[00:00.000 --> 00:09.140]  Today's topic is, too long didn't read, privacy, data collection, and coercive agreements.
[00:12.110 --> 00:15.490]  So, hold on, okay, just to make it clear.
[00:16.750 --> 00:23.610]  There's actually a difference between a terms of service and a privacy policy.
[00:24.070 --> 00:35.370]  Some people, like when I was talking about, you know, doing this website, and research, thought that I was talking about privacy policies.
[00:36.330 --> 00:43.130]  And they pointed me to a tool, I think it was Polis, but it didn't work.
[00:43.270 --> 00:45.850]  It was like an extension for Firefox or something.
[00:46.390 --> 00:47.470]  It didn't even work.
[00:48.830 --> 00:55.610]  But I wanted to make a clear distinction between terms of service and privacy agreements.
[00:55.610 --> 01:07.970]  So, the terms of service is basically the document when you, you know, join a platform, download software, whatever.
[01:07.970 --> 01:27.210]  And it has basics of like ownership, warranties, user agreement, and a few other items like legal arbitration, stuff like that.
[01:27.210 --> 01:42.990]  So, the, the policy, the privacy agreement or policy is actually, you know, legal document that companies have, basically tells like what data they're collecting,
[01:47.110 --> 01:52.850]  how long they retain the data, and who they share it with or sell it with.
[01:56.810 --> 02:06.350]  And so, that, I just wanted to discuss that for a minute, as far as policies and terms of service.
[02:11.720 --> 02:16.100]  So, if I had my presentation, but I'll just go, I'm winging it.
[02:16.260 --> 02:16.540]  Okay.
[02:16.840 --> 02:19.120]  So, who do you trust?
[02:19.880 --> 02:20.800]  No one.
[02:21.120 --> 02:22.100]  Thank you.
[02:22.440 --> 02:22.760]  Me.
[02:23.240 --> 02:24.440]  Don't even trust me.
[02:25.960 --> 02:28.120]  I mean, I'm here for you, but don't trust me.
[02:28.360 --> 02:28.860]  No.
[02:29.040 --> 02:29.920]  Not with your data.
[02:30.660 --> 02:37.700]  Like, would you trust the person sitting behind you with your social security number, your ID?
[02:37.840 --> 02:39.780]  Go ahead, pass it, pass back to them.
[02:40.280 --> 02:40.680]  Everyone?
[02:41.020 --> 02:41.360]  No?
[02:41.700 --> 02:42.040]  No?
[02:45.080 --> 02:49.360]  So, why are we trusting these companies with our data?
[02:50.400 --> 03:01.880]  Is their product or service so relevant and so necessary that we need to give them all of our data and our content?
[03:01.880 --> 03:08.920]  They're taking our content, they're using it to train models, they're sharing it.
[03:09.100 --> 03:15.260]  And it's not considered selling it for cash, but for value.
[03:15.300 --> 03:19.760]  So, they are selling our data and sharing it.
[03:20.300 --> 03:28.720]  That's why it's really important to review the privacy policies of the companies that you agree.
[03:28.720 --> 03:30.560]  You can click agree.
[03:32.480 --> 03:33.540]  But did you read it?
[03:33.820 --> 03:39.300]  I mean, I started out, I wanted to analyze a bunch of terms of service and policies.
[03:39.460 --> 03:40.760]  I went to the Zoom one.
[03:40.900 --> 03:45.860]  It took me an hour and a half just to read it, much less analyze it, right?
[03:46.620 --> 03:49.260]  And I mean, I was at the end, it was a beast.
[03:49.840 --> 04:04.460]  I was like, what if I have a 15 minute interview using Zoom, and now I got to read an hour and a half worth of documentation, you know, to decide whether or not I want to use their service?
[04:06.860 --> 04:09.300]  So, that's why it's a very important topic.
[04:09.300 --> 04:13.760]  And it's really important because there's a lot of breaches.
[04:14.840 --> 04:21.120]  And this audience, especially, probably knows at least one or two, right?
[04:22.860 --> 04:25.560]  And there have been breaches in healthcare.
[04:25.740 --> 04:29.660]  There have been breaches in education.
[04:30.340 --> 04:40.680]  There have been what I would consider a violation of rights with no informed consent in capturing your data.
[04:42.740 --> 04:46.120]  Let's take the Walgreens refrigerators.
[04:47.180 --> 04:49.000]  Have you ever been to a Walgreens?
[04:49.260 --> 04:50.980]  Have you seen these refrigerators?
[04:51.160 --> 04:52.920]  They have advertising in them.
[04:53.200 --> 04:59.740]  They're also collecting emotion wreck, age gender wreck, and face wreck.
[04:59.820 --> 05:03.620]  Not just people, but actual identifiable information.
[05:04.780 --> 05:06.500]  And there's no sign on the door.
[05:08.360 --> 05:11.780]  There's, like, what are you supposed to do anytime you go to the store?
[05:12.140 --> 05:14.300]  Like, oh, I'm going to go to ShopRite.
[05:15.040 --> 05:19.000]  I'm going to pull up their privacy policy now before I go get an orange juice.
[05:19.920 --> 05:21.640]  That's pretty much where we're at.
[05:21.940 --> 05:33.260]  Because they're doing biometric face wreck and coordinating with law enforcement to report anything that comes up of someone who might have an active warrant.
[05:34.820 --> 05:40.460]  And I'm not saying I have an active warrant, but it rubs me the wrong way.
[05:41.540 --> 05:46.900]  So I don't know about you, but these are things that, you know, we need to be informed of.
[05:46.980 --> 05:49.260]  And it's not just that.
[05:49.260 --> 05:57.280]  As I mentioned before, with all the breaches and all of the data being leaked.
[05:58.180 --> 05:59.620]  Millions, billions.
[06:00.080 --> 06:01.600]  I think there was one that was a billion.
[06:02.240 --> 06:04.820]  Others are 140 million records.
[06:05.460 --> 06:08.280]  I mean, we're trusting these people with our data.
[06:08.680 --> 06:11.960]  Like, who's going to protect our data?
[06:11.960 --> 06:15.640]  I think that comes upon us, right?
[06:15.780 --> 06:19.800]  The sysadmins, the developers, the hackers.
[06:20.280 --> 06:22.740]  I mean, we need to get out there.
[06:23.000 --> 06:35.700]  At least the white hat ethical hackers need to get out there and really work on some orange book stuff to prevent data breaches.
[06:36.300 --> 06:36.560]  Seriously.
[06:39.480 --> 06:40.980]  You know, okay.
[06:41.280 --> 06:42.480]  So here we go.
[06:42.660 --> 06:51.620]  So I went to ShopRite in Vernon, Connecticut, because I had heard that they were starting the space wreck thing.
[06:52.740 --> 06:55.600]  And it was a last minute decision.
[06:55.600 --> 07:00.500]  You know, if I can get this mouse to work here.
[07:04.000 --> 07:04.720]  Okay.
[07:05.860 --> 07:18.540]  So if you notice here, the sign that informs users that their biometric data is being stored and that its space wreck is right here.
[07:19.340 --> 07:21.340]  These are the entrance doors.
[07:22.000 --> 07:25.880]  And as you can see, people just walk into the store.
[07:26.140 --> 07:30.320]  They're not reading this small notice here.
[07:32.880 --> 07:36.540]  And there it is in larger, like a close-up of it.
[07:36.920 --> 07:38.240]  Oh, and that's me.
[07:38.580 --> 07:53.540]  So what I did was, since face masks, like, you know, Halloween masks, full face masks are illegal in Connecticut, I threw a bunch of band-aids on my face, put a hair, like a hat on.
[07:53.820 --> 07:56.600]  Oh, and it's an EFF hat.
[07:57.960 --> 08:03.300]  And wore gloves, paid cash to see if I could try.
[08:03.660 --> 08:07.420]  And I mean, there's no way to know, unless I could ask ShopRite, right?
[08:07.420 --> 08:09.400]  Like, I kind of did my own test.
[08:09.580 --> 08:14.060]  Like, would they stop me?
[08:14.980 --> 08:16.620]  Would they capture my data?
[08:17.840 --> 08:22.360]  And what I found was, people felt really sorry for me because I had band-aids all over my face.
[08:23.840 --> 08:28.800]  So, you know that song, Give Me One Moment In Time, when I'm more than I thought I could be?
[08:28.980 --> 08:31.300]  I had no idea that it would work like that.
[08:33.100 --> 08:36.760]  But the point being, I don't think I was captured.
[08:36.940 --> 08:40.780]  I don't think they got the points that they needed, right?
[08:41.260 --> 08:44.740]  I mean, just a little test.
[08:44.920 --> 08:52.380]  I know there's a lot of other ways to protect your privacy when you're out in public and there are cameras capturing you.
[08:53.920 --> 08:56.780]  So, maybe we can work on some more tools like that.
[08:57.000 --> 09:02.140]  Some hardware devices that block the camera from, you know, with lights.
[09:02.140 --> 09:06.880]  And I've seen a few of these products, right?
[09:07.560 --> 09:09.740]  So, there's that.
[09:10.880 --> 09:17.020]  As I mentioned before about the Orange Book, you know, if you have ever...
[09:17.020 --> 09:19.780]  How many have heard of or read the Orange Book?
[09:19.780 --> 09:21.640]  All right, all right.
[09:21.840 --> 09:37.100]  So, you know, trustworthiness and, you know, measuring states in order to confirm that the system has not been compromised or changed.
[09:37.980 --> 09:42.780]  And just basically kind of like root of trust, right?
[09:43.460 --> 09:49.520]  If we implemented these kinds of measures in systems that are supposed to be...
[09:49.520 --> 09:59.520]  keeping confidential data, then, you know, it could offer more protection of the data and reduce breaches.
[10:00.500 --> 10:08.980]  The one thing about it is, if we can't stop them from collecting our data, then we really need to protect our data.
[10:08.980 --> 10:13.840]  And I don't think, at this point, a lot of data has been collected, right?
[10:14.020 --> 10:20.900]  I mean, I don't think we can stop them from collecting our data unless we take our own personal measures, right?
[10:22.020 --> 10:22.740]  But...
[10:27.640 --> 10:31.160]  Okay, the website is dirtytos.com.
[10:31.760 --> 10:34.120]  Can we open a new tab?
[10:34.620 --> 10:35.260]  Maybe?
[10:35.780 --> 10:37.120]  Is that a possibility?
[10:37.120 --> 10:37.900]  I don't know why.
[10:39.500 --> 10:41.040]  So, smart TVs.
[10:42.840 --> 10:44.540]  Who has a smart TV?
[10:45.020 --> 10:45.760]  Raise your hands.
[10:46.620 --> 10:47.180]  All right.
[10:48.000 --> 10:53.280]  Do you know how to change your ID on a smart TV?
[10:53.680 --> 10:55.320]  Or protect your data?
[10:56.460 --> 10:57.520]  Factory reset.
[10:58.080 --> 10:59.420]  Factory reset.
[11:00.140 --> 11:05.060]  Actually, when you need... you know, every once in a while, it's not a bad idea.
[11:07.300 --> 11:07.980]  All right.
[11:08.580 --> 11:11.100]  So, there's all kinds of smart TVs out there.
[11:11.300 --> 11:15.600]  I actually have a Samsung I got at Micro Center.
[11:18.540 --> 11:21.920]  It doesn't work with my Pi 4 or my Pi 5.
[11:24.140 --> 11:24.660]  But...
[11:27.740 --> 11:28.500]  Let's see.
[11:28.940 --> 11:30.520]  I have some links here.
[11:30.520 --> 11:34.900]  How to stop your smart TV from spying on you.
[11:36.380 --> 11:38.600]  Use a VPN like Express.
[11:39.340 --> 11:41.480]  Disable the ACR technology.
[11:45.140 --> 11:45.980]  That's...
[11:45.980 --> 11:49.140]  For the Samsung, LG vulnerabilities.
[11:50.560 --> 11:51.360]  Yeah.
[11:51.740 --> 11:53.260]  So, a lot of people...
[11:53.260 --> 12:06.140]  I know a lot of people who are very privacy-minded who still use flip phones and will never use a smart TV or... let's segue into a newer car.
[12:06.400 --> 12:06.800]  Right?
[12:07.180 --> 12:11.220]  Because your newer car spies on you, too, and collects data.
[12:12.160 --> 12:12.300]  Right?
[12:12.300 --> 12:12.380]  Right?
[12:12.920 --> 12:14.380]  So, there was...
[12:17.100 --> 12:18.480]  There was something called OwnStar.
[12:19.400 --> 12:19.860]  Right?
[12:20.120 --> 12:21.240]  Have you heard of OwnStar?
[12:22.280 --> 12:26.540]  It was a hack by... I forget his last name.
[12:26.640 --> 12:27.300]  S-A-M-Y.
[12:27.440 --> 12:29.400]  He's done a lot of cool stuff.
[12:30.460 --> 12:31.060]  And...
[12:32.320 --> 12:34.520]  Basically, he hacked the OnStar.
[12:35.000 --> 12:37.140]  So, then, OnStar didn't update.
[12:37.420 --> 12:40.760]  And within 24 hours, he had OwnStar, too.
[12:43.840 --> 12:44.440]  So...
[12:46.280 --> 12:47.460]  All right.
[12:47.520 --> 12:52.120]  While he's doing that, I want to talk about education and privacy.
[12:52.120 --> 12:53.580]  And I'm not talking about FERPA.
[12:54.720 --> 13:00.220]  There are certain Proctor software.
[13:00.600 --> 13:01.900]  I think it's called Proctor.
[13:02.260 --> 13:03.920]  It's used by the Linux Foundation.
[13:04.980 --> 13:11.780]  And during the test, it is used to capture everything.
[13:12.120 --> 13:13.480]  Sounds, noise.
[13:13.480 --> 13:20.900]  And according to their terms and conditions, no one else can be in the room during the test.
[13:22.080 --> 13:25.780]  They have to see, you know, everything in the room.
[13:26.960 --> 13:27.520]  And...
[13:27.520 --> 13:27.860]  Okay.
[13:27.980 --> 13:29.340]  I understand that.
[13:29.580 --> 13:30.140]  Right?
[13:30.340 --> 13:34.440]  I don't understand why anyone would take a test from them.
[13:34.660 --> 13:35.200]  But...
[13:35.200 --> 13:35.780]  Okay.
[13:35.940 --> 13:37.880]  If you're getting certified, you need a Proctor.
[13:37.880 --> 13:46.640]  Anyone at a university or who has, you know, had to use a personal Proctor at the university would...
[13:48.380 --> 13:49.400]  Oh, yeah, yeah.
[13:50.840 --> 13:54.740]  So there's some links there going back to the car thing.
[13:59.600 --> 14:02.420]  The battle against distracted driving.
[14:02.420 --> 14:09.820]  Your car will tell on you if your hand... if it detects that your hands are not on the wheel.
[14:13.650 --> 14:14.290]  Oh.
[14:14.470 --> 14:15.510]  I don't think that...
[14:15.510 --> 14:17.010]  That's not it.
[14:17.210 --> 14:17.230]  That's not it.
[14:17.270 --> 14:17.410]  Yeah.
[14:23.340 --> 14:28.260]  Is that a trusted computing group document about privacy?
[14:28.780 --> 14:29.740]  I don't know.
[14:30.520 --> 14:30.880]  Okay.
[14:30.880 --> 14:32.680]  So then...
[14:33.680 --> 14:35.340]  Just to the main page?
[14:36.260 --> 14:37.400]  Insurance companies.
[14:37.800 --> 14:42.760]  So, about 10 years ago, I worked at a place called T-SYS, Child of Visa.
[14:43.040 --> 14:44.520]  They're an acquirer processor.
[14:45.280 --> 15:06.400]  That's when I first started realizing that even though PCI compliance states that your credit card number cannot be stored, all of your data is, what you purchase, how much it costs, when, where, etc., is stored.
[15:09.080 --> 15:16.500]  It was being used at the time for insurance companies and for advertising.
[15:16.500 --> 15:31.320]  So, insurance companies would basically take that data, take your social media presence, who you were connected with, and do their risk assessment based on that.
[15:31.580 --> 15:35.500]  And that's when I was like, wow, are you serious?
[15:35.500 --> 15:48.000]  There was a story at the company going around where Target sent a postcard, a personalized advertising postcard to a family.
[15:48.060 --> 15:51.760]  And it said, congratulations on your pregnancy.
[15:52.380 --> 15:54.720]  The father freaked out.
[15:55.380 --> 15:57.900]  And he's like, what are you talking about?
[15:57.900 --> 16:12.700]  Well, according to the profile, if you matched, like, say, 10 of the 12 items of purchase, then you were determined through profile to be pregnant.
[16:13.060 --> 16:16.940]  As it turned out, his daughter really was pregnant.
[16:17.060 --> 16:19.620]  And so Target got it right.
[16:20.460 --> 16:22.720]  Even though it's wrong.
[16:28.650 --> 16:32.790]  Oh, let's talk about Facebook Ghostbusters for a second.
[16:33.570 --> 16:40.290]  So Facebook wanted to get information about Snapchat, but it was encrypted, right?
[16:40.830 --> 16:43.130]  So how could they get that information?
[16:45.450 --> 16:52.890]  They set in their agreements that they would have access to users' Snapchat.
[16:52.890 --> 16:55.030]  And Snapchat found out.
[16:55.330 --> 16:57.290]  And there was big lawsuit.
[16:58.230 --> 16:58.810]  And, uh,
[17:02.300 --> 17:11.180]  yeah, that basically they did a man in the middle attack on, uh, on not just Snapchat.
[17:11.180 --> 17:15.740]  They ended up doing it on Amazon and a few other platforms as well to get data.
[17:20.820 --> 17:22.620]  So let's see, what else you got?
[17:24.100 --> 17:26.900]  All right, how about, uh, healthcare?
[17:27.660 --> 17:29.640]  I want to talk more about healthcare.
[17:29.940 --> 17:31.080]  Is it in there?
[17:32.920 --> 17:33.700]  I don't know.
[17:35.300 --> 17:44.760]  So Rite Aid was banned for five years from using facial recognition because of the way that their models were trained.
[17:47.960 --> 17:52.580]  And a lot of pharmacies, they don't, yeah, they don't.
[17:52.640 --> 17:55.080]  So the concerns are no informed consent.
[17:55.760 --> 17:58.180]  There are no safeguards in place.
[17:59.760 --> 18:03.780]  Um, there's no disclosure.
[18:04.780 --> 18:09.600]  And they share, oh, they share pharmacy data with local law enforcement.
[18:09.600 --> 18:10.360]  That's what happened.
[18:10.580 --> 18:10.680]  Okay.
[18:10.820 --> 18:15.700]  So CVS, Rite Aid, and what was the other pharmacy?
[18:16.160 --> 18:16.620]  Kroger.
[18:17.420 --> 18:18.020]  Fries.
[18:18.760 --> 18:24.340]  Um, they were sharing pharmacy data with law enforcement without consent.
[18:24.860 --> 18:33.220]  And the way when I, when I was researching it, the, um, Kroger said, well, we received a lot of pressure from law enforcement.
[18:33.220 --> 18:39.120]  So without a warrant, they were sharing your medical data.
[18:39.720 --> 18:41.840]  And that's not cool.
[18:42.500 --> 18:44.600]  And then there was Walgreens.
[18:49.440 --> 19:03.880]  Uh, so if you see these refrigerators, which by the way, it's kind of a moot point because it happened during COVID, that they were trying to get emotion wreck.
[19:04.140 --> 19:11.040]  So the only thing they really got was like my door dasher with a confused look, where's the string cheese?
[19:11.520 --> 19:19.600]  You know, like their advertisements didn't affect the delivery people who were getting items from the store.
[19:19.660 --> 19:22.080]  So it's not even clean data, right?
[19:22.140 --> 19:27.120]  It's not even good information, but they wanted to collect it.
[19:27.120 --> 19:29.600]  So, um, okay.
[19:30.700 --> 19:32.800]  I think, uh, can we go to the laws?
[19:34.420 --> 19:36.200]  Yeah, let's go to some laws.
[19:37.520 --> 19:38.520]  That's my favorite.
[19:40.940 --> 19:43.200]  Uh, no, it should say like laws.
[19:46.360 --> 19:47.520]  Ah, here we are.
[19:47.940 --> 19:53.780]  Okay, so back in the day, I used to do this DNCA thing because I was really concerned about censorship.
[19:54.600 --> 20:02.220]  And we had a lot of people who, um, used the DMCA to prevent people from giving, uh, reviews.
[20:02.840 --> 20:04.520]  Bad reviews, usually.
[20:05.260 --> 20:14.760]  And so they would, uh, make a notice where, uh, you know, to block people from getting bad reviews for the company.
[20:14.760 --> 20:21.460]  And then more recently, um, they were using terms of service to restrict bad reviews.
[20:21.720 --> 20:29.700]  If you gave a bad review to a platform, you would be summarily kicked as a violation, right?
[20:29.700 --> 20:36.600]  Well, then this Consumer, um, Review Fairness Act came out.
[20:36.740 --> 20:43.760]  So they cannot restrict you from an honest review from their service.
[20:43.760 --> 20:49.640]  They can't put any verbiage in the, um, privacy policy or terms of service.
[20:49.640 --> 20:53.360]  So we are, I would consider that kind of a win, right?
[20:53.760 --> 21:00.440]  I mean, they might try to find other parts of the agreement, you know, if they really wanted to.
[21:01.340 --> 21:08.640]  But no, they can't even put it in the terms of service or agreement anymore, right?
[21:08.920 --> 21:18.640]  Because that, that, and that leads me to the point of, these agreements are all usually in their favor, right?
[21:18.640 --> 21:20.420]  They own your content.
[21:20.460 --> 21:22.360]  They can use your data.
[21:23.140 --> 21:25.280]  They, like, everything.
[21:26.060 --> 21:40.040]  So, um, there is a, an act called FAIR to stop them from, uh, putting arbit, arbitration clauses in the terms of service.
[21:40.480 --> 21:45.860]  So that, like, you can sue if something goes left, right?
[21:46.820 --> 21:47.880]  Left, right?
[21:47.880 --> 21:47.920]  Okay.
[21:49.320 --> 21:56.580]  And then, finally, the reason I called it TLDR isn't just because they are.
[21:57.020 --> 22:08.680]  But there is a bill right now, it passed Congress, it needs to pass the Senate, and, um, it is about simplifying terms of service.
[22:10.740 --> 22:22.380]  So, these terms of service have gotten to the point where we need to pass a law in order to make them more readable, more understandable, and, you know.
[22:23.940 --> 22:24.340]  Yeah.
[22:24.380 --> 22:25.680]  So, I don't know.
[22:25.880 --> 22:26.760]  Where are we on time?
[22:27.040 --> 22:27.640]  Are we good?
[22:28.140 --> 22:30.080]  Like, 20 minutes.
[22:30.080 --> 22:30.220]  20 minutes.
[22:31.180 --> 22:31.580]  Okay.
[22:32.000 --> 22:32.520]  All right.
[22:34.420 --> 22:34.820]  Cool.
[22:34.960 --> 22:35.340]  Go ahead.
[22:35.460 --> 22:36.440]  Yeah, let's do questions.
[22:42.700 --> 22:45.980]  So, um, that's actually a comment and a question.
[22:46.060 --> 22:58.380]  First comment is I used to work for a big health communications company, whose line item included the sale of consumer information, the third-party.
[22:58.700 --> 23:01.720]  That was a line item in their revenue projection.
[23:02.560 --> 23:04.960]  So, it's, it's big business.
[23:04.960 --> 23:08.820]  But the question is, are GDPR and data brokers, right?
[23:09.000 --> 23:18.540]  So, when you click on a website and you've agreed to this terms, your information sense of all these data brokers, the GDPR is the right to forget.
[23:19.300 --> 23:25.580]  But by the time you exercise the right to forget, it's already been at the data brokers maybe three or four times over.
[23:25.800 --> 23:28.820]  So, how do we get the right to forget to actually work?
[23:29.980 --> 23:30.820]  Oh, wow.
[23:31.380 --> 23:34.940]  I, I, this is what I know about the GDPR.
[23:36.540 --> 23:45.280]  I know that if there's a violation, there's a huge fine, huge, like 4% of your revenue, right?
[23:46.800 --> 24:00.180]  So, you would think that there would be more, you know, protections in place when it comes to that sort of, you know, collection and sharing and third parties.
[24:00.180 --> 24:06.620]  And if you notice in a lot of privacy agreements, it will say, and third parties.
[24:06.820 --> 24:07.440]  And that's it.
[24:07.660 --> 24:13.780]  It's, it's, it's like, and who are these third parties and what are they doing with the data?
[24:13.780 --> 24:14.780]  Exactly.
[24:16.180 --> 24:17.120]  Anyone else has questions?
[24:18.340 --> 24:20.180]  Oh, okay.
[24:22.860 --> 24:24.900]  Any other questions?
[24:25.740 --> 24:26.260]  Comments?
[24:26.960 --> 24:28.020]  Concerns?
[24:29.240 --> 24:30.020]  No?
[24:30.760 --> 24:31.360]  Okay.
[24:31.980 --> 24:33.020]  Oh, no.
[24:33.560 --> 24:34.120]  Do you have a question?
[24:34.700 --> 24:40.320]  On the issue of the pharmacies, we might show that's a massive PIPA violation.
[24:40.540 --> 24:41.120]  Oh, yeah.
[24:41.120 --> 24:43.420]  Giving out the data to the law enforcement.
[24:43.920 --> 24:50.880]  So, don't they have counsel that, you know, to say, no, you're not going to give that out because you go to jail?
[24:50.880 --> 24:52.740]  You would think.
[24:53.460 --> 24:54.620]  You would think.
[24:54.780 --> 25:08.460]  Oh, oh, the question was, isn't there counsel for some of these companies who are violating consumer rights by sharing medical data with law enforcement without a warrant?
[25:08.860 --> 25:09.640]  Absolutely.
[25:10.160 --> 25:13.020]  HIPAA violations come with a large price tag.
[25:13.440 --> 25:19.800]  You would think that their legal department would dissuade their staff from sharing.
[25:19.800 --> 25:28.880]  But apparently, during research, it looked like there was even a memo, like, go ahead, give it to law enforcement, right?
[25:31.380 --> 25:34.340]  And, yeah, this is the concern.
[25:34.840 --> 25:43.560]  So many, okay, just recently, change healthcare, which, by the way, if you used it, then change actually.
[25:45.640 --> 25:48.440]  They had a huge breach, right?
[25:48.740 --> 25:55.200]  And it isn't just about, like, the law enforcement thing, which is actually a huge concern.
[25:56.060 --> 25:57.620]  The breach is, too.
[25:58.000 --> 26:01.920]  I mean, you're supposed to be protecting this data.
[26:01.960 --> 26:21.380]  And when you have educational FERPA or medical HIPAA, you would think that extra protections would be put into place to make sure that any type of remote attestation or any type of network intrusion would be immediately detected.
[26:22.520 --> 26:26.260]  Or how about we prevent it from ever happening in the first place?
[26:26.820 --> 26:26.960]  Right?
[26:27.480 --> 26:27.700]  You know?
[26:28.780 --> 26:35.020]  But, yeah, I wonder about some of these companies and their textile.
[26:35.740 --> 26:38.320]  Some of these are coming from inside.
[26:39.400 --> 26:42.680]  Bad players get inside on contracts.
[26:43.120 --> 26:45.280]  Or, I mean, that's the best way, right?
[26:45.280 --> 26:46.820]  You sniff out the network.
[26:47.060 --> 26:49.540]  You see, you know, where the weaknesses are.
[26:49.720 --> 26:50.280]  And then you attack.
[26:51.500 --> 26:53.980]  And some of these might be that.
[26:54.220 --> 26:59.360]  And some of them might be they want to pay the lowest bidder to do the work.
[27:00.360 --> 27:03.080]  Maybe their legal counsel was like, oh, who cares?
[27:03.380 --> 27:03.640]  You know?
[27:03.900 --> 27:05.300]  We'll just share it with the police.
[27:06.540 --> 27:07.660]  But, yes.
[27:07.660 --> 27:08.140]  It's possible.
[27:10.060 --> 27:11.180]  But...
[27:13.020 --> 27:14.560]  So, what are your suggestions?
[27:15.140 --> 27:28.180]  My suggestion is to read the orange book and start developing workflows around identity, trust, and trustworthiness.
[27:28.180 --> 27:28.220]  Yes.
[27:28.940 --> 27:32.880]  That is... That... Because the... Like, G is out of the bottle, right?
[27:33.080 --> 27:35.180]  Pandora's box has been opened.
[27:36.400 --> 27:42.880]  Now, to protect yourselves personally, I would say change your passwords.
[27:44.580 --> 27:51.640]  Change, you know, frequently change, like, your settings.
[27:52.140 --> 27:55.020]  Check for privacy settings in the...
[27:55.020 --> 27:58.280]  Some companies do have privacy settings that you can set.
[27:58.740 --> 28:03.520]  Don't... That, you know, like, you don't allow AI to train off of your content or data.
[28:03.960 --> 28:04.400]  Right?
[28:04.700 --> 28:08.500]  So, check your own settings to protect yourselves.
[28:08.920 --> 28:10.520]  To protect the rest of us.
[28:10.980 --> 28:11.380]  Yeah.
[28:12.200 --> 28:14.980]  Grab that book and start coding.
[28:19.840 --> 28:20.660]  Oh, yeah.
[28:20.980 --> 28:21.440]  Of course.
[28:21.680 --> 28:22.120]  Of course.
[28:23.240 --> 28:33.380]  I was going to mention that I have, oh, four or five or six different monitoring, credit monitoring systems.
[28:33.640 --> 28:39.400]  Simply because of data reaches, either between banks or insurance companies, things like that.
[28:39.500 --> 28:39.920]  Okay.
[28:39.920 --> 28:41.900]  In fact, the last one was over.
[28:42.140 --> 28:43.160]  They're going to give me a...
[28:43.960 --> 28:44.520]  Right.
[28:44.920 --> 28:45.020]  Right.
[28:46.060 --> 28:47.260]  Because there's so many... Yeah.
[28:47.520 --> 28:47.700]  Okay.
[28:48.060 --> 28:48.300]  Okay.
[28:48.560 --> 28:48.680]  Yeah.
[28:48.680 --> 28:57.980]  I have a lot of the cases where, you know, my information is burnt down to the point where it's like, I assume everybody knows my stuff is out there.
[28:58.360 --> 29:06.720]  The only thing I do is make sure that nobody, or I try not to make myself visible.
[29:06.720 --> 29:07.380]  Right.
[29:08.140 --> 29:09.700]  The art of invisibility.
[29:10.080 --> 29:10.940]  Kind of.
[29:11.300 --> 29:19.460]  I mean, the TLDR is a good idea, but I mean, it's one of those things that normally you want to do this, you have the software, it's right there.
[29:19.740 --> 29:22.380]  But there's this 22 page thing.
[29:22.680 --> 29:23.640]  Oh my gosh.
[29:24.240 --> 29:24.660]  Uh-huh.
[29:24.660 --> 29:29.380]  And, you know, it will reduce my work down in like three minutes if I do that.
[29:30.020 --> 29:42.740]  So, you know, it's a... I understand, but it's like we're always playing off how convenient is it to how much do you think they really will take that data and throw it out there.
[29:42.920 --> 29:44.740]  And if it's already out there...
[29:44.740 --> 29:45.380]  Right.
[29:45.620 --> 29:47.500]  And it can be sold.
[29:47.820 --> 29:49.060]  Yeah, it can be sold.
[29:50.680 --> 29:52.020]  It can be used.
[29:52.040 --> 29:54.620]  It can be used in, you know, phishing attacks.
[29:54.960 --> 29:56.160]  All kinds of things.
[29:56.380 --> 29:56.560]  Yes.
[29:57.460 --> 29:57.940]  Hi.
[29:58.200 --> 29:58.400]  Hi.
[29:58.800 --> 30:02.780]  I'm part of Restore the Force, the privacy group.
[30:03.160 --> 30:06.100]  And I was listening to you, even though you were you.
[30:06.740 --> 30:11.940]  And one thing that come, my attention, you asked me about the orange book.
[30:12.100 --> 30:12.780]  I haven't read it.
[30:12.840 --> 30:13.780]  I didn't know it existed.
[30:13.980 --> 30:14.900]  So I don't know what it is.
[30:15.460 --> 30:15.880]  Okay.
[30:15.880 --> 30:33.120]  But you seem to advocate that we as individuals should be safeguarding ourselves from society who should have been setting rules on those corporations that are selling our data.
[30:33.360 --> 30:33.940]  No, you're right.
[30:34.220 --> 30:36.220]  Basically, you're talking about the bills here.
[30:36.220 --> 30:36.880]  Yeah.
[30:37.080 --> 30:45.960]  And the reason I say the comment is because a few years ago at HOPE 11, we started, a few of us started something that we still work in called...
[30:45.960 --> 30:48.700]  We're trying to hack the political parties.
[30:48.940 --> 30:49.360]  Okay.
[30:49.360 --> 30:49.460]  All right.
[30:49.540 --> 30:51.200]  And we still...
[30:51.200 --> 30:52.360]  It's an ongoing thing.
[30:52.640 --> 30:53.340]  So...
[30:53.340 --> 31:06.160]  But in hacking the political parties, we discovered that it is a very minority amount of people who are lawyers who don't understand how society really works.
[31:06.460 --> 31:06.780]  Right.
[31:06.780 --> 31:14.580]  And they are the one manipulating all the elected officials that are going to work on those bills you're talking about.
[31:14.880 --> 31:21.980]  And when I talk to them about policy on privacy, it's like it goes to one year and it goes out to the other.
[31:22.100 --> 31:24.080]  How much money are you going to give me for my candidate?
[31:24.740 --> 31:24.980]  Right.
[31:24.980 --> 31:30.340]  So that's why the rabbit hole from HOPE 11 to today is still working on it.
[31:30.580 --> 31:38.800]  But what I want to say is government is our government and we need to participate in it.
[31:38.940 --> 31:42.920]  And the reason those lawyers have so much access is because none of us...
[31:42.920 --> 31:59.460]  I don't know if you participate in the internal of either parties, but we need to kind of advocate also that we should take your talk to those in those moments in our neighborhood, wherever we live in the United States.
[31:59.640 --> 32:02.240]  Because that's where the action happens.
[32:02.540 --> 32:10.300]  And if you come with your talk and we all go to these people, trust me, we can make change to have...
[32:10.300 --> 32:15.380]  to move to the next scene where they cannot build a car that will spy on us.
[32:15.440 --> 32:18.460]  They will go to a pharmacy that doesn't spy on us.
[32:18.460 --> 32:20.600]  And that was my message, kind of...
[32:21.220 --> 32:22.580]  That is a great message.
[32:22.840 --> 32:26.340]  I will be for talks of HOPE 20... how much more?
[32:26.540 --> 32:26.900]  Two years.
[32:27.080 --> 32:29.280]  In four more years.
[32:30.420 --> 32:32.000]  That would be... you know what?
[32:32.080 --> 32:42.900]  I agree that participation in pushing forward, especially tech laws, because the lawyers really don't know.
[32:43.180 --> 32:43.960]  They really don't.
[32:43.960 --> 32:46.000]  They're... the laws are behind.
[32:46.600 --> 32:48.700]  The lawyers are not up to speed.
[32:48.700 --> 32:50.660]  They're not teaching as much.
[32:50.760 --> 32:52.800]  Maybe now a little bit more than before.
[32:53.140 --> 33:02.000]  But I found that when it came to copyright law, the students in the classroom didn't know what activists did, right?
[33:02.220 --> 33:06.020]  And the professor is frustrated trying to explain it.
[33:06.140 --> 33:08.120]  And then we don't have lobbyists.
[33:08.120 --> 33:10.140]  We don't have deep pockets.
[33:10.400 --> 33:11.900]  Maybe some of us, not me.
[33:12.160 --> 33:26.380]  But I want to believe that every person can make a difference by contacting your local congressman, senator, state senator, even mayor to, you know, implement.
[33:26.380 --> 33:27.740]  That's what I was telling you.
[33:27.760 --> 33:28.240]  That's it.
[33:28.840 --> 33:29.280]  So...
[33:29.280 --> 33:30.500]  They don't listen, right?
[33:30.820 --> 33:31.760]  They don't understand.
[33:32.240 --> 33:34.440]  There's this thing, think globally, act locally.
[33:34.600 --> 33:35.620]  And that's exactly what you're saying.
[33:35.860 --> 33:39.780]  Yeah, but it goes beyond calling the senator, because we've restored the force.
[33:39.980 --> 33:41.420]  We used to do that.
[33:42.020 --> 33:42.480]  That's for sure.
[33:42.480 --> 33:45.500]  It's like a monumental ask.
[33:45.640 --> 33:46.060]  Oh, yeah.
[33:46.240 --> 33:49.540]  We go to them, and we realized, why not elect our own?
[33:49.900 --> 33:51.100]  That would be great.
[33:51.760 --> 33:55.920]  And we turned from calling them to watch out.
[33:55.920 --> 33:58.560]  If you don't change, we have this guy who's going to run...
[33:58.560 --> 34:00.860]  Well, you got someone for Connecticut?
[34:01.780 --> 34:02.300]  Because...
[34:02.300 --> 34:03.800]  Yes, actually, I do.
[34:04.000 --> 34:04.320]  I do.
[34:04.620 --> 34:05.800]  So, no, I don't have the...
[34:05.800 --> 34:07.620]  Let's talk offline.
[34:07.700 --> 34:09.320]  I'm totally serious.
[34:09.320 --> 34:09.520]  Yes.
[34:10.720 --> 34:12.400]  I'm totally serious.
[34:12.760 --> 34:13.260]  Okay.
[34:14.320 --> 34:15.140]  Hi there.
[34:15.280 --> 34:26.140]  I have an idea that I want to share with the rest of the world, and that is to use the framework of collective bargaining to elicit line item changes in terms of services.
[34:26.780 --> 34:36.220]  So, people that are parties to the contracts would band together into bargaining groups very similar to the framework that the labor organizations use.
[34:36.220 --> 34:46.380]  And they would leverage their collective power to ask for line item changes to terms of services to areas that people find disagreeable.
[34:46.380 --> 34:52.860]  And I think there should be, like, an NLRB for consumer contracts.
[34:53.100 --> 35:09.820]  And once a certain threshold is reached of people participating in the bargaining process, then it would have to go to arbitration to elicit the line item changes in terms of services that that group of collective bargainers found objectionable.
[35:09.820 --> 35:11.660]  I think it's possible.
[35:11.960 --> 35:15.600]  I think it's possibly a tool that could be used to level the playing field.
[35:15.820 --> 35:16.960]  That is genius.
[35:17.440 --> 35:23.620]  And it comes down to collaboration, community, and we are fed up.
[35:25.160 --> 35:32.380]  There was one where... one terms of service where they were collecting my chat transcripts, but the software didn't have any chat.
[35:33.020 --> 35:34.160]  What are you doing?
[35:34.400 --> 35:36.620]  Why are you collecting my chat logs?
[35:37.220 --> 35:40.520]  What gives you the right... Oh, because I clicked the button that said agreed?
[35:40.680 --> 35:43.020]  No, we need that removed, right?
[35:44.160 --> 35:48.200]  Honestly, that is one of the best solutions.
[35:48.560 --> 35:50.060]  Yeah, keep coming up with solutions.
[35:50.060 --> 35:52.340]  Because that... and that one is good.
[35:53.020 --> 35:56.340]  Do you have... has it ever been tested or tried or...
[35:56.340 --> 35:57.740]  No, it's... I think we need to.
[35:57.880 --> 36:00.060]  It's just an idea that I've had and...
[36:00.580 --> 36:08.420]  No, that... that is... that's... I've done all sorts of Google searches and I've never seen anyone conceptualize it into like...
[36:08.420 --> 36:12.500]  But it would be a great, like, social experiment as well.
[36:12.980 --> 36:14.100]  And if it works.
[36:14.100 --> 36:22.100]  It would be a wiki... a wiki-style, um, editing platform where you could tear into the terms of services and people would vote on individual changes.
[36:22.860 --> 36:27.060]  And there would be a periodic review cycle that would be submitted to the arbitration panel.
[36:27.320 --> 36:31.800]  Um, you know, would... process forward in a practical way.
[36:32.320 --> 36:32.740]  Yeah.
[36:33.120 --> 36:34.980]  I would like to be a part of that.
[36:36.580 --> 36:39.600]  I would love to rip up a terms of service.
[36:39.600 --> 36:39.740]  Yes.
[36:40.320 --> 36:41.600]  And it sure says it.
[36:42.000 --> 36:42.520]  Yes.
[36:43.840 --> 36:44.900]  That's a good time.
[36:45.720 --> 36:45.940]  Yes.
[36:45.980 --> 36:46.500]  Yes.
[36:46.580 --> 36:46.720]  Please.
[36:46.840 --> 36:48.600]  Please do ask me about...
[36:48.600 --> 36:49.100]  You...
[36:49.100 --> 36:51.400]  Oh, okay.
[36:51.740 --> 36:52.120]  All right.
[36:52.140 --> 36:52.580]  I will.
[36:52.740 --> 36:54.160]  I'll ask you afterwards.
[36:54.820 --> 36:55.300]  Thank you.
[36:55.440 --> 36:56.240]  I'll talk to both of you.
[36:56.760 --> 36:57.280]  All right.
[36:57.540 --> 36:57.920]  Thanks.
[36:59.500 --> 37:00.540]  Oh, that's...
[37:00.540 --> 37:00.820]  Okay.
[37:03.320 --> 37:03.700]  Yeah.
[37:07.040 --> 37:08.060]  Any other questions?
[37:08.960 --> 37:09.480]  Comments?
[37:10.180 --> 37:10.700]  Ideas?
[37:11.440 --> 37:11.960]  Suggestions?
[37:12.460 --> 37:12.780]  No?
[37:13.120 --> 37:13.640]  Am I...
[37:13.640 --> 37:15.220]  Am I close to the end of...
[37:15.220 --> 37:15.900]  Oh, right.
[37:16.040 --> 37:17.360]  Because I saw some people coming in.
[37:17.840 --> 37:21.480]  Well, thank you all for sitting through and listening through this.
[37:21.620 --> 37:24.980]  And I hope you protect your own data, if nothing else.
[37:25.240 --> 37:31.420]  But I see some people are working toward a better and brighter future for us.
[37:31.420 --> 37:31.520]  Yes.
[37:31.760 --> 37:32.760]  And I...
[37:33.600 --> 37:36.200]  I'm gonna keep my eyes on you.
[37:36.500 --> 37:37.120]  All right.
[37:37.300 --> 37:37.760]  Thank you.
[37:38.100 --> 37:39.080]  Have a great day.
[37:39.080 --> 37:39.160]  Talking to you all, hey.