[01:00.070 --> 01:00.870]  Thank you.
[01:02.810 --> 01:04.750]  Good afternoon, hopeful people.
[01:05.070 --> 01:07.330]  Hope you're having a great time so far.
[01:08.490 --> 01:10.190]  We have some dry announcements.
[01:10.590 --> 01:14.150]  One of them is make sure you stay hydrated, keep a mask on, please.
[01:14.470 --> 01:15.690]  We want to make sure everybody's safe.
[01:19.540 --> 01:21.880]  We have sign-ups for a fourth track.
[01:22.140 --> 01:27.280]  They're kind of as you go, so visit the info desk, visit the coffee shop to see those.
[01:27.280 --> 01:29.520]  Please mute your phones while you're here.
[01:30.280 --> 01:31.780]  We don't want any interference.
[01:33.700 --> 01:36.520]  And we still need some volunteers.
[01:36.520 --> 01:37.720]  I'm a volunteer myself.
[01:37.880 --> 01:38.880]  A lot of us are volunteers.
[01:39.220 --> 01:41.620]  Security in particular, it's not a difficult job.
[01:42.480 --> 01:48.760]  If you're staying here all night and overnight and you want to do something and get a cool shirt, security might be the gig for you.
[01:49.460 --> 01:52.480]  So you could go to room 301 if you're interested.
[01:53.340 --> 01:58.940]  And we have the first block of late-night mature content programming in the video room, which is 406.
[01:59.460 --> 02:01.980]  And it'll begin after 9:30 p.m.
[02:02.320 --> 02:07.320]  Tonight's video room late-night theme is humor and horror, so expect the unexpected.
[02:07.660 --> 02:07.960]  All right?
[02:08.140 --> 02:10.520]  Now let's welcome Robert Stribley.
[02:10.560 --> 02:14.620]  And he's going to do a talk about designing for privacy in an increasingly public world.
[02:14.920 --> 02:15.500]  Thank you.
[02:17.540 --> 02:18.880]  Thank you very much.
[02:19.960 --> 02:21.820]  Yes, my name's Robert Stribley.
[02:21.920 --> 02:23.440]  I guess a little bit about myself.
[02:23.720 --> 02:26.880]  I'm a UX designer, or designer broadly.
[02:27.380 --> 02:34.340]  I've been working in New York City for the last 16 or 17 years, but about 20 years in the business of digital design.
[02:35.300 --> 02:41.260]  I work for Peebles' group, other names, Razorfish, you may be familiar with.
[02:41.260 --> 02:50.160]  And the group I work with right now, we're so top secret we don't even have a public name, but I work for Publicis, mainly, doing design.
[02:50.400 --> 02:57.580]  And in the last few years, I've become increasingly interested in the issue of privacy as it applies specifically to design.
[02:57.860 --> 03:00.240]  And so that's what I'm here to talk about today.
[03:02.640 --> 03:06.320]  So what do we mean when we talk about designing for privacy then?
[03:07.620 --> 03:09.440]  This is an issue that's growing.
[03:09.440 --> 03:13.000]  In fact, when I pitched this for HOPE, you know, it was a passion of mine.
[03:13.160 --> 03:20.640]  I feel like since the last month, this subject has become even more important in ways that we'll talk about given the current events.
[03:21.440 --> 03:32.820]  But as designers, and I would include all of us as designers, I think you can use the term, of course, for a very specific role like I have, but if you're building anything at all, there is an eye to design.
[03:32.820 --> 03:35.900]  You're thinking about experiences and how people interact with them.
[03:35.900 --> 03:41.100]  And many of us work with companies or organizations or maybe you even are building an app yourself.
[03:41.340 --> 03:43.280]  So it kind of applies to all of us these days.
[03:43.480 --> 03:52.460]  But companies especially have to consider the privacy of their users' data increasingly and also their browsing behavior for their clients' benefit and safety.
[03:52.540 --> 03:55.720]  Now, obviously, they have some very selfish reasons for doing that, right?
[03:55.900 --> 03:59.440]  They do it for their own personal and financial self-interest.
[03:59.440 --> 04:04.740]  And we'll talk more about using that as leverage to get them to do the right thing a little bit later.
[04:05.000 --> 04:11.400]  But it is increasingly important that they consider privacy and security issues affecting their digital experiences.
[04:11.400 --> 04:21.260]  So how do we, though, as designers designing these experiences, whether they're apps, websites, whatever they are, how do we keep an eye to people's privacy?
[04:21.840 --> 04:25.860]  I think this audience knows the difference between privacy and security.
[04:25.860 --> 04:29.560]  I'll touch on that really briefly because the things do overlap.
[04:29.820 --> 04:35.160]  Privacy, of course, is your ability to control your personal information at its simplest, right?
[04:35.360 --> 04:37.860]  And the security is that organization.
[04:38.120 --> 04:40.400]  How secure do they keep your data?
[04:40.520 --> 04:42.340]  That's a very simple way of explaining it.
[04:42.480 --> 04:46.640]  However, these concepts do often overlap, so I'll probably refer to them both.
[04:47.040 --> 04:52.820]  Largely, our focus, though, is designing experiences so the emphasis is upon privacy.
[04:54.400 --> 04:55.960]  So, why privacy?
[04:56.220 --> 04:59.980]  I think everyone here is probably familiar with Edward Snowden.
[05:00.180 --> 05:04.120]  I think he said this about as succinctly as it can be said.
[05:04.900 --> 05:14.540]  Arguing that you don't care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don't care about free speech because you have nothing to say.
[05:15.020 --> 05:18.840]  And for a lot of people, free speech may not be that big of a deal either.
[05:18.840 --> 05:24.420]  But I think increasingly we're aware of why privacy is a big deal.
[05:24.600 --> 05:28.780]  It's maybe something we've been able to rest on our laurels and think, I've got nothing to hide.
[05:29.140 --> 05:37.500]  But increasingly we see reasons not to think of it as hiding, but to think of it as protecting things that the public does not necessarily need to know.
[05:37.500 --> 05:43.720]  So, even if we're not personally concerned about privacy, we talk about user-centered design.
[05:43.960 --> 05:45.720]  The user is not me, right?
[05:45.820 --> 05:48.600]  The user is not you who is doing the designing.
[05:49.020 --> 05:52.280]  We are thinking about the people who are using this particular design.
[05:52.760 --> 05:58.960]  And if you're familiar with user-centered design, usability, increasingly we talk a lot about empathy.
[05:59.140 --> 06:05.120]  That the way we can build good experiences, design good experiences, is to have empathy for other people.
[06:05.500 --> 06:12.720]  But we really can't do that if we're not talking to people, looking at their experiences, thinking about their different backgrounds.
[06:13.400 --> 06:20.780]  And another field that is increasingly something that we're paying attention to, thankfully, is the idea of inclusive design.
[06:21.260 --> 06:28.120]  And if we're going to design inclusively, then we also will want to think about privacy issues, I think.
[06:28.120 --> 06:33.080]  And we'll want to talk to, get to know people with different backgrounds and perspectives.
[06:33.380 --> 06:36.280]  And importantly, have them on our own teams, right?
[06:36.980 --> 06:46.900]  So, for an example, this is a relatively small nonprofit, day one, here in New York City, that we've gotten to work with a little bit in the past on a pro bono basis.
[06:47.580 --> 06:52.680]  And they are an organization that works with young people who are often in abusive relationships.
[06:53.060 --> 06:57.600]  Now, they don't necessarily recognize that they're in an abusive relationship sometimes.
[06:57.600 --> 07:05.980]  And what the organization can do is help them to see those moments where something is actually intrusive or abusive.
[07:06.220 --> 07:08.620]  And that often is from a privacy perspective.
[07:08.860 --> 07:25.740]  In other words, if your partner is demanding to know your passwords through your phone or different websites and putting a guilt trip on you and saying, if you really love me, you wouldn't mind sharing your password with me, recognizing that that's actually abusive behavior,
[07:25.800 --> 07:26.020]  right?
[07:26.020 --> 07:44.460]  So, even when we're helping them with their website in different considerations, we want to keep that audience in mind and understand even something so simple that if someone is reviewing the content on this website, they may want to exit it very quickly if someone comes along and is looking over their shoulder.
[07:44.620 --> 07:49.340]  So, we built an exit button, for example, on the site for them to get out of there.
[07:51.000 --> 07:55.260]  Similarly, though, LGBTQ youth, they may have a need for privacy.
[07:55.380 --> 07:58.060]  They very much do have a need for privacy.
[07:58.280 --> 08:01.220]  And they will want to feel secure through reaching out to people.
[08:01.420 --> 08:08.060]  Now, I'll use Facebook as an example here because it is a very popular platform for people to communicate on.
[08:08.200 --> 08:15.960]  And the average person, the average kid, this may be the first place or one of the first places they think to go to to look for help.
[08:16.140 --> 08:25.060]  So, if they're going to an organization like Audre Lorde on Facebook, can they be sure that their activity is private?
[08:25.100 --> 08:26.540]  Is somebody watching them?
[08:26.680 --> 08:39.640]  Is the fact that they liked the Audre Lorde page visible to other people or, you know, any other nonprofit that they might be interacting with or magazine or something like that that suits their preferences?
[08:39.820 --> 08:43.620]  As we'll see, it is not necessarily private.
[08:44.720 --> 08:47.000]  So, what are some different privacy issues?
[08:47.100 --> 08:57.400]  I'm sure that you're familiar with a lot of these, but I think it's interesting just to touch on different ones to get us thinking about how these things are and how they're growing all the time.
[08:58.480 --> 09:02.180]  Data security, an issue from a security perspective.
[09:02.180 --> 09:09.160]  In the Wall Street Journal, 2019 said that security experts believe that we will break through...
[09:09.160 --> 09:12.240]  Quantum computers will help break through encryption within a decade.
[09:12.420 --> 09:15.000]  And so, all our passwords potentially become useless.
[09:15.460 --> 09:18.740]  What does that mean to all our personal information, our personal data?
[09:19.060 --> 09:20.740]  Of course, people are working on solutions.
[09:21.020 --> 09:23.160]  People talk about biometrics as a solution.
[09:23.380 --> 09:25.760]  Is that a solution from a privacy perspective?
[09:26.020 --> 09:28.000]  There's a lot of things to be considered, right?
[09:29.800 --> 09:38.580]  More personally, perhaps, last year, in April, we learned that Facebook, of course, the largest social media platform on the planet, was hacked.
[09:39.160 --> 09:42.300]  Half a billion people's data was leaked.
[09:42.520 --> 09:45.660]  And that included things like phone numbers and personal data.
[09:45.980 --> 10:00.220]  And you can imagine that this sort of information, if it doesn't allow someone to steal your identity immediately, it can be a base for certainly approaching that, for stealing your identity or using it in all sorts of nefarious ways.
[10:01.060 --> 10:07.180]  In fact, during the pandemic, identity theft has taken off.
[10:07.220 --> 10:08.900]  And it may or may not be a surprise to you.
[10:08.960 --> 10:11.260]  I was a victim of it early last year myself.
[10:11.320 --> 10:13.560]  It was one of the worst things I've been in.
[10:13.700 --> 10:15.880]  Spent hours and hours on phone with the bank.
[10:16.240 --> 10:17.120]  Dozens of calls.
[10:17.120 --> 10:21.520]  They told me I stole my money at one point and eventually figured it all out.
[10:21.680 --> 10:22.280]  It was awful.
[10:22.700 --> 10:30.260]  But the FTC said there were 1.4 million reports of identity theft in 2020, which is double from the year before.
[10:30.860 --> 10:40.320]  So identity theft thieves even targeted the government funds that were earmarked to help people who are hit financially by the pandemic.
[10:40.320 --> 10:42.180]  You probably heard tell of that.
[10:42.300 --> 10:45.700]  Of course, there were also big corporations that took advantage of this situation too.
[10:45.700 --> 10:49.940]  But leaks of this kind of personal data can really be catastrophic.
[10:50.340 --> 10:54.380]  And as some of you may know, it can take a long time to recover from these sort of incidents.
[10:56.540 --> 10:57.640]  Facial recognition.
[10:57.940 --> 10:59.840]  Many of you may be familiar with Clearview.
[11:01.020 --> 11:15.680]  Clearview scraped public sites, images, Instagram, social media, and got 3 billion photos of people that they were able to then use to build facial recognition models for people without their permission.
[11:15.980 --> 11:22.220]  The idea, of course, is that if you put your photos on Instagram or Facebook or Twitter or whatever, that you're giving permission.
[11:22.760 --> 11:35.040]  But when you put your photos out there, you may not realize, of course, that an organization like Clearview could be creating a facial recognition program, which they then sell the results of to law enforcement.
[11:35.040 --> 11:38.240]  And indeed, that is what they were doing.
[11:39.480 --> 11:49.600]  Similarly, you may have heard tell of stores like Albertsons, Rite Aid, Macy's, Ace Hardware, etc., using facial recognition programs to identify customers.
[11:49.780 --> 11:52.840]  You might think, oh, is that theft protection?
[11:53.160 --> 11:53.700]  No.
[11:54.500 --> 11:59.220]  Actually, sometimes they are not willing to tell the public why they are utilizing these programs.
[11:59.220 --> 12:07.000]  But we do know that they are actually using them to track customers around the store in order to present them with ads online later.
[12:07.440 --> 12:17.420]  So it's not just your browsing habits on the web that might bring that advertisement on Instagram or Facebook for the shorts that you're looking at.
[12:19.520 --> 12:20.160]  Deepfakes.
[12:20.480 --> 12:25.680]  I like to touch on deepfakes because they can have a personal privacy issue, of course.
[12:25.680 --> 12:30.240]  And I previously had used the example of the Barack Obama video.
[12:30.240 --> 12:35.680]  But when the war in Ukraine broke out, people immediately began to warn there are going to be deepfakes.
[12:36.500 --> 12:40.140]  And indeed, there were, both of Putin and Zelensky.
[12:40.380 --> 12:43.840]  Now, I think they were probably pretty amateurish, but they did...
[12:44.400 --> 12:49.080]  They were put out there nonetheless to create, you know, confusion and misinformation and whatnot.
[12:49.600 --> 12:53.200]  But these can also be used to undermine people's privacy, of course.
[12:53.200 --> 12:58.740]  And when you put your video, when you put your imagery out there, who knows how it might be used in the future.
[12:59.060 --> 13:04.820]  You might also know that people are doing the very same thing with voice as well.
[13:05.540 --> 13:09.140]  So the hacker, for example, or I shouldn't say hacker.
[13:09.240 --> 13:16.220]  The person who stole my money from the bank did try to imitate me, but they couldn't imitate my voice yet.
[13:16.640 --> 13:18.380]  That may happen in the near future.
[13:20.600 --> 13:21.320]  Dark patterns.
[13:21.460 --> 13:26.160]  The earlier discussion I did here mentioned dark patterns, and I was grateful for that.
[13:26.280 --> 13:28.640]  And I want to go into more detail about dark patterns, too.
[13:29.060 --> 13:30.100]  These are very, very common.
[13:30.260 --> 13:32.000]  Once you see them, you'll see them everywhere.
[13:32.720 --> 13:37.560]  A great example recently, the New York Times covered, was Donald Trump.
[13:38.220 --> 13:41.840]  The Trump campaign creating what they called a money bomb.
[13:42.000 --> 13:44.780]  Literally referred to this design as a money bomb.
[13:45.420 --> 13:50.500]  Where if you were to sign up for a donation, you didn't realize it, but it was a recurring donation.
[13:50.820 --> 13:52.700]  So I'll show you on the next slide.
[13:53.000 --> 13:56.020]  This checkbox here was pre-selected.
[13:56.380 --> 13:57.500]  Yellow background.
[13:58.040 --> 14:03.080]  Different kinds of, you know, font size, caps, whatever.
[14:03.080 --> 14:04.940]  And they kept changing the wording and everything.
[14:05.140 --> 14:09.900]  And it was intentionally done to make you... to trick you into a recurring payment.
[14:10.160 --> 14:13.860]  So this made a lot of Trump supporters actually very angry.
[14:14.620 --> 14:16.880]  But this, again, was done intentionally.
[14:17.040 --> 14:19.260]  A great example of a dark pattern.
[14:19.760 --> 14:23.840]  Their donations did grow astronomically, but so did fraud complaints.
[14:25.480 --> 14:26.620]  Loss of privacy.
[14:26.900 --> 14:33.960]  In early 2021, delivery drivers were required to sign consent forms, which allowed Amazon to collect their biometric data.
[14:34.080 --> 14:35.160]  You've probably heard of this, too.
[14:35.680 --> 14:40.060]  So all sorts of monitoring of their behavior on the job, which did include...
[14:40.060 --> 14:42.180]  which did prompt one person, at least, to quit.
[14:43.860 --> 14:44.740]  Data sharing.
[14:45.000 --> 14:49.980]  So this is where, of course, I allude to the developments in the last month or so as Roe v. Wade was overturned.
[14:50.900 --> 14:57.440]  As soon as this got into the news, there was a lot of talk about you better delete particular apps.
[14:57.440 --> 15:03.320]  But even more importantly, there is already discussion that deleting apps isn't enough.
[15:03.340 --> 15:08.080]  Because your browsing behavior is seen and shared amongst companies.
[15:08.380 --> 15:15.720]  And if you trust one company with your information, but they have partners that they share it with, do you trust those partners as well?
[15:15.860 --> 15:19.960]  So your data isn't just held by that one particular company.
[15:19.960 --> 15:22.460]  It can be looked at by a lot of different people.
[15:22.460 --> 15:26.820]  And indeed, this actually isn't a new issue.
[15:27.080 --> 15:39.020]  You go back here to 2019 and this story about Missouri reviewing data about Planned Parenthood's patients, including their periods to identify failed abortions.
[15:39.160 --> 15:45.960]  So this was basically the government, the state government, sending people in and demanding to review data at that time.
[15:47.320 --> 15:53.040]  But of course, in a post-Roe USA, we're already seeing how data can be used against us.
[15:53.120 --> 15:59.040]  And that article on the left is just confirming, after Roe, what was already happening.
[15:59.040 --> 16:08.900]  That this location data broker admitted that they had excess data for Planned Parenthood clinics in order to understand these sort of things.
[16:08.900 --> 16:17.420]  And Planned Parenthood discovered that they had marketing trackers for Facebook on some of their pages and immediately removed those.
[16:17.680 --> 16:22.000]  And there are other stories in the news more recently of studies of the...
[16:22.000 --> 16:25.040]  I think it was the top 100 hospitals in the United States.
[16:25.100 --> 16:31.460]  And they found that 30% of them had social media trackers like Facebook on their websites.
[16:31.920 --> 16:38.560]  And that meant that if you were filling out a form on a particular page, Facebook was getting pinged with some of that information as well.
[16:39.700 --> 16:50.120]  Further looked at some of those hospitals and found, I think it was seven, that there were logged in portals where that information was being shared with Facebook.
[16:50.460 --> 16:52.780]  Now, this could be disappearing.
[16:53.200 --> 16:55.160]  It may have no eyes on it.
[16:55.300 --> 16:56.960]  But again, we don't know, right?
[16:57.080 --> 16:58.260]  We don't know who's looking at that.
[16:58.300 --> 17:02.960]  We don't know what other partners are also on the receiving end of that information.
[17:05.480 --> 17:11.340]  So, we talk a lot about personalization in my field and we kind of talk about it as a value.
[17:11.760 --> 17:13.960]  People seem to like personalization a lot.
[17:14.080 --> 17:19.180]  When you ask them outright in polls, they'll say that they do appreciate personalization.
[17:19.540 --> 17:26.000]  But when you ask them the questions that reveal how personalization actually works, it's a very different story.
[17:26.000 --> 17:36.160]  So, when you ask them from the perspective of, do you mind being followed around the Internet to have these ads personalized for you, it becomes a very different story.
[17:36.380 --> 17:43.200]  So, a 2019 survey, for example, by RSA, found that only 17% of respondents thought it was ethical.
[17:43.320 --> 17:46.600]  17% thought it was ethical to track their online activity.
[17:46.600 --> 17:57.960]  And earlier, Pew Research found 91% of adults believe consumers have lost control of how their personal information is collected and used by companies.
[17:59.480 --> 18:08.400]  So, in a sign of a time, you're probably aware of this or have noticed it at least, Apple rolled out this new iPhone feature, App Tracking Transparency.
[18:08.660 --> 18:10.400]  It's an anti-tracking shield.
[18:10.400 --> 18:15.880]  You say you opt in or out of being tracked by this particular app.
[18:15.880 --> 18:17.940]  And they have to ask first.
[18:18.100 --> 18:20.380]  So, it has been hugely popular so far.
[18:21.460 --> 18:24.720]  Initially, I think the number was even lower than 20%.
[18:24.720 --> 18:29.560]  But the last figure I could find is about 20% of iOS users allowing apps to track them.
[18:29.740 --> 18:33.800]  I'm sure that varies according to the type of app that you're talking about.
[18:33.940 --> 18:37.080]  So, they've been a little bit more fine-tuning to that.
[18:37.360 --> 18:41.980]  And people are more likely to allow the app to track them in certain situations.
[18:42.320 --> 18:46.400]  But what you're seeing on the right there is Instagram basically trying to sell you on this.
[18:46.520 --> 18:50.520]  And they don't want to go into too much detail, obviously, or take up too much of your time.
[18:50.640 --> 18:55.760]  But they're giving some bullets there that say that they can personalize ads for you better.
[18:55.940 --> 18:57.440]  That it will keep Instagram free.
[18:57.780 --> 18:59.620]  And that you'll be supporting businesses.
[18:59.880 --> 19:03.140]  And, you know, you can take each of those bullets for what they're worth.
[19:03.300 --> 19:04.940]  But that's what they're trying to do.
[19:05.020 --> 19:09.140]  They're trying to make sure that you click allow on that next screen.
[19:09.140 --> 19:10.480]  Because a lot of people are not.
[19:10.960 --> 19:14.980]  And then, of course, there's the oncoming cookie apocalypse.
[19:15.520 --> 19:17.920]  Google's plan to update the Chrome browser by 2023.
[19:18.400 --> 19:21.520]  Which would prevent companies from tracking your wanderings.
[19:21.940 --> 19:28.440]  I think most people would understand that this does not completely prevent a company from learning about you.
[19:28.560 --> 19:30.560]  They have plenty of ways that they can do that.
[19:30.560 --> 19:36.640]  But this is going to be an unpopular move with a lot of companies, of course.
[19:36.880 --> 19:42.820]  A lot of this is really a reaction to competition amongst companies like Apple, Google, and Facebook.
[19:43.400 --> 19:49.960]  But it is also a result of the fact that people are increasingly concerned with the privacy of their data.
[19:51.500 --> 19:55.560]  So, we just kind of looked really quickly at some top privacy concerns.
[19:55.560 --> 20:01.520]  There are some good articles out there or studies about this one I refer to.
[20:01.700 --> 20:03.520]  The 2019 Smashing Magazine one.
[20:03.680 --> 20:07.180]  Where they talk about 24 top user privacy concerns.
[20:07.480 --> 20:10.680]  And there's a lot more there that I think we can all identify with.
[20:11.000 --> 20:14.560]  Whether it's things like the hidden fees or social profiling.
[20:15.440 --> 20:18.520]  Automatically importing contact information of your friends.
[20:18.740 --> 20:21.380]  That's a pretty common one, unfortunately.
[20:21.740 --> 20:23.600]  And also a dark pattern.
[20:24.320 --> 20:27.080]  We'll show an example, perhaps, of that in a moment.
[20:27.280 --> 20:33.000]  Where, you know, you accidentally end up sending information to dozens or hundreds of your friends.
[20:33.000 --> 20:34.560]  Due to a dark pattern.
[20:35.660 --> 20:37.060]  There are some regulations.
[20:37.580 --> 20:39.740]  Some of which you've probably heard of, at least.
[20:40.160 --> 20:41.560]  The GDPR, of course.
[20:41.700 --> 20:45.300]  A general data protection regulation that will help with some of this.
[20:45.660 --> 20:47.800]  It was finalized in 2016.
[20:47.800 --> 20:49.880]  Came into effect in 2018.
[20:49.880 --> 20:53.940]  And that does regulate how apps and sites can collect this sort of information.
[20:53.940 --> 20:55.300]  At least within the EU.
[20:55.640 --> 20:59.800]  But also, what happens to that data when it's transferred outside of the EU.
[20:59.980 --> 21:03.100]  So, if you remember, three or so years ago.
[21:03.240 --> 21:05.980]  When you got dozens and dozens of emails at once.
[21:06.140 --> 21:07.900]  We've updated our privacy policy.
[21:08.120 --> 21:10.520]  That's what this was a result of at the time.
[21:11.840 --> 21:13.960]  So, some things that GDPR requires.
[21:14.400 --> 21:18.240]  It requires that people opt in to sharing their data.
[21:18.400 --> 21:21.500]  Works a little differently in the United States so far, as we'll see in a minute.
[21:21.680 --> 21:22.660]  So, you have to opt in.
[21:22.740 --> 21:26.600]  You have to communicate to people in the moment when you're collecting their personal data.
[21:26.860 --> 21:28.860]  Still something that we don't see enough of here.
[21:29.000 --> 21:31.480]  And you have to be transparent about what you're doing with it.
[21:31.560 --> 21:35.040]  And you have to allow people to download and delete their data as well.
[21:36.240 --> 21:41.140]  Similarly, in the United States, we do have things like the California Consumer Privacy Act.
[21:41.720 --> 21:44.140]  Our own GDPR so far, if you will.
[21:44.900 --> 21:45.820]  Very similar.
[21:45.980 --> 21:48.560]  But there is an interesting difference, as I alluded to.
[21:48.760 --> 21:53.120]  And that is that you have to opt out of having your data shared.
[21:53.300 --> 21:59.020]  Which definitely seems like the very American way of doing things as opposed to the GDPR.
[21:59.140 --> 22:03.240]  Is that businesses by default can collect your information.
[22:03.240 --> 22:06.100]  And you have to explicitly say, please do not do this.
[22:06.660 --> 22:11.920]  In March of 2021, California also announced that they are banning dark patterns.
[22:12.120 --> 22:15.800]  We'll look again at dark patterns in a little bit more detail in a moment.
[22:16.100 --> 22:20.700]  It will be very interesting to see how they codify and identify dark patterns.
[22:20.700 --> 22:21.940]  Because some of them are very slippery.
[22:22.220 --> 22:23.860]  But there are some obvious ones.
[22:24.060 --> 22:27.700]  And in some of the more recent articles, they have talked about how they will address that.
[22:28.240 --> 22:32.360]  They also developed a new privacy options icon, which could be good.
[22:32.480 --> 22:34.940]  But I haven't really seen it released in the wild yet.
[22:35.340 --> 22:39.400]  That was designed by the folks at Carnegie Mellon and University of Michigan.
[22:40.120 --> 22:44.340]  The idea for that is that it would appear on the page somewhere and draw your attention to it.
[22:44.440 --> 22:49.000]  That, aha, here's where I can go to read this and maybe take care of privacy issues.
[22:49.000 --> 22:56.280]  So since New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Hawaii at least are all working on developing their own privacy laws as well.
[22:56.440 --> 23:00.980]  And we have to kind of be designing with GDPR and California in mind.
[23:01.080 --> 23:05.140]  We may as well sort of design for the highest common good, right?
[23:05.360 --> 23:11.320]  And assume that things will continue to change with more emphasis upon privacy and security in the future.
[23:12.200 --> 23:14.960]  But I said we're probably all designers.
[23:15.620 --> 23:20.800]  And I often do address designers, UX designers, for this sort of presentation.
[23:21.000 --> 23:22.180]  What is our role then?
[23:22.220 --> 23:24.280]  Where does the rubber really meet the road?
[23:25.360 --> 23:27.380]  You might be familiar with Mike Montero.
[23:27.480 --> 23:31.260]  He wrote a book, or more of an extended rant maybe, Ruined by Design.
[23:31.520 --> 23:33.040]  It's a very entertaining read.
[23:33.360 --> 23:38.040]  He said, we're not hired to get approval or to have your work pinned to the company fridge.
[23:38.040 --> 23:41.340]  People hire you to be the expert, so you may as well be the expert.
[23:41.600 --> 23:54.100]  Now, I know working with a lot of younger designers, it can take a while to develop the confidence maybe to address things with your company, with your manager, with whomever it is.
[23:54.600 --> 23:59.740]  But one of the things I hope to do in this presentation is tackle some talking points around that.
[24:00.160 --> 24:06.840]  So specifically, I think it's good to think of the fact that we as designers do have a responsibility to advocate for users.
[24:06.840 --> 24:10.080]  Especially if we call ourselves user-centered designers.
[24:10.820 --> 24:19.160]  But that term user, I try to avoid using as much as I used to because it does tend to strip people of their individual characteristics.
[24:19.440 --> 24:19.520]  Right?
[24:19.620 --> 24:24.020]  Their personality, their history, their unique needs, even their lives.
[24:24.340 --> 24:28.140]  We have to think of it as a responsibility to real human beings.
[24:28.140 --> 24:32.720]  And we might even need to push back where necessary in terms our clients understand.
[24:34.880 --> 24:36.800]  What are some ways that we can do that?
[24:37.240 --> 24:37.680]  Oops, sorry.
[24:38.400 --> 24:45.020]  We can talk to them, first of all, this is the most highfalutin way maybe, is talk to them about their need for civic responsibility.
[24:45.300 --> 24:50.920]  And that's again, reminding them, hey, I'm a user-centered designer, I'm thinking of users, I want this site to be good for them.
[24:51.580 --> 24:56.700]  So we want to encourage them to think of these end users as human beings who are part of their community.
[24:57.220 --> 25:00.080]  But there's also reputation management, right?
[25:00.340 --> 25:05.220]  We may need to remind our clients that what they do can undermine their brands.
[25:05.860 --> 25:13.960]  We can let them know that dark patterns that we'll look at again in a few minutes can anger people and can also cause them to abandon your site.
[25:13.960 --> 25:16.560]  can also contribute to undermining your reputation.
[25:17.360 --> 25:23.020]  We can remind them that data breaches and sloppy treatment of data can lead to loss of their base.
[25:23.360 --> 25:30.000]  And, of course, there's that financial consideration increasingly as we have more laws and regulations about this kind of thing.
[25:31.360 --> 25:39.660]  Basically, we need to tell them that, yes, you might think that there's an upfront cost to designing for privacy and security, but the long-term costs can be devastating.
[25:39.660 --> 25:50.880]  And this conversation applies increasingly in related fields like accessibility as well, where when we point out issues around accessibility on websites, we might get pushback.
[25:51.080 --> 25:52.220]  Oh, that's going to take time.
[25:52.300 --> 26:01.260]  Well, the investment upfront is going to be worth it because you are helping people, but you're also not going to get sued, potentially.
[26:02.580 --> 26:06.000]  Anybody familiar with this gentleman, Rene Carmille?
[26:06.000 --> 26:15.200]  This is a dramatic example, the most dramatic example that I've ever found of somebody who had to make a decision around privacy.
[26:15.400 --> 26:21.160]  This was in the 1940s, but he and his team, they worked on the French census.
[26:21.420 --> 26:33.480]  They were called the first ethical hackers, and they decided to sabotage their machines to prevent them from recording individual people's religion.
[26:33.480 --> 26:39.560]  And, of course, that was because they were then able to hide the fact that some people were jewish.
[26:39.980 --> 26:48.020]  Now, the Nazis did discover that they were doing this, they were arrested, they were tortured, and Carmille died at Dachau.
[26:48.020 --> 26:57.160]  But they did prevent some tens of thousands of people potentially living in France from being identified and thereby save their lives.
[26:57.460 --> 27:12.740]  So what is amazing to me about that story is it is from the 1940s, but this is a story about people adjusting an experience, and, you know, an early digital one, if you will, too, in order to do something good.
[27:12.860 --> 27:19.100]  They were resisting, if you will, and they were standing up for the privacy of these particular people.
[27:19.260 --> 27:21.060]  So that's a very dramatic example.
[27:21.300 --> 27:25.180]  We may think we're not likely to ever have anything happen like that.
[27:25.180 --> 27:33.460]  But more recently, in 2019, maybe not as dramatic, but certainly was a big deal for these people.
[27:33.700 --> 27:39.540]  Five employees quit their jobs at GitHub after learning that that company had shared data with ICE.
[27:39.720 --> 27:58.600]  And, of course, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, if you're familiar with them, they have done a lot of things that are questionable at best involving immigration and immigrants and actually potentially breaking human rights, creating human rights violations as well.
[27:58.800 --> 28:01.760]  So this must have been a very big deal for them in particular.
[28:03.420 --> 28:05.160]  What are some best practices, though?
[28:05.260 --> 28:06.980]  Those are sort of the dramatic examples.
[28:07.280 --> 28:09.220]  What are some actual best practices?
[28:09.220 --> 28:14.620]  Let's look at those for how we can work on a day-to-day basis with some of these situations.
[28:15.360 --> 28:22.420]  Dr. Ann Kavoukian, she has what I could call a manifesto, the privacy by design manifesto, if you will.
[28:22.600 --> 28:25.080]  And she lays out some foundational principles on that.
[28:25.160 --> 28:26.140]  It's worth having a look at.
[28:26.240 --> 28:27.660]  It's available as a PDF online.
[28:27.660 --> 28:29.180]  You can probably read it in five minutes.
[28:29.400 --> 28:33.760]  But she recommends making privacy the default setting in our designs.
[28:33.920 --> 28:37.140]  And she says that privacy should be embedded in design.
[28:37.140 --> 28:41.800]  So when you hear that phrase, privacy by design, a lot of time that's where this is coming from.
[28:42.020 --> 28:44.460]  But what are some practical ways to do that?
[28:45.520 --> 28:48.120]  First of all, avoid dark patterns.
[28:48.320 --> 28:51.640]  And I mention this one first because it does cover a lot of territory.
[28:51.740 --> 28:53.980]  And I'll give you some practical examples.
[28:54.660 --> 28:59.380]  Dark patterns, that is a term that was coined by Harry Brignall in 2010.
[28:59.380 --> 29:00.520]  He has a website.
[29:00.740 --> 29:03.800]  I think it's literally darkpatterns.org or .com.
[29:03.980 --> 29:07.800]  And he identified about 12 different types of dark patterns.
[29:07.900 --> 29:13.880]  It'll be interesting to see if more of those are articulated, especially if California's trying to codify this.
[29:14.020 --> 29:16.020]  I don't think they're just pointing to his website.
[29:17.020 --> 29:19.420]  But these basically trick people.
[29:19.500 --> 29:23.160]  Dark patterns trick people into doing something that they didn't intend to do.
[29:23.160 --> 29:26.100]  I like what another researcher said about this.
[29:26.520 --> 29:31.860]  He said that dark patterns supplant user value in favor of shareholder value.
[29:33.520 --> 29:37.240]  So some of the types here, I definitely encourage you to check them out on the site.
[29:37.240 --> 29:44.060]  If you're not familiar with these already, once you read them, you'll start seeing them everywhere, probably every day.
[29:44.580 --> 29:49.220]  There's bait and switch, where you try to accomplish one thing and something undesirable happens.
[29:49.420 --> 29:57.020]  You could refer, I suppose, to the Trump campaign one, where people thought they were making one payment and they were making recurring payments as a bait and switch.
[29:57.740 --> 30:01.640]  There's confirmed shaming, which we talked about in an earlier session.
[30:01.840 --> 30:09.900]  The example there on the right, you try to opt out of something and it tries to humiliate you or trick you, guilt you into staying.
[30:09.900 --> 30:19.200]  So the choices there are, you know, daily guide to healthier life, you want to live healthier by clicking the big blue button, or you don't want to be healthier.
[30:19.580 --> 30:21.460]  This is the other one that you can click.
[30:21.600 --> 30:24.680]  And of course, that's in small font that you can hardly see.
[30:25.500 --> 30:29.860]  So, you know, the impact of that, it's just kind of shitty and annoying.
[30:30.480 --> 30:37.700]  But other dark patterns, as you can imagine, are much more powerful and even potentially devastating.
[30:37.700 --> 30:41.340]  Friends spamming, for example, that could just be embarrassing, right?
[30:41.480 --> 30:43.340]  But it is a huge form of annoyance.
[30:44.000 --> 30:49.860]  Maybe you're filling out a form and there's a little check box that's preselected that you didn't notice that says, share with my contacts.
[30:50.060 --> 30:51.480]  And all of a sudden, you hit submit.
[30:51.800 --> 30:56.240]  And as the page is refreshing, you're like, holy crap, I just saw that.
[30:56.240 --> 30:59.460]  And this went out to hundreds of my friends or something.
[30:59.680 --> 31:03.040]  They were all invited to this new website or whatever.
[31:05.220 --> 31:10.300]  Again, Mike Montero, this quote really hit home for me from his book, Ruined by Design.
[31:10.620 --> 31:14.380]  Dark patterns are the canaries in the coal mine of an ethical design.
[31:14.600 --> 31:18.500]  A company who's willing to keep a customer hostage is willing to do worse.
[31:18.660 --> 31:20.880]  So it sounds kind of like the iceberg effect, right?
[31:21.000 --> 31:28.960]  If you know that a company is willing to do some of these particular things, there's probably a lot else going on there that might not be too great as well.
[31:31.840 --> 31:34.160]  Examples, this is Venmo.
[31:34.380 --> 31:35.820]  I'm sure you're all very familiar with.
[31:36.200 --> 31:41.820]  Interestingly enough, I believe to this day, Venmo payments are still public by default.
[31:42.060 --> 31:44.820]  And this could definitely be one of those, hey, it's not a big deal.
[31:44.940 --> 31:46.660]  Venmo is a social kind of app.
[31:46.680 --> 31:50.600]  I kind of know that if I go in there, what I do is being shared with other people.
[31:50.920 --> 31:55.980]  But it has been public by default, and people complained about that.
[31:55.980 --> 32:01.800]  And there were a couple of websites that were set up to demonstrate this with good intentions.
[32:02.220 --> 32:05.980]  One was Vismo, which basically showed everybody...
[32:06.680 --> 32:16.000]  They basically chose keywords for things like sex and drugs, prostitution, alcohol, and things like that.
[32:16.140 --> 32:23.200]  They may have been originally posted in good fun and had nothing to do with those things, or they may have been legitimate.
[32:23.520 --> 32:30.280]  But the idea was all of these things are public and you can go to a site and you can see them happening in real time.
[32:31.140 --> 32:34.520]  You might be like, well, but they did that publicly on Venmo.
[32:34.780 --> 32:42.740]  That's one venue, but that information was there publicly to be taken and put in another venue where the people weren't necessarily expecting to show up.
[32:43.040 --> 32:45.960]  And there was a Twitter account, I think, that did the exact same thing.
[32:45.960 --> 32:51.220]  Again, you do have the option to change this now, but I think it's still public by default.
[32:52.240 --> 32:54.440]  This is probably a worse example.
[32:55.280 --> 32:56.740]  Strava, good app.
[32:56.860 --> 32:58.680]  I've used it myself in the past.
[32:59.080 --> 33:00.740]  They brainstormed a feature.
[33:00.980 --> 33:02.640]  So this, again, wasn't an accident.
[33:03.040 --> 33:04.580]  They called it Flyby.
[33:04.860 --> 33:15.920]  And the idea, again, by default, it just got rolled out, was that when you ran by someone who was also using Strava, it would show you an image of them.
[33:16.160 --> 33:22.200]  It would show you their running route, kind of effectively revealing where they lived, you know, potentially.
[33:22.860 --> 33:26.000]  And, of course, they got a lot of backlash for this.
[33:26.380 --> 33:32.080]  And I believe they kept it, but they did make it so that you had to opt into it in this case.
[33:32.080 --> 33:34.540]  So, again, privacy by default.
[33:34.720 --> 33:38.840]  Privacy by design, that should have been private by default.
[33:40.360 --> 33:46.240]  Another, maybe, way of looking at this case study is it would be interesting to know who was on the design team here.
[33:46.380 --> 33:47.920]  We're talking about inclusive design.
[33:48.120 --> 33:56.860]  If there had been more women, perhaps, on this particular team, would they have pushed back on this particular feature a little harder and said, are you crazy?
[33:56.860 --> 33:59.060]  You just designed stalkerware.
[33:59.360 --> 34:01.700]  Because, in fact, that's what they had done, right?
[34:01.700 --> 34:04.660]  Stalkerware doesn't have to be something that is intentionally designed.
[34:04.860 --> 34:09.860]  It can be incidental, which is likely what happened in this particular case.
[34:11.260 --> 34:14.060]  Another example, my wife found this one.
[34:14.920 --> 34:19.680]  She was checking out on Delta Airlines, and she's already got her seat.
[34:19.840 --> 34:22.440]  You've probably all seen this one on one side or another.
[34:22.940 --> 34:29.080]  And she's ready to go, and you get this window that says, move to main cabin, and that costs $100 more.
[34:29.080 --> 34:33.760]  And there's a big red button there that says, what does it say?
[34:33.940 --> 34:36.600]  Move to... move to main cabin.
[34:36.840 --> 34:36.960]  Right.
[34:37.240 --> 34:41.200]  So, by default, they're getting you to pay another $100.
[34:41.420 --> 34:43.880]  If you're not looking, you just hit that and you keep going.
[34:44.080 --> 34:48.720]  The button that you want, more likely, is the tiniest script on that page.
[34:49.300 --> 34:52.400]  And it's lower contrast than anything else there.
[34:52.400 --> 34:55.220]  And it says, continue with basic economy.
[34:55.840 --> 35:01.900]  Now, this particular dark pattern, and that's what it is, of course, is just kind of annoying, right?
[35:01.940 --> 35:02.880]  It slows you down.
[35:02.880 --> 35:09.100]  You probably aren't going to be fooled by it, but you'll be annoyed that you have to find the link that you wanted to find.
[35:09.360 --> 35:13.420]  But it is a dark pattern, and it might trick people into spending money they didn't want.
[35:13.420 --> 35:30.320]  But this pattern itself is the one that gets a lot of people in trouble, because if it's not here upgrading me to, you know, but with $100, it might be that the small print says something or the checkbox that's preselected that says, share this with all of my contacts.
[35:31.040 --> 35:33.800]  And there, you know, it could be a lot worse.
[35:35.200 --> 35:42.500]  Secondly, be transparent about what personal data is being used, especially with PII.
[35:42.500 --> 35:47.120]  PII, personally identifiable information, probably familiar with that.
[35:47.840 --> 35:51.340]  That's generally data points that are pretty unique to you.
[35:51.520 --> 36:01.500]  So your name is only, you know, there might be more than one of Robert Stribbley, but there's one person with my email, there's one person with my phone number, social security number.
[36:02.200 --> 36:07.920]  All those things help narrow down to who you are, and, of course, that makes it easier for someone to steal your identity.
[36:08.140 --> 36:19.540]  So if they're using that information, if you're filling out a form and entering that, again, maybe I trust that CVS, let's use CVS as an example for a very specific reason.
[36:20.280 --> 36:36.700]  I maybe trust CVS, but when I look at their privacy statement, as I did, which is on the wall physically next to a kiosk in CVS, it says that they do share my data with other parties to help me, and I don't know who they are.
[36:36.700 --> 36:37.960]  They might all be trustworthy.
[36:38.340 --> 36:41.080]  But when I was in CVS recently, after Roe v. Wade was overturned, I see a list of their services includes pregnancy services and pregnancy testing and things like that.
[36:48.920 --> 36:54.620]  And I could walk up to a kiosk and literally, you know, indicate as a person that I'm interested in something like that.
[36:54.800 --> 36:56.040]  Who's that being shared with?
[36:56.220 --> 36:56.980]  I don't know.
[37:00.200 --> 37:04.860]  87% of the U.S. population can be uniquely identified by just said date of birth, gender, and ZIP Code.
[37:05.320 --> 37:07.720]  Notice that those three things are not PII.
[37:08.260 --> 37:09.420]  They're not PII.
[37:09.600 --> 37:14.240]  But just with those three things, we can almost guaranteedly pinpoint who you are.
[37:14.420 --> 37:19.280]  So imagine how much damage can be done with three points, data points of PII.
[37:19.480 --> 37:24.700]  The more personal information that we collect about an individual, the greater chance that they can be harmed on.
[37:24.700 --> 37:31.020]  So we want to be transparent about why personal information is being collected or shared as well.
[37:31.820 --> 37:34.520]  And we should consider this an opportunity, right?
[37:34.920 --> 37:39.460]  To explain the benefits, just like Instagram was trying to do in that little screen.
[37:39.680 --> 37:44.000]  If we're taking your information, does it ensure a better experience in the future?
[37:44.160 --> 37:46.480]  Does it personalize ads and offers for them?
[37:47.180 --> 37:57.640]  With the GDPR in Europe, you'll see on some news sites that it actually does provide a list of all the third parties that that newspaper is sharing your information with.
[37:57.780 --> 38:00.220]  And I opened one, and I started scrolling through it.
[38:00.300 --> 38:03.060]  And I was like, whoa, this isn't 30.
[38:03.280 --> 38:09.640]  And it was something like 600 other third parties that this newspaper was sharing information with.
[38:09.860 --> 38:11.380]  So at least I can see them.
[38:11.560 --> 38:13.560]  Am I going to sit there and go through them?
[38:13.900 --> 38:15.000]  No, probably not.
[38:16.440 --> 38:18.040]  So is that a solution?
[38:18.060 --> 38:18.580]  I don't know.
[38:18.580 --> 38:21.880]  Be prepared, though, to explain these benefits in detail.
[38:21.880 --> 38:25.860]  And if you can't consider whether you're designing the right sort of product.
[38:27.740 --> 38:30.320]  Example here from Lemonade, home insurance app.
[38:30.400 --> 38:34.440]  They do a pretty good job of this, creating a digestible privacy policy.
[38:34.700 --> 38:38.800]  They itemize what they're doing and also explain why.
[38:39.000 --> 38:42.500]  And they also promise not to share your information with third parties.
[38:44.300 --> 38:47.140]  Of course, we want to use clear and approachable language.
[38:47.560 --> 38:48.800]  Seems like a no-brainer.
[38:49.060 --> 38:57.940]  But, you know, in this study from the New York Times in 2019, they looked at 150 privacy policies, which sounds like the worst job on earth to me.
[38:58.720 --> 39:01.920]  And you can see the scattergram of how they performed.
[39:01.920 --> 39:06.040]  And, unfortunately, Airbnb is way up there in the worst sector.
[39:06.080 --> 39:09.860]  And they said that their privacy policy was particularly inscrutable.
[39:10.440 --> 39:12.120]  And a little excerpt from it there.
[39:12.200 --> 39:20.240]  This information is necessary for the adequate performance of the contract between you and us to allow us to comply with our legal obligations.
[39:20.740 --> 39:23.520]  So we kind of all know that legalese is bad.
[39:23.520 --> 39:28.980]  But it really undermines people's privacy when they don't understand what they're looking at, right?
[39:28.980 --> 39:30.040]  And it's on purpose.
[39:30.360 --> 39:34.460]  As I say, the vague language is there to help lawyers.
[39:34.620 --> 39:36.940]  It's not defending the company.
[39:37.080 --> 39:41.640]  It's not to help us understand what the company or organization is doing with our data.
[39:43.280 --> 39:49.640]  Twitter, for whatever faults they may have, has a reasonably good practice here that I like.
[39:49.640 --> 39:53.520]  They pull some things from their privacy policy up front.
[39:53.520 --> 39:56.180]  And they say, here are six things that you should know.
[39:56.600 --> 39:59.160]  So that, I thought, was an interesting way of handling it.
[39:59.380 --> 40:01.480]  They assume you're not going to read the whole thing.
[40:01.600 --> 40:04.080]  But you better pay attention to these six things.
[40:04.100 --> 40:05.340]  We do advise that.
[40:05.420 --> 40:06.700]  And we advise you read the rest.
[40:08.080 --> 40:12.860]  True Love is an app that I came across which focuses on healing our relationship with technology.
[40:12.860 --> 40:17.660]  They have a very plain spoken way of explaining what the app is doing.
[40:18.260 --> 40:25.920]  And, you know, for example, language like, if you like, you can help True Love by giving permission to collect anonymized data through Unity Analytics.
[40:26.140 --> 40:28.460]  This helps catch bugs and blips.
[40:28.620 --> 40:31.280]  And then they ask for your permission to even do that.
[40:31.400 --> 40:32.320]  You can opt out of it.
[40:32.480 --> 40:39.020]  And you notice in the screen capture on the right, it also talks about the data that you enter is only stored in iCloud.
[40:39.020 --> 40:40.960]  It doesn't, apparently, go to them.
[40:42.980 --> 40:44.260]  Some guidelines then.
[40:44.660 --> 40:47.080]  The obvious, I guess, is avoid legalese and jargon.
[40:47.440 --> 40:50.360]  Your terms and conditions really doesn't have to sound like legal content.
[40:50.480 --> 40:53.600]  Though the bigger the organization you are, the more likely that is to happen, of course.
[40:54.180 --> 40:57.000]  Consider different age groups and levels of savviness.
[40:58.120 --> 41:03.120]  Remember that most adult Americans read at about a basic or intermediate literacy level.
[41:03.500 --> 41:07.320]  Fifty percent can't read a book written at an eighth grade level.
[41:07.320 --> 41:09.580]  When I first saw that, I thought it must be wrong.
[41:09.640 --> 41:10.800]  And so I kept looking at it.
[41:10.920 --> 41:12.360]  And that is accurate.
[41:12.800 --> 41:17.640]  The Content Marketing Institute recommends writing for about a 14 or 15-year-old then.
[41:18.300 --> 41:27.660]  And we could also think about, though, if we do believe that content could be aimed at a different audience, of course, thinking about carefully crafted personas.
[41:27.820 --> 41:29.120]  Who is our audience?
[41:30.360 --> 41:33.840]  You know, try to avoid broad stereotypes and things like that.
[41:33.840 --> 41:36.360]  That might help you adjust this reading level a little bit.
[41:36.540 --> 41:41.880]  But so many of the apps and websites that we are talking about are aimed for a very broad, broad market.
[41:43.240 --> 41:46.060]  Fifth, give users options to control their own data.
[41:46.980 --> 41:53.940]  So Google does allow a privacy checkup of sorts, which shows you how and why your data is being used.
[41:54.040 --> 42:00.520]  They have some controls that you can use to go in, turn off your tracking, turn off your YouTube history, etc.
[42:00.520 --> 42:03.600]  I am not saying Google is doing great with everything.
[42:03.740 --> 42:06.340]  I am going to use Facebook as an example in a moment, too.
[42:06.780 --> 42:13.400]  But I feel like if we are using these sites, and some people do need to use them, they should be aware of what they are doing.
[42:13.640 --> 42:22.120]  So this is a good moment to recall in Dr. Kavoukian's maxim, keep these privacy settings private by default.
[42:22.300 --> 42:23.920]  Keep these settings private by default.
[42:25.460 --> 42:27.540]  Some other examples of user controls here.
[42:27.720 --> 42:31.180]  We are seeing more and more of these, of course, with cookies and allowing them or not.
[42:31.660 --> 42:39.160]  The one on the left is trying to do a nice job, I think, of saying use necessary cookies, allow selection, or just allow all cookies.
[42:39.440 --> 42:42.920]  But it is kind of cluttered and hard to understand what is going on there.
[42:43.000 --> 42:47.000]  You really have to sit there and stare at it to know what you are about to click on.
[42:47.160 --> 42:51.000]  So I really think that one could be simplified, even though maybe the intentions are good.
[42:51.000 --> 42:55.080]  The one on the right, on the other hand, is very clean and simple looking.
[42:55.260 --> 42:59.340]  So I can just accept and continue or manage cookies.
[42:59.600 --> 43:03.900]  But I don't know what's happening when I click accept and continue.
[43:04.040 --> 43:04.680]  What does that mean?
[43:04.880 --> 43:09.860]  Accept and continue giving you all the data or only necessary?
[43:10.180 --> 43:14.480]  I'm probably going to assume that it's saying allow all cookies, basically, is what that means.
[43:16.300 --> 43:21.100]  Also, ensure that privacy features are placed contextually and that they're easy to find.
[43:22.600 --> 43:28.600]  Important information shouldn't be hidden in the footer, eight point font, you know, buried in the terms and conditions.
[43:29.020 --> 43:36.980]  It would be nice to see that you could go on most sites and see a privacy icon like this directing you to where you can attend to some of these things.
[43:36.980 --> 43:39.640]  And it isn't just terms and conditions.
[43:39.900 --> 43:44.100]  It's tools to help you maintain your privacy and to turn things on and off.
[43:45.580 --> 43:48.060]  Contextual and easy to find also means onboarding.
[43:48.160 --> 43:53.020]  So when people first use your app, telling them this is what we're going to be doing.
[43:53.160 --> 43:54.160]  This is who we're sharing with.
[43:54.220 --> 43:54.720]  Are you in?
[43:54.800 --> 43:55.220]  Are you out?
[43:55.220 --> 44:06.760]  And then just in time alerts, meaning there are some things that maybe you're doing for the first time within an app or a website and letting people know at just that moment, this is what we're about to do.
[44:07.000 --> 44:10.140]  These are the people that we're about to share information with.
[44:11.420 --> 44:14.080]  So Mozilla does this, you know, to some degree.
[44:14.300 --> 44:15.840]  If you download the browser, open it up.
[44:15.920 --> 44:18.400]  The first thing they show you is privacy information.
[44:19.800 --> 44:24.980]  And again, Facebook, if you're going to use Facebook, they do have privacy tools.
[44:25.540 --> 44:27.900]  And they're one or two clicks away.
[44:27.900 --> 44:32.840]  If you know where to look for them, you can turn off some things and create better privacy.
[44:33.100 --> 44:38.620]  And so a lot of times I know that people do go to Facebook for a sense of community.
[44:38.620 --> 44:40.060]  Maybe they can't find elsewhere.
[44:40.120 --> 44:41.940]  It is valuable to them that way.
[44:42.020 --> 44:46.320]  And so at least be equipped, you know, if you're using that platform.
[44:48.220 --> 44:50.260]  Onboarding example here from Babbel.
[44:50.460 --> 44:59.540]  It's very high level, but you see in the right-hand side there, they're also trying to set up reasons for you to allow Babbel to track you.
[45:00.020 --> 45:03.940]  They don't go into a lot of detail there, honestly, but you can see the pattern at least.
[45:04.040 --> 45:08.620]  There's an opportunity when you're first coming on to review this information and know what's happening.
[45:10.440 --> 45:14.780]  Seventh, remind users regularly about their privacy options and encourage them to take care of them.
[45:15.380 --> 45:17.260]  Facebook and Google both do this.
[45:17.400 --> 45:20.200]  They allow you to set reminders so that you can go back.
[45:20.760 --> 45:25.180]  If it's anything like the alerts, they seem to change all the time.
[45:25.380 --> 45:28.380]  And when I turn off alerts, they make up new alerts to annoy me.
[45:28.800 --> 45:31.240]  So the privacy things probably change as well.
[45:31.420 --> 45:34.960]  And you'll want to go and look at those and see if it makes sense to change them.
[45:34.960 --> 45:39.840]  But one final point, never change users' privacy settings without telling them in advance.
[45:40.240 --> 45:44.080]  And also give them the option to opt out of such changes.
[45:44.200 --> 45:45.740]  This seems like a no-brainer, right?
[45:46.120 --> 45:48.240]  But I alluded to this earlier on.
[45:48.320 --> 45:54.220]  A few years ago, Facebook did indeed make users' likes available overnight.
[45:54.660 --> 45:57.240]  And a lot of people kind of just said, well, big deal.
[45:57.420 --> 45:58.320]  You know, they're my likes.
[45:59.040 --> 46:02.800]  But that does ignore the fact that that could have outed some people at the time.
[46:02.900 --> 46:05.060]  Could have outed people in the LGBT community.
[46:05.740 --> 46:09.900]  I grew up in a very strict, fundamentalist kind of environment.
[46:09.900 --> 46:14.840]  And I know a lot of people this could have applied to where they could have been kicked out of their homes.
[46:15.200 --> 46:19.220]  They could have been disenfranchised from their friends, from their church, or whatever.
[46:19.940 --> 46:24.220]  But that also could reveal people's personal, political, religious beliefs as well.
[46:24.840 --> 46:30.720]  I had the opportunity to talk to an employee at Facebook at the time and ask how they justified that change.
[46:30.860 --> 46:37.200]  And they responded that the company believed in transparency and wanted people to be transparent about their interests.
[46:38.020 --> 46:46.020]  Of course, that aligned with what Mark Zuckerberg has famously said as well, that he thinks that privacy is no longer a social norm.
[46:46.020 --> 46:50.140]  I would say in response to that, that depends on who you are.
[46:50.300 --> 46:55.800]  And not necessarily what you have to hide, per se, but maybe what you need to protect.
[46:56.220 --> 47:01.480]  So, you know, we don't have the right to make decisions about people's data and interests on their behalf.
[47:01.860 --> 47:08.020]  Assuming that everyone's information can be safely made public really kind of comes from a position of privilege.
[47:08.260 --> 47:09.680]  Like, doesn't apply to me.
[47:09.820 --> 47:10.800]  I'm cool with it.
[47:11.700 --> 47:13.220]  Certainly not inclusive.
[47:13.740 --> 47:18.920]  So we shouldn't make decisions like that which can profoundly affect people's privacy without their consent.
[47:19.640 --> 47:22.480]  In conclusion, again, empathy.
[47:22.680 --> 47:24.500]  We talk a lot about empathy in design.
[47:24.700 --> 47:30.000]  If we want to design with empathy, we won't design for experiences that we wouldn't want to use ourselves.
[47:30.200 --> 47:32.860]  We won't incorporate dark patterns.
[47:32.980 --> 47:36.900]  We'll learn how to push back on dark patterns, how to come up with better solutions.
[47:37.460 --> 47:48.080]  If you have to do that, you can maybe even show the company that you're going to make people happy if they know that you're studiously avoiding doing some things that other organizations are doing.
[47:48.080 --> 47:51.040]  So another quote there from Dr. Ann Kavukian.
[47:51.200 --> 47:54.340]  She says, privacy is not about secrecy.
[47:54.900 --> 47:56.240]  It's about control.
[47:56.420 --> 48:00.060]  Controlling your own information, your own personal information.
[48:00.340 --> 48:11.960]  So if we want to ensure people have control over their own personal information, if we want to ensure our experiences are truly user-centered, I think we'll keep these best practices for privacy in mind.
[48:11.960 --> 48:12.900]  Thank you.
[48:19.210 --> 48:19.990]  Thank you.
[48:20.170 --> 48:21.970]  We have about 10 minutes for questions.
[48:22.150 --> 48:22.270]  Okay.
[48:22.270 --> 48:22.750]  You can go ahead.
[48:23.030 --> 48:23.310]  Facilde.
[48:23.750 --> 48:24.350]  Thank you.
[48:24.790 --> 48:25.070]  It
[48:28.300 --> 48:29.200]  was really horrifying.
[48:29.460 --> 48:31.560]  An example of the Facebook tracker on the
[48:39.500 --> 48:41.220]  people who allowed that to get through.
[48:41.320 --> 48:47.420]  And I'm curious if, I guess, one, do you have any insight into, you know, if they had a postmortem and what they found?
[48:47.880 --> 48:50.580]  And two, how do you know?
[48:53.990 --> 48:54.430]  Right.
[48:54.730 --> 49:03.710]  Well, I imagine there's a lot of conversations going on at Planned Parenthood and similar organizations right now to attend to some of these things that might have seemed a little bit more innocent in the past.
[49:04.490 --> 49:12.590]  But if I remember correctly, in this case, they removed the Facebook pixel just from certain parts of the site and left it in others.
[49:14.270 --> 49:17.270]  You know, there's a lot of nuance to that that I'm not up to speed on.
[49:17.870 --> 49:24.710]  But yeah, I think it's imperative more so than ever for companies to be thinking about this kind of stuff for that reason.
[49:24.710 --> 49:31.470]  And a lot of times we talk about design and we talk, thankfully, increasingly about accessibility.
[49:31.470 --> 49:39.230]  But that's why I think that this particular topic is increasingly important for companies and organizations to be thinking about as well.
[49:39.230 --> 49:45.250]  Because it's not really a practice within most organizations to think about privacy by design.
[49:45.250 --> 49:54.630]  So I don't know how to answer your question other than to say that maybe this time period, if people were already becoming concerned about it, overturning Roe v. Wade has made this starkly important to a lot of people overnight and that this may help to energize people into thinking more about it.
[50:04.110 --> 50:04.190]  Yeah.
[50:04.510 --> 50:05.790]  And I'm so sorry, so sorry.
[50:05.870 --> 50:09.770]  We have ten minutes to wrap this around for the next speaker.
[50:09.770 --> 50:13.790]  So if there's any questions and you're open to it to taking them over there.
[50:13.910 --> 50:14.810]  Thank you so much.
[50:14.970 --> 50:15.170]  Okay.
[50:15.490 --> 50:15.570]  Yeah.
[50:15.750 --> 50:15.990]  Thank you.