[00:00.000 --> 00:02.240]  I'm not sure how many of you have heard of this organization.
[00:04.000 --> 00:06.680]  It used to be called No Such Agency, the NSA.
[00:09.820 --> 00:11.860]  And there's supposed to be a picture up on the screen now.
[00:13.760 --> 00:14.560]  Ah, there it is.
[00:16.740 --> 00:18.680]  That's as close as we could get to the NSA.
[00:21.080 --> 00:24.820]  That's a photo by our resident photographer, Kyle.
[00:24.820 --> 00:29.240]  We have the 2013 Hacker Calendar ready.
[00:29.480 --> 00:30.820]  It just came out yesterday.
[00:31.240 --> 00:32.880]  And we have that at the 2600 store.
[00:33.360 --> 00:36.200]  And the theme this year, or next year, is surveillance.
[00:36.520 --> 00:42.560]  And we went down to Fort Meade, Maryland to take that picture to make one of the pictures for the calendar.
[00:43.540 --> 00:46.660]  And, of course, we got in trouble for this very quickly.
[00:47.000 --> 00:49.780]  We were surrounded by four NSA police cars.
[00:49.880 --> 00:51.900]  I didn't know there was an NSA police, but there is.
[00:52.380 --> 00:55.220]  And they kept us for about a half hour asking us questions.
[00:55.360 --> 00:56.840]  Oddly enough, they didn't know we were taking pictures.
[00:57.020 --> 00:58.500]  They just wanted to know why we were there, period.
[01:00.320 --> 01:02.560]  And do we have other pictures that we didn't...
[01:02.560 --> 01:04.200]  Yeah, this is... Okay, read this sign.
[01:04.460 --> 01:09.260]  There's so many things you can't do, including read this sign if you're driving by.
[01:10.100 --> 01:16.520]  But just to make it quick, unauthorized photography, note-taking, making of drawings.
[01:16.520 --> 01:18.600]  Do not make any drawings when you're down there.
[01:19.460 --> 01:22.560]  Maps or other graphic representations, all prohibited.
[01:23.300 --> 01:25.040]  It just goes on and on and on.
[01:25.240 --> 01:31.480]  And taking a picture of this sign is probably forbidden too, although I don't know any other way you would know what you couldn't do.
[01:32.680 --> 01:35.280]  No photographic imagery equipment, media recording sound.
[01:35.400 --> 01:38.040]  I'm sure it's illegal for all of us to be looking at this right now.
[01:38.820 --> 01:45.160]  But that is what we are faced with when we go down to Fort Meade and try to visit the National Security Agency.
[01:46.420 --> 01:47.920]  It's kind of scary.
[01:48.240 --> 01:51.680]  It used to be you could go right up to the buildings, but now you can't get anywhere near them.
[01:51.820 --> 01:53.540]  And if you go close, you will get questioned.
[01:54.280 --> 01:58.080]  And just for fun, there's one other picture we have here.
[01:58.260 --> 02:11.100]  This is actually a bunch of sheep in England, but in the distance is basically the antenna farm of Menwith Hill, which is a massive receiving station.
[02:12.020 --> 02:15.880]  And those radomes, they're basically covering satellite dishes.
[02:16.020 --> 02:18.280]  And the reason they're round is you can't tell where they're pointed.
[02:18.400 --> 02:19.720]  You don't know what they're listening to.
[02:20.380 --> 02:22.940]  But it's an incredible listening post.
[02:23.180 --> 02:28.720]  They basically are getting just about everything going over the satellites in that part of the world.
[02:29.260 --> 02:37.100]  But, you know, we pretended we were taking pictures of sheep for a couple of hours and got some pretty nifty photography there.
[02:37.720 --> 02:42.020]  So anyway, that's in the hacker calendar as well for 2013, all about surveillance.
[02:43.300 --> 02:49.480]  But now we have a keynote speaker that I'm really honored to be introducing here.
[02:49.700 --> 02:53.500]  We've had many heroes speak on this stage over the years.
[02:54.460 --> 03:07.100]  Basically, people who stand up to authority, people who question the rules, people who face a lot of crap for basically saying what they think is right or taking an action.
[03:07.400 --> 03:17.640]  And I think that's a model that the whole hacker community should be looking at as something that steers us in future years or in our present day life.
[03:18.160 --> 03:23.720]  It's all about whether you're in high school or whether you're working for a government someplace or a corporation.
[03:24.060 --> 03:28.500]  If you see something that's wrong, you say something about it or you tell people about it.
[03:28.500 --> 03:31.460]  If you see a security hole, you do something about it.
[03:31.520 --> 03:34.880]  You let the world know or you at least let the people that can fix it know.
[03:35.160 --> 03:36.480]  Many times you'll be blamed.
[03:36.640 --> 03:39.660]  Many times the messenger is confused with the message.
[03:39.780 --> 03:44.320]  And that's why we gather together to share these stories of what we've been through.
[03:45.020 --> 03:49.180]  William Binney worked for the NSA for over 30 years as an analyst.
[03:49.780 --> 03:54.320]  And believe me, he's learned an awful lot in that period of time.
[03:55.760 --> 03:58.180]  Probably was... we can get rid of that.
[03:58.660 --> 03:59.340]  I don't know if he ever went there.
[03:59.480 --> 04:04.000]  But he certainly was in the NSA buildings that we saw just a moment ago.
[04:05.280 --> 04:10.860]  Well, after 9-11, he noticed a change in what the NSA was doing.
[04:10.860 --> 04:16.360]  He saw that the technology was being used against Americans in our own country.
[04:17.120 --> 04:20.380]  And that was too much for him to deal with.
[04:20.760 --> 04:25.180]  And he became... instead of an NSA analyst, he became an NSA whistleblower.
[04:25.540 --> 04:33.180]  And I think there's nothing more courageous than standing up to such a powerful entity and letting the rest of us know what's really going on.
[04:33.300 --> 04:36.820]  And with that, it's my honor to introduce as our keynote this Friday, William Binney.
[04:46.750 --> 04:48.190]  Thank you very much.
[04:49.810 --> 04:56.990]  Thank you to the coordinators of HOPE for inviting me here to give me the opportunity to express my story.
[04:57.270 --> 04:58.690]  Some of it was hard to believe.
[04:58.690 --> 05:01.450]  I'm sure you'll find some of it difficult to believe.
[05:01.570 --> 05:08.210]  I find some of it difficult myself to even believe that actually things like this happened and our government did these kinds of things.
[05:09.610 --> 05:24.250]  So what I'd like to do is go through my entire background with NSA and how I handled the events in 9-11 after that and all the things that happened with the Department of Justice and us after that.
[05:25.030 --> 05:43.350]  Plus, then I'd like to go into some of the technology that is involved in large database analysis with you and then give you my impression of what the White House's new initiative on big data analysis is really all about even though they can't say it correctly.
[05:43.870 --> 05:50.230]  This is really what they're asking and I'll try to define that for you and hopefully that'll give you some idea.
[05:50.490 --> 06:01.330]  It'll certainly give you a better idea, I believe, of how these events occurring and how dangerous metadata is to monitoring the entire population.
[06:01.330 --> 06:15.870]  As I've said before in different forums, the KGB, the Stasi and the Gestapo could never have dreamt of having anything as great or as comprehensive as this capacity to monitor the population.
[06:16.330 --> 06:25.770]  Their primary focus, they tried to get information about their population so they could control it and that's fundamentally what dictatorships and totalitarian systems do around the world.
[06:26.270 --> 06:29.110]  And that, unfortunately, is the way our government is going.
[06:29.110 --> 06:37.830]  And so I'll try to define what that's all about, the technology behind that and what they're asking now and in the future.
[06:37.890 --> 06:40.250]  And they're spending hundreds of millions to do that a year here.
[06:40.890 --> 06:42.630]  But let me give you some of my background.
[06:44.210 --> 06:51.820]  I first... I was a hillbilly from the central western Pennsylvania and I came out as a small-town guy, so I had small-town ethics.
[06:53.670 --> 06:57.270]  And, of course, I hunted, so I was a marksman.
[06:57.570 --> 07:00.390]  So this was in 1965.
[07:01.430 --> 07:08.430]  I joined the Army as opposed to getting drafted and going into a rifle company and being shipped to Vietnam and having to kill somebody.
[07:08.430 --> 07:09.950]  I didn't want to do that, okay.
[07:10.170 --> 07:13.130]  So I volunteered for the Army to go to Europe.
[07:13.290 --> 07:16.470]  And so they sent me through a bunch of... a battery of tests.
[07:16.590 --> 07:19.650]  And they said, gee, you really have a good aptitude for this analysis.
[07:20.430 --> 07:24.090]  So I said... because I was at a mathematics degree and I was...
[07:24.810 --> 07:28.930]  my background is mathematics, so I fit right into that.
[07:29.030 --> 07:38.970]  So they sent me off doing the traffic analysis school, which ended up to be... I thought it was going to be counting cars going by on the street or something, you know.
[07:40.150 --> 07:49.130]  But it turned out to be analysis of data, data systems and codes and ciphers and things like that.
[07:49.170 --> 07:52.030]  And that's basically what I ended up doing in the military.
[07:52.030 --> 07:55.490]  And then eventually NSA got a hold of me after that.
[07:55.670 --> 07:57.490]  And so that started my career.
[07:57.670 --> 08:01.450]  So I spent about four years in the military and then I went into NSA directly.
[08:02.810 --> 08:06.830]  So I ended up with about 37 years of service combined.
[08:07.170 --> 08:10.230]  So my... thanks.
[08:11.470 --> 08:13.350]  Most of it was a lot of fun, I tell you.
[08:13.430 --> 08:17.470]  It was really a lot of fun breaking these puzzles, you know, solving problems and things like that.
[08:17.830 --> 08:19.170]  And that's really what I did.
[08:19.370 --> 08:23.770]  I fundamentally started working out with data, looking at data, and data systems and how you do that.
[08:24.150 --> 08:26.130]  And, of course, I had the background, so I...
[08:26.130 --> 08:28.330]  And Euclid, by the way, I keep mentioning this.
[08:28.470 --> 08:48.570]  Euclid had a really nice little theorem back in circa 300 BC, where he said, you know, this is the fundamental theorem of arithmetic that any number greater than one can be divided down into primes or products of primes, which meant that in data and data systems,
[08:48.710 --> 08:49.350]  when you're looking at some...
[08:49.350 --> 09:01.010]  If somebody's created a data system, you're trying to figure out what that data system's all about, that kind of... that theorem is very helpful because you simply figure out how many possible combinations can be generated.
[09:01.610 --> 09:03.130]  And you say, okay, that's a number.
[09:03.350 --> 09:10.130]  Then you factor it down into its primes and look at the prime combinations and say, okay, those are the optional organizational properties.
[09:11.030 --> 09:14.930]  If it's a matrix kind of thing, you look at row-column combinations and things like that.
[09:15.130 --> 09:19.270]  And you look at that as a way of doing diagnostics at the highest level.
[09:19.430 --> 09:24.350]  And sometimes it gives you the idea of how you can simply go straight forward to a solution.
[09:24.690 --> 09:28.630]  By organizing it properly, it'll allow you to see what they're really doing.
[09:28.890 --> 09:38.870]  So in many cases, it might be their alphabet or powers of ten, you know, things like that, that organizing pages and structures like that.
[09:40.010 --> 09:42.350]  But that was my background as an analyst.
[09:42.530 --> 09:48.830]  And throughout that whole problem, I was there during the Tet Offensive.
[09:52.170 --> 09:54.290]  And I watched all that happen.
[09:54.670 --> 09:57.130]  Unfortunately, that was well known that that was coming.
[09:59.190 --> 10:04.010]  But it wasn't being believed by the military, senior military people.
[10:04.010 --> 10:07.070]  So a lot of people lost their lives there.
[10:07.950 --> 10:11.150]  And we lost over 2,000 men, I think, in that offensive.
[10:11.870 --> 10:27.990]  So that kind of made it clear to me that it was important in intelligence production to make sure you could get to these solutions, get them quickly, and get the results of that documented in some sort of reportable form that's understandable by leadership.
[10:28.930 --> 10:38.110]  So that became... that was drilled into me initially as the fundamental driver of what was important to do in this business.
[10:39.290 --> 10:41.210]  And so I'd go around.
[10:41.450 --> 10:46.710]  And unfortunately, at the time, NSA was... got so big that it started to have...
[10:46.710 --> 10:48.990]  instructional managers have to manage something.
[10:49.710 --> 11:09.770]  So what they started to do was break away operations from technical support, meaning engineers and computer folks, people who would build things, make things, and execute things, or take operational requirements and translate them into meaningful systems that would handle the problem.
[11:10.990 --> 11:12.950]  And when they did that, they broke it away.
[11:13.310 --> 11:18.950]  What that did was it separated NSA into two real... two camps with two separate priorities.
[11:19.790 --> 11:29.380]  On the one hand, operations still had that priority to figure out intentions and capabilities of the potential enemies and report that.
[11:29.700 --> 11:41.160]  And on the other hand, their emphasis became a structure that needed money to function, to build things, they needed money, to maintain things, they needed money.
[11:41.440 --> 11:42.320]  It meant contracts.
[11:42.580 --> 11:45.180]  They had to support contractors once they got that going.
[11:45.460 --> 11:50.600]  So their emphasis then turned to money as opposed to production of intelligence.
[11:51.200 --> 11:56.780]  So that separation was probably one of the worst things they could have done, but...
[11:56.780 --> 11:59.000]  And they're still separated, by the way.
[12:00.000 --> 12:04.640]  But...so that meant when I had an operational problem, I had to try to figure out who could help me solve it.
[12:04.660 --> 12:11.260]  So I tried to go to people in that other operational organizations and try to say, you know, I have a problem here, can you help me?
[12:11.360 --> 12:12.140]  And things like that.
[12:13.140 --> 12:15.780]  And they were all really reluctant to come over into operations.
[12:16.600 --> 12:23.980]  So, number one, if you're a technical person like that, you tend to be...over here in operations, you know, this is where people get killed.
[12:24.860 --> 12:26.920]  Okay, this is the real world.
[12:27.200 --> 12:40.440]  And over here in the engineering world and things like that, they can have time to research, to do things like that, to do...try to do development.
[12:43.060 --> 12:48.540]  And basically, what they tried to do was large-scale development, which was fundamentally the wrong way to do it.
[12:48.720 --> 12:53.080]  I mean, if you try to do everything all at once, sometimes that just doesn't work.
[12:53.220 --> 12:59.240]  And if your assumptions anywhere along the line are wrong, then the whole thing fails, as I'll point out in some later programs.
[13:01.620 --> 13:04.240]  So, they were all reluctant to come over and help me.
[13:04.240 --> 13:06.240]  So, I ended up having to do a lot of it myself.
[13:06.540 --> 13:08.980]  So, I'd try to go around anywhere I could in NSA.
[13:09.180 --> 13:11.800]  Just to get something done, I would try to do that.
[13:13.820 --> 13:17.660]  But then finally, eventually, I found Dr. John T.
[13:17.780 --> 13:19.760]  We're not supposed to mention their last names, okay?
[13:20.920 --> 13:22.320]  So...I won't mention last names.
[13:22.620 --> 13:24.480]  But he's still a good friend of mine.
[13:24.520 --> 13:25.520]  He's retired now, too.
[13:25.520 --> 13:28.100]  But he was in research.
[13:28.120 --> 13:30.880]  And he was trying to do some automation research.
[13:31.100 --> 13:32.180]  Well, that fit right into me.
[13:32.220 --> 13:38.160]  Because I was developing this concept of analysis was not an art form.
[13:38.180 --> 13:55.000]  It was a discipline, maybe not a science, but a discipline that was definable in rules and had structure to it and order, so that you could lay it out in such a way that it could be coded and executed electronically, meaning you could automate analysis,
[13:55.220 --> 13:55.420]  okay?
[13:56.020 --> 13:59.000]  So that was the whole...that was my whole theme there at NSA.
[13:59.340 --> 14:00.800]  Eventually, that's what I ended up to.
[14:00.880 --> 14:02.820]  I was the only one there doing that, by the way.
[14:05.640 --> 14:10.220]  So I kept trying to find others to try to help me down through the years.
[14:10.380 --> 14:12.420]  And every time I went somewhere, they were always so...
[14:13.560 --> 14:19.320]  They didn't want to join me, but they would take my requirement and say, how about writing it up so I can get more money, okay?
[14:20.180 --> 14:22.700]  This, then, requirement would be taken downtown Congress.
[14:22.720 --> 14:24.960]  We need more money because this guy has this requirement.
[14:24.960 --> 14:27.460]  I need to build something for him to solve this requirement.
[14:27.620 --> 14:29.600]  I need a lot of money to do that, so...
[14:29.600 --> 14:33.580]  So that's the way they used me for a number of years, and I finally got wise to them.
[14:34.060 --> 14:38.460]  You know, I just decided, hey, I'm not going to write any more requirements for that.
[14:38.680 --> 14:42.320]  I'm going to try to go do it myself because you're not really trying to help me.
[14:43.160 --> 14:47.540]  In fact, during that period of time, I ended up...
[14:48.020 --> 14:53.240]  You know, I tried to think of things like vision statements to help motivate people to do things like...
[14:53.240 --> 14:59.700]  In the SIGINT automation research, which we eventually formed, I had vision statements like, everything all the time.
[15:01.080 --> 15:01.560]  Okay.
[15:01.860 --> 15:03.120]  Aim high and do better.
[15:04.020 --> 15:13.120]  And my vision of their vision statement seemed to me to be, at least at that point in time, aim low and miss.
[15:15.440 --> 15:17.760]  Because they consistently failed.
[15:17.760 --> 15:23.820]  I mean, in operations, I mean, you were on the line all the time.
[15:23.980 --> 15:28.240]  I mean, failure was not an acceptable outcome.
[15:30.700 --> 15:41.820]  So, to try to combat that, to work a way around that, I took a COR course.
[15:41.880 --> 15:44.200]  Now, that's a contract officer representative course.
[15:45.660 --> 15:47.860]  Which meant that I could now run the contracts.
[15:48.080 --> 15:49.940]  So, I didn't need all those other people.
[15:50.160 --> 15:50.280]  Okay.
[15:51.020 --> 15:59.160]  I would hire my own contractors, run the contract locally, and tell them to do exactly what I wanted done.
[15:59.300 --> 16:02.240]  Then I'd get an operational result.
[16:02.900 --> 16:04.620]  Because I wasn't getting it otherwise.
[16:07.520 --> 16:10.000]  So, I started that out.
[16:10.000 --> 16:11.820]  I was running about several programs.
[16:11.980 --> 16:15.660]  One of which I conveniently...
[16:15.660 --> 16:20.440]  I tried to lock NSA into this program.
[16:21.360 --> 16:25.600]  So, I put together an international coalition of about five countries.
[16:26.540 --> 16:30.720]  And got an agreement signed with them that we would all cooperate in this program.
[16:31.560 --> 16:35.100]  So, that kind of locked NSA in once I had that agreement signed.
[16:35.600 --> 16:38.240]  They didn't realize what was happening by the time it was signed.
[16:38.520 --> 16:39.420]  It was too late.
[16:40.840 --> 16:41.400]  So...
[16:42.160 --> 16:45.180]  But the whole idea was to share everything.
[16:46.460 --> 16:48.220]  Because we were all in a joint effort.
[16:48.460 --> 17:00.380]  It was a joint effort against the Soviet Union and any other international threats that threatened, not just this country, but our allies and friendly countries around the world.
[17:00.740 --> 17:04.540]  So, I got that program running.
[17:04.540 --> 17:06.700]  And set up even a...
[17:06.700 --> 17:13.600]  I set up a multi-source or a multi-country network web, if you will.
[17:14.020 --> 17:18.120]  So, we all get on the web and we would update our latest technical developments right there.
[17:18.220 --> 17:19.380]  And everybody would have them at launch.
[17:19.580 --> 17:22.580]  You know, it was a complete sharing process, even internally in NSA.
[17:22.760 --> 17:24.140]  They could look at them if they wanted to.
[17:25.240 --> 17:25.620]  So...
[17:28.000 --> 17:28.380]  And...
[17:29.640 --> 17:31.380]  So, that was going along pretty well.
[17:31.480 --> 17:34.140]  And then we decided, gee, we need to do this on a much larger scale.
[17:34.140 --> 17:40.340]  Because the problems were so much larger than just these simple areas I was attacking.
[17:42.140 --> 17:43.980]  So, John Taggart...
[17:43.980 --> 17:45.760]  Sorry, don't scratch that name.
[17:46.520 --> 17:48.020]  John and I...
[17:51.590 --> 17:53.370]  It's not as bad as CIA.
[17:53.650 --> 17:55.490]  You know, CIA, you get a totally different name.
[17:56.210 --> 17:57.890]  Here, they just cut off your last name.
[17:59.410 --> 17:59.970]  So...
[17:59.970 --> 18:00.990]  But...
[18:00.990 --> 18:02.270]  So, we started the...
[18:03.810 --> 18:09.390]  We started the SIG and Automation Research Center by pulling together multi-disciplines.
[18:09.690 --> 18:12.090]  We got everybody in the same room, basically.
[18:12.490 --> 18:16.670]  So, where we were all working together, computer people, engineers, and so on.
[18:16.810 --> 18:18.030]  So, we'd have a problem.
[18:18.130 --> 18:19.370]  We'd say, here's the engineering part of it.
[18:19.530 --> 18:22.170]  And this is the problem that you're really focusing on.
[18:22.170 --> 18:24.190]  So, they knew what they were really contributing to.
[18:24.350 --> 18:27.530]  Instead of being in isolation, over on the side, working in a little box.
[18:29.170 --> 18:31.970]  Because when you created those little boxes, people didn't get out of their boxes.
[18:32.190 --> 18:33.270]  You know, they stayed in their box.
[18:33.390 --> 18:36.230]  So, they didn't really understand the enterprise approach.
[18:37.650 --> 18:42.030]  So, by pulling the disciplines together, we got that perspective of the enterprise.
[18:42.810 --> 18:44.110]  And that was the focus.
[18:44.810 --> 18:45.930]  So, we wanted to...
[18:46.930 --> 18:49.530]  We wanted to do that on a much larger scale in NSA.
[18:49.830 --> 18:52.110]  And the focus there was on automating analysis.
[18:52.190 --> 18:53.890]  Because that was the driver of everything.
[18:54.410 --> 18:55.630]  Because the analytic parts...
[18:55.630 --> 19:02.350]  When you make a breakthrough in the analytic part, one part of the enterprise, you can leverage that across the entire enterprise.
[19:02.350 --> 19:03.390]  And make...
[19:03.390 --> 19:06.130]  And help successes in other environments.
[19:06.870 --> 19:07.670]  Excuse me.
[19:15.210 --> 19:21.330]  So, when we got that SART going, we started doing some wild and crazy things.
[19:21.330 --> 19:22.230]  To say the least.
[19:22.610 --> 19:24.330]  Which I thought would fit in here perfectly.
[19:25.530 --> 19:27.730]  Out of the box kind of thinking.
[19:28.050 --> 19:31.570]  And also, we took no legacy inputs at all.
[19:31.570 --> 19:34.510]  Anything that was existing was, to us, legacy.
[19:34.950 --> 19:40.790]  And we, therefore, said that, well, we're going to start from scratch and figure out the best way to do it.
[19:41.130 --> 19:42.410]  And not adopt...
[19:42.410 --> 19:46.570]  Because the existing system wanted you to adopt their legacy approach.
[19:46.630 --> 19:48.590]  Because if you...
[19:48.590 --> 19:52.930]  If you had a good idea that everybody wanted to support, that meant you got money.
[19:53.170 --> 19:53.390]  Okay?
[19:54.370 --> 19:56.130]  So, these people over here wanted the money.
[19:56.290 --> 20:00.850]  So, they said, okay, well, what we need to do is, you need to be dependent on our legacy system.
[20:00.850 --> 20:04.170]  So, we make you structurally dependent to that legacy system.
[20:04.350 --> 20:06.090]  That way, you have to feed us to keep going.
[20:06.950 --> 20:08.610]  So, they take some of your money that way.
[20:08.730 --> 20:09.730]  So, that was their entire...
[20:09.730 --> 20:11.830]  So, I wised up to that one pretty quickly, you know.
[20:12.410 --> 20:15.250]  That was pretty clear to me what they were doing.
[20:16.170 --> 20:17.910]  And Congress also picked up on that.
[20:18.010 --> 20:18.670]  That was the point.
[20:18.850 --> 20:20.850]  And this really got us in trouble, you know.
[20:20.950 --> 20:29.510]  Because when Congress found out what some of the things we were doing, they started to support us with budget plus-ups, directed directly to us.
[20:30.850 --> 20:32.510]  Now, I don't know if you know...
[20:32.510 --> 20:39.510]  The budget process is probably pretty ambiguous or obscure to everybody in the country.
[20:39.710 --> 20:46.350]  But there's a whole markup process that goes through every year, fiscal year, one October on.
[20:47.110 --> 20:50.170]  So, your markups are usually done in the...
[20:50.170 --> 20:52.330]  By early summer, they're done.
[20:52.670 --> 20:55.090]  And they're under review up to that point.
[20:55.230 --> 20:57.850]  And then they start executing the budget in October.
[21:00.930 --> 21:07.830]  So, those budget plus-ups were in addition to the requested money by the administration.
[21:08.390 --> 21:11.490]  So, this was above and beyond what they were asking for.
[21:12.330 --> 21:14.190]  And they were directed at us.
[21:14.190 --> 21:19.350]  So, we became very noticed there as getting money from Congress.
[21:20.210 --> 21:21.010]  In fact, I...
[21:21.010 --> 21:25.130]  At one point, I had a couple million directed to me personally by name.
[21:25.310 --> 21:26.630]  And I didn't even ask for it.
[21:26.850 --> 21:27.290]  So...
[21:27.790 --> 21:32.190]  But what they were doing was trying to stimulate us to do more crazy and wild things.
[21:32.350 --> 21:33.390]  You know, to...
[21:33.390 --> 21:35.330]  So, I did some of those.
[21:35.750 --> 21:36.310]  But we...
[21:36.310 --> 21:38.190]  But one of the things was...
[21:39.030 --> 21:40.550]  I wanted to work in...
[21:41.030 --> 21:43.610]  And I'll show you in a technology where I tried to work it in.
[21:43.610 --> 21:48.510]  It was latent semantic indexing where you would take text and look at text.
[21:48.690 --> 21:51.570]  And try to assess it relative to other text.
[21:51.830 --> 21:53.330]  And see how it...
[21:53.330 --> 21:54.790]  If it related...
[21:54.790 --> 21:55.210]  And what...
[21:55.210 --> 22:00.310]  The idea was to cluster related text so you could begin to analyze common...
[22:01.890 --> 22:02.410]  Common...
[22:02.410 --> 22:03.510]  Or related text.
[22:03.670 --> 22:05.090]  And who was sending them and what they were saying.
[22:05.770 --> 22:06.190]  So...
[22:06.190 --> 22:08.090]  I tried to do that with about...
[22:08.650 --> 22:09.190]  I was...
[22:09.190 --> 22:12.270]  I took about 486,000 and tried it on one case.
[22:12.430 --> 22:13.430]  And said...
[22:14.250 --> 22:14.670]  Okay...
[22:14.670 --> 22:16.270]  Let's just try it here.
[22:17.050 --> 22:17.470]  And...
[22:17.470 --> 22:20.650]  When I got it set up on a computer there for me, I said...
[22:20.650 --> 22:20.870]  Okay...
[22:20.870 --> 22:21.970]  Here's 10,000 items.
[22:22.230 --> 22:22.670]  You know...
[22:22.670 --> 22:23.810]  This is a small number.
[22:24.810 --> 22:25.230]  Okay...
[22:25.230 --> 22:28.390]  This is just a little chunk to see how we deal with a little chunk.
[22:29.430 --> 22:32.210]  Well, it came back and the clusters were all over the screen.
[22:32.650 --> 22:35.090]  There was absolutely no distinction in the clusters at all.
[22:36.310 --> 22:36.830]  Because...
[22:36.830 --> 22:41.310]  That told me there were several problems with the latent semantic indexing.
[22:41.430 --> 22:41.870]  One...
[22:41.870 --> 22:44.010]  One I discovered simply by looking at it.
[22:44.170 --> 22:50.370]  And because when they start putting together matrices of words and comparing the matrices and things like that...
[22:50.370 --> 22:51.990]  There's one dimension they forgot.
[22:53.510 --> 22:55.090]  That's the dimension of the...
[22:55.090 --> 22:57.070]  Of the meanings...
[22:57.070 --> 22:58.650]  The multiple meanings of the words.
[22:59.330 --> 23:01.270]  If they match a word, it doesn't mean...
[23:01.270 --> 23:04.070]  It doesn't say it necessarily has the same meaning and context.
[23:04.950 --> 23:05.430]  Okay...
[23:05.430 --> 23:05.990]  So...
[23:05.990 --> 23:09.550]  It might be the first, second, or third meaning in the dictionary of the word.
[23:09.550 --> 23:10.910]  In one case, it's...
[23:10.910 --> 23:12.690]  And it might be a totally different one in another case.
[23:13.530 --> 23:14.010]  So...
[23:14.590 --> 23:15.070]  So...
[23:15.070 --> 23:18.410]  It missed that dimension of word combinations.
[23:19.290 --> 23:20.570]  But also...
[23:20.570 --> 23:24.430]  The other real problem, and because we're looking at billions of things...
[23:26.010 --> 23:26.650]  Is...
[23:26.650 --> 23:30.470]  Random probabilities of combination across multiple items of...
[23:30.970 --> 23:32.450]  On a large scale.
[23:33.510 --> 23:35.850]  Hundreds of thousands, millions, billions of items.
[23:36.790 --> 23:37.610]  It's just that...
[23:37.610 --> 23:40.610]  No matter where you look, any word will...
[23:40.610 --> 23:41.070]  Or any...
[23:41.070 --> 23:41.630]  Any...
[23:41.630 --> 23:46.310]  Any context will have a relationship to some other text out of those billions.
[23:47.250 --> 23:50.590]  And conversely, the ones that it matches will have other relationships and so on.
[23:50.670 --> 23:52.670]  So that they fold back on themselves.
[23:52.830 --> 23:57.090]  And the probability is that you will find no distinction whatsoever on a large scale.
[23:58.890 --> 24:03.550]  So that meant that they had to do something to reduce the problem to a manageable level...
[24:03.550 --> 24:04.350]  Where the meaning...
[24:04.350 --> 24:06.990]  Where latent semantic indexing would have some meaning.
[24:07.310 --> 24:09.070]  And I'll show you how we did that here.
[24:10.850 --> 24:13.850]  And how, in my view, it needs to be done for the future.
[24:15.630 --> 24:16.030]  So...
[24:16.030 --> 24:20.230]  But continuing with our SARC, we started to look at...
[24:20.230 --> 24:21.910]  Yeah, this was into the 90s.
[24:22.090 --> 24:28.010]  And we said, well, gee, with the World Wide Web and the Internet coming along, we have a real problem here with this.
[24:28.110 --> 24:30.990]  And I'm talking about 16 people total.
[24:30.990 --> 24:36.590]  And we were running like four separate, five at one time or another, programs.
[24:36.830 --> 24:40.670]  So with those 16 people, you know, some of them were working on multiple programs.
[24:40.950 --> 24:41.230]  So...
[24:41.710 --> 24:43.490]  It was a very small set of people.
[24:43.710 --> 24:44.110]  We were...
[24:44.110 --> 24:45.950]  We didn't take any crap, you know.
[24:46.590 --> 24:47.570]  We didn't give any.
[24:47.710 --> 24:48.510]  We didn't ask for any.
[24:48.690 --> 24:49.370]  But we asked...
[24:49.370 --> 24:50.230]  What we did was...
[24:50.230 --> 24:52.910]  We needed blunt, honest, straightforward talk.
[24:53.690 --> 24:56.370]  An exchange of knowledge of different disciplines.
[24:57.990 --> 24:59.550]  And we weren't hiding.
[24:59.730 --> 25:00.510]  We weren't building anything.
[25:00.730 --> 25:01.170]  All we...
[25:01.170 --> 25:03.510]  Our entire objective was to solve the problem.
[25:04.890 --> 25:08.210]  So when it came to the Internet, that's exactly what we did.
[25:08.510 --> 25:10.510]  And I'll show you how...
[25:10.510 --> 25:14.290]  Big data analysis will be able to show you how that works.
[25:14.530 --> 25:15.650]  And how you can do that.
[25:15.710 --> 25:22.150]  How you can look at terabytes of data passing by you on a continuing basis.
[25:23.250 --> 25:26.250]  And see what's in it without actually looking at what's in it.
[25:27.710 --> 25:30.910]  And it has to do with metadata and using metadata relationships.
[25:31.790 --> 25:32.310]  So...
[25:32.850 --> 25:33.370]  But...
[25:33.370 --> 25:34.750]  So the...
[25:34.750 --> 25:38.370]  When we'd solved that problem, the NTO, which is the...
[25:38.370 --> 25:41.490]  NSA Transition Office at the time was...
[25:41.490 --> 25:44.850]  They were running all these multi-billion dollar transition programs.
[25:46.050 --> 25:47.750]  So they knew we were doing...
[25:47.750 --> 25:48.690]  In fact, the guy who was in...
[25:48.690 --> 25:50.170]  The chief there was a friend of mine.
[25:51.990 --> 25:52.390]  Um...
[25:52.970 --> 25:53.370]  And...
[25:53.370 --> 25:53.390]  He...
[25:53.390 --> 25:55.550]  He sent his deputy down and said, Uh...
[25:55.550 --> 25:58.450]  What could you guys do with, uh...
[25:58.450 --> 26:00.150]  1.2 billion dollars?
[26:01.590 --> 26:03.070]  And we're sitting there, you know...
[26:03.070 --> 26:03.730]  Well, again...
[26:03.730 --> 26:04.890]  This is...
[26:04.890 --> 26:05.430]  You know...
[26:05.430 --> 26:06.550]  This is, uh...
[26:06.550 --> 26:07.150]  I mean...
[26:07.150 --> 26:09.150]  What are we supposed to do with 1.2 billion?
[26:09.310 --> 26:10.530]  Okay, well, uh...
[26:10.530 --> 26:11.090]  Let us...
[26:11.090 --> 26:11.710]  Give us a few days.
[26:11.850 --> 26:12.990]  We'll look at it and see what we could...
[26:12.990 --> 26:16.450]  And we took a few days and we said, uh...
[26:16.450 --> 26:16.750]  Uh...
[26:16.750 --> 26:18.090]  Gee, we could, uh...
[26:18.090 --> 26:19.630]  We could upgrade the entire world.
[26:20.330 --> 26:20.550]  Every...
[26:20.550 --> 26:21.030]  Every...
[26:21.030 --> 26:21.970]  Every place we have.
[26:22.210 --> 26:22.930]  And, you know...
[26:22.930 --> 26:24.910]  Even everything back here in the States and everything.
[26:25.730 --> 26:26.170]  But...
[26:26.170 --> 26:26.410]  We...
[26:26.410 --> 26:28.770]  We can only spend about 300 million of that.
[26:31.450 --> 26:32.490]  Well, I mean...
[26:32.490 --> 26:34.570]  They went back and they said, Gee, this is really great.
[26:34.730 --> 26:34.970]  You know...
[26:34.970 --> 26:39.290]  And they started going downtown briefing and saying, Well, this is really what we should be doing.
[26:39.550 --> 26:40.770]  You know...
[26:40.770 --> 26:41.230]  Uh...
[26:41.230 --> 26:43.750]  At the same time, there was a separate issue with, uh...
[26:43.750 --> 26:45.130]  A program called Trailblazer.
[26:45.330 --> 26:46.690]  They wanted to start a program.
[26:46.990 --> 26:47.290]  It was...
[26:47.290 --> 26:47.690]  There was...
[26:47.690 --> 26:49.470]  Nothing existed there at the time.
[26:49.770 --> 26:50.250]  So...
[26:50.250 --> 26:52.570]  But it was a planned program for development.
[26:52.790 --> 26:54.890]  So we were coming into conflict with that.
[26:57.010 --> 26:57.490]  Um...
[26:57.490 --> 26:58.550]  And, um...
[26:58.550 --> 26:59.350]  So, uh...
[26:59.350 --> 27:02.830]  Also, what we were coming into conflict with was the, uh...
[27:02.830 --> 27:04.350]  What I referred to as the...
[27:04.350 --> 27:10.170]  Feasting by the corporations that were leeches on the side of NSA and other agencies of the government.
[27:13.150 --> 27:13.670]  Um...
[27:13.670 --> 27:15.010]  I referred to that, uh...
[27:15.010 --> 27:16.430]  Process of, uh...
[27:16.430 --> 27:22.930]  Government feeding all of these corporations as the military-industrial com...happiness-management complex.
[27:23.610 --> 27:24.610]  You know...
[27:24.610 --> 27:26.070]  They were keeping each other happy.
[27:26.170 --> 27:28.130]  They would retire from government to go to...
[27:28.130 --> 27:29.350]  Work for those corporations.
[27:29.530 --> 27:32.070]  The corporations would send people in to manage that...
[27:32.070 --> 27:35.010]  Programs and they'd get the contracts back to feed some more.
[27:35.090 --> 27:37.750]  It was all a feasting program and it's still going on.
[27:37.750 --> 27:40.010]  I mean, that's why we have, uh...
[27:40.010 --> 27:41.690]  That's why we have such a large debt.
[27:44.230 --> 27:44.750]  Uh...
[27:44.750 --> 27:45.930]  At any rate, uh...
[27:46.550 --> 27:53.910]  Shortly after they were briefing that downtown at the NTO office that they were planning on doing this with us, uh...
[27:53.910 --> 27:56.190]  The chief of the NTO, uh, was fired.
[27:57.470 --> 28:01.010]  Because he didn't conform to the corporate position.
[28:01.930 --> 28:02.450]  Uh...
[28:02.450 --> 28:03.730]  Which was to feed...
[28:03.730 --> 28:07.610]  Feed the corporations that existed on the side of NSA.
[28:08.030 --> 28:10.150]  And, I mean, it's just, uh...
[28:10.150 --> 28:11.290]  So, uh...
[28:11.290 --> 28:13.090]  What they did was, uh...
[28:13.090 --> 28:17.010]  In order to correct the problem, NSA management brought in, uh...
[28:17.910 --> 28:22.670]  And hired them on directly to take over the NTO, which is a senior executive position.
[28:22.970 --> 28:23.130]  Uh...
[28:23.130 --> 28:23.190]  Uh...
[28:23.190 --> 28:26.890]  They hired a vice president of SAIC to come in and manage that.
[28:28.290 --> 28:29.590]  Now, uh...
[28:29.590 --> 28:31.030]  Consequence of that, you know, it's what...
[28:31.030 --> 28:32.510]  What happened was, of course, the...
[28:32.970 --> 28:33.230]  That...
[28:33.230 --> 28:36.310]  That meant that SAIC got some large chunks of contracts.
[28:37.250 --> 28:38.190]  Which they did.
[28:40.070 --> 28:40.470]  Um...
[28:40.930 --> 28:44.750]  And, of course, at the same time, NSA management transferred, uh...
[28:44.750 --> 28:47.630]  The SARC to the same organization.
[28:47.870 --> 28:48.490]  The same man.
[28:48.690 --> 28:50.150]  So, he was managing all of that.
[28:50.890 --> 28:53.450]  And the first thing he did, he calls me up to his office.
[28:56.050 --> 28:56.850]  And, um...
[28:56.850 --> 28:57.190]  Uh...
[28:57.190 --> 28:57.550]  He...
[28:57.550 --> 28:57.970]  He said...
[28:57.970 --> 29:06.170]  The first thing he said to me in the office there was, I don't want you briefing ThinThread, which was our program to do the World Wide Web, to anyone anymore.
[29:07.250 --> 29:07.650]  Uh...
[29:07.650 --> 29:09.170]  That's because it was showing success.
[29:09.490 --> 29:11.750]  And he didn't want success being showed because...
[29:11.750 --> 29:13.670]  That means you've solved the problem.
[29:13.770 --> 29:17.930]  That means they don't have the problem to ask for the money to get the feeding for all the corporations.
[29:18.170 --> 29:19.050]  You know, it's a circle.
[29:19.210 --> 29:20.490]  It just keeps going round and round.
[29:22.310 --> 29:24.830]  But that's the process that's still going on right now.
[29:26.870 --> 29:27.270]  Um...
[29:27.270 --> 29:28.530]  And, unfortunately, that was it.
[29:28.630 --> 29:30.170]  So, that basically told me...
[29:32.010 --> 29:32.810]  You know...
[29:32.810 --> 29:33.270]  Um...
[29:33.270 --> 29:34.610]  The way I put it here is the...
[29:34.610 --> 29:36.790]  The forces of evil are too numerous here.
[29:37.710 --> 29:38.630]  So, I...
[29:38.630 --> 29:39.970]  I said I was going to resign.
[29:40.130 --> 29:42.270]  There wasn't anything I could do internally in NSA.
[29:42.590 --> 29:45.310]  The entire leadership of NSA was focused this way.
[29:45.470 --> 29:46.130]  And they weren't...
[29:46.130 --> 29:47.650]  They wanted no...
[29:48.190 --> 29:49.190]  No creativity.
[29:49.490 --> 29:50.150]  No innovation.
[29:50.490 --> 29:51.810]  No problem solved.
[29:51.810 --> 29:53.670]  They wanted to...
[29:53.670 --> 29:54.110]  They wanted to...
[29:54.110 --> 29:55.610]  As I came up with a later...
[29:55.610 --> 29:57.590]  Version of their vision statement.
[29:57.910 --> 29:58.150]  They...
[29:58.150 --> 30:00.290]  They wanted to...
[30:00.290 --> 30:03.130]  Keep the problem going so the money keeps flowing.
[30:04.210 --> 30:05.530]  That was their new...
[30:05.530 --> 30:07.070]  That was their vision statement all along.
[30:07.070 --> 30:08.310]  I just didn't realize it.
[30:08.410 --> 30:09.170]  You know, I was...
[30:09.170 --> 30:11.850]  This naive hillbilly from the hills of Pennsylvania.
[30:12.590 --> 30:14.330]  Thinking operations was important.
[30:14.890 --> 30:18.490]  And instead, it was the money and the flowing and the feeding and the feasting.
[30:20.910 --> 30:21.330]  So...
[30:22.530 --> 30:25.350]  So I basically, at that point, announced my retirement.
[30:25.350 --> 30:26.150]  I was leaving.
[30:26.410 --> 30:28.110]  And that was the...
[30:28.110 --> 30:30.390]  About July of 2001.
[30:34.270 --> 30:35.110]  And then...
[30:35.110 --> 30:36.590]  So I was at that point.
[30:36.730 --> 30:39.290]  From there on, I wasn't sharing anything internally with NSA.
[30:39.530 --> 30:42.290]  I was cleaning up all my papers.
[30:42.490 --> 30:42.830]  I had...
[30:42.830 --> 30:49.330]  You know, I had all kinds of things I had to pass off to the archives and different people internally in NSA so they could keep them from...
[30:49.330 --> 30:50.590]  For the records for...
[30:50.590 --> 30:52.610]  Well, here's how this solution worked.
[30:52.730 --> 30:54.290]  You know, it was actually penciled out.
[30:54.430 --> 30:55.670]  It wasn't done in the computer.
[30:56.470 --> 30:57.350]  You know...
[30:57.350 --> 30:59.970]  The point is the miracles don't happen in the computer.
[31:00.110 --> 31:01.050]  They happen in your mind.
[31:01.150 --> 31:02.510]  And you relate them on paper.
[31:02.970 --> 31:04.670]  And you could see them on paper.
[31:04.810 --> 31:05.190]  And then...
[31:05.190 --> 31:07.490]  Then you build the programs to manage them.
[31:09.590 --> 31:10.710]  So, I mean...
[31:10.710 --> 31:12.470]  Computers can do a certain amount.
[31:12.790 --> 31:13.250]  But...
[31:14.370 --> 31:16.530]  Fundamentally, the trick is to get the...
[31:16.530 --> 31:20.050]  Get your mind wrapped around the problem to where you can understand it.
[31:20.090 --> 31:22.050]  To the point where you can see into it.
[31:22.210 --> 31:23.970]  And begin to break it apart.
[31:24.310 --> 31:25.290]  And solve it.
[31:27.430 --> 31:27.930]  So...
[31:27.930 --> 31:29.650]  At any rate, 9-11 happened.
[31:29.650 --> 31:30.310]  And...
[31:31.030 --> 31:32.810]  So I started thinking...
[31:32.810 --> 31:33.710]  Gee, you know...
[31:33.710 --> 31:34.210]  I...
[31:34.210 --> 31:35.830]  Maybe I should reconsider retiring.
[31:36.050 --> 31:36.770]  Because I'd wanna...
[31:36.770 --> 31:37.050]  I...
[31:37.050 --> 31:38.290]  I always wanted to...
[31:38.290 --> 31:39.930]  Do something positive.
[31:40.090 --> 31:40.450]  Like...
[31:40.450 --> 31:41.530]  Stop the bad guys.
[31:41.690 --> 31:41.990]  Even...
[31:41.990 --> 31:43.750]  Even though there was all this corruption around me.
[31:43.870 --> 31:44.110]  You know.
[31:47.650 --> 31:48.170]  But...
[31:49.230 --> 31:51.350]  It must have been right after.
[31:51.710 --> 31:52.510]  A few days.
[31:52.630 --> 31:54.590]  No more than a week after 9-11.
[31:54.970 --> 31:59.630]  That they had decided to begin actively spying on everyone in this country.
[32:01.510 --> 32:02.030]  Um...
[32:02.030 --> 32:03.870]  And they were doing it by taking...
[32:03.870 --> 32:04.370]  Um...
[32:04.370 --> 32:05.630]  Billing data from telecoms.
[32:06.290 --> 32:08.650]  But what I didn't know at the time was...
[32:09.450 --> 32:09.970]  Um...
[32:09.970 --> 32:11.550]  In February of 2001.
[32:12.070 --> 32:12.350]  Uh...
[32:12.350 --> 32:15.930]  They had already started requesting that data from different telecoms.
[32:16.950 --> 32:17.350]  Uh...
[32:17.350 --> 32:17.890]  This is when...
[32:18.450 --> 32:18.970]  Um...
[32:18.970 --> 32:20.650]  The CEO of Quest, uh...
[32:20.650 --> 32:21.230]  Refused them.
[32:21.350 --> 32:23.370]  And he went into court and testified to that.
[32:23.770 --> 32:24.010]  And...
[32:24.010 --> 32:26.910]  That he was approached by some three-star general out of NSA.
[32:26.910 --> 32:29.550]  To provide customer data.
[32:31.230 --> 32:31.830]  Uh...
[32:31.830 --> 32:34.770]  But that was in February of 2001.
[32:35.470 --> 32:36.070]  Well...
[32:36.070 --> 32:40.590]  The point was that we had put our system together from end to end.
[32:40.670 --> 32:43.010]  And had it functioning in November of 2000.
[32:43.410 --> 32:44.850]  So this is three months after that.
[32:45.750 --> 32:52.010]  Which meant that they wanted that back part of our program to run all this spying.
[32:52.010 --> 32:53.090]  All right?
[32:53.530 --> 32:54.030]  So...
[32:54.030 --> 32:54.950]  That's...
[32:54.950 --> 32:56.310]  That's exactly what they did.
[32:56.750 --> 33:00.590]  So then they started taking the telecom data and then expanded after that.
[33:01.190 --> 33:01.690]  So...
[33:01.690 --> 33:04.090]  I mean, the one I knew was AT&T.
[33:04.250 --> 33:07.030]  And that one provided 320 million records every day.
[33:08.030 --> 33:09.450]  That was just phone calls.
[33:09.530 --> 33:16.690]  And then when they got the taps in like the ones in San Francisco, they started the nearest devices to take the data off the Internet.
[33:20.050 --> 33:22.330]  So what I did after that was...
[33:23.050 --> 33:26.730]  I was naive enough to think that the government would really...
[33:27.990 --> 33:38.170]  If people in certain positions of the government knew this was going on, that they would take some action to correct it or at least bring it back into some constitutional form of...
[33:38.710 --> 33:41.870]  Or some process that was constitutionally acceptable.
[33:42.930 --> 33:43.450]  You know?
[33:44.350 --> 33:44.910]  So...
[33:44.910 --> 33:45.930]  I kept...
[33:46.390 --> 33:47.190]  I went to...
[33:47.190 --> 33:48.450]  First I went to the House...
[33:48.450 --> 33:49.250]  Senate...
[33:49.250 --> 33:52.270]  The House Intelligence Committee, the HPSI.
[33:52.550 --> 33:54.770]  And the staff member that I personally knew there.
[33:56.590 --> 34:00.930]  And she then went to Porter Goss, who was the chairman of that committee.
[34:01.470 --> 34:07.210]  And also Nancy Pelosi, who was the deputy or the minority rep.
[34:09.450 --> 34:12.490]  They were all briefed into the program at the time, by the way.
[34:12.930 --> 34:16.990]  And all the other programs that were going on, including all these CIA programs.
[34:20.270 --> 34:20.990]  And they...
[34:20.990 --> 34:26.330]  Porter Goss referred her to General Hayden, out at NSA.
[34:26.530 --> 34:27.290]  By all I mean, you know.
[34:27.910 --> 34:31.070]  It's going back to the origin of this program, so...
[34:31.690 --> 34:33.950]  And he went out there and, of course, he talked to...
[34:33.950 --> 34:38.030]  She talked to him and he said, of course, we don't have to worry about that now.
[34:38.030 --> 34:41.190]  It's all been approved by the White House and it's legal, so...
[34:41.190 --> 34:43.750]  So spying on everybody then was legal internally.
[34:43.750 --> 34:47.570]  And it was all written up in memos by you and, I guess, others.
[34:48.670 --> 34:49.410]  Held in...
[34:49.410 --> 34:56.730]  In fact, I know the NSA lawyer went down to Addington's office in Cheney's...
[34:56.730 --> 34:58.730]  Who was right outside of Cheney's office.
[34:58.890 --> 35:02.590]  Addington was his legal rep there.
[35:03.330 --> 35:08.490]  And he asked for the memos that said that the spying was legal.
[35:08.490 --> 35:14.690]  So he'd have a written record documentation so that his ass wasn't on the line, you know.
[35:16.070 --> 35:17.530]  And he never got it, of course.
[35:19.010 --> 35:24.570]  Because if he got anything like that, and I don't think anything like that was written, because that would be direct evidence for impeachment.
[35:27.090 --> 35:27.490]  So...
[35:27.490 --> 35:29.530]  But they didn't do that, so...
[35:29.530 --> 35:31.990]  And they didn't get the records, so they kept going.
[35:31.990 --> 35:36.170]  And that program was reauthorized every 45 days by the...
[35:36.170 --> 35:41.830]  What I called the Yes Committee, which was Hayden and Tennant and the DOJ.
[35:45.510 --> 35:46.030]  So...
[35:46.590 --> 35:48.630]  Shortly after that, I mean, I went from there.
[35:48.830 --> 35:49.430]  I went to...
[35:49.430 --> 35:49.810]  We...
[35:49.810 --> 35:50.370]  Kirk...
[35:50.370 --> 35:51.810]  I wasn't alone in this, by the way.
[35:51.870 --> 35:52.430]  There were like...
[35:52.430 --> 35:56.610]  There were four others out of NSA and one staff from the HPSI.
[35:56.790 --> 35:58.010]  One member of the staff.
[35:58.010 --> 36:08.870]  We were all trying to work internally in the government over these years, trying to get them to come around to being constitutionally acceptable and take it into the courts and have the courts oversight of it, too.
[36:11.370 --> 36:15.770]  So we naively kept thinking that that could happen.
[36:16.550 --> 36:17.810]  And it never did.
[36:18.810 --> 36:21.710]  In fact, even now, they're trying to keep all these issues out of the court.
[36:21.830 --> 36:22.690]  That's why I signed the F.
[36:22.750 --> 36:26.010]  David for EFF to help testify.
[36:26.650 --> 36:29.270]  I wanted to testify in court about all this stuff.
[36:31.210 --> 36:39.650]  Because, in my mind, these people are still hiding behind this, quote, national security curtain.
[36:40.450 --> 36:47.830]  And all I want to do is move that aside and say, don't pay attention to that man behind the curtain because he's affecting you.
[36:48.470 --> 36:50.190]  He's affecting every one of us.
[36:51.730 --> 36:59.650]  I mean, in my mind, we're going down this slippery slope towards totalitarianism.
[37:00.110 --> 37:05.110]  And that's why I told Jim Bamford that I thought we were about that far from a totalitarian state.
[37:05.110 --> 37:11.410]  At least everything is set to make that... turn that key and have that happen.
[37:12.930 --> 37:15.930]  Because the government's now intimidating people in different ways.
[37:16.210 --> 37:29.030]  And, you know, they had this... they had this thing about being able to pick you up off the street and then charge you with things and keep you isolated from no... you would get no due process and things like that.
[37:29.030 --> 37:33.210]  That was... that's just been found, of course, unconstitutional, which it is.
[37:34.090 --> 37:35.950]  And everything they're doing is unconstitutional.
[37:36.110 --> 37:46.110]  That's why they're trying to keep the EFF lawsuit out of the Supreme Court, because at that point it'll be... they're afraid it'll be ruled unconstitutional and their whole house of cards will fall.
[37:47.630 --> 37:49.150]  That's really what's driving them.
[37:50.610 --> 37:58.770]  But, at any rate, after that and all the stuff we were doing, they decided to raid us to keep us quiet, threaten us, you know.
[37:59.430 --> 38:02.390]  So we were raided, simultaneously, four of us.
[38:03.130 --> 38:06.910]  By the way, I forgot to mention, we did sign a...
[38:06.910 --> 38:12.350]  the complaint to the DOD IG's office about all the corruption in NSA and all this feeding.
[38:13.190 --> 38:20.350]  I mean, they provided a hotline that said, you know, if you see waste, fraud, and abuse, you're supposed to report it here.
[38:20.910 --> 38:22.290]  This is government policy.
[38:22.290 --> 38:24.070]  So, I said, okay, well, let's do it.
[38:24.310 --> 38:25.990]  So, we did.
[38:26.690 --> 38:31.270]  And, of course, they sent the FBI to visit us.
[38:31.930 --> 38:33.930]  In my case, they came in with guns drawn.
[38:33.950 --> 38:36.390]  I don't know why they did that, but they did, so...
[38:37.550 --> 38:38.470]  I mean, it didn't...
[38:38.470 --> 38:40.730]  I mean, like I said before, I've been shot at.
[38:41.470 --> 38:43.570]  Mostly, I haven't told anybody, but most of the...
[38:43.570 --> 38:49.090]  most of the time that I was shot at was by deer hunters when I was out hunting in Pennsylvania woods.
[38:49.590 --> 38:52.290]  And the guys coming down were from New York.
[38:53.690 --> 38:56.090]  I mean, they would shoot at anything.
[38:57.050 --> 38:59.570]  I would hear these bullets come on by my head, you know.
[39:00.310 --> 39:01.250]  Let me get out of here.
[39:01.430 --> 39:05.050]  I said, I didn't shoot back because I wouldn't miss, you know.
[39:11.870 --> 39:14.810]  So, anyway, after we got raided by...
[39:15.970 --> 39:18.510]  they came in and took our computers and everything.
[39:19.930 --> 39:23.650]  And then, over time, they wanted to keep us continually quiet.
[39:23.830 --> 39:26.470]  This raid, by the way, happened the day after...
[39:26.470 --> 39:40.710]  the second morning after Attorney General Gonzalez's testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee where he was testifying to these surveillance programs.
[39:40.930 --> 39:46.230]  And what he referred to as the TSP, Terror Surveillance Program, which was a bunch of programs.
[39:47.510 --> 39:55.070]  And the one that we were talking about spying on Americans, everybody in this country was called Stellar Wind, and he never addressed that one at all.
[39:55.770 --> 40:00.590]  So, they were afraid that we would go to that committee and tell them what he never told them.
[40:01.170 --> 40:03.590]  So, they wanted to keep us quiet in that way, too.
[40:04.410 --> 40:12.590]  That was why they raided us right after his testimony because they realized that we had a history of visiting committees, you know.
[40:13.510 --> 40:21.790]  Well, since we knew what the program was all about, we probably would take a shot at the Judiciary Committee since none of the other committees were paying any attention.
[40:23.550 --> 40:36.730]  So, anyhow, that was an experience, but it didn't scare me.
[40:36.870 --> 40:39.490]  What it did was make me mad, all right?
[40:39.810 --> 40:42.130]  I was getting mad while they were still there.
[40:43.330 --> 40:55.950]  In fact, I got so mad I accused them of being sent there by somebody else and that, you know, and I said, the reason you're really here is you want me to keep quiet about Stellar Wind and here's what this program does, spying on all Americans, taking all the data in.
[40:56.190 --> 40:58.870]  And I'm explaining this to them on my back porch.
[40:59.690 --> 41:09.730]  And I'm doing it because the head agent there, Special Agent Paul Marrick, who signed the affidavit with a bunch of lies to get the judge to sign it.
[41:09.810 --> 41:11.110]  Little did the judge know, right?
[41:12.990 --> 41:15.890]  And we're still dealing with that.
[41:17.750 --> 41:20.770]  Being quiet is not one thing I'm going to do, by the way.
[41:21.630 --> 41:24.750]  I will not sit here and actually ask you this.
[41:36.060 --> 41:39.520]  Well, and I'm not alone, so you need to know that.
[41:39.640 --> 41:42.840]  There are other people who are with me, like five of us, who came with that.
[41:42.840 --> 41:48.340]  And then we ran into people who were downtown Washington, GAP and EFF and ACLU.
[41:48.460 --> 41:51.900]  And we're cooperating with all of them, trying to help them, too.
[41:53.360 --> 41:54.440]  So we aren't alone.
[41:54.580 --> 42:01.040]  There's a large community out there, which we didn't know at the time, because we... I mean, I was a back-back room guy from NSA who broke code.
[42:01.160 --> 42:04.160]  You know, I came out and, gee, what's the world really about out here?
[42:04.280 --> 42:04.440]  You know?
[42:05.560 --> 42:06.980]  So this is all new to me.
[42:07.040 --> 42:08.200]  It took me a while to figure this out.
[42:08.200 --> 42:13.420]  But I wasn't going to sit by and let the FBI do what they were doing.
[42:13.640 --> 42:17.260]  So I accused them of many things at my house.
[42:17.540 --> 42:21.500]  And before they left, they had to have a meeting outside my house, because none of the other...
[42:21.500 --> 42:29.160]  See, I caused them a problem when I exposed this highly classified program to all these agents who weren't cleared.
[42:29.780 --> 42:30.260]  Okay?
[42:31.840 --> 42:33.520]  So they have a problem now.
[42:34.240 --> 42:37.320]  And the head agent was the only one who was cleared.
[42:37.320 --> 42:40.560]  Now, you know, he took an oath to defend the Constitution, too.
[42:41.920 --> 42:43.660]  But he wasn't living up to his oath.
[42:43.840 --> 42:49.340]  And as I've said before, neither are any people in Congress or anybody in the administration.
[42:49.860 --> 42:52.120]  They're all violating our constitutional rights.
[42:57.340 --> 42:58.760]  So that's why I'm...
[42:59.380 --> 43:04.220]  That's why I'm standing up and saying these things, because, you know, I just can't let it pass.
[43:04.340 --> 43:06.000]  I mean, these people are basically cowards.
[43:06.500 --> 43:10.780]  I mean, this guy, when I was explaining this to all these other agents, the only thing he could do was look at the floor.
[43:12.040 --> 43:13.080]  I mean, I was watching.
[43:13.100 --> 43:14.820]  I watched the body language, everything, you know.
[43:14.960 --> 43:17.000]  I read more into body language than anything else.
[43:18.820 --> 43:21.360]  So it was pretty clear to me that he was ashamed of what he was doing.
[43:21.840 --> 43:23.060]  But he was still doing it.
[43:23.700 --> 43:26.900]  And I told him the Nuremberg, you know, defense doesn't work.
[43:27.580 --> 43:31.620]  Following orders is not, you know, not acceptable.
[43:38.640 --> 43:39.040]  So...
[43:40.410 --> 43:42.800]  So then after that, I decided, well...
[43:42.800 --> 43:45.860]  I mean, we lawyered up right after that raid, so that...
[43:45.860 --> 43:48.560]  And our lawyers are saying, you have to be quiet.
[43:48.700 --> 43:49.300]  Don't say anything.
[43:49.480 --> 43:51.320]  You know, they'll use it against you and stuff like that.
[43:52.220 --> 43:54.600]  You know, so he was really a strong advocate.
[43:54.600 --> 44:01.500]  And he was an ex-prosecutor, so he was a strong advocate of saying nothing.
[44:01.740 --> 44:07.220]  So that, you know, you didn't give ammunition to the prosecution.
[44:07.560 --> 44:09.220]  Well, there wasn't any ammunition to give him.
[44:09.920 --> 44:18.540]  Except the stuff I would talk about would be things they'd have to drag me into court and charge me with would be exposing the crimes they were committing.
[44:19.380 --> 44:19.790]  Right?
[44:19.860 --> 44:21.220]  So I thought that would be a good idea.
[44:22.160 --> 44:23.380]  Let them do that.
[44:24.360 --> 44:29.560]  So at any rate, that was up until 2010.
[44:29.560 --> 44:32.540]  Then in 2010, they decided that...
[44:32.540 --> 44:33.980]  Well, they threatened us with...
[44:33.980 --> 44:37.740]  They made one last threat for prosecution against us.
[44:37.740 --> 44:40.140]  It had to do with our Turf Valley Club meeting.
[44:40.940 --> 44:49.340]  And at the Turf Valley Club, we had all the people who they were interested in met.
[44:49.340 --> 44:56.880]  What we were trying to do was to address how to solve and how to approach the solution of Medicare and Medicaid fraud.
[44:58.700 --> 45:01.140]  And the FBI, after their raid...
[45:01.140 --> 45:02.700]  They raided it shortly after that.
[45:02.940 --> 45:05.300]  And that was...
[45:05.300 --> 45:06.080]  And they had...
[45:06.080 --> 45:07.640]  What that gave them was all the...
[45:07.640 --> 45:11.560]  I mean, of course, not that they already didn't have all the emails and everything we were sending back and forth.
[45:11.560 --> 45:19.480]  But in email, we listed the agenda of what we were going to discuss and a cooperation paper and all that, which we took off the web, by the way.
[45:20.100 --> 45:21.740]  They called it a conspiracy paper.
[45:21.860 --> 45:23.140]  It was taken directly off the web.
[45:23.180 --> 45:27.480]  So I guess the web is a conspiracy center or something.
[45:28.360 --> 45:36.840]  But at any rate, they were planning on doing that.
[45:37.000 --> 45:37.490]  And so I...
[45:38.040 --> 45:41.640]  And our lawyer told that they were planning on indicting us on that Turf Valley Club meeting.
[45:41.900 --> 45:43.790]  And I figured they had all the evidence.
[45:43.790 --> 45:44.660]  Why are they doing that?
[45:44.800 --> 45:47.740]  I said, well, it's a malicious prosecution is the charge.
[45:48.580 --> 45:49.060]  Okay.
[45:49.260 --> 45:49.980]  So I figured...
[45:49.980 --> 45:51.040]  This is when...
[45:51.040 --> 45:51.820]  This is when I...
[45:52.300 --> 45:53.920]  I explained this on democracy now.
[45:54.540 --> 45:55.020]  I...
[45:55.020 --> 45:55.360]  I...
[45:55.360 --> 45:57.660]  I said, well, I know...
[45:57.660 --> 45:59.940]  I know Tom Drake's phone is tapped.
[46:00.380 --> 46:00.680]  Okay.
[46:01.290 --> 46:03.140]  Because he's been indicted already.
[46:04.240 --> 46:08.240]  So, I'm going to call Tom and tell him all the evidence that we have...
[46:09.420 --> 46:14.560]  About malicious prosecution that they're trying to get against us on this Turf Valley Club meeting.
[46:14.620 --> 46:17.100]  So I called up Tom and I listed all this stuff, you know.
[46:17.540 --> 46:20.160]  And I figured the FBI couldn't find the data.
[46:20.160 --> 46:23.900]  So I said, well, when you go into the file, you know, you click on the file.
[46:24.260 --> 46:26.960]  And you go down to properties, you know, and...
[46:28.200 --> 46:30.340]  So I had to explain it over the phone to Tom.
[46:30.520 --> 46:31.300]  Tom didn't say anything.
[46:31.380 --> 46:33.290]  I think he understood what I was doing, but...
[46:33.980 --> 46:38.200]  So after that happened, though, we never heard about the Turf Valley Club again.
[46:39.180 --> 46:43.000]  So then the DOJ decides they're going to offer us letters of immunity.
[46:43.360 --> 46:45.180]  That was Kirk, Weeby, and I.
[46:46.100 --> 46:57.290]  So they offered us letters of immunity under the condition that we would be honest and tell them everything that we discussed at lunches with Tom Drake.
[46:57.380 --> 47:01.000]  Because we had lunches with Tom after he got raided, too, because we were friends, you know.
[47:01.160 --> 47:06.820]  And just because somebody gets raided by the FBI doesn't make them a non-friend, you know.
[47:06.820 --> 47:09.400]  So we weren't going to throw them away just because of that.
[47:11.940 --> 47:12.380]  So...
[47:13.320 --> 47:17.500]  And our lawyer kept... I mean, I will tell you what I told our lawyer.
[47:17.760 --> 47:22.040]  He said, They want to talk to you, and so they'll give you letters of immunity.
[47:22.290 --> 47:26.020]  And I said, You tell those bastards to go piss up a rope.
[47:27.800 --> 47:29.920]  And he said, And he said, No, here's a way to...
[47:29.920 --> 47:30.640]  This is...
[47:30.640 --> 47:31.540]  You know, he finally convinced.
[47:31.620 --> 47:35.940]  He said, Well, you know, if you do this, you're off the hook, and it's all done with, and they will never come back.
[47:36.080 --> 47:36.760]  And I said...
[47:36.760 --> 47:38.500]  So I said, Okay, so...
[47:38.860 --> 47:41.160]  I couldn't pass up the opportunity, you know.
[47:41.300 --> 47:49.700]  Because when I went to meet these guys, one was the prosecutor, Welsh, who was the same prosecutor in the Stephen, Senator Stephen's case.
[47:50.940 --> 47:53.100]  He's also the prosecutor in Tom's case.
[47:53.460 --> 47:54.360]  And he was also...
[47:54.360 --> 48:01.500]  He came in and took over from another prosecutor, who was threatening to indict us on that at Turf Valley's thing.
[48:02.200 --> 48:02.680]  So...
[48:02.680 --> 48:07.360]  He was there, and then an FBI person was there, a woman.
[48:07.740 --> 48:09.050]  And then a man who...
[48:09.640 --> 48:10.720]  No, he kind of...
[48:10.720 --> 48:12.000]  He tried to stay.
[48:12.000 --> 48:12.800]  He was with the FBI.
[48:12.940 --> 48:16.360]  But I knew he was from Q2 from NSA, you know.
[48:16.580 --> 48:16.800]  So...
[48:18.280 --> 48:19.680]  So the three of them were there.
[48:19.880 --> 48:26.040]  And I started off saying, you know, because I wanted to make it clear how I felt about them.
[48:26.380 --> 48:29.840]  I said, You people do not know how pissed off at you I really am.
[48:31.140 --> 48:32.220]  You know, and then...
[48:32.220 --> 48:36.320]  You know, and then we got into asking questions, and I would answer their questions, and I said...
[48:36.320 --> 48:44.060]  And then I got into saying random things like, you know, I was really irritated at all the laws that NSA was breaking, you know.
[48:44.420 --> 48:44.860]  And...
[48:44.860 --> 48:44.960]  And...
[48:45.960 --> 48:50.020]  This idiot on the end from Q2 said, What laws are those?
[48:50.240 --> 48:51.980]  Well, you know, that was my opening.
[48:52.290 --> 48:52.940]  You know, I...
[48:54.040 --> 48:54.840]  I just...
[48:54.840 --> 48:57.020]  I just had to lay them all out.
[48:58.120 --> 48:59.200]  Including the Constitution.
[48:59.620 --> 49:04.200]  And all he could do at the end of that was look at the prosecutor, and none of them could say a word.
[49:04.740 --> 49:06.400]  That's why I say they're all cowards.
[49:07.320 --> 49:09.600]  Sunlight is the solution to these things.
[49:09.940 --> 49:11.820]  And so that's why I'm trying to do that.
[49:13.540 --> 49:13.980]  Thanks.
[49:22.980 --> 49:31.920]  And to do that, I ran into people like Jane Mayer of the New Yorker, and Laura Poitras here, and Jim Bamford, and others who are trying to...
[49:31.920 --> 49:35.880]  trying to help the... expose what's been going on here.
[49:37.280 --> 49:37.840]  So...
[49:37.840 --> 49:40.920]  Like I say, I think that...
[49:43.160 --> 49:44.960]  President Reagan had it right.
[49:45.280 --> 49:48.020]  We're a country with a government, not the reverse.
[49:49.060 --> 49:51.160]  And I'd like to see it stay that way.
[49:53.820 --> 49:54.380]  Thanks.
[50:02.740 --> 50:05.420]  Now I'd like to take you into a little bit of the technology.
[50:05.700 --> 50:06.720]  This is the fun part.
[50:07.400 --> 50:07.800]  So...
[50:08.320 --> 50:09.620]  You may be interested in this.
[50:09.780 --> 50:10.000]  I don't know.
[50:11.660 --> 50:13.980]  Emmanuel slash Eric has the copies.
[50:14.980 --> 50:16.920]  If you want copies, you're welcome to them.
[50:17.060 --> 50:17.740]  I don't...
[50:18.840 --> 50:19.880]  So these were the...
[50:21.360 --> 50:22.540]  Today's approaches, you know.
[50:23.760 --> 50:24.460]  They would...
[50:24.460 --> 50:27.860]  Everybody would create their own files, so everybody would have all kinds of different files.
[50:27.860 --> 50:29.080]  You know, a time...
[50:29.080 --> 50:30.020]  Some would be real time.
[50:30.200 --> 50:30.740]  Some wouldn't.
[50:31.620 --> 50:32.020]  Some...
[50:32.020 --> 50:32.460]  You know.
[50:34.660 --> 50:35.060]  And...
[50:36.540 --> 50:39.620]  In many cases, they would say, well, we can't ingest all this data.
[50:39.740 --> 50:41.780]  Okay, so throw all that away, and we'll take in this.
[50:42.100 --> 50:43.100]  We won't even look at it.
[50:43.200 --> 50:43.760]  Just throw it away.
[50:45.320 --> 50:45.720]  So...
[50:46.820 --> 50:47.220]  So...
[50:47.220 --> 50:49.960]  And RDBM, relational databasing schemes.
[50:50.240 --> 51:01.920]  The problem with relational databasing schemes, when you're dealing at the terabyte per minute rates, or fiber optic rates, is it's hard to index and keep up with the rate coming in.
[51:02.760 --> 51:05.180]  It starts to back up and fall apart.
[51:05.420 --> 51:07.580]  So we went with absolute flat files.
[51:08.020 --> 51:09.320]  The whole way...
[51:09.320 --> 51:12.440]  The best way we saw to do it was B plus tree indexing and flat file.
[51:12.560 --> 51:13.040]  Quick index.
[51:13.200 --> 51:13.780]  Quick lookup.
[51:14.060 --> 51:14.240]  You know.
[51:14.780 --> 51:16.620]  Fast decision making right away.
[51:17.100 --> 51:17.500]  So...
[51:20.540 --> 51:21.280]  That was...
[51:21.280 --> 51:22.040]  That gets into that.
[51:26.860 --> 51:28.580]  Yeah, they are...
[51:28.580 --> 51:30.520]  Their content queries can be...
[51:30.520 --> 51:32.320]  The point is, we didn't...
[51:32.320 --> 51:34.260]  You can't look at it like a Google query.
[51:34.420 --> 51:36.360]  If you do a Google query, you'll get...
[51:36.360 --> 51:38.340]  You know, you can get millions of returns.
[51:39.760 --> 51:42.780]  And there may be something in there that you want, but you can't really tell.
[51:42.900 --> 51:44.320]  So that's not really a good query.
[51:44.320 --> 51:48.980]  And that was really focusing on basically a series of words or content scanning.
[51:51.200 --> 51:52.580]  Or indexing that form.
[51:52.700 --> 51:53.660]  Whereas we wanted to...
[51:53.660 --> 51:56.800]  We wanted to be able to look into the data without actually looking at the content.
[51:56.980 --> 51:58.680]  We wanted to save that till the end.
[51:59.220 --> 51:59.660]  Alright.
[51:59.700 --> 52:03.060]  We'll look at content at the very end of our selection process.
[52:04.680 --> 52:05.120]  So...
[52:05.120 --> 52:06.040]  Next slide please.
[52:07.980 --> 52:09.220]  So we looked at...
[52:09.220 --> 52:10.400]  These are the kind of the requirements.
[52:10.860 --> 52:12.680]  Although they rarely state them this way, you know.
[52:13.480 --> 52:14.840]  That's because they really...
[52:14.840 --> 52:20.380]  They have a very difficult time expressing what their real requirements are.
[52:21.540 --> 52:24.020]  Because you have to know what the problem is to do that.
[52:25.000 --> 52:25.400]  Alright.
[52:25.540 --> 52:27.100]  That's unfortunate.
[52:28.300 --> 52:28.740]  So...
[52:28.740 --> 52:31.280]  But you can read through these and see that, you know.
[52:32.560 --> 52:35.240]  Some of these are pretty straightforward, obvious things, you know.
[52:35.440 --> 52:36.100]  It's not...
[52:36.100 --> 52:37.340]  Not very complicated.
[52:38.520 --> 52:38.960]  Okay.
[52:39.100 --> 52:39.520]  Next slide.
[52:42.700 --> 52:44.140]  So this gets into...
[52:45.580 --> 52:48.320]  Automating analysis is really the underlying theme here.
[52:49.600 --> 52:52.740]  Making a system that's smart enough to be able to figure things out.
[52:55.780 --> 52:56.460]  You know.
[52:57.240 --> 53:00.100]  These slides, by the way, are about 12 years old.
[53:00.560 --> 53:01.040]  No.
[53:01.300 --> 53:02.220]  No, I'm sorry.
[53:02.380 --> 53:02.860]  They're not 12.
[53:03.000 --> 53:04.140]  They're 8 years old.
[53:05.700 --> 53:09.000]  So, you know, this is not a current problem.
[53:09.340 --> 53:13.100]  I haven't been at NSA for 10 years, and I haven't had a clearance since 2007.
[53:13.100 --> 53:16.980]  So we haven't been working anywhere near any of this stuff since then, so...
[53:17.860 --> 53:24.760]  But the problems haven't changed, as if you read the latest White House big data initiative.
[53:24.760 --> 53:27.100]  They're asking for the same things right here.
[53:28.620 --> 53:30.020]  But they don't say it that way.
[53:30.200 --> 53:30.260]  Okay.
[53:31.740 --> 53:32.220]  Next slide.
[53:33.900 --> 53:34.660]  This is...
[53:34.660 --> 53:37.260]  We used this all along, and this is right off the web.
[53:37.400 --> 53:38.680]  This was a picture of the web.
[53:39.940 --> 53:40.960]  Someone made this up.
[53:41.040 --> 53:42.100]  I don't know who did it, but...
[53:43.480 --> 53:46.500]  This is basically a physical connection, not the...
[53:46.500 --> 53:51.420]  What we call a logical connection, which is who's communicating across the network.
[53:51.420 --> 53:59.840]  These are the physical fiber optic lines, satellites, wires, things like that, that all that communication transits on.
[54:01.340 --> 54:06.880]  But you can see that each little dot is maybe 10,000 computers or something, you know.
[54:07.860 --> 54:11.160]  I don't know how many, but it's just a way of visualizing the network.
[54:12.220 --> 54:14.340]  But you can see choke points and things like that.
[54:14.480 --> 54:18.720]  Well, those are where you want to go for all the grasping of all the data.
[54:19.340 --> 54:20.600]  So, next slide.
[54:22.820 --> 54:23.140]  Yes.
[54:23.400 --> 54:24.580]  This is my favorite one.
[54:24.900 --> 54:25.520]  They said...
[54:25.520 --> 54:31.580]  They kept saying, you know, volume, velocity, and variety, and this is what they used in Congress to get all the money, is the real problem.
[54:31.660 --> 54:32.620]  We can't handle this anymore.
[54:32.720 --> 54:33.720]  And I said, gee, this is...
[54:33.720 --> 54:35.500]  Everything here is positive, you know.
[54:36.780 --> 54:38.280]  Volume, you get more about your target.
[54:38.720 --> 54:39.740]  Velocity, you get it faster.
[54:39.880 --> 54:41.140]  Variety, you get more aspects of this.
[54:41.140 --> 54:41.820]  This is all positive.
[54:42.600 --> 54:44.140]  Why are we saying this is a problem?
[54:45.480 --> 54:48.620]  Well, it was to get money, you know, and do the feeding, and...
[54:49.540 --> 54:51.600]  Continue the process in the circular.
[54:51.900 --> 54:53.360]  You know, I'll retire.
[54:53.500 --> 54:54.120]  Come over your way.
[54:54.260 --> 54:55.900]  You can hire on to me or something, you know.
[54:57.060 --> 54:57.660]  Next slide.
[54:58.900 --> 55:03.500]  So, this is kind of the idea of how you put together an ingest of data.
[55:04.820 --> 55:07.880]  But the process really needs to validate that data in the beginning.
[55:08.260 --> 55:11.240]  And the reason they need to do that is like for customs and border protection.
[55:11.240 --> 55:15.320]  You have tens of thousands of people writing out all these forms worldwide.
[55:15.580 --> 55:17.820]  And, you know, they speak the primary language.
[55:17.980 --> 55:19.040]  It's a different language, not English.
[55:19.420 --> 55:19.640]  So...
[55:20.240 --> 55:27.580]  And so they're filling out all these forms on data and inputting all the attributes of the companies and the things they want to buy or sell.
[55:28.120 --> 55:29.980]  And then they send these forms in.
[55:30.180 --> 55:35.180]  Well, they don't always spell the names of the companies right or don't...
[55:35.180 --> 55:39.200]  You know, they might make a visual error on a phone number or the address or something.
[55:40.240 --> 55:46.100]  And so you have to go through a process of validating that data and then correcting it.
[55:46.720 --> 55:51.880]  So that you can then base all follow-on processing on solid data.
[55:52.620 --> 55:53.900]  If you don't do it...
[55:53.900 --> 55:54.600]  If you build on...
[55:54.600 --> 55:59.320]  If you take in crap, you're going to have garbage in there and you're building on sand from that point.
[55:59.600 --> 55:59.860]  So...
[56:00.780 --> 56:02.600]  So then we did event recognition.
[56:02.600 --> 56:04.940]  Things we want to really analyze with the data.
[56:05.160 --> 56:07.100]  And then privacy protection, you know.
[56:07.920 --> 56:09.440]  You want to keep...
[56:09.440 --> 56:15.100]  You uniquely encrypt things that any attribute of a U.S. citizen, for example.
[56:15.280 --> 56:16.160]  So no one could...
[56:16.160 --> 56:19.000]  No one could follow it from that point on.
[56:19.420 --> 56:22.000]  Remember, this is the initial acquisition of data points.
[56:22.180 --> 56:27.080]  So from that point on, nobody can look at anything but an encrypted version of an attribute of a U.S. citizen.
[56:27.860 --> 56:32.480]  And then you use a distributed storing and you index the content against that because...
[56:32.480 --> 56:35.400]  And you'll see it later when it comes up on the timelining scheme.
[56:36.960 --> 56:44.720]  All this is predicated on the enterprise approach, which says in the end you want to produce intelligence from timelines and graphs and things like that.
[56:44.720 --> 56:45.940]  So you have...
[56:45.940 --> 56:49.080]  What you're doing here has to support that all the way through the enterprise.
[56:50.340 --> 56:51.380]  And that's where...
[56:51.380 --> 56:52.380]  That's where you get that...
[56:52.380 --> 56:56.900]  When you bring multi-disciplines together, that's where you get that understanding of how one can help the other.
[56:57.860 --> 57:02.220]  And how one breakthrough at one point along the line can support the entire enterprise.
[57:04.780 --> 57:07.180]  And then you get into building the graphs.
[57:08.840 --> 57:13.520]  This is where you take relationships, the ones you want to track, and you do a...
[57:14.400 --> 57:17.580]  Again, this is where we use the B plus tree kind of approach.
[57:17.740 --> 57:20.680]  You index A to B, but you also have to index B to A.
[57:21.100 --> 57:23.680]  So you do a double index, basically.
[57:23.840 --> 57:25.700]  Because if you're pulling on B, you want to get A.
[57:25.780 --> 57:27.080]  And if you pull on A, you want to get B.
[57:29.420 --> 57:35.320]  And then you keep a frequency count of how many times you've seen that link, and in which direction, and so on.
[57:35.540 --> 57:37.380]  So that kind of thing tells you...
[57:38.060 --> 57:40.460]  That's the building of relationships graph.
[57:40.760 --> 57:42.720]  And actually, it builds rather quickly.
[57:42.940 --> 57:47.480]  If you take a few billion inputs, you get a really big spike of the graph, adding links.
[57:47.740 --> 57:53.040]  But after a point, it starts leveling off because you're collecting the same links over and over again.
[57:53.040 --> 57:57.720]  So as you build over time, you've reconstructed most of your social network.
[57:57.920 --> 58:03.140]  So until you add somebody to your social network, the graph does not increase in size.
[58:04.240 --> 58:11.960]  And then you go in and look at other domains and other graphs, and then you cross-correlate those domains into a consolidated graph.
[58:12.920 --> 58:17.160]  Where now you have... and then you have to have tables of attributes of entities so that you know...
[58:17.720 --> 58:19.580]  And you don't use a person's name.
[58:20.000 --> 58:22.620]  That's the first thing you do not use.
[58:23.260 --> 58:26.240]  Like they use to render some people.
[58:28.040 --> 58:30.500]  You know, it's hard to believe that they would do that.
[58:30.600 --> 58:31.540]  They would use a name.
[58:31.740 --> 58:36.120]  It's the most unreliable attribute of a person, is the name.
[58:37.040 --> 58:43.680]  I mean, I do a Google on my name, and I get about five or six William Edward Binneys in the United States alone.
[58:44.260 --> 58:48.460]  Now, if you start Mohammed somebody, how many of those are you going to get?
[58:48.680 --> 58:51.540]  Well, that's the most unreliable aspect.
[58:52.780 --> 58:57.200]  But they've done that, and it's just insane.
[58:57.760 --> 59:06.840]  So, I mean, the reliable attributes are phone numbers, addresses, passport number, driver's license numbers, things like that.
[59:07.260 --> 59:10.220]  Those are the things you key on, the reliable attributes.
[59:10.840 --> 59:12.920]  And then you start building the graphs with those.
[59:13.540 --> 59:14.080]  Next slide.
[59:19.000 --> 59:19.480]  Yeah.
[59:20.180 --> 59:22.540]  And so, this is then... and then you try to consolidate...
[59:23.120 --> 59:26.120]  We had the vision for government here, so that this is...
[59:26.120 --> 59:29.560]  This is how you would consolidate all the graphs from all the government agencies.
[59:30.380 --> 59:33.320]  And this was one we were going to use with Social Security.
[59:33.560 --> 59:34.340]  Like, who's dead?
[59:34.540 --> 59:35.180]  Who's alive?
[59:35.600 --> 59:35.760]  Right?
[59:36.180 --> 59:43.160]  Medicare, Medicaid, doctors, hospitals, you know, and labs, and things like that.
[59:43.400 --> 59:50.780]  And then do a consolidated graph approach to try to discover, as they request payment, the fraud.
[59:53.080 --> 59:56.580]  And this is what the FBI, in their infinite wisdom, stopped.
[59:58.060 --> 59:59.660]  So, we still have it going.
[01:00:00.880 --> 01:00:01.780]  At any rate.
[01:00:02.520 --> 01:00:03.340]  Next slide.
[01:00:06.620 --> 01:00:11.300]  So, in automating analysis, this was our automate analysis process.
[01:00:12.500 --> 01:00:21.660]  We take high integrity data, that is, data that's either stored in basis or live streaming in, and validated.
[01:00:21.660 --> 01:00:23.020]  So, you have to do...
[01:00:23.020 --> 01:00:24.740]  You have to validate it to get high integrity.
[01:00:24.880 --> 01:00:26.160]  Otherwise, you're building on sand.
[01:00:27.200 --> 01:00:29.100]  So, then the next...
[01:00:29.100 --> 01:00:36.960]  The next thing is to do some kind of event recognition within that data, that may be meaningful in a given environment.
[01:00:37.320 --> 01:00:37.620]  Okay?
[01:00:37.760 --> 01:00:39.660]  So, at that point, you may be able to say...
[01:00:39.660 --> 01:00:40.560]  You alert, or...
[01:00:40.560 --> 01:00:41.800]  Why don't you go look here?
[01:00:41.900 --> 01:00:47.000]  You can get other resources looking at the same problem, saying that something like this might be happening from this...
[01:00:47.000 --> 01:00:49.880]  Why don't you go look there and see if you can find something that will support it?
[01:00:50.620 --> 01:00:53.820]  And then, after that, you go up through events.
[01:00:54.080 --> 01:00:56.040]  You get into activity, which is...
[01:00:56.040 --> 01:00:57.460]  This is where you build the graph.
[01:00:58.140 --> 01:01:02.780]  And you build the communities of the relationships of the entities in the events.
[01:01:03.400 --> 01:01:06.460]  And then you look at the community and see how that community is acting.
[01:01:06.860 --> 01:01:08.160]  And that gives you an activity.
[01:01:08.860 --> 01:01:16.160]  And then, at that point, you look and think, well, at this point, we get things like status and disposition of what that community is doing.
[01:01:17.480 --> 01:01:17.820]  Okay?
[01:01:18.000 --> 01:01:20.310]  And then, at that point, then you go up to intentions and capabilities.
[01:01:20.880 --> 01:01:21.940]  That's the next level of automation.
[01:01:22.080 --> 01:01:23.800]  This is probably the most difficult level.
[01:01:24.460 --> 01:01:29.500]  But the point is, you can take past history and look at what they've done in the past and say, here's the criteria.
[01:01:29.500 --> 01:01:33.920]  Well, here's what they did specifically prior to any action that they took.
[01:01:34.080 --> 01:01:41.540]  And you can use that criteria in the activity recognition or recognizing certain activity process to do inferencing.
[01:01:42.020 --> 01:01:44.080]  Either that or you could postulate conditions.
[01:01:44.220 --> 01:01:45.100]  You don't have to be...
[01:01:45.100 --> 01:01:48.600]  You know, and a lot of this information is already in the data.
[01:01:48.860 --> 01:01:51.920]  You don't have to have knowledge about it to begin with.
[01:01:52.540 --> 01:01:56.920]  When you start working with the data, you'll see this knowledge inside that data.
[01:01:57.060 --> 01:01:58.380]  The properties are already there.
[01:01:59.820 --> 01:02:01.120]  And I'll show you some of that.
[01:02:01.260 --> 01:02:02.540]  Next slide, please.
[01:02:03.800 --> 01:02:05.020]  Here's how some of it going.
[01:02:05.240 --> 01:02:05.820]  This is like...
[01:02:05.820 --> 01:02:06.940]  In vision, this is the graph.
[01:02:07.500 --> 01:02:08.540]  And this is how...
[01:02:08.540 --> 01:02:16.320]  If you think of the blue as everything else, and the red is what you're really interested in, and the yellow is the zone of proximity that you might...
[01:02:16.320 --> 01:02:23.000]  There's a high probability, or there's a high possibility they might be associated with something you're really interested in.
[01:02:23.020 --> 01:02:24.240]  So you want to look at them closely.
[01:02:25.040 --> 01:02:29.920]  Well, then this then gives you the zone to really focus in.
[01:02:30.020 --> 01:02:32.300]  And this is where you'd want to use latent semantic indexing.
[01:02:32.340 --> 01:02:43.460]  Because you've reduced the problem to such a state that now you're only comparing data of things that are related or in close proximity to a known entity with the data of that entity.
[01:02:43.460 --> 01:02:46.680]  You see, now latent semantic indexing would work.
[01:02:47.480 --> 01:02:51.400]  Because you've reduced it to the level, so probabilities of combinations go away.
[01:02:51.580 --> 01:02:57.980]  And the fact that they're so close, there's a high probability that words in common will actually have the same meaning.
[01:02:59.380 --> 01:02:59.780]  Okay.
[01:03:00.580 --> 01:03:04.840]  And the rest of it, you could think of as the graph that would cover...
[01:03:05.640 --> 01:03:07.460]  If you did the world, you would cover...
[01:03:07.460 --> 01:03:10.820]  You could say it would cover New York City and a part of a lower state in New York, you know.
[01:03:11.280 --> 01:03:12.220]  At that scale.
[01:03:13.580 --> 01:03:15.360]  But the idea is then...
[01:03:15.360 --> 01:03:19.820]  And here's where this new big data initiative starts to come in.
[01:03:19.820 --> 01:03:21.580]  They want to have...
[01:03:21.580 --> 01:03:23.200]  What they really need is some...
[01:03:23.780 --> 01:03:25.060]  This is my impression of it.
[01:03:25.920 --> 01:03:32.600]  They want to have a program go through and automatically figure out new entities that they should consider entities of interest.
[01:03:33.560 --> 01:03:33.860]  Okay.
[01:03:34.900 --> 01:03:35.640]  They want to...
[01:03:35.640 --> 01:03:36.440]  You want to do...
[01:03:36.440 --> 01:03:39.120]  They want you to do automatic target development.
[01:03:39.980 --> 01:03:41.440]  At that level right there.
[01:03:41.700 --> 01:03:51.520]  But also, they want you to go into the blue mass out there in New York State and New York City and say, What out there should I also be looking at?
[01:03:51.680 --> 01:03:53.320]  And is there a way to figure that out, too?
[01:03:53.380 --> 01:03:56.900]  And there are ways of doing that, but I never told them about that, so...
[01:03:58.980 --> 01:03:59.380]  Anyhow...
[01:03:59.380 --> 01:04:02.480]  Also, there's a way of looking at communities out there, too.
[01:04:03.320 --> 01:04:05.780]  And that's what they're asking in this big data initiative.
[01:04:05.920 --> 01:04:10.160]  I mean, the Pentagon is going to spend $250 million a year on it.
[01:04:11.360 --> 01:04:12.580]  And that's only the Pentagon.
[01:04:12.820 --> 01:04:15.400]  I mean, they've got other agencies listed here.
[01:04:15.540 --> 01:04:16.700]  They're spending money on it, too.
[01:04:16.840 --> 01:04:18.540]  But it's all basically the same thing.
[01:04:19.660 --> 01:04:21.020]  Analysis is basically...
[01:04:21.020 --> 01:04:22.360]  Analysis data is data.
[01:04:22.560 --> 01:04:25.860]  I mean, you know, it's not that different from one agency to another.
[01:04:26.100 --> 01:04:30.740]  That's why we can take this entire concept and apply it to Medicare-Medicaid fraud.
[01:04:34.000 --> 01:04:34.480]  So...
[01:04:34.480 --> 01:04:35.400]  Next slide.
[01:04:36.960 --> 01:04:40.240]  Also, with the big data, here's an example of timelining.
[01:04:41.520 --> 01:04:42.700]  It doesn't have to be...
[01:04:42.700 --> 01:04:44.240]  This is just a way of picturing it.
[01:04:44.240 --> 01:04:45.160]  I mean, it could be...
[01:04:45.160 --> 01:04:46.840]  You could look at it any way you want.
[01:04:46.980 --> 01:04:48.960]  You can reconfigure it.
[01:04:48.980 --> 01:04:50.660]  But these are the attributes down the side.
[01:04:51.500 --> 01:04:56.120]  Activity is graphed over a time dimension, which you can vary and add.
[01:04:56.660 --> 01:05:15.880]  And then what they want to do is, okay, I want you going down this timeline, looking at activities of this community, or any other community, and saying, here's a set of activities that looks like, or a set of combinations of relationships that are going on that look like there's some activity.
[01:05:17.520 --> 01:05:22.980]  And that activity might be terrorism or something like that, or anything else, and you need to figure that out.
[01:05:23.060 --> 01:05:25.260]  I need an automatic process to help me figure that out.
[01:05:25.600 --> 01:05:29.820]  And then I need a process also to automatically assess whether or not that's a...
[01:05:29.820 --> 01:05:31.100]  We call that a profile.
[01:05:31.340 --> 01:05:31.600]  Okay?
[01:05:31.620 --> 01:05:34.620]  That's a profile of a community.
[01:05:35.300 --> 01:05:37.600]  And is it then a profile of interest?
[01:05:37.960 --> 01:05:38.920]  That is, there is an...
[01:05:38.920 --> 01:05:41.160]  Now you're getting into intentions and capabilities.
[01:05:41.680 --> 01:05:48.960]  Like, for example, if you're going to smuggle drugs, the guy wanting to buy the drugs has to call the guy to sell it.
[01:05:49.020 --> 01:05:50.260]  You know, they've got to relate somehow.
[01:05:50.500 --> 01:05:52.660]  They have to set up the money transaction.
[01:05:52.660 --> 01:05:53.860]  They have to set up transport.
[01:05:53.860 --> 01:05:55.180]  All those things have to happen.
[01:05:55.380 --> 01:05:57.840]  And they show up in relationships in the community.
[01:05:59.000 --> 01:06:10.040]  And so you want to be able to recognize that kind of combination and say, okay, they're going to smuggle drugs from this country to that country, or they're going to smuggle guns from this one to that one.
[01:06:10.140 --> 01:06:10.900]  It's the same principle.
[01:06:12.140 --> 01:06:12.200]  Right?
[01:06:12.840 --> 01:06:14.240]  So that's really what they want.
[01:06:14.400 --> 01:06:16.180]  They're not asking those questions, though.
[01:06:16.520 --> 01:06:18.440]  But that's really what they need to do.
[01:06:19.500 --> 01:06:21.000]  And that's really what they're after.
[01:06:23.600 --> 01:06:24.000]  So...
[01:06:24.000 --> 01:06:31.820]  And in my mind, this is the real danger because now, unless the rules are correct, there's a lot of mistakes could be made here by them.
[01:06:34.520 --> 01:06:38.720]  And especially when they pull these kinds of activities or...
[01:06:38.720 --> 01:06:42.640]  This knowledge, by the way, is automatically generated.
[01:06:42.920 --> 01:06:43.720]  It's sitting there.
[01:06:45.440 --> 01:06:48.100]  So it only pops up if they ask for it.
[01:06:48.960 --> 01:06:49.440]  Okay?
[01:06:50.260 --> 01:06:53.100]  So if you ask for this timeline, you'll get it.
[01:06:53.400 --> 01:06:55.180]  And you could get it on anyone.
[01:06:55.660 --> 01:06:57.700]  Because the data already exists there.
[01:06:59.660 --> 01:07:04.280]  And this is the problem that I see that is the threat.
[01:07:04.660 --> 01:07:11.440]  This is what the Stasi, the KGB, and the Gestapo were after.
[01:07:11.660 --> 01:07:13.900]  This was their knowledge of the population.
[01:07:15.700 --> 01:07:17.280]  And this is the real danger.
[01:07:18.960 --> 01:07:25.020]  Unfortunately, it's also the real way to solve nasty problems and get bad guys.
[01:07:25.020 --> 01:07:27.720]  And unfortunately, it is the same in both cases.
[01:07:27.720 --> 01:07:28.560]  And there's a threat.
[01:07:30.780 --> 01:07:37.020]  And unfortunately, our government is, as Dick Cheney would say, moving to the dark side.
[01:07:40.030 --> 01:07:48.710]  At any rate, this is the technology I thought I'd try to pass on to you and see if you enjoyed it anyway.
[01:08:02.050 --> 01:08:04.390]  I guess we could take questions now.
[01:08:04.530 --> 01:08:05.630]  If you have any questions.
[01:08:05.890 --> 01:08:08.390]  I mean, there's a microphone here.
[01:08:15.370 --> 01:08:16.670]  Fifteen minutes of questions?
[01:08:16.950 --> 01:08:17.110]  Okay.
[01:08:17.310 --> 01:08:17.550]  All right.
[01:08:18.350 --> 01:08:18.710]  Okay.
[01:08:21.960 --> 01:08:22.980]  Is the mic on?
[01:08:27.720 --> 01:08:28.520]  Can you hear me?
[01:08:28.520 --> 01:08:28.900]  Okay.
[01:08:32.380 --> 01:08:41.260]  So, how would a system like this respond to a more and more decentralized and standard-based type of interconnection of everybody?
[01:08:43.100 --> 01:08:44.160]  How would it...
[01:08:44.160 --> 01:08:45.720]  Decentralized, do you mean...
[01:08:45.720 --> 01:08:48.720]  Like as in, you know, mesh networks and...
[01:08:48.720 --> 01:08:50.500]  Well, this is already set up...
[01:08:50.500 --> 01:08:53.920]  Yeah, I think that this is already set up to reconstruct whatever network is there.
[01:08:53.920 --> 01:08:54.920]  So, it's not a...
[01:08:55.960 --> 01:08:57.720]  It's not a question of a structured network.
[01:08:57.740 --> 01:09:03.400]  Well, how does it get into the kind of direct connections that the nodes are going to have in such a network?
[01:09:04.300 --> 01:09:06.920]  How's it going to snoop inside of a network like that?
[01:09:07.780 --> 01:09:10.000]  I'm not quite sure I can answer that for you.
[01:09:10.180 --> 01:09:14.520]  Maybe you can tell me a little more about it offline and I might be able to answer that for you.
[01:09:14.520 --> 01:09:35.100]  But, like for example, I try to explain the Tor network, but the way they would attack the Tor network is to monitor a large segment of the network and then look at streams of bit streams passing from around the link and do a time collapse of common bit streams.
[01:09:35.100 --> 01:09:41.120]  So, then you could see potentially bit streams moving from one segment to another in time sequence.
[01:09:41.400 --> 01:09:43.880]  And even predict the links you're missing and things like that.
[01:09:44.100 --> 01:09:47.740]  So, that's the way I would envision attacking that.
[01:09:49.500 --> 01:09:50.020]  So...
[01:09:50.800 --> 01:09:53.200]  And then there's a lot of other things I'd do after that.
[01:09:56.940 --> 01:10:00.840]  Many, many thanks for an absolutely incredible presentation and everything you've done.
[01:10:00.940 --> 01:10:01.240]  Thank you.
[01:10:01.240 --> 01:10:10.580]  In February of 2011, a group of hacktivists associated with Anonymous cracked into intelligence contractor H.B.
[01:10:10.680 --> 01:10:11.480]  Gary's servers.
[01:10:11.900 --> 01:10:18.540]  And among the things they found were PowerPoint presentations describing how H.B.
[01:10:18.660 --> 01:10:33.170]  Gary, along with other intelligence contractors, Palantir, proposed to silence progressive voices like Glenn Greenwald of the Salon.com columnist, critics of the Bank of America, critics of the Chamber of Commerce.
[01:10:33.550 --> 01:10:34.670]  Two-point question.
[01:10:35.110 --> 01:10:42.650]  First, how does America defend herself against rogue national security contractors?
[01:10:42.650 --> 01:10:55.650]  And second, I'm a bank whistleblower, and my telephone and email are being deliberately disrupted and hacked ever since I talked to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
[01:10:56.030 --> 01:11:00.270]  So, local police won't help you, the FBI won't help you.
[01:11:00.450 --> 01:11:03.470]  Where do you go when your telephone and email are being hacked by these people?
[01:11:04.670 --> 01:11:09.170]  You know, well, I figure they get copies of everything I do, right?
[01:11:09.350 --> 01:11:09.770]  So...
[01:11:09.770 --> 01:11:13.110]  But they're not disrupting my ability to communicate.
[01:11:13.410 --> 01:11:14.570]  That's a little bit different.
[01:11:16.250 --> 01:11:18.630]  Monitoring, I can accept, but the disruption...
[01:11:18.630 --> 01:11:18.830]  Right.
[01:11:19.810 --> 01:11:21.070]  That's a little...
[01:11:21.070 --> 01:11:21.550]  It's isolation.
[01:11:21.550 --> 01:11:25.630]  They disrupted my life when they sent people with guns at me, in that case, so...
[01:11:26.250 --> 01:11:26.650]  But...
[01:11:27.710 --> 01:11:29.790]  But they aren't disrupting my ability...
[01:11:29.790 --> 01:11:31.590]  I guess they want to watch what I say, you know?
[01:11:31.710 --> 01:11:34.710]  So I keep trying to tell them exactly what I think of them, you know?
[01:11:35.390 --> 01:11:35.670]  Sorry.
[01:11:36.710 --> 01:11:37.110]  So...
[01:11:37.110 --> 01:11:37.870]  So...
[01:11:37.870 --> 01:11:39.370]  But I'm not sure.
[01:11:39.510 --> 01:11:39.950]  I don't know...
[01:11:39.950 --> 01:11:42.150]  I don't know what to tell you to do there.
[01:11:42.650 --> 01:11:43.270]  Well, what about...
[01:11:43.270 --> 01:11:46.390]  How does America defend herself against these contractors?
[01:11:47.670 --> 01:11:48.070]  Uh...
[01:11:48.070 --> 01:11:48.710]  See, the...
[01:11:48.710 --> 01:11:48.950]  The...
[01:11:48.950 --> 01:11:49.310]  The...
[01:11:49.310 --> 01:11:49.770]  As I...
[01:11:50.230 --> 01:11:51.010]  I said...
[01:11:51.010 --> 01:11:52.890]  I said this to ALA the other...
[01:11:52.890 --> 01:11:53.570]  Last month.
[01:11:53.970 --> 01:11:54.490]  And...
[01:11:54.490 --> 01:12:00.610]  The only thing I could think of that we could start doing is replacing everybody in Congress and getting laws passed that really...
[01:12:00.610 --> 01:12:03.330]  I mean, I'm an advocate for...
[01:12:03.330 --> 01:12:04.270]  Term limits.
[01:12:05.390 --> 01:12:05.910]  I...
[01:12:05.910 --> 01:12:07.070]  Term limits the only way.
[01:12:07.210 --> 01:12:07.890]  I mean...
[01:12:07.890 --> 01:12:09.070]  Otherwise, I would...
[01:12:09.070 --> 01:12:11.110]  If the police aren't helping you...
[01:12:11.110 --> 01:12:11.630]  Um...
[01:12:11.630 --> 01:12:12.850]  Which they're supposed to do, of course.
[01:12:13.350 --> 01:12:15.190]  If somebody, you know...
[01:12:15.190 --> 01:12:15.870]  Um...
[01:12:15.870 --> 01:12:16.430]  I...
[01:12:16.430 --> 01:12:17.610]  I would go buy some...
[01:12:17.610 --> 01:12:19.470]  Simple things like buy...
[01:12:19.470 --> 01:12:20.070]  Buy...
[01:12:20.070 --> 01:12:21.230]  Throw away phones.
[01:12:21.730 --> 01:12:22.090]  And...
[01:12:22.090 --> 01:12:23.050]  And keep buying them.
[01:12:23.070 --> 01:12:24.250]  That doesn't help people who...
[01:12:24.810 --> 01:12:25.110]  Uh...
[01:12:25.110 --> 01:12:26.370]  Want to get in touch with you.
[01:12:26.590 --> 01:12:26.730]  I...
[01:12:26.730 --> 01:12:27.170]  That's great.
[01:12:27.430 --> 01:12:28.810]  It's a very, very different scenario.
[01:12:29.250 --> 01:12:30.750]  But you have to have some way to tell them.
[01:12:31.030 --> 01:12:31.130]  Right.
[01:12:31.350 --> 01:12:31.670]  Right.
[01:12:32.270 --> 01:12:34.530]  I said the most secure way is to buy two phones.
[01:12:34.650 --> 01:12:35.450]  Give one to your friend.
[01:12:35.550 --> 01:12:36.210]  You take one.
[01:12:36.730 --> 01:12:37.450]  And then...
[01:12:37.450 --> 01:12:38.170]  You'll use it.
[01:12:38.210 --> 01:12:39.810]  You'll show up as a graph as a link.
[01:12:40.290 --> 01:12:41.670]  Isolate the link and no one else...
[01:12:41.670 --> 01:12:43.430]  You'll not be connected anywhere, so...
[01:12:43.430 --> 01:12:45.950]  Yes, but if you're counting on people to get in touch with you...
[01:12:45.950 --> 01:12:46.510]  Yes.
[01:12:46.610 --> 01:12:47.010]  No, I...
[01:12:47.010 --> 01:12:48.050]  I understand the problem.
[01:12:48.050 --> 01:12:49.510]  But I just don't know what to tell you.
[01:12:52.570 --> 01:12:52.930]  Um...
[01:12:52.930 --> 01:12:53.090]  Hello.
[01:12:53.350 --> 01:12:55.110]  This is actually a bit tangential.
[01:12:55.390 --> 01:12:56.130]  But, um...
[01:12:56.130 --> 01:13:08.490]  When you were talking about some of the ways you'd have to look at the data and some of the problems you had, you were talking about how Google-type search terms wouldn't work because of inaccuracies, because of ways things get spelled differently.
[01:13:09.010 --> 01:13:13.970]  Could you use some of the techniques you developed to create a more efficient way of searching just the open web?
[01:13:14.410 --> 01:13:14.690]  Yes.
[01:13:15.210 --> 01:13:17.310]  In fact, we approached Google for doing that.
[01:13:18.530 --> 01:13:20.810]  But they said, no, we do really well, Marcel.
[01:13:21.070 --> 01:13:21.330]  So...
[01:13:22.350 --> 01:13:22.870]  Okay.
[01:13:23.270 --> 01:13:23.690]  Interesting.
[01:13:23.910 --> 01:13:24.450]  Thank you.
[01:13:24.450 --> 01:13:24.490]  Hi.
[01:13:25.150 --> 01:13:29.590]  Well, actually, we approached Google in 2003.
[01:13:32.950 --> 01:13:33.510]  Hi.
[01:13:33.610 --> 01:13:37.310]  There was a big New Yorker article a few months ago about this.
[01:13:37.430 --> 01:13:53.230]  And I wondered, besides coming to your talk today, what is there in the public space that we could use to follow up technically on, you know, how to apply this kind of analysis and all sorts of data problems?
[01:13:56.550 --> 01:14:05.310]  See, a lot of companies, when they get this, they keep these things as intellectual capital and don't share it.
[01:14:05.970 --> 01:14:07.530]  And that's true also of the government.
[01:14:07.830 --> 01:14:10.990]  So, a lot of times they won't tell you these kinds of things.
[01:14:11.130 --> 01:14:16.890]  Like, I never documented how to do anything because I didn't want the government to know it.
[01:14:17.850 --> 01:14:19.670]  So, I would put out what to do.
[01:14:19.750 --> 01:14:21.090]  This is what to do here, you know.
[01:14:21.310 --> 01:14:22.410]  So, they could easily...
[01:14:22.410 --> 01:14:24.090]  But it's very...
[01:14:24.090 --> 01:14:27.410]  I guess the companies feel that they lose or...
[01:14:28.830 --> 01:14:34.150]  I guess the university is the only free-flowing place to get knowledge like that.
[01:14:34.350 --> 01:14:40.470]  I mean, they tend to say you have to share, you know, whereas government and companies don't.
[01:14:40.670 --> 01:14:44.110]  So, I'm not quite sure what to tell you where to look there.
[01:14:44.110 --> 01:14:50.270]  So, I mean, I go around the web looking all the time just with technical terms just to see and then look at it.
[01:14:50.370 --> 01:14:53.630]  And most of it's advertising, you know, and nothing really technical.
[01:14:53.630 --> 01:15:02.370]  So, they're trying to keep their secrets of whatever they're doing to themselves, the specifics of it anyway.
[01:15:02.370 --> 01:15:08.770]  I googled thin thread and I found paper from MITRE that had nothing to do with it.
[01:15:09.130 --> 01:15:09.270]  Right.
[01:15:09.710 --> 01:15:09.970]  That's right.
[01:15:10.070 --> 01:15:11.750]  That's the other problem, right?
[01:15:12.210 --> 01:15:12.870]  With the...
[01:15:12.870 --> 01:15:14.690]  The word doesn't necessarily...
[01:15:14.690 --> 01:15:20.090]  You have to do a combination of things like NSA, thin thread, you know...
[01:15:21.630 --> 01:15:23.530]  Actually, you still won't find much there.
[01:15:25.110 --> 01:15:32.310]  You will find the redacted DODIG report, which is like 97% redacted.
[01:15:32.550 --> 01:15:37.190]  The only thing they left in was the DODIG's assessment of thin thread.
[01:15:37.310 --> 01:15:40.270]  It says it doesn't really have enough documentation for the operators.
[01:15:41.490 --> 01:15:44.470]  Well, see, the problem that they...
[01:15:44.470 --> 01:15:46.350]  I thought that was pretty funny myself.
[01:15:46.750 --> 01:15:57.690]  Because they really didn't quite understand what they were looking at because that was a fully automated, remotely controlled system that had zero operators on the front end.
[01:15:58.430 --> 01:16:01.710]  The only thing we provided was a hardware diagram.
[01:16:01.710 --> 01:16:04.390]  So, if hardware broke or wore out, they could replace it.
[01:16:05.350 --> 01:16:07.290]  So, I thought that was funny.
[01:16:07.290 --> 01:16:10.750]  But they left all that kind of stuff in there, in that report, if you look at it.
[01:16:11.730 --> 01:16:12.170]  Yeah.
[01:16:21.280 --> 01:16:22.620]  Thank you for a great talk.
[01:16:23.100 --> 01:16:23.380]  Thank you.
[01:16:23.380 --> 01:16:28.840]  I'm wondering how you would classify your security status at this moment, for one thing.
[01:16:29.020 --> 01:16:32.270]  Well, my security... I don't really care, okay?
[01:16:35.900 --> 01:16:41.480]  So, then I guess my next question is, what prevents this from breaking into the public sphere more?
[01:16:41.640 --> 01:16:43.700]  Like, obviously, you haven't been entirely censored.
[01:16:43.760 --> 01:16:44.380]  You're here speaking.
[01:16:44.540 --> 01:16:45.770]  I've seen you on Democracy Now.
[01:16:45.960 --> 01:16:46.120]  Right, right.
[01:16:46.120 --> 01:16:51.900]  But what stops there from being a press conference with you and other people who you mentioned who are sympathetic?
[01:16:52.480 --> 01:16:54.540]  And, in fact, I volunteer for all of them.
[01:16:55.500 --> 01:16:55.880]  Right.
[01:16:55.880 --> 01:16:56.840]  So, but I mean...
[01:16:56.840 --> 01:16:58.840]  I don't mean technically, what stops.
[01:16:58.980 --> 01:16:59.920]  Socially, what have you.
[01:17:00.000 --> 01:17:00.350]  How come...
[01:17:00.350 --> 01:17:03.220]  Socially, I gave you my impression of it.
[01:17:03.340 --> 01:17:08.100]  Socially, I think there's a lot of press that is afraid of this issue.
[01:17:08.900 --> 01:17:12.850]  National security is kind of a taboo issue for them.
[01:17:14.020 --> 01:17:15.380]  They can't discuss it.
[01:17:15.700 --> 01:17:20.140]  When, in fact, to my mind, that's the most important thing we need to discuss right now.
[01:17:20.260 --> 01:17:21.300]  Or one of them, anyway.
[01:17:22.300 --> 01:17:23.440]  That's basically it.
[01:17:23.730 --> 01:17:23.940]  Yeah.
[01:17:30.090 --> 01:17:32.050]  I have two questions.
[01:17:32.410 --> 01:17:36.410]  One is related to what the woman said about, you know, securing her own communication.
[01:17:36.630 --> 01:17:38.330]  You said, well, I'll get some disposable phones.
[01:17:38.530 --> 01:17:47.450]  But in the day of mass information, what's to stop Staples, who sells the track phone, which it's called, from watching you as you go out?
[01:17:47.570 --> 01:17:47.910]  Yeah.
[01:17:48.370 --> 01:17:49.850]  See, even if you pay with cash.
[01:17:50.130 --> 01:17:50.230]  Yeah.
[01:17:50.390 --> 01:17:51.610]  You're taking a picture.
[01:17:51.750 --> 01:17:52.370]  You got photo ID.
[01:17:52.610 --> 01:17:54.890]  How is any of that really secure?
[01:17:54.890 --> 01:17:56.930]  That was a question that came up just when she asked.
[01:17:57.350 --> 01:18:01.290]  Well, I mean, the point is you don't have to give them your name when you buy the phone.
[01:18:02.630 --> 01:18:02.950]  Right.
[01:18:03.050 --> 01:18:09.310]  But what I'm saying is with information, you know, I've heard of like face recognition stuff that's going on with Facebook now, everything.
[01:18:09.590 --> 01:18:09.710]  Okay.
[01:18:09.870 --> 01:18:12.950]  But see, you have to hide within the crowd, right?
[01:18:12.950 --> 01:18:15.350]  What's the random probability of the match?
[01:18:15.630 --> 01:18:15.870]  Mm-hmm.
[01:18:16.310 --> 01:18:17.670]  Or actually having...
[01:18:17.670 --> 01:18:20.850]  I mean, they could have a picture of you, but so what?
[01:18:21.010 --> 01:18:21.170]  Right.
[01:18:21.390 --> 01:18:24.610]  Unless they can match you to a name and a place and who you are and what you're doing.
[01:18:24.930 --> 01:18:25.070]  Right.
[01:18:25.290 --> 01:18:28.570]  I mean, that's still private then.
[01:18:29.050 --> 01:18:29.190]  Okay.
[01:18:29.630 --> 01:18:31.470]  Well, two more questions.
[01:18:31.670 --> 01:18:32.490]  One is very short.
[01:18:32.610 --> 01:18:33.650]  To what degree do you think...
[01:18:33.650 --> 01:18:34.110]  I didn't hear...
[01:18:34.110 --> 01:18:35.310]  I wasn't sure if you answered this before.
[01:18:35.490 --> 01:18:38.130]  The Tor browser is secure for just...
[01:18:38.130 --> 01:18:42.390]  Well, all I did was give my approach of attacking it how I would attack it.
[01:18:42.570 --> 01:18:42.630]  Okay.
[01:18:42.750 --> 01:18:42.830]  I see.
[01:18:43.350 --> 01:18:46.250]  Actually, I think it creates work.
[01:18:46.590 --> 01:18:48.710]  I mean, somebody would have to put in the work to figure it out.
[01:18:49.470 --> 01:18:49.910]  So...
[01:18:49.910 --> 01:18:51.790]  Actually, that's not a bad...
[01:18:51.790 --> 01:18:53.090]  See, that's not a bad point.
[01:18:53.690 --> 01:18:57.530]  The point is to disrupt this kind of activity is...
[01:18:57.530 --> 01:19:03.770]  Making work for them, especially by the people, causes them a lot of problems.
[01:19:03.970 --> 01:19:04.110]  Okay.
[01:19:05.110 --> 01:19:06.650]  So, in other words...
[01:19:08.650 --> 01:19:09.470]  If you...
[01:19:09.470 --> 01:19:10.570]  It does.
[01:19:10.830 --> 01:19:12.170]  It causes them a lot of problems.
[01:19:12.170 --> 01:19:13.490]  People have to work that out.
[01:19:13.910 --> 01:19:15.530]  I mean, if a machine can work it out...
[01:19:15.530 --> 01:19:18.410]  If you have a cipher and a machine can break the code...
[01:19:18.410 --> 01:19:20.010]  That's not a lot of work for them.
[01:19:20.450 --> 01:19:21.450]  But if you...
[01:19:21.450 --> 01:19:21.890]  If you...
[01:19:21.890 --> 01:19:23.470]  As I've said to a couple of other people...
[01:19:23.470 --> 01:19:25.430]  If you start using codes, right?
[01:19:26.030 --> 01:19:26.770]  That they're...
[01:19:26.770 --> 01:19:30.190]  You substitute nouns for nouns, verbs for verbs, and so on.
[01:19:30.410 --> 01:19:34.370]  So, the constructor of the words that you would put together...
[01:19:34.890 --> 01:19:35.330]  Would...
[01:19:35.890 --> 01:19:36.330]  Would...
[01:19:36.330 --> 01:19:37.630]  Read like anything else.
[01:19:37.990 --> 01:19:39.190]  And be logical.
[01:19:39.690 --> 01:19:39.890]  Right?
[01:19:40.110 --> 01:19:40.890]  Position wise.
[01:19:41.530 --> 01:19:42.610]  But it wouldn't...
[01:19:43.250 --> 01:19:44.070]  It wouldn't have...
[01:19:44.070 --> 01:19:45.950]  It wouldn't have the meaning that they were reading.
[01:19:46.370 --> 01:19:46.690]  Okay?
[01:19:47.110 --> 01:19:47.970]  So, they'd be reading this.
[01:19:48.110 --> 01:19:49.130]  So, what does that mean?
[01:19:49.490 --> 01:19:49.850]  Somebody...
[01:19:49.850 --> 01:19:51.970]  A person, then, has to look at it.
[01:19:52.090 --> 01:19:53.670]  And now, they've got to take time out.
[01:19:53.990 --> 01:19:54.350]  And...
[01:19:54.350 --> 01:19:56.730]  So, if a lot of people started doing that, you know...
[01:19:56.730 --> 01:19:57.650]  That would...
[01:19:57.650 --> 01:19:59.970]  That would surely, you know, make a lot of work for them.
[01:20:00.630 --> 01:20:02.190]  So, one of the other things...
[01:20:02.190 --> 01:20:03.170]  I think...
[01:20:03.170 --> 01:20:04.170]  I was mentioning...
[01:20:04.170 --> 01:20:05.190]  I came up with the...
[01:20:05.190 --> 01:20:08.170]  Jacob Applebaum and the tour project.
[01:20:09.030 --> 01:20:12.750]  One of the questions was, where are all these other sites in the network?
[01:20:14.110 --> 01:20:14.570]  And...
[01:20:15.350 --> 01:20:16.270]  I was...
[01:20:16.270 --> 01:20:17.490]  I suggested...
[01:20:17.490 --> 01:20:20.670]  I didn't know if I said it to Jacob or not, but...
[01:20:20.670 --> 01:20:24.360]  I was suggesting one of the things you could do, is if you're distributed around the country...
[01:20:24.360 --> 01:20:29.520]  Is just do trace routes on all the things that you're sending to one another.
[01:20:30.820 --> 01:20:31.160]  And...
[01:20:31.160 --> 01:20:32.320]  Lay the links...
[01:20:32.320 --> 01:20:34.780]  Lay the links out that go across the trace.
[01:20:35.320 --> 01:20:40.380]  And overlap them as like a multi-dimensional scaling approach on all the linking.
[01:20:41.280 --> 01:20:45.140]  Then that should reconstruct the inside the United States of the network.
[01:20:46.400 --> 01:20:52.280]  And then you could look at that as a scaling issue and try to lay it on a map of the United States.
[01:20:53.900 --> 01:20:54.260]  See?
[01:20:55.120 --> 01:20:58.160]  And then that would give you the lines inside the United States.
[01:20:58.260 --> 01:21:02.360]  Then you look at the intersecting points that say, here are the converging points of a lot of lines.
[01:21:02.480 --> 01:21:05.740]  And so therefore, that's a high probability site to tap.
[01:21:06.960 --> 01:21:07.320]  Okay?
[01:21:07.500 --> 01:21:07.920]  So that...
[01:21:07.920 --> 01:21:09.660]  And by the way, I did the...
[01:21:09.660 --> 01:21:11.280]  I did for the IFF, I did...
[01:21:12.200 --> 01:21:13.500]  I did some numbering...
[01:21:13.500 --> 01:21:16.300]  I didn't tell them this, but I didn't sign it in my affidavit, but...
[01:21:16.300 --> 01:21:17.300]  So it's not there.
[01:21:17.300 --> 01:21:23.060]  But I did some further calculations on the storage site in Utah at Buffdale.
[01:21:23.640 --> 01:21:28.340]  If you looked at the 100,000 square feet there of storage space, that's...
[01:21:28.340 --> 01:21:31.440]  Of the million square feet, that's 100,000 square foot, it's going to be storage.
[01:21:32.040 --> 01:21:48.160]  If you looked at that and said, okay, with today's technology, like CleverSafe.com has it, I think, they sell a 10 exabyte storage capacity that will occupy 21 racks in like 200 square feet.
[01:21:49.480 --> 01:21:56.520]  So at 10 exabytes for every 200 square feet, 100,000 feet gives you 5,000 exabytes or 5 zetabytes.
[01:21:57.100 --> 01:21:57.220]  Okay?
[01:21:58.160 --> 01:22:04.000]  Now, I did some calculations at 10 gigabits a second off the nearest device production.
[01:22:04.480 --> 01:22:05.400]  What would it take...
[01:22:05.400 --> 01:22:11.020]  How many nearest devices would it take to maintain 100 of the last 100 years of data online?
[01:22:11.020 --> 01:22:13.040]  Or the latest 100, however you want to look at it.
[01:22:13.480 --> 01:22:17.060]  How many nearest devices would it take to sustain that storage?
[01:22:17.980 --> 01:22:29.200]  And it turns out full processing would take about 1,250 nearest devices running full processing all the time to sustain 100 years of data on that system.
[01:22:32.000 --> 01:22:33.880]  So, but the nearest doesn't...
[01:22:33.880 --> 01:22:35.200]  I mean, none of the networks work that way.
[01:22:35.320 --> 01:22:41.060]  So it's probably somewhere between almost up to twice that number that they would need to do that.
[01:22:42.240 --> 01:22:46.380]  So, but that's with... even with today's storage capacity.
[01:22:47.140 --> 01:22:52.060]  I mean, so down the road, it's only going to get much higher, so...
[01:22:52.980 --> 01:22:53.380]  Okay.
[01:22:53.580 --> 01:23:04.620]  Last question is, to what degree do you think there are people involved in higher levels of NSA or the CIA, whatever, that are sympathetic to the average person's cause of privacy?
[01:23:04.800 --> 01:23:09.460]  And to what degree do you think we have, we are moving towards the dark side where these people are kind of consumed themselves?
[01:23:09.720 --> 01:23:10.580]  Or, you know...
[01:23:10.580 --> 01:23:12.520]  Legends in their own minds, that's what I refer to.
[01:23:13.000 --> 01:23:13.160]  Right.
[01:23:13.440 --> 01:23:17.700]  Yeah, the arrogance is... the higher you go, the higher the arrogance, level of arrogance.
[01:23:18.280 --> 01:23:18.540]  Yes.
[01:23:19.180 --> 01:23:19.580]  Okay.
[01:23:20.220 --> 01:23:21.680]  I don't know how else to put it.
[01:23:22.500 --> 01:23:23.160]  Next point.
[01:23:23.880 --> 01:23:24.020]  Yeah.
[01:23:24.200 --> 01:23:24.440]  All right.
[01:23:24.720 --> 01:23:25.000]  All right.
[01:23:25.640 --> 01:23:25.960]  Thanks.
[01:23:26.820 --> 01:23:27.360]  Great talk.
[01:23:27.700 --> 01:23:27.920]  Yeah.
[01:23:28.080 --> 01:23:28.320]  Thanks.
[01:23:30.960 --> 01:23:33.180]  Thank you very much for all you've done.
[01:23:34.340 --> 01:23:34.780]  I...
[01:23:34.780 --> 01:23:41.360]  It's funny, I have that sense of surveillance in my life and I often think I don't mind them hearing me if I thought they would listen to me.
[01:23:43.480 --> 01:23:43.920]  That's...
[01:23:45.860 --> 01:23:47.640]  Reception is a different issue, yeah.
[01:23:48.140 --> 01:23:48.180]  Right.
[01:23:48.880 --> 01:23:49.320]  Comprehension.
[01:23:49.540 --> 01:23:49.860]  Yeah, right.
[01:23:50.220 --> 01:23:50.560]  Right.
[01:23:50.640 --> 01:23:54.780]  And you had talked about, like, the solution to this problem being vote the bastards out.
[01:23:55.200 --> 01:24:00.420]  Which, you know, we're living in the most gerrymandered representative democracy in the world.
[01:24:00.620 --> 01:24:04.880]  Obviously, I think there's just no two ways about the fact that that's not going to work.
[01:24:05.120 --> 01:24:05.520]  Okay.
[01:24:05.740 --> 01:24:06.500]  That's not going to happen.
[01:24:07.320 --> 01:24:07.760]  Yeah.
[01:24:08.120 --> 01:24:08.900]  Unfortunately, yeah.
[01:24:09.100 --> 01:24:13.060]  So, you're talking about being on that verge of totalitarianism.
[01:24:13.060 --> 01:24:18.320]  So, we're stuck between an impossible electoral situation and what you think is the verge of totalitarianism.
[01:24:18.620 --> 01:24:22.380]  What, in your mind, flips over that verge?
[01:24:22.420 --> 01:24:23.200]  And what does that look like?
[01:24:23.260 --> 01:24:27.380]  What is life like after all this infrastructure is put to the point of control?
[01:24:29.260 --> 01:24:35.340]  I don't know about you, but it looks like, to me, East Germany, or the Weimar Republic.
[01:24:36.240 --> 01:24:44.280]  Just before, I mean, I think that we're in that state now where, you know, if some people don't start, because they didn't speak up in the Weimar Republic, look what they got.
[01:24:44.960 --> 01:24:52.220]  So, I mean, it was probably before your time, but that was when Hitler came to rise in Germany.
[01:24:53.180 --> 01:24:58.980]  And because nobody spoke up, you know, nobody opposed it, that happened.
[01:24:59.500 --> 01:25:07.880]  Now, we're in an environment where I think one of the great lessons, media lessons, of the Bush administration is that if everyone speaks up and you just ignore them, nothing happens.
[01:25:08.780 --> 01:25:12.020]  And so, you know, personally, I'm in the media.
[01:25:12.200 --> 01:25:17.020]  I'm like, I would like it if telling stories changed things, but I'm not sure right now that it does.
[01:25:18.320 --> 01:25:27.080]  Actually, the influence does occur when large numbers of people do call in to representatives, House and Senate, and you can put pressure on that way.
[01:25:27.400 --> 01:25:39.140]  The White House can maybe ignore you, but the House and Senate, they're a lot closer, and they have a higher fear factor, fear of being voted out.
[01:25:39.520 --> 01:25:42.200]  I believe in limits.
[01:25:42.380 --> 01:25:48.180]  I mean, that way they don't become sedimentary kind of people there that are perpetually there.
[01:25:48.560 --> 01:25:54.380]  And they tend to begin to think that their vision of what should happen is obviously the right one.
[01:25:55.160 --> 01:25:58.540]  In other words, they corrupt their own minds after a while.
[01:25:58.540 --> 01:26:03.700]  So, essentially, you're saying that the best bet of avoiding totalitarianism is probably a WikiLeaks blackout?
[01:26:03.880 --> 01:26:04.570]  I don't...
[01:26:05.080 --> 01:26:06.100]  Sorry, a Wikipedia blackout.
[01:26:06.260 --> 01:26:10.100]  I think exposing anything, in any way you can expose it is the best way.
[01:26:10.420 --> 01:26:10.920]  Right.
[01:26:10.940 --> 01:26:11.240]  Right.
[01:26:15.330 --> 01:26:33.330]  You started by pointing out that the national intelligence agencies weren't providing operational intelligence to the operators or anything, and then expanded to the programs that expanded beyond any sort of constitutional controls and any reasonable limits on what they do.
[01:26:33.490 --> 01:26:34.730]  Are those related in some way?
[01:26:34.870 --> 01:26:41.190]  Would devolving power from national agencies down to the services or to the smaller entities be able to corrupt them?
[01:26:41.190 --> 01:26:44.790]  I think the theme there is sharing, and the sharing is the issue.
[01:26:44.790 --> 01:26:52.310]  They have a problem sharing knowledge, and also sharing information, and making things known to the public or anybody.
[01:26:53.210 --> 01:26:57.050]  Sharing is, I think, the common problem crossing that.
[01:26:57.210 --> 01:26:58.550]  Both internally and externally.
[01:26:58.790 --> 01:26:58.810]  Yes.
[01:26:58.910 --> 01:26:59.010]  Yeah.
[01:27:01.470 --> 01:27:02.070]  Okay.
[01:27:02.210 --> 01:27:04.030]  All right.
[01:27:04.330 --> 01:27:04.470]  Okay.
[01:27:05.110 --> 01:27:05.490]  Thank you.
[01:27:24.660 --> 01:27:25.640]  Did you get that?
[01:27:29.280 --> 01:27:29.860]  Hello?
[01:27:30.560 --> 01:27:31.400]  Check, check.