[00:02.240 --> 00:02.960]  Hello, hello.
[00:04.440 --> 00:05.140]  How you doing?
[00:07.360 --> 00:12.180]  Are we all surviving?
[00:13.380 --> 00:14.020]  Everyone's cool?
[00:14.160 --> 00:14.600]  Everyone's happy?
[00:14.980 --> 00:15.420]  Okay.
[00:16.200 --> 00:18.600]  By the way, in case you don't know, there are Segway rides downstairs.
[00:18.600 --> 00:21.180]  If you haven't taken advantage of them, it's a ton of fun.
[00:21.700 --> 00:26.060]  We have Segway guides who will show you how to ride these crazy contraptions and not kill yourselves.
[00:26.980 --> 00:27.960]  That's on the second floor.
[00:28.060 --> 00:29.360]  All kinds of other activities going on.
[00:30.100 --> 00:35.580]  A few minor schedule things to throw you away.
[00:35.780 --> 00:42.580]  Everything's going nice and normally, so I just want to tell you of a couple of things that aren't going quite as normally as they should.
[00:42.780 --> 00:55.840]  The panel that was just on now, just wasn't on now, actually, Phiber Optik's panel on Blue Boxing, the return of Blue Boxing, I guess, that has been rescheduled to 8 o'clock tonight in this room.
[00:56.300 --> 01:00.060]  Now, I know some of you might say, well, where the f*ck is Kevin Mitnick?
[01:00.120 --> 01:01.820]  He's supposed to be on 8 o'clock tonight.
[01:01.880 --> 01:02.740]  And you're right, he is.
[01:02.740 --> 01:11.220]  But the last we heard, we've actually been following the story for a couple of days now, Kevin was in Colombia, and he got very sick down there and was in a hospital.
[01:11.500 --> 01:15.500]  And we don't believe he's made it back to the States as of yet.
[01:15.960 --> 01:18.100]  So it doesn't look like he's going to be on that panel.
[01:18.260 --> 01:26.580]  There's a slight chance he'll be here tomorrow, but for right now, we have to assume that he's still in a hospital in Colombia and hopefully safe in Colombia.
[01:26.680 --> 01:28.420]  We'll keep you updated.
[01:29.620 --> 01:36.280]  So Phiber Optik's, Blue Box panel will be right on after the hackers in prison panel, scheduled for 7 o'clock.
[01:37.080 --> 01:38.800]  Also, another scheduling change.
[01:39.020 --> 01:45.560]  Yesterday, we had a panel scheduled for 9 o'clock, alienation and engagement over in area B.
[01:45.780 --> 01:51.820]  And that had to be canceled because an airplane got diverted with the person on it who was supposed to be on that panel.
[01:51.980 --> 02:03.320]  That's going to be taking place at 6 o'clock in area B, in place of the quantum, crypto, and computation talk, which has been canceled due to a power outage in Queens.
[02:05.980 --> 02:07.240]  I shit you not.
[02:08.880 --> 02:10.840]  The city is crumbling all around us.
[02:10.920 --> 02:11.880]  I don't know if anybody has noticed.
[02:13.880 --> 02:14.640]  Don't ask me.
[02:14.760 --> 02:15.160]  I don't know.
[02:15.980 --> 02:17.760]  Okay, that's the minor stuff.
[02:17.900 --> 02:19.100]  Here's something a little bit bigger.
[02:19.560 --> 02:22.840]  We're all gathered here today for privacy is dead.
[02:22.980 --> 02:23.380]  Get over it.
[02:23.460 --> 02:24.520]  And that is taking place.
[02:28.320 --> 02:29.580]  But with a little caveat.
[02:33.420 --> 02:34.240]  How do I say this?
[02:34.340 --> 02:41.180]  Okay, well, as some of you know, I don't know if anybody was at the Pallorium seminar, which was taking place on the sixth floor.
[02:41.420 --> 02:42.940]  It wasn't actually part of the HOPE conference.
[02:43.040 --> 02:44.620]  It was something that was going on at the same time.
[02:45.080 --> 02:54.000]  It was sort of a mini conference being led by Steve Rambam, the private investigator who has been at every single one of our HOPE conferences and knows an awful lot about these things.
[02:54.460 --> 02:55.400]  And it went very well.
[02:55.500 --> 03:01.240]  We had seminars, very intensive seminars, that went for, I think, 8 in the morning until about 4 o'clock.
[03:01.240 --> 03:14.000]  Well, right after it ended at 4 o'clock, rather quietly and without much fuss, these two guys came up behind Steve, asked him if he had any weapons, and identified themselves as the FBI.
[03:14.760 --> 03:18.500]  The last thing we saw was Steve being led away in handcuffs.
[03:18.500 --> 03:25.840]  So, yeah, it's... Oh, I want to tell you what's going on so that no rumors get started.
[03:25.980 --> 03:26.700]  That's what we know.
[03:26.900 --> 03:27.520]  That's what we know.
[03:27.640 --> 03:28.360]  We're going to try to find out.
[03:28.780 --> 03:32.660]  Of all the people in this place, he's the last person I would expect to get arrested.
[03:33.900 --> 03:35.780]  He's the one that would be arresting others.
[03:36.020 --> 03:43.140]  But, I mean, we're talking about somebody who hunts down Nazis all over the world and is just great at finding people.
[03:43.340 --> 03:46.780]  And I guess he found the wrong person or they found him or something.
[03:47.580 --> 03:49.740]  So, that's going to obviously affect this panel.
[03:50.120 --> 03:53.240]  We have the people here who are going to be on the panel.
[03:53.380 --> 03:54.180]  And they're fascinating people.
[03:54.360 --> 04:01.320]  They're experts in all sorts of cool things like polygraph machines and databases and things like that.
[04:01.460 --> 04:05.820]  So, they're going to tell you their stories and experiences and take your questions.
[04:06.720 --> 04:12.860]  And we're going to find out where Steve is, hopefully get him here somehow, and we'll keep you updated.
[04:12.860 --> 04:22.460]  But in the meantime, I want to introduce Jerry Keenan, Reginald Montgomery, and Kelly Riddle, who will be taking privacy is dead.
[04:22.920 --> 04:23.560]  Get over it.
[04:23.860 --> 04:24.120]  Take care.
[04:31.650 --> 04:33.630]  Well, we're as surprised as y'all are by it.
[04:33.750 --> 04:38.430]  So, I actually was doing the last seminar on surveillance, of all things.
[04:38.430 --> 04:44.830]  And as things would have it, just as I was finishing my talk, people were coming up asking questions.
[04:44.830 --> 04:49.510]  The back door opened and four guys in blue coats with the big FBI on it came in.
[04:50.670 --> 04:53.750]  And if you know Steve, you know that he is flamboyant.
[04:53.910 --> 04:55.970]  So, at first I thought, eh, it's PR, you know.
[04:56.330 --> 04:58.610]  And so, I kept on with the questions and everything else.
[04:58.690 --> 05:03.730]  And they asked him to step out in the hallway, place the handcuffs on him, and started to lead him off.
[05:03.730 --> 05:09.670]  And Reggie was there, so he got the attorney's number and Steve's parents' number.
[05:09.830 --> 05:11.550]  And Steve said, call him for me.
[05:11.630 --> 05:13.190]  So, it ain't no joke.
[05:13.930 --> 05:14.370]  Why?
[05:14.510 --> 05:15.310]  Who knows, you know.
[05:16.410 --> 05:18.590]  I will tell you, Steve and I go way back.
[05:19.370 --> 05:24.370]  Just so you'll know, I am Kelly Riddle, and in your packet, I'm number 77.
[05:25.650 --> 05:27.090]  I'm from San Antonio.
[05:27.390 --> 05:29.110]  I own a private investigation company there.
[05:30.850 --> 05:33.150]  I have about 40 employees that work for me.
[05:33.290 --> 05:40.670]  We do a lot of international work, a lot of everything from pre-employment all the way through bug sweeps, electronic bug sweeps.
[05:40.730 --> 05:44.690]  We do a lot of corporate investigations, just about anything you can do in this particular field.
[05:45.150 --> 05:46.450]  I've written 10 books.
[05:47.410 --> 05:50.810]  Like Steve, I've been on most of the TV shows, et cetera, et cetera.
[05:50.810 --> 05:53.670]  I will tell you that Steve had a good presentation.
[05:54.090 --> 05:58.710]  His computer and all of the things that he left behind were ushered out of here, as you can imagine.
[05:58.890 --> 06:14.550]  So, I saw briefly the presentation, and he basically had 500 pages of documentation that he had taken off of databases, the Internet, and other sources on this gentleman right here, Rick, who agreed to be the target.
[06:14.550 --> 06:19.310]  So, it was going to be quite fascinating.
[06:19.310 --> 06:25.870]  He even had aerial photographs of Rick, his house, and a close-up of Rick, among other things.
[06:26.030 --> 06:29.230]  So, what we're going to do is fill the time.
[06:29.810 --> 06:33.290]  We all, respectively, do the same thing.
[06:33.550 --> 06:37.550]  Steve had the PowerPoint presentation and was going to do the majority of this.
[06:37.550 --> 06:41.430]  So, we will answer your questions.
[06:41.710 --> 06:44.010]  But, in the meantime, I'm going to let these guys introduce themselves.
[06:44.310 --> 06:46.590]  And then, if you have questions, we'll be happy to take them.
[06:47.590 --> 06:48.030]  Okay.
[06:53.850 --> 06:54.850]  I'm Jerry Keenan.
[06:56.510 --> 06:58.870]  Kelly does surveillance stuff.
[06:59.010 --> 07:00.630]  I'm an expert in military records.
[07:00.770 --> 07:03.850]  I can find anything that has to do with the military.
[07:03.850 --> 07:14.490]  Not just the American military, but I also can get information on military personnel from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Russia, and the French Foreign Legion.
[07:15.770 --> 07:19.530]  And the Legion, by the way, still adheres to Legion names.
[07:19.790 --> 07:21.850]  In other words, when you enlist, you can take another name.
[07:22.630 --> 07:25.270]  So, in order to find someone, you have to have their real name.
[07:27.750 --> 07:32.610]  Other than that, I also have known Steve for a while.
[07:34.850 --> 07:37.510]  And I'm just as confused as everybody else.
[07:38.470 --> 07:40.030]  But these things happen.
[07:41.430 --> 07:42.090]  What's the matter?
[07:42.150 --> 07:42.830]  Nobody hear me out there?
[07:43.690 --> 07:44.430]  Oh, okay.
[07:46.310 --> 07:48.270]  Don't want to cover my ugly mocha.
[07:50.090 --> 07:52.830]  So, that's basically what I will be doing.
[07:53.330 --> 07:55.530]  I'll give you some case histories that I've worked.
[07:55.970 --> 07:59.770]  I get a lot of pleasure out of busting frauds and wannabes, by the way.
[07:59.910 --> 08:04.970]  I'm a 20-year Navy veteran myself with five years with Naval Security and Investigative Command as a civilian.
[08:05.370 --> 08:10.230]  And I spent 25 years in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa without a break.
[08:10.670 --> 08:11.750]  That was constant.
[08:13.170 --> 08:15.990]  I did come back here about 20 years ago.
[08:17.370 --> 08:18.970]  So, I've been retired for a while.
[08:19.830 --> 08:25.770]  So, if anybody has any questions, I'll answer them when we're getting ready to.
[08:26.190 --> 08:28.610]  In the meantime, hand you over to Reggie.
[08:33.180 --> 08:33.900]  Good evening.
[08:34.280 --> 08:35.480]  My name is Reggie Montgomery.
[08:35.980 --> 08:39.920]  I'm a private investigator like these other two gentlemen, the one they took away in handcuffs.
[08:41.720 --> 08:43.240]  I don't know if that's good right now.
[08:44.500 --> 08:45.840]  But it is.
[08:45.980 --> 08:46.900]  It is what it is.
[08:47.600 --> 08:51.200]  My forte, or one of them, is polygraph and interview.
[08:53.260 --> 09:00.480]  Basically, my practice consists of corporate investigations and criminal defense investigations.
[09:00.920 --> 09:03.240]  So, I guess I'll have to talk to Steve soon.
[09:08.590 --> 09:10.030]  These guys were serious.
[09:10.470 --> 09:12.070]  At first, we thought it was a joke.
[09:12.070 --> 09:13.150]  It was not a joke.
[09:13.750 --> 09:17.210]  If you want to visit Steve over the weekend, he'll be at 26 Federal Plaza.
[09:18.550 --> 09:24.650]  I guess he's going to be waiting for an arraignment on Monday and a bail amount to be posted by a judge.
[09:27.950 --> 09:37.270]  As these gentlemen did their respective specialties, I did a bit on polygraph as an investigative tool.
[09:39.540 --> 09:47.070]  Throughout my 27 years of running polygraph examinations and doing interview and interrogations...
[09:47.070 --> 09:48.810]  Well, we call it interview now.
[09:48.970 --> 09:49.830]  It's not interrogations.
[09:52.730 --> 09:59.430]  I've amassed a record of over $30 billion in recovered, stolen, or misappropriated property.
[10:00.830 --> 10:02.810]  You may have some questions about that.
[10:03.730 --> 10:10.270]  But a lot of these things were big cases that were intellectual property, which was stolen.
[10:10.810 --> 10:18.850]  And through the use of polygraph and interview process and other investigative techniques, we were able to recover these losses.
[10:19.610 --> 10:22.270]  So, you may have some questions about that from time to time.
[10:22.270 --> 10:29.130]  I also wrote a book on corporate investigations and have written a couple of chapters for criminal defense investigation books.
[10:32.090 --> 10:41.290]  So, I don't know how many more of you guys are going to get taken out of here in handcuffs, but you may need a criminal defense investigator at some time.
[10:42.250 --> 10:46.470]  I know I was anxious to come here because you guys are smart.
[10:47.470 --> 10:49.090]  It's scary how smart you are.
[10:49.610 --> 10:57.590]  Some of the things that I read in this little book that we get for HOPE Six, I'm going, what are they saying?
[10:58.810 --> 11:02.610]  I don't even know what the topic is or how I would listen.
[11:03.430 --> 11:05.250]  So, obviously, you guys are smart.
[11:05.790 --> 11:11.770]  I know in our instructions for the speakers, they said, speak to these people like they're sophisticated.
[11:11.770 --> 11:16.850]  So, I guess I'm going to have to do that because you're way over my head.
[11:19.130 --> 11:28.770]  We have tools that we use in investigations that some of them are more available to you than they are to us.
[11:29.510 --> 11:36.630]  Because other than reading my email and trying to figure out my contact list, I'm pretty screwed up with my computer.
[11:37.610 --> 11:47.330]  So, if any one of you guys, and I'm looking for volunteers or ladies, would like to help me make my life easier using computers, I would like that.
[11:47.890 --> 11:49.870]  Although, Steve tried that and look what it got him.
[11:51.570 --> 11:53.750]  So, I don't know, maybe I don't want that.
[11:53.910 --> 11:59.050]  But if you have any volunteers or you want to talk to me, ask me any questions, please, I'd love to answer all your questions.
[11:59.050 --> 11:59.610]  Thank you.
[12:07.330 --> 12:07.670]  Okay.
[12:07.890 --> 12:09.870]  And with that, if you have any questions, shout them out.
[12:10.050 --> 12:11.010]  But, yes.
[12:14.190 --> 12:15.030]  Mike, do we have a mic?
[12:21.810 --> 12:22.770]  Do we have a mic?
[12:22.910 --> 12:23.230]  Do we have a mic?
[12:23.790 --> 12:25.490]  Do we have a mic in the house?
[12:26.170 --> 12:27.070]  Is mine working?
[12:27.950 --> 12:28.870]  I guess it is.
[12:29.230 --> 12:29.530]  Okay.
[12:30.710 --> 12:35.510]  It's my impression that the polygraph tests are only permitted in certain instances.
[12:35.510 --> 12:37.550]  What's the reason it's not permitted in others?
[12:37.590 --> 12:40.650]  And what are those instances where it is or is not permitted?
[12:41.570 --> 12:41.930]  Ridge?
[12:42.750 --> 12:45.750]  Well, depends on what you want to use it for.
[12:45.830 --> 12:48.370]  First of all, it's not polygraphy or calligraphy.
[12:49.810 --> 12:51.190]  It's a polygraph exam.
[12:52.910 --> 12:55.070]  And it's allowed in a lot of circumstances.
[12:55.350 --> 12:56.710]  There's not many it isn't allowed in.
[12:57.210 --> 12:58.350]  Do you have an example?
[12:59.030 --> 13:00.190]  It's just my impression...
[13:02.690 --> 13:04.930]  Actually, that's the biggest misnomer of them all.
[13:05.070 --> 13:06.390]  It is admissible in court.
[13:07.050 --> 13:08.790]  It's admissible under stipulation.
[13:08.790 --> 13:26.350]  If you are charged with a crime, which many of us may be at some point in time, and you know you are innocent, you can ask your attorney to have a polygraph exam run of you, I would do that with your own polygraph examiner before you went to the law enforcement examiner.
[13:26.970 --> 13:38.870]  If, in fact, you are truthful and your polygraph backs that up, you can go to the prosecutor or the prosecuting entity and ask them for what's called a stipulated polygraph.
[13:38.870 --> 13:40.230]  So you're right.
[13:40.370 --> 13:42.310]  It wouldn't be admissible in that situation either.
[13:42.610 --> 13:56.090]  What would happen is, if the prosecutor or the district attorney or whoever the prosecutorial arm is agrees to that, and you prove to them that you pass the polygraph, there won't be any charges.
[13:56.390 --> 13:57.430]  The charges will be dropped.
[13:57.430 --> 14:06.230]  So, therefore, it's not admitted in that particular situation, but it could be admitted as long as it's stipulated to in a trial at the time.
[14:06.590 --> 14:17.930]  It's my impression that employers, as I am one, is not permitted to routinely do polygraph exams of employees when there's no investigation.
[14:18.550 --> 14:19.250]  That's correct.
[14:19.630 --> 14:19.830]  Okay.
[14:19.950 --> 14:20.610]  What's the reasoning?
[14:20.830 --> 14:22.270]  What would the purpose of prohibiting that?
[14:22.270 --> 14:23.370]  There was a law passed in 1988.
[14:23.810 --> 14:26.810]  It's the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988.
[14:27.770 --> 14:28.710]  That's what I'm getting at.
[14:28.770 --> 14:29.730]  What's the reason for that?
[14:30.010 --> 14:42.730]  The reason for that is politicians got this bill passed, and a president signed it who was under pressure to sign it, because if he didn't, he would have been prosecuted for the contra scandal.
[14:46.190 --> 14:53.010]  President Reagan came into office and was the biggest proponent of polygraph that we've ever seen in the White House.
[14:53.450 --> 14:59.990]  He wanted all the CIA agents, FBI agents, and all our politicians, elected officials, polygraphed.
[15:00.430 --> 15:08.890]  It wasn't very popular at the time, because the polygraph at that point was in its heyday and was working very well.
[15:11.170 --> 15:17.190]  Now, through the early 1980s, we had a lot of cases, like Tylenol.
[15:18.350 --> 15:20.950]  I did a couple, like, straight pins in the cheese doodles.
[15:22.490 --> 15:23.610]  Let's see, where was another one?
[15:23.710 --> 15:26.210]  How about porno books in the Cracker Jacks prize system?
[15:26.370 --> 15:27.230]  That was a good one.
[15:27.810 --> 15:31.490]  And in order to eliminate suspects, we used a polygraph.
[15:31.790 --> 15:33.850]  And it's a great way to eliminate suspects.
[15:33.850 --> 15:42.190]  If you have five or six hundred people in a factory and any one of them had the availability to do one of these things, we could eliminate them very quickly as suspects.
[15:43.290 --> 15:44.930]  So that was in the early 80s.
[15:45.090 --> 16:02.350]  By the mid-80s, when Ollie North was under the gun and swallowing his sword for his president and his country, a guy by the name of Kennedy, I think his name was Ted, who didn't like polygraph very much.
[16:02.470 --> 16:05.670]  Apparently, there was a thing in Chappaquiddick and polygraph.
[16:10.070 --> 16:16.190]  So what happened was Ted, who was pressured, he didn't come up with this by himself.
[16:16.190 --> 16:18.090]  He rarely does come up with things by himself.
[16:19.430 --> 16:32.870]  He was pressured by big labor because big labor didn't like polygraphs because their people were being polygraphed around the country and being fired wholesale for theft and whatever because of polygraph examinations.
[16:33.110 --> 16:35.650]  They came up with this Employee Polygraph Protection Act.
[16:35.830 --> 16:44.630]  And what that act calls for is no more pre-employment or continued employment polygraphs, which is referred to as periodic.
[16:44.630 --> 16:50.010]  In other words, you would come into a factory or to a jewelry store as a classic example.
[16:50.150 --> 16:52.750]  How many diamonds have you stolen since we last polygraphed you?
[16:52.830 --> 16:53.390]  That type of thing.
[16:53.730 --> 16:54.810]  That was eliminated.
[16:54.970 --> 16:58.870]  And the pre-employment polygraph was eliminated except for, guess who?
[16:59.850 --> 17:06.090]  Government, anything to do with armored cars, security officers, banks, things like that.
[17:06.210 --> 17:08.270]  Those were eliminated, taken out of that bill.
[17:08.930 --> 17:19.950]  So for all intents and purposes, big labor and big Kennedy got his way and pretty much destroyed the polygraph industry.
[17:20.170 --> 17:22.810]  But now the polygraph industry has taken a new turn.
[17:22.810 --> 17:34.570]  What they're using polygraph for is testing for recidivism rates in child molesters and sexual offenders in many states out west.
[17:34.950 --> 17:46.030]  In order to stay out of jail or get out of jail, convicted felons, child molesters, sexual offenders have to take periodic polygraphs.
[17:46.030 --> 17:54.150]  Every month or two, they have to come in and answer questions about their sexual activities for the period before.
[17:55.070 --> 17:55.650]  Thank you.
[17:55.650 --> 17:57.230]  And that's where polygraph's going now.
[17:57.270 --> 17:58.290]  Let me answer that a little bit.
[17:58.350 --> 18:03.230]  I think in the employment realm, what you're getting at is you can't single out an employee.
[18:03.370 --> 18:14.170]  So in other words, if you've got internal theft going on and it happens to be in a particular room, you have to investigate everyone that had access to that room before you can start asking them to take a polygraph.
[18:14.650 --> 18:17.090]  And then you have to give them sufficient time.
[18:17.230 --> 18:20.590]  It varies state to state, 42 hours, 72 hours.
[18:21.010 --> 18:28.570]  Give them notice that they are there to appear at a certain location for a polygraph and you give them that timeframe in order to seek legal advice.
[18:29.230 --> 18:33.930]  The federal law actually calls for a 48-hour period after they're requested to take a polygraph.
[18:34.550 --> 18:44.950]  Before you can ask anybody to take a polygraph now for a specific loss even, you have to interview them and make sure that they're a real possibility and a real suspect before you can even ask them to take a polygraph.
[18:45.170 --> 18:46.450]  They have 48 hours.
[18:47.410 --> 18:52.150]  Notice at that point, written notice, before you can even polygraph them.
[18:52.610 --> 18:59.730]  They can have their lawyer present, their rabbi, their priest, their wife, their mother, whoever they want for the pre-test interview.
[19:00.790 --> 19:06.570]  After the pre-test interview, the polygraph examiner and the subject do the test.
[19:06.570 --> 19:12.030]  For the post-test interview, you can have a representative available also.
[19:12.870 --> 19:15.370]  But that's basically how the law works.
[19:15.610 --> 19:16.290]  Thank you.
[19:20.340 --> 19:22.880]  The gentleman wants to know about court's compelling test.
[19:23.220 --> 19:24.020]  I'm sorry?
[19:24.380 --> 19:26.480]  The gentleman wants to know about the court's compelling...
[19:26.480 --> 19:32.240]  Courts can compel tests and I've been ordered by courts to test people for the judge.
[19:32.240 --> 19:34.160]  The judge wants to know.
[19:34.640 --> 19:42.220]  And they have put in a court order that one party or the other or both have to take polygraph tests regarding a particular question.
[19:42.580 --> 19:43.300]  Thanks again.
[19:45.420 --> 19:52.060]  You recommended if you're going to volunteer to take a polygraph test that you get your own examiner and not trust the law enforcement agencies.
[19:52.060 --> 20:02.380]  So the implication I'm sensing here is that there are methods for an examiner to use that will skew the results in the direction that they want them to go.
[20:02.500 --> 20:03.120]  Is that correct?
[20:03.300 --> 20:03.820]  And if so...
[20:03.820 --> 20:04.980]  That is absolutely correct.
[20:05.200 --> 20:06.680]  Could you give some examples?
[20:06.900 --> 20:09.120]  An examiner could make the test go either way.
[20:10.300 --> 20:11.380]  Because it's subjective.
[20:12.360 --> 20:13.220]  This is not...
[20:13.860 --> 20:17.100]  It's somewhat scientific in that the instrumentation we use...
[20:17.100 --> 20:19.300]  A polygraph is no more than a recording device.
[20:19.300 --> 20:25.460]  It records your body functions, your bodily functions, your physiological reactions to questions, to stimuli.
[20:26.060 --> 20:29.320]  If I put a gun to Jerry's head, Jerry's going to react.
[20:29.420 --> 20:34.740]  Whether he moves or not, or he looks like he's reacting to you, his body functions are going to react.
[20:35.020 --> 20:36.640]  I'll probably have to change my underwear.
[20:39.880 --> 20:48.580]  Are there also wide, shall we say, differences of opinion in interpretation of test results?
[20:50.520 --> 20:57.740]  Not for polygraph examiners that are trained and have the education and keep up with their education.
[20:58.620 --> 20:59.020]  The...
[20:59.720 --> 21:03.320]  In order to go to even... go to polygraph school, you have to have a bachelor's degree.
[21:03.440 --> 21:05.460]  You have to have five years investigative experience.
[21:05.460 --> 21:09.340]  It's an eight-week intensive program and a 26-week...
[21:12.080 --> 21:13.000]  What do they call it?
[21:13.580 --> 21:14.100]  Probation?
[21:14.340 --> 21:14.860]  OTJ.
[21:15.660 --> 21:27.620]  It's really an on-the-job type of thing where you have to do 25 tests within that six months that are closely watched by your instructor to make sure you're doing everything properly.
[21:28.320 --> 21:30.600]  And it's quite intensive.
[21:31.460 --> 21:42.720]  The biggest thing in a polygraph test is the polygraph examiner has to psychologically set the subject to make them aware that this works and it will work with them.
[21:42.840 --> 21:44.340]  And that's done in a number of ways.
[21:44.760 --> 21:45.380]  Thank you.
[21:48.280 --> 21:50.880]  Hey, I don't know if this is a real question or more of a topic.
[21:51.900 --> 22:03.940]  When you were talking about investigating people in different armies, soldiers, things like that, I was thinking about the soldiers in Iraq who aren't, you know, belonging to a country, that are kind of like the outsourced soldiers that we hear about.
[22:04.080 --> 22:06.020]  Do you... have you gotten into that at all?
[22:06.140 --> 22:07.900]  Or have you worked on any of those cases?
[22:08.180 --> 22:10.300]  Are you talking about the mercs or...?
[22:10.300 --> 22:10.660]  Yeah, yeah.
[22:12.080 --> 22:14.280]  Well, most of them are former military.
[22:15.140 --> 22:17.420]  And the bulk of them are American and British.
[22:18.940 --> 22:22.740]  Because the Americans and the Brits have the largest private military.
[22:22.960 --> 22:24.620]  Well, they don't call them mercenaries anymore.
[22:24.780 --> 22:26.580]  They're now called private military companies.
[22:28.860 --> 22:30.060]  Yeah, go figure.
[22:30.620 --> 22:35.020]  But I guess they don't want to confuse them with Mercedes-Benz by calling them mercs, you know.
[22:36.920 --> 22:38.720]  So, yeah, they...
[22:39.240 --> 22:43.380]  Sometimes I have had to find people like that.
[22:44.620 --> 22:46.500]  Technically speaking, I'm not an investigator.
[22:46.500 --> 22:52.240]  What I do is I'm basically your expert in military research and military records.
[22:52.260 --> 22:55.820]  And I do help locate people, which is why private investigators come to me.
[22:57.080 --> 23:00.280]  Because military records research is actually a maze.
[23:01.900 --> 23:09.880]  Anybody looking for most investigators and most private citizens know that you can get a person or a veteran's records from St. Louis, Missouri.
[23:10.380 --> 23:20.660]  However, as I pointed out in my little speech this morning, there are over 160 locations in this country where you can find military records.
[23:20.660 --> 23:23.180]  And you're not always going to find what you're looking for in St. Louis.
[23:23.740 --> 23:27.600]  The trick is knowing where they are and how to find them and why they're there.
[23:28.420 --> 23:41.960]  So, some of these people, if they've gotten out, they're veterans, and they join a private military company, I usually find the information on them from their military career, turn it over to the private investigator who then tries to track them down.
[23:41.960 --> 23:44.340]  Although I can locate military personnel.
[23:45.000 --> 23:48.070]  But these private companies, they're not military personnel.
[23:48.800 --> 23:50.260]  They are not under military control.
[23:51.020 --> 23:58.000]  You would have to do an investigation on them just like you would have to do an investigation on any employee of any private company.
[23:58.260 --> 23:59.400]  Because that's what they are.
[23:59.460 --> 24:00.920]  They're employees of private companies.
[24:01.320 --> 24:04.640]  So you have to find an employment search, basically, is what it is.
[24:06.200 --> 24:06.660]  Hi.
[24:06.760 --> 24:07.920]  My question is for Mr. Keenan.
[24:08.460 --> 24:12.620]  Are you in any way affiliated with AuthentaSeal, which is the...
[24:13.280 --> 24:14.620]  Let's just say I know them.
[24:14.800 --> 24:15.320]  You know them?
[24:15.560 --> 24:20.860]  Them and a few other SEALs, and I'm in really tight with the British SAS as well.
[24:21.060 --> 24:21.360]  Perfect.
[24:21.640 --> 24:32.360]  And my next question would be, for someone who's actually interested in private investigation as a further career, what kind of tips could you give someone in the crowd that would be to start out in that sort of career?
[24:32.460 --> 24:36.120]  What kind of education would you start from, or what's a good starting platform?
[24:36.580 --> 24:39.940]  Well, one of the things most people will always tell you is read, read, read.
[24:40.740 --> 24:42.520]  Then take courses, too.
[24:43.820 --> 24:53.240]  I used to teach, even though I'm not a private investigator, for about 11 years, I taught private investigation for the Board of Cooperative Education Services for the State of New York.
[24:53.900 --> 24:57.020]  I'm also a certified security guard instructor for the State.
[24:59.020 --> 25:17.300]  But I never bothered going out to get, you know, my PI license, because for a while there, and because the other side of my business is counterterrorism and terrorism research, which, as you might guess, keeps me a little bit busy these days, I just didn't have the time.
[25:17.300 --> 25:25.340]  I could not do any investigative work because, you know, if you're going on surveillance, that's eight hours that I might be needed somewhere else for something else.
[25:25.680 --> 25:26.860]  So I never did.
[25:26.860 --> 25:30.300]  So I just do the military research and counterterrorism.
[25:31.300 --> 25:33.300]  But there's courses you can take.
[25:33.460 --> 25:44.060]  And one thing I have to tell you, because a lot of people were under this misconception, even students of my own, when they came into my class, were under the same misconception about this.
[25:46.040 --> 25:52.720]  You cannot become a private investigator and get a license simply by attending a course, even if it's accredited.
[25:54.440 --> 26:00.340]  For instance, the state of New York requires three years of field service before you can even take the test.
[26:00.760 --> 26:02.980]  That doesn't... they don't care if you've got a master's degree.
[26:03.920 --> 26:06.680]  So it's kind of like an apprenticeship program with an existing investigator?
[26:06.680 --> 26:07.260]  Basically, yeah.
[26:07.420 --> 26:08.580]  Except you're getting paid for it.
[26:08.720 --> 26:08.940]  Okay.
[26:09.200 --> 26:09.480]  Thank you.
[26:11.520 --> 26:12.140]  Hey, guys.
[26:12.240 --> 26:12.620]  Thanks for coming.
[26:12.820 --> 26:23.520]  I was wondering what kind of methods, whether non-technical or technical, both in the military side as well as just general PI, you guys use to gather the information you do?
[26:23.680 --> 26:25.880]  Is it still through the mail and by fax?
[26:26.300 --> 26:28.500]  Or are a lot more of them databases now?
[26:28.500 --> 26:32.880]  I'm sure probably on the PI side they are, and maybe not so much on the military side.
[26:33.100 --> 26:37.880]  What kind of technology, since we have more of a technical crowd, do you guys use to gather that information?
[26:38.260 --> 26:39.340]  Well, I'll be honest with you.
[26:39.440 --> 26:43.940]  In the military end of things, it's as low-tech as it gets.
[26:45.820 --> 26:51.580]  Because they have never, and they will never, put military personnel files on a database.
[26:52.600 --> 26:55.100]  All military records are paper files.
[26:56.080 --> 26:56.460]  Right.
[26:57.040 --> 27:06.180]  However, there is a website out there that you can go to that they just used to have to fax in and get on the feds list and everything else.
[27:06.180 --> 27:15.020]  But they've now made it so that you can just go to the website, and if you have the person's name, social security number, you enter that in and it will tell you if they're active duty or not.
[27:15.840 --> 27:20.360]  Now, you said they don't store that information on data.
[27:20.360 --> 27:23.780]  I know the company he's talking about because I work for them.
[27:24.060 --> 27:24.420]  Okay.
[27:25.360 --> 27:26.840]  I provide a lot of their info.
[27:26.960 --> 27:29.920]  You said they only do it on paper for military records.
[27:30.040 --> 27:34.320]  What about situations with the VA laptop and other situations?
[27:34.320 --> 27:37.380]  Okay, that's a database of an entirely different color.
[27:37.580 --> 27:37.800]  Okay.
[27:38.760 --> 27:41.960]  That type of database is for VA claims.
[27:43.400 --> 27:47.660]  If you make it, and it's separate from, basically it's separate from the Department of Defense.
[27:48.040 --> 27:50.400]  It's the Department of Veterans Affairs, which is different.
[27:50.540 --> 27:54.420]  I mean, even though they may seem as if they're the same thing, they're two separate entities.
[27:54.560 --> 27:55.520]  Is that a citizen organized?
[27:56.340 --> 27:59.520]  Yeah, well, the VA has always had problems, trust me.
[28:01.220 --> 28:10.540]  And they have all these names on there because if you make a VA claim, the VA opens a record on you.
[28:11.140 --> 28:14.840]  Obviously, any company like that would that's handing out any kind of benefits.
[28:15.200 --> 28:17.860]  They want to know who you are and what you're doing and why you're making the claim.
[28:18.520 --> 28:23.260]  At the same time, active duty personnel, their families are also eligible for a lot of these benefits.
[28:23.620 --> 28:29.480]  So that's why there's dependence information on that stolen or was on that stolen database.
[28:30.780 --> 28:32.820]  Found out that I was on it.
[28:33.000 --> 28:35.880]  My wife was a 21-year Navy veteran.
[28:35.880 --> 28:36.620]  She was on it.
[28:36.700 --> 28:42.500]  My son from my first marriage is on that same thing because we all got out after a certain date.
[28:43.220 --> 28:44.280]  I think it was 75.
[28:45.300 --> 28:47.660]  Anyone who got out after 75 is in that database.
[28:48.280 --> 28:50.980]  On the PI side, are there more technical databases now?
[28:51.580 --> 28:52.020]  Yes.
[28:52.280 --> 28:52.780]  Other than mail?
[28:53.260 --> 28:53.420]  Yeah.
[28:53.600 --> 28:54.660]  Could you describe any?
[28:54.800 --> 28:58.980]  Not specifically what the sources are, you know, the companies or anything.
[28:59.380 --> 29:00.520]  What methods?
[29:00.640 --> 29:02.720]  I mean, is it a database structure?
[29:02.980 --> 29:05.900]  Is it, you know, just a client application that you download?
[29:06.200 --> 29:07.280]  What do you guys use?
[29:08.340 --> 29:10.740]  There's a lot of databases out there that you can use.
[29:10.960 --> 29:15.560]  And sometimes I use them in conjunction with military stuff too when I'm trying to locate somebody.
[29:16.420 --> 29:21.420]  Because if it's a military person who's stationed in the States, nine times out of ten they're going to have a civilian address.
[29:21.900 --> 29:24.740]  So you're going to have to locate them the same way as you locate anyone else.
[29:25.220 --> 29:29.920]  A lot of them are just, you type in certain information, they'll ask you for certain information.
[29:29.920 --> 29:35.120]  You can do a search by telephone number, street address, by name, by all three.
[29:35.760 --> 29:42.340]  Type it in there and it'll come up as if there's a change in the address or if that person is still there.
[29:42.660 --> 29:46.800]  And then there's another one, ancestry.com, I'm sure most of you have heard of that one.
[29:47.700 --> 29:50.740]  They have a social security number, death index.
[29:51.620 --> 29:58.700]  You can go into the SSDI there, I think they charge for it, but I don't know how much, and find out when a person died.
[29:58.700 --> 29:58.840]  So that's just that one, taking place, brush that a vehicle, Scox, Keith can I buy.
[29:58.840 --> 29:58.860]  It's supposed to... we can we use local governments to get the import of it.
[29:59.000 --> 29:59.080]  It's supposed to be because it's meant by basketball since we've had to be studied.
[29:59.580 --> 29:59.660]  You can see... to particulate as it's…

[00:00.000 --> 00:04.500]  ...affiliations with companies, liens, judgments, lawsuits, criminal records.
[00:04.660 --> 00:05.380]  It just goes on and on.
[00:05.500 --> 00:06.460]  That's off of one database.
[00:07.720 --> 00:15.700]  And where they get that is they cull it out of known information, such as newspaper subscriptions, magazines, utilities, all those kind of things.
[00:15.860 --> 00:21.400]  So, yes, the PI has access, but unfortunately, we're getting scrutinized, and so some of that's getting shut down, too.
[00:21.400 --> 00:21.440]  Thank you.
[00:23.200 --> 00:37.340]  I was wondering if you guys like to comment on how you see technology, specifically anonymization and encryption, which I'm sure a lot of people here are familiar with, how you see that impacting your business in the next 20 or 30 years?
[00:38.140 --> 00:41.500]  Well, I know, for one, five years ago, I didn't know how to spell computer.
[00:41.660 --> 00:42.760]  Now I can't live without one.
[00:43.820 --> 00:44.840]  Same with a cell phone.
[00:44.940 --> 00:47.280]  My wife brought me into the 21st century with a cell phone.
[00:47.960 --> 00:57.920]  You know, basically, the PI industry, there's people that specialize in nothing but background investigations, and there's people that do nothing but cheating spouses and that kind of stuff.
[00:58.040 --> 01:00.700]  And so it depends on what it is that you're into.
[01:00.880 --> 01:06.580]  But in just about any investigation that you do, if I'm going to do surveillance, I've got to know where the guy is.
[01:06.600 --> 01:09.480]  Or if I've got an address for him, I've got to know it's a good address.
[01:09.500 --> 01:16.080]  So you've got to do certain investigative techniques to find the truth to that before you even step foot out of the office.
[01:17.280 --> 01:28.060]  You know, a case that we had where a CEO of a major company was getting emails sent to him that was very, you know, harsh, incriminating, threatening, et cetera, et cetera.
[01:28.060 --> 01:37.600]  And we backtracked that email to a computer in one of the airports so we could tell him where the computer was exactly, which computer it was.
[01:37.720 --> 01:42.280]  But again, it's a public location, so we had to rely on surveillance cameras.
[01:42.280 --> 01:44.240]  And the suspect was in that terminal.
[01:44.360 --> 01:48.220]  But unfortunately, we couldn't prove that he was the one that sent it from a public terminal, you know.
[01:48.340 --> 01:54.260]  So encryption is going to impact us based on the fact that everything that we do revolves around...
[01:54.260 --> 01:54.840]  Not everything.
[01:55.020 --> 02:03.140]  Most of what we do revolves around some type of generated computer, whether it's searches, whether it's not we're tracking somebody, whatever it is.
[02:03.140 --> 02:05.780]  So encryption is definitely going to stand in our way.
[02:05.880 --> 02:12.200]  And, you know, the government's intentionally trying to set tighter perimeters on the PI.
[02:12.920 --> 02:15.600]  Actually, I do a lot of intellectual property.
[02:16.020 --> 02:22.680]  And encryption is, and has, changed how we deal with the intellectual property.
[02:22.980 --> 02:25.760]  I do a lot of drug companies.
[02:25.980 --> 02:33.520]  So every one of these drug companies have their laptop computers, which they issue to every one of their salespeople, encrypted.
[02:34.120 --> 02:42.700]  They don't want anybody getting a hold of these things and find out their whole sales plan and how they distribute their products and things like that.
[02:42.840 --> 02:52.360]  So I think it's going to... the more encryption... the more it gets sophisticated, the more they're going to use it on a daily basis.
[02:53.000 --> 02:57.140]  Also, I wanted to know if you could make any guesses as to whether the president actually served in the military.
[02:57.940 --> 02:58.300]  But...
[03:13.940 --> 03:15.400]  First, I have a couple of things.
[03:15.660 --> 03:16.920]  First is for Mr. Riddle.
[03:17.080 --> 03:17.440]  Is that right?
[03:17.660 --> 03:17.800]  Yes.
[03:18.080 --> 03:19.960]  What type of surveillance do you do?
[03:20.100 --> 03:21.480]  Is it just electronic video?
[03:22.700 --> 03:24.300]  We do all types of surveillance video.
[03:24.500 --> 03:27.840]  We have clients that want to put GPS on vehicles and stuff.
[03:27.960 --> 03:31.440]  And you have legal ramifications that you can and cannot put GPS on there.
[03:31.440 --> 03:33.060]  That tells you where the vehicle is.
[03:33.140 --> 03:36.480]  It doesn't necessarily tell you where the person is that's driving it.
[03:36.900 --> 03:40.200]  As a point in case, we followed somebody five different times to a Walmart.
[03:40.620 --> 03:46.360]  They went in the store, finally figured out that they were going out the back door and hooking up with somebody else and leaving.
[03:46.540 --> 03:48.580]  So it doesn't tell you necessarily where the person is.
[03:48.680 --> 03:50.480]  So we do physical surveillance.
[03:50.620 --> 03:54.480]  We do just about any type of surveillance you want to talk about.
[03:54.480 --> 03:55.820]  Electronic, et cetera, et cetera.
[03:55.980 --> 03:58.960]  So we also do countermeasures.
[03:59.000 --> 04:03.340]  So we do a lot of finding bugs and electronic bugs and those kind of things.
[04:03.520 --> 04:07.480]  So anything that has to do with surveillance, we do physically, electronically, et cetera.
[04:08.260 --> 04:22.400]  In terms of physical surveillance, what are, if, this wouldn't happen to me, of course, but if someone thought they were being followed, as it were, what are their legal rights in terms of trying to dodge that surveillance?
[04:22.540 --> 04:29.100]  Would that be resisting arrest or if they thought the person was a potential mugger or pretended to think that?
[04:29.300 --> 04:31.400]  I mean, how are those kinds of things handled?
[04:31.400 --> 04:42.780]  Well, the first thing you need to do, you know, to take any kind of legal action against the person, you've got to document with a law enforcement entity three separate times so that it can be considered harassment and or stalking.
[04:42.940 --> 04:44.320]  So you need to report it.
[04:44.460 --> 04:48.300]  But, you know, I have followed people that have been professionals.
[04:49.660 --> 04:53.820]  And, I mean, as a point in case, I had one guy turn around and come right back at me.
[04:54.000 --> 04:57.480]  And then I got back on him.
[04:57.560 --> 04:58.680]  He led me down to cul-de-sac.
[04:58.800 --> 05:00.060]  Unfortunately, I knew it was a cul-de-sac.
[05:00.060 --> 05:01.140]  And so you get things like that.
[05:01.300 --> 05:03.840]  So if you think you're being followed, you know, do those kind of things.
[05:03.960 --> 05:06.700]  Turn around in the driveway, go back at the person, get license plates.
[05:07.320 --> 05:14.640]  You know, of course, we also have people that walk in and say, you know, here's a list of 300 license plates and I think I'm being followed.
[05:14.880 --> 05:17.180]  You know, that doesn't really do anything for us, so...
[05:17.180 --> 05:19.320]  Or you can drive to the nearest police station.
[05:19.540 --> 05:19.780]  Yeah.
[05:20.840 --> 05:23.600]  What color shoes do you wear when you physically surveil people?
[05:25.580 --> 05:26.160]  Thank you all.
[05:30.240 --> 05:34.320]  I just have a polygraph experience to share, pre-employment actually.
[05:34.580 --> 05:39.280]  It was optional, but I decided to take it just for the experience because I've never taken a test like that.
[05:40.400 --> 05:46.480]  And I lied my ass off on the thing, just for fun, because I didn't care about the job too much.
[05:46.600 --> 05:48.420]  And I was honest about other stuff as well.
[05:48.420 --> 05:54.260]  But, and also just stuff that I shouldn't have even lied about, like I admitted to arson and stuff like that too.
[05:56.560 --> 05:57.440]  But, uh...
[05:57.440 --> 05:58.720]  I can see you're unemployed, huh?
[06:00.460 --> 06:01.980]  No, that's the big point.
[06:02.520 --> 06:03.580]  They did employ me.
[06:04.060 --> 06:05.520]  Is the FBI still here?
[06:05.700 --> 06:06.620]  Is the FBI still in the house?
[06:07.700 --> 06:10.900]  If it was optional, was it for a private concern?
[06:12.060 --> 06:14.020]  Private being the company being private?
[06:14.160 --> 06:14.320]  Yeah.
[06:14.320 --> 06:15.240]  Yeah, yes.
[06:15.540 --> 06:15.860]  Yeah.
[06:16.040 --> 06:17.580]  It was a private company, so...
[06:19.060 --> 06:21.480]  You know, it's only as good as the examiner giving the test.
[06:22.200 --> 06:22.460]  Right.
[06:22.660 --> 06:24.740]  You said earlier about having something at stake.
[06:25.820 --> 06:26.140]  Yeah.
[06:26.560 --> 06:28.020]  You really have to have something to lose.
[06:28.080 --> 06:29.000]  You didn't have anything to lose.
[06:29.200 --> 06:30.240]  So it didn't matter to you.
[06:30.640 --> 06:30.960]  Right.
[06:31.060 --> 06:32.720]  And also, I actually, I think it...
[06:32.720 --> 06:34.660]  I didn't say that I got away with the lies.
[06:34.800 --> 06:35.800]  It may have even picked them up.
[06:35.820 --> 06:37.340]  I just don't think that they looked at the results.
[06:37.340 --> 06:40.200]  I don't, you know, I don't know the situation.
[06:40.200 --> 06:44.540]  But, you know, I think you'd have to take it in context, whatever it is.
[06:44.960 --> 06:45.180]  Yeah.
[06:45.780 --> 06:45.980]  Thanks.
[06:49.920 --> 06:53.500]  I actually have maybe a couple of questions or a subject.
[06:55.000 --> 07:01.280]  You guys are doing stuff that somebody that has malicious intent could also do.
[07:01.280 --> 07:03.520]  They could steal...
[07:04.340 --> 07:04.880]  Can't hear you.
[07:04.940 --> 07:05.180]  Sorry.
[07:05.300 --> 07:05.760]  Can't hear you.
[07:05.940 --> 07:09.200]  They can steal company property or intellectual property.
[07:09.360 --> 07:10.800]  They can find out stuff about...
[07:10.800 --> 07:17.220]  You guys can find out stuff about companies and persons that would be real valuable in terms of corporate intelligence.
[07:17.620 --> 07:17.940]  Mm-hmm.
[07:19.420 --> 07:23.240]  Are you also into corporate intelligence or are the markets...
[07:23.240 --> 07:26.280]  Well, there's an aspect of our business called competitive intelligence.
[07:26.760 --> 07:27.240]  Competitive...
[07:27.240 --> 07:27.540]  I'm sorry.
[07:27.540 --> 07:29.280]  And that works through...
[07:29.280 --> 07:31.300]  Basically, you start with the company website.
[07:32.120 --> 07:34.240]  And you get information from the company website.
[07:34.340 --> 07:35.060]  Or Google.
[07:35.460 --> 07:35.780]  Mm-hmm.
[07:35.880 --> 07:38.220]  You take the principles of the company and Google them.
[07:39.020 --> 07:40.680]  And it gives you a lot more information.
[07:40.920 --> 07:44.760]  And then using the databases we have available to us, you can get a lot more information.
[07:45.140 --> 07:56.460]  So, I mean, you can do a lot of investigation just by starting with the company website, going through their principles, their directorships.
[07:56.760 --> 08:01.480]  You know, you can Google the people for people who don't have the availability for the databases.
[08:01.480 --> 08:01.960]  We do.
[08:02.120 --> 08:03.460]  It's a good start right there.
[08:03.900 --> 08:04.000]  Yeah.
[08:04.800 --> 08:09.060]  And using the databases we have, you can accumulate a lot of information very quickly.
[08:09.840 --> 08:14.100]  From a company's point of view, in security, we have things like that.
[08:14.100 --> 08:15.240]  We have penetration testing.
[08:15.520 --> 08:19.460]  And we make a security policy and a risk analysis.
[08:19.580 --> 08:23.920]  And we try to figure out what kind of risks are involved with running the company.
[08:24.100 --> 08:26.260]  And what's it going to cost us if the risks are, you know, occurring.
[08:27.060 --> 08:30.560]  What you guys are doing, I never see in risk tables.
[08:30.840 --> 08:32.700]  And it's a big risk for a lot of companies.
[08:32.700 --> 08:37.300]  I do risk assessments and I'm a physical security professional.
[08:37.300 --> 08:44.740]  So, we do risk assessment on facilities, on alarm systems, on whatever.
[08:45.000 --> 08:46.820]  So, we do that kind of stuff.
[08:46.940 --> 08:48.600]  We also try to defeat it.
[08:49.640 --> 08:52.080]  I noticed there was a couple of classes in your book.
[08:52.080 --> 08:56.540]  There was a couple of classes on defeating different aspects of alarm systems.
[08:57.080 --> 08:58.540]  And certainly that can be done.
[08:58.540 --> 09:04.980]  That's why we try to integrate 7, 8, 9, 10 different types of systems in our alarms for a facility.
[09:05.220 --> 09:06.680]  Because I'm trying to figure out...
[09:06.680 --> 09:09.280]  In computer security, we have firewalls and IDS's.
[09:09.560 --> 09:14.080]  And you have a lot of reactive things like bug sweeps.
[09:14.200 --> 09:15.800]  But do you also have proactive things?
[09:16.780 --> 09:18.620]  Well, let me get this, Reggie, real quick.
[09:18.800 --> 09:18.980]  I'm sorry.
[09:19.180 --> 09:20.120]  Here's the problem, man.
[09:20.160 --> 09:21.600]  You guys are talking about electronic stuff.
[09:21.680 --> 09:24.000]  And a lot of it comes back to something as simple as dumpster diving.
[09:24.300 --> 09:30.720]  I mean, if we're going to go dig up stuff on a company, you know, their trash is one of the best places to do it, you know.
[09:30.860 --> 09:33.540]  So, I mean, it can be something as simple as that.
[09:33.820 --> 09:35.620]  Not all the high-tech stuff, you know.
[09:35.840 --> 09:44.480]  So, could you give some indications of proactive things companies could do to prevent you guys from, you know, going around and finding all the information?
[09:44.680 --> 09:50.000]  One thing is to educate employees to prevent just what Kelly just mentioned, dumpster diving.
[09:50.000 --> 09:54.520]  Because with all the high-tech stuff out there, everybody is worried about computer security.
[09:55.120 --> 10:00.960]  So, you're coming up with new virus protections, new firewalls, you name it, and they're building it.
[10:01.220 --> 10:14.060]  In the meantime, the employees are just throwing paper in the trash with social security numbers on it and all sorts of other good information that somebody just has to go out to the trash, take it away, and leaf through it.
[10:14.760 --> 10:22.060]  One of the biggest things that we try to educate the employees is loose lips sink ships.
[10:22.980 --> 10:29.200]  You know, Silicon Valley back in the 80s and 90s had a major malfunction going on.
[10:29.620 --> 10:39.500]  What they would do is, bars and restaurants were hiring MIT graduates to be waiters and waitresses and bartenders.
[10:41.660 --> 10:42.440]  And guess what?
[10:42.540 --> 10:44.040]  They found out a lot of good stuff.
[10:44.160 --> 10:46.060]  Because they could understand what you people were talking about.
[10:47.560 --> 10:50.020]  There'd be people sitting at the bar saying, What are you working on?
[10:50.140 --> 10:50.640]  I'm working on this.
[10:52.920 --> 10:53.820]  And guess what?
[10:53.820 --> 11:02.420]  But those bartenders and waitresses understood what they were talking about and routed these companies, just ripped them off.
[11:04.020 --> 11:09.980]  From that experience, companies started to figure out, We've got to start protecting our intellectual property.
[11:10.060 --> 11:11.260]  And that's done by education.
[11:11.600 --> 11:17.980]  And that's not in the workplace with, you know, throwing a piece of paper away.
[11:17.980 --> 11:23.200]  It's keeping your mouth shut when you're out to dinner, when you're out socializing.
[11:24.760 --> 11:27.000]  Oftentimes, competitors will socialize.
[11:28.080 --> 11:31.640]  And there's a lot of big companies, a lot of big jobs.
[11:31.720 --> 11:32.280]  But guess what?
[11:32.500 --> 11:34.660]  Those jobs stay within a small group of people.
[11:35.700 --> 11:36.500]  And they talk.
[11:36.960 --> 11:40.240]  What happens also is you have a lot of people that they know they're switching to a competitor.
[11:40.240 --> 11:46.620]  And so they email client information or they download it ahead of time, do all that kind of stuff, you know.
[11:46.960 --> 11:57.220]  But, I mean, we were instrumental in a case our client won $230 million because we were able to prove that the other side balked on a contract.
[11:57.320 --> 11:59.820]  And the way we did that is we went dumpster diving.
[11:59.840 --> 12:02.880]  And we found an email from one executive to the other that they had thrown away.
[12:03.120 --> 12:10.960]  So to answer your question, you need shredders, you know, you need to protect your trash, you need to protect your physical security as much as you need to do your electronic.
[12:11.740 --> 12:12.360]  Thank you.
[12:15.480 --> 12:17.500]  Hello, this question is for Mr. Riddle.
[12:18.040 --> 12:20.920]  Actually, I'd like to start, free Steven.
[12:22.240 --> 12:23.620]  I hear you, free Steve.
[12:31.980 --> 12:37.180]  So at the last conference, we saw that Steven showed us that it was tremendously easy.
[12:37.380 --> 12:46.600]  And it sounded like it had become a lot easier to get access to information as us as private individuals just hitting some website and giving our credit number, credit card number.
[12:46.840 --> 12:49.940]  And it sounds like perhaps some things are getting easier.
[12:50.160 --> 12:56.440]  I'd like to know what has changed in the last two years since Steven last spoke to us about privacy in the States.
[12:57.220 --> 13:00.000]  The government has been holding a lot more congressional hearings.
[13:00.080 --> 13:07.840]  In other words, they just finished a large investigation related to those companies that have been buying and selling cell phone records.
[13:07.840 --> 13:20.620]  And so there's a law that is passing related to making that a federal crime, being able to block the social security numbers.
[13:21.000 --> 13:29.180]  A lot of the databases out there that we have access to, they now have to do on-site inspections before they will allow you to sign up.
[13:29.780 --> 13:32.580]  So, I mean, it's gone to a new level.
[13:32.760 --> 13:38.500]  I mean, the government has decided that our privacy is something that they want to protect, and they are enforcing it.
[13:38.580 --> 13:46.200]  I mean, they're physically making demands on the information brokers, is what we call them, to make it more difficult.
[13:46.340 --> 13:53.160]  I mean, it's to a point where, you know, I was in the process of putting together a database myself, and I said, you know, I don't want to deal with all the red tape, man.
[13:53.160 --> 13:59.180]  So, you know, unless you're already in it, there's not a real incentive to join in the bandwagon, you know.
[14:00.120 --> 14:01.820]  So, it's definitely getting tighter.
[14:02.140 --> 14:04.260]  The information is going to be there because it is there.
[14:06.060 --> 14:19.700]  I'm dealing with a case right now where a court in one particular state threw out seven years of court records, and we just happened to catch wind of it, and we were there and videoed it and got those records.
[14:19.700 --> 14:26.840]  And so, again, you know, if you're going to throw stuff out, you know, it's going to come up on somebody's database somewhere.
[14:26.900 --> 14:32.520]  And I've had people, you know, from a privacy issue, they go, look, man, I don't want all my stuff out there.
[14:32.640 --> 14:46.660]  And so I asked them, this one lady actually gave me that argument, and I said, look, when you go to, you know, a home show or a garden show or whatever, I said, do you ever fill out those, you know, win a sweet steak kind of deal?
[14:46.660 --> 14:48.120]  And she says, yeah, all the time.
[14:48.260 --> 14:49.560]  And I said, what number do you put on there?
[14:49.580 --> 14:50.600]  She said, I put my cell phone.
[14:50.680 --> 14:52.840]  I said, well, what do you think is going on the database?
[14:53.000 --> 14:55.020]  You know, it's for marketing, which goes on the other databases.
[14:55.180 --> 15:00.820]  So it's happened, it's going to happen, but it's going to limit the guys that are trying to stay within the boundaries of the law.
[15:01.680 --> 15:09.000]  So would you say that the 500 pages of information on the chap at the front was easier to get than two years ago or harder?
[15:09.540 --> 15:14.580]  Let me let Rick tell you, because, you know, Rick is one of those guys that there's a lot out there on.
[15:14.760 --> 15:15.200]  Here you go, Rick.
[15:15.800 --> 15:17.460]  I can't imagine why, looking at him.
[15:19.900 --> 15:20.760]  So, whoa.
[15:21.180 --> 15:28.600]  So when I volunteered to do this, I heard Steve on Off The Hook, I guess, and I emailed him.
[15:28.600 --> 15:32.820]  And on a Sunday night, I'd listen to the, you know, I'd listen to the MP3 Sunday night.
[15:32.980 --> 15:33.940]  I emailed him when I got home.
[15:34.740 --> 15:35.340]  8 a.m.
[15:35.420 --> 15:40.260]  in the morning, the next day, Monday morning, he emailed me back and said, yes, we'll do you.
[15:40.380 --> 15:44.620]  You're going to be our digital proctology guinea pig, as he referred to me.
[15:47.500 --> 15:52.620]  And so I said, yeah, give me a call when I get into the office and we'll talk about it.
[15:52.680 --> 15:58.080]  And so 45 minutes later, when I got in, my cell phone rang as I was pulling in my parking space.
[15:58.080 --> 16:02.000]  And he knew, and all I had given him in my email was my name.
[16:02.500 --> 16:05.200]  I just signed the email and obviously he had my email address.
[16:06.440 --> 16:08.200]  He knew everywhere I'd ever lived.
[16:08.620 --> 16:10.400]  He knew what kind of car I was driving.
[16:10.520 --> 16:12.300]  He was looking at satellite photos of my house.
[16:13.420 --> 16:21.400]  He knew somebody else in Alabama had been using my social security number since 1983, when I was like 11.
[16:23.880 --> 16:25.120]  He knew my friend.
[16:25.120 --> 16:28.620]  And then he only, I talked to him briefly today before he got arrested.
[16:29.860 --> 16:34.620]  And he showed me, he had this 500 pages of stuff that he had on me.
[16:34.860 --> 16:41.120]  And I'm a semi-public figure, so there's sort of more out about me than there might be about other people.
[16:41.120 --> 16:46.000]  But just because I've done, I worked on a, I was the lead designer of a game called City of Heroes.
[16:46.000 --> 16:48.180]  And I have a book and a blog and stuff like that.
[16:50.660 --> 16:53.620]  So there's a lot of, but he knew a ton of stuff.
[16:53.640 --> 16:55.160]  And he'd found all my friends.
[16:55.320 --> 16:58.460]  And he knew, like he'd found pictures of my friends.
[16:58.600 --> 17:00.140]  And the fact that I looked like other people.
[17:00.360 --> 17:02.200]  And he knew about my brother's criminal history.
[17:02.420 --> 17:04.340]  And like just an amazing amount of stuff.
[17:04.340 --> 17:05.660]  And that was all in four and a half hours.
[17:06.080 --> 17:07.340]  You know, that's all he spent on it.
[17:08.460 --> 17:17.740]  So I would say that if you're already in with the database companies, that it's still pretty easy to find out a shitload of stuff about people.
[17:18.360 --> 17:19.080]  Thanks very much.
[17:21.020 --> 17:22.600]  And a lot of it's just public information.
[17:22.760 --> 17:24.200]  I mean, if you Google them and everything else, you know.
[17:24.400 --> 17:29.640]  But any good PI can pull that kind of stuff up because it's out there.
[17:31.040 --> 17:36.380]  These databases that you mentioned that PIs have restricted access to.
[17:37.020 --> 17:39.840]  How many are there and who controls these databases?
[17:44.140 --> 17:46.700]  There are a multitude.
[17:47.040 --> 17:50.860]  Every state has computer access to certain records.
[17:51.860 --> 17:56.140]  I just did something yesterday in Colorado, which is wide open except for probate and juvenile.
[17:56.520 --> 17:58.740]  You can get any kind of court cases.
[18:00.860 --> 18:07.120]  It varies from state to state what you can get from state access computers.
[18:07.840 --> 18:18.040]  We have... the databases that we have are a conglomeration of, I guess, different people would have access to different things.
[18:18.200 --> 18:19.840]  They got bought up by other entities.
[18:20.280 --> 18:22.240]  Now they have one conglomerate thing.
[18:22.380 --> 18:26.080]  So you get... there's one source where you get a pretty good picture of what's going on.
[18:27.000 --> 18:32.120]  I did that last week on an individual and I gave it to Steve because he has a totally different database.
[18:32.720 --> 18:35.400]  He came up with almost exactly the same information.
[18:35.620 --> 18:37.700]  He came up with, I think, one or two more addresses.
[18:38.660 --> 18:44.840]  And that's why when I do database searches of somebody, it's just a place to start.
[18:45.560 --> 18:50.100]  Because it's going to tell you their former addresses, you know, their dates of births.
[18:50.100 --> 18:59.140]  There's some... like in Chris's case, relatives possibly, former neighbors, every place you've lived.
[18:59.820 --> 19:02.060]  Sometimes they'll have jobs in there.
[19:02.980 --> 19:06.560]  Any publications that you may have written will be mentioned.
[19:06.700 --> 19:07.460]  They may have excerpts.
[19:07.560 --> 19:09.340]  They may have a review of your book.
[19:09.340 --> 19:12.500]  You know, if you Google me, it has a review of my book in there.
[19:13.040 --> 19:16.480]  So there's... there's so many different databases that are available.
[19:16.640 --> 19:24.060]  There's no one source that I would trust and use as gospel because there's always more to be found out there.
[19:24.440 --> 19:29.100]  And, for example, this one woman I did last week, she lived in seven different states.
[19:29.100 --> 19:35.060]  So not only do I take that database information, I call somebody, another PI, in that state.
[19:35.480 --> 19:39.840]  And say, what can you get in your state that is not going to be on this main database?
[19:40.160 --> 19:42.740]  Do you guys pay for, like, subscription for each of these databases?
[19:42.740 --> 19:45.020]  Is that why you called somebody from another state?
[19:45.140 --> 19:47.740]  Like, why didn't you just go in to that database?
[19:48.260 --> 19:50.160]  Because I don't pay for that or have the ability...
[19:50.160 --> 19:50.440]  It's a subscription.
[19:50.760 --> 19:50.920]  Okay.
[19:51.040 --> 19:51.160]  Right.
[19:51.620 --> 19:53.480]  I wouldn't have the ability to get to that source.
[19:53.900 --> 19:54.980]  I wouldn't have the need.
[19:55.360 --> 19:57.560]  Like, I don't do a lot of investigations in Colorado.
[19:57.560 --> 19:59.220]  I mean, we do work out there.
[19:59.440 --> 20:01.240]  You know, I do maybe a dozen cases a year out there.
[20:01.340 --> 20:05.460]  But it doesn't pay for me to subscribe for that many cases.
[20:06.220 --> 20:11.740]  What you have, though, is there's about ten major players in that industry.
[20:12.000 --> 20:15.820]  And they have other websites and other companies that are subsidiaries of them.
[20:16.300 --> 20:18.820]  And so a lot of the information is the same.
[20:19.100 --> 20:24.140]  And once you've been around enough to know, you know which ones are kind of the, you know, one hand's feeding the other kind of thing.
[20:24.220 --> 20:25.340]  And it's just another way to market it.
[20:26.360 --> 20:32.600]  But as Reggie's alluding to, you know, any good PI, which is why he's talking about getting a local PI, it's an unconfirmed source.
[20:32.860 --> 20:36.540]  Anything you get off of a database is exactly that, an unconfirmed source.
[20:36.660 --> 20:42.020]  So you've got to physically, or through interviews or something else, go through the process of verifying it.
[20:42.020 --> 20:43.500]  Okay, thank you.
[20:47.020 --> 20:48.820]  Hi, I had a couple questions.
[20:49.260 --> 21:04.280]  Coming from a computer forensic background on the network intrusion side, I was wondering the role computer forensics are playing in some of your investigations now, such as, like, a suspicious wife having you dump the data off a husband's GPS in their car or PDAs.
[21:04.280 --> 21:13.100]  And my other question would be, I was curious in the counter-terrorism research if you were doing, like, link analysis or profiling or, like, kind of how you were working.
[21:14.700 --> 21:16.080]  Do you want to answer that first one?
[21:17.760 --> 21:29.740]  Well, in the first place, if you download a hard drive or mirror a hard drive, whatever you want, copy a hard drive, whatever you want to say, you can find out just about anything you want about that person and their activity on that computer.
[21:31.000 --> 21:34.960]  Just involved in a high-profile case out in the Hamptons, you might have read about.
[21:35.580 --> 21:36.860]  A beautiful blonde girl.
[21:37.240 --> 21:39.940]  And the whole case was on the husband's computers.
[21:40.320 --> 21:40.880]  It's over.
[21:41.000 --> 21:41.260]  It's done.
[21:41.260 --> 21:42.640]  There's no more to be done.
[21:43.160 --> 21:43.720]  He's had.
[21:43.880 --> 21:44.400]  It's finished.
[21:44.560 --> 21:44.880]  Cooked.
[21:45.680 --> 21:46.000]  Cooked.
[21:46.800 --> 21:47.240]  You know what I mean?
[21:48.340 --> 21:49.360]  It's all on his computers.
[21:49.520 --> 21:50.280]  We didn't have to do anything.
[21:51.220 --> 21:51.780]  The case is over.
[21:52.680 --> 21:53.280]  So there it is.
[21:53.400 --> 21:57.220]  So forensic examination of a hard drive is all it took.
[21:57.300 --> 22:02.520]  So what I was curious about, like, spousal permission and that kind of stuff, as long as one, like, under the law...
[22:02.520 --> 22:06.480]  I know for law enforcement, they can come in with a warrant and say, you know, we're going to look at this.
[22:06.480 --> 22:14.260]  But from a PI side, is it like the spouse or a roommate can say, okay, you can look at this computer?
[22:14.400 --> 22:15.820]  Is that how it works on the PI side?
[22:15.980 --> 22:17.460]  It varies from state to state.
[22:17.780 --> 22:26.360]  And I won't do anything without checking with my computer forensics guy who should know the state law in that particular state.
[22:26.360 --> 22:29.220]  And running it past the attorney.
[22:30.160 --> 22:32.780]  I'm not going to do anything that's going to jeopardize a case.
[22:33.280 --> 22:37.740]  Now, if an attorney says to me, it's okay, the wife paid for the computer.
[22:38.860 --> 22:39.660]  Okay, me.
[22:40.440 --> 22:41.740]  Because I check with an attorney.
[22:42.280 --> 22:43.220]  Now, he's become...
[22:43.680 --> 22:45.700]  He's representing the client.
[22:45.920 --> 22:47.300]  And at that point, me.
[22:48.560 --> 22:49.880]  Because I don't want to break any laws.
[22:50.000 --> 22:53.980]  And I told him, I always tell him, I don't want to break any laws by doing this.
[22:54.480 --> 22:56.580]  Is it legal in this state or wherever?
[22:57.400 --> 23:01.000]  And, you know, we haven't had any problem with those situations.
[23:01.640 --> 23:01.960]  Okay.
[23:03.200 --> 23:05.540]  And then just the counter-terrorism stuff.
[23:05.540 --> 23:06.940]  I was kind of wondering what you were going on.
[23:07.280 --> 23:08.920]  What did you want to know about that?
[23:09.380 --> 23:11.460]  Are you doing, like, broad...
[23:11.460 --> 23:15.760]  Are you doing profiling of groups or profiling of, like, factors that would make someone suspicious?
[23:15.820 --> 23:18.140]  Or are you doing, like, links, linking?
[23:18.740 --> 23:20.280]  Boy, you guys are really good.
[23:21.500 --> 23:22.680]  I just started that.
[23:23.620 --> 23:29.180]  As a matter of fact, I'm an associate of the Western Defense Studies Institute in Rome.
[23:29.980 --> 23:32.580]  And I'm going to be building a database for them.
[23:33.040 --> 23:40.360]  And what it's going to consist of, basically, I'm going to be writing profiles of every known or suspected terrorist in the world.
[23:41.540 --> 23:44.420]  And I've got enough information...
[23:45.880 --> 23:53.660]  I have enough information at home about 60 CDs worth of information on terrorism.
[23:53.940 --> 23:55.240]  Do you guys have any from here?
[23:56.760 --> 24:02.480]  No, but I have to do one on several people with the same last name as me.
[24:03.060 --> 24:03.780]  Oh, wow.
[24:04.020 --> 24:06.620]  And I lived in Northern Ireland myself for five years.
[24:07.720 --> 24:09.080]  There's a lot of Keenan's there.
[24:09.200 --> 24:13.140]  In fact, the Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army in 1998 was Brian Keenan.
[24:15.760 --> 24:17.560]  So, I'm a little hesitant about that.
[24:17.700 --> 24:21.060]  And I always try to get to the airport real early in case I have to go somewhere.
[24:23.340 --> 24:24.060]  Thank you.
[24:28.040 --> 24:32.900]  I've got a bunch of questions, but I'm going to restrict myself to one because I think that's fair.
[24:34.520 --> 24:39.100]  I want to know, is there a formal code of ethics for private investigators?
[24:39.800 --> 24:44.160]  Would that be administered by a licensing body or a trade organization?
[24:44.580 --> 24:53.940]  And I'd like to ask each one of you individually to come up, perhaps, with one instance of a case that you have refused on ethical grounds?
[24:54.280 --> 25:00.540]  Or, if not, maybe a scenario where you would refuse it on ethical grounds, if we think that's fair.
[25:02.520 --> 25:09.380]  Well, I can tell you one that I've shared in my seminar today where I should have refused.
[25:09.740 --> 25:18.900]  And it happened to be an individual that walked into my office and said, look, my wife dropped me off at work yesterday and is supposed to pick me up from work.
[25:19.140 --> 25:19.880]  She didn't do it.
[25:19.920 --> 25:20.620]  I caught a ride home.
[25:20.620 --> 25:23.320]  When I got home, my furniture was gone.
[25:23.420 --> 25:24.700]  My two-year-old was gone.
[25:25.200 --> 25:28.100]  And I don't care if she wants to leave me, but I want to know where my two-year-old is.
[25:28.400 --> 25:34.360]  So I interviewed this guy for an hour, trying to provoke him, trying to see if he was the violent type and everything else.
[25:34.420 --> 25:36.380]  And I eventually said, all right, I'll take your case.
[25:36.640 --> 25:42.860]  He thought that she was staying with a sister in a neighboring town and gave me the name of the sister.
[25:42.960 --> 25:45.180]  And fortunately, he gave me the wrong name of the sister.
[25:45.180 --> 25:47.760]  And we started doing database searches and didn't find her.
[25:48.220 --> 25:52.240]  The next day, I walk into my house and his mug shots on the screen.
[25:52.520 --> 26:00.100]  He had found his wife's mother, held her hostage, shot her execution style because she wouldn't tell where her two sisters are.
[26:00.320 --> 26:06.460]  And then in her purse was some information about a storage unit in the town where they were actually located.
[26:06.460 --> 26:13.720]  He broke into the storage unit, found the address of the apartment complex, went and staked the apartment complex out.
[26:13.820 --> 26:16.040]  The next morning, the wife came out with a two-year-old.
[26:16.380 --> 26:19.340]  She saw him, freaked out, shot at him and missed.
[26:19.340 --> 26:23.480]  He shot back, hit her in the head, but didn't kill her, scooped up the two-year-old and took off.
[26:24.480 --> 26:30.420]  About three days later, they got a suspicious person call at a bank up in Washington, Washington State.
[26:30.720 --> 26:34.620]  And the police surrounded him and he shot and killed himself with the two-year-old sitting in the car next to him.
[26:34.620 --> 26:36.880]  So, you know, yeah, exactly.
[26:37.200 --> 26:40.460]  That might be kind of just a happenstance happening.
[26:41.020 --> 26:49.400]  No, no, I mean, really the meat of my question is, I mean, is there identifiable factors that would cause you to turn down a case on ethics?
[26:49.840 --> 26:50.220]  Absolutely.
[26:50.320 --> 26:54.500]  And if you can't point to a real case, can we maybe give a scenario you can think of?
[26:55.460 --> 26:56.420]  If you'd like.
[26:56.680 --> 26:57.280]  That'll be all.
[26:57.820 --> 26:58.380]  You want to go?
[26:58.380 --> 27:08.120]  Well, in my case, it's pretty short and sweet because technically speaking there are, we're bound, I'm bound by the same sort of ethics, you know.
[27:08.400 --> 27:14.660]  But we also can run, I can also run into a similar situation as Kelly.
[27:15.880 --> 27:24.500]  But the main things that I do, they are all legal, except I have been asked to get the character of a discharge on people more than once.
[27:25.740 --> 27:28.900]  Now, I can do it, but it's illegal and I won't do it.
[27:31.540 --> 27:44.720]  Because the government in 1979, any vet, anybody being separated from any branch of the armed services from 1979 to the present day, their character of discharge is not public record.
[27:45.280 --> 27:52.240]  Therefore, unless they sign a waiver granting you access to that information, you can't get it.
[27:52.240 --> 27:59.480]  And in order to get it, you'd have to go do it basically illegally, which means you'd have to be in collusion with a federal employee.
[28:00.940 --> 28:04.520]  And you'll both be hung out to dry when you're caught, because you will be caught.
[28:06.140 --> 28:09.380]  For my part, to answer your questions about ethics.
[28:10.220 --> 28:14.080]  Just to clarify, if that's whether it's an honorable or dishonorable discharge?
[28:14.860 --> 28:17.160]  Well, there again, there are several different discharges.
[28:17.280 --> 28:23.860]  You have honorable, bad conduct, discharge, dishonorable, administrative.
[28:24.540 --> 28:33.000]  And within all of them, you have certain levels, needs of the service, medical, a whole bunch of other ones.
[28:33.120 --> 28:41.640]  There's a whole lot of enlisted, what they call re-enlistment and separation codes that they use when somebody gets out of the service, when they're discharged.
[28:42.060 --> 28:47.940]  Now, they're not available to the public anymore, but I happen to get my hands on the last one that was made available to the public.
[28:48.400 --> 28:53.640]  So I can more or less break down all these codes that'll tell you just why that person was discharged.
[28:53.800 --> 28:56.980]  But again, I have to have those codes before I can look them up.
[28:59.020 --> 29:01.340]  Let's get back to your ethics question.
[29:02.120 --> 29:05.360]  Last count, I think I'm number 111 on this thing.
[29:05.800 --> 29:08.280]  I don't know if it's all my associations are in there.
[29:08.280 --> 29:12.600]  But last count, I think last week, I'm a member of 23 different trade associations.
[29:13.240 --> 29:14.660]  They all have a code of ethics.
[29:16.780 --> 29:19.420]  And obviously, illegal acts is right at the top.
[29:20.380 --> 29:22.500]  And conflict of interest is right behind it.
[29:24.640 --> 29:27.540]  And, you know, there are other things that I won't get involved in.
[29:27.540 --> 29:29.840]  You know, there's often times where I turn down work.
[29:29.980 --> 29:31.440]  People want me to find somebody.
[29:32.420 --> 29:34.900]  And, you know, they don't give me a good reason why.
[29:35.140 --> 29:36.700]  Well, I'm not going to have somebody...
[29:37.180 --> 29:41.200]  Find somebody with somebody, have them get shot or killed or murdered or injured or whatever.
[29:42.620 --> 29:49.240]  I've been asked to do all kinds of things from bug phones to arrange for somebody's legs to be broken.
[29:49.240 --> 29:53.400]  You know, or point me in the right direction.
[29:53.640 --> 29:55.600]  You know, and I point them in the right direction.
[29:55.760 --> 29:56.340]  Out of here.
[29:57.840 --> 29:59.800]  I don't get involved in anything that's illegal.
[30:00.140 --> 30:01.880]  I won't get involved in a conflict.
[30:01.880 --> 30:04.860]  If I represent one party, I certainly wouldn't represent the other.
[30:05.240 --> 30:06.580]  I won't set anybody up.
[30:06.720 --> 30:07.480]  People call me all the time.
[30:07.660 --> 30:13.420]  Do you, you know, arrange for women to check out and see if my husband is faithful?
[30:14.000 --> 30:15.100]  No, I don't.
[30:15.360 --> 30:16.260]  You need a pimp.
[30:19.920 --> 30:25.400]  What we do as investigators, we verify what is happening.
[30:25.640 --> 30:27.180]  We don't make things up.
[30:27.320 --> 30:30.300]  All we do is document what is going on.
[30:30.780 --> 30:33.260]  And that's what our charge is.
[30:33.840 --> 30:39.080]  And in most cases, state law dictates what you can and can't do.
[30:39.220 --> 30:43.800]  So if you read your licensing law from state to state, it'll pretty much tell you that.
[30:43.960 --> 30:50.200]  And what that doesn't tell you, your own good common sense should tell you or your code of ethics from your professional associations.
[30:54.130 --> 30:54.530]  Okay.
[30:55.310 --> 30:58.190]  So I had a strange experience with a polygraph recently.
[30:58.610 --> 31:02.330]  They baselined me with a stim test and it worked.
[31:03.870 --> 31:08.670]  I showed up as not lying on all the ones I wasn't supposed to be lying and I showed up as lying on the one that I was.
[31:09.270 --> 31:13.990]  And then I took the regular test and I failed every single question except for my name.
[31:14.910 --> 31:20.990]  So I wanted to know, what can someone do to prevent that type of false positive?
[31:21.190 --> 31:22.310]  And is that a common thing?
[31:22.470 --> 31:28.650]  And, you know, if the false positive rate is so high, why do they put such a reliance on polygraphs in the first place?
[31:28.650 --> 31:33.550]  Well, false positives I addressed earlier in my presentation.
[31:34.490 --> 31:36.790]  There's something called a gill complex reactor.
[31:40.210 --> 31:42.070]  Did you murder John Kennedy?
[31:42.710 --> 31:44.590]  You know, and people react like they did.
[31:45.290 --> 31:46.630]  And they weren't born yet.
[31:47.210 --> 31:50.810]  So, I mean, these people, I mean, there are certain people you can't test.
[31:50.810 --> 31:54.150]  There's about 5% of the population of the world you can't test.
[31:55.730 --> 32:07.790]  And it's for whatever psychological reason they have or physiological reason or they're using some sort of medication that, well, we can't read their charts.
[32:07.930 --> 32:09.170]  I mean, there's a lot of different reasons.
[32:10.310 --> 32:14.190]  But a test should be done ahead of time to see if they're a gill complex reactor.
[32:14.190 --> 32:15.170]  And that's one of the questions.
[32:15.330 --> 32:16.270]  Did you kill John Kennedy?
[32:16.530 --> 32:18.930]  Usually, we ask that of people that were born after 63.
[32:19.630 --> 32:21.990]  So, we know they didn't kill John Kennedy.
[32:22.150 --> 32:22.990]  Because, you know, who knows?
[32:23.070 --> 32:24.450]  Oswald might have been not guilty.
[32:24.650 --> 32:25.210]  I mean, I...
[32:27.050 --> 32:29.150]  But polygraph is nothing more than a tool.
[32:29.610 --> 32:30.730]  It's not an end-all.
[32:30.910 --> 32:34.130]  That's what brought polygraph down in the 80s.
[32:34.470 --> 32:36.730]  The beginning of the 80s, it was the end-all.
[32:36.890 --> 32:41.510]  And it went from the end-all to, see ya, by 88.
[32:41.810 --> 32:43.750]  There are some people that still swear by it, though.
[32:44.190 --> 32:44.850]  Like you said...
[32:44.850 --> 32:46.010]  Well, I believe in polygraph.
[32:46.030 --> 32:48.350]  And in certain circumstances, it's very helpful.
[32:48.530 --> 32:51.650]  When I go in and I have facts against somebody, like...
[32:51.650 --> 32:54.190]  What we'll do is we do a lot of employee investigations.
[32:54.310 --> 32:58.850]  So, let's say we put a camera, a hidden camera on somebody and watch them stealing.
[32:59.830 --> 33:01.610]  Then I'll have them come in and I'll interview them.
[33:01.710 --> 33:05.310]  And I say, look, you know, this is the deal.
[33:05.490 --> 33:09.530]  You can talk to me or you can talk to Officer Tutti over there.
[33:10.110 --> 33:12.590]  You talk to me and you might walk out of this room and go home.
[33:12.590 --> 33:14.790]  You talk to him and you're going home in handcuffs.
[33:15.870 --> 33:22.570]  So, if you tell me the truth and I can verify you told me the truth, and how I verify it is through polygraph.
[33:23.510 --> 33:27.910]  So, the guy says he stole $500 worth of stuff and he actually stole $1,500 worth of stuff.
[33:27.910 --> 33:30.330]  I'll be able to determine that after a polygraph examination.
[33:30.670 --> 33:31.930]  We already know he stole.
[33:33.150 --> 33:34.470]  So, it's just how much.
[33:34.470 --> 33:43.470]  And what that does is verify for the insurance companies so that we can make a claim and be fairly accurate on how much their losses actually were.
[33:43.670 --> 33:44.650]  So, it's a tool.
[33:44.810 --> 33:45.690]  It's not an end-all.
[33:45.970 --> 33:46.250]  Okay.
[33:46.310 --> 33:47.730]  It's something I use as a threat.
[33:48.270 --> 33:49.230]  Are you telling me the truth?
[33:49.370 --> 33:49.530]  Fine.
[33:49.650 --> 33:54.090]  Would you like to volunteer to take a polygraph to verify your veracity?
[33:54.330 --> 34:01.590]  Well, for pre-employment screening, if there's no way you can get the job without taking a polygraph, what's that 5% of the population supposed to do?
[34:01.590 --> 34:02.730]  Tell them.
[34:03.710 --> 34:06.470]  Say, listen, I went to take a polygraph before and it got all screwed up.
[34:07.330 --> 34:07.810]  All right.
[34:08.110 --> 34:08.270]  Thanks.
[34:08.270 --> 34:08.790]  That's all you can do.
[34:08.910 --> 34:12.870]  I mean, there's very few instances where you have to take a pre-employment polygraph nowadays.
[34:13.730 --> 34:15.450]  Or try another line at work.
[34:16.830 --> 34:17.610]  No comment.
[34:19.570 --> 34:20.070]  Thanks.
[34:20.350 --> 34:20.490]  Thanks.
[34:25.130 --> 34:25.630]  Hi.
[34:25.770 --> 34:34.430]  Being European, I think that your activity can eventually go beyond the border of the United States.
[34:34.430 --> 34:39.730]  And you have to do, eventually, some activity also in other countries.
[34:40.030 --> 34:47.230]  Part of the countries where there is a special, specific trouble.
[34:47.230 --> 34:52.310]  I mean, nation under war or in terror and trouble.
[34:53.070 --> 35:18.890]  Which, and also in the case of an activity not promoted or supported by both government acting as a private investigator, what method do you use for a different culture, a different language, a different way to access a local database?
[35:19.890 --> 35:24.150]  And how do you act, for instance, in Italy, where I come from?
[35:25.010 --> 35:27.510]  If you had, if you did, for instance, or...
[35:27.510 --> 35:34.830]  If I understand you right, you're asking about how American private investigators would operate in Europe?
[35:34.830 --> 35:35.810]  Yeah.
[35:36.070 --> 35:36.710]  I mean, yeah.
[35:37.210 --> 35:38.290]  Above the...
[35:38.290 --> 35:38.830]  Above the...
[35:39.450 --> 35:40.230]  Beyond the...
[35:40.230 --> 35:40.530]  Yeah.
[35:40.650 --> 35:41.730]  For instance, in Europe.
[35:42.750 --> 35:53.790]  What they normally do, these days, because of technology, is they get somebody, they get a private investigator in that country to do, you know, whatever it is they're gonna do.
[35:53.790 --> 35:57.650]  They don't go over there themselves anymore like they did 30 years ago.
[35:58.550 --> 36:06.690]  They now, with all the networking, because I'm in touch with private investigators in Italy, Spain, Britain, Ireland, you name it.
[36:07.710 --> 36:08.190]  Columbia.
[36:08.690 --> 36:10.490]  I'm in touch with all of them myself.
[36:11.510 --> 36:13.190]  And I know these guys are too.
[36:13.690 --> 36:20.410]  So if you have an international situation, and I see them posted on these news groups all the time.
[36:20.410 --> 36:22.890]  I see, I need help in this country or that country.
[36:23.030 --> 36:30.130]  I'm looking for a marriage certificate from Germany or bank accounts in Italy, something like that.
[36:30.250 --> 36:36.850]  Because they're looking for somebody who skipped out with funds or somebody who's a polygamist or something like that.
[36:37.110 --> 36:42.550]  So they work more or less with investigators in other countries.
[36:42.710 --> 36:47.250]  So an American investigator wouldn't necessarily go to that country himself.
[36:47.250 --> 36:57.670]  He'll what they call subcontract to a European in that particular country, who obviously would be better for the job anyway, because he'll know the laws, knows the lay of the land.
[36:58.270 --> 36:59.070]  Okay, thank you.
[37:03.290 --> 37:12.550]  So, in the case of a poker game, and you don't have a polygraph machine with you, and you're kind of wondering if a person is bluffing or not.
[37:12.970 --> 37:22.030]  Do you think there's like, are there a couple of like simple questions that you think might be able, and simple responses you can look for, that you think might be able to help you figure something like that out?
[37:22.190 --> 37:23.170]  Yeah, what do you got in your hand?
[37:23.390 --> 37:23.830]  Raise them.
[37:24.690 --> 37:25.070]  Like...
[37:25.510 --> 37:26.430]  Yeah, ask him that.
[37:26.570 --> 37:27.050]  That's easy.
[37:28.190 --> 37:29.670]  Raise them 10 and let them call.
[37:31.390 --> 37:35.090]  Hey Reg, talk to them about the voice analyzers and all that stuff.
[37:35.630 --> 37:36.270]  Voice stress?
[37:36.270 --> 37:36.710]  Yeah.
[37:37.330 --> 37:47.410]  There are some technologies out there now which rely on voice to determine truth from deception.
[37:49.250 --> 38:09.650]  I don't know about the latest round, but in the early 80s, 90s, and as late as 2000, I was involved in studies of these single parameter, which is voice versus polygraph, which is cardio, your heart activity, galvanic skin response, central nervous system,
[38:10.050 --> 38:11.730]  and pneumo, which is your breathing.
[38:12.110 --> 38:15.010]  There's three parameters in a polygraph and only one in voice.
[38:15.270 --> 38:24.050]  So I have to say, in my experience in the testing, we've had much more accurate results with the polygraph because there's three parameters.
[38:24.630 --> 38:27.990]  All three of these verify and they usually coincide.
[38:27.990 --> 38:29.730]  With voice, you only have one.
[38:31.630 --> 38:38.150]  So whether the technologies that are there with these advanced algorithms is the crap I'm being fed.
[38:39.290 --> 38:43.250]  And you guys would know a lot more about advanced algorithms than I would.
[38:44.050 --> 38:49.990]  that through the, because of these advanced algorithms fed through this, da-da-da-da-da-da-da-da, you know, and they come up.
[38:50.150 --> 38:51.450]  Well, I've tested it.
[38:51.810 --> 38:53.330]  I've polygraph tested people.
[38:53.530 --> 38:58.050]  Then use this voice stress evaluator, or it's not called that now.
[38:58.270 --> 39:00.090]  It's something else, but it uses voice.
[39:02.550 --> 39:03.690]  It's not as accurate.
[39:03.850 --> 39:08.790]  It's probably about 10 to 15 points less in accuracy than polygraph.
[39:08.790 --> 39:15.850]  Well, they do have one more thing coming out, too, that I've been noticing because of the counter-terrorism side of my line, my line of work.
[39:16.510 --> 39:28.490]  They are also experimenting now with eyeball recognition, if you want to call it that, that reads the retina and all that other stuff, just like you see in those James Bond movies and all that.
[39:28.590 --> 39:32.050]  Actually, pupantology has been around for a long time.
[39:32.050 --> 39:39.810]  There's a room in Virginia at CIA headquarters.
[39:39.990 --> 39:41.870]  They call it The Room.
[39:43.510 --> 39:47.790]  And in this room, there's a polygraph-type equipment.
[39:48.150 --> 39:55.410]  Not only the three parameters I mentioned, pupantology that Jerry mentioned, they also have an aura machine.
[39:55.410 --> 40:02.570]  So while under questioning, your aura will change as you are questioning and you get stimuli.
[40:03.170 --> 40:21.230]  They use also, in some cases where they test people for these sex crimes and sexual proclivities, they use a thing called the penile plethysmograph.
[40:23.970 --> 40:28.550]  And they show child molesters, they put this apparatus...
[40:28.550 --> 40:30.310]  Somebody puts this apparatus on them.
[40:32.430 --> 40:36.910]  And they show them pictures of young boys or whatever the thing may be.
[40:36.970 --> 40:39.650]  Young boys, young girls, young dogs, I don't know.
[40:41.230 --> 40:47.630]  And they can tell by the amount of arousal where this guy is being a good boy.
[40:49.330 --> 40:51.230]  And then you send them to a penal colony.
[40:52.790 --> 40:55.650]  But kind of back to my, sort of the point of my original question.
[40:55.830 --> 41:00.550]  Like, I don't know if you've had times in your investigative career where you haven't had equipment to rely on.
[41:00.650 --> 41:04.410]  You've maybe had to rely on your own abilities to tell whether somebody was telling the truth or not.
[41:04.410 --> 41:08.650]  Maybe by how they were holding themselves, where they were looking or things like that.
[41:08.650 --> 41:18.610]  So, like, I mean, is there general guidelines for a couple of things that are maybe, like, sort of the easiest, quickest things for especially somebody who's not terribly trained and experienced to look for in a situation like that?
[41:18.630 --> 41:18.750]  Yeah.
[41:19.210 --> 41:19.830]  There is.
[41:20.410 --> 41:21.210]  Stupid statements.
[41:22.370 --> 41:23.390]  I'll give you an example.
[41:23.470 --> 41:25.250]  The biggest recovery I ever had was the...
[41:25.250 --> 41:28.390]  I recovered the formula to make fiber optics work.
[41:29.070 --> 41:32.570]  It's the ink that goes on the outside of the monofilament that contains light.
[41:33.110 --> 41:34.530]  This was back in 1982.
[41:35.450 --> 41:37.670]  It was worth something like $20 billion.
[41:38.690 --> 41:40.570]  And we had about five suspects.
[41:40.950 --> 41:42.630]  So, we bring them in and we interview them.
[41:43.150 --> 41:45.670]  And the first thing you ask them is, Hi, what's your name?
[41:45.850 --> 41:46.150]  Etta-ta.
[41:46.410 --> 41:47.070]  How are you?
[41:47.170 --> 41:48.970]  My name is Reggie and nice to see you.
[41:49.550 --> 41:50.810]  Did you steal this formula?
[41:52.030 --> 41:53.950]  And I asked everyone the same question.
[41:54.130 --> 41:57.630]  And everybody said no, except this one guy says no.
[41:57.990 --> 42:01.450]  He says, you know, as a matter of fact, I've never stolen anything in my whole life.
[42:02.730 --> 42:03.670]  I said, really?
[42:03.870 --> 42:05.970]  He says, yeah, and I've never told a lie either.
[42:07.910 --> 42:09.890]  Well, it was a pretty easy case, huh?
[42:12.010 --> 42:12.850]  Cool, thanks.
[42:14.390 --> 42:17.190]  I just wanted to make a statement about the voice stress analyzers.
[42:17.450 --> 42:19.930]  My roommate made one to detect social engineering.
[42:20.170 --> 42:27.730]  We got above an 80% detection rate for social engineering over the telephone by comparing multiple factors instead of just...
[42:27.730 --> 42:29.710]  Social engineering, does that mean trying to get a date?
[42:39.680 --> 42:41.040]  There'll be a talk about it later.
[42:41.380 --> 42:42.580]  Is that what it's for?
[42:42.840 --> 42:43.520]  No, no, no.
[42:43.720 --> 42:46.560]  It's engineering anyone to release information.
[42:46.560 --> 42:47.380]  They're not allowed to.
[42:48.600 --> 42:50.380]  Oh, you're trying to get information from somebody?
[42:50.600 --> 42:50.840]  Yeah.
[42:51.400 --> 42:53.620]  And how do you verify your accuracy at 80%?
[42:54.320 --> 42:55.620]  We had a controlled test.
[42:55.860 --> 43:02.540]  We had one group of people that were posing as social engineers and another group of about 30 individuals who were posing as a call center.
[43:02.700 --> 43:04.180]  They didn't know what the test was about.
[43:05.540 --> 43:12.220]  And we had random control calls that were normal calls to place orders for things.
[43:12.460 --> 43:12.640]  Right.
[43:12.720 --> 43:23.180]  And then me and another friend and a few other people around here posed as the social engineers and we managed to get credit cards out of this class of students that were posing as the call center.
[43:23.500 --> 43:26.460]  And we analyzed the audio afterwards.
[43:28.800 --> 43:31.460]  Now, Steve just got taken away.
[43:31.940 --> 43:32.420]  Yeah.
[43:32.540 --> 43:34.120]  You're getting credit card numbers like this?
[43:35.300 --> 43:35.900]  No, no.
[43:35.900 --> 43:36.060]  Hello?
[43:36.280 --> 43:37.460]  These were ones that we made up.
[43:37.620 --> 43:38.280]  They weren't real.
[43:38.580 --> 43:39.040]  Okay.
[43:39.840 --> 43:42.620]  I would say your question's probably over now.
[43:43.000 --> 43:43.140]  No.
[43:43.580 --> 43:44.720]  But if you can...
[43:44.720 --> 43:45.560]  Along with his life.
[43:46.000 --> 43:47.540]  Controlled settings for our master's thesis.
[43:47.540 --> 43:50.280]  If you can bottle it and sell it, do it.
[43:50.740 --> 43:51.060]  Oh, yeah.
[43:51.700 --> 43:52.340]  Yeah, exactly.
[43:53.220 --> 43:53.560]  Yeah.
[43:53.760 --> 43:54.580]  Freedom of information.
[43:54.720 --> 43:56.360]  Yeah, I think you should post the plans for everybody here.
[43:56.360 --> 43:58.320]  We can all do the social engineering thing.
[44:00.640 --> 44:03.720]  You know, I've heard this 80% figure banded around before.
[44:04.120 --> 44:05.440]  I'd be serious with you.
[44:07.320 --> 44:08.620]  You know, the police...
[44:08.620 --> 44:11.880]  There's a testing facility in Rome, New York.
[44:12.040 --> 44:17.240]  And the police have been messing around with this for probably eight, nine years now.
[44:17.240 --> 44:21.540]  And, you know, they claim anywhere between, you know, 70 and 85.
[44:22.180 --> 44:23.400]  I just don't see it.
[44:23.860 --> 44:27.240]  And, again, common sense.
[44:27.460 --> 44:29.680]  Three parameters in polygraph, one in voice.
[44:30.020 --> 44:32.580]  We got much more than one in voice.
[44:33.100 --> 44:33.440]  Oh, you do?
[44:33.640 --> 44:33.820]  Yeah.
[44:34.060 --> 44:39.380]  Instead of just taking the baseline stress, like variations in frequency and pitch...
[44:39.380 --> 44:41.500]  Is that what these advanced algorithm things?
[44:42.440 --> 44:43.900]  Well, I can explain a little more.
[44:43.980 --> 44:44.540]  I didn't write it.
[44:44.660 --> 44:45.700]  The person who wrote it isn't here.
[44:45.800 --> 44:46.500]  He'll be back tomorrow.
[44:46.500 --> 44:48.060]  He's the guy selling wallets downstairs.
[44:48.340 --> 44:49.120]  If anyone knows him.
[44:53.720 --> 44:58.200]  Listen, if you can get something to work like that, you'll make a lot of money.
[44:58.300 --> 44:58.800]  Oh, he knows.
[44:59.700 --> 45:03.540]  The problem is that you're going to have to do a lot of studies.
[45:03.680 --> 45:09.260]  By the time you get done with these studies, like I said, in Rome, New York, they've been studying this technology now for about 10 years.
[45:10.100 --> 45:11.740]  Some police departments are using it.
[45:13.660 --> 45:15.420]  The problem is that it's not foolproof.
[45:15.640 --> 45:19.320]  You know, like 80% is good, but that leads to a lot of false negatives, a lot of false positives.
[45:19.320 --> 45:24.200]  Well, I tell you what, you get one false lead out of something like this and you're off on a wild goose chase.
[45:24.360 --> 45:24.500]  Yeah.
[45:25.720 --> 45:31.000]  Again, I believe polygraph and polygraph technology and lie detection technology is a tool.
[45:31.440 --> 45:32.920]  It is not an end-all.
[45:33.160 --> 45:38.280]  It can give you ideas, but the way I use it is to verify statements I already get.
[45:38.860 --> 45:47.360]  The way polygraph examiners do things is they interview the person first, get them to commit to certain statements, and then verify it using the polygraph.
[45:47.940 --> 45:50.660]  This social engineering thing, this is a phone call.
[45:50.820 --> 45:51.140]  Yes.
[45:51.240 --> 45:51.560]  Hi, honey.
[45:51.620 --> 45:52.060]  How you doing?
[45:52.220 --> 45:52.940]  Did you lie to me today?
[45:53.080 --> 45:53.280]  No.
[45:53.480 --> 45:53.780]  Okay.
[45:55.020 --> 46:04.360]  That's an interview type of deal that could mislead you and miscue you into going off into areas you shouldn't be or that's not going to be fruitful.
[46:05.080 --> 46:08.720]  So, if it was used like a polygraph, it may have great value.
[46:08.940 --> 46:09.220]  Oh, no.
[46:09.280 --> 46:10.740]  This wouldn't be used like a polygraph.
[46:10.920 --> 46:17.280]  This would be where it's a passive monitoring of a call center, maybe, and you would monitor for attackers coming in.
[46:17.420 --> 46:18.560]  So, it's like an IDS system.
[46:18.880 --> 46:21.840]  If you have one of these things working, I'd love to test it for you.
[46:23.080 --> 46:24.820]  I'll get you in contact with the person who did.
[46:24.980 --> 46:25.460]  Sounds great.
[46:28.910 --> 46:34.430]  Bringing it back to kind of the whole privacy thing for just a second.
[46:34.570 --> 46:35.930]  The end of privacy, if you will.
[46:37.170 --> 46:43.950]  How does it change you personally to have access to all that information?
[46:43.950 --> 46:49.930]  And how do you think it would change if everybody here had that information just in general?
[46:50.750 --> 46:51.350]  You do.
[46:52.410 --> 46:52.950]  You do.
[46:53.550 --> 46:53.910]  You do.
[46:53.910 --> 46:55.950]  You have the availability to get all the information that we do.
[46:57.010 --> 46:57.990]  You just got to pay for it.
[46:58.530 --> 47:00.150]  And it doesn't come from one source.
[47:00.250 --> 47:02.790]  We can get it out of one source, nicely packaged for us.
[47:02.870 --> 47:06.150]  But, you know, you can go to court records and get half the stuff we can get.
[47:06.270 --> 47:09.050]  You know, it's just not as accessible, readily accessible.
[47:09.050 --> 47:09.610]  So, it's there.
[47:10.650 --> 47:17.110]  So, you think it's just, like he said, the widespread pervasity of people thinking that they can't get it?
[47:18.030 --> 47:20.710]  Well, the problem is there's a lot of bogus information out there.
[47:20.810 --> 47:23.690]  I mean, I had a lady come into my office and gave me 15 sheets on a guy.
[47:23.930 --> 47:28.230]  And it took me about two hours to figure out that only about one page dealt with the subject.
[47:28.410 --> 47:33.990]  So, I mean, there's a lot of information that gets cross-sectioned accidentally.
[47:34.270 --> 47:37.350]  I mean, if you go in to buy a car and the clerk really doesn't care.
[47:37.470 --> 47:42.310]  If she's, you know, doing your credit app and she punches in one number wrong, you're going to end up on somebody else's credit app, you know?
[47:42.510 --> 47:43.950]  And so, it's just that simple.
[47:45.350 --> 47:45.670]  Thanks.
[47:48.170 --> 47:58.450]  Before I ask my question, I don't want to sound like a whiner, but even when I was standing directly behind this gentleman, I couldn't hear what he was saying because there's a lot of people talking in the back of the room.
[47:58.970 --> 47:59.510]  Thank you.
[48:01.110 --> 48:02.690]  Please limit your talking, then.
[48:03.430 --> 48:03.870]  Go ahead.
[48:04.250 --> 48:09.670]  At any rate, I think I have more than one question for each of y'all, so I'm just going to keep going to the back of the line.
[48:09.690 --> 48:10.710]  I can't hear you.
[48:10.750 --> 48:11.270]  Can you speak louder?
[48:13.130 --> 48:13.930]  I can't.
[48:14.070 --> 48:15.710]  There's too many people talking in the back there.
[48:16.370 --> 48:16.730]  Yeah, I know.
[48:16.850 --> 48:17.270]  I was just...
[48:18.170 --> 48:20.090]  Shut the f*ck up back there!
[48:20.410 --> 48:21.270]  There you go.
[48:27.900 --> 48:28.940]  Thank you.
[48:31.620 --> 48:41.600]  In terms of military records, what type of information is in there that makes it worth going through so much trouble to go through all that paperwork?
[48:41.800 --> 48:42.360]  Lots of things.
[48:43.800 --> 48:49.980]  I had a PI contact me from California one time, just a couple of months ago, as a matter of fact.
[48:51.660 --> 48:55.860]  He was the... I believe he was an investigator for the defense.
[48:56.760 --> 48:58.420]  It involved a murder case.
[48:59.160 --> 49:02.400]  This guy, he was a Marine, just out of the Marines.
[49:03.500 --> 49:08.180]  At 75 yards at night, without a light, one shot, he took somebody out in the front seat of a car.
[49:09.640 --> 49:12.600]  Now, they're trying to say...
[49:12.600 --> 49:16.340]  The one side was saying, well, he was a trained killer.
[49:16.580 --> 49:22.100]  The other side was saying, well, it was a lucky shot, so he can get it down to at least manslaughter or something.
[49:23.040 --> 49:26.120]  Well, they wanted to find out, so they came to me.
[49:26.320 --> 49:27.140]  I got his record.
[49:27.240 --> 49:28.540]  He never had any formal...
[49:28.540 --> 49:31.700]  He had normal Marine rifle training.
[49:31.940 --> 49:33.220]  He was not a marksman.
[49:33.960 --> 49:37.420]  So they called it a lucky shot, and they got the charge brought down to manslaughter.
[49:37.500 --> 49:43.360]  I mean, the guy did it, but, you know, because of that information, he didn't get lethal injection.
[49:43.360 --> 49:45.260]  He got a life sentence instead.
[49:46.580 --> 50:05.080]  And I had another one, not quite so bad, but this one woman, this is why I like busting frauds and wannabes, had lived in fear of her husband for four years because he kept telling her he was a Navy SEAL, he was a trained killer, and all this stuff.
[50:05.460 --> 50:10.100]  And she finally got up the nerve to go to a private investigator to have him looked into.
[50:10.100 --> 50:11.620]  He came to me.
[50:12.000 --> 50:13.160]  I checked into him.
[50:13.300 --> 50:15.960]  The guy never served one day in uniform in any branch of the service.
[50:18.940 --> 50:23.500]  So this guy, this woman, had been living in fear for years of a guy who was a phony.
[50:24.740 --> 50:26.500]  So she got the divorce and moved away.
[50:34.780 --> 50:37.100]  Let me, I guess, deepen the question.
[50:37.100 --> 50:44.200]  What other sorts of information besides maybe the things that we would know about things hidden or...
[50:44.200 --> 50:47.060]  What's in the military records that we have no idea about?
[50:47.160 --> 50:48.880]  There's two things about military records.
[50:49.040 --> 50:53.420]  One, if you have the subject's signature, you can get a lot of information, including personal stuff.
[50:53.840 --> 51:00.700]  If you don't have a signature, you can still get information, but it's going to be what they call redacted.
[51:00.700 --> 51:04.460]  In other words, you're only going to get military information.
[51:04.460 --> 51:05.900]  You won't get any personal stuff.
[51:07.040 --> 51:13.260]  So when I submit a request, I usually do it by letter instead of using the standard form that they have.
[51:14.580 --> 51:17.680]  I make sure they know it's a Freedom of Information Act request.
[51:17.680 --> 51:21.360]  That way it's handled differently.
[51:22.980 --> 51:41.060]  And what I do is I ask them for all and any and all releasable information, including medals, awards, citations, ribbons, military training, education, history of assignments.
[51:42.000 --> 51:44.740]  Obviously, the history of assignments is going to vary.
[51:44.740 --> 51:49.540]  In the Navy personnel records, it's called a page three, history of assignments.
[51:49.820 --> 51:53.440]  Other branches call it something else, but they all say the same thing.
[51:53.980 --> 51:57.700]  And the longer your military career, the more pages you actually have.
[51:57.840 --> 52:05.280]  So a page three can actually be, like in my case, four pages, because I did 20 years and I was all over the place, never spent more than two years in any one place.
[52:06.380 --> 52:12.920]  So it will list the day you entered the service to the very day you got out of the service and everything in between.
[52:12.920 --> 52:20.840]  The day that you were left one duty station, how many days in between that one and the next one, which would be leave time.
[52:21.240 --> 52:24.280]  Usually you're granted a certain period of leave in between transfers.
[52:25.640 --> 52:33.800]  There will also be listed your primary duties at those assignments, what you did, supervisory position in such and such.
[52:34.200 --> 52:38.520]  Any MOSs, which is military occupational specialty, you'll find those.
[52:38.680 --> 52:41.480]  That's what they call them in everything but the Navy and the Coast Guard.
[52:41.860 --> 52:45.320]  We call them NECs, Navy Enlisted Classifications.
[52:45.820 --> 52:49.560]  But they've come out to the same thing, except that the numbers and everything are all different.
[52:50.620 --> 52:51.720]  And they'll be listed.
[52:52.680 --> 52:54.440]  So you can find out all that stuff.
[52:54.580 --> 52:59.480]  You can also find out, prior to 1979, the character of their discharge.
[53:00.240 --> 53:02.720]  After 79, of course, it requires the signature.
[53:03.000 --> 53:04.860]  And you can find out all sorts of stuff.
[53:05.140 --> 53:12.420]  What it does, it also shows where that person enlisted in the military and where they got out.
[53:12.420 --> 53:15.340]  And this can be a good starting point for investigators.
[53:16.000 --> 53:20.180]  Because a lot of people, when they get out of the service, they don't move very far from where they got out.
[53:21.600 --> 53:22.400]  Especially retirees.
[53:23.560 --> 53:27.500]  Because what happens is they have what they call twilight tours.
[53:27.800 --> 53:33.200]  If you're doing 20 years, your last tour of duty, they try and give you what you want.
[53:33.380 --> 53:34.840]  The duty station you want.
[53:35.120 --> 53:38.240]  Which means that that person is probably going to stay in the area once they retire.
[53:39.720 --> 53:40.800]  That's what they did to me.
[53:42.520 --> 53:43.340]  That's amazing.
[53:43.620 --> 53:43.960]  Thank you.
[53:44.560 --> 53:44.960]  You're welcome.
[53:45.400 --> 53:45.700]  Medical?
[53:46.320 --> 53:49.980]  You can get them, but again, only with a signature.
[53:49.980 --> 53:53.140]  Otherwise, you're not going to get even an acknowledgement that they exist.
[53:53.420 --> 53:56.020]  They're even tighter on that than doctors in civilian life.
[53:57.260 --> 53:57.660]  Hello?
[53:58.120 --> 53:59.300]  Even I had to get...
[54:00.560 --> 54:04.500]  My kids' records were all held by the Embassy in London at the Navy Clinic there.
[54:05.780 --> 54:14.100]  And I had to get special authorization for our doctor on Long Island, and he had to send off to the Navy to have them shipped over.
[54:14.320 --> 54:19.460]  They wouldn't even send them to me, the kid's father, for further transfer.
[54:19.460 --> 54:21.040]  I had to go direct doctor to doctor.
[54:22.720 --> 54:24.460]  I have two quick questions.
[54:24.860 --> 54:34.040]  The first question is, are they doing anything with the analysis of brain waves for the polygraph machine to bring it closer to the stem?
[54:34.040 --> 54:45.920]  If you're monitoring heart and eyes and pulse and things like that, could there be a way to bring it a little bit closer to home so there's no possibility of error?
[54:46.280 --> 54:47.980]  That's the best way I can phrase it.
[54:48.400 --> 54:53.320]  Well, galvanic skin response is a measure of central nervous system activity.
[54:53.320 --> 54:56.420]  So, in fact, that is already one of the parameters.
[54:56.420 --> 55:05.860]  What you're talking about, brain wave activity, is one of those parameters that they have in that room in Quantico.
[55:08.020 --> 55:10.940]  And it's the place where, really, nobody wants to visit.
[55:13.580 --> 55:20.300]  Because, you know, if anybody's ever taken a polygraph, I've taken a few polygraphs, and I don't recommend it.
[55:22.160 --> 55:31.960]  And the reason I got involved in polygraphs, when I was in the police academy back in 1971, there was a guy from the New Jersey State Police who came in there and just raped a few people.
[55:33.000 --> 55:35.380]  Just by asking questions while hooked up to a machine.
[55:36.580 --> 55:38.320]  And I was always impressed with that.
[55:40.700 --> 55:45.140]  And the guy said, don't ever take a polygraph.
[55:46.120 --> 55:56.160]  Unless you're absolutely, positively sure that you are telling the truth, and then have somebody test you before you let the police test you, to make sure.
[55:57.500 --> 55:59.000]  It's a very scary thing.
[55:59.100 --> 56:03.340]  And when somebody comes in and says, you know, I'm nervous, is that going to affect the test?
[56:03.820 --> 56:06.900]  Well, if you weren't nervous, you'd be dead or drugged.
[56:08.840 --> 56:11.580]  It's not a, you know, a neat situation.
[56:11.580 --> 56:13.020]  Yeah, hook me up, you know.
[56:13.140 --> 56:15.840]  It's just not something I want in my life.
[56:15.960 --> 56:17.980]  It's like somebody can look inside your brain.
[56:18.820 --> 56:21.520]  And if a polygraph examiner is good, he can.
[56:22.620 --> 56:27.980]  So it's not something, you know, if you're asked to take a polygraph and you can avoid it, avoid it.
[56:29.680 --> 56:31.260]  You know, I'll never take one again.
[56:31.980 --> 56:33.260]  It's coming from an expert.
[56:34.800 --> 56:35.200]  Absolutely.
[56:36.180 --> 56:37.360]  It's coming from an expert.
[56:37.520 --> 56:46.480]  Unless, you know, I was accused of something that I knew I didn't do, and I knew I had an examiner that was going to test me, and he said, no problem, go ahead and take it.
[56:46.700 --> 56:47.660]  I wouldn't do it.
[56:49.640 --> 56:51.480]  It's a tense situation in your life.
[56:51.600 --> 56:54.200]  It's not a fun day at the beach, you know.
[56:54.740 --> 56:55.980]  Hopefully I'll never find out.
[56:57.120 --> 57:01.060]  The second part would be more about the hardware of the actual polygraph machine.
[57:01.920 --> 57:08.760]  It's obviously come a long way in the last, say, 50 years, when they started having these machines as far as technological advances.
[57:09.160 --> 57:13.100]  Are they trying to move it into the computer era so we'll have a...
[57:13.100 --> 57:16.540]  It's been in the computer era for about the last 12 years.
[57:16.980 --> 57:21.280]  What I'm thinking of is more of like a polygraph machine with a firmware written by...
[57:21.280 --> 57:26.160]  you have a polygraph machine that's based on an interpreter who is one person.
[57:26.400 --> 57:30.240]  You could have a firmware on it that would have, say, the...
[57:30.240 --> 57:30.620]  That's right.
[57:30.680 --> 57:31.280]  We already have that.
[57:31.720 --> 57:32.080]  You do?
[57:32.360 --> 57:32.700]  Oh, yeah.
[57:33.360 --> 57:33.560]  Okay.
[57:33.860 --> 57:43.060]  Computerized polygraphs now, there is a built-in program where three different polygraph examiners have fed in their criteria for what's called numerical scoring.
[57:44.040 --> 57:49.900]  Numerical scoring is taught at the Baxter School of Polygraph and was developed because of these...
[57:49.900 --> 57:53.360]  There's three results in a polygraph test that are possible.
[57:54.700 --> 57:56.980]  Truthful, deceptive, and inconclusive.
[57:57.580 --> 58:03.900]  That inconclusive, they've been trying to make that a smaller part of the equation.
[58:03.900 --> 58:07.500]  And the way to do that is by numerical scoring.
[58:07.760 --> 58:13.280]  That's where we grade the cardio, the pneumo, and the GSR.
[58:13.900 --> 58:17.960]  And the control question versus the relevant question.
[58:18.400 --> 58:22.440]  And by using comparative numbers, it's easier to score.
[58:22.720 --> 58:34.980]  So what happens in this computerized polygraph that they have now is three different people have fed in their subjective scoring method, okay?
[58:35.280 --> 58:39.800]  That is, fed in to the computer as you're taking the test.
[58:40.900 --> 58:42.660]  The three different ones.
[58:42.820 --> 58:44.480]  So there's an average there.
[58:44.760 --> 58:52.280]  So the computer will actually score that person based on the subjective reliance of three different polygraph examiners.
[58:52.280 --> 58:55.800]  And it'll come up with an answer for the examiner.
[58:55.960 --> 58:59.240]  Then the examiner also rates that chart.
[58:59.940 --> 59:03.380]  So now there's four people writing the chart instead of one.
[59:04.100 --> 59:08.400]  So it is much more scientific and computerized than ever before.
[59:08.640 --> 59:09.120]  I have no idea.
[59:09.440 --> 59:18.440]  Would you say as far as how they've come to current date that it's pretty much until the next technological revolution that it's pretty much as far as it's going to go?
[59:18.700 --> 59:19.460]  Or is it...
[59:20.460 --> 59:29.200]  There are philosophical differences within the polygraph industry.
[59:29.360 --> 59:31.740]  There's a thing called the American Polygraph Association.
[59:32.280 --> 59:41.300]  And they're like the body that would certify you as an examiner.
[59:41.460 --> 59:44.300]  And they're the accreditation arm of the industry.
[59:44.340 --> 59:47.220]  And, you know, they do all the training and so forth.
[59:47.220 --> 59:49.160]  But they want to keep it to these three parameters.
[59:49.880 --> 59:54.120]  Now, oftentimes they use four pens or two pneumos.
[59:54.180 --> 59:58.120]  So you have a breathing tube around your chest and one around your abdomen.
[59:59.440 --> 01:00:17.540]  But I think as time goes on and the polygraph industry shrinks, because the private sector is going to be going totally to the sexually oriented testing and or specific loss, I think they're going to have to entertain other parameters, such as voice, sense,
[01:00:17.820 --> 01:00:21.440]  you know, pupantology, aura, whatever.
[01:00:22.020 --> 01:00:31.520]  Especially now in the age of computers, the technology is either there or on the brink of being there to add those parameters and make it more scientific.
[01:00:32.220 --> 01:00:35.160]  The problem has always been since Fry versus U.S.
[01:00:35.200 --> 01:00:40.740]  in 1923, a court ruled then that polygraph was an art and not a science.
[01:00:40.940 --> 01:00:44.580]  And until it became more scientific, it was not going to be admitted.
[01:00:45.340 --> 01:00:47.900]  And that's why I get all these admission questions.
[01:00:47.900 --> 01:00:52.080]  But since then, it's always been admitted under stipulation.
[01:00:52.320 --> 01:01:04.720]  It is becoming more and more scientific or else the courts in the western states of the United States wouldn't require that these sex offenders take these polygraphs to stay out of jail.
[01:01:05.380 --> 01:01:19.220]  So, you know, it has more credibility within the legal community and certainly within the law enforcement community than it does within the public because of the way it was beat down by politicians and labor in the 80s.
[01:01:20.120 --> 01:01:27.960]  It is much better than it was in the 80s in that we have in the early 90s, they come up with computerized polygraph, which has also been improving.
[01:01:27.960 --> 01:01:32.520]  It used to be running on a DOS format and now it's Windows.
[01:01:32.940 --> 01:01:39.140]  And when they first came out with the Windows program, it would crash all the time and, you know, now it's better.
[01:01:39.360 --> 01:01:42.980]  And, of course, you know, Apple will probably come out with their version, you know.
[01:01:43.400 --> 01:01:44.640]  I mean, it's getting better.
[01:01:45.320 --> 01:01:50.980]  But in fact, again, you know, people get hung up on polygraph like an end-all.
[01:01:51.120 --> 01:01:52.340]  It's not an end-all, it's a tool.
[01:01:52.900 --> 01:01:57.500]  It is a tool that investigators use, not people doing social engineering.
[01:01:57.500 --> 01:01:58.260]  You know what I mean?
[01:01:59.040 --> 01:01:59.980]  Because they go to jail.
[01:02:00.880 --> 01:02:06.300]  And we verify bad guys are bad guys and good guys are good guys and all that good stuff.
[01:02:06.520 --> 01:02:07.240]  It's a tool.
[01:02:07.540 --> 01:02:10.140]  It's used by law enforcement, used by the government.
[01:02:11.760 --> 01:02:20.220]  You know, people have been coming up with years that, you know, with this voice thing that they can use when they're doing a business deal or they're playing poker.
[01:02:20.500 --> 01:02:22.060]  You know, it ain't happening.
[01:02:22.560 --> 01:02:24.240]  Because there are some good liars out there.
[01:02:26.180 --> 01:02:28.540]  And you need... I believe you need more than one parameter.
[01:02:28.740 --> 01:02:34.920]  Even if you think there's more than one parameter in your voice, I'm not buying into that.
[01:02:35.800 --> 01:02:37.000]  One parameter is voice.
[01:02:37.160 --> 01:02:38.340]  One parameter is aura.
[01:02:38.460 --> 01:02:39.480]  One parameter is pupils.
[01:02:39.680 --> 01:02:40.720]  One parameter is your penis.
[01:02:40.960 --> 01:02:43.080]  One parameter is, you know, your breathing.
[01:02:43.500 --> 01:02:44.680]  That's a parameter to me.
[01:02:44.780 --> 01:02:45.880]  Voice is one parameter.
[01:02:46.020 --> 01:02:48.000]  Even though you think there's a lot of things in it.
[01:02:48.000 --> 01:02:49.000]  And there may be.
[01:02:49.280 --> 01:02:54.320]  In the cardio, there's probably 11 different areas we look at in cardio alone.
[01:02:54.800 --> 01:02:58.700]  So voice may have 5, 10, 20, whatever.
[01:02:59.080 --> 01:03:00.560]  To me, it's one parameter.
[01:03:02.540 --> 01:03:07.700]  Polygraphs come a long way, and it's going to go a long way as technology improves.
[01:03:08.460 --> 01:03:09.360]  Thank you for your time.
[01:03:13.000 --> 01:03:13.860]  Good evening, Reggie.
[01:03:13.900 --> 01:03:14.640]  Questions for Reggie.
[01:03:15.100 --> 01:03:20.280]  I guess a good icebreaker when you walk into a poly is to say, wow, it looks nothing like my polygraph tester at home.
[01:03:20.520 --> 01:03:23.140]  So to kind of make sure the guy knows what's going on, right?
[01:03:23.760 --> 01:03:41.060]  A question I have for you, though, is going back a couple of years when doing polys and different types of things, there was something called pin-induced validation that was in the intelligence community that they talked about being able to circumvent or to be able to give false positives to polygraphs by using pin-induced reactions.
[01:03:41.480 --> 01:03:49.360]  So therefore, during a polygraph, the person would have a tack in their shoe, or they would have a pin on their hand or underneath their arm.
[01:03:50.080 --> 01:03:53.580]  Is that a valid statement, in your opinion, since this is what you do for a living?
[01:03:53.680 --> 01:03:55.120]  Does that actually affect test results?
[01:03:55.260 --> 01:03:55.900]  What's the statement?
[01:03:56.000 --> 01:03:57.220]  The pin-induced pain?
[01:03:57.640 --> 01:03:58.940]  The pin-induced reactions.
[01:03:59.140 --> 01:04:00.680]  Do you believe that to actually affect the results?
[01:04:01.100 --> 01:04:02.740]  In polygraph school, you play with that.
[01:04:02.860 --> 01:04:05.880]  You put the tack under your toe and the shoe at the right time.
[01:04:05.880 --> 01:04:12.520]  You push down your toe, which causes pain, which causes a reaction.
[01:04:12.740 --> 01:04:12.880]  Correct.
[01:04:14.180 --> 01:04:15.820]  What that calls for...
[01:04:15.820 --> 01:04:20.540]  So about every question, you're doing the same input, you'd have a similar variation of the result.
[01:04:20.760 --> 01:04:25.340]  Well, the way polygraphy is judged, there's a control question and a relevant question.
[01:04:25.460 --> 01:04:25.700]  Correct.
[01:04:26.860 --> 01:04:28.020]  In most methods.
[01:04:28.260 --> 01:04:31.900]  In some methods, the control question is also the relevant question.
[01:04:33.520 --> 01:04:41.660]  So, if an examiner is keen and sharp and does what he should do, he should be noticing that this guy's foot's moving around.
[01:04:41.820 --> 01:04:42.320]  You know what I mean?
[01:04:43.100 --> 01:04:45.080]  Well, again, assuming that that's...
[01:04:45.080 --> 01:04:52.660]  Well, I mean, I want to see you sit up here, sit anywhere, and put this tack anywhere on your body and induce pain to yourself and not twitch.
[01:04:53.660 --> 01:04:54.700]  I want to see you do that.
[01:04:55.260 --> 01:04:56.460]  I want to see anybody do that.
[01:04:56.500 --> 01:04:56.780]  I'd be happy to...
[01:04:56.780 --> 01:04:57.920]  So I've watched my subjects.
[01:04:58.180 --> 01:04:58.440]  So, yeah.
[01:04:58.780 --> 01:05:00.340]  Well, I mean, people have been doing this tack thing.
[01:05:00.420 --> 01:05:01.060]  This isn't new.
[01:05:01.200 --> 01:05:01.580]  Sure, sure.
[01:05:01.900 --> 01:05:04.480]  This has been going on for 40 or 50 years.
[01:05:04.880 --> 01:05:07.720]  And, you know, if the examiner doesn't watch...
[01:05:07.720 --> 01:05:09.600]  The examiner gets beat, not the polygraph.
[01:05:09.720 --> 01:05:13.720]  All the polygraph does is record your physiological responses.
[01:05:14.020 --> 01:05:16.880]  One of those responses would be to pain.
[01:05:17.220 --> 01:05:17.460]  Sure.
[01:05:17.480 --> 01:05:18.420]  Self-induced pain.
[01:05:18.860 --> 01:05:21.880]  But you have to know the methods of polygraph.
[01:05:22.000 --> 01:05:28.440]  There are seven different methods that are approved by the APA and recognized.
[01:05:29.620 --> 01:05:35.520]  You would have to know every one of those methods and when the reaction has to be bigger than the other reaction.
[01:05:35.520 --> 01:05:40.000]  So, somewhere along the line, if you do two, three, or four charts...
[01:05:40.000 --> 01:05:41.760]  Because if a polygraph examiner gets...
[01:05:41.760 --> 01:05:43.760]  You know, I think you might be twitching.
[01:05:44.280 --> 01:05:45.560]  Maybe run a few more charts.
[01:05:45.640 --> 01:05:47.020]  After a while, you get confused.
[01:05:47.540 --> 01:05:50.120]  Especially because you're inducing all this pain in your system.
[01:05:51.500 --> 01:05:54.640]  So, again, polygraph is only good as the examiner.
[01:05:55.280 --> 01:06:01.260]  A polygraph is no more than a cassette recorder set up for your body instead of for sound.
[01:06:01.600 --> 01:06:02.120]  That's all it is.
[01:06:02.140 --> 01:06:06.780]  A follow-up question to kind of the same premise of trying to avoid or exploit a poly.
[01:06:07.300 --> 01:06:12.080]  What's your opinion on chemical-induced issues such as...
[01:06:12.080 --> 01:06:16.040]  Special K has been stated as being an inducement before taking a poly.
[01:06:16.540 --> 01:06:19.380]  People have been known to do ecstasy before taking a poly.
[01:06:19.600 --> 01:06:21.500]  To go ahead and have exactly what you're saying.
[01:06:21.620 --> 01:06:25.860]  Because within 72 hours of an employment request for a poly, you know it's coming, right?
[01:06:26.020 --> 01:06:30.920]  So, the idea is that it's been published and it's interesting reading about preparing for a polygraph exam.
[01:06:31.300 --> 01:06:33.660]  To beat it when you're actually in the wrong.
[01:06:33.900 --> 01:06:36.700]  I just think it's an interesting white paper, if you will, that's been written.
[01:06:36.920 --> 01:06:43.780]  And your input on people taking polys while under the influence obviously need to be able to detect it first.
[01:06:43.780 --> 01:06:47.740]  But again, if it's a neurological-induced issue...
[01:06:47.740 --> 01:07:01.260]  Well, the first question, or the last question I should say, on every polygraph chart, in every school that I've ever heard of, have you taken any drugs to pass this test?
[01:07:01.360 --> 01:07:01.620]  Wait a minute.
[01:07:03.320 --> 01:07:04.260]  Get the wording.
[01:07:10.280 --> 01:07:12.240]  It's 44J is what we call it.
[01:07:12.580 --> 01:07:13.460]  It's a drug question.
[01:07:13.680 --> 01:07:16.520]  Have you taken any drugs to pass this test?
[01:07:17.000 --> 01:07:19.220]  Which number is, have you had sex with sheeps?
[01:07:22.180 --> 01:07:24.720]  But it's the last question on every chart.
[01:07:25.720 --> 01:07:29.960]  And I've given these, you know, really over 10,000 tests.
[01:07:29.960 --> 01:07:36.360]  And what happens is, if you get a guy who's taking drugs, or a woman who's taking drugs, you'll have what we call flat charts.
[01:07:36.500 --> 01:07:38.540]  In other words, there'll be no reaction different than the other.
[01:07:39.800 --> 01:07:42.660]  The only place you get a reaction is when you ask the drug question.
[01:07:45.700 --> 01:07:47.660]  So, let's see, that's pretty simple.
[01:07:47.820 --> 01:07:48.540]  He's guilty.
[01:07:49.660 --> 01:07:50.380]  He's lying.
[01:07:50.860 --> 01:07:59.240]  If you don't cooperate, the first thing, when we sit a person down, we have a nice little talk with him, we get real friendly, and how are you, Ken, what's going on, how's your day, and da-da-da.
[01:07:59.860 --> 01:08:01.520]  Now listen, this is serious here.
[01:08:02.000 --> 01:08:04.600]  Sit down and do exactly as I tell you to do.
[01:08:05.000 --> 01:08:09.480]  If you don't follow my instructions, I am going to take it that you are deceptive.
[01:08:10.360 --> 01:08:10.960]  How's that?
[01:08:11.680 --> 01:08:13.960]  This is as serious as a freaking heart attack.
[01:08:15.140 --> 01:08:15.920]  Don't move.
[01:08:16.100 --> 01:08:18.800]  So, if somebody's moving on me...
[01:08:19.260 --> 01:08:19.660]  Sure.
[01:08:19.860 --> 01:08:29.340]  Again, I just think it's interesting to go at it from a different direction when you have troops that are abducted, right, and then troops that are under polys to give information about troop movements from the other side.
[01:08:29.440 --> 01:08:33.400]  For instance, like Israeli soldiers that are under captivity or people that are being abducted in Iraq.
[01:08:33.620 --> 01:08:39.540]  I'm interested to know what the intelligence community is telling these individuals as it pertains to giving polys so that their troop movements can not be pointed out.
[01:08:39.660 --> 01:08:45.120]  So, I was just wondering, comments for avoiding such polygraphs does have relevance as it pertains to the issue.
[01:08:45.180 --> 01:08:52.240]  Well, first of all, if somebody's going to give you a forced polygraph, you can cause all kinds of reactions through the whole polygraph so the polygraph doesn't work.
[01:08:52.980 --> 01:08:55.700]  So, then the bad guys are going to say, he's lying.
[01:08:57.400 --> 01:08:58.800]  So, they torture him a little bit more.
[01:08:59.480 --> 01:09:02.880]  I mean, it doesn't work under a torture situation.
[01:09:03.000 --> 01:09:03.160]  Sure.
[01:09:03.280 --> 01:09:03.640]  It just doesn't.
[01:09:03.720 --> 01:09:03.960]  Thank you.
[01:09:06.780 --> 01:09:09.000]  This is a continuation of the last line of questioning.
[01:09:09.620 --> 01:09:10.740]  How would you beat it?
[01:09:11.720 --> 01:09:12.720]  How would I beat it?
[01:09:12.920 --> 01:09:13.320]  What?
[01:09:13.360 --> 01:09:14.000]  Not take it.
[01:09:15.160 --> 01:09:16.060]  I already told you.
[01:09:16.560 --> 01:09:17.920]  Well, you aren't listening.
[01:09:18.660 --> 01:09:19.960]  Don't take a polygraph.
[01:09:20.340 --> 01:09:22.680]  Unless you're absolutely positive, you are telling the truth.
[01:09:23.020 --> 01:09:27.260]  And then you come to a guy like me and say, let's make sure I'm telling the truth.
[01:09:28.300 --> 01:09:29.100]  Don't take it.
[01:09:30.040 --> 01:09:32.040]  There's no reason to subject yourself to that.
[01:09:32.340 --> 01:09:33.940]  Find a different job category.
[01:09:35.980 --> 01:09:39.380]  So, you don't think there's any way to beat a voluntary polygraph?
[01:09:39.660 --> 01:09:41.280]  Yeah, there's ways of beating everything.
[01:09:41.420 --> 01:09:42.700]  Once you're in the chair, basically.
[01:09:43.340 --> 01:09:45.240]  There's ways of beating a polygraph, yes.
[01:09:45.240 --> 01:09:47.820]  And you're not willing to discuss those here, or...?
[01:09:47.820 --> 01:09:49.540]  I get a lot of money for that.
[01:09:57.740 --> 01:09:58.220]  Hi.
[01:09:59.260 --> 01:10:08.560]  I'm from Canada, and in Canada there was someone who bought a background check on themselves from a company on the Internet called abaca.com.
[01:10:09.820 --> 01:10:13.720]  And so, it also came with a psychological profile.
[01:10:13.960 --> 01:10:15.600]  And they didn't like what they saw.
[01:10:15.820 --> 01:10:17.040]  Extra bonus, was it?
[01:10:17.780 --> 01:10:18.300]  Yeah.
[01:10:18.520 --> 01:10:20.880]  It was 200 bucks or something, I think.
[01:10:21.000 --> 01:10:22.060]  And this U.S.
[01:10:22.180 --> 01:10:25.720]  company will give you your profile for this person in Canada.
[01:10:25.940 --> 01:10:30.780]  So, the person gave the results to the Canadian government, the privacy commissioner there.
[01:10:30.780 --> 01:10:34.600]  And the privacy commissioner couldn't compel the company in the U.S.
[01:10:34.760 --> 01:10:38.040]  to tell them their sources, how they got this information.
[01:10:39.200 --> 01:10:43.220]  So, I ordered one of those for myself, just to see, you know, what my profile was.
[01:10:44.220 --> 01:10:46.340]  And I haven't received the results back yet.
[01:10:46.500 --> 01:10:48.360]  But where do you...
[01:10:48.360 --> 01:10:53.000]  So, I'm assuming they hire an investigator in Canada to dig up information.
[01:10:53.620 --> 01:10:56.040]  But how does that information get dug up exactly?
[01:10:56.040 --> 01:11:03.240]  And what would the difference be between, you know, what you can get for $200 and what a better investigator could do?
[01:11:03.740 --> 01:11:07.880]  Without seeing what they gave to you or give to you, there would be no way of determining that.
[01:11:07.980 --> 01:11:09.740]  We'd have to see what information is included.
[01:11:11.100 --> 01:11:17.860]  Sometimes, by the format, we can tell, because all the database information we do checks on, we can tell where it came from.
[01:11:18.380 --> 01:11:20.600]  But without having it, we wouldn't be able to tell.
[01:11:20.700 --> 01:11:24.740]  As far as your psychological evaluation, these are tests...
[01:11:25.420 --> 01:11:28.380]  Was this question thing where you mark with the pencil and all that?
[01:11:28.620 --> 01:11:29.160]  Was that it?
[01:11:29.240 --> 01:11:29.580]  No, no.
[01:11:29.680 --> 01:11:31.460]  You can buy someone else's profile.
[01:11:32.520 --> 01:11:32.840]  So...
[01:11:32.840 --> 01:11:34.720]  You can buy somebody else's profile.
[01:11:34.980 --> 01:11:35.300]  Yeah.
[01:11:35.560 --> 01:11:37.100]  That's what they claim, right?
[01:11:37.100 --> 01:11:37.580]  So...
[01:11:38.100 --> 01:11:44.260]  Apparently, this person got it and sent it to the government and said, you know, this isn't accurate on me or whatever, you know.
[01:11:44.340 --> 01:11:46.560]  Based on demographics, what do you think about this?
[01:11:47.920 --> 01:11:53.660]  Well, I mean, there are companies out there that work on demographics for a lot of different things.
[01:11:53.660 --> 01:11:56.900]  Like, why are we putting McDonald's on this corner rather than this corner?
[01:11:57.600 --> 01:11:59.640]  How come the crime rate is so high here?
[01:11:59.640 --> 01:12:05.660]  I mean, they do it by a company that measures crime rate and across districts.
[01:12:05.860 --> 01:12:08.540]  What does these do with the credit score and if they have any military background?
[01:12:09.800 --> 01:12:13.440]  We'd have to know the criteria that they use to come up with it.
[01:12:14.000 --> 01:12:15.000]  And, you know...
[01:12:15.000 --> 01:12:19.300]  Is that bull, basically, then, to say they come up with a profile like that, you think?
[01:12:19.420 --> 01:12:19.980]  It's kind of...
[01:12:19.980 --> 01:12:23.220]  What they probably do, Reggie, is the credit thing.
[01:12:23.220 --> 01:12:27.400]  You know, we have attorneys and everybody else call us up and say, we need a credit report on this individual.
[01:12:27.580 --> 01:12:29.040]  And they don't have a signed authorization.
[01:12:29.100 --> 01:12:40.100]  So we can do a credit profile, which basically means you search, you know, the district records, federal records, everything else, find out how many lawsuits they have, you know, who's suing them, you know, bankruptcies, all those kind of things.
[01:12:40.200 --> 01:12:43.640]  And if a guy's got a bankruptcy, he's not very good with money.
[01:12:43.680 --> 01:12:44.940]  So that's a profile, you know.
[01:12:45.040 --> 01:12:46.240]  So it's probably the same kind of deal.
[01:12:46.580 --> 01:12:47.480]  Okay, thanks.
[01:12:50.500 --> 01:12:50.820]  Hi.
[01:12:51.500 --> 01:12:54.140]  My question is about military records.
[01:12:54.560 --> 01:13:07.120]  And basically, the question involves, more or less, if someone has some sort of, I don't know, for lack of a better term, like a secret mission, something that would be considered classified.
[01:13:08.220 --> 01:13:10.880]  Have you ever, like, stumbled upon something like that?
[01:13:11.020 --> 01:13:16.620]  Or if there's, maybe you could see that if there's some sort of gap in their history?
[01:13:16.880 --> 01:13:19.380]  I can see where you're heading with this, because I get this all the time.
[01:13:19.380 --> 01:13:22.380]  There's no such thing as a sealed military record.
[01:13:22.600 --> 01:13:23.480]  They don't exist.
[01:13:24.140 --> 01:13:25.780]  There are no secret units.
[01:13:25.940 --> 01:13:27.180]  There are no secret personnel.
[01:13:28.360 --> 01:13:30.640]  All of it is public record, every bit of it.
[01:13:30.840 --> 01:13:34.440]  The only thing you'll find is a classified mission.
[01:13:35.500 --> 01:13:40.160]  Individual missions are classified, and there's very, very few of those around.
[01:13:41.080 --> 01:13:45.760]  I only know one guy who was on a mission in Vietnam, and that mission is still classified.
[01:13:46.000 --> 01:13:48.680]  But if you look in his record, he was a seal.
[01:13:48.980 --> 01:13:55.980]  And if you look in his record, he's still listed during that timeframe as being with that particular seal team.
[01:13:56.700 --> 01:13:59.240]  That's where he was assigned, that's the unit he was assigned.
[01:13:59.440 --> 01:14:04.640]  But in that timeframe was a covert mission, which remains classified to this day.
[01:14:06.220 --> 01:14:07.280]  That's what you'll find.
[01:14:07.600 --> 01:14:18.940]  Anybody tells you that they are a superhero, and their record is sealed because they saw it on some TV show or some Hollywood presentation of it, it's BS.
[01:14:19.600 --> 01:14:20.240]  Big time.
[01:14:21.140 --> 01:14:22.220]  There's no such thing.
[01:14:22.340 --> 01:14:23.120]  They just don't exist.
[01:14:23.320 --> 01:14:24.200]  There are no sealed records.
[01:14:24.800 --> 01:14:27.180]  We have ten minutes left, so let's try to get through the line.
[01:14:27.300 --> 01:14:30.040]  Please, no one else come up to the line.
[01:14:30.500 --> 01:14:30.760]  All right.
[01:14:31.480 --> 01:14:36.980]  Being private investigators, I imagine sometimes you guys run up against aliases, and you've got to track down people's different names.
[01:14:37.540 --> 01:14:40.680]  I was just kind of curious, what are the issues regarding setting up aliases?
[01:14:41.640 --> 01:14:45.820]  Is there a way to legally set one up, or do you just randomly decide to call yourself Joe Blow?
[01:14:45.940 --> 01:14:46.520]  When is it fraud?
[01:14:46.580 --> 01:14:47.380]  When is it not fraud?
[01:14:48.600 --> 01:14:51.320]  Because, personally, I like to screw around with companies that send me bullshit.
[01:14:52.200 --> 01:14:56.980]  And I'd like to know if I can set up a bank account in another name without it being fraud.
[01:14:57.140 --> 01:14:58.440]  Like, I'm not trying to defraud anyone.
[01:14:58.440 --> 01:15:01.160]  I'm not trying to cheat anyone out of any money, but...
[01:15:01.160 --> 01:15:04.140]  You can call yourself anything as long as you don't present that ID.
[01:15:04.340 --> 01:15:06.480]  I mean, you can make up, you know, you're president of Microsoft.
[01:15:06.840 --> 01:15:13.140]  As long as you don't present a false ID to a law enforcement, you haven't broken the law, basically, in a nutshell.
[01:15:14.380 --> 01:15:16.680]  So, I mean, there's websites out there.
[01:15:16.800 --> 01:15:18.640]  You can go and get dual citizenship.
[01:15:18.960 --> 01:15:20.480]  You can get international driver's license.
[01:15:20.640 --> 01:15:23.080]  You can get just about whatever you want to and whatever name you want.
[01:15:23.280 --> 01:15:24.380]  And it looks legitimate.
[01:15:24.380 --> 01:15:31.480]  So, as far as an AKA goes, you can get a DBA, an assumed name, whatever.
[01:15:32.600 --> 01:15:35.060]  You know, Joe's lawn service or whatever.
[01:15:35.340 --> 01:15:39.780]  Then you can just make another DBA that you are the person Joe below or whatever.
[01:15:40.040 --> 01:15:42.020]  So, file it with the courthouse.
[01:15:42.240 --> 01:15:43.400]  It usually costs $10 to $15.
[01:15:44.100 --> 01:15:45.900]  And that's how the ball gets rolling.
[01:15:46.020 --> 01:15:48.700]  All you need is one piece of information with your name on it.
[01:15:48.820 --> 01:15:51.900]  Apply for a credit card with a, you know, bogus name on it.
[01:15:51.960 --> 01:15:56.780]  As soon as you get that down, then that gives you one verifiable piece of information.
[01:15:56.860 --> 01:15:58.220]  So, it's really not that difficult.
[01:15:58.360 --> 01:15:59.800]  So, what do I file with the courthouse?
[01:15:59.920 --> 01:16:00.180]  What was that?
[01:16:01.480 --> 01:16:02.660]  It's called an assumed name.
[01:16:03.500 --> 01:16:03.680]  Okay.
[01:16:03.820 --> 01:16:04.240]  Great, thanks.
[01:16:06.960 --> 01:16:07.640]  Hey, guys.
[01:16:08.300 --> 01:16:08.760]  Two things.
[01:16:09.660 --> 01:16:10.280]  First one.
[01:16:10.460 --> 01:16:14.180]  Can everybody in the back just wait five minutes until this is done, please?
[01:16:14.520 --> 01:16:14.920]  Thank you.
[01:16:17.480 --> 01:16:17.920]  Credit.
[01:16:18.440 --> 01:16:21.100]  You know, like identity theft these days and credit and whatnot.
[01:16:21.340 --> 01:16:25.700]  If your credit gets damaged, you know, because of your...
[01:16:25.700 --> 01:16:28.360]  You mentioned that guy with social security since 83.
[01:16:28.820 --> 01:16:29.660]  What do you do?
[01:16:29.820 --> 01:16:30.980]  What are the sources, you know?
[01:16:31.720 --> 01:16:34.660]  If somebody knows nothing about it, are you supposed to go to a credit lawyer?
[01:16:35.220 --> 01:16:37.160]  First thing you do is close all your accounts down.
[01:16:37.580 --> 01:16:40.880]  Call and write the credit unions, three major credit unions.
[01:16:41.080 --> 01:16:43.160]  File a police report so it's verifiable.
[01:16:43.800 --> 01:16:47.700]  And then also file record with the Social Security Administration.
[01:16:47.700 --> 01:16:50.280]  So, it's on file because it's the same thing that happens.
[01:16:50.420 --> 01:16:52.180]  You know, people steal identities for a purpose.
[01:16:52.440 --> 01:16:54.420]  And a lot of times it's to commit crimes.
[01:16:54.760 --> 01:17:04.800]  So, unfortunately, I know of situations where people were stopped for a traffic citation and were arrested because they've got a different name that's in the database.
[01:17:05.380 --> 01:17:14.000]  So, you've got to leave a written, verifiable form of documentation that you've tried to clear this up.
[01:17:14.080 --> 01:17:17.220]  But as far as credit goes, three major credit references.
[01:17:17.480 --> 01:17:19.360]  Close all your credit cards.
[01:17:19.640 --> 01:17:20.520]  Close all your bank accounts.
[01:17:20.660 --> 01:17:21.000]  Start over.
[01:17:21.000 --> 01:17:22.600]  So, you can do this yourself?
[01:17:22.760 --> 01:17:25.800]  You don't have to go to PIs or credit lawyers or anything like that?
[01:17:26.060 --> 01:17:35.040]  Credit card companies are now offering a service where they monitor your credit scores by the three different major credit card rating companies.
[01:17:35.780 --> 01:17:39.720]  And they give you a compilation of that every three months they send it to you.
[01:17:40.560 --> 01:17:43.560]  And what that shows is any new accounts that were opening up.
[01:17:44.320 --> 01:17:45.840]  Any unusual activity.
[01:17:46.280 --> 01:17:48.700]  Any cards that you didn't know about would be on there.
[01:17:48.880 --> 01:17:52.360]  Any new loans that were taken out under your name.
[01:17:52.700 --> 01:17:55.600]  So, a three month window is pretty quick.
[01:17:56.020 --> 01:17:58.500]  Where you can nip this in the bud.
[01:17:59.100 --> 01:18:01.700]  Go to the bank that issued the loan that you didn't make.
[01:18:01.860 --> 01:18:03.020]  Or the credit card.
[01:18:03.020 --> 01:18:06.160]  And it'll list there where that credit card is...
[01:18:06.160 --> 01:18:07.980]  The statement is going.
[01:18:08.500 --> 01:18:09.980]  Where that person was from.
[01:18:10.120 --> 01:18:11.660]  You can nip this in the bud pretty quickly.
[01:18:11.860 --> 01:18:15.120]  And I think it's $4 a month.
[01:18:15.180 --> 01:18:17.120]  Of course, you're like $12 a quarter or something.
[01:18:17.320 --> 01:18:21.920]  And they'll send you your compiled credit score every three months.
[01:18:22.580 --> 01:18:23.920]  That's really all it's...
[01:18:23.920 --> 01:18:29.040]  In fact, practically, to protect your identity.
[01:18:29.040 --> 01:18:31.480]  And from your self-identity theft.
[01:18:31.880 --> 01:18:33.080]  And from these kind of rip-offs.
[01:18:33.220 --> 01:18:34.220]  That's really all you need.
[01:18:34.660 --> 01:18:36.040]  Nobody wants to really tell you that.
[01:18:36.200 --> 01:18:36.980]  But that's reality.
[01:18:37.420 --> 01:18:37.800]  Thanks a lot.
[01:18:40.480 --> 01:18:40.920]  Hi.
[01:18:41.580 --> 01:18:42.940]  My voice is pretty shot.
[01:18:44.360 --> 01:18:45.640]  I just wanted to...
[01:18:45.640 --> 01:18:46.460]  We don't have a lot of time.
[01:18:46.600 --> 01:18:47.200]  Like five minutes.
[01:18:47.500 --> 01:18:48.720]  But did you have any...
[01:18:48.720 --> 01:18:52.840]  Could you speak a little bit about lying or liars that you've interacted with?
[01:18:53.400 --> 01:18:53.840]  Anything?
[01:18:54.220 --> 01:18:54.660]  Do you have any clue?
[01:18:54.940 --> 01:18:56.140]  No, we can't hear you.
[01:18:56.340 --> 01:18:56.680]  Oh, really?
[01:18:57.980 --> 01:18:58.420]  Liars.
[01:18:58.420 --> 01:18:58.520]  Liars.
[01:18:58.780 --> 01:19:01.300]  Basically, what stories do you have about lying and liars?
[01:19:02.260 --> 01:19:03.400]  Anything that comes to mind.
[01:19:03.500 --> 01:19:03.880]  About lying and liars?
[01:19:03.980 --> 01:19:05.480]  Wasn't that the one good before?
[01:19:05.560 --> 01:19:06.560]  I never told a lie in my life.
[01:19:06.660 --> 01:19:07.280]  Did I ever stole anything?
[01:19:07.500 --> 01:19:08.280]  That was pretty good.
[01:19:08.280 --> 01:19:08.560]  Hey, Reg.
[01:19:08.860 --> 01:19:11.040]  And he stole some worth $20 billion.
[01:19:12.100 --> 01:19:13.220]  He made a good choice.
[01:19:13.380 --> 01:19:13.980]  Or a bad one.
[01:19:14.100 --> 01:19:14.300]  Reg.
[01:19:14.440 --> 01:19:15.260]  Sorry to cut you off, man.
[01:19:15.400 --> 01:19:15.860]  Time's up.
[01:19:15.980 --> 01:19:17.100]  We've got other things going on.
[01:19:17.360 --> 01:19:18.340]  Thank you all for having us.
[01:19:18.460 --> 01:19:18.980]  Appreciate it.
[01:19:19.340 --> 01:19:22.140]  Thank you.