> 31:53.970] Because they're wireless and they're not encrypted in most cases. [31:54.630 --> 31:55.270] Um... [31:55.270 --> 31:55.910] But again... [31:55.910 --> 31:56.670] Um... [31:56.670 --> 31:57.970] So there's a lot of, um... [31:58.830 --> 31:59.010] Um... [31:59.010 --> 31:59.790] Vital sign monitoring. [32:00.030 --> 32:01.430] Motion analysis I mentioned earlier. [32:01.770 --> 32:05.750] Parkinson's disease is one application where you can look at mobility or actions. [32:06.130 --> 32:08.150] And correlate it with, um... [32:08.150 --> 32:09.210] You know, uh... [32:09.210 --> 32:09.530] Health. [32:10.330 --> 32:10.650] Uh... [32:10.650 --> 32:11.370] Early detection. [32:12.470 --> 32:12.810] Um... [32:12.810 --> 32:13.870] Enhanced first responder. [32:14.350 --> 32:15.350] Improved life quality. [32:15.350 --> 32:20.770] So there's a lot of good research on this coming out of the Aware Home Research Initiative in Georgia Tech. [32:20.990 --> 32:21.690] They have, like, a... [32:21.690 --> 32:24.790] A model home set up where they experiment with these things. [32:25.090 --> 32:32.550] And again, the intent is positive in terms of how do we make home health monitoring so someone isn't put into a home, but they're in their home. [32:32.830 --> 32:40.150] But how do you set these things up so that someone, you know, that they contract from outside can keep track of these things and get on top of something. [32:40.150 --> 32:52.470] So if they fall on the floor or there's an episode, this information can get electronically sent to the caregiver or the monitor and respond. [32:53.750 --> 32:54.350] Um... [32:54.350 --> 32:59.950] So there's a whole bunch of technology in addition to what I'm talking about that works in this field as well. [33:02.250 --> 33:05.270] So assisted livings, I've mentioned a few times. [33:08.150 --> 33:12.590] AlarmNet, University of Virginia, Smart Medical Home, Aware Home, Georgia Tech again. [33:12.990 --> 33:14.470] So they're looking at... [33:14.470 --> 33:18.810] So this is more intrusive stuff, but again, sort of along the same idea. [33:19.370 --> 33:25.150] So you've got something on the person, so it can check their heartbeat, their blood pressure. [33:26.470 --> 33:37.550] But in addition to the other infrastructure-mediated technologies, it gives you a richer picture of what the activity is to help protect the health of the person. [33:39.210 --> 33:40.690] So resource conservation. [33:41.990 --> 33:49.590] So reduce unnecessary use of scarce resources, reduce environmental emissions, reduce the carbon footprint, all that good stuff. [33:49.590 --> 33:52.110] The term is micro-sustainability. [33:53.950 --> 33:54.510] Um... [33:54.510 --> 33:56.530] So again, detailed information on your water use. [33:57.350 --> 34:01.770] You can review that yourself voluntarily and reduce your use. [34:03.430 --> 34:03.990] Um... [34:03.990 --> 34:10.090] So if your municipality or your state has water conservation requirements or recommendations, it helps you follow that. [34:10.630 --> 34:12.870] Same thing for natural gas and electric use. [34:16.350 --> 34:22.490] And so there are papers written about this, Sisyphean goals, life improvement goals. [34:23.130 --> 34:24.570] So improve health fitness. [34:24.910 --> 34:27.830] So again, if you have these in your home and you could... [34:27.830 --> 34:32.770] So instead of writing that down, what your activities are, which is a good way of feedback for yourself. [34:33.730 --> 34:34.170] Um... [34:34.170 --> 34:34.630] You can... [34:34.630 --> 34:37.110] This will give you, you know, how often did you open the refrigerator? [34:37.370 --> 34:38.710] How much did you use the water? [34:39.450 --> 34:40.010] Um... [34:40.010 --> 34:42.550] If you have the floor sensors or the AFAC sensors, you can... [34:42.550 --> 34:44.270] You can check your movements in the house. [34:45.610 --> 34:46.170] Um... [34:46.170 --> 34:50.070] So it can capture relevant info, make use of that information by tracking performance. [34:51.070 --> 34:52.190] And, um... [34:52.190 --> 34:55.710] There's a whole, uh, school of thought, uh, research on MN... [34:56.410 --> 34:58.550] I'm terrible in pronunciation for some reason today. [34:59.070 --> 34:59.450] Meme? [34:59.630 --> 35:00.170] Meneem? [35:00.950 --> 35:01.230] Uh... [35:01.230 --> 35:02.110] Sensor architecture. [35:02.930 --> 35:03.490] Um... [35:03.490 --> 35:04.130] Where it... [35:04.890 --> 35:05.450] It... [35:05.450 --> 35:11.350] It helps the data that's collected, uh, through these infrastructure-mediated sensing to do the tracking. [35:13.730 --> 35:14.830] So what could go wrong? [35:15.890 --> 35:16.550] Nothing, right? [35:16.770 --> 35:17.290] I mean... [35:17.290 --> 35:19.090] That's the favorite hacker question. [35:19.310 --> 35:24.110] So when I research these things, I look at, you know, like most of you, well, this is what they intended to be for. [35:24.890 --> 35:27.070] But, you know, when is... [35:27.070 --> 35:29.070] When is something ever used just for what's intended? [35:29.810 --> 35:31.290] Uh, so you have data leakage. [35:33.270 --> 35:34.110] And, um... [35:34.110 --> 35:44.030] But also, uh, I think that the problem is less that the government, God forbid, is going to require some of these things for, let's say, water conservation, which would be the biggest, uh, application. [35:44.370 --> 35:53.030] But it might be your landlord, or your next landlord, or, or the condo association, uh, or, you know, uh, who says, so they're under pressure. [35:53.150 --> 35:53.850] Well, I'll get to that. [35:55.210 --> 35:55.630] Um... [35:55.630 --> 35:59.570] So the wireless sensors could be hacked, uh, collected surreptitiously. [36:00.090 --> 36:02.530] Uh, it increases the reach of surveillance into the home. [36:03.470 --> 36:07.950] Um, the, the evidence could be falsified. [36:08.370 --> 36:10.750] Uh, could it be used in a criminal case? [36:11.250 --> 36:13.190] Uh, could it be inaccurate? [36:13.530 --> 36:14.570] Maybe it's not falsified. [36:14.570 --> 36:15.330] It's just wrong. [36:15.590 --> 36:17.570] But someone acts upon it. [36:17.850 --> 36:20.890] So this is a laundry list of some things that could go wrong. [36:21.030 --> 36:21.910] So let's look at them. [36:22.450 --> 36:23.630] Will the data leak out? [36:23.790 --> 36:24.410] No, of course not. [36:24.410 --> 36:28.470] Um, I, I, I started to catalog this, and it just, the list is just too long. [36:28.910 --> 36:38.730] And, and, and it, it, every day you read about more, um, laptops being left at, at, uh, airports with, uh, health data, or 50,000 social security numbers. [36:39.170 --> 36:41.910] Uh, someone hacks a database and gets passwords and usernames. [36:42.010 --> 36:42.790] That happens every day. [36:43.830 --> 36:46.590] Um, credit card numbers, uh, health information. [36:47.290 --> 36:51.630] And I read somewhere that thieves will pay 10 times more for stolen health information than for credit cards. [36:52.010 --> 36:53.190] I don't know why. [36:53.510 --> 36:54.570] Maybe someone here knows why. [36:54.730 --> 36:57.430] But that's, that's the, uh, information I'd be able to find. [36:57.890 --> 37:05.510] Credit cards actually aren't worth that much because, um, uh, they're, they're, the, the, the theft is detected and they, and they're closed. [37:05.750 --> 37:07.610] Uh, they're, they're closed out pretty quickly, apparently. [37:08.150 --> 37:11.030] Um, but you get it, you get a social security number. [37:11.190 --> 37:12.650] Well, that's, that's a fake identity. [37:12.810 --> 37:14.890] That's identity theft, which is rampant. [37:14.890 --> 37:21.870] Um, now Patchube, uh, which is now acquired by LogMeIn, uh, is an online database. [37:22.130 --> 37:26.790] Now that's a good thing where people accumulate the data from monitoring various things. [37:27.510 --> 37:32.770] Um, from, from building monitoring systems, from wireless, uh, data. [37:33.130 --> 37:43.050] And so I'm not saying it's a bad thing, but again, here's more and more data of this type that's on the Internet, uh, that builds a pattern, builds a database of things. [37:43.610 --> 37:47.270] So, and it's an iPhone app, which, you know, could be hacked. [37:47.950 --> 37:50.410] Um, so, so there's more and more information. [37:50.910 --> 37:54.190] I try to look up, uh, how much information is there in the world? [37:54.410 --> 37:57.510] And it keeps increasing, uh, exponentially or more. [37:57.790 --> 38:02.410] Um, and how much information on personal behavior is there in the world? [38:02.770 --> 38:04.990] And that's increasing, uh, exponentially. [38:04.990 --> 38:18.530] So that's a whole nother talk right there because these technologies in Patchube and people monitoring themselves for the, for good purposes and these, uh, health monitoring, uh, data probably never goes away. [38:18.530 --> 38:26.050] And as it accumulates, it, uh, it, it, it creates problems perhaps in the future for how is this data going to be used? [38:26.050 --> 38:29.090] Like the gigantic database that Google has on all of us. [38:29.090 --> 38:36.430] Uh, of course the government could get it very easily, uh, from whoever the second or third party is that gets the information. [38:36.750 --> 38:38.190] Or if they sell the information. [38:38.910 --> 38:43.030] Um, so, data, data leaks out. [38:43.270 --> 38:43.970] It's, it's a rule. [38:45.130 --> 38:46.630] Electro-kimp, I just read about. [38:47.070 --> 38:50.650] Um, so, uh, for the Internet of things, it's another topic. [38:50.970 --> 38:52.510] It's another word for what we're talking about. [38:52.710 --> 38:58.630] So the Internet of things where everything, especially with IPv6 taking off finally, everything's going to have an IP address. [38:59.210 --> 39:01.590] And get it beyond the Internet almost automatically. [39:01.870 --> 39:06.670] So you can control it or monitor it from anywhere with your iPhone or your, or your Android or, or whatever. [39:07.210 --> 39:09.810] Uh, so this is another way of putting it on the Internet. [39:10.530 --> 39:12.890] Um, and you can save resources. [39:12.890 --> 39:17.670] So you can, with, with electric imp or many other applications like this. [39:17.830 --> 39:24.850] And there are ads now on, on, on, on TV and in the media for monitoring your home through your smartphone, which is a great idea. [39:25.270 --> 39:28.810] You know, so, but that data gets, gets created. [39:29.450 --> 39:38.730] So it's not as much that the, that, that someone's going to hack into your smartphone and, and control your home or check your video without you knowing it, which of course will occur. [39:39.050 --> 39:43.990] But on top of that, all this data is being collected and, and, and, um, and accumulated. [39:45.410 --> 39:47.930] So this is from, uh, this is all quoted from their webpage. [39:48.510 --> 39:55.250] Um, and it's just another way of, um, you know, a database being created, uh, from these type of devices. [39:55.870 --> 40:01.990] And I'm not trying to, I'm not saying I'm being exhaustive in the type of devices that, uh, use infrastructure mediated sensing. [40:02.610 --> 40:06.010] Um, a lot of people use different terms for similar things. [40:06.210 --> 40:16.170] So if the Internet of things is ubiquitous, ubiquitous computing, pervasive computing, uh, everything's becoming wireless with an IP address, being on the Internet. [40:16.910 --> 40:22.010] And many of them track what, what you do in your home or what you do anywhere else. [40:22.550 --> 40:27.610] And it's going to be hard to escape from that, um, if it isn't already. [40:28.250 --> 40:34.630] And, of course, under CISPA, I try to look up the recent, this is a big, uh, a lot of news about this, uh, earlier in the year. [40:34.790 --> 40:35.790] And I tried to find the latest. [40:35.970 --> 40:38.510] And as far as I know, it's, it still was passed by the House. [40:39.370 --> 40:43.550] Uh, Obama, there's, there's people saying that Obama's will sign it if it passes the Senate. [40:43.550 --> 40:46.750] But maybe EFF can explain what's going on in the Senate. [40:46.930 --> 40:48.190] I couldn't find the latest information. [40:48.630 --> 41:01.070] But, um, the biggest problem for what we're talking about, notwithstanding any of the provision of law, which is a very broad term meaning you can do it, companies may share information, including the federal government. [41:01.330 --> 41:08.930] So like in the wireless wiretapping, the, the, uh, the telcos, uh, we're just giving information to the federal government. [41:09.130 --> 41:16.610] Well, any, any of these entities that collect this type of information can just give it to the federal government on request without you knowing about it. [41:16.730 --> 41:17.570] You don't need a search warrant. [41:17.670 --> 41:18.430] You don't need a subpoena. [41:19.030 --> 41:20.770] Um, you don't need a wiretap. [41:20.950 --> 41:23.790] You don't need, uh, uh, FSMA, uh, secret court. [41:24.230 --> 41:25.470] Uh, it's just out there. [41:28.430 --> 41:31.930] So that's another way that information, this information will leak out. [41:33.310 --> 41:35.770] So, uh, Google could be watching. [41:36.030 --> 41:37.110] I'm sorry, is watching. [41:38.410 --> 41:41.210] Um, so, so it gets worse. [41:41.370 --> 41:43.430] So Google is right on top of this, of course. [41:43.670 --> 41:45.310] They're, they're, they're in the cutting edge. [41:45.510 --> 41:48.630] So they're talking about actually getting this data themselves. [41:49.030 --> 41:49.770] Surprise, surprise. [41:50.110 --> 41:52.050] I mean, Google never has enough data. [41:52.870 --> 41:55.290] So they want a home activity recognition. [41:55.290 --> 41:55.890] I'm reading this. [41:55.950 --> 41:57.130] I'm saying, this sounds familiar. [41:57.250 --> 41:58.170] That's what we're talking about. [41:58.450 --> 42:01.290] To track people's activities through home network interactions. [42:01.290 --> 42:06.390] So they're talking about the home area network where your electric, electric, your electric appliances. [42:07.150 --> 42:08.670] Well, I think that's what they're talking about. [42:09.530 --> 42:10.470] Among other things. [42:10.730 --> 42:13.690] Your home area network is where your electric appliances are networked. [42:13.790 --> 42:17.610] And you've got a central control center that you can access through your smartphone, most likely. [42:17.830 --> 42:20.650] Where you can turn things on or off remotely or in your home. [42:20.790 --> 42:21.610] Which is very useful. [42:22.130 --> 42:23.310] But of course, it's wireless. [42:23.710 --> 42:24.370] It's on the Internet. [42:25.090 --> 42:26.250] So Google wants it. [42:26.410 --> 42:27.650] What are they gonna do with that information? [42:27.810 --> 42:29.210] They're gonna just do it to protect you, right? [42:30.990 --> 42:33.110] So to remind you to take medication. [42:33.370 --> 42:35.110] So they know what medication you're taking. [42:35.290 --> 42:36.170] Well, that's good. [42:36.310 --> 42:36.930] That's very helpful. [42:37.550 --> 42:39.210] Encourage them to act more safely. [42:39.610 --> 42:40.770] Remember iRobot? [42:41.150 --> 42:43.450] You know, the three laws of robotics. [42:44.470 --> 42:47.030] So they're gonna help you act more safely. [42:47.950 --> 42:50.530] So they're gonna prevent you from doing things that could hurt you. [42:50.930 --> 42:52.050] That's a good thing, right? [42:52.770 --> 42:54.250] Or to recommend changes in behavior. [42:54.750 --> 42:56.590] I'm not liking this very much so far. [42:57.830 --> 43:02.470] So using UPNPN discovery protocol, which is fairly universal. [43:03.330 --> 43:04.610] Creates instance table and operation. [43:04.770 --> 43:06.810] So this is still under development, I guess. [43:07.010 --> 43:07.910] But don't worry. [43:08.110 --> 43:08.690] They got the money. [43:08.770 --> 43:09.650] They'll figure out how to do it. [43:09.890 --> 43:12.130] So this is independent of what I was talking about. [43:12.270 --> 43:12.810] This is... [43:12.810 --> 43:14.650] But could be integrated with it very easily. [43:15.930 --> 43:16.810] So his... [43:17.250 --> 43:20.850] I'm stealing stuff from one of their web pages or discussion about this. [43:20.950 --> 43:22.170] Something about this leaked out. [43:22.170 --> 43:23.290] And then Google... [43:23.730 --> 43:25.050] Someone from Google denied it. [43:25.230 --> 43:27.870] But then there's a paper where they talk about it. [43:29.510 --> 43:30.170] SQL database. [43:30.790 --> 43:31.850] Oh, those can't be hacked. [43:32.070 --> 43:33.890] Uses event notification technology. [43:34.030 --> 43:35.610] Which supports status and control variable status. [43:36.770 --> 43:39.370] Common home network device like computers, phones, and TVs. [43:39.630 --> 43:40.270] Game consoles. [43:40.630 --> 43:42.210] But could accept and include other types of sensors. [43:42.210 --> 43:44.270] Then I cut off... [43:44.270 --> 43:44.890] I stopped... [43:44.890 --> 43:46.110] I stopped quoting it. [43:46.650 --> 43:47.030] So... [43:47.030 --> 43:47.430] Yeah. [43:47.610 --> 43:47.850] Google. [43:48.030 --> 43:49.170] With their Google Glasses. [43:49.430 --> 43:51.050] And your Google web page. [43:51.150 --> 43:52.330] And your Google Gmail. [43:53.130 --> 43:54.330] And everything Google. [43:56.250 --> 43:57.350] So the... [43:57.350 --> 43:59.530] That ups the ante a little, I think. [44:01.230 --> 44:02.390] And FATS attack. [44:02.550 --> 44:02.730] Okay. [44:02.850 --> 44:05.610] So let's say for the infrastructure mediated sensing. [44:06.490 --> 44:09.710] And this comes from the same researchers at University of Washington. [44:09.710 --> 44:10.610] Right. [44:10.930 --> 44:11.910] Let's say they encrypt it. [44:12.430 --> 44:14.230] They know there's a privacy issue. [44:14.390 --> 44:14.590] Okay. [44:14.650 --> 44:15.830] I'm not saying they don't know that. [44:16.090 --> 44:17.470] They know there's a privacy issue. [44:17.590 --> 44:18.830] So they're working on encrypting it. [44:19.110 --> 44:21.830] So one of the researchers said, well, what if it's encrypted? [44:22.150 --> 44:24.450] Can you still find out what's going on in the house? [44:24.550 --> 44:25.770] And the answer is yes. [44:26.450 --> 44:29.650] So a fingerprint and timing based snooping attack. [44:30.090 --> 44:31.890] Type of side channel attack. [44:32.230 --> 44:38.710] So you don't need to read the transmissions from the individual infrastructure sensing devices. [44:39.710 --> 44:42.730] You just have to know when the signals come out. [44:43.990 --> 44:46.530] So they put motion sensors. [44:46.750 --> 44:47.870] So it's a basic research. [44:48.290 --> 44:54.630] And without actually reading the signals, they were still able to determine the activities of daily life. [44:54.750 --> 45:00.130] Such as sleeping bathroom and kitchen visits, bathroom activities, kitchen activities, and high-level health information. [45:00.970 --> 45:01.950] It's very sophisticated. [45:02.530 --> 45:03.870] So you don't have to read the signal. [45:04.030 --> 45:04.950] You don't have to decode it. [45:05.490 --> 45:08.730] You just have to know when the signal occurred and where it came from. [45:08.890 --> 45:09.830] So you have to look at the fingerprint. [45:10.050 --> 45:12.870] You have to know what motion sensor or device it came from. [45:14.170 --> 45:16.670] So then they looked at, okay, how do we protect against that? [45:16.830 --> 45:17.530] Which is good. [45:17.530 --> 45:23.150] So it's nice research that's being done on this and that they're looking at the attack and the defense. [45:23.550 --> 45:27.830] The question will be when these things actually go in production, will they have these or not? [45:27.990 --> 45:31.010] So the protection is signal attenuators. [45:31.270 --> 45:37.210] So you send the signal out not when the activity occurs but some random time after that. [45:37.770 --> 45:38.670] Random delays. [45:38.670 --> 45:44.170] Or attenuators, you reduce the... I'm sorry, that's when you reduce the... how far the signal goes. [45:44.750 --> 45:45.650] Periodic transmission. [45:45.890 --> 45:47.130] So you don't... so you time it. [45:47.270 --> 45:54.070] So instead of sending the signal when the activity occurs, you time it so every 15 minutes or every 20 minutes or whatever it goes out. [45:54.070 --> 46:00.210] So you can't use the FATS attack to correlate the timing of it with the activity. [46:00.790 --> 46:01.650] Fingerprint masking. [46:01.870 --> 46:06.650] Again, I don't know if... you know, it's a UNP identifier. [46:06.650 --> 46:08.070] I don't know if it's a MAC address. [46:08.670 --> 46:12.010] Some other... you have to know what device it's coming from, obviously. [46:12.310 --> 46:14.450] So you mask it somehow. [46:15.630 --> 46:17.250] Or you put in fake transmissions. [46:17.710 --> 46:21.970] So the good news is these people aren't evil who are coming up with things. [46:22.090 --> 46:24.170] They are trying to do it for beneficial reasons. [46:24.730 --> 46:28.990] They are thinking about some of the negative uses of it. [46:29.670 --> 46:37.110] This, of course, doesn't protect you against the fact that the data is actually collected anyway and it's in a database somewhere by their company or another company. [46:37.430 --> 46:42.970] And the data can still be exfiltrated or stolen or given to the government or taken by the government. [46:43.290 --> 46:47.370] But this at least protects you from someone snooping from outside the house if they put these in place. [46:49.810 --> 46:51.190] But who would want this information? [46:51.190 --> 46:54.830] So this... I adapted this from a discussion on electric smart meters. [46:54.970 --> 46:56.010] And I won't go through the whole thing. [46:56.350 --> 46:57.310] Not all of these apply. [46:57.790 --> 47:00.450] I couldn't give a story for each of these. [47:00.930 --> 47:03.710] But, of course, utility... so I'm talking about a smart meter. [47:05.090 --> 47:07.030] But a lot of this still applies. [47:07.310 --> 47:34.450] So you got... so for water conservation, what if the... a company that sells water conservation devices or electric conservation or natural gas conservation, they get the database and they figure out that here's a list of people in this city who... who aren't complying with the conservation requirements or that they know want to conserve gas or electricity use or water more. [47:34.670 --> 47:39.870] And they get a database and they... so they send them a marketing email or... or mailing if they still use snail mail. [47:39.870 --> 47:41.430] Law enforcers. [47:43.470 --> 47:56.610] Again, there have been some cases where water use has been... the... the FBI goes to the water utility and finds out excessive water use and says, gee, maybe they're... maybe they're growing marijuana. [47:56.870 --> 47:58.950] Or maybe they're cooking meth. [47:59.290 --> 48:01.310] Because they also have high electric use. [48:02.350 --> 48:04.530] So this gives you more fine-grained information. [48:05.190 --> 48:09.050] What if you think someone's holding someone hostage or kidnapping? [48:09.530 --> 48:10.450] That's a good thing. [48:10.790 --> 48:16.150] But you can... so you can get information from here of how many people are in the house by looking at the water use, electric use, et cetera. [48:17.230 --> 48:21.470] So there's a whole bunch of potential uses that I couldn't think of. [48:21.830 --> 48:23.310] But it's probably in here somewhere. [48:24.050 --> 48:27.450] And since these devices aren't in the market yet, it's hard to see... [48:27.450 --> 48:29.430] I don't have any examples of what's actually happening. [48:29.810 --> 48:33.510] But the bad news is, is that this information is collected. [48:34.450 --> 48:38.310] Even if we can't think right now how it could be used badly. [48:38.730 --> 48:39.410] Don't worry. [48:39.530 --> 48:39.910] Somebody will. [48:42.820 --> 48:43.340] Okay. [48:43.760 --> 48:45.460] So a bad way... [48:45.460 --> 48:49.340] And I'm in favor... I used to work for environmental agencies and environmental groups. [48:49.500 --> 48:51.940] So water conservation is a good thing in general. [48:51.940 --> 48:59.220] Because even if you have plenty of water, quote unquote, in a municipality, it's not going to last forever, especially with population and business increasing. [48:59.220 --> 49:00.780] So water conservation is a good thing. [49:00.940 --> 49:03.000] However, should we make people do it? [49:03.220 --> 49:06.360] Well, a lot of... sometimes you have to make people do it. [49:06.860 --> 49:08.080] You have to have a law. [49:08.340 --> 49:09.480] How do you enforce the law? [49:09.580 --> 49:10.260] It's very hard. [49:11.180 --> 49:16.300] So some examples are San Francisco, L.A., architects. [49:16.300 --> 49:17.600] There's a LEED certification. [49:17.640 --> 49:19.380] I don't remember what the acronym stands for. [49:19.500 --> 49:25.680] But where a building is energy and environmentally efficient and conservation wise. [49:25.680 --> 49:36.540] So what if the building... it's... it's... it's now a regular part of putting in a building, is these water meter... hydrosense and electrosense and so on. [49:37.280 --> 49:42.180] What if they're added to building codes because it's now a community or priority to reduce use? [49:45.440 --> 50:00.220] I think the biggest threat would be probably that, especially in California, which is under strict requirements to reduce water use 20% by 2020, which is very hard to do, once you've eliminated watering lawns, if you can, and easy things. [50:01.840 --> 50:08.580] It looks like a natural for me that California would require municipalities to meet the requirement. [50:08.840 --> 50:23.720] Municipalities to meet it would say, okay, landlord, condo owner, building superintendents, you have to require your tenants to put these things in so you can monitor the water use and then slap their hands or require them to do things to meet the requirement. [50:24.040 --> 50:30.080] I think that's sort of the most likely way this will be applied. [50:31.260 --> 50:34.080] But, again, these aren't in the market yet, so we'll see. [50:34.420 --> 50:35.300] Enforce better living. [50:35.480 --> 50:35.680] Okay. [50:36.240 --> 50:39.260] My favorite movie for this is, of course, Demolition Man. [50:41.140 --> 50:46.860] And there was a law passed in Massachusetts to prohibit public swearing. [50:47.400 --> 50:51.800] Now, they don't have these handy little devices that listen to you and give you a fine. [50:52.260 --> 50:53.480] And it's very... [50:53.480 --> 50:54.000] What? [50:54.240 --> 50:55.740] Well, I was going to use the free shelves. [50:56.060 --> 50:56.920] Yes, that's right. [50:57.040 --> 51:00.160] So that's a very useful device for Sylvester there. [51:01.040 --> 51:01.960] So without reading... [51:01.960 --> 51:04.500] I'm running out of time now, so I won't read all this, but... [51:05.560 --> 51:08.800] So there are regulations out there that look at... [51:08.800 --> 51:11.820] They get intrusive to what you do in your home to protect people. [51:12.240 --> 51:13.860] And this could be a way of doing that. [51:14.360 --> 51:15.320] Use a law enforcement. [51:15.740 --> 51:15.820] Okay. [51:15.980 --> 51:16.780] Minority report. [51:16.900 --> 51:17.460] Pre-crime. [51:17.740 --> 51:26.500] Well, obviously, we're not going to have precogs doing this, but the FBI is looking at using big data to look at activity outside the home, but maybe they could use it inside the home. [51:26.500 --> 51:32.260] You put the data together, and you can figure out things that may or may not be accurate. [51:32.600 --> 51:33.460] For example, Target. [51:33.680 --> 51:34.980] There's a big story out... [51:34.980 --> 51:35.640] Well, there was... [51:35.640 --> 51:36.140] That I caught. [51:36.460 --> 51:37.900] Target has figured out a way. [51:38.140 --> 51:40.900] Target stores that sell things. [51:41.560 --> 51:48.940] When a woman is pregnant, based upon if she buys a few things, they know before she does, or her husband anyway, that she's pregnant. [51:49.640 --> 51:52.880] And it was accurate, at least in one case, which created the story. [51:53.620 --> 51:57.800] That's the only example I know of where you could put all this data together and suddenly, boom. [51:58.420 --> 52:02.100] So I'm sure the FBI has got data crackers working on that right now. [52:02.700 --> 52:04.480] I'm going to end very quickly here. [52:04.600 --> 52:05.100] I apologize. [52:05.420 --> 52:05.620] Let's see. [52:05.760 --> 52:06.200] Conclusions. [52:06.420 --> 52:06.600] Okay. [52:07.080 --> 52:08.240] There's number six again. [52:08.580 --> 52:09.760] It's the beginning of the show. [52:10.860 --> 52:12.380] And there's Tom Cruise, of course. [52:13.920 --> 52:15.320] So there are benefits from these. [52:15.560 --> 52:16.500] I'm not saying that they're not. [52:17.360 --> 52:20.400] But like anything else, how... [52:20.400 --> 52:21.500] You know, what could go wrong? [52:21.880 --> 52:24.900] And there are serious privacy issues that could result. [52:26.320 --> 52:27.120] And security. [52:27.300 --> 52:31.960] Again, if somebody knows what's going in your home and you don't know they're doing it, they could take advantage of that. [52:32.720 --> 52:34.040] It's a privacy Richter scale. [52:34.300 --> 52:36.680] It's not really a 9.5 because it's not here yet. [52:37.200 --> 52:41.140] The utility manufacturer Belkin bought the HydroSense. [52:41.340 --> 52:43.680] So that may be coming on the market soon. [52:44.180 --> 52:50.960] And finally, I don't think we're going to get 1984, but we'll be like the prisoner with cameras and monitors everywhere. [52:51.460 --> 52:52.280] Be seeing you. [52:52.460 --> 52:52.920] Thank you.