[00:29.680 --> 00:30.720]  It's turned on.
[00:37.240 --> 00:38.860]  Oops, we're cutting out.
[00:42.600 --> 00:43.440]  Don't touch that.
[00:44.000 --> 00:45.660]  Yeah, thank you.
[01:27.510 --> 01:29.370]  Do you want to talk about this on the show next week?
[01:29.730 --> 01:30.150]  I would
[01:54.170 --> 01:56.270]  have had a prompting radio station.
[01:56.410 --> 01:57.470]  I didn't miss the whole thing.
[01:57.650 --> 01:58.130]  No, I didn't.
[02:11.420 --> 02:13.060]  I mean, it really looked like something.
[02:13.060 --> 02:14.320]  It should be N6H.
[02:14.320 --> 02:17.680]  It looks like the next day's E-Bot for the road road, you know.
[02:19.460 --> 02:20.400]  It's a two-beater.
[02:21.360 --> 02:22.100]  Handbrake, you know.
[02:22.520 --> 02:23.200]  Okay, ready then?
[02:23.400 --> 02:23.800]  Let's...
[02:23.800 --> 02:24.740]  Alright, over there.
[02:27.420 --> 02:29.100]  Okay, if we could have your attention.
[02:29.420 --> 02:29.680]  Ready?
[02:30.460 --> 02:31.060]  Anybody here?
[02:31.140 --> 02:31.260]  Good.
[02:32.460 --> 02:34.540]  Welcome to the final talk of the HOPE Conference.
[02:41.540 --> 02:44.220]  I want to thank you all for braving the elements to get here.
[02:44.480 --> 02:47.100]  I want to thank Stevens for allowing us to be here.
[02:47.100 --> 02:50.980]  I want to thank Arseny for arranging all of this and making it possible.
[02:56.980 --> 03:04.640]  And, of course, the person to really thank is the person who stuck through a lot of hell in July and came back to give the talk that he wasn't able to give in July.
[03:05.240 --> 03:06.020]  Steve Rambam.
[03:12.160 --> 03:16.780]  As Evil pointed out, this is quite a bit of unfinished business.
[03:17.360 --> 03:20.080]  Three months late, but better late than never.
[03:20.080 --> 03:22.260]  Where is Arseny, by the way?
[03:25.100 --> 03:29.500]  Before I start, I just very much want to thank Arseny for setting this up.
[03:29.640 --> 03:32.040]  I got an email from him out of the blue.
[03:32.300 --> 03:34.080]  He said, I understand that...
[03:34.680 --> 03:35.980]  No idea who he was.
[03:36.140 --> 03:39.520]  Didn't have any affiliation with 2600 that I knew of.
[03:39.520 --> 03:42.180]  He sent an email to me.
[03:42.260 --> 03:44.760]  I think I was actually in the Far East at the time.
[03:47.360 --> 03:59.320]  And it said something along the lines of, My name is Arseny Lebedev and I would like you to come to Stevens Institute of Technology and give this speech.
[04:00.220 --> 04:01.880]  And we emailed back and forth.
[04:02.140 --> 04:07.620]  And first of all, I didn't believe that somebody with the name Arseny Lebedev existed.
[04:08.960 --> 04:12.820]  And basically, he just kept saying, Come to Stevens on the 16th.
[04:12.860 --> 04:13.840]  Everything will be fine.
[04:13.860 --> 04:15.500]  And, you know, can you make it?
[04:15.580 --> 04:16.680]  How big a room do you need?
[04:16.860 --> 04:19.660]  And I'm thinking like, yeah, sure, Borat.
[04:19.660 --> 04:20.700]  I'm going to fall for this.
[04:21.440 --> 04:30.500]  You know, I expected to come here and find a guy in a shiny gold thong with a wrestling bear or something, but...
[04:30.500 --> 04:31.340]  That's tomorrow.
[04:31.460 --> 04:32.420]  That's tomorrow.
[04:32.720 --> 04:34.540]  Come back after 12.
[04:37.460 --> 04:49.060]  The fact that this late in the game with crappy weather, out of nowhere, that we have a standing room only crowd is entirely due to arsony.
[04:49.280 --> 04:53.020]  So, give him money, buy him food, do something.
[04:57.000 --> 05:02.180]  Let me very quickly tell you what we're doing here today.
[05:03.520 --> 05:15.120]  This is normally part of an eight-hour full-day course, which is half a day computer-aided investigation and half a day foreign investigation.
[05:15.520 --> 05:38.700]  The computer-aided investigation portion, which we've modified into a privacy seminar for 2600, is essentially designed to teach investigators law enforcement people with a genuine need to know how to track people down and find things out about them, how to do it before they go out in the field.
[05:39.460 --> 05:49.280]  Computer-aided investigation and database access access is now an essential part of any investigator or law enforcement officer's toolkit.
[05:49.820 --> 05:58.500]  And then in the afternoon we move on to the foreign investigation portion of it where we cover what to do if they have to go out of the country.
[06:00.200 --> 06:11.820]  Over the years working with 2600, we've put together a speech, and we've realized that privacy is in fact the mirror image of database investigation.
[06:12.240 --> 06:22.600]  You can't talk about access to people's personal information and you can't talk about who can access it without discussing what's out there and who should be able to access it.
[06:26.620 --> 06:44.460]  As part of the seminar that I was supposed to give 90 days ago and that I'm giving tonight, we asked for a volunteer, we asked for a victim, somebody to call in or write in and allow us to essentially invade his privacy, find out everything we could about him.
[06:45.020 --> 06:47.750]  And we got a number of volunteers.
[06:48.300 --> 06:55.440]  Most of them were people who were either too young or too nice to have any sort of history.
[06:57.100 --> 07:00.660]  Thank goodness a guy by the name of Rick Dakin volunteered.
[07:00.860 --> 07:05.260]  Now Rick is very active in the online community.
[07:05.260 --> 07:06.320]  He's also a writer.
[07:06.440 --> 07:08.120]  He most recently wrote Geek Mafia.
[07:08.120 --> 07:12.380]  He's a pretty remarkable guy and there's a ton of stuff about Rick.
[07:12.520 --> 07:20.960]  And Rick is a very colorful guy, so not all of it is just simple where does he live and where does he work stuff, as you'll see.
[07:23.580 --> 07:32.500]  Because of Rick's cooperation, we were able to put together a program, which you'll see in a second, that allows us to talk about what's out there in private hands.
[07:32.500 --> 07:38.600]  Proprietary databases, corporate databases, credit bureaus, non-governmental databases.
[07:39.440 --> 07:52.300]  Let me just dismiss governmental databases today by saying, everything that you see us do here today, the government has 50 times as much, and they have access to everything that you're going to be seeing today.
[07:53.580 --> 08:09.480]  We're not going to talk about NCIC, FinCEN, which is where all your financial history is, TEX, TEX2, any of the incarnations of the databases used by what used to be Treasury, what's now Homeland Security, that sort of thing.
[08:09.640 --> 08:10.880]  We're not going to talk about that.
[08:11.040 --> 08:19.780]  We're going to talk about stuff that a skilled private investigator or a governmental investigator with access to private databases can access.
[08:22.340 --> 08:25.740]  What we're also not going to do today is...
[08:26.340 --> 08:28.920]  What I'm not going to do today is have a point of view.
[08:29.480 --> 08:33.720]  I'm going to lay this out for you in as neutral a manner as possible.
[08:34.240 --> 08:43.830]  Now, granted, seven FBI agents in raid jackets coming in the first time I try to give this speech has sort of skewed my opinion somewhat.
[08:45.100 --> 08:59.460]  But still, I am not convinced that, on one hand, all the databases need to be closed, or on the other hand, all the databases need to be open to the world.
[08:59.780 --> 09:04.360]  I mean, there are legitimate reasons for access, and we're going to be talking about that.
[09:04.520 --> 09:12.380]  So, as I say in all the talks I give, I'm not going to tell you what to think, but I am going to try to tell you what to think about.
[09:14.780 --> 09:19.500]  Database collection has been around forever since the days of the Bible.
[09:19.690 --> 09:20.600]  People have been counted.
[09:20.880 --> 09:22.420]  People have been pigeonholed.
[09:22.570 --> 09:24.340]  People have been categorized.
[09:24.980 --> 09:27.460]  Here's what's different in the past ten years.
[09:28.020 --> 09:30.220]  First of all, computing power and speed.
[09:31.210 --> 09:41.660]  I have now in my office more data and more data storage space than the FBI computers had ten years ago.
[09:42.740 --> 09:49.640]  Storage space, you can go now to a store and get a 750 gig drive for, what, about 300 bucks.
[09:49.640 --> 10:03.480]  You can set up an array of computers that will process whatever data you gather so quickly that ten years ago you would have had to use literally a Cray supercomputer to do the equivalent amount of computing.
[10:06.900 --> 10:10.600]  Everything, everything is now in digital format.
[10:10.900 --> 10:21.880]  Everything you do when you fill out an application, when you buy an item, when you make a telephone call, when you go through an easy pass lane or use a metro card.
[10:22.420 --> 10:25.330]  Everything is already in digital format.
[10:25.570 --> 10:33.830]  Which means taking it, putting it in a database, analyzing it and indexing it, never has to be touched by human hands.
[10:34.780 --> 10:41.550]  You today, not some third party typing in front of a terminal, you are contributing all the data about you.
[10:43.460 --> 10:45.790]  OCR, optical character recognition.
[10:46.690 --> 10:55.170]  Even the old data, the stuff that's on paper forms 20 years ago, 30 years ago, is being OCR'd at the speed of light.
[10:55.330 --> 10:57.120]  And it's being sucked into databases.
[10:57.980 --> 10:58.940]  And why?
[10:59.300 --> 11:01.140]  Because data is worth money.
[11:01.880 --> 11:07.720]  You access a database, you typically pay a substantial flat rate to access that database.
[11:07.720 --> 11:09.320]  It can be thousands of dollars a month.
[11:09.440 --> 11:11.000]  Or you pay per search.
[11:11.300 --> 11:19.410]  And the more hits the user gets, the more money the database provider gets, and the happier they are.
[11:19.540 --> 11:23.320]  So they're going to keep sucking in info, so you'll pay for access to it.
[11:26.810 --> 11:37.490]  People are also willingly, and we're going to talk about this in great detail tonight, people are also willingly contributing enormous amounts of personal data about themselves.
[11:37.490 --> 11:40.690]  And when I say personal, I don't mean their address and phone number.
[11:40.850 --> 11:42.750]  I mean ridiculously personal things.
[11:43.090 --> 11:51.130]  You go to MySpace pages, people talk about drug use, sexual activity, religion, you know, sexual orientation, politics.
[11:51.570 --> 11:59.150]  Things they won't tell their own family, anybody who accesses their MySpace page is going to be able to determine immediately.
[11:59.150 --> 12:13.670]  And by the way, all of that data, there are bots right now, my bots, other people's bots, running through MySpace, running through Friendster, running through Bebo and everything else, sucking down that information and categorizing it.
[12:15.830 --> 12:25.510]  If you think that a MySpace page is not accessed unless somebody knows to go to your MySpace page, that's wrong.
[12:25.510 --> 12:42.830]  There is, for example, a free service now called Guerrilla Trace, that routinely when you put in somebody's name, address and telephone number, searches MySpace and Friendster and all of the online sites, the relationship sites, the posting sites, for any of the information that you put in.
[12:45.070 --> 12:48.670]  Finally, the main thing that's changed is cross-referencing.
[12:49.730 --> 12:53.410]  Fifteen years ago, I was working on a murder case in Texas.
[12:53.770 --> 13:06.350]  And the sheriff's department that I was working with said, we got a tip that the person who committed the murder lived at this location three, four years ago and came back.
[13:06.490 --> 13:08.410]  We checked all the old city directories.
[13:08.530 --> 13:09.810]  We couldn't find anything.
[13:09.810 --> 13:19.350]  Because I had in my office every Texas driver's license and motor vehicle, I was able to run it through our system, do...
[13:19.350 --> 13:20.910]  I mean, back then it wasn't even indexed.
[13:20.950 --> 13:24.490]  We just did a simple grep search, a UNIX search, for the address.
[13:24.690 --> 13:25.390]  It came up.
[13:25.470 --> 13:26.690]  We gave it to the sheriff's department.
[13:26.830 --> 13:27.390]  They grabbed the guy.
[13:27.490 --> 13:27.950]  He confessed.
[13:28.030 --> 13:29.490]  He's now executed.
[13:29.670 --> 13:31.410]  Texas kills you if you commit a murder.
[13:32.430 --> 13:37.350]  But basically, he was caught by his driver's license.
[13:37.350 --> 13:46.790]  At that time, the state of Texas, the DPS, the people who maintained the driver's license databases, could not do a search by address.
[13:48.330 --> 13:49.470]  Private industry could.
[13:49.650 --> 13:55.550]  And by the way, as you'll see, private industry is leading everything that we're talking about.
[13:55.670 --> 13:55.990]  The U.S.
[13:56.410 --> 14:08.330]  government is still three, four, five, six years behind in terms of cross-referencing, cross-indexing, developing, you know, artificial intelligence programs.
[14:08.510 --> 14:24.770]  Until two years ago, there were still non-crossed index records on Osama bin Laden because some databases misspelled his name and they didn't have a program written that would search for name variations.
[14:27.250 --> 14:31.010]  Let me talk to you about how an investigator builds a biographical profile.
[14:33.670 --> 14:38.370]  In the example I'm going to be using, we started with Rick Dakin's telephone number.
[14:38.510 --> 14:41.930]  And typically, that's very, very often how a case starts.
[14:42.050 --> 14:45.790]  You either have a name and address or a telephone number or a license plate.
[14:45.790 --> 14:51.750]  You have one pit, one tiny bit of data that you're going to try to expand from.
[14:52.370 --> 14:54.770]  Well, from a telephone, whoop, wrong button.
[14:55.550 --> 14:58.090]  From a telephone number, you know you can get a name and address.
[14:59.530 --> 15:04.370]  From that, even a beginning investigator can get a date of birth and a social security number.
[15:04.590 --> 15:09.170]  Now, by the way, what you're looking at here are the holy grail of database access.
[15:09.170 --> 15:16.650]  These are the five key pieces of information that almost every database index is by.
[15:16.990 --> 15:20.130]  Date of birth, social security number, name address and telephone number.
[15:20.970 --> 15:28.870]  From there, you can get past addresses and family members, including what's the holy grail of everybody else, the mother's maiden name.
[15:29.390 --> 15:32.010]  The place of employment, businesses, corporations.
[15:33.130 --> 15:37.310]  Now, so far, everything that you're looking at here is only basic stuff.
[15:37.310 --> 15:48.030]  Real property, marriage, divorce records, voter registration, criminal records, civil court and public filings, all sorts of other public filings, including, by the way, weapons permits.
[15:49.290 --> 15:59.050]  Driver's license, motor vehicles, accidents, credit reports, phone bills, credit card bills, 800 number calls, purchasing history, charitable donations.
[15:59.230 --> 16:03.490]  I've got no room left on the page, so let's go on to other things.
[16:03.490 --> 16:17.830]  Now, typically, every investigator, every investigator, every law enforcement officer, most reporters will go out and gather this sort of information on a person before they contact them, before they talk to them.
[16:17.910 --> 16:19.810]  You want to know who you're talking to.
[16:19.890 --> 16:26.410]  You want to have a picture of the person that you're talking to so you know what to say, what not to say.
[16:26.550 --> 16:31.110]  Maybe some common point of interest that you can bring up and develop a report.
[16:31.810 --> 16:34.450]  Every investigator accesses this sort of information.
[16:34.710 --> 16:35.910]  And much, much more.
[16:39.340 --> 16:41.260]  Let's talk about MySpace for a second.
[16:41.620 --> 16:44.200]  Here is information that's typically on MySpace.
[16:44.420 --> 16:56.040]  Now, I've got to tell you, when I started out as an investigator, which is 20-plus years ago, to get this sort of information on someone, I would charge $1,000, which was good money when I just started.
[16:56.040 --> 17:02.640]  This would be considered a phenomenal background investigation, a phenomenal background report.
[17:02.900 --> 17:07.340]  This is... go on MySpace tonight and just realize what you're looking at.
[17:07.620 --> 17:12.040]  People put in their name, their date of birth or their age, their city, photos of them.
[17:12.280 --> 17:18.320]  I used to pay a fortune to get a photo of somebody before I went out looking for them or looking to talk to them.
[17:18.380 --> 17:20.880]  I wanted to be sure I was talking to the right person.
[17:20.880 --> 17:29.900]  Now there are millions and millions and millions and tens of millions of people's photos on MySpace and on the other sites.
[17:30.000 --> 17:33.280]  And I've got to tell you, they're being sucked down by third-party databases.
[17:33.640 --> 17:40.620]  Where they went to school, where they worked, their music, the music they like, books they read, who their friends are.
[17:41.160 --> 17:44.500]  All of this is typically on a MySpace-type page.
[17:46.440 --> 17:47.720]  Here's a perfect example.
[17:47.860 --> 17:49.260]  I don't know... how clear is this?
[17:51.020 --> 17:52.120]  Well, alright.
[17:52.700 --> 18:06.820]  Let me just... let me just tell you, it's somebody, Rain DeMalco, who put up just a long ranting screed about her life, talking about how she was molested by her dad and his name.
[18:06.980 --> 18:09.960]  And by the way, yes, that would come up if I was investigating him.
[18:10.880 --> 18:22.120]  How her first husband was abusive, how she got into a variety of types of relationships, everything she went through and how she came out the end, and she's now in a better place and so on and so forth.
[18:22.660 --> 18:27.460]  The point is, ten years ago, there were...
[18:27.460 --> 18:41.840]  to get this sort of information on someone, you had to question their friends, their neighbors, their family members, or you had to be part of Nixon's, you know, dirty tricks guys and burglarize a psychiatrist.
[18:43.260 --> 18:44.880]  How likely is it to be true?
[18:47.100 --> 18:48.420]  Seventy-five, eighty percent.
[18:49.300 --> 18:50.880]  People always exaggerate.
[18:50.980 --> 18:53.020]  I mean, especially on dating sites.
[18:53.240 --> 18:59.620]  I mean, you've got five-foot-five bald guys who are six-foot-one, you know, whatever.
[18:59.620 --> 19:05.420]  But anyway, here's... that's a little... that's a little better.
[19:05.640 --> 19:26.740]  Here's a ganja girl who gives her real name, who gives her address, tells where she works, tells where she goes to school, talks about she's bisexual, she's a drug user, interests, hanging out with friends, partying, drinking, getting high, weird kinky sex.
[19:27.520 --> 19:28.260]  Okie dokie.
[19:29.900 --> 19:33.320]  If I'm ever in Lake Elsinore, California, I'll give you a call.
[19:34.220 --> 19:35.060]  Here's somebody else.
[19:35.260 --> 19:41.980]  I... the ones that I put up here, and we're going to go through this pretty quickly and get to the really interesting stuff, but I really want to set the stage here.
[19:42.120 --> 19:45.080]  Here's another one that just absolutely cracks me up.
[19:45.820 --> 19:52.160]  This guy's motto is, you'll excuse me, those of you listening to the video, plug your ears right now.
[19:52.480 --> 19:55.180]  The guy's motto is, just f*cking kill yourself.
[19:55.760 --> 20:01.580]  He gives his name, he gives his date of birth, he gives his location, and here's my favorite thing, ambition.
[20:01.900 --> 20:03.660]  I'm going to become a police officer.
[20:06.100 --> 20:11.780]  OK, now here's a guy, you'll notice the photos of him pointing a shotgun into the camera.
[20:12.380 --> 20:18.200]  You currently smell like, and he puts in gunpowder, and this guy, where is it?
[20:18.200 --> 20:19.580]  He's a corrections officer.
[20:20.860 --> 20:21.660]  Very good.
[20:24.200 --> 20:31.220]  There are five or six places that you can go to find out everything that you want to know about someone.
[20:31.300 --> 20:33.480]  And by the way, these people sell their data.
[20:34.960 --> 20:39.900]  To find out what your interests are, what your religion is, what your politics are.
[20:39.900 --> 20:46.520]  Think about what books you buy, what music you listen to, where you spend your money.
[20:46.800 --> 21:00.000]  If somebody watched what you did in front of a computer, and how you interacted with whatever company or ISP or whatever is on the other end, what could they determine about you?
[21:00.060 --> 21:05.480]  Let's talk about Amazon, which, by the way, sells their data and makes it accessible.
[21:06.060 --> 21:10.020]  What you read, what music you like, where you travel, what you buy.
[21:10.180 --> 21:17.000]  Even if you don't use them for the actual travel service, chances are you're going to buy a guidebook to Upper Borneo before you go there.
[21:18.500 --> 21:22.680]  There's going to be a permanently logged history of your likes and dislikes.
[21:22.680 --> 21:31.740]  Those of you that log on and log in on Amazon, you notice popping up, might we recommend the following book to you?
[21:31.940 --> 21:34.700]  They do that because they know everything you like.
[21:34.840 --> 21:36.740]  And they know your past history purchases.
[21:37.680 --> 21:41.280]  Very, very good clues to your personal characteristics.
[21:41.580 --> 21:47.960]  Sexual orientation, religion, health and certain, you know, and sensitive personal issues.
[21:47.960 --> 21:54.200]  If you've bought a book on kidney cancer, either you or somebody close to you has kidney cancer.
[21:57.650 --> 22:06.250]  And to add to that, they now have a search engine, and they have a search inside the book feature, which you have to log on to access.
[22:06.890 --> 22:12.170]  And if you're searching for something, it goes into that great store of knowledge that they have about you.
[22:12.810 --> 22:20.250]  Now, somebody here I was talking to, I won't point him out, he is actually testifying in a case tomorrow involving eBay.
[22:21.070 --> 22:26.470]  Let me tell you, eBay, PayPal and Skype are now, if you don't realize it, it's the same company.
[22:26.470 --> 22:40.890]  So in one location is everything you buy, everything you look to buy, everything you're interested in, where your bank account is, where your home is, what your social security number is.
[22:41.490 --> 22:49.350]  A whole bunch of other financial information that they make you surrender to get, I forget what it's called, qualified, certified, something like that.
[22:50.670 --> 22:58.750]  And Skype, who you talk to, what hour of the day you talk to them, where you physically are when you talk to them.
[22:58.810 --> 23:04.070]  In other words, what Wi-Fi did you connect through or what hardwired line did you collect through.
[23:04.950 --> 23:11.470]  Enormous, enormous, enormous amount of personal confidential information on you in one repository.
[23:11.710 --> 23:14.990]  And I can tell you personally, yes, third parties can get at it.
[23:18.340 --> 23:23.460]  If there's going to be a Skynet in the United States, it's Google.
[23:24.120 --> 23:30.940]  People think Google is this wonderfully beneficial utility you can go in and access X, Y, and Z.
[23:31.460 --> 23:38.740]  You have no clue how much information Google is gathering on you, me, and everyone.
[23:39.060 --> 23:45.180]  Never mind that they have in their possession every single web page indexed.
[23:45.180 --> 23:50.420]  Never mind that they have every single book or soon will indexed.
[23:52.320 --> 23:55.020]  Blogs, news groups, Gmail.
[23:55.500 --> 23:58.200]  If you have a Gmail account, they keep bugging you.
[23:58.660 --> 23:59.280]  Don't delete.
[23:59.780 --> 24:00.380]  Store.
[24:00.640 --> 24:01.200]  Don't delete.
[24:01.600 --> 24:02.820]  Well, fine.
[24:03.140 --> 24:06.700]  You don't delete and they have access to all of your email.
[24:06.700 --> 24:09.720]  And trust me, it's indexed.
[24:09.860 --> 24:10.860]  It's scanned.
[24:11.200 --> 24:13.120]  If you're communicating back...
[24:13.120 --> 24:29.860]  And they'll tell you if you actually are the one in 8,000 person who reads their privacy policy, they'll tell you, we look through your email to develop marketing targets towards the Gmail subscribers.
[24:31.660 --> 24:36.720]  They have Google Finance coming out, which is going to be a competitor to PayPal.
[24:37.240 --> 24:39.020]  Google Checkout, ditto.
[24:40.140 --> 24:43.660]  Google Telecom, which is going to be a Google VOIP.
[24:43.660 --> 24:49.500]  Now, some of this stuff is not very, very well known, but if you research it, it'll pop right up.
[24:49.600 --> 24:50.720]  You have to know to look for it.
[24:51.920 --> 25:00.540]  Now, here's some of the ways that Google tracks and cross-references your personal activity, including where you are a good part of the day.
[25:01.060 --> 25:01.940]  Google accounts.
[25:03.060 --> 25:06.080]  Everything that you do on Google is permanently stored by them.
[25:06.080 --> 25:11.120]  Deleting your email will not delete their index of what interests you.
[25:11.980 --> 25:12.560]  Gmail.
[25:14.500 --> 25:22.500]  Everything that you do, who you write to, what your interests are, and where you were when you logged on, they log your IP address.
[25:22.800 --> 25:25.620]  They log the MAC address and they log the IP address.
[25:25.880 --> 25:28.420]  And I know because I've subpoenaed them in cases.
[25:30.360 --> 25:33.380]  They always, always, always log the IP number.
[25:35.960 --> 25:37.840]  Now, people say, okay, fine.
[25:37.960 --> 25:39.040]  I don't have a Gmail account.
[25:40.020 --> 25:42.360]  I've never told them who I am.
[25:42.680 --> 25:49.740]  They'll never figure out who's doing the search on how to poison my grandmother.
[25:50.660 --> 25:51.900]  Well, let me tell you something.
[25:52.020 --> 25:52.580]  That's not true.
[25:52.820 --> 25:54.240]  They log the IP address.
[25:54.580 --> 25:58.520]  And here's, here's something that nobody in this room is going to deny.
[25:59.120 --> 26:00.620]  Everybody Googles themself.
[26:01.940 --> 26:08.660]  Everybody Googles their own name, their own telephone number, their own address, their own social security number, things like that.
[26:08.860 --> 26:15.780]  Well, it's all linked to that same IP address that you've logged in and said, how do I kill my grandmother with castor oil?
[26:17.900 --> 26:19.160]  Google knows who you are.
[26:19.300 --> 26:20.200]  I promise you.
[26:24.780 --> 26:29.480]  Now here, by the way, here is Google's own statement.
[26:29.740 --> 26:30.170]  Search.
[26:30.380 --> 26:30.880]  Don't sort.
[26:31.190 --> 26:32.450]  Don't throw anything away.
[26:32.450 --> 26:40.740]  We've already got 2,746 petrobytes of your email.
[26:41.300 --> 26:44.170]  Yes, he's squinting because he doesn't believe it.
[26:44.620 --> 26:46.280]  Keep it all in context.
[26:46.600 --> 26:47.560]  Well, they certainly do.
[26:49.500 --> 26:55.320]  Google has gotten so good because of the massive amount of data it has on individual people.
[26:55.320 --> 27:00.140]  Google is now running a predictive profiling service called Google Trends.
[27:00.980 --> 27:02.860]  It's exactly what it sounds like.
[27:03.060 --> 27:09.720]  How many people in Arizona who buy Skippy Peanut Butter are going to vote for George Bush?
[27:10.060 --> 27:11.060]  That sort of thing.
[27:11.340 --> 27:12.340]  It's scary.
[27:12.950 --> 27:18.580]  Now, by the way, this has no bearing on databases of privacy except when I read it.
[27:18.880 --> 27:20.800]  First I laughed and then I got pissed off.
[27:21.820 --> 27:27.930]  CNET was doing... the CNET.com service was doing a story on Google and the reporter went in.
[27:28.630 --> 27:37.060]  He actually Googled the Google executive that he was about to interview so they would have a point of discussion.
[27:37.060 --> 27:38.720]  Look at what Google has about you.
[27:38.880 --> 27:39.690]  What do you think about this?
[27:39.980 --> 27:45.640]  Well, the guy threw him out of the office and banned CNET for one year from Google interviews.
[27:45.640 --> 27:47.880]  So, don't Google Google.
[27:50.740 --> 27:53.220]  Slightly under the radar screen is Yahoo.
[27:53.450 --> 27:55.580]  Yahoo actually has more information about you.
[27:56.410 --> 27:57.380]  Yahoo groups.
[27:57.580 --> 27:58.880]  Don't forget about Yahoo groups.
[27:59.430 --> 28:03.100]  Yahoo has bigger and better email and more people using the email.
[28:05.020 --> 28:08.300]  Yahoo is, however, a bit more honest.
[28:08.460 --> 28:10.300]  That's what they say in their privacy policy.
[28:10.300 --> 28:14.980]  Once you register with Yahoo and sign into our service, you are not anonymous to us.
[28:18.950 --> 28:27.570]  No matter what portal you use to get into the Internet and what you're doing while you're there, someone is logging it.
[28:28.030 --> 28:29.910]  And soon, it's going to be federal law.
[28:30.410 --> 28:32.270]  Big Brother is trying to pass a law.
[28:32.410 --> 28:34.750]  Big Brother meaning U.S.
[28:34.890 --> 28:35.110]  government.
[28:35.110 --> 28:56.790]  It's trying to pass a law that says you, you, ISP, you Internet service providers, everyone down from AOL and Earthlink and what have you, all the way down to Bob's Internet must keep records, must keep traffic accounts, must keep ISPs logged, and so on and so forth.
[28:59.310 --> 29:09.810]  Now, in addition to everything that you do, it is very, very easy for even the most mumbling, inept investigator to determine who your friends and family are.
[29:10.970 --> 29:22.190]  Now, sometimes, and thank you very much, those of you that do this, sometimes you make your, make the job very, very easy for investigators by actually putting up a MySpace page and listing who all your friends are.
[29:22.190 --> 29:26.170]  And I'm not talking about the 46,000 people who join as your friends.
[29:26.470 --> 29:32.650]  I mean, the people you give shout-outs to, the people who you put their photos up on your site and so on and so forth.
[29:33.370 --> 29:37.990]  Facebook, Friendster, Bebo, all of those, great friends of investigators.
[29:40.450 --> 29:49.210]  Where you work, and your work history, there are a zillion sites like Monster.com, like...
[29:50.690 --> 29:53.370]  I thought it was going to be the next page.
[29:53.850 --> 30:00.690]  Monster.com, for example, hosts ads from employers and also hosts resumes.
[30:01.290 --> 30:06.510]  There are, I believe, 14 million current and archived resumes.
[30:06.790 --> 30:08.590]  And these are resumes.
[30:09.130 --> 30:12.350]  It's everything you could possibly want to know about the person.
[30:12.350 --> 30:14.050]  Here's an example.
[30:14.930 --> 30:16.030]  The objective.
[30:16.310 --> 30:17.090]  Their experience.
[30:17.250 --> 30:23.130]  And by experience, that means everywhere they ever worked and what they did there and their job descriptions.
[30:23.470 --> 30:24.510]  Their education.
[30:24.710 --> 30:30.230]  Well, he has a master's degree from here and he has a BA from there and here's his skill set.
[30:31.190 --> 30:34.550]  Now, by the way, here's a real ad for those of you that are interested.
[30:35.390 --> 30:38.050]  They call it a principal technology risk analyst.
[30:38.230 --> 30:39.550]  It's actually ethical hacker.
[30:41.350 --> 30:43.190]  And here's a job description.
[30:43.610 --> 30:44.630]  Now, ZabaSearch.
[30:45.370 --> 30:58.830]  ZabaSearch is an example of how previously obscure and unavailable information is now available to anybody with a modem or a DSL line or who can drag themselves into the library and use their computer.
[30:58.830 --> 31:01.310]  Here is Kevin Mitnick.
[31:01.470 --> 31:04.630]  And that is, in fact, his old home address in California.
[31:06.910 --> 31:07.990]  Evil Corley.
[31:08.910 --> 31:10.790]  Here we went to ZoomInfo.
[31:11.050 --> 31:14.490]  ZoomInfo indexes everybody's job sites.
[31:15.510 --> 31:19.110]  Employer.com, resume.com, all of that.
[31:19.270 --> 31:23.170]  And they suck it in, frankly, in the most remarkably intelligent way.
[31:23.170 --> 31:29.370]  They must have a phenomenal AI engine because it shows where Eric went to school.
[31:29.550 --> 31:33.010]  It shows that he's involved with 2600 and so on and so forth.
[31:34.690 --> 31:38.590]  I would spend all day here going through all of the various sites.
[31:38.710 --> 31:48.930]  But here's a variety of other sites that gather whether you wanted to or not just by virtue of how you access it and what you do while you're accessing it.
[31:49.490 --> 31:51.710]  Terrific amount of personal information about you.
[31:52.550 --> 31:56.930]  Now, by the way, God bless you all on the behalf of all investigators.
[31:57.210 --> 31:59.470]  God bless you all if you have a blog up.
[31:59.890 --> 32:00.890]  Oh, my God.
[32:01.150 --> 32:07.310]  I know everything you've done, the day that you did it, who you did it with and how you felt about it.
[32:08.310 --> 32:16.830]  Now, there are, the Internet being what it is, people spew, they vent.
[32:17.350 --> 32:20.630]  And there are hundreds of what I call rage sites.
[32:21.610 --> 32:24.090]  These are the two funniest ones.
[32:24.650 --> 32:26.090]  One is don't date him, girl.
[32:26.470 --> 32:28.010]  And the other is who's a rat.
[32:28.750 --> 32:29.910]  Don't date him, girl.
[32:30.710 --> 32:35.030]  He has hundreds of thousands of women who've had a crappy time with a guy.
[32:37.110 --> 32:38.150]  Alleged cheater.
[32:38.270 --> 32:39.390]  This is a real one, by the way.
[32:39.510 --> 32:41.230]  Alleged cheater, Aaron Carter III.
[32:41.690 --> 32:44.190]  This boy will use you like no other.
[32:44.390 --> 32:47.010]  He smokes weed all day, every day.
[32:47.210 --> 32:49.810]  And if he doesn't have it, he will freak out.
[32:49.810 --> 32:52.590]  And it goes downhill from there.
[32:53.770 --> 32:58.330]  If I'm investigating Aaron Carter, man, thank you.
[32:58.810 --> 33:00.410]  I even have his picture.
[33:00.670 --> 33:04.450]  And he kind of looks like he needs some weed right there.
[33:05.490 --> 33:06.170]  Okay.
[33:06.610 --> 33:07.550]  Alleged cheater.
[33:07.850 --> 33:09.490]  Jonathan John Rainwater.
[33:10.610 --> 33:13.250]  This man, our so-called boy, is such a liar.
[33:13.250 --> 33:14.930]  First, he said he loved me.
[33:15.350 --> 33:16.930]  We were together for four years.
[33:17.070 --> 33:20.210]  Then I catch him in bed with another guy, Devin Pridemore.
[33:20.690 --> 33:23.630]  Well, that's actually two for the price of one.
[33:23.750 --> 33:28.430]  If I'm investigating this guy or Pridemore, thank you.
[33:30.110 --> 33:30.870]  Who's a rat?
[33:31.350 --> 33:34.170]  Who's a rat is... I just love this site.
[33:34.630 --> 33:41.130]  First of all, let me tell you, this site is in Australia for reasons that will be immediately obvious to you all.
[33:41.770 --> 33:47.850]  This is FBI informants, government informants, and undercover agents.
[33:48.110 --> 33:51.110]  Their photos, their histories, court documents, everything.
[33:51.510 --> 33:55.070]  And I've got to tell you, I have used this on cases.
[33:55.070 --> 34:00.830]  And I'm actually going to be posting an enormous one there myself on a case I just closed.
[34:01.290 --> 34:03.910]  Unless I'm instructed by my attorney not to.
[34:04.730 --> 34:07.650]  I mean, here's a perfect example.
[34:09.590 --> 34:10.750]  Yeah, you can read that.
[34:12.450 --> 34:13.910]  Guy's name is Thomas Evans.
[34:14.070 --> 34:15.190]  He's 32 years old.
[34:15.310 --> 34:16.310]  He's in Massachusetts.
[34:16.710 --> 34:22.110]  He used to... all the towns he was in, he's a rat for the Massachusetts State Police and the DEA.
[34:22.190 --> 34:24.330]  And all sorts of stuff on his background and stuff he's done.
[34:24.470 --> 34:25.150]  And his picture.
[34:25.290 --> 34:28.130]  I think that's probably a yearbook photo.
[34:28.130 --> 34:29.550]  But nevertheless, pretty good.
[34:30.230 --> 34:33.910]  I mean, he... it's just... it's just astounding.
[34:34.330 --> 34:37.150]  Some of this, you know, you have to discount occupation.
[34:37.510 --> 34:39.230]  Sits home and collects welfare.
[34:42.310 --> 34:52.150]  Now, all of this is stuff... everything that I've covered so far is stuff that with little or no trouble, either you or someone on your behalf can access.
[34:52.330 --> 34:53.170]  Now, think about this.
[34:53.630 --> 35:00.030]  Think about the picture that just the stuff I've shown you can paint on anyone.
[35:00.110 --> 35:03.470]  Unless you're the unabomber living in a cabin in the woods.
[35:03.650 --> 35:07.730]  And even then, I'd know where you are because you're paying taxes on that cabin.
[35:07.830 --> 35:09.090]  And that's public record.
[35:10.190 --> 35:13.870]  But everywhere you've lived... everywhere you live or have ever lived.
[35:14.130 --> 35:15.130]  Everywhere you work.
[35:16.230 --> 35:17.470]  Your phone information.
[35:17.650 --> 35:19.210]  Who you talk to on the phone.
[35:19.690 --> 35:20.790]  What you buy.
[35:21.010 --> 35:22.070]  What your religion is.
[35:22.170 --> 35:24.030]  What your sexual orientation is.
[35:24.830 --> 35:27.190]  You know, where you are at a given moment.
[35:27.310 --> 35:28.970]  We're going to go into trackers in a second.
[35:29.230 --> 35:32.550]  I mean, it's down to the point where I can tell where you physically are most of the time.
[35:35.130 --> 35:36.970]  Now, let's talk about some other stuff.
[35:37.450 --> 35:37.890]  MIB.
[35:37.890 --> 35:40.050]  So appropriately named.
[35:40.370 --> 35:42.030]  Medical Information Bureau.
[35:42.350 --> 35:43.470]  Insurance claims.
[35:43.710 --> 35:44.590]  Insurance applications.
[35:45.510 --> 35:50.850]  Anything to do with you buying, applying for, or using insurance.
[35:53.780 --> 35:54.980]  ID scans.
[35:55.180 --> 36:10.200]  How many of you go into buildings or go into bars or go into public locations and you let them take a scan of your driver's license either down on a plate or through a card reader.
[36:10.400 --> 36:12.160]  Let me tell you, this happens...
[36:12.160 --> 36:16.760]  This company alone gets scanned 17 million times a year.
[36:16.940 --> 36:20.620]  And I want to tell you, it gets sucked immediately into a database.
[36:20.620 --> 36:30.580]  And ultimately, it goes to companies like ChoicePoint or Sisint or whatever, and it goes into the store of knowledge available on you.
[36:34.120 --> 36:40.080]  Let me talk to you for a second about what I call Rambam's Law of Unintended Data Use.
[36:41.640 --> 36:50.500]  Every bit of data that's out there, no matter the reason that it was collected for, will eventually be accessed and used by somebody like me.
[36:50.700 --> 36:52.080]  And I'm one of the good guys.
[36:52.780 --> 36:55.500]  It'll also be used by somebody not so nice.
[36:56.480 --> 36:58.640]  Domino's Pizza is a perfect example.
[36:59.200 --> 37:02.860]  You call Domino's, you dial the same 800 number no matter where you are in America.
[37:04.260 --> 37:06.840]  Domino's has direct telco access.
[37:08.020 --> 37:21.720]  When you dial that 800 number, your number comes up on Annie, and Domino's knows right away address, name it's listed to, whether it's a pay phone, a paid phone, a cell phone, whatever.
[37:21.720 --> 37:29.980]  And they say, and their system, by the way, takes that information and routes it to the Domino's geographically closest to you.
[37:30.220 --> 37:40.540]  So when Bob at the Domino's two blocks away answers, it's been routed through all of that, and Bob at that Domino's has on the screen in front of him all the information.
[37:40.760 --> 37:41.660]  How may I help you?
[37:41.740 --> 37:42.580]  You'd like blah, blah, blah.
[37:42.760 --> 37:44.220]  It goes into their database.
[37:44.420 --> 37:45.320]  Well, let me tell you something.
[37:47.320 --> 37:56.540]  State of Missouri, the NYPD, the U.S. Marshals Service, a host of major collection agencies buy that data.
[37:56.780 --> 38:01.540]  And I want to read you a quote from Domino's.
[38:02.520 --> 38:07.380]  For collection, pizza delivery lists are one of the best sources used to locate people.
[38:08.140 --> 38:12.660]  The first time that your babysitter orders pizza, they have your name and address.
[38:12.940 --> 38:14.020]  That's absolutely true.
[38:14.020 --> 38:20.020]  So there's a lot of skips that are being caught, a lot of fugitives that are being caught because they ordered pizza.
[38:20.460 --> 38:21.820]  And by the way, this is not just Domino's.
[38:21.920 --> 38:23.600]  It's Papa John's and all the major chains.
[38:25.300 --> 38:28.460]  Now sometimes, that's kind of funny about Domino's.
[38:28.700 --> 38:30.260]  This is not so funny.
[38:32.020 --> 38:39.820]  There's a variety of programs that were in the making to develop a secure flyer program.
[38:39.980 --> 38:43.200]  The purpose of this program is you go through a background investigation.
[38:43.200 --> 38:46.180]  You can sensually go through a background investigation.
[38:47.020 --> 38:53.080]  And ultimately, if you come out clean, you come out the other end, they can verify you are who you say you are.
[38:53.200 --> 39:02.160]  You're not, you know, living in a room with three guys recently arrived from Yemen and ordering, you know, ureaic acid through the mail.
[39:02.160 --> 39:05.200]  Well, they will give you a special card.
[39:05.840 --> 39:08.280]  Secure flyer, frequent traveler.
[39:08.680 --> 39:10.500]  There was a whole host of names.
[39:10.780 --> 39:13.880]  Well, there's really no reliable way to do that.
[39:14.080 --> 39:25.380]  I mean, I can tell you that you can build a very, very good identity or steal someone else's and apply for this card and breeze right through as if you are a good guy.
[39:26.720 --> 39:28.280]  So the programs have been canceled.
[39:28.400 --> 39:31.200]  These programs are now pretty much officially dead.
[39:31.200 --> 39:34.760]  Well, you've got all this information that they've been compiling.
[39:35.020 --> 39:46.240]  Names, addresses, telephone numbers, criminal history, flying history, purchase history, all sorts of stuff that they've amalgamated to find out who you are.
[39:46.600 --> 39:48.940]  This is a phenomenally valuable database.
[39:49.260 --> 39:51.780]  Remember, databases are about money pretty much.
[39:53.020 --> 40:05.760]  Well, there's a company now called Jetira that is going to take this data and use it to, I'm going to quote here, provide individual entertainment options for flyers.
[40:06.760 --> 40:08.820]  And here's what they say, for example.
[40:09.080 --> 40:14.320]  If your buying habits suggest that you're a baseball fan, maybe your in-flight movie will be the natural.
[40:15.720 --> 40:17.900]  Do they really need to do that?
[40:18.000 --> 40:23.700]  Or can they talk to JetBlue about having 22 channels in front of you and you'll switch to the one you like?
[40:23.700 --> 40:25.520]  I mean, it's a BS excuse.
[40:26.200 --> 40:40.620]  But this information that you've now, in some cases, contributed, in some cases the airlines contributed, and in some cases, as part of pilot programs the U.S. government contributed, is now going to go into a private database.
[40:41.420 --> 40:52.600]  So again, let me emphasize, any data that you contribute anywhere, for any reason, will ultimately find its way somewhere else to be used for some other reason.
[40:52.600 --> 40:54.460]  And eventually, by me.
[40:56.420 --> 40:57.480]  Points of purchase.
[40:57.580 --> 41:02.060]  Points of purchase are one of the best sources of info about you.
[41:02.320 --> 41:12.200]  And I want to tell you, every major retailer collects this information and does anything they can to get you to contribute to this type of information.
[41:12.440 --> 41:16.240]  Because you are a sales tool.
[41:16.760 --> 41:18.380]  They want to know who you are.
[41:18.480 --> 41:19.960]  They want to be able to target you.
[41:19.960 --> 41:23.820]  They want to be able to sell your info to somebody else to target and market you.
[41:24.000 --> 41:30.580]  They want to be able to take that info, match it with other info, and have a hugely accurate picture of you.
[41:30.760 --> 41:38.860]  That's why, for example, if you go to a supermarket and you have one of their affinity cards, you get 1% off all the food you buy.
[41:38.860 --> 41:40.860]  Which adds up to a lot of money.
[41:41.100 --> 41:42.800]  They're not being nice to you.
[41:43.180 --> 41:45.100]  They want to know your purchases.
[41:45.560 --> 41:51.100]  They want to know, do you buy 47 cases of beer a month?
[41:51.700 --> 41:56.820]  Because then somebody with perhaps a 12-step program is going to market to you.
[41:57.480 --> 42:01.700]  Now, this, by the way, this, by the way, is not theory.
[42:02.000 --> 42:03.480]  For example, Stop and Shop.
[42:03.780 --> 42:10.660]  Stop and Shop, big supermarket chain, tested a really stupidly named program called Smart Mouth.
[42:12.260 --> 42:15.920]  And it would comment on the purchaser's history.
[42:16.160 --> 42:17.920]  You're buying too much sodium.
[42:18.120 --> 42:19.460]  You're buying too much fat.
[42:20.300 --> 42:26.600]  There was an uproar when it came out that all the local area HMOs were about to buy these databases.
[42:27.040 --> 42:28.680]  And what was the purpose for?
[42:28.880 --> 42:39.100]  Not so they would have your favorite potato chips in the doctor's office, but if you bought a ton of potato chips a month, your health insurance rates were going to go through the roof.
[42:39.460 --> 42:46.520]  You buy a lot of wine, you buy a lot of cigarettes, you buy a lot of fatty foods, a lot of high-sodium foods, you are a health risk.
[42:46.520 --> 42:48.500]  Now, by the way, that's really true.
[42:48.640 --> 42:49.480]  You are a health risk.
[42:50.180 --> 42:51.980]  Do they have a right to know that?
[42:52.800 --> 42:55.080]  I kind of draw the line at potato chips.
[42:56.500 --> 42:58.440]  Now, let's talk about trackers.
[42:59.540 --> 43:02.360]  This is scary, scary stuff.
[43:04.580 --> 43:20.600]  Up until, I want to say, four or five years ago, I could find out anything I wanted to know about you, and I mean anything, but I couldn't always find out where you are.
[43:21.820 --> 43:24.180]  Physically, where you are.
[43:24.380 --> 43:27.440]  I've got this enormous dossier on someone.
[43:28.380 --> 43:30.340]  Where is this person?
[43:31.080 --> 43:37.220]  Well, about 90% of the time now, you are indexed as to your location.
[43:37.840 --> 43:40.960]  Some of this can be tracked real-time, some of it can't.
[43:40.960 --> 43:42.380]  You all have a cell phone?
[43:42.800 --> 43:43.640]  Not a problem.
[43:44.220 --> 43:50.040]  If it's a GPS-enabled cell phone, I can tell almost down to the seat that you are sitting in in a room.
[43:50.960 --> 43:59.720]  If it's not a GPS-enabled cell phone, and you are in an urban area, absolutely possible to triangulate to within 150 yards.
[43:59.720 --> 44:02.560]  New York City, it's down to like 50 yards, I think.
[44:03.860 --> 44:10.280]  If you're talking on the phone, driving through the Holland Tunnel, or, I don't know, does the Holland Tunnel have cell sites?
[44:10.680 --> 44:12.960]  Okay, well, the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, for sure.
[44:13.220 --> 44:18.880]  I can tell where you are in the tunnel, and how fast you're driving as you go from cell site to cell site.
[44:18.880 --> 44:26.180]  Here are some, first, the obnoxious but semi-known trackers.
[44:27.420 --> 44:32.960]  Microsoft has something which they obnoxiously call genuine advantage, which it's not.
[44:33.340 --> 44:34.720]  Windows Genuine Advantage.
[44:35.000 --> 44:38.240]  Your computer phones home every time you use it.
[44:38.560 --> 44:42.280]  And under Microsoft's rules, you're not allowed to disable it.
[44:42.960 --> 44:49.480]  I take my laptop, I go onto the road, I check in to the Fairfield Inn, which is not where I actually stay.
[44:50.580 --> 44:52.500]  I connect to the Wi-Fi.
[44:53.040 --> 44:59.220]  They know the hotel I'm in because of the IP address, and because it has contacted them, as an example.
[45:00.240 --> 45:04.340]  I log in through a business DSL line.
[45:04.500 --> 45:05.720]  They know I'm at work.
[45:06.060 --> 45:10.020]  I connect from a hot spot at a Starbucks.
[45:10.020 --> 45:12.300]  They know, okay, yeah, it's 6 o'clock.
[45:12.540 --> 45:15.340]  Right around this time, Steve gets his coffee and checks his email.
[45:16.480 --> 45:20.620]  Microsoft knows where you are at all times if you have an upgraded version of their Windows.
[45:21.500 --> 45:33.080]  And, again, their, their user license agreement, their electronic user license agreement, which, by the way, you've probably never seen or read, says you're not allowed to disable it.
[45:34.020 --> 45:37.260]  Now, everybody's going, ooh, boo, evil Bill Gates.
[45:38.500 --> 45:41.040]  My boys at Apple do the same thing.
[45:41.400 --> 45:48.400]  If you use iTunes and you have the mini store turned on, they know what music you're listening to and where you are when you're listening to it.
[45:48.540 --> 45:49.480]  Real time.
[45:51.120 --> 45:54.960]  Windows Media Player, back to the bad people at Windows.
[45:54.960 --> 46:05.300]  Windows Media Player has something on it called a unique player ID, which they had the honesty, but the incredible chutzpah to call a supercookie.
[46:06.000 --> 46:07.280]  It really is.
[46:07.780 --> 46:08.640]  Honestly is.
[46:10.740 --> 46:12.260]  Here's the bottom line, though.
[46:12.380 --> 46:13.840]  The last point is the key point.
[46:13.840 --> 46:21.900]  Any time that your identity is known or verified, we know where you are.
[46:22.280 --> 46:27.420]  You log into your Hotmail account from a given IP address, we know where you are.
[46:28.260 --> 46:32.860]  You use Skype from a given IP address, we know where you are.
[46:33.220 --> 46:40.280]  You're at a Internet cafe in Borneo checking your email, we know where you are.
[46:40.380 --> 46:42.660]  And so on, and so on, and so on.
[46:43.160 --> 46:54.680]  Any time that you in some way authenticate who you are with a password, with an identity, with a type of search that's going to reliably connect us to you, we physically know where you are.
[46:54.800 --> 46:56.120]  And you do this all the time.
[46:56.840 --> 46:59.960]  Now, your cell phone is broadcasting your location at all times.
[47:00.540 --> 47:04.480]  But these are, even if you turn off your cell phone, you've got to contend with this stuff.
[47:04.840 --> 47:06.420]  And here's some more.
[47:07.520 --> 47:07.960]  OnStar.
[47:09.260 --> 47:10.400]  You know, OnStar.
[47:10.620 --> 47:11.540]  Gee, great convenience.
[47:11.700 --> 47:12.460]  You all hear the commercials.
[47:12.460 --> 47:13.320]  Oh, thank you.
[47:13.400 --> 47:16.140]  My little puppy was locked in the car and you unlocked it.
[47:16.940 --> 47:20.560]  Let me tell you what else OnStar can do.
[47:21.400 --> 47:25.000]  OnStar tracks your location real time, everywhere, all the time.
[47:25.660 --> 47:28.620]  The phone in your car, help OnStar, help.
[47:28.780 --> 47:30.940]  There's a bad man trying to get into the car.
[47:31.780 --> 47:34.920]  OnStar can remotely turn on that telephone anytime they want.
[47:35.240 --> 47:38.540]  And they've done it in connection with Warrens.
[47:38.540 --> 47:42.240]  You have a bug in your car if you have OnStar.
[47:42.880 --> 47:53.440]  Now, they're not going to turn it on without a warrant, but speaking personally, speaking personally, it is possible to get a warrant regarding an innocent person.
[47:55.620 --> 47:57.540]  EasyPass, I-Pass, SunPass.
[48:00.060 --> 48:04.500]  Connected to your driver's license and or your license plate.
[48:04.780 --> 48:08.660]  Everywhere you travel, real time when you go past a transponder.
[48:08.820 --> 48:12.920]  And by the way, you're not only going past the transponder when you go through a toll booth.
[48:14.060 --> 48:17.620]  SunPass in Florida, they got transponders all over the place.
[48:17.740 --> 48:20.420]  And they're now using them to vector in highway patrol.
[48:21.140 --> 48:29.060]  They can tell, okay, there's a guy in the 50-mile space where there's no toll booths, but man, he's passing these transponders.
[48:29.140 --> 48:30.620]  He must be going 90 miles an hour.
[48:32.140 --> 48:33.080]  And they got you.
[48:35.000 --> 48:35.560]  MetroCard.
[48:37.360 --> 48:48.740]  If somebody can tie that MetroCard to you, they know when you get on the subway, when you transfer to a bus, your public transportation activities.
[48:48.940 --> 48:56.080]  Now, if you're considerate enough, like more than 50% of the people are, to buy that MetroCard with a credit card, thank you very much.
[48:57.560 --> 48:58.760]  Passenger lists.
[48:59.180 --> 49:01.360]  Frequent flyer information.
[49:01.720 --> 49:03.540]  Frequent renter programs.
[49:03.820 --> 49:05.260]  Frequent guest programs.
[49:05.840 --> 49:07.360]  Frequent buyer programs.
[49:07.720 --> 49:11.980]  It logs where you were and what you did at given times.
[49:13.280 --> 49:14.340]  Car chips.
[49:14.780 --> 49:23.300]  All modern cars since last year have little chips in their system that record what you've been doing for the past 300 hours.
[49:25.320 --> 49:32.060]  And by the way, in a lot of cases, in accidents, especially DWI, DUI accidents, the cops pop those out now.
[49:32.960 --> 49:40.700]  And, oh, okay, this shows that he was traveling at 75 miles an hour in a residential area and suddenly slammed on his brakes.
[49:41.160 --> 49:42.620]  It actually reports that.
[49:43.820 --> 49:45.440]  Digital license plate readers.
[49:45.560 --> 49:46.220]  Let me tell you something.
[49:46.340 --> 49:51.240]  Digital license plate readers are now on a Star Trek level of accuracy.
[49:52.360 --> 49:57.480]  If there's a camera set up with a $20,000 system, that's all it costs.
[49:57.640 --> 50:00.000]  And by the way, it's based on a Dell.
[50:01.420 --> 50:04.560]  Hopefully an exploding Dell, but it's based on a Dell.
[50:05.420 --> 50:13.920]  LAPD, for example, has now a pilot program where they're just driving around in cars with these license plate readers running.
[50:13.920 --> 50:16.500]  They claim that they're using it for stolen cars.
[50:16.620 --> 50:19.380]  And they have, in fact, recovered hundreds of stolen cars.
[50:20.320 --> 50:28.020]  They've also, as they've been doing that, sucked into their database and it logs time and location and everything.
[50:28.200 --> 50:29.200]  It's mated with a GPS.
[50:29.200 --> 50:41.860]  So as they drive down the street, they have a permanent database record of every car parked on the street, every car that drives into that camera's viewfinder, where it was and what time of day it was there.
[50:43.380 --> 50:45.700]  Technology, this is not a fantasy.
[50:46.000 --> 50:52.340]  The technology exists to log your car's location 24-7 anywhere there's a camera now.
[50:54.160 --> 50:57.060]  We discussed cell phone activity, Wi-Fi activity.
[50:57.320 --> 51:14.320]  Wi-Fi activity says, I am so and so, I'm using such and such a device, an Internet phone, a Wi-Fi enabled laptop, something, and I am typically, I'm within 30 meters of this particular location.
[51:18.800 --> 51:23.940]  You know, tracking cell phones is not just the feds anymore.
[51:24.220 --> 51:26.420]  There are services that offer this commercially.
[51:26.740 --> 51:37.120]  If you give your kid a cell phone, nearly every major carrier allows you to turn on a tracking feature, where you can pull up a web page and you're allowed to search it, I think, 40 times a day.
[51:37.120 --> 51:40.520]  You know, beyond that, you're a maniac.
[51:40.900 --> 51:46.580]  But, I mean, these are Teen Arrival Live, Find Friends, Mobile Angel, Tracer Mobile.
[51:46.860 --> 51:50.100]  There are services that are made available to companies now.
[51:50.640 --> 51:55.740]  Any cell phone on your company plan, you can tell where Fred is.
[51:55.860 --> 52:01.080]  Now, we're going to talk in a second about GPS location.
[52:02.140 --> 52:17.880]  It's now possible, through cross-referencing GPS and mapping, to tell not only where a person is, for example, that he is on River Street between 5th and 6th, but what's at River Street between 5th and 6th.
[52:19.120 --> 52:20.640]  Is he in a bar?
[52:21.040 --> 52:22.820]  Is he at a strip joint?
[52:23.560 --> 52:25.960]  Is he out shopping for wedding rings?
[52:26.480 --> 52:28.660]  Is he anything?
[52:29.220 --> 52:33.080]  Essentially, what's at the location where this individual is?
[52:36.880 --> 52:41.760]  Companies... Now, this is from a marketing magazine, so most of you have never looked at it.
[52:41.980 --> 52:47.440]  Frankly, I read target marketing every month because it gives me some of my best database sources.
[52:47.680 --> 52:54.320]  These are the people who want to be able to count heads and know who you are and what you like and so on and so forth.
[52:55.180 --> 52:56.400]  Here's an example.
[52:56.680 --> 52:58.240]  Here's an express mail drop.
[52:58.540 --> 53:00.040]  Here's a parking garage.
[53:00.300 --> 53:01.080]  There's a restaurant.
[53:01.500 --> 53:04.700]  They have every location mapped and detailed.
[53:04.960 --> 53:22.860]  Now, by the way, on a slightly lower level, if you buy Info USA, which is probably one of the biggest privacy invaders in America, if you buy Info USA's map DVD, it has every single business in America on it.
[53:23.640 --> 53:49.500]  And you can, you can, this is not some major governmental agency or corporation, you can with a laptop drive down the street, plug in what you're looking for, it will take the GPS, it will see your location, it will show it on a map, you type in pizza store or pizza and it will pop up another blinking point where the nearest pizza store is and it will show you how to get there.
[53:50.180 --> 53:58.140]  So, you can buy a database that's immediately available to you anytime you want that shows everything at every location.
[54:00.560 --> 54:03.780]  MapQuest now has BindMeNow as an example.
[54:04.100 --> 54:10.000]  No, no, no, question and answer is, I think, do we have to change the tape in five minutes?
[54:10.220 --> 54:10.740]  Let's do that now.
[54:11.280 --> 54:12.940]  Okay, they're recording this.
[54:13.400 --> 54:15.340]  We're going to take, do it quickly.
[54:15.900 --> 54:17.860]  We're going to change the tape and then...