[00:00.000 --> 00:04.020]  ...and attacks are just repeating themselves over and over the years.
[00:04.380 --> 00:04.720]  Guys?
[00:04.880 --> 00:05.220]  Thank you, sir.
[00:10.470 --> 00:13.430]  So, I've been thinking about this talk and this subject for a while.
[00:13.770 --> 00:15.630]  And there's two reasons I wanted to give it.
[00:15.850 --> 00:19.710]  The first I'll give you now, and the second reason I'll give you at the end, when it'll make more sense.
[00:22.250 --> 00:24.590]  I see a lot of familiar faces and a lot of new ones.
[00:24.690 --> 00:27.550]  And I know that because you're at HOPE, you are...
[00:27.550 --> 00:29.870]  you share some personality characteristics with me.
[00:30.370 --> 00:32.290]  You love puzzles and black boxes.
[00:32.290 --> 00:35.450]  You never believe anyone who says there's only one way to do something.
[00:35.950 --> 00:38.190]  And you love the latest and greatest.
[00:38.650 --> 00:41.090]  The newest of, not just the tech, but the knowledge.
[00:44.590 --> 00:51.110]  I take, actually, a bit of personal pride in the fact that I know stuff that other people don't know.
[00:52.690 --> 00:59.070]  And that results in, you know, people with personalities like mine, in a little bit of smugness.
[01:00.410 --> 01:07.110]  And if history has taught us anything, it's that the best and the brightest are brought down by hubris.
[01:10.290 --> 01:14.730]  So, when... among a bunch of other stuff, I have a minor in history.
[01:15.570 --> 01:20.650]  And as I got deeper and deeper into security, I kept finding these patterns repeating themselves over and over again.
[01:22.370 --> 01:26.910]  There have been hackers since the first caveman picked up a rock.
[01:28.730 --> 01:30.490]  Nothing that we do is new.
[01:30.770 --> 01:32.710]  It's just variations on a theme.
[01:33.230 --> 01:38.570]  And you need to know that so that you don't expect that... that what you're...
[01:38.570 --> 01:40.090]  So, you don't make mistakes.
[01:40.670 --> 01:42.350]  Because it's dangerous not to know.
[01:42.590 --> 01:46.350]  So, when I first thought about giving this talk, I was going to give you...
[01:46.350 --> 01:51.690]  Here's a hacker characteristic and here is a historical example of it.
[01:51.810 --> 01:53.710]  Here's another aspect and here's another example.
[01:53.910 --> 01:56.650]  And I thought that would be, well, kind of dry.
[01:57.790 --> 01:59.950]  So, instead, I just want to tell you some stories.
[02:03.400 --> 02:13.720]  If you want to study the security... computer security arms race and you want to find patterns anywhere, your best place to look is in military history.
[02:14.900 --> 02:23.080]  Our arms race is paralleling anything that I can find predominantly in the military.
[02:23.580 --> 02:31.160]  And Sun Tzu, ancient Chinese general, is one of the... you should read his art of war.
[02:32.060 --> 02:38.760]  The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of an enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him.
[02:38.960 --> 02:44.140]  Not on the chance that he's not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
[02:46.220 --> 02:47.520]  So, first story.
[02:49.040 --> 02:50.420]  And how about this?
[02:50.540 --> 02:52.580]  I will give a chocolate bar.
[02:52.720 --> 02:54.240]  This is Linds Weinachschokolade.
[02:54.300 --> 02:57.140]  It's only available one time of year and you have to import it from Europe.
[02:57.880 --> 03:00.740]  To somebody who can translate the Latin for me.
[03:00.740 --> 03:01.840]  Quick.
[03:05.840 --> 03:06.400]  No?
[03:06.660 --> 03:07.620]  Nobody without Googling?
[03:08.000 --> 03:08.280]  All right.
[03:08.720 --> 03:11.860]  This is the very, very famous line from Virgil's Aeneid.
[03:11.960 --> 03:15.260]  And it says, Don't believe the horse.
[03:17.540 --> 03:21.660]  Trojans, I fear those Greeks, even those bearing gifts.
[03:23.560 --> 03:25.440]  That means we get to eat the chocolate, right?
[03:25.440 --> 03:26.100]  Yeah, here.
[03:26.680 --> 03:27.440]  That's cool.
[03:29.360 --> 03:30.080]  We'll share.
[03:30.920 --> 03:31.400]  Interesting.
[03:31.620 --> 03:33.380]  So, the interesting thing...
[03:35.520 --> 03:36.820]  This is why I study with him.
[03:38.500 --> 03:46.540]  The interesting thing about the story of the Trojan horse is not just that Odysseus had this idea to build this gigantic horse and hide a bunch of soldiers in it.
[03:46.540 --> 03:48.860]  It's a story of social engineering.
[03:49.620 --> 03:50.840]  Brilliant social engineering.
[03:51.520 --> 03:55.720]  So, Virgil writes that all the Greek heroes were there.
[03:56.260 --> 03:58.840]  You're all familiar with the story of the Trojan horse, right?
[03:59.060 --> 03:59.220]  Yeah.
[03:59.400 --> 04:04.340]  You know that Paris kidnapped Helen and started the Trojan war and it took the Greeks forever to even find Troy.
[04:05.240 --> 04:11.480]  And then when they did, they laid siege around it and they were there forever and they were beginning to run out of supplies.
[04:11.720 --> 04:13.280]  And they were going to have to do something.
[04:13.960 --> 04:17.200]  And then Odysseus comes up with this idea to build a wooden rabbit.
[04:18.320 --> 04:19.620]  And you got it.
[04:21.180 --> 04:22.620]  And hide people in it.
[04:24.100 --> 04:35.380]  But what they did, and this is the brilliant part, is that they hid 30 soldiers in there, including Odysseus and Agamemnon and Mycenas, some of the greatest Greek warriors that there were.
[04:36.040 --> 04:40.620]  But they left one person out, a soldier named Sinon who volunteered.
[04:41.060 --> 04:47.400]  And Sinon had the hardest job of all because Sinon had to convince the Trojans that all the Greeks had sailed away.
[04:47.840 --> 05:00.920]  So what he did is he told them that they had built this enormous horse as a gift to honor the goddess Athena because they had destroyed her temple and they wanted to make recompense.
[05:00.920 --> 05:02.180]  And that's why it was so...
[05:02.180 --> 05:05.760]  And the reason it was so large was not because there's somebody in it.
[05:05.840 --> 05:06.120]  No, never.
[05:06.340 --> 05:13.680]  But because they made it so big that it wouldn't fit in the walls of Troy so that the Trojans wouldn't get any of the benefit of the blessings of Athena.
[05:14.240 --> 05:16.700]  In other words, they manipulated their emotions.
[05:17.580 --> 05:19.140]  We did this, you can't do it.
[05:19.240 --> 05:20.860]  So it's ours, you can't have it.
[05:21.060 --> 05:22.780]  So naturally, they're going to want it.
[05:23.940 --> 05:26.760]  And that's why they brought it inside and that's why they celebrated.
[05:28.460 --> 05:30.720]  Social engineering, it's been around forever.
[05:35.710 --> 05:36.670]  Next story.
[05:40.780 --> 05:54.620]  A little while ago, oh, five, six, seven hundred years, there was this nation state that was known for its naval prowess.
[05:54.620 --> 06:01.180]  And it went to war against this other nation state that was known for its army and its land warfare.
[06:02.660 --> 06:07.320]  And this is, by the way, the Turks against the Christians in Constantinople.
[06:07.680 --> 06:15.200]  And the Turks surrounded Constantinople and on all the sides except for the one side that was on the water.
[06:15.360 --> 06:18.820]  It was on this little bay and had this narrow approach to its port.
[06:18.820 --> 06:23.100]  And they were able to surround them everywhere and lay siege.
[06:23.220 --> 06:24.620]  And the siege went on for a long time.
[06:24.740 --> 06:26.700]  And both sides were getting kind of desperate.
[06:27.360 --> 06:32.800]  But the Christians in Constantinople were able to get...
[06:32.800 --> 06:35.600]  They did blockade the sea outside of that port.
[06:35.760 --> 06:39.620]  But the Christians were able to run ships through the blockade.
[06:39.660 --> 06:40.700]  It wasn't really working.
[06:42.460 --> 06:49.540]  So the Turkish general, or I guess he'd be a naval commander, brought his ships up there.
[06:49.760 --> 07:04.200]  And what the people of Constantinople had done was forge these huge chains and run them under the water so that when the Turks got there, they couldn't get their ships through.
[07:04.320 --> 07:06.520]  And these, I think, were galley road ships at the time.
[07:08.060 --> 07:09.440]  But it worked.
[07:09.780 --> 07:12.640]  So essentially what they did is they laid a firewall across their port.
[07:16.960 --> 07:18.700]  And the ships couldn't get through.
[07:19.560 --> 07:22.300]  And so the battle went on for a while and it looked like...
[07:22.300 --> 07:28.020]  Once again, the people laying siege were running out of supplies, just like in the Trojan War.
[07:28.020 --> 07:35.560]  And it looked like the people in Constantinople were going to win.
[07:36.560 --> 07:41.780]  But what they hadn't counted on was that the naval commander, the Turkish naval commander, was a hacker.
[07:42.520 --> 07:44.040]  And what do hackers do?
[07:44.260 --> 07:45.220]  The unexpected.
[07:45.700 --> 07:47.180]  They violate assumptions.
[07:48.480 --> 07:51.380]  A naval commander wants his ships on the water.
[07:51.460 --> 07:52.280]  That's where he's the strongest.
[07:52.820 --> 07:55.280]  So the Turkish commander beached his ships.
[07:55.820 --> 07:57.220]  He pulled them out of the water.
[07:57.360 --> 08:04.320]  He forced his sailors, and I don't know if they were galley slaves or not, into the woods where they chopped down trees.
[08:05.280 --> 08:06.560]  And they took those trees.
[08:06.680 --> 08:07.480]  They stripped them of bark.
[08:07.680 --> 08:09.200]  They laid them down and used them as rollers.
[08:09.380 --> 08:12.480]  Pulled every boat out of the water and went up and around the chain.
[08:12.760 --> 08:15.240]  In other words, history's first successful firewall bypass.
[08:18.920 --> 08:19.700]  And it worked.
[08:20.620 --> 08:27.780]  Though the siege went on for a little while, and it wasn't until somebody accidentally left a gate open, in other words, an open port, that Constantinople fell.
[08:31.140 --> 08:39.600]  And at this point now, I am actually going to switch over to Chez, because we have here with us one of the people who did the first original work on firewalls.
[08:39.600 --> 08:43.860]  And he's going to talk to us a little bit about castles and warfare.
[08:44.070 --> 08:45.520]  It was back in Constantinople.
[08:46.650 --> 08:47.740]  This is Bill Cheswick.
[08:49.480 --> 08:50.310]  Thank you, ma'am.
[08:51.080 --> 08:51.880]  My pleasure, sir.
[08:51.960 --> 08:55.640]  I suppose I should be wired, but I can use this device right here.
[08:56.720 --> 08:58.860]  Now, the world's quickest changeover.
[08:59.120 --> 09:01.170]  I can't use it because you can't see me over the podium.
[09:01.810 --> 09:02.520]  Stand up.
[09:05.960 --> 09:07.190]  I know, she is standing.
[09:08.100 --> 09:08.480]  Ta-da!
[09:08.830 --> 09:09.620]  I can't see it.
[09:09.670 --> 09:10.070]  Is it there?
[09:10.310 --> 09:10.670]  Yes.
[09:11.260 --> 09:11.620]  Excellent.
[09:12.190 --> 09:12.550]  Okay.
[09:12.760 --> 09:13.260]  Elapsed time.
[09:13.360 --> 09:14.620]  Boy, this is going to go quickly, I guess.
[09:14.960 --> 09:15.190]  Okay.
[09:15.340 --> 09:24.760]  So, what I'm going to present to you in the next 43 slides in 12 minutes is a shard of an old talk I used to give, security ideas from all over.
[09:24.760 --> 09:29.410]  And since it has historical note, we can get...
[09:29.410 --> 09:29.670]  Whoa.
[09:30.960 --> 09:31.520]  Thank you.
[09:31.960 --> 09:32.640]  It's...
[09:33.750 --> 09:34.430]  Yeah.
[09:35.310 --> 09:37.550]  I think somebody is irradiating me.
[09:40.580 --> 09:46.740]  Matt Blaze plugged his stuff into my machine a while ago, and I blame him for this.
[09:47.080 --> 09:48.220]  I think...
[09:48.220 --> 09:49.050]  Someone's doing it.
[09:49.450 --> 09:50.880]  Bluetooth is still on?
[09:51.790 --> 09:52.460]  Fascinating.
[09:52.830 --> 09:53.770]  Well, the time is...
[09:53.760 --> 09:54.460]  You can blame yourself for that.
[09:55.080 --> 09:55.690]  That's true.
[09:56.190 --> 09:57.170]  Well, you know...
[09:58.550 --> 09:59.340]  It is a Mac.
[09:59.550 --> 10:01.480]  It's a computer you already know how to use.
[10:01.600 --> 10:02.260]  It's not available.
[10:02.410 --> 10:03.140]  I did turn it off.
[10:03.450 --> 10:03.840]  Okay.
[10:03.980 --> 10:06.120]  Well, anyway, we'll just proceed as if this isn't happening.
[10:06.790 --> 10:07.740]  But it's a great hack.
[10:07.960 --> 10:08.980]  Pretty good Wall of China.
[10:09.220 --> 10:14.710]  The idea of the Great Wall of China was to keep the barbarians of the North out of their economy.
[10:15.020 --> 10:18.430]  It was not so much defensive as economically defensive.
[10:18.620 --> 10:30.550]  It was formed as shorter segments, built over a fair amount of time as they found it worked, and it wasn't nearly as imposing in some parts as it was in the other because, well, frankly, it takes a lot of work to build the wall.
[10:30.690 --> 10:34.380]  So, where it didn't really count, it was just a pile of rubble and it still is.
[10:34.710 --> 10:38.100]  Turns out Genghis Khan walked past the wall unopposed and into Beijing.
[10:39.140 --> 10:40.410]  So, it wasn't really that good.
[10:40.690 --> 10:42.520]  Now, the wall is just a single layer.
[10:42.640 --> 10:47.790]  And, of course, this is on mountaintops, which makes a second layer.
[10:47.960 --> 10:50.810]  It's... you don't want to run uphill with someone shooting arrows at you.
[10:51.480 --> 10:53.840]  The Chinese have other similar things.
[10:54.080 --> 10:56.020]  Here's... I believe this is a summer palace.
[10:57.180 --> 10:58.460]  It might be the Forbidden City.
[10:58.560 --> 10:59.720]  It's been a while for me now.
[10:59.720 --> 11:03.700]  And when you go there, you pay an entry fee and you go through several layers of walls.
[11:03.860 --> 11:05.860]  And they say, oh, you want to see the inside?
[11:06.140 --> 11:07.820]  Well, you have to pay more money.
[11:09.290 --> 11:11.910]  But they also include these firewalls.
[11:13.040 --> 11:21.170]  These are raised... they have these all over China, raised doorways to trip the evil spirits so they can't get in.
[11:21.680 --> 11:24.910]  This is sort of a firewall for a fairly modest threat.
[11:27.080 --> 11:29.080]  I'm also told it helps keep the dust out.
[11:29.220 --> 11:29.920]  But I've been to China.
[11:30.060 --> 11:30.800]  I don't think it does.
[11:31.910 --> 11:32.740]  There are many doors.
[11:32.940 --> 11:35.700]  While the temples have them, many opportunities for defense.
[11:36.360 --> 11:38.880]  And stupid defenses keep... usually keep out.
[11:39.080 --> 11:40.460]  Only stupid defense...
[11:40.460 --> 11:40.460]  attackers.
[11:40.880 --> 11:41.980]  That's not always true, though.
[11:42.420 --> 11:43.910]  Speaking of stupid defenses...
[11:45.660 --> 11:47.500]  There is, of course, a firewall here.
[11:47.940 --> 11:50.240]  I am, of course, referring to the flower pots.
[11:51.260 --> 11:53.560]  Here's a close-up view of an implementation.
[11:54.290 --> 11:55.560]  Here is a firewall.
[11:55.760 --> 11:57.980]  These, of course, keep the big trucks off the item.
[11:58.140 --> 12:00.670]  And it goes on, extends around the thing.
[12:01.080 --> 12:02.910]  Fire... security doesn't have to be ugly.
[12:03.100 --> 12:04.940]  I talked to the guy who waters the...
[12:05.620 --> 12:08.170]  the sort of sad-looking plants and these things.
[12:08.480 --> 12:11.380]  It takes a better part of the day to go all the way around and water them all.
[12:11.820 --> 12:14.540]  And, of course, here is an actual genuine firewall.
[12:15.080 --> 12:19.100]  This was photographed before 9-11, but even so, I was a little nervous.
[12:19.100 --> 12:23.600]  And I sat down there, and I was taking pictures of the Capitol click.
[12:24.300 --> 12:28.200]  And, you know, so they wouldn't see me photographing the guards and the dog and so on.
[12:28.410 --> 12:30.220]  The real firewall is the Delta barrier.
[12:31.200 --> 12:31.920]  And there it is.
[12:31.980 --> 12:33.410]  It's a little thing that rises up and down.
[12:33.480 --> 12:34.420]  You've seen it in the movies.
[12:34.600 --> 12:36.540]  In Arlington Hill, it was installed backwards.
[12:38.900 --> 12:42.740]  So, if you have the diode pointing the wrong way, maybe it won't work.
[12:43.300 --> 12:46.800]  These things... there's a panic button in the guards' shack.
[12:47.100 --> 12:49.880]  They can say, no, and it goes up very quickly.
[12:50.640 --> 13:03.500]  It is a well-documented fact that some guard hit the button once too early as a Japanese ambassador was going through in his limo, and it flipped the limo on its roof with the ambassador inside.
[13:03.500 --> 13:05.960]  So, anyway, there's another firewall.
[13:06.340 --> 13:08.700]  Now, Parliament has the same thing.
[13:09.000 --> 13:10.180]  This is a little odd.
[13:10.410 --> 13:12.220]  You can see in the foreground there's a stick.
[13:12.420 --> 13:15.840]  This is the old Mission Impossible stick I'm going to crash the car through.
[13:16.960 --> 13:20.500]  Of course, the point is not to damage your car, but to make you show intent.
[13:20.540 --> 13:22.180]  If you break the stick, you're a bad guy.
[13:22.480 --> 13:30.860]  You'll also notice that there is a Delta barrier there next to the guard shack, and, oddly enough, a road going around it.
[13:30.860 --> 13:32.640]  I'm not sure what's going on here.
[13:33.530 --> 13:36.820]  But if you go a few yards to the left, this was also taken a while ago.
[13:36.920 --> 13:38.360]  I suspect this has been repaired.
[13:38.600 --> 13:39.700]  Here is the exit.
[13:42.460 --> 13:43.260]  No, nothing.
[13:44.150 --> 13:46.000]  Would a bad guy drive in the exit?
[13:46.100 --> 13:47.440]  I guess it's just not done.
[13:49.790 --> 13:51.200]  And you can see I was lucky.
[13:51.200 --> 13:53.260]  I happened to catch the minister for silly walks.
[13:56.770 --> 13:59.120]  So, perimeter defenses usually have leaks.
[13:59.300 --> 13:59.840]  I built...
[14:00.650 --> 14:02.910]  A postern gate is one.
[14:03.600 --> 14:04.860]  There are other ways.
[14:05.200 --> 14:10.920]  Edinburgh Castle fell because the guards knew a way to sneak down and visit the girlfriend in the city.
[14:11.140 --> 14:14.910]  And the British caught the guard and had him come back in.
[14:15.220 --> 14:17.920]  It's a Trojan horse, but just a guy looking for a girl.
[14:18.580 --> 14:19.020]  Most...
[14:19.020 --> 14:20.880]  Here's a map of a big company's network.
[14:21.060 --> 14:24.240]  And that big orange blob was a leak to the outside world.
[14:24.800 --> 14:25.980]  This is a whole business.
[14:26.120 --> 14:27.460]  You could start a whole business doing this.
[14:29.020 --> 14:30.740]  Layered defenses should be in-depth.
[14:30.910 --> 14:31.910]  We have lots of layers.
[14:33.020 --> 14:33.460]  Don't...
[14:33.460 --> 14:34.880]  Security by obscurity.
[14:35.140 --> 14:41.920]  Well, when you think about it, a cryptographic key is nothing but a carefully scientifically chosen hunk of obscurity.
[14:42.760 --> 14:45.500]  And it shouldn't be your only defense, but it's not a bad start.
[14:45.500 --> 14:47.910]  See, we're up to slide 22 of about 20 now.
[14:49.340 --> 14:52.300]  Belt and suspenders is safer and takes longer to get through.
[14:52.520 --> 14:56.120]  And they're more likely that the attackers will trick the alarm if you bother doing that.
[14:56.410 --> 14:57.340]  Here is...
[14:57.840 --> 15:02.500]  If you have need to know and clearance, you can spend a week at Sandia National Laboratories.
[15:02.670 --> 15:07.680]  And they'll teach you all about the design and effects of nuclear weapons.
[15:09.040 --> 15:11.240]  This is one of the slides from that course.
[15:11.420 --> 15:13.670]  Steve Belevin put in a FOIA request.
[15:14.290 --> 15:15.960]  About half the slides came back blank.
[15:17.000 --> 15:18.670]  But this one was quite interesting.
[15:19.020 --> 15:23.880]  This was the layers of stuff they used to prevent unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.
[15:24.000 --> 15:28.300]  And as you might assume, there are lots and lots of different layers and lots and lots of different types.
[15:28.420 --> 15:32.260]  Personnel, procedures, security, stinking badges, you know, that sort of stuff.
[15:33.720 --> 15:35.320]  Recapture and recovery is one of them.
[15:35.670 --> 15:43.740]  You know, these things are designed to be in bad guys' hands for a certain amount of time, like a safe, before you can do something bad to the weapon and to yourself.
[15:45.110 --> 15:46.560]  That time is classified.
[15:46.740 --> 15:48.640]  So, let's look at something a little older.
[15:48.910 --> 15:54.460]  If you're ever in Germany, I suggest you visit a few castles.
[15:54.860 --> 15:56.600]  In Heidelberg, there's a castle there.
[15:56.700 --> 16:00.170]  And here is, if you want to attack it, this is one of the ways you can attack it.
[16:00.170 --> 16:02.120]  You can run along the side of this hill.
[16:02.580 --> 16:07.500]  And you'll see there's a little arrow placed, give you an opportunity to die for your country.
[16:07.940 --> 16:09.240]  Or your cause, actually.
[16:09.860 --> 16:13.320]  Germany was such a bunch of different pieces, it's hard to tell who you were dying for.
[16:13.500 --> 16:15.100]  Well, no, you knew who you were dying for.
[16:15.180 --> 16:17.960]  But it gets confusing unless you're in history major.
[16:18.240 --> 16:19.380]  So, a chance to do that.
[16:19.720 --> 16:24.860]  And so you run past these things and you come up to, ooh, a gate, which of course was all locked.
[16:25.000 --> 16:28.080]  So you had to get your way through here while people shot at you.
[16:28.080 --> 16:35.000]  And once you got in, you got into this courtyard where you were met with more gates and more little places for arrows to shoot you.
[16:35.420 --> 16:39.020]  And then you'd come down this hallway on the lower left.
[16:39.420 --> 16:45.290]  And there are little holes where you get more people are throwing epithets and things down on you.
[16:46.880 --> 16:49.380]  And, of course, then you win through that.
[16:49.540 --> 16:54.520]  And, yes, there's another doorway with people shooting down at you that's hard to get back.
[16:54.640 --> 16:59.410]  Then you go inside this sort of wine cask area with lots of holes to get shot at.
[17:00.380 --> 17:01.360]  And at the...
[17:01.360 --> 17:01.540]  Boiling oil.
[17:01.680 --> 17:02.060]  You forgot the boiling oil.
[17:02.060 --> 17:02.760]  Boiling oil.
[17:02.880 --> 17:03.180]  Oh, yeah.
[17:03.240 --> 17:04.080]  All that sort of stuff.
[17:04.240 --> 17:06.220]  And more epithets in your general direction.
[17:06.220 --> 17:11.840]  And here you come up to the cashier's gate, which, of course, wasn't a cashier's gate.
[17:13.440 --> 17:15.260]  And you'd have to fight your way through there.
[17:15.360 --> 17:17.120]  This is... I've lost track of the number of layers.
[17:17.530 --> 17:21.120]  And, of course, once you get through that, you break in and you get to the cement mixer.
[17:24.510 --> 17:28.600]  And if that was a little confusing to you, here is a diagram of the castle.
[17:28.600 --> 17:34.920]  The castle had what may still be the world's largest wine storage container.
[17:35.300 --> 17:36.980]  You paid your taxes in wine.
[17:36.980 --> 17:39.140]  They checked it before you got to pour it in there.
[17:39.280 --> 17:42.100]  And there was actually a pipe to the main hall.
[17:42.360 --> 17:43.760]  So they had plenty of wine.
[17:45.440 --> 17:47.440]  Failure modes of the Heidelberg castle.
[17:47.880 --> 17:49.640]  Well, captured...
[17:49.640 --> 17:50.860]  By the way, when you go on...
[17:50.860 --> 17:57.960]  When you go to Europe and you visit castles and they give you a tour of the castles, ask them how their castles died, how they were taken over.
[17:57.960 --> 17:59.380]  Because they're usually very proud of them.
[17:59.540 --> 18:03.960]  And they don't want to tell you, oh, the French came in and just overran it in a few hours.
[18:05.840 --> 18:09.220]  On the other hand, for something like Heidelberg, it's pretty obvious that it happened.
[18:09.320 --> 18:10.360]  And I'll show you why in a moment.
[18:11.160 --> 18:12.980]  Tilly captured it after a two-month siege.
[18:13.580 --> 18:16.480]  And I see I have a department of redundancy department here.
[18:17.460 --> 18:17.820]  Captured...
[18:17.820 --> 18:22.140]  In 1689, it was captured by 30,000 French soldiers in...
[18:22.140 --> 18:22.640]  Well, French.
[18:22.680 --> 18:23.560]  I don't know if they were soldiers.
[18:23.820 --> 18:25.480]  In a few hours...
[18:26.580 --> 18:28.840]  There were something like 290 defenders.
[18:29.080 --> 18:30.100]  They ran out of defenders.
[18:30.280 --> 18:31.820]  You have to hire enough defenders.
[18:33.140 --> 18:37.240]  And, of course, once you've taken over a castle...
[18:37.240 --> 18:39.920]  I mean, it'll piss you off to spend hours getting into a castle.
[18:40.140 --> 18:42.100]  Lots of your friends are dead and so on.
[18:42.500 --> 18:47.660]  You go to where they store the gunpowder and you blow the thing up.
[18:47.660 --> 18:49.200]  This must have been awesome.
[18:49.320 --> 18:50.660]  Look how thick those walls were.
[18:51.040 --> 18:53.340]  That was because it's for gunpowder.
[18:54.640 --> 18:58.880]  This must have been, okay, guys, get really far away and watch.
[18:59.020 --> 18:59.960]  This is going to be fun.
[19:00.940 --> 19:05.080]  I don't know if I'd want to light the fuse, but this happened.
[19:05.260 --> 19:09.860]  And, of course, what you see when you're on the outside is the castle that...
[19:09.860 --> 19:12.040]  Half a tower is called the clock tower.
[19:12.040 --> 19:14.420]  You can tell the French were pretty pissed at that, too.
[19:16.040 --> 19:18.920]  So I'm actually finishing up here a little ahead of time.
[19:19.520 --> 19:25.940]  And I'll give you a modern-day example that you may have thought about incorrectly or so on.
[19:26.080 --> 19:27.280]  Where do programs run?
[19:27.540 --> 19:30.920]  Show of hands, and I can't see a single one of you, but you can see yourselves.
[19:31.180 --> 19:33.740]  How many of you have seen this diagram at least once?
[19:35.420 --> 19:36.420]  Oh, lots of hands.
[19:36.500 --> 19:37.480]  Yeah, it's in all the books.
[19:37.480 --> 19:39.920]  It's been there for 40 years or something like that.
[19:40.440 --> 19:43.280]  The fact of the matter is, this model is wrong.
[19:43.560 --> 19:45.760]  The actual answer is this.
[19:45.780 --> 19:49.520]  It's the kernel that talks to the outside world, not the program.
[19:50.200 --> 19:53.240]  And if you want root, root may let you in through it.
[19:53.380 --> 19:56.040]  But you see, even there, the layers are not so clear.
[19:56.200 --> 19:57.460]  And that is my talk.
[19:57.700 --> 19:58.120]  Thank you.
[20:00.160 --> 20:01.180]  Do you want to draw it?
[20:05.020 --> 20:08.320]  So, let me introduce... Matt's going to talk about something else.
[20:08.560 --> 20:13.080]  Because there's other kinds of arms races, not just military and not just security.
[20:13.580 --> 20:16.340]  And a really fun one, of course, is in the lock community.
[20:16.540 --> 20:18.880]  So there's a lot of really interesting stuff.
[20:18.900 --> 20:22.740]  But there have been lock hackers well before TOOOL was created.
[20:24.300 --> 20:27.720]  So, I've asked Matt to talk to us about the history of locks.
[20:32.520 --> 20:33.980]  I have another one, by the way.
[20:34.180 --> 20:36.460]  Somebody gets a prize if they can identify the music I was playing.
[20:36.480 --> 20:36.980]  I'd like it darker though.
[20:37.120 --> 20:38.600]  Next time, ask a different prize.
[20:38.820 --> 20:42.720]  So, I'm going to move to modern history.
[20:44.980 --> 20:46.300]  I guess I'm not on here.
[20:47.400 --> 20:48.440]  I don't know what's happening.
[20:49.520 --> 20:50.900]  That means you don't have a screen.
[20:51.580 --> 20:51.920]  Okay.
[20:53.160 --> 20:53.640]  How's that?
[20:54.020 --> 20:54.340]  Okay.
[20:54.580 --> 20:57.160]  So, I'm going to talk about modern history.
[20:57.160 --> 21:00.720]  That is, you know, through like the 19th century.
[21:01.500 --> 21:14.480]  And in particular, some familiar circumstances that look an awful lot like what goes on today, except no one was using electricity for any of it.
[21:15.660 --> 21:32.480]  So, in particular, I want to talk about what happened to security when mass production and the scientific method started to take hold and created, you know, the industrial revolution.
[21:32.820 --> 21:45.720]  And in particular, this is this time period from about 1794 to about 1851 that is the first place I'm going when I get my time machine.
[21:45.720 --> 21:58.600]  And the first person I want to go back and talk to is a fellow by the name of Joseph Brahma, who was a British inventor, kind of the Benjamin Franklin of Britain.
[21:58.600 --> 22:04.820]  If you're a British school child, this is the guy you learn about that you're supposed to be like.
[22:04.820 --> 22:09.940]  He invented the flush toilet, the design, the current design.
[22:10.020 --> 22:12.980]  If you've ever been to England in a hotel, you know how you can't flush the toilet.
[22:13.140 --> 22:15.100]  That was Joseph Brahma's design.
[22:16.580 --> 22:23.000]  He invented the modern beer pump, the one that they pull beer from a cask.
[22:23.100 --> 22:24.100]  That's Joseph Brahma.
[22:24.100 --> 22:33.880]  He invented a whole bunch of other mostly kind of hydrodynamically related things, dealing, you know, between the beer pump and the flush toilet, kind of both ends of the digestive spectrum.
[22:35.500 --> 22:48.020]  And that made his fortune from that and built an increasingly large manufacturing shop outside of London, patented some of his designs and licensed them out.
[22:48.020 --> 22:54.680]  Again, a lot of these designs remain in use to this day for various things.
[22:55.260 --> 22:58.760]  And then decided, well, what do I do next?
[22:59.160 --> 23:04.680]  And there's some varying stories about how this came about.
[23:04.680 --> 23:07.380]  In one of the stories, he was burglarized.
[23:07.420 --> 23:13.100]  But he decided to take his machining and call his attention to locks.
[23:13.100 --> 23:24.760]  And in particular, he wanted to apply the modern idea of interchangeable standard parts to locks.
[23:25.360 --> 23:30.480]  And this was a completely radical, crazy idea at the time.
[23:30.480 --> 23:44.660]  Because the idea of how locks get built is you get a locksmith, a member of the guild, the very heavily trusted guild of locksmiths, to design a lock for your door.
[23:44.940 --> 23:47.600]  And the locksmith is somebody with a lot to lose.
[23:47.700 --> 23:53.720]  And so you can be sure that he is not going to tell anybody how the lock on your door works.
[23:54.240 --> 24:02.100]  And he's not going to reuse the design anywhere else so that your key will fit into some other customer of his's lock.
[24:02.100 --> 24:06.060]  And in order to become a locksmith was a very, very big deal.
[24:06.260 --> 24:10.040]  Only the very, very wealthy had locks on their door.
[24:10.720 --> 24:15.000]  And they had to... if you lost your key, you were really screwed.
[24:15.000 --> 24:17.500]  Because it would take you about a year to get a replacement.
[24:18.120 --> 24:21.780]  A new lock designed and custom made for you.
[24:22.920 --> 24:29.120]  And Joseph Barama decided to bring to England this idea that maybe you can have a standard lock design.
[24:29.120 --> 24:31.680]  And interchangeable parts.
[24:31.840 --> 24:34.920]  And just sell everybody the same lock from the same machining.
[24:35.060 --> 24:38.400]  He also built his own machining and his own tooling and so on.
[24:38.960 --> 24:57.540]  And he is so famous for this that when in the late 19th century, when he moved his store from 124 Piccadilly to up near Baker Street, he ended up becoming essentially a full-time lock manufacturing company.
[24:57.540 --> 25:00.480]  His descendants still run it to this day.
[25:00.720 --> 25:07.020]  He moved from Piccadilly in very central London to near Baker Street in slightly less central London.
[25:07.440 --> 25:15.240]  But the storefront of his original shop got moved intact to the basement of the London Science Museum.
[25:15.440 --> 25:24.720]  And school children can go and see it and you can look at the original storefront of this fellow's lock.
[25:25.380 --> 25:28.080]  His locks are quite beautiful.
[25:28.400 --> 25:41.320]  I went and visited his shop and spoke with Jeffrey Brahma, who is his great, great, great, great, whatever, to the nth grandchild, who currently runs the store and sits in the shop.
[25:43.060 --> 25:47.120]  And, you know, if you say, hey, I'm a big fan, you'll get the tour.
[25:48.780 --> 25:51.540]  And I got a couple of his locks from there.
[25:51.760 --> 25:58.720]  It's a design that's a little bit unusual to kind of traditional American lock designs.
[25:58.960 --> 26:05.520]  The tumblers are in a circular pattern, so it's more like one of those tubular lock keys for a bicycle.
[26:05.520 --> 26:06.800]  And it doesn't use pins.
[26:06.980 --> 26:08.620]  It uses these things called sliders.
[26:10.280 --> 26:12.220]  It's a standard-sized cylinder.
[26:12.980 --> 26:17.920]  The key is this tubular type of key.
[26:18.020 --> 26:19.140]  It's all quite beautiful.
[26:19.340 --> 26:38.580]  And to this day, if you go through the expensive neighborhoods of London and you check out the locks that are on the doors, you will encounter various generations of Brahma locks in front of some of the more expensive homes and businesses there, because the design is regarded as being pretty good.
[26:38.740 --> 26:41.200]  Now, if you do this too much, the cops are going to come.
[26:42.240 --> 26:47.100]  But, you know, until they come, you will find, you know, you can spot the Brahma lock before the cops pick you up.
[26:47.160 --> 26:47.680]  That's kind of a game.
[26:47.680 --> 26:57.900]  One of the things that I noticed in his reconstruction of his shop, they had the contract called an indenture.
[26:58.460 --> 27:06.140]  This is how you learned a trade in those days between him and his assistants from 1794.
[27:06.480 --> 27:20.400]  It contains in part, you know, it starts out with, he won't embezzle or purloin or waste any of the goods or property of the master, nor lend the same without his consent to any person or persons whoever, nor sell, nor buy, or traffic with his own goods,
[27:20.700 --> 27:37.560]  nor those of any other person or persons during the said term, so you don't set up your own side business, nor play at dice cards or any other unlawful or immoral games or sports, nor frequent, nor go to any playhouses or houses of ill fame, nor any caverns or ale houses,
[27:37.760 --> 27:40.500]  except about his said master's business.
[27:41.900 --> 27:53.160]  And there to be done and only to stay so long as shall absolutely be necessary for transacting his said master's business, and shall not commit fornication, nor contract matrimony, nor depart or absent himself from...
[27:53.160 --> 28:00.100]  So, you know, you had to really be committed if you wanted to learn in this business.
[28:00.520 --> 28:01.400]  But one of the things...
[28:01.400 --> 28:01.700]  They had the FBI back then?
[28:01.760 --> 28:01.960]  Sorry?
[28:02.140 --> 28:03.280]  They had the FBI back then?
[28:05.660 --> 28:12.280]  So, this is a picture of a modern key, and essentially Brahma's lock applied this principle.
[28:12.500 --> 28:16.520]  There's nothing secret about the key except the way it's cut.
[28:17.620 --> 28:19.880]  So there's a standard key design.
[28:20.160 --> 28:25.920]  All of the customers of this lock, everybody who buys the lock, gets the same key.
[28:25.920 --> 28:37.420]  And that key is then customized to be configured with the security parameter for the particular instance of the lock that you buy.
[28:37.620 --> 28:46.880]  And that allows you to describe the security parameter of a key by basically describing how it's been parameterized for that lock.
[28:46.880 --> 28:59.240]  So, essentially, we could go to a locksmith today and say, give me a Slage SC20 key bidded for code 314159, and what you'll get will look exactly like this.
[28:59.740 --> 29:09.720]  And so we have this concise description of a key, and we don't have to say, okay, I'm going to send off to the factory, and they're going to cast this thing, and we'll get it in a couple of weeks.
[29:09.860 --> 29:16.460]  They can just take the key blank that they buy in bulk and configure it to fit your particular lock.
[29:16.460 --> 29:30.460]  So, essentially, we have the first system entirely in the mechanical world in which the security is based entirely on the password rather than on the password checking mechanism.
[29:30.740 --> 29:32.900]  Everybody gets the same basic lock design.
[29:33.180 --> 29:34.940]  Everybody gets the same basic keys.
[29:35.160 --> 29:48.360]  But having the key to my apartment doesn't help me open your apartment or house or castle or business or what have you because the secret is that easily changed little parameterized thing.
[29:48.600 --> 29:50.640]  Now, what effect does that have?
[29:50.840 --> 30:00.460]  It makes these things go from being very expensive custom machines to really cheap things that you can, if it's compromised, change out quickly.
[30:02.300 --> 30:06.660]  So, Brahma's design, by the way, survives to this day even outside of Brahma's lock.
[30:06.900 --> 30:09.660]  Who can tell me what the bottom picture is here?
[30:10.500 --> 30:11.560]  That's Brahma's key.
[30:11.860 --> 30:12.520]  What's the top?
[30:13.640 --> 30:15.340]  Tubular, like a bicycle lock key.
[30:15.580 --> 30:16.580]  Same basic idea.
[30:17.520 --> 30:21.260]  If you look head-on, you'll see that there are these cuts in it.
[30:21.260 --> 30:23.120]  This is kind of looking head-on down the barrel.
[30:23.400 --> 30:28.180]  If you take a look down at the key itself, you'll see that there are these little ridges.
[30:28.420 --> 30:30.540]  I don't know if I can... well, I can't really point.
[30:31.160 --> 30:33.560]  But you'll see if you look at the bottom, there are these ridges.
[30:33.620 --> 30:34.940]  There are varying depths.
[30:35.460 --> 30:38.220]  That's the security parameter for these things.
[30:39.060 --> 30:43.740]  Brahma's key looks kind of cooler and older, but it's the same basic idea.
[30:44.820 --> 30:46.540]  His keys come with a little cap.
[30:46.540 --> 30:55.060]  In Dickens the Pickwick paper, there's a reference to a rich person who has a Brahma key, distinguished by the little cap at the end to keep dust out.
[30:55.260 --> 31:00.380]  The cap at the end is now made of plastic instead of leather, but he still provides it.
[31:01.220 --> 31:17.000]  The locks are interchangeable parts, and they interoperate not from the very beginning of them, from the very beginning of history, but they will interoperate with locks that go back on the order of a hundred years.
[31:17.700 --> 31:23.540]  Does the Brahma cap actually act as another security feature in that it would prevent you from photographing the key?
[31:23.640 --> 31:23.680]  That's right.
[31:23.780 --> 31:27.360]  It prevents you from shoulder surfing the key.
[31:27.360 --> 31:34.420]  By the way, the same mechanism is used if you've ever spent time in a prison as a visitor.
[31:34.940 --> 31:39.100]  The guards often have a cover over their keys.
[31:39.280 --> 31:41.280]  They use these large keys that open cells.
[31:41.900 --> 32:02.480]  One of the models of a lock made by Adams Wright uses... has a snap-on cover that can conceal the keying pattern on the lock because the people in jail have nothing to do but watch the guards all day and learn what their keys look like.
[32:02.480 --> 32:05.300]  So this also provides a bit of a security mechanism.
[32:05.360 --> 32:10.140]  But I think Brahma does it mostly because there's this reference to it in Dickens.
[32:10.420 --> 32:14.320]  And, you know, why lose that by not having this anymore?
[32:14.580 --> 32:16.060]  Again, all interchangeable parts.
[32:16.060 --> 32:24.160]  If something goes wrong with part of it, you can just fix that one piece.
[32:24.160 --> 32:34.600]  In particular, if you want it rekeyed, this center cylinder contains the sliders that are the parameterized mechanism for the security of it.
[32:34.740 --> 32:46.840]  So the big question that Brahma had to answer when he said this radical idea, everyone is going to get the same lock and it's going to be more secure than before.
[32:47.760 --> 32:50.580]  What do you think Brahma needed to overcome?
[32:50.580 --> 32:54.680]  And by the way, my lock's a little bit cheaper than that expensive one that you were buying.
[32:54.760 --> 32:56.880]  What do you think people might have worried about?
[32:58.140 --> 32:58.940]  It's crazy.
[32:59.220 --> 33:00.480]  This guy's crazy.
[33:00.860 --> 33:02.860]  Or this guy's trying to rip me off.
[33:04.080 --> 33:06.560]  Because how could this possibly be secure?
[33:06.900 --> 33:09.160]  This is a radically new idea.
[33:09.400 --> 33:12.900]  You know, why standardized parts for a lock?
[33:13.060 --> 33:17.520]  And he didn't invent the idea of standardized parts, but he really did bring it to Britain at the time.
[33:17.520 --> 33:21.000]  And it was an unusual one.
[33:21.140 --> 33:23.540]  How is this going to be secure?
[33:24.860 --> 33:27.220]  So, he did a very clever thing.
[33:27.600 --> 33:32.780]  He started the first, as far as I can tell, the first documented security challenge.
[33:33.940 --> 33:41.200]  And he put in, in 1794, he put this placard in front of his shop.
[33:41.380 --> 33:42.680]  And it says, I'll read it.
[33:42.740 --> 33:44.140]  It's a little hard to read on the screen.
[33:44.140 --> 33:45.600]  I presume I can't see this.
[33:45.780 --> 33:47.880]  It's hard for me to read on the screen because I can't see the screen at all.
[33:48.100 --> 33:56.840]  But it says, the artist who can make an instrument that will pick or open this lock shall receive 200 guineas the moment it is produced.
[33:57.080 --> 33:58.520]  Applications in writing only.
[33:59.640 --> 34:00.640]  Brahma's patent locks.
[34:00.780 --> 34:01.220]  Caution.
[34:04.040 --> 34:16.260]  It is respectfully informed that every lock made in Brahma is stamped with their address, 124 Piccadilly, except no substitutes, essentially.
[34:17.040 --> 34:19.080]  200 guineas if you open this lock.
[34:19.460 --> 34:25.750]  Not, open this lock and I will have the cops lock your ass up and you will never be heard from again.
[34:25.870 --> 34:27.080]  That's how we will secure it.
[34:27.160 --> 34:27.330]  No.
[34:27.620 --> 34:29.980]  Open this lock and I will reward you greatly.
[34:30.200 --> 34:34.330]  But don't open it and I am going to continue to crow that nobody has done it.
[34:35.040 --> 34:37.180]  And how long do you think that lasted?
[34:37.890 --> 34:38.490]  Till 1851.
[34:39.080 --> 34:40.020]  Till 1851.
[34:40.430 --> 34:40.680]  Thank you, Skylar.
[34:41.540 --> 34:42.060]  Actually.
[34:42.450 --> 34:45.000]  So, 1794 to 1851.
[34:45.730 --> 34:49.430]  This lock was unopened in Brahma's shop.
[34:49.600 --> 34:52.120]  Then the Great Exhibition happened.
[34:53.250 --> 34:56.310]  And the Great Exhibition was sort of a world's fair.
[34:56.430 --> 34:56.620]  Yep.
[34:57.160 --> 35:05.430]  The Great Exhibition was sort of a world's fair of invention and the modern world just outside of London.
[35:05.890 --> 35:19.520]  And a fellow, the other person who I want to meet with my time machine, I might have to make two trips to go and meet them both at the same time, was a fellow by the name of Alfred C.
[35:20.020 --> 35:20.450]  Hobbs.
[35:20.750 --> 35:21.850]  He is my hero.
[35:21.850 --> 35:23.910]  He deserves to be your hero too.
[35:24.460 --> 35:27.910]  He was an American lock hacker, just extraordinaire.
[35:28.770 --> 35:35.640]  He heard about the Brahma lock, saved his money for passage to Britain and said, you know what, I'm going to get that 200 guineas.
[35:35.890 --> 35:44.370]  200 guineas, by the way, was a lot of money, even with the inflation that occurred between 1794 and 1852.
[35:44.370 --> 35:52.230]  This was enough to not only make your reputation if you had defeated Brahma's lock, but you would make a fortune by defeating...
[35:52.230 --> 35:53.580]  Plus no inflation in the period.
[35:54.080 --> 35:54.560]  Well...
[35:54.560 --> 35:54.850]  Fair enough.
[35:56.160 --> 35:58.730]  In any case, the...
[36:02.430 --> 36:04.560]  Hobbs had never seen this lock before.
[36:04.560 --> 36:07.700]  He had heard about it and was sure that he could defeat it.
[36:07.790 --> 36:16.660]  So he went over to the Brahma booth, essentially, at the Great Exhibition and said, let me see that thing, and spent a couple of days with it and opened it.
[36:17.480 --> 36:23.890]  And instead of suing the guy's ass and saying, oh, well, you didn't read the fine print.
[36:24.020 --> 36:25.600]  It said, not valid at Great Exhibition.
[36:27.330 --> 36:30.850]  After some haggling, they didn't actually pay up immediately.
[36:30.850 --> 36:33.700]  It took a little while, but he got the money.
[36:34.290 --> 36:49.910]  And Brahma slightly improved his lock design as a result, made some not basic changes to the design, but did make some small changes to the design to try to defeat some of the methods that he used.
[36:50.290 --> 36:52.620]  And essentially, Brahma stayed in business.
[36:52.750 --> 36:55.370]  He ended up looking good because he did the honorable thing.
[36:55.950 --> 36:58.000]  He didn't try to weasel out of it.
[36:58.680 --> 37:10.370]  Hobbs then proceeded to go and open the Chubb lock, which was the main competitor to the Brahma lock, and then the Yale lock, which is the main lock design used in the United States, and showed how to defeat those.
[37:10.620 --> 37:12.100]  And then he opened a few safes.
[37:13.500 --> 37:15.060]  And what did he then do?
[37:15.290 --> 37:16.700]  Well, he could have done two things.
[37:16.810 --> 37:24.980]  He could have kept this to himself and become the world's greatest thief, because he really was, you know, equipped to be the world's greatest thief.
[37:24.980 --> 37:27.140]  But he did the honorable thing, too.
[37:27.460 --> 37:28.960]  He told everybody else.
[37:29.230 --> 37:36.310]  He destroyed the value of the secrets that he knew about how to open these locks by writing a book describing it.
[37:37.350 --> 37:40.480]  And this book still kind of goes in and out of print.
[37:40.700 --> 37:46.910]  It's called On the Construction of Locks and Safes, but it's really On the Defeating of Locks and Safes by Alfred Hobbs.
[37:46.910 --> 37:48.830]  It was first published in 1853.
[37:49.600 --> 37:52.160]  And I'm just going to read you from the preface to this.
[37:52.310 --> 37:54.480]  It's in small print, so I'm going to just read it.
[37:54.680 --> 37:57.180]  He started out with an interesting comment.
[37:57.500 --> 38:09.080]  He says, In a commercial, and in some respects social doubt, has been started within the last year or two, whether or not it is right to discuss so openly the security or insecurity of locks.
[38:09.460 --> 38:21.120]  Many well-meaning persons suppose that the discussion respecting the means for baffling the supposed safety of locks offers a premium for dishonesty by showing others how to be dishonest.
[38:21.330 --> 38:22.600]  This is a fallacy.
[38:23.250 --> 38:29.480]  Rogues are very keen in their profession and already know much more than we can teach them, respecting their several kinds of roguery.
[38:30.080 --> 38:36.200]  Rogues knew a good deal more about lockpicking long before locksmiths discussed it among themselves as they have lately done.
[38:36.410 --> 38:43.660]  If a lock, let it have been made in whatever country or by whatever maker, is not so invaluable as it has hitherto been deemed to be.
[38:44.040 --> 38:51.620]  Surely it is in the interest of honest persons to know this fact, because the dishonest are tolerably certain to apply the knowledge practically.
[38:52.250 --> 38:57.270]  And by the spread of the knowledge, it is necessary to give fair play to those who might otherwise suffer by ignorance.
[38:57.540 --> 39:04.230]  It cannot be too earnestly urged that an acquaintance with real facts will in the end be better for all parties.
[39:04.600 --> 39:06.350]  Now, if it weren't for the fact that...
[39:06.350 --> 39:07.480]  Okay, my question.
[39:07.500 --> 39:09.370]  I don't get to claim credit for this.
[39:09.450 --> 39:10.040]  This was Hobbes.
[39:10.040 --> 39:15.870]  I just would want to point out that if it weren't for the fact that this is well written, this could easily have been written today.
[39:17.310 --> 39:19.140]  Did I tell you nothing changes?
[39:19.370 --> 39:27.960]  And let me just leave you with a hundred years later, Lentz and Kenton wrote the standard...
[39:27.960 --> 39:28.930]  Oh, never mind.
[39:29.100 --> 39:32.910]  Lentz and Kenton wrote the standard book on safe cracking.
[39:32.910 --> 39:45.730]  In 1953, exactly a hundred years after Hobbes broke the Brahma lock.
[39:45.960 --> 39:49.100]  And they included a preface in their book too.
[39:49.390 --> 39:58.790]  And it says that it is extremely important that the information contained in this book be faithfully guarded so as not to fall into the hands of undesirables.
[39:58.790 --> 40:05.660]  We suggest after you become proficient in the art of manipulation, destroy this book completely so as to protect yourself in our craft.
[40:05.870 --> 40:09.830]  Now, fortunately, not everyone followed that advice because I got my copy from the library.
[40:10.040 --> 40:10.410]  Thanks.
[40:10.410 --> 40:11.020]  All right.
[40:19.290 --> 40:20.210]  So, music.
[40:21.110 --> 40:23.830]  You know it.
[40:23.970 --> 40:24.190]  Okay.
[40:27.170 --> 40:31.330]  For those of you that came late, I was playing music and I can't seem to get to play right now.
[40:34.510 --> 40:35.410]  Yep, so is this.
[40:36.630 --> 40:42.310]  But the Allegri Miserere is a marvelous piece of polyphonic chant.
[40:43.150 --> 40:45.530]  And it has some interesting characteristics.
[40:46.630 --> 40:54.590]  The first one is that it is written for in a challenge response mode.
[40:55.010 --> 41:04.630]  And the treble solo, which is one of the earliest pieces in history to hit the high C, changes every repetition, every iteration.
[41:07.830 --> 41:23.750]  Another interesting part about it is that it, well, it was one of the first pieces in history to be controlled by the analog version of DRM.
[41:24.930 --> 41:29.370]  You see, Allegri wrote it late 16th century.
[41:30.110 --> 41:31.630]  And he wrote it for the Pope.
[41:31.830 --> 41:33.690]  And the Pope loved it.
[41:34.150 --> 41:35.870]  It's this ethereal beauty.
[41:35.950 --> 41:37.730]  It's just this gorgeous piece of music.
[41:39.090 --> 41:41.130]  And therefore, he wanted to keep it all to himself.
[41:41.810 --> 41:47.870]  So he issued a papal ban on copies of this piece of music appearing anywhere.
[41:48.410 --> 41:51.350]  He actually allowed two very expensive licenses.
[41:51.350 --> 41:55.810]  There were two princes who were allowed to license copies of it for one performance only.
[41:56.810 --> 41:57.770]  Sound familiar?
[41:58.630 --> 41:59.770]  But otherwise...
[41:59.770 --> 42:00.830]  Did they self-destruct?
[42:01.250 --> 42:09.750]  No, they were given back to the hand of Vatican Chapel people and returned back to the Vatican Chapel library.
[42:10.170 --> 42:15.390]  The other thing about the Miserere is that it's only allowed to be played during Easter week.
[42:15.950 --> 42:22.230]  So if you weren't anywhere near the Vatican, you never got a chance to hear this really spooky piece of music.
[42:23.110 --> 42:27.350]  That is until a 14-year-old hacker got a chance to hear it.
[42:28.690 --> 42:32.270]  Mozart, on tour of Italy, happened to be visiting during Easter week.
[42:33.090 --> 42:39.410]  And he went to a Tuesday Vespers, listened to it, and came out and wrote it down.
[42:44.690 --> 42:48.690]  He went back the next day and picked up the few pieces that he'd missed.
[42:50.010 --> 42:51.730]  And now there are two...
[42:51.730 --> 42:55.330]  History says that there are two theories of what happened.
[42:55.510 --> 43:04.030]  One is that the Pope was so impressed by Mozart's magical musical ability that he forgave him and everything was okay.
[43:05.070 --> 43:08.150]  But really, Mozart sold it to a music publisher.
[43:11.010 --> 43:12.990]  DRM didn't work then, it doesn't work now.
[43:15.350 --> 43:18.390]  The interesting thing about this piece of music is that...
[43:18.390 --> 43:20.970]  or about Mozart's writing it down, is that it's a very simple algorithm.
[43:21.870 --> 43:25.350]  Any lead hacker with sufficient skills could write this piece down.
[43:26.630 --> 43:32.990]  It's chant, which means that most of it is the same, and then there's some slight variation, and then it differs.
[43:32.990 --> 43:39.370]  So the algorithm used to get this piece of music is the same one that you use to back up your systems if you do incremental backups.
[43:39.970 --> 43:43.630]  One pass to get the most of it, and other passes to get the things that have changed.
[43:48.930 --> 43:54.230]  So, at the beginning of the talk, I said that there were two reasons that I wanted to give the talk.
[43:56.950 --> 44:02.930]  I'm seeing certain threads of patterns that by themselves are neither good nor bad, they just simply are.
[44:02.930 --> 44:12.230]  But when you tie them together, it's a bit scary from a security perspective, if you look at security from a meta level and not at each individual part.
[44:12.430 --> 44:14.190]  And the three threads are these.
[44:17.790 --> 44:21.170]  First, in my talk today, I've used three different computers.
[44:23.190 --> 44:24.830]  This one was acting as a timepiece.
[44:25.290 --> 44:26.910]  This one is my projection device.
[44:27.390 --> 44:28.990]  And this one was my media player.
[44:29.350 --> 44:31.810]  Now, I could have used just one, but I happen to like stuff.
[44:32.270 --> 44:33.970]  Especially if it's shiny and has lights on it.
[44:36.790 --> 44:40.470]  And all of these machines are full-fledged computers.
[44:41.410 --> 44:43.410]  All of them interact with each other.
[44:43.890 --> 44:48.710]  All of them interact with everybody else's, whether here or on the far side of the world.
[44:49.490 --> 44:52.530]  All of them have multiple attack surfaces.
[44:52.870 --> 44:56.730]  And all of them can be configured to be attack vectors.
[44:57.230 --> 44:58.270]  That's pattern one.
[45:00.410 --> 45:01.330]  Thread two.
[45:02.290 --> 45:06.590]  Computer science as a field, as a science, is maturing.
[45:07.070 --> 45:11.090]  And like all fields, as they mature, it's beginning to fracture into its specialties.
[45:11.090 --> 45:22.590]  So now, at a normal undergraduate program, it is very difficult to get a complete in-depth education of all parts of computer science and graduate in four years.
[45:22.690 --> 45:23.390]  You can't do it.
[45:23.510 --> 45:24.950]  You have to specialize in something.
[45:25.990 --> 45:28.810]  What this means for security is really bad.
[45:30.450 --> 45:34.850]  We can't afford to specialize because, well, attackers can, defenders can't.
[45:36.330 --> 45:38.270]  You have to defend against everything.
[45:38.270 --> 45:38.330]  Okay.
[45:39.150 --> 45:51.550]  So, in the academic world, what I'm seeing is that the programming languages people are getting grant money to develop secure programming languages because that is going to solve all of security's problems.
[45:51.910 --> 45:54.330]  The database people, the same thing.
[45:54.450 --> 45:55.970]  The architecture people, the same thing.
[45:56.050 --> 46:01.470]  The theory people, we've just got this perfect theory of security and that will solve all of our problems.
[46:01.790 --> 46:03.310]  But I'm a systems person.
[46:03.310 --> 46:08.830]  I see everything as how it interacts with everything else as part of a system.
[46:10.370 --> 46:10.810]  And...
[46:12.730 --> 46:29.450]  This scares me because that programming program that is written in a programming language, that is compiled with a compiler, that is running on an OS, that is using an architecture, that has a firmware, and that has hardware on it, and every single part of that is potentially vulnerable.
[46:30.590 --> 46:34.470]  And all I have to do is a simple rights amplification to get...
[46:34.470 --> 46:37.970]  Well, maybe not so simple, but you understand my idea.
[46:39.210 --> 46:41.390]  And the third reason that I...
[46:41.390 --> 46:44.570]  The third thread is the real reason I wanted to give this talk.
[46:46.230 --> 46:54.190]  Last year at DEFCON, in one of those really rare moments of quiet, we were all sitting in somebody's hotel room, a handful of us, and Dragorn suddenly burst out laughing.
[46:54.730 --> 46:59.290]  And we thought that he had found another one of his seriously demented videos, and we all wanted to see it.
[47:00.030 --> 47:01.750]  Because they're funny, but they're twisted.
[47:03.390 --> 47:06.930]  And no, he looked up and he said, hello, 1990s.
[47:07.230 --> 47:08.830]  TCP injection is back.
[47:10.430 --> 47:13.150]  And I haven't been able to stop thinking about that all year.
[47:13.330 --> 47:13.990]  It's back.
[47:13.990 --> 47:14.650]  It shouldn't be.
[47:14.730 --> 47:15.690]  We solved this problem.
[47:16.010 --> 47:23.190]  But if any of you got the privilege of hearing RenderMan and Dragorn's talk on Friday, it's not only back, it's back with a vengeance.
[47:23.350 --> 47:24.350]  It's worse than it was.
[47:24.510 --> 47:29.010]  We are far more vulnerable because of the unexpected interactions of parts of systems.
[47:29.870 --> 47:35.610]  And that system could be a single device or multiple devices interconnecting from who knows where.
[47:39.230 --> 47:46.970]  If history teaches anything, it's that if you don't know your history, you're condemned to make those mistakes yourself.
[47:47.670 --> 47:49.050]  And we can't afford that.
[47:49.410 --> 47:51.610]  Because the thing about...
[47:51.610 --> 47:54.150]  I think this is another quote from Sun Tzu.
[47:58.110 --> 47:59.830]  No, I guess I didn't put that one on.
[48:02.350 --> 48:04.050]  But you can't fight.
[48:04.390 --> 48:07.550]  You can't win a war where you're purely on the defensive.
[48:07.870 --> 48:09.630]  All you can do is maintain a status quo.
[48:09.910 --> 48:11.530]  And that's the best we can do right now.
[48:11.530 --> 48:12.130]  There are...
[48:12.130 --> 48:14.170]  We have two models for defending ourselves.
[48:14.550 --> 48:25.770]  You either have the Center for Disease Control model where you inoculate yourself against every known virus, every known vulnerability, and you stick yourself out there and you wait to get attacked.
[48:25.910 --> 48:27.910]  And then when you are, you clean yourself off and you do it again.
[48:29.230 --> 48:32.070]  And the second model is the castle and moat model.
[48:32.530 --> 48:35.690]  You build these layers of defenses.
[48:35.790 --> 48:38.470]  You strictly control ingress and egress.
[48:39.090 --> 48:41.550]  And you stick yourself out there and you wait to get attacked.
[48:42.470 --> 48:43.670]  And that's all we have.
[48:43.790 --> 48:44.830]  And that's the best we can do.
[48:44.930 --> 48:45.950]  And I'm almost out of time.
[48:49.720 --> 48:54.100]  But the status quo, for now, if you do it right, it's working.
[48:55.100 --> 48:56.840]  But you need to know...
[48:56.840 --> 48:59.460]  You cannot make the assumptions that because I have...
[48:59.460 --> 49:03.680]  I'm special in this field, that that's where all my attacks are going to come from.
[49:03.680 --> 49:07.200]  And that's the hubris that we need to be aware of.
[49:07.780 --> 49:09.340]  We need to pay attention to everything.
[49:09.520 --> 49:10.900]  So you need to learn your history.
[49:10.960 --> 49:12.000]  And we're out of time.
[49:12.140 --> 49:13.140]  So thank you for listening.
[49:13.300 --> 49:15.020]  And come get some chocolate because...
[49:15.440 --> 49:16.540]  Actually, Josh gets us.
[49:19.320 --> 49:23.000]  We have plenty left, but this one goes to Josh for identifying the miserere.
[49:23.000 --> 49:23.100]  And we're out of time today.
[49:24.080 --> 49:24.800]  Thank you.
[49:24.840 --> 49:25.100]  Thank you.