[00:01.140 --> 00:01.820]  Hey, everybody.
[00:02.140 --> 00:02.980]  I'm Evan Light.
[00:03.220 --> 00:05.500]  I'm going to be talking with you tonight for a while.
[00:07.140 --> 00:10.920]  So you may have noticed that you have the Android app, the session after this one got cancelled.
[00:11.460 --> 00:14.500]  And the organizers gave me free reign to go wait over, so we might.
[00:24.660 --> 00:26.000]  Times have changed!
[00:26.220 --> 00:27.400]  Our kids are getting worse!
[00:27.720 --> 00:30.660]  They won't obey their parents, they just want to fight and curse!
[00:30.960 --> 00:32.220]  Should we blame the government?
[00:32.480 --> 00:33.500]  Or blame society?
[00:33.960 --> 00:35.940]  Or should we blame the images on TV?
[00:35.940 --> 00:36.780]  No!
[00:37.040 --> 00:37.860]  Blame Canada!
[00:38.360 --> 00:39.380]  Blame Canada!
[00:39.860 --> 00:43.200]  With all the beady little eyes, the flapping heads don't form my lies.
[00:43.340 --> 00:44.200]  Blame Canada!
[00:44.620 --> 00:45.640]  Blame Canada!
[00:46.200 --> 00:47.740]  We need to form a full assault!
[00:47.980 --> 00:48.600]  You need Canada assault!
[00:49.700 --> 00:52.440]  Don't blame me for my son Stan.
[00:52.800 --> 00:55.620]  He saw the darn cartoon and now he's off to join the clan.
[00:55.940 --> 01:01.120]  And my boy Eric once had my picture on his shelf, but now when I see him he tells me to fuck myself.
[01:01.620 --> 01:02.920]  Well, Blame Canada!
[01:03.420 --> 01:04.440]  Blame Canada!
[01:04.440 --> 01:08.180]  It seems that everything's gone wrong since Canada came along!
[01:08.400 --> 01:09.220]  Blame Canada!
[01:09.900 --> 01:10.680]  Blame Canada!
[01:11.200 --> 01:13.440]  They're not even a real country anyway.
[01:14.560 --> 01:17.620]  My son could have been a doctor or a lawyer, Richard True.
[01:17.960 --> 01:20.500]  And said he burned a plac-a-peggy on a barbecue.
[01:21.120 --> 01:22.400]  Should we blame the matches?
[01:22.660 --> 01:23.880]  Should we blame the fire?
[01:23.980 --> 01:26.240]  Or the doctors who allowed him to expire?
[01:26.240 --> 01:26.900]  Heck no!
[01:27.140 --> 01:27.980]  Blame Canada!
[01:28.740 --> 01:29.540]  Blame Canada!
[01:30.000 --> 01:30.100]  Blame Canada!
[01:30.100 --> 01:31.680]  With all the hockey huff of a mow!
[01:31.820 --> 01:33.180]  And that bitch Anne-Marie too!
[01:33.420 --> 01:34.260]  Blame Canada!
[01:34.780 --> 01:35.880]  Cheating on Canada!
[01:36.580 --> 01:36.980]  Oh!
[01:37.520 --> 01:38.600]  This is what we must have to trust.
[01:38.700 --> 01:39.040]  This is fast.
[01:39.120 --> 01:40.580]  The laughter and fuck must all be a duck.
[01:40.660 --> 01:42.100]  We must win them and cause the fuss.
[01:42.200 --> 01:44.160]  Before somebody thinks somebody does!
[01:50.500 --> 02:00.400]  So I was actually going to start with the video, but like the Library of Freedom Project presentation today, the labor office was not totally cooperating with video or images.
[02:00.400 --> 02:02.440]  So I'll do the audio instead.
[02:03.200 --> 02:04.460]  As I mentioned, my name's Evan.
[02:04.640 --> 02:07.720]  I'm an associate professor of communications at York University in Toronto.
[02:08.700 --> 02:16.340]  Can we talk about some sort of long-term, slow-moving research that quickly accelerated in November last year?
[02:17.640 --> 02:23.100]  But first, I want to give some context and talk about Canada, because it's quite different than the U.S.
[02:23.260 --> 02:24.360]  I'm originally from New Jersey.
[02:24.360 --> 02:27.940]  I got out in 95 and never have moved back.
[02:30.080 --> 02:31.620]  Canada is an interesting place.
[02:31.740 --> 02:33.840]  Does anybody understand the Canadian parliamentary system at all?
[02:34.860 --> 02:35.700]  A little bit.
[02:37.740 --> 02:44.180]  So, as an American living in Canada for a long time, I find Canadians to be very trusting in their government.
[02:45.760 --> 02:47.400]  It's a very different scene than here.
[02:47.620 --> 02:53.020]  There's really no civil society the way there is in the U.S., at least working on surveillance issues and privacy.
[02:53.880 --> 02:54.920]  Nothing like the EFF.
[02:54.920 --> 02:58.820]  The CCLA is kind of like the ACLU, the Canadians of Liberties Association.
[03:00.020 --> 03:06.640]  But there's nothing like the foundation funding that goes into making a real civil society functional in the U.S.
[03:07.400 --> 03:16.200]  And so it falls onto a lot of, well, not that many, academic researchers like myself to sort of step into this activist gap and try and make things happen.
[03:18.680 --> 03:36.080]  Some of my work is around surveillance reform, and some of this work I'm going to talk about today is a reaction to some research that I did with a colleague a number of years ago, where we proposed that civil society around the world can adopt tactics that have been used in media reform and reform
[03:36.080 --> 03:40.200]  around environmental movements, but without really understanding what we're dealing with.
[03:40.460 --> 03:43.040]  And so I said, well, how would we, like, map it out?
[03:43.140 --> 03:44.340]  What do we want to reform?
[03:44.480 --> 03:45.400]  What the hell is going on?
[03:45.520 --> 03:46.840]  What technologies are being used?
[03:46.980 --> 03:48.640]  What laws exist to surveil us?
[03:48.960 --> 03:50.080]  What stuff doesn't exist?
[03:50.420 --> 03:53.040]  And I found the EFF's Atlas of Surveillance.
[03:53.620 --> 03:56.140]  If you don't know it, check it out, atlasofsurveillance.org.
[03:56.140 --> 03:56.900]  It's fantastic.
[03:57.560 --> 04:09.280]  It takes advantage of the massive infrastructure that you have in the U.S., where there are dozens, if not hundreds, of activists, academic researchers, civil society groups across the U.S.
[04:09.320 --> 04:17.260]  that do tons of FLI work, and the Atlas of Surveillance aggregates all of this and makes it really easily searchable and available.
[04:18.820 --> 04:21.480]  So I was like, well, maybe we can do something like this in Canada, too.
[04:23.340 --> 04:25.800]  The difference being nobody else is doing this sort of work.
[04:25.800 --> 04:30.920]  So I and the few people that work with me are the ones filing the FOIs and access to information requests.
[04:32.920 --> 04:35.520]  This all started as a project during the pandemic.
[04:35.580 --> 04:42.420]  I wound up in an online symposium of security researchers in the U.S., or in the U.K., in Canada.
[04:44.240 --> 04:53.660]  And if you were in these weird virtual spaces during the deep pandemic, it was, like, nice to encounter friendly people in weird online spaces.
[04:53.660 --> 04:54.860]  We came together.
[04:55.140 --> 05:10.760]  We got some grant funding from the British Academy and CFAR, which is a Canadian funding agency, to bootstrap this project called Deobfuscating State Surveillance, where we basically want to map out the surveillance capabilities of the Canadian state from municipal to federal,
[05:11.240 --> 05:15.200]  across the entire country, what's being used, what's being done to people.
[05:16.960 --> 05:21.420]  And then we got a large grant from SHRC, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council in Canada.
[05:21.800 --> 05:24.980]  Whenever I talk about this work in the U.S., I find it funny how people react to that.
[05:25.080 --> 05:27.920]  My government is giving me money to do this research on them.
[05:29.040 --> 05:35.000]  But it's the way it works, and there's actual insulation from political influence in the way that research funding happens in Canada.
[05:37.420 --> 05:40.900]  One of the entry points is looking at the lens of technologies.
[05:41.780 --> 05:49.400]  So this isn't really a definitive list, but this is the list we're going off of in terms of going through FOIs and looking for what's being purchased.
[05:49.740 --> 06:06.400]  So automated license plate radars, ALPRs, body cameras, FRT or facial recognition technology, social media monitoring, MC catchers, mobile forensic devices, which are the thing I'm going to focus on today, aerial surveillance, which I'll talk about a bit as well,
[06:06.660 --> 06:10.800]  data brokers, predictive policing, surveillance cameras, and gunshot detection.
[06:14.500 --> 06:21.480]  We generally look in court records and filing FLI and in Canada, we have sort of two separate systems.
[06:21.820 --> 06:25.680]  At the federal level, it's called Access to Information, governed by the Access to Information Act.
[06:25.900 --> 06:30.360]  At either municipal or provincial, we have the Freedom of Information.
[06:31.300 --> 06:38.520]  Similar acts that govern different things, but also cost vastly different amounts of money.
[06:39.520 --> 06:43.520]  To date in this project, so we've been working on this for about three years now.
[06:45.000 --> 06:53.660]  One of my research assistants is putting together a wonderful sort of 50 page companies of interest list with profiles of companies that just make surveillance gear.
[06:55.260 --> 07:11.540]  We filed around 300 requests for some 2,000 contracts, just at the federal level, from 2012 to 2022, totaling around $850 million, which is a lot of money to be spending on surveillance gear in a 10-year period in a pretty small country.
[07:12.860 --> 07:15.260]  Canada's got about 37 million people.
[07:16.580 --> 07:20.440]  To date, our success rate in getting information back is 37%.
[07:20.440 --> 07:25.000]  Not because we've been rejected, but because this is typically a super long process.
[07:26.600 --> 07:34.080]  In Canada, I've downloaded or requested copies of things that were asked for seven years ago.
[07:34.080 --> 07:36.840]  It can take decades to get information out of the government.
[07:38.740 --> 07:43.620]  So it's a super long process, but that can yield some pretty high impact results that I'm going to get to in a bit.
[07:45.800 --> 07:47.120]  But why procurement research?
[07:47.280 --> 07:50.640]  So most of the bulk of the research we're doing right now is asking for copies of contracts.
[07:52.160 --> 08:00.900]  And before I get into the contracts themselves, I want to explain why I sort of deviated to this route of asking for boring things that come to me fairly quickly.
[08:01.360 --> 08:07.740]  By showing you another case study of similar research, part of the same project, but that's gone quite in a different direction.
[08:08.820 --> 08:12.580]  So I teach communications, my background is in radio spectrum policy.
[08:14.300 --> 08:19.240]  And so I found myself occasionally reading the Recommunication Act, which governs the radio spectrum in Canada.
[08:20.200 --> 08:24.640]  A couple years ago, I noticed that there were a whole bunch of exemptions that I never noticed in this law.
[08:25.240 --> 08:27.980]  This is the law that governs how the radio spectrum works in Canada.
[08:28.140 --> 08:43.840]  And so I found the RCMP, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who are our version of the FBI crossed with the National Police Force, had been given exemptions during weird times in history, about 15 times over the course of about 20 years.
[08:45.280 --> 08:47.740]  And I wanted to dig into it and say, okay, well, why?
[08:48.440 --> 08:49.380]  What does this mean?
[08:50.020 --> 09:06.220]  And each exemption shows that the RCMP, and in this case the Canadian Forces, so the Canadian Army, was exempted from the portion of the Radio Communication Act around interference, meaning they can do whatever the fuck they want with the radio spectrum in however they want, whatever way they want.
[09:08.560 --> 09:18.200]  But strangely, each one of these exemptions has a really tightly defined geographic quadrant, defined by longitude and latitude, where they have this exemption.
[09:18.680 --> 09:21.940]  And so I tried to find out what this meant.
[09:23.460 --> 09:31.360]  This is the law that they're exempt from, for which people can get jailed or fined for interfering with radio communications.
[09:35.880 --> 09:39.580]  And these are quickly the geographic quadrants, so this started in 2002.
[09:39.940 --> 09:42.600]  So a year after 9-11, more or less.
[09:42.980 --> 09:45.240]  This is really the entirety around Calgary.
[09:47.720 --> 09:50.200]  Also around Toronto, the same period of time.
[09:51.900 --> 09:53.680]  2007, we have Ottawa.
[09:56.420 --> 09:59.260]  2008, Quebec City, a big Chancophonie summit.
[10:01.320 --> 10:03.600]  2009, Ottawa for some reason.
[10:04.220 --> 10:14.300]  And then the Vancouver Olympics in 2010, the RCMP was basically given the right to surveil aerially, through the entirety of BC where people live.
[10:14.580 --> 10:17.860]  From Whistler South, we're thinking about 6 million people.
[10:19.300 --> 10:21.880]  For three weeks, before, during and after the Olympics.
[10:23.980 --> 10:28.580]  And then if anybody was in Toronto for the G8, G20, that was a total shit show.
[10:28.720 --> 10:31.100]  They also had an exemption during the entire G8, G20.
[10:31.860 --> 10:36.720]  And a huge swath of land, including all Toronto and quite far north.
[10:41.520 --> 10:45.240]  So we're talking about the ability to surveil most of the people in Canada.
[10:48.600 --> 10:53.720]  During interesting times in history, such as Obama's visit to Ottawa in 2010.
[10:54.380 --> 11:07.560]  And so I submitted an FOI, or an access to information request, an ATI, to ICED, who's our spectrum regulator, saying, tell me why you made these decisions to exempt the RCMP from radio interference laws.
[11:07.560 --> 11:09.780]  And they rejected me.
[11:10.140 --> 11:16.440]  They claimed it's called Cabinet Privilege, that the Prime Minister's Cabinet can reject what you...
[11:16.440 --> 11:24.060]  Reject your request if it impidges on their ability to govern, or national security measures, or whatever.
[11:24.400 --> 11:25.320]  They rejected me.
[11:25.400 --> 11:29.940]  So I filed another ATI with the RCMP and said, okay, what was your aerial fleet?
[11:30.060 --> 11:34.280]  Give me the tail numbers, so I can track down flight records and maintenance logs, etc.
[11:34.760 --> 11:36.060]  That took two years to get.
[11:36.300 --> 11:38.120]  I got a list of those about a month ago.
[11:39.000 --> 11:42.940]  And now I'll ask for flight records, maintenance records.
[11:43.340 --> 11:46.060]  Maybe another four years, I'll know what these planes have been doing.
[11:46.260 --> 11:47.180]  Maybe I'll never find out.
[11:49.020 --> 11:51.780]  So in the meantime, I started going down the procurement route.
[11:53.580 --> 11:58.320]  This sort of case study I'm talking about today is around mobile forensic devices, a group out of D.C.
[11:58.400 --> 12:04.920]  called Upturn put out a report in 2020, where they filed FOIs in some 2,000 police forces across the United States.
[12:05.500 --> 12:07.000]  Has anybody heard of mobile forensic devices?
[12:08.880 --> 12:14.820]  Made by Celebrite, Magnet Forensics, who work in Canada, Grayshift, Oxygen Forensics.
[12:16.520 --> 12:21.820]  Basically, for those of you who don't know these devices, think of a little box that lets you make an image of a cell phone.
[12:22.000 --> 12:23.760]  You plug it in, makes a copy of it.
[12:24.620 --> 12:26.680]  If a cop pulls you over, they might ask you for your phone.
[12:26.680 --> 12:32.540]  This could happen on the road, this can happen at the border, in airport, in generally powerless places.
[12:35.740 --> 12:39.700]  And Upturn found these being used in 2,000 police forces across the United States.
[12:39.900 --> 12:41.900]  They're pretty cheap, they're about 35 grand.
[12:43.480 --> 12:46.260]  Once you make an image of the phone, you can do what you want with the image.
[12:46.500 --> 12:50.160]  You can access people's email, really anything.
[12:50.460 --> 12:53.140]  Encryption, any security measures on your device don't matter anymore.
[12:54.140 --> 12:58.780]  According, it leads to their marketing materials on YouTube, manuals that have come out online.
[13:00.780 --> 13:08.880]  But even more advanced, the new models also give the user access to tokens to access your cloud services without needing your phone.
[13:08.980 --> 13:11.620]  It can all happen through the image that is made of your phone.
[13:12.380 --> 13:16.400]  And so, I started to look in Canada.
[13:16.620 --> 13:18.200]  We have a thing called Proactive Disclosure.
[13:23.900 --> 13:24.900]  Where, yeah.
[13:26.540 --> 13:31.140]  Where all contracts worth 10 grand or more are made, not publicly available quite.
[13:31.140 --> 13:35.100]  They give you a rough idea of what was purchased, and by what agency and the government.
[13:35.560 --> 13:38.740]  And so, I started to run queries for the manufacturers of these devices.
[13:38.920 --> 13:43.440]  Magnet Forensics, Rayshift, Celebrite, and started to find millions of dollars contracts.
[13:44.860 --> 13:47.260]  And so, I started asking for them.
[13:49.100 --> 13:53.240]  And to my surprise, I would get things back within a month, with really no read actions.
[13:54.320 --> 13:59.500]  For those of you who don't know FOI, Freedom of Information, or Access to Information, historically, it's a journalistic technique.
[14:00.020 --> 14:01.840]  Increasingly, academic researchers use it too.
[14:02.540 --> 14:03.360]  Activists as well.
[14:04.560 --> 14:08.060]  In Canada, it costs you $5 to make a request federally.
[14:08.440 --> 14:11.620]  You can ask for free copies of requests other people have made.
[14:11.820 --> 14:20.240]  It's sort of a running database that's about a million requests now, where you can see what's been filed and given back in the last 10 years or so.
[14:21.600 --> 14:25.120]  But at the provincial and municipal level, they make you pay a lot of money.
[14:25.500 --> 14:31.400]  Charging you by the quarter hour of work, charging you for DVDs, for paper, for labor, etc.
[14:32.680 --> 14:37.000]  So I tend to do mostly the work at the federal level, where I pay $5 and get everything I want.
[14:37.160 --> 14:39.880]  Including email chains between the feds and the provinces.
[14:41.400 --> 14:44.020]  Saying, I want to come and demo my MC catcher for you.
[14:44.200 --> 14:44.720]  Things like that.
[14:49.190 --> 14:50.610]  This is one of the contracts I got back.
[14:50.830 --> 14:54.410]  A $4 million contract with Celebrate.
[14:56.350 --> 14:59.090]  Typically, it's cops that use these devices.
[14:59.550 --> 15:01.410]  At least that's what Upturn documented in the U.S.
[15:01.590 --> 15:05.990]  And I expected to just find police using mobile forensic devices in Canada.
[15:07.590 --> 15:15.330]  And so, has anybody ever had a sinking feeling in their stomach when they've uncovered a centralized cell phone hacking operation in their government?
[15:17.470 --> 15:18.370]  This is weird.
[15:18.550 --> 15:27.370]  So, I found not just the cops, but 13 different agencies inside the government using what's marketed as essentially military-grade cell phone hacking tools.
[15:28.190 --> 15:29.490]  Fisheries in the Ocean of Canada.
[15:29.970 --> 15:31.290]  Environment and Climate Change Canada.
[15:31.870 --> 15:35.770]  The Canadian Radio, Television and Telecommunication Commission, which is our version of the FCC.
[15:36.810 --> 15:38.750]  The Canada Revenue Agency.
[15:39.790 --> 15:40.950]  Shared Services Canada.
[15:41.330 --> 15:43.530]  Who are interesting and play a pretty central role in this story.
[15:43.710 --> 15:46.590]  They used to be just the IT group for the federal government.
[15:46.850 --> 15:49.010]  And they morphed into the procurement arm of the government.
[15:49.690 --> 15:53.010]  So, these contracts I've been getting are generally through Shared Services Canada.
[15:53.210 --> 15:55.790]  The centralized procurement of mobile forensic devices.
[15:55.910 --> 15:59.070]  They realized that these things were being used so widely across the government.
[15:59.430 --> 16:02.110]  And being bought individually by different agencies.
[16:02.110 --> 16:06.170]  That if they centralized procurement that he'd get better deals on the devices.
[16:07.030 --> 16:08.630]  But it also makes my research much easier.
[16:08.830 --> 16:11.430]  Because they literally send me maps of where this stuff is.
[16:11.690 --> 16:16.950]  I get a contract back saying, this is all the gear that went to certain RCMP detachments.
[16:17.370 --> 16:19.330]  Or certain border detachments across the country.
[16:20.230 --> 16:22.270]  But other agencies like the Competition Bureau.
[16:22.550 --> 16:23.290]  Global Affairs.
[16:23.590 --> 16:24.910]  The Transportation Safety Board.
[16:26.070 --> 16:27.310]  Natural Resources Canada.
[16:27.790 --> 16:28.570]  Correctional Services.
[16:29.250 --> 16:30.650]  Canadian Border Services Agency.
[16:30.650 --> 16:31.370]  National Defense.
[16:31.670 --> 16:32.050]  The RCMP.
[16:32.270 --> 16:33.010]  And the Copyright Board.
[16:34.170 --> 16:36.130]  Have all purchased mobile forensic devices.
[16:37.530 --> 16:40.190]  And so, I got in touch with a journalist that I know at Radio Canada.
[16:40.410 --> 16:43.390]  Radio Canada is our French public broadcaster.
[16:43.610 --> 16:44.930]  We have Radio Canada and the CBC.
[16:45.290 --> 16:46.730]  They work together pretty tightly.
[16:48.350 --> 16:52.170]  And Brigitte's been reporting on politics in Ottawa for about 30 years.
[16:52.710 --> 16:56.750]  She broke a huge story in 2017 on MC catchers being used around Ottawa.
[16:57.810 --> 16:59.550]  Within the vicinity of Parliament.
[17:00.850 --> 17:01.570]  Numerous embassies.
[17:02.170 --> 17:03.550]  And so, I knew her from the story.
[17:03.770 --> 17:05.030]  I got in touch with her and said, hey Brigitte.
[17:05.890 --> 17:08.110]  I think I'm on to something big.
[17:08.630 --> 17:10.210]  But it's also fucking weird.
[17:10.390 --> 17:12.330]  Can you look at these documents and let me know what you think?
[17:12.550 --> 17:14.330]  And she said, yeah, you're on to something.
[17:14.570 --> 17:15.170]  Let's do it.
[17:16.430 --> 17:19.690]  She's the sort of journalist that politicians cannot say no to.
[17:19.830 --> 17:21.030]  Or refuse to give an answer to.
[17:22.090 --> 17:23.510]  Whereas they can blow off people like me.
[17:23.510 --> 17:27.770]  And so, we had a really fruitful relationship working for a few months together.
[17:29.050 --> 17:32.630]  Last November, she and her producer came to Toronto from Ottawa.
[17:32.810 --> 17:34.830]  And we did an afternoon of interviews in English and French.
[17:35.430 --> 17:39.610]  The news broke, I think, November 30th in English and French.
[17:39.850 --> 17:41.230]  On web, TV and radio.
[17:41.570 --> 17:43.470]  All at the same time across the entire country.
[17:44.430 --> 17:48.510]  CBS, or CBC rather, is in Canada a bit like NPR.
[17:49.730 --> 17:54.410]  Except that it's really the most listened to radio and TV across the entire country.
[17:55.210 --> 17:56.890]  People watch the national news.
[17:57.070 --> 17:57.790]  It's called the national.
[17:58.550 --> 18:00.010]  Everybody watches it across the country.
[18:00.270 --> 18:03.690]  So, this was big breaking news that got a lot of...
[18:03.690 --> 18:05.470]  It made a lot of pretty quick impact.
[18:08.310 --> 18:16.890]  One of the things that Brigitte discovered was that not only were they using these devices in weird places, but they were using them in total violation of federal policy.
[18:17.470 --> 18:25.650]  There was a 2002 directive from the Treasury Board that said that if you're using privacy-invasive tools, you need to do what's called a privacy impact assessment.
[18:26.030 --> 18:29.710]  To make sure that you're using these things in a necessary and proportionate way.
[18:30.730 --> 18:34.910]  She found out by asking that not a single agency had done this.
[18:36.290 --> 18:37.830]  In the U.S., you have something similar.
[18:38.290 --> 18:45.730]  The E-Government Act came out also in 2002, and has similar requirements around privacy impact assessments in the U.S.
[18:46.990 --> 18:54.830]  If you're not familiar with the phrase, necessarily proportionate, refers to an EFF project from around 2013.
[18:55.550 --> 18:59.070]  The EFF and a number of NGOs around the world put together this report.
[18:59.070 --> 19:04.390]  Or a proposal called Unnecessary in Proportion on the Application of Human Rights in Communication Surveillance.
[19:06.830 --> 19:19.870]  And this reporting made such a big impact that within a week, a Standing Committee of Parliament, the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy, and Ethics, voted unanimously to hold a series of hearings on this situation.
[19:20.070 --> 19:25.890]  On the federal government's use of technological tools capable of extracting personal data from mobile devices and computers.
[19:29.710 --> 19:30.850]  This is kind of a big deal.
[19:31.010 --> 19:31.990]  The Liberals are in power.
[19:32.250 --> 19:34.590]  They're generally sort of center-left-ish.
[19:35.210 --> 19:37.490]  They've been in power for about 15 years in Canada.
[19:38.230 --> 19:43.570]  And it was understood that they would probably vote against it on this committee, that the three opposition parties would vote and get it through.
[19:43.910 --> 19:49.770]  Instead, they all voted unanimously to hold this set of hearings, which happened in February and March of this year.
[19:49.770 --> 19:51.450]  They invited me to come as their one expert.
[19:53.590 --> 19:59.390]  And they hauled in the heads of the 13 agencies to testify about why they use these tools, what they use them for.
[20:00.450 --> 20:02.830]  And the testimony was really pretty astonishing.
[20:05.330 --> 20:16.990]  Half of the agencies claim to only use mobile offensive devices in the case of administrative investigations, on their own staff.
[20:17.490 --> 20:19.110]  But they do it with their consent.
[20:19.410 --> 20:21.350]  Like it's not a big deal.
[20:21.590 --> 20:23.470]  And like somebody can actually consent.
[20:24.690 --> 20:29.290]  The other half with law enforcement powers said, well, yeah, we just use these with warrants.
[20:30.670 --> 20:33.910]  To which the members of the parliament said, well, that's kind of besides the point.
[20:34.790 --> 20:36.410]  Maybe you shouldn't be using them in the first place.
[20:40.150 --> 20:42.770]  So consent is a pretty interesting situation.
[20:44.490 --> 20:47.130]  These federal unions were livid.
[20:47.710 --> 20:57.650]  The idea that any employee, let alone a junior employee in the federal government, can give informed consent to having their cell phone searched in hugely invasive ways.
[21:00.130 --> 21:03.070]  The question of warrants wasn't really interrogated that much.
[21:03.670 --> 21:09.550]  And this is something I want to explore in the years to come, especially with MC catchers and with mobile offensive devices.
[21:09.790 --> 21:15.750]  The idea that maybe there are technologies that should just be off, that we shouldn't be able to use in the first place.
[21:15.850 --> 21:18.770]  It doesn't matter if you have a warrant, if you shouldn't be able to use the technology in the first place.
[21:18.770 --> 21:23.910]  If it's an unjust technology, then a warrant shouldn't matter.
[21:27.460 --> 21:34.380]  But also some big things coming out of the testimony.
[21:34.680 --> 21:39.040]  There are really no mechanisms around transparency or reporting within any of these agencies at all.
[21:40.280 --> 21:46.600]  Any federal government actor can order a mobile forensic device or any other surveillance tech through Shared Returns of Canada.
[21:47.600 --> 21:50.940]  There's no oversight, there's no vetting, there's no accountability of any sort.
[21:52.480 --> 22:01.020]  When they asked the agencies how often they used them, the head of the RCMP said, well, we used these, I think, 6,325 times last year.
[22:02.140 --> 22:09.360]  Where CBSA, the Canada Border Services Agency, who runs the Canadian border, had no fucking clue.
[22:10.600 --> 22:12.580]  They said, we use them a lot.
[22:14.700 --> 22:17.740]  And they were like, you have a week to tell us how many times you've used them.
[22:19.740 --> 22:25.680]  Just to give a little context, last year, 5 million people crossed into Canada over the Canadian border from the U.S.
[22:25.720 --> 22:26.020]  and elsewhere.
[22:28.660 --> 22:34.620]  So, if they use them a lot and there are 5 million people, who knows how many times they've used them and in legal situations.
[22:37.680 --> 22:38.900]  A couple other interesting nuggets.
[22:39.040 --> 22:45.460]  So yeah, Shared Services Canada, their president, a guy named Steve Jones, testified saying, well, I just buy stuff.
[22:45.620 --> 22:46.340]  I buy things.
[22:46.480 --> 22:47.300]  People ask me for things.
[22:47.300 --> 22:47.900]  I buy them.
[22:48.280 --> 22:49.540]  I don't care what they want.
[22:49.680 --> 22:50.480]  They send me orders.
[22:50.480 --> 22:51.240]  I buy stuff.
[22:51.240 --> 22:51.900]  And that's it.
[22:54.240 --> 22:56.660]  The Competition Bureau was also interesting.
[22:57.940 --> 23:05.600]  A guy who had been in the civil service for a long time said very matter-factly, well, you know, we've been using this tool since around 96.
[23:06.720 --> 23:08.660]  I had found contracts going back to 2010.
[23:08.680 --> 23:14.740]  So, it was mind-blowing to find out that they've been using mobile forensic devices since the mid-90s.
[23:19.150 --> 23:20.210]  Some interesting surprise.
[23:20.390 --> 23:20.810]  Outcomes.
[23:22.930 --> 23:36.290]  So, there's a mechanism that I didn't know about until one of the members of this committee came over to me after I testified and said, I just wanted to let you know that I filed an order paper notice, which is a parliamentary device where a member of parliament can ask the government to produce any information they want.
[23:37.510 --> 23:40.290]  And the government has to produce it within 45 days.
[23:40.650 --> 23:41.670]  There's no fucking around.
[23:41.790 --> 23:42.650]  They have to produce it.
[23:43.170 --> 23:49.150]  And so, he asked the government to produce a full inventory of mobile forensic devices within the entire federal apparatus.
[23:51.170 --> 23:56.570]  In March, the head of the Treasury Board testified also and said, you know what?
[23:56.850 --> 24:02.090]  After these hearings, we're going to be bringing in some big changes this summer so that our policies can't be ignored.
[24:02.410 --> 24:03.750]  This hasn't been rolled out yet.
[24:03.750 --> 24:05.970]  The committee hasn't written their report yet.
[24:06.510 --> 24:08.130]  But this should be happening.
[24:11.900 --> 24:13.480]  So, some next steps.
[24:15.960 --> 24:26.760]  The standing committee asked me to give them my written recommendation of what I think they should do to change the laws to make things work right, which was kind of amazing.
[24:27.940 --> 24:32.940]  In Canada, unlike the U.S., we have a federal privacy regulator, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.
[24:33.500 --> 24:37.480]  And then every province and territory in Canada also has their own privacy commissioner.
[24:37.920 --> 24:41.680]  But interestingly, the provincial ones, territorial ones, have judicial authority.
[24:41.840 --> 24:43.380]  They can fine people and companies.
[24:43.520 --> 24:44.320]  They can put people in jail.
[24:44.700 --> 24:46.440]  The federal one has no actual power.
[24:46.600 --> 24:49.700]  They can just recommend things and do research.
[24:49.760 --> 24:52.360]  And they've been asking for judicial power for years.
[24:52.360 --> 24:56.380]  They've been... and so I, you know, give them judicial authority.
[24:57.020 --> 24:59.000]  But also give them veto power over procurement.
[25:00.000 --> 25:10.800]  If people in government want to buy privacy-invasive technology, why not have the experts who regulate privacy be the ones who decide whether they should get the gear or not, instead of some dude who just buys stuff.
[25:13.040 --> 25:18.080]  But also propose that they do a retroactive accounting for and regulation of mobile forensic devices.
[25:18.240 --> 25:19.120]  These things are out there.
[25:19.340 --> 25:20.560]  You should know where they are.
[25:20.560 --> 25:22.140]  You should control how they're used.
[25:24.160 --> 25:28.740]  I also propose that they do a full inventory of all privacy-invasive technology within the government.
[25:29.460 --> 25:36.280]  There's all sorts of stuff they've been buying for decades that's completely unregulated, untracked, non-transparent.
[25:36.960 --> 25:40.460]  So see what's there and see how you can regulate it.
[25:41.060 --> 25:46.320]  And then finally, right now there's a big loophole around buying things.
[25:46.440 --> 25:50.100]  There's proactive disclosure, but only for contracts for $10,000 or more.
[25:50.100 --> 25:52.660]  But also demos don't show up.
[25:52.840 --> 25:58.080]  So Clearview AI made inroads in Canada into the RCMP because they offered free demos.
[25:58.500 --> 26:01.080]  Demos don't show up in paperwork anywhere.
[26:02.940 --> 26:07.700]  But also I propose that they improve and automate access to information and freedom of information.
[26:07.740 --> 26:10.780]  So that doesn't take months or years to get information out of the government.
[26:12.800 --> 26:23.780]  At the same time, last year, in 2023, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace put out a report documenting the use of spyware and mobile forensic devices in countries around the world.
[26:23.940 --> 26:26.780]  They have a live data set they can access through their website.
[26:27.460 --> 26:31.120]  I'm going to be contributing my Canadian data on an ongoing basis to the data set.
[26:31.300 --> 26:36.440]  Right now it just says that the RCMP has used spyware and admitted to using some sort of spyware.
[26:37.880 --> 26:39.840]  But there's nothing about mobile forensic devices.
[26:40.820 --> 26:43.220]  And this committee is going to be putting out their report in September.
[26:46.160 --> 26:52.140]  At the same time, we've built up an online archive of all of our FOI and access information documents.
[26:52.820 --> 26:54.880]  This is a big worry in building up this project.
[26:55.020 --> 26:57.240]  I consulted with some librarians at York University where I work.
[26:57.380 --> 27:01.220]  And they said, this is a great idea, but you might get phoked over by copyright.
[27:01.600 --> 27:06.160]  Because the crown, which is in, I guess, former England.
[27:07.180 --> 27:09.620]  We still have a queen or a king now.
[27:11.560 --> 27:12.360]  Crown copyright.
[27:13.620 --> 27:18.040]  They're not necessarily giving you the ability to or the right to distribute this stuff.
[27:18.220 --> 27:22.120]  They're giving you the documents, but they're not giving you the power to republish them.
[27:22.760 --> 27:29.120]  And then, about a year after that, the government announced out of nowhere, we're changing our policy.
[27:29.260 --> 27:30.700]  When we give you documents, you can do what you want.
[27:31.360 --> 27:32.920]  And so we're actually completely illegal.
[27:33.780 --> 27:35.480]  You can check it out if you want.
[27:35.600 --> 27:37.980]  Surveillance.glendon.yorku.ca is the website.
[27:38.800 --> 27:41.220]  Runs on Omeka and Elasticsearch.
[27:41.500 --> 27:44.400]  So all the documents are OCRed and TextSearchable.
[27:47.120 --> 27:50.900]  In the coming year, probably, we'll open it up to collect people's collections.
[27:50.900 --> 27:59.620]  Just like in the U.S., there are all sorts of random people that do access information and free of information work, and have their own random collections of similar stuff that's going to be useful.
[28:00.760 --> 28:06.840]  And so we'll open up a call for contributions for people to submit their collections of ATIs and FOIs.
[28:08.240 --> 28:14.400]  One of the nice things about the EFF's Atlas of Surveillance is they have a really nice geographical interface.
[28:14.580 --> 28:15.720]  They run it on ArcGIS.
[28:16.640 --> 28:19.180]  I met with them in figuring out what to use for this.
[28:19.320 --> 28:21.160]  They warned me, don't use ArcGIS.
[28:21.280 --> 28:21.880]  It's way too heavy.
[28:23.020 --> 28:24.660]  I had experience with Omeka already.
[28:25.020 --> 28:27.120]  Omeka has a thing called Neatline.
[28:27.480 --> 28:34.200]  If anybody's worked with Omeka, really great open-source archival software, open-source, and built by the people behind Zotero.
[28:35.420 --> 28:39.000]  Neatline is basically a geographical interface that snaps into Omeka.
[28:39.000 --> 28:49.580]  So we can give you the ability to drill down to what documents are there, documenting the use or the location of various surveillance technologies across the country.
[28:50.580 --> 28:53.120]  And finally, grok it all and make it all available.
[28:56.430 --> 28:58.710]  Eventually, maybe we need a World Atlas of Surveillance.
[28:59.790 --> 29:03.010]  If any of you are also in academia, there's a group called the Surveillance Studies Network.
[29:03.390 --> 29:05.730]  It's largely European but branching out a lot more.
[29:05.850 --> 29:13.230]  I was at a conference of theirs in Slovenia in May, where they have some funding to bring in colleagues from Africa and the Middle East and Latin America.
[29:13.490 --> 29:17.450]  There's a lot of amazing similar research happening throughout Latin America and in Africa.
[29:18.130 --> 29:23.310]  So it would be really interesting and useful to take advantage of the fact that this is a global phenomenon.
[29:24.190 --> 29:25.470]  Governments cooperate on surveillance.
[29:26.190 --> 29:30.110]  Activists should cooperate more on counter-surveillance or anti-surveillance.
[29:32.590 --> 29:37.630]  And finally, some lessons that I think can be used practically in the U.S.
[29:37.630 --> 29:38.010]  and elsewhere.
[29:38.010 --> 29:39.970]  Know your privacy impact assessments.
[29:40.530 --> 29:44.150]  So these privacy PIAs exist in the U.S.
[29:44.330 --> 29:50.390]  There are laws around the use of privacy-invasive technologies here that are probably not being in hereby.
[29:51.170 --> 29:55.450]  And pointing those things out to certain members of Congress might be useful.
[29:56.750 --> 29:59.050]  There are some journalists that government can't ignore.
[29:59.290 --> 30:00.930]  Government can't ignore activists.
[30:01.130 --> 30:02.510]  They can ignore academics.
[30:02.510 --> 30:06.410]  But there are some journalists who they cannot not respond to.
[30:06.910 --> 30:20.690]  And if those people are, I guess, easy to work with or willing to go pretty deep in criticism of the government, then things can go...
[30:20.690 --> 30:23.270]  Yeah, you can get access to information you might not have otherwise.
[30:24.070 --> 30:26.130]  Public service unions also can't be ignored.
[30:26.270 --> 30:28.050]  So the unions testified the same day I did.
[30:28.250 --> 30:29.350]  They were livid.
[30:29.510 --> 30:30.650]  And they're quite powerful.
[30:31.830 --> 30:36.010]  Our governments employ hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people.
[30:36.790 --> 30:39.390]  And who are all generally highly unionized.
[30:40.010 --> 30:46.150]  And so if government is illegally spying on their own employees, it creates a lot of friction.
[30:46.910 --> 30:56.270]  In this case, one of the big points was that there's actually a federal government policy on using your work phone for personal business.
[30:56.450 --> 30:59.050]  They permit it as long as it doesn't impede your work.
[30:59.430 --> 31:04.130]  And so on one hand, their employer is saying, feel free to use your work phone.
[31:04.830 --> 31:06.950]  And then on the other hand, they're saying, use your work phone.
[31:06.950 --> 31:10.290]  But by the way, we're going to hack it and get access to your entire life.
[31:13.350 --> 31:16.090]  You're all experts, but lawmakers are not.
[31:16.290 --> 31:18.150]  Lawmakers usually don't know...
[31:18.610 --> 31:21.530]  They're not experts in these technologies at all.
[31:21.890 --> 31:24.350]  They look to people like us to find out about them.
[31:25.770 --> 31:31.850]  So when you get involved in activism around regulating tools like this, just tell them what reality is.
[31:31.930 --> 31:32.870]  Don't be an asshole about it.
[31:33.990 --> 31:35.950]  Educate them like you would any other member of the public.
[31:36.670 --> 31:39.430]  But also know that they don't necessarily know what they're talking about.
[31:40.250 --> 31:41.890]  And that they also know that.
[31:42.130 --> 31:46.810]  They look to people with expertise to give them the knowledge they need to govern.
[31:48.670 --> 31:50.230]  Don't take civil society for granted.
[31:50.630 --> 31:52.650]  There's amazing civil society in the U.S.
[31:53.050 --> 31:54.470]  There's really none in Canada.
[31:55.490 --> 31:57.470]  Which makes me want to do this work even more.
[31:58.370 --> 32:00.770]  And don't be afraid to call bullshit in a crowded room.
[32:01.830 --> 32:04.690]  Testifying to a congressional or parliamentary committee can be really weird.
[32:04.690 --> 32:11.870]  I found myself sort of in the sort of nexus of political sniping between multiple political parties.
[32:12.210 --> 32:20.450]  Who would ask me questions that would start with like a three minute accusation of the other party.
[32:21.290 --> 32:25.590]  To the point where I had to put them in line and say no, privacy is a fundamental human right.
[32:25.770 --> 32:27.070]  We're not arguing about this shit.
[32:27.070 --> 32:30.650]  We're having a conversation about regulating our privacy.
[32:31.270 --> 32:31.470]  Stop.
[32:31.970 --> 32:34.170]  Like sniping at each other through me.
[32:36.770 --> 32:40.990]  But also I found myself being attacked by some of the members of the party that's in power.
[32:42.270 --> 32:47.690]  There was one that came at me and said, you know, it's illegal to lie to this committee.
[32:47.810 --> 32:49.950]  When you testify here, it's actually if you've taken an oath in court.
[32:50.570 --> 32:56.030]  And so are you telling us seriously that all the civil servants that have come before you and testified to us are lying?
[32:56.530 --> 32:58.430]  I said, I have not said that.
[32:58.750 --> 33:01.670]  But what I have said is that I'm a researcher who relies on evidence.
[33:02.150 --> 33:04.810]  And nobody who's come to this committee has actually given you anything.
[33:05.650 --> 33:07.610]  They've said things, but they haven't given you anything.
[33:07.610 --> 33:11.330]  And so I'm not going to make judgments based on, like, nothing.
[33:15.270 --> 33:17.630]  If you want to collaborate, I'm all up for it.
[33:17.970 --> 33:20.330]  The whole project is completely open-source.
[33:21.090 --> 33:23.170]  My email, elight at yorku.ca.
[33:23.630 --> 33:27.570]  I'm also going to be changing jobs in January, moving to the University of Toronto's faculty information.
[33:27.810 --> 33:32.490]  So you can also get me on ProtonMail at Overseas with a zero at Proton.me.
[33:32.750 --> 33:36.750]  Or on Signal, the website again, surveillance.glendon.yorku.ca.
[33:38.310 --> 33:41.930]  And in light of this interesting situation where we have a lot of time to work with.
[33:42.650 --> 33:46.050]  For those of you who came in a little bit late, the session after this one has been canceled.
[33:46.570 --> 33:49.690]  And so HOPE told me that we can go way over if we want to.
[33:50.890 --> 33:54.130]  And so I wanted to open up a conversation.
[33:56.070 --> 33:57.790]  I don't think any of the sessions I've been to yet.
[33:58.270 --> 34:01.710]  There's been, I mean, some conversation, but we haven't gotten to know each other.
[34:02.090 --> 34:04.830]  So maybe if we can do a quick round of intros.
[34:05.150 --> 34:06.150]  What you're doing here.
[34:06.370 --> 34:06.970]  Who you are.
[34:08.190 --> 34:09.330]  Maybe why you came to this session.
[34:09.630 --> 34:10.810]  Or what you're hoping to get out of HOPE.
[34:12.510 --> 34:13.170]  Other than hope.
[34:15.750 --> 34:16.970]  And yeah, you know who I am.
[34:17.270 --> 34:18.250]  Maybe we can start with you.
[34:18.250 --> 34:19.170]  Yeah, that's fine.
[34:19.430 --> 34:20.470]  My name is Josh.
[34:21.030 --> 34:24.250]  I work, well, I'm right now I'm the security engineer for a bank.
[34:25.390 --> 34:29.610]  And I've always been interested in mobile surveillance and Celebrite.
[34:30.090 --> 34:32.210]  And also, of course, MC Catchers.
[34:32.210 --> 34:35.090]  And also, and the Polo Pegasus and its own thing.
[34:36.430 --> 34:39.350]  And whatnot for quite a few years now, so.
[34:42.850 --> 34:43.710]  I'm Devin.
[34:43.870 --> 34:44.710]  I'm retired.
[34:44.910 --> 34:46.850]  I used to work in finance with computers.
[34:47.630 --> 34:53.170]  I'm here because I'm interested in, you know, governance and government overreach.
[34:53.330 --> 34:56.890]  And it started out to be a very uplifting talk.
[34:57.670 --> 35:07.850]  Until you got to the part about the experts, since in this country the Supreme Court has decided to take things out of the hands of the experts and put them into the courts.
[35:10.630 --> 35:11.650]  Yes, there is that.
[35:16.950 --> 35:18.970]  I don't have much to say, particularly.
[35:19.610 --> 35:20.190]  All women, please.
[35:22.030 --> 35:26.370]  Should I record or should I turn off the speakers and you think it's more private?
[35:26.610 --> 35:27.490]  What do people think?
[35:28.450 --> 35:30.170]  Would you like to maybe...
[35:30.170 --> 35:30.730]  Yeah.
[35:30.730 --> 35:31.450]  It doesn't need to be...
[35:32.050 --> 35:32.310]  Yeah.
[35:32.490 --> 35:33.530]  We can talk about it.
[35:33.630 --> 35:33.830]  Yeah.
[35:33.950 --> 35:34.490]  If anyone...
[35:35.310 --> 35:35.830]  Yeah.
[35:36.430 --> 35:40.670]  And, of course, you absolutely reserve the right to remain anonymous.
[35:41.350 --> 35:41.470]  Yeah.
[35:47.090 --> 35:47.610]  Hi.
[35:47.850 --> 35:48.550]  I'm Jack.
[35:48.950 --> 35:51.470]  I've done some activist stuff a long time ago.
[35:52.650 --> 35:54.130]  I do software stuff.
[35:55.970 --> 36:05.870]  Sometimes I testified for one of my local cities that was trying to regulate stingray and I guess, at one point, it definitely is a weird time.
[36:10.190 --> 36:11.610]  The guy is just behind Josh.
[36:12.270 --> 36:12.830]  Oh, me?
[36:13.010 --> 36:13.090]  Yeah.
[36:13.370 --> 36:13.890]  Oh, hey.
[36:14.010 --> 36:14.450]  I'm Chuck.
[36:15.170 --> 36:16.970]  I run a little tech company.
[36:17.550 --> 36:20.790]  So the reason I came to this talk is because you're talking about Canada.
[36:20.790 --> 36:25.770]  I'm originally from India and I'm kind of curious about...
[36:25.770 --> 36:31.650]  So the U.S. has a very particular culture with regard to freedom, turbulence, stuff like that.
[36:31.650 --> 36:39.130]  But a lot of Western-style democracies, Canada, New Zealand, the UK maybe, they're actually...
[36:39.130 --> 36:40.070]  They're quite different.
[36:40.250 --> 36:50.690]  So even though there is a tradition of transparency or democracy, but the attitude is actually pretty different.
[36:52.150 --> 36:57.550]  And in many ways, there's a sort of divergence between the U.S. and Western-style democracies.
[36:57.930 --> 36:59.990]  That's why I was interested in this talk.
[37:00.170 --> 37:01.310]  I do have a question for you.
[37:01.410 --> 37:01.550]  Sure.
[37:01.790 --> 37:02.750]  So you said...
[37:02.750 --> 37:04.390]  Something that you said was really...
[37:04.390 --> 37:05.830]  That really stood out starkly for me.
[37:05.870 --> 37:07.510]  You said there's no civil society in Canada.
[37:08.150 --> 37:10.070]  And I kind of feel like that about India.
[37:10.590 --> 37:14.570]  But I was curious as to why you feel that way about Canada, you know, closely.
[37:14.570 --> 37:19.730]  I mean, there is civil society, but not working on this area at all.
[37:20.210 --> 37:21.330]  That's what I want to know.
[37:21.590 --> 37:22.810]  What do you think that is?
[37:22.910 --> 37:24.250]  There are organizations, I think.
[37:25.010 --> 37:28.090]  And this, I'm afraid to mention this during the talk, but a lot of...
[37:28.690 --> 37:32.390]  Historically, a lot of Canadian civil society groups get their funding from the government.
[37:33.610 --> 37:44.690]  And I realized through my PhD, doing research for people looking at this, I realized, like, looking at the history of community organizing since, like, the 1940s in Canada, that people only get so radical.
[37:46.910 --> 37:58.230]  And as somebody who's been arrested and beaten by cops, it's like, as long as I can go and get free healthcare after you beat me, then it takes the edge off.
[38:04.970 --> 38:10.430]  But yeah, I mean, a bit like India, there are groups that do all sorts of other wonderful work.
[38:10.790 --> 38:12.670]  There's really nobody that does this sort of work.
[38:14.570 --> 38:18.990]  If I make, is that because of a lack of interest or a lack of awareness?
[38:18.990 --> 38:29.530]  Or do people feel that because the state is more cohesive or, you know, there's not a separation between the federal government and the state government.
[38:29.850 --> 38:32.370]  So do people feel more in control?
[38:33.090 --> 38:34.590]  Does that make sense to that?
[38:35.050 --> 38:36.470]  Which one do you think it is?
[38:37.770 --> 38:39.930]  I don't think they feel more in control.
[38:40.090 --> 38:41.230]  I feel more taken care of.
[38:41.730 --> 38:46.590]  There's a much more innate trust in the state to take care of you.
[38:46.590 --> 38:46.930]  Right.
[38:48.670 --> 38:50.950]  Where there's not that same sort of thing here.
[38:51.130 --> 38:55.530]  And so in the U.S., you know, organizations have been around for over a hundred years taking care of people.
[38:58.510 --> 39:02.990]  And I think there may be disinterest, there is interest, but there's also the same amount of funding.
[39:03.210 --> 39:05.870]  So like the foundation infrastructure in the U.S. is enormous.
[39:06.570 --> 39:09.050]  The amount of money that goes into organizing the U.S. is enormous.
[39:09.350 --> 39:11.310]  In Canada, that infrastructure isn't there.
[39:12.030 --> 39:12.650]  Yeah.
[39:18.050 --> 39:20.050]  To the point, I'm Larry.
[39:22.610 --> 39:26.030]  I'm a climate migrant, I would classify myself.
[39:26.350 --> 39:29.930]  I really like my cold weather, man.
[39:30.150 --> 39:31.270]  So I go up there a lot.
[39:32.950 --> 39:36.030]  I just actually came straight here from there.
[39:39.270 --> 39:47.230]  And just in a, you know, disorganized, anecdotal, observational way, I've noticed what you're talking about.
[39:48.530 --> 39:51.050]  Because, yeah, like there is civil society, right?
[39:51.150 --> 39:52.950]  But like people aren't concerned about this.
[39:52.950 --> 40:01.750]  And my anecdotal evidence for that would be, I live like five minutes from the parliament building in Quebec.
[40:03.110 --> 40:08.630]  And there's not a fucking UPS store or anything for me to take packages at.
[40:09.150 --> 40:12.850]  Like, I can't, I can't make fucking photocopies.
[40:12.950 --> 40:15.750]  I've got to drive across town to Bureau on Gross, you know?
[40:15.750 --> 40:28.250]  Like, it's just crazy to me that like, there's no sort of, like, where I live in the U.S., you know, and a lot of people say like, you know, the U.S.
[40:28.370 --> 40:36.030]  has this like uniquely, like, like, it has this paranoia about the government that's kind of unique to it.
[40:36.030 --> 40:40.690]  Especially within that sort of whatever the U.K.
[40:41.090 --> 40:43.330]  has engendered, you know?
[40:46.770 --> 40:51.390]  But I think, you know, to your point about like, I think it's sort of a two-way street.
[40:51.590 --> 40:55.010]  Like, like, I pay a lot of freaking taxes there, right?
[40:55.290 --> 40:57.550]  But like, dude, they keep my roads plowed.
[40:57.690 --> 41:01.410]  They take care of, like, they're, you know, my power has never gone out.
[41:01.610 --> 41:02.350]  You know, stuff like this.
[41:02.350 --> 41:06.450]  Where I live in Maryland is a freaking war zone.
[41:06.550 --> 41:08.410]  I mean, I'm not even exaggerating, you know?
[41:08.630 --> 41:19.010]  I had, part of how I got into the, you know, the phone stuff was I ran a growth store, a hydroponic growth store, and I'd see all these drug dealers coming in that have no idea what the hell they're doing.
[41:19.510 --> 41:24.730]  And, you know, I'd help them, like, learn how to use signal and stuff like that, right?
[41:25.190 --> 41:31.550]  And, like, my point about that is, like, you know, my store also got shot up a couple times.
[41:31.550 --> 41:35.090]  You know, and that would never happen in Canada.
[41:35.310 --> 41:42.650]  And I feel like people know that on some, maybe, subconscious level, and they're less willing to contest.
[41:42.830 --> 41:44.070]  They don't want to rock the boat.
[41:45.750 --> 41:49.750]  And so, yeah, I can't make photocopies in freaking Quebec City.
[41:49.750 --> 41:50.130]  I'm just kidding.
[41:54.370 --> 41:54.930]  Okay.
[41:55.350 --> 41:55.610]  I'm Arno.
[41:56.030 --> 42:00.150]  I work for an organization that a lot of people have been harmed by AI.
[42:02.940 --> 42:12.880]  I can't do this stuff, because I'm generally interested in how other countries have developed protections for those who have been harmed by technology, and see what we can do.
[42:13.760 --> 42:14.320]  Cool.
[42:15.060 --> 42:15.480]  Thanks.
[42:16.820 --> 42:17.800]  Yeah, I'm Melissa.
[42:18.160 --> 42:18.620]  I am.
[42:18.740 --> 42:20.340]  I'm Canadian, so I have to represent.
[42:23.820 --> 42:31.440]  But, yeah, I'm also, I've done some activist things and being relatively publicly within my own spaces in, like, cybersecurity as a field.
[42:31.440 --> 42:33.920]  I've been asked a lot, like, what should I do?
[42:34.440 --> 42:36.660]  I've had a couple of people who, like, I think my phone's hacked.
[42:36.780 --> 42:37.400]  What should I do?
[42:37.400 --> 42:39.560]  And, like, I don't know.
[42:39.760 --> 42:45.960]  I feel like I'm kind of lazy with it, because I'm like, you're not going to do all the things you need to actually be secure.
[42:46.320 --> 42:50.720]  Like, you know, you signal through the bare minimum, and, like, if the NSA wants to get you, they will.
[42:50.900 --> 42:52.520]  Like, that's kind of where I'm at.
[42:52.860 --> 42:58.760]  So, I didn't know too much about Canadian surveillance, and I was kind of like, it's probably mostly okay.
[43:02.080 --> 43:02.760]  I don't know.
[43:03.080 --> 43:07.860]  The fact that the boarder doesn't even know how many phones they've hacked is concerning.
[43:08.120 --> 43:10.820]  I think they know, they just wanted to tell.
[43:11.100 --> 43:11.300]  Yeah.
[43:11.780 --> 43:16.440]  And they thought they could get it by MPs, and they were having none of it.
[43:17.280 --> 43:17.760]  That's good.
[43:17.920 --> 43:23.940]  And it was interesting to see how the hearings progressed, because in the beginning, the MPs were fairly hands-off.
[43:24.500 --> 43:31.940]  And then by, like, the second or third session, they would just be like, can you please just do the fucking PIAs?
[43:32.560 --> 43:38.020]  Like, if you idiots hadn't just, like, dealt with the bureaucracy, we wouldn't be here today.
[43:38.140 --> 43:41.720]  It was like, well, this is wonderful, because obviously we're here today, and something's being done.
[43:42.400 --> 43:42.840]  Yeah.
[43:43.380 --> 43:43.600]  Okay.
[43:45.740 --> 43:46.880]  Hi, I'm Zoe.
[43:47.220 --> 43:48.220]  I'm also Canadian.
[43:48.500 --> 43:49.000]  I'm from Toronto.
[43:49.560 --> 43:53.240]  I'm a student at the University of Toronto, so welcome to the faculty.
[43:55.300 --> 43:56.980]  Look forward to seeing you on campus.
[43:57.920 --> 44:10.640]  I came to this talk because I am very interested in surveillance in Canada in particular, and I've worked for Professor Timothy Sale on the Canada Declassified website, if you know what that is.
[44:10.720 --> 44:16.800]  It's, like, a bunch of compiled declassified documents that he's requested through, like, ATIP and fourth mob and stuff.
[44:18.140 --> 44:18.520]  I should talk to them.
[44:18.520 --> 44:26.360]  And so I've worked on that, and I also, I work at the Citizen Lab now, and so we do some work on surveillance and, like, spyware and stuff.
[44:27.220 --> 44:34.440]  And you're right that we don't focus overly on Canada that much, except maybe, like, Kate and Neil, I guess.
[44:34.660 --> 44:36.220]  I don't know if you, like, know any of these people.
[44:36.480 --> 44:37.740]  I know their work, but I don't know them.
[44:37.740 --> 44:38.040]  Yeah.
[44:38.280 --> 44:38.640]  Yeah.
[44:38.920 --> 44:42.720]  And, yeah, so I was just, like, interested in this talk because of that reason.
[44:43.000 --> 44:48.120]  And then also I've done, I've tried to do some of my own, like, security research and requesting things from the government.
[44:48.280 --> 44:49.000]  It's very difficult.
[44:49.360 --> 44:50.780]  Like, they make it so hard.
[44:52.000 --> 44:58.960]  And, like, the fact that you need to, like, tell them who you are to, like, do a request sometimes is also, like, it makes you not want to do it.
[45:00.120 --> 45:04.440]  You can also give them a thick name and an email address that's not actually yours.
[45:04.440 --> 45:06.760]  Yeah, yeah, that's what I've done, actually.
[45:07.320 --> 45:09.320]  Is that, is that technically illegal?
[45:10.380 --> 45:11.440]  It might be.
[45:12.000 --> 45:13.780]  I mean, I've, uh...
[45:13.780 --> 45:18.860]  No, I'm just saying, like, as a rule of thumb, I lie to corporations, but I tell the truth to the government.
[45:20.240 --> 45:20.640]  Yeah.
[45:21.560 --> 45:23.980]  Yeah, anyway, so I thought your talk was very, very cool.
[45:24.200 --> 45:26.160]  It's actually my favorite so far that I've been to.
[45:27.600 --> 45:31.160]  But, yeah, probably just because it's already stuff that I'm very interested in.
[45:31.320 --> 45:32.920]  But I do have a question.
[45:32.920 --> 45:39.060]  So, you said that, um, federal, getting information from the federal government was easier because of, like, the money thing.
[45:39.260 --> 45:52.100]  But I was also wondering, like, if you don't necessarily know if, what level of surveillance is happening at in the government, like, do you just file, like, a request for information from, like, any level or something?
[45:52.100 --> 45:55.920]  Because, like, I've been to, like, just as an example, some protests and things.
[45:56.020 --> 46:01.520]  And there was, like, this surveillance vehicle that was following protesters and it was a camera on it.
[46:01.560 --> 46:01.920]  In Toronto?
[46:02.720 --> 46:03.660]  Yeah, in Toronto.
[46:04.420 --> 46:04.460]  Yeah, in Toronto.
[46:04.460 --> 46:09.280]  And even, like, following student protesters and just, like, I'm concerned for friends.
[46:10.340 --> 46:14.640]  And I was just, like, wondering how do I find out which agencies are running that?
[46:14.680 --> 46:21.820]  Because I went on this, like, wild goose chase trying to track down the logo on the camera on top of the vehicle to see which...
[46:21.820 --> 46:22.660]  Did you get the license plate?
[46:22.660 --> 46:23.380]  Which...
[46:23.380 --> 46:24.580]  I did get the license plate.
[46:24.740 --> 46:25.160]  Do you want...
[46:25.160 --> 46:26.040]  Yes, we should talk.
[46:26.340 --> 46:26.820]  Yeah, we should.
[46:26.820 --> 46:26.860]  Okay.
[46:26.860 --> 46:29.440]  Because I've been looking into hunting down similar vehicles.
[46:29.760 --> 46:30.900]  Like, I really...
[46:30.900 --> 46:32.580]  I was talking with one of my...
[46:32.580 --> 46:38.800]  Now, a former PhD student who's teaching at NYU about, can we figure out, like, radio...
[46:40.100 --> 46:40.900]  Sort of...
[46:40.900 --> 46:43.520]  Radio signatures of MC catchers.
[46:43.960 --> 46:45.980]  Like, of the hardware devices.
[46:46.380 --> 46:46.540]  Yeah.
[46:46.540 --> 46:47.320]  Is there a way that we can...
[46:47.320 --> 46:48.400]  Like, what's in the vehicle?
[46:48.520 --> 46:53.880]  You can see, like, on the outside, they at least have one camera with probably facial recognition technology in it.
[46:53.980 --> 46:55.920]  But what else have they got in there?
[46:56.360 --> 46:57.380]  And, like, what else...
[46:57.380 --> 46:59.460]  What other information they're harvesting from people?
[46:59.600 --> 47:05.440]  And I'm also curious if you've done any research into the information that universities take about their students.
[47:06.360 --> 47:10.560]  Because I know for a fact that the University of Toronto has so much information on us.
[47:10.620 --> 47:11.780]  They monitor social media.
[47:11.960 --> 47:13.140]  They have all these cameras everywhere.
[47:13.500 --> 47:16.400]  They do a lot of stuff that feels very invasive.
[47:16.400 --> 47:18.140]  And I feel like no one's looking into that.
[47:18.300 --> 47:19.380]  I haven't.
[47:19.820 --> 47:20.060]  Yeah.
[47:20.060 --> 47:22.040]  I know EFF has done some stuff in the U.S.
[47:23.440 --> 47:30.880]  At York, they did a community consultation a couple years ago on security on campus.
[47:31.100 --> 47:34.220]  And they couldn't even tell me what their agreement was with the Toronto police.
[47:37.380 --> 47:38.840]  Like, 56,000 students here.
[47:38.900 --> 47:42.020]  You must have an agreement with the local police about when they come on campus.
[47:42.060 --> 47:42.660]  And they didn't.
[47:42.660 --> 47:43.660]  Yeah.
[47:43.880 --> 47:49.160]  Well, the Toronto police actually put up cameras on campus during the Palestine encampment.
[47:49.280 --> 47:49.440]  Really?
[47:49.840 --> 47:50.660]  And they put...
[47:50.660 --> 47:56.160]  They literally put up cameras and microphones and these other weird boxes that we could not figure out what they were.
[47:57.060 --> 47:57.580]  So...
[47:57.580 --> 47:58.500]  I mean, pictures.
[47:58.720 --> 47:59.220]  There are pictures.
[47:59.440 --> 48:00.820]  What did the boxes look like?
[48:00.960 --> 48:01.700]  They were like...
[48:01.700 --> 48:07.240]  They looked sort of like a Wi-Fi router looks, but they looked kind of off.
[48:07.240 --> 48:08.980]  And we weren't sure if they were like...
[48:08.980 --> 48:13.580]  Because maybe like the cameras and microphones need to be on their own, like Wi-Fi network or something.
[48:13.720 --> 48:15.840]  So that was like a hypothesis that was floating around.
[48:15.900 --> 48:18.080]  But we really don't know what was happening there.
[48:18.180 --> 48:20.340]  And they were put there by Toronto police, not the university.
[48:20.620 --> 48:25.220]  But the university did hire a bunch of private security as well during the encampment to like watch the students.
[48:26.620 --> 48:27.600]  Yes, we should talk.
[48:31.300 --> 48:32.320]  Hi, I'm Nicola.
[48:34.480 --> 48:36.720]  I'm from Hamilton, which is in Canada.
[48:37.820 --> 48:39.500]  I feel like I recognize you from somewhere.
[48:40.000 --> 48:41.180]  You also feel like it's me.
[48:41.840 --> 48:44.300]  Anyway, I'm from Hamilton.
[48:44.320 --> 48:51.700]  I just moved to the U.S. a year ago to study my master's degree in tech policy at an elite tech school here.
[48:52.140 --> 48:56.060]  And I found it very hard to find funding for...
[48:56.060 --> 48:58.180]  Because I was interested in studying repression of activists.
[48:58.880 --> 49:03.280]  And it's very hard to find funding that was not like the DOB, big tech.
[49:03.520 --> 49:04.920]  My current research is funded by MISA.
[49:07.720 --> 49:22.120]  And as much as there's less civil society in Canada, I also feel like even the research that I think is trying to reform social media and stuff here is also funded by billionaires who are trying to buy TikTok.
[49:22.120 --> 49:28.400]  Like, this is the pattern that I see and I don't think it's necessarily better.
[49:29.940 --> 49:31.600]  I was just surprised by these facts.
[49:32.660 --> 49:33.940]  It is a different scene.
[49:34.380 --> 49:35.740]  Thank you for commenting on that.
[49:38.860 --> 49:39.340]  Thanks.
[49:39.860 --> 49:41.020]  Hi, I'm Paul.
[49:43.240 --> 49:46.880]  I'm very interested in security and surveillance and all those things.
[49:46.880 --> 49:55.640]  So, I'm a big supporter of EFF and Institute for Justice, which does a lot of work about civil forfeiture and things like that.
[49:56.200 --> 50:00.580]  If you don't have a group pushing back, these things just become the rules.
[50:01.000 --> 50:03.280]  So, it's good to see you guys are pushing back.
[50:03.440 --> 50:05.480]  Because without it, they just do what they want.
[50:06.620 --> 50:09.540]  I invest in a number of security companies and EPN companies.
[50:09.920 --> 50:17.800]  And, you know, my view is surveillance hits the weakest, the lowest in society who cannot speak up for themselves.
[50:18.500 --> 50:23.580]  And so, they need the support of these organizations that hold people in account.
[50:23.880 --> 50:27.080]  And we need tools readily available to the people for that.
[50:28.280 --> 50:31.340]  You know, it's a terrible problem.
[50:31.460 --> 50:32.200]  It just gets worse.
[50:34.460 --> 50:36.360]  And we need to do what we can to them.
[50:36.480 --> 50:37.200]  So, that's my support.
[50:37.400 --> 50:38.800]  It's invested in those kind of companies.
[50:39.020 --> 50:42.420]  And in supporting, highly supporting EFF.
[50:42.780 --> 50:45.020]  It's super justice in a number of companies that are like that.
[50:46.240 --> 50:46.660]  Thanks.
[50:49.180 --> 50:50.780]  I'm going to escape the next box.
[50:52.520 --> 50:53.920]  We have some bad news for you.
[50:53.920 --> 50:55.260]  The talk at 8 o'clock?
[50:56.060 --> 50:56.840]  The talk at 8?
[50:57.080 --> 50:57.320]  Yeah.
[50:57.560 --> 50:58.200]  That was canceled.
[50:58.600 --> 50:59.140]  It was?
[50:59.260 --> 50:59.300]  Yeah.
[50:59.340 --> 51:00.520]  It was the one with JetBlue, wasn't it?
[51:00.920 --> 51:02.060]  I think it was.
[51:02.420 --> 51:03.080]  Yeah, I did actually.
[51:03.700 --> 51:05.020]  I blame the number for JetBlue.
[51:05.520 --> 51:07.460]  But, some of these guys speak the first day.
[51:08.480 --> 51:09.620]  They're giving two talks.
[51:09.740 --> 51:10.160]  The cloud.
[51:10.480 --> 51:10.680]  Yeah.
[51:11.080 --> 51:11.560]  Securing them.
[51:11.980 --> 51:13.160]  The cloud or something.
[51:15.620 --> 51:16.500]  Yeah, sure.
[51:19.820 --> 51:20.540]  You were here though.
[51:21.320 --> 51:21.680]  With that?
[51:21.800 --> 51:22.640]  And you were here.
[51:22.640 --> 51:23.120]  The whole time.
[51:23.180 --> 51:24.420]  I came in like five minutes late.
[51:24.540 --> 51:25.140]  So, I've had before.
[51:25.380 --> 51:26.100]  Hi, everybody.
[51:26.260 --> 51:26.760]  I'm Allison.
[51:28.460 --> 51:30.220]  I run Library Freedom Project.
[51:30.360 --> 51:31.340]  I gave a talk earlier today.
[51:31.600 --> 51:32.000]  I think it was good.
[51:33.480 --> 51:34.580]  We're U.S.-based.
[51:34.980 --> 51:39.340]  We do a lot of work educating the public about surveillance and policy and stuff like that.
[51:39.880 --> 51:42.100]  But, I have a lot of members who are in Canada.
[51:42.100 --> 51:44.780]  And so, like, understanding the Canadian conduct is important.
[51:45.040 --> 51:47.680]  And also, Evan and I have just connected about our work already.
[51:47.960 --> 51:55.220]  And since he's moving to the iSchool at Toronto, that's like literally where the library, the Master of Library Science program is.
[51:55.360 --> 51:58.120]  So, I feel like, you know, I want to like see what's going on.
[51:58.300 --> 51:59.200]  So, anyway, that's why I'm here.
[51:59.300 --> 51:59.420]  Hi.
[51:59.960 --> 52:03.020]  And I'm super excited to be part of training teacher librarians.
[52:03.480 --> 52:03.680]  Yeah.
[52:03.840 --> 52:04.100]  Hell yeah.
[52:05.120 --> 52:05.500]  Thank you.
[52:08.440 --> 52:09.080]  Hey, guys.
[52:09.220 --> 52:10.780]  I was here for the 8 o'clock coffee got canceled.
[52:11.940 --> 52:12.320]  Damn.
[52:13.600 --> 52:14.060]  Yeah.
[52:14.240 --> 52:18.000]  But we're having a conversation and a discussion about surveillance.
[52:18.220 --> 52:19.360]  So, you're totally welcome to join us.
[52:19.800 --> 52:20.120]  Thanks.
[52:20.960 --> 52:21.900]  We're not going to surveil.
[52:22.000 --> 52:23.100]  Everybody gets to surveil.
[52:24.880 --> 52:26.900]  Or to take part.
[52:27.420 --> 52:27.480]  Yeah.
[52:31.440 --> 52:33.700]  So, I can inject.
[52:34.660 --> 52:34.740]  Yeah.
[52:37.120 --> 52:38.100]  I'm not important.
[52:38.260 --> 52:43.500]  But I was at the 2000 Computers Freedom and Privacy 2000 in Toronto.
[52:44.420 --> 52:47.320]  And there was a bunch of NSA people there, interestingly.
[52:48.540 --> 52:50.720]  CFP is less active than it used to be.
[52:50.940 --> 52:51.980]  Do you know about it?
[52:52.100 --> 52:52.300]  No.
[52:52.640 --> 52:52.800]  Okay.
[52:52.880 --> 52:56.620]  So, it was the big conference on these topics back in the 90s, CFP.
[52:57.600 --> 52:59.320]  Or computers Freedom and Privacy.
[52:59.520 --> 53:01.320]  And all the big shots would show up.
[53:01.420 --> 53:03.240]  Bill Zimmerman who invented PPP.
[53:03.600 --> 53:03.840]  Blah, blah, blah.
[53:04.120 --> 53:05.300]  And so, it was kind of fun.
[53:05.420 --> 53:06.800]  Because I was a nobody.
[53:06.980 --> 53:08.260]  Just a kid from MIT.
[53:08.860 --> 53:10.860]  And you'd see these super famous people.
[53:11.060 --> 53:14.680]  And Zimmerman would say, I think it was maybe even at the Toronto Conference in 2000.
[53:15.440 --> 53:17.900]  We need a privacy commissioner in the USA.
[53:18.600 --> 53:18.920]  Right?
[53:19.120 --> 53:21.780]  And this was the guy who was like the symbol of digital privacy.
[53:22.000 --> 53:22.160]  Right?
[53:22.220 --> 53:23.020]  Of course, it didn't happen.
[53:23.320 --> 53:25.700]  But everyone's like, whoa, you're just the geek.
[53:25.820 --> 53:26.460]  What are you talking about?
[53:26.480 --> 53:27.880]  How are you getting involved in policy?
[53:27.880 --> 53:30.480]  But it was just a silly anecdote.
[53:30.720 --> 53:32.620]  These NSA guys had us in a room.
[53:32.700 --> 53:33.720]  Well, we went to their room.
[53:34.000 --> 53:34.300]  I'm kidding.
[53:35.720 --> 53:36.580]  And it was funny.
[53:36.640 --> 53:37.620]  Why were they in Toronto?
[53:37.860 --> 53:37.960]  Right?
[53:38.840 --> 53:40.840]  And they were kind of like coy about it.
[53:40.840 --> 53:46.080]  But this was on future threats to chaos in the digital environment.
[53:46.360 --> 53:47.860]  And I think back to it now.
[53:48.600 --> 53:52.200]  Actually, we've run into a lot of shit in the 24 years since then.
[53:52.320 --> 53:54.980]  Maybe they were actually onto something.
[53:55.740 --> 53:57.860]  Like at the time, what do you guys thought?
[53:57.920 --> 53:59.060]  And they were very discreet.
[53:59.200 --> 53:59.820]  But it was interesting.
[54:01.880 --> 54:03.320]  Anyway, just anecdotes.
[54:03.420 --> 54:04.560]  Well, they are pretty tight.
[54:04.620 --> 54:07.180]  A couple other examples of the NSA in Canada.
[54:07.400 --> 54:09.160]  So, I grew up in South Jersey.
[54:09.160 --> 54:18.260]  And you probably all have some sorts of connections through neighbors with people who work in national security.
[54:18.420 --> 54:21.660]  So, there's this guy I grew up with who went on to work for the NSA.
[54:22.840 --> 54:34.680]  And I found this out through my mom, who was talking with his mom, who told my mom that this guy was at the NSA headquarters in Ottawa for two years.
[54:34.680 --> 54:36.340]  And I was like, what the fuck?
[54:37.840 --> 54:40.080]  There is no NSA headquarters in Ottawa.
[54:40.420 --> 54:43.500]  But he and his wife was a cryptographer in the NSA.
[54:43.660 --> 54:45.060]  He was doing something similar.
[54:45.360 --> 54:48.380]  And they were stationed in Ottawa for two years, including during the G8-G20.
[54:49.000 --> 54:50.420]  That was like when they landed.
[54:50.420 --> 54:52.500]  It was in preparation for the G8-G20.
[54:54.080 --> 55:00.860]  And then, the journalist that I mentioned earlier, she wrote this huge story in 2017, on indicators being used around Ottawa.
[55:02.280 --> 55:07.560]  She filed tons of access information requests that I got, and then read through thousands of pages.
[55:07.560 --> 55:14.640]  And you have these amazing email conversations between people in government after this news story breaks, about how they want to spin it.
[55:15.680 --> 55:29.920]  And so, I got these completely unredacted email chains between CSIS, our version of the NSA, and public safety Canada, the cops, the prime minister's office, talking about what's actually happened.
[55:30.060 --> 55:33.540]  Can anybody categorically deny that they had anything to do with it?
[55:33.680 --> 55:38.500]  And everybody except for CSIS categorically denies they had anything to do with it.
[55:38.500 --> 55:43.960]  And the head of CSIS says, well, I was just on the phone with the NSA, and we can't say we had nothing to do with it.
[55:47.220 --> 55:51.200]  So there's like still some tight connections between the NSA and CSIS.
[55:52.320 --> 55:54.840]  I mean, there are probably still people from the NSA working in Canada.
[55:55.020 --> 55:57.300]  Do you have that publicly documented?
[55:58.180 --> 56:01.560]  I have it in my cache of documents.
[56:02.020 --> 56:04.120]  But I haven't published about it yet.
[56:07.060 --> 56:07.500]  Yeah?
[56:08.080 --> 56:11.840]  Well, the NSA definitely still has a presence in like CSE.
[56:12.320 --> 56:18.340]  Because like there's like liaison officers that like go between the two agencies as like part of like five eyes exchange.
[56:18.540 --> 56:21.880]  And then also like the NSA agreement that leads all the way back to like 1950.
[56:22.840 --> 56:24.880]  And I like to study intelligence history.
[56:25.100 --> 56:28.640]  But even though like almost no one in Canada does, because like there's just no interest.
[56:29.200 --> 56:37.580]  And also because of our like ridiculous, the fact that we don't like declassify things after a certain amount of time has gone by in Canada.
[56:38.360 --> 56:41.640]  Everything just stays classified until someone requests it.
[56:41.900 --> 56:44.120]  So it's only after something has been requested.
[56:44.460 --> 56:54.420]  So one interesting project I was on at university was just trying to get documents from the Canadian government that are from like the 1950s that are still classified.
[56:55.400 --> 56:58.000]  even though they have no relevance to national security now.
[56:58.200 --> 57:02.960]  And then even once we get the documents, which can sometimes take years, they're like redacted and stuff.
[57:03.220 --> 57:05.560]  So that was you guys, because I've gotten copies of those.
[57:05.700 --> 57:06.040]  Yeah.
[57:06.240 --> 57:07.260]  And added them to this archive.
[57:07.560 --> 57:08.020]  Oh, nice.
[57:08.040 --> 57:13.300]  But I was like, who's requesting all these files of like Secret Service stuff from the 50s?
[57:13.300 --> 57:13.780]  Yeah.
[57:14.040 --> 57:16.880]  That's probably Professor Timothy Sale.
[57:17.420 --> 57:23.160]  That's probably 90% and maybe some of his students, PhD students and stuff.
[57:23.660 --> 57:23.740]  Yeah.
[57:24.520 --> 57:28.220]  This is hardly relevant, but I have my CSE duck socks on today.
[57:28.840 --> 57:32.000]  They give them out for the students.
[57:32.260 --> 57:32.680]  Yeah.
[57:32.680 --> 57:34.060]  They try to recruit us.
[57:34.440 --> 57:36.600]  I keep saying no when they keep asking.
[57:37.520 --> 57:37.960]  Yeah.
[57:38.460 --> 57:42.600]  In case you guys don't know, CSE is the Communication Security Establishment.
[57:42.700 --> 57:44.000]  That's like Canada's NSA.
[57:44.240 --> 57:47.820]  Except it's not as much like the NSA as like the UK's GCHQ.
[57:48.540 --> 57:50.700]  If you know what that is, it's more just like signals intelligence.
[57:51.060 --> 57:52.120]  Like the NSA does other things.
[57:52.600 --> 57:52.860]  Yeah.
[57:53.500 --> 57:53.740]  But...
[57:53.740 --> 57:55.680]  And then divide it between CSE and CSIS.
[57:55.840 --> 57:56.080]  Yeah.
[57:56.420 --> 57:58.080]  Except that we don't have any foreign intelligence.
[57:58.520 --> 57:59.540]  Except CSE, sort of.
[57:59.600 --> 58:01.640]  I thought CSE did some foreign intelligence.
[58:01.640 --> 58:03.760]  But no human foreign intelligence.
[58:05.140 --> 58:06.140]  Except diplomats.
[58:09.960 --> 58:11.400]  Embassies are another thing.
[58:13.160 --> 58:21.080]  So I'm curious, has anybody ever been in a situation at a border or otherwise where a cop has asked you for your phone?
[58:21.240 --> 58:25.220]  Or a border agent has asked you for your phone and disappeared with it for a period of time?
[58:26.140 --> 58:28.420]  Yeah, I was going to ask and wondered about that.
[58:28.580 --> 58:33.460]  Because they can compel anyone coming into the Canada from the border, right?
[58:33.540 --> 58:34.560]  Not just the Canadians.
[58:34.900 --> 58:35.400]  Oh yeah, anybody.
[58:35.620 --> 58:35.700]  Yeah.
[58:35.980 --> 58:36.220]  That's right.
[58:36.340 --> 58:36.540]  Yeah, yeah.
[58:38.020 --> 58:39.460]  Does it happen if you fly in?
[58:41.360 --> 58:42.880]  Yeah, flying or driving.
[58:43.540 --> 58:44.600]  There seems to be different roles.
[58:44.740 --> 58:49.240]  I was at a conference in Canada and someone who wanted to come to the conference did not have a passport.
[58:49.760 --> 58:54.120]  Apparently you could take a bus without a passport to go into Canada.
[58:54.780 --> 58:56.400]  How long ago was this?
[58:56.580 --> 58:58.580]  Because I think their rule changed.
[58:59.200 --> 59:00.580]  Yeah, 10 years ago.
[59:01.020 --> 59:02.540]  It was 2017, 2014.
[59:03.200 --> 59:05.640]  I think you need a passport now at the border.
[59:06.060 --> 59:08.120]  Even if you're American, you still need a passport.
[59:08.560 --> 59:12.040]  And you used to need one anyway because you needed to get back into the U.S.
[59:12.360 --> 59:16.100]  Even though you didn't have to show it getting into Canada, you still had to have to come back.
[59:16.460 --> 59:17.600]  Depends how long you might wait.
[59:18.340 --> 59:20.800]  I had zero passports and I'm a dual citizen.
[59:22.640 --> 59:24.880]  I was willing to camp out of the border and be a*****.
[59:25.120 --> 59:25.300]  Yeah.
[59:26.500 --> 59:30.640]  I feel like they literally sleep on their floor and kill them and they help at me in both directions.
[59:33.080 --> 59:35.160]  Just so you know, the 8 o'clock session was cancelled.
[59:35.640 --> 59:35.760]  Huh?
[59:35.980 --> 59:37.180]  The 8 o'clock session was cancelled.
[59:37.320 --> 59:37.780]  It was cancelled.
[59:37.860 --> 59:40.060]  Yeah, so we're having a big conversation on surveillance instead.
[59:40.540 --> 59:40.700]  Okay.
[59:42.040 --> 59:42.840]  You're welcome to join us.
[59:43.060 --> 59:43.880]  Welcome to watch.
[59:46.300 --> 59:50.580]  Sort of in light of all of the other sessions being big sessions without a whole lot of time for discussion.
[59:50.960 --> 59:51.360]  Yeah.
[59:51.440 --> 59:55.400]  We're just having a sort of big rambling conversation about state surveillance, which is fun.
[59:56.620 --> 59:58.600]  So, I do...
[59:59.320 --> 01:00:03.320]  I'd love to hear anybody's feedback because I have no idea with the Han Joon.
[01:00:03.420 --> 01:00:06.680]  But I switch SIM cards.
[01:00:07.220 --> 01:00:11.740]  Like, I have an American SIM card and a Canadian SIM card.
[01:00:11.740 --> 01:00:23.080]  And so, before I get to the border, I switch off and I fly dark, right, through the border because I don't like...
[01:00:23.080 --> 01:00:28.580]  I mean, I'm sure they can do it anyway, but it's more of a bulk collection thing when you're going through totals and whatnot.
[01:00:28.580 --> 01:00:35.360]  You're more isolated at the checkpoint, so it's like very clear that it's your MZ with your tag.
[01:00:35.700 --> 01:00:37.500]  So, I don't like that association.
[01:00:37.780 --> 01:00:39.360]  So, I fly dark through the border.
[01:00:39.520 --> 01:00:41.560]  I get a couple hours past the border.
[01:00:41.860 --> 01:00:42.960]  Stop somewhere.
[01:00:43.220 --> 01:00:44.080]  Switch SIMs.
[01:00:44.500 --> 01:00:45.660]  With the same phone, right?
[01:00:46.520 --> 01:00:46.920]  Yeah.
[01:00:46.920 --> 01:00:47.420]  Switch SIMs.
[01:00:47.620 --> 01:00:49.000]  In the same phone, right?
[01:00:49.100 --> 01:00:49.500]  Yes.
[01:00:49.660 --> 01:00:50.260]  In the same phone.
[01:00:50.420 --> 01:00:50.500]  Yeah.
[01:00:51.860 --> 01:00:53.900]  I mean, which honestly, like, it's...
[01:00:53.900 --> 01:00:56.260]  You know, I'm using it for, you know, my personal shit.
[01:00:56.260 --> 01:00:57.020]  That's a mean...
[01:00:57.760 --> 01:00:59.500]  Your threat model may not really...
[01:00:59.500 --> 01:00:59.760]  Yeah.
[01:00:59.800 --> 01:01:00.860]  It is a different phone.
[01:01:01.100 --> 01:01:01.760]  It's more...
[01:01:01.760 --> 01:01:05.640]  It's more an interest in just my own privacy, you know, than...
[01:01:05.640 --> 01:01:07.420]  You guys are welcome to join us.
[01:01:07.640 --> 01:01:08.260]  ...than opposite.
[01:01:08.940 --> 01:01:09.660]  Yeah, I know.
[01:01:10.340 --> 01:01:11.140]  I was just curious.
[01:01:12.340 --> 01:01:12.640]  Yeah.
[01:01:12.640 --> 01:01:18.940]  I'm curious, having done the research on Canadian surveillance, what you would recommend to activists?
[01:01:19.180 --> 01:01:21.440]  Because I feel like things escalate very quickly.
[01:01:21.840 --> 01:01:22.600]  You know, it goes...
[01:01:22.600 --> 01:01:23.480]  Use signal.
[01:01:23.720 --> 01:01:25.600]  Don't bring your phone to protest if you don't have to.
[01:01:26.180 --> 01:01:27.040]  Don't have SIM card.
[01:01:27.160 --> 01:01:27.800]  Don't have a phone.
[01:01:28.040 --> 01:01:28.840]  Like, live in the woods.
[01:01:29.080 --> 01:01:29.200]  Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[01:01:29.360 --> 01:01:30.540]  Like, don't use the grid.
[01:01:30.760 --> 01:01:31.840]  Like, I don't know what...
[01:01:31.840 --> 01:01:33.280]  Only talk to people in person.
[01:01:33.440 --> 01:01:34.660]  No electronic communications.
[01:01:34.960 --> 01:01:36.520]  It's like, it escalates so quickly.
[01:01:36.760 --> 01:01:37.340]  Like, I...
[01:01:37.340 --> 01:01:41.160]  It's hard to balance useful with, like, applicable.
[01:01:41.780 --> 01:01:42.740]  Fair to you, that is.
[01:01:44.480 --> 01:01:45.760]  Have a good lawyer on call.
[01:01:45.920 --> 01:01:46.240]  Yeah.
[01:01:47.160 --> 01:01:50.620]  Like, when I started doing this work, I also, like, I maintained an archive of the Stone documents, too.
[01:01:51.340 --> 01:01:55.280]  And when I started doing this work, I asked my university how much they would back me up.
[01:01:55.940 --> 01:02:02.500]  And they were super excited at first, and then they had a meeting and said, the university is your client, not you.
[01:02:03.060 --> 01:02:05.480]  It sounds like you have connections, you should use your connections.
[01:02:05.660 --> 01:02:09.460]  So now Stone's ACLU lawyer is my guy on call in the U.S.
[01:02:10.220 --> 01:02:11.620]  But my university won't back me.
[01:02:11.860 --> 01:02:12.100]  Right.
[01:02:13.100 --> 01:02:13.320]  Yeah.
[01:02:13.540 --> 01:02:13.920]  Yeah.
[01:02:14.060 --> 01:02:16.240]  I mean, for activists, I say, have, like...
[01:02:16.720 --> 01:02:22.200]  Get in touch with the CCLA, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, who will back you up.
[01:02:22.960 --> 01:02:23.360]  Interesting.
[01:02:23.760 --> 01:02:23.960]  Cool.
[01:02:25.380 --> 01:02:35.820]  But in terms of technology, I mean, something I didn't touch on during the talk, in 2019, a cryptographer at John Hopkins, Matt Green, put out a report with...
[01:02:35.820 --> 01:02:39.840]  Was anybody at Two Shores Talk yesterday on mesh networking for protests?
[01:02:40.000 --> 01:02:40.120]  Yeah.
[01:02:40.640 --> 01:02:44.840]  So he was a graduate student with Matt Green at John Hopkins.
[01:02:45.300 --> 01:02:55.220]  The two of them and another guy put out a report in 2019 called Secure Phones, on the website securephones.io, showing how, on architectural level, phones are fucked.
[01:02:55.220 --> 01:02:56.980]  There's no way to have a secure phone.
[01:02:57.180 --> 01:02:58.700]  So just give up on this idea.
[01:02:58.960 --> 01:02:59.120]  Yeah.
[01:02:59.600 --> 01:03:00.580]  Bring in that book.
[01:03:01.880 --> 01:03:02.360]  Or...
[01:03:02.360 --> 01:03:03.000]  Yeah.
[01:03:03.200 --> 01:03:04.520]  Or just, like, remember things.
[01:03:04.840 --> 01:03:05.320]  Yeah.
[01:03:06.180 --> 01:03:15.660]  I mean, there are some apps that allow you to do things like transferring data, like communicating over Bluetooth low energy, but even that, obviously, have Mac address.
[01:03:16.900 --> 01:03:17.380]  So...
[01:03:17.380 --> 01:03:17.660]  Yeah.
[01:03:19.420 --> 01:03:20.380]  Just on...
[01:03:20.380 --> 01:03:22.360]  You said you were collecting, like, Snowden documents.
[01:03:22.680 --> 01:03:26.240]  Were you meaning, like, specifically the Canadian ones that were in the big league?
[01:03:26.700 --> 01:03:27.460]  No, more than that.
[01:03:27.640 --> 01:03:27.820]  So, like...
[01:03:27.820 --> 01:03:29.180]  Also all of the 5i ones.
[01:03:29.800 --> 01:03:31.500]  All the ones have been published by the media.
[01:03:31.940 --> 01:03:32.480]  Oh, okay.
[01:03:32.680 --> 01:03:32.820]  So...
[01:03:32.820 --> 01:03:33.640]  Basically, I was working with...
[01:03:33.640 --> 01:03:36.560]  I was wondering if you've read, like, Chris Parsons' blog.
[01:03:36.780 --> 01:03:39.680]  He, like, works now, like, the privacy commissioner, I think.
[01:03:39.920 --> 01:03:40.020]  Yeah.
[01:03:40.020 --> 01:03:40.060]  Yeah.
[01:03:40.260 --> 01:03:48.380]  But he has, like, a blog where he, like, explains all of the, like, Canadian ones specifically that were in the Snowden Lake and, like, all of the, like, acronyms and stuff that he's figured out what they mean.
[01:03:48.520 --> 01:03:50.800]  So it's just, like, a good resource if you're going to be analyzing that.
[01:03:50.800 --> 01:03:50.940]  Yeah.
[01:03:50.960 --> 01:03:51.520]  I have checked it out.
[01:03:51.720 --> 01:03:52.040]  Yeah.
[01:03:52.200 --> 01:03:52.240]  Yeah.
[01:03:53.900 --> 01:03:54.800]  What was the site?
[01:03:54.980 --> 01:03:55.520]  Chris Parsons?
[01:03:55.760 --> 01:03:57.160]  Oh, Chris Parsons' blog.
[01:03:57.320 --> 01:03:58.400]  I don't know what it's called.
[01:03:59.060 --> 01:03:59.980]  He's just a guy.
[01:04:01.460 --> 01:04:01.820]  Yeah.
[01:04:01.960 --> 01:04:03.800]  He was at the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto.
[01:04:04.280 --> 01:04:05.300]  He worked at the Citizen Lab.
[01:04:05.440 --> 01:04:06.700]  And now he works for the government.
[01:04:06.840 --> 01:04:07.020]  Yeah.
[01:04:07.020 --> 01:04:09.040]  For the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.
[01:04:09.420 --> 01:04:18.960]  Well, actually, question for you specifically because I went to visit Citizen Lab and I was, like, afraid to, like, knock on the door because I figured they'd be, like, why are you here?
[01:04:19.060 --> 01:04:20.860]  Because all the secret research...
[01:04:20.860 --> 01:04:21.220]  You can't visit them.
[01:04:21.220 --> 01:04:22.020]  No, the research...
[01:04:22.020 --> 01:04:22.320]  That's right.
[01:04:22.420 --> 01:04:23.300]  I just took a picture.
[01:04:23.580 --> 01:04:24.780]  Well, that's what I was going to ask.
[01:04:24.880 --> 01:04:28.060]  Because I just took a picture of the building, the monk school, and it kept walking by.
[01:04:28.220 --> 01:04:28.440]  Yeah.
[01:04:28.860 --> 01:04:30.600]  Because I had a feeling that I wouldn't be able to go inside.
[01:04:30.920 --> 01:04:30.960]  You can't come in.
[01:04:30.960 --> 01:04:31.240]  Yeah.
[01:04:31.420 --> 01:04:32.320]  I thought that was probably the case.
[01:04:32.320 --> 01:04:34.460]  Like, you could come into the monk school, obviously.
[01:04:34.660 --> 01:04:36.600]  That's just, like, a regular university building.
[01:04:37.060 --> 01:04:37.200]  Well, yeah, but...
[01:04:37.200 --> 01:04:38.360]  But you can't come into the lab.
[01:04:38.500 --> 01:04:39.840]  I had a feeling that was the case.
[01:04:39.840 --> 01:04:40.360]  Yeah, I'm sorry.
[01:04:40.360 --> 01:04:40.980]  Thank you for confirming.
[01:04:41.220 --> 01:04:41.960]  No worries.
[01:04:42.720 --> 01:04:43.940]  You would be refused.
[01:04:44.500 --> 01:04:46.460]  No, and I wouldn't expect them to, actually.
[01:04:46.600 --> 01:04:46.720]  Yeah.
[01:04:46.720 --> 01:04:47.760]  That's why I figured that wouldn't even bother.
[01:04:47.760 --> 01:04:49.620]  We get a lot of strange people coming.
[01:04:49.620 --> 01:04:50.040]  So...
[01:04:50.040 --> 01:04:50.980]  I would imagine.
[01:04:51.740 --> 01:04:59.000]  I think Citizen Lab was pretty fizzle in getting that Google project, the sidewalk thing, shut down.
[01:04:59.320 --> 01:05:00.100]  You mean the...
[01:05:00.100 --> 01:05:00.420]  In Toronto?
[01:05:01.320 --> 01:05:02.460]  The smart city?
[01:05:02.580 --> 01:05:02.940]  Yeah.
[01:05:04.120 --> 01:05:05.340]  That's before my time.
[01:05:05.420 --> 01:05:06.560]  Sidewalk Labs, right?
[01:05:06.860 --> 01:05:07.140]  Yeah.
[01:05:07.340 --> 01:05:07.800]  Yeah, Sidewalk Labs.
[01:05:07.800 --> 01:05:09.020]  Nicole also works at the Citizen Lab.
[01:05:09.120 --> 01:05:10.340]  Or she used to...
[01:05:10.340 --> 01:05:10.580]  Yeah.
[01:05:10.860 --> 01:05:11.860]  That was also...
[01:05:11.860 --> 01:05:13.840]  That was before her time, as well.
[01:05:14.020 --> 01:05:16.500]  The Sidewalk Labs, I did research in the...
[01:05:16.500 --> 01:05:22.180]  It was also part of a project housing, affordable housing project, basically.
[01:05:22.520 --> 01:05:24.640]  So it's kind of like pay with your data for...
[01:05:24.640 --> 01:05:25.220]  Right.
[01:05:25.520 --> 01:05:26.040]  Yeah, yeah.
[01:05:26.380 --> 01:05:26.780]  Horrifying.
[01:05:27.480 --> 01:05:32.040]  No, but everyone is so mad about the whole smart city thing and all that surveillance, it got shut down.
[01:05:32.180 --> 01:05:33.440]  That's never going to happen in Toronto.
[01:05:34.280 --> 01:05:34.940]  No way.
[01:05:35.260 --> 01:05:37.320]  I think that's credit to the Citizen Lab.
[01:05:39.080 --> 01:05:41.480]  A lot of different activists, I think, helped with that.
[01:05:41.680 --> 01:05:44.140]  And that's an example of some civil society, too.
[01:05:44.540 --> 01:05:45.240]  Yeah, for sure.
[01:05:45.240 --> 01:05:49.560]  Well, I think Ron Debrick considered this part of civil society.
[01:05:50.120 --> 01:05:54.240]  But other people would say academia is not really the same thing.
[01:05:55.320 --> 01:05:55.540]  But yeah.
[01:05:57.040 --> 01:05:59.080]  Yeah, it's complicated.
[01:06:04.420 --> 01:06:05.780]  I have a question.
[01:06:05.960 --> 01:06:06.060]  Yeah.
[01:06:06.060 --> 01:06:10.860]  So for you all in Canada, have you had good...
[01:06:10.860 --> 01:06:17.380]  Have you had good times learning from American protesters and our technical experience?
[01:06:17.820 --> 01:06:21.180]  Or does some of that get lost across the border?
[01:06:22.200 --> 01:06:27.480]  Because I know a lot of it gets transferred like just word of mouth and not necessarily put down on the paper.
[01:06:27.480 --> 01:06:35.280]  Or have you gotten the benefit of like some of the things that happened from, that we learned from like Occupy and so on?
[01:06:36.140 --> 01:06:37.140]  I think so.
[01:06:37.460 --> 01:06:43.180]  I mean, I think even within countries, like cities are so localized, everything is different.
[01:06:43.920 --> 01:06:48.260]  Like I imagine Toronto would have a big difference to what I've experienced.
[01:06:48.260 --> 01:06:50.220]  Well, there are a lot of Americans in Toronto.
[01:06:50.380 --> 01:06:51.140]  Yeah, that's true.
[01:06:52.620 --> 01:06:53.200]  But yeah.
[01:06:53.440 --> 01:06:55.820]  I mean, I think there's definitely things that have been taken.
[01:06:55.820 --> 01:07:00.060]  But like, I see these videos and photos of American protesters like so big.
[01:07:00.280 --> 01:07:02.740]  Like you have the entire population of my city in one protest.
[01:07:03.600 --> 01:07:04.800]  I don't know how it happens.
[01:07:05.740 --> 01:07:09.860]  But yeah, I think we've definitely learned aspects.
[01:07:10.140 --> 01:07:17.260]  And it's about trying things and then iterating and finding a unique solution for your locality.
[01:07:18.760 --> 01:07:19.360]  Yeah.
[01:07:20.480 --> 01:07:28.500]  From my experience, a lot of the most active student activists that I know are students from the U.S.
[01:07:28.520 --> 01:07:30.040]  who are studying at the University of Toronto.
[01:07:30.340 --> 01:07:32.000]  And they're the ones who are organizing.
[01:07:32.720 --> 01:07:33.320]  Interesting.
[01:07:34.480 --> 01:07:36.040]  Yeah, so that's pretty funny.
[01:07:36.200 --> 01:07:43.060]  But also funny is every time there's a protest in Toronto about pretty much anything, they decide to hold it in front of the U.S.
[01:07:43.140 --> 01:07:43.560]  consulate.
[01:07:43.760 --> 01:07:44.960]  Like every single time.
[01:07:45.320 --> 01:07:46.700]  And that place is a fortress.
[01:07:46.980 --> 01:07:49.540]  And there's always like a billion police officers in front of it.
[01:07:49.820 --> 01:07:50.080]  Yeah.
[01:07:51.000 --> 01:07:51.760]  It's crazy.
[01:07:52.000 --> 01:07:53.340]  But it's like, it does not matter.
[01:07:53.500 --> 01:07:55.060]  It does not have to be American related.
[01:07:55.380 --> 01:07:57.020]  It's just that is where the protest will be.
[01:07:57.460 --> 01:07:58.060]  That's funny.
[01:07:58.860 --> 01:07:59.280]  So...
[01:07:59.280 --> 01:08:07.120]  I wonder if just based on, you know, your breadth of knowledge and, you know, more direct experience.
[01:08:07.380 --> 01:08:09.760]  But is there...
[01:08:09.760 --> 01:08:17.120]  You know, what is the state of collaboration versus sort of divergence with the francophone?
[01:08:18.080 --> 01:08:25.220]  Not only, you know, the civil society of it, but also the like, they care about different stuff.
[01:08:25.720 --> 01:08:25.900]  You know?
[01:08:26.160 --> 01:08:29.880]  Like, they'd rather be separate in some ways.
[01:08:30.120 --> 01:08:36.120]  But then also, that's a great pool of like militancy and interest.
[01:08:37.640 --> 01:08:38.400]  Yeah, it's very...
[01:08:38.400 --> 01:08:39.060]  It's very different.
[01:08:39.200 --> 01:08:40.140]  I think there's a whole lot of crossover.
[01:08:40.400 --> 01:08:41.720]  So I lived in Montreal for 20 years.
[01:08:41.840 --> 01:08:44.640]  I went to grad school at Ducam where the French University is in Montreal.
[01:08:45.680 --> 01:08:50.400]  I was part of the eight-month student protest in 2012 while finishing my PhD.
[01:08:52.240 --> 01:08:58.100]  And, like, we were on strike for eight months because they wanted to raise tuition by $300 a year.
[01:09:00.040 --> 01:09:08.620]  Like, when I finished my PhD, having been in grad school for eight years, my master's and PhD, I was paying $1,500 a year for tuition.
[01:09:08.960 --> 01:09:09.260]  Wow.
[01:09:10.360 --> 01:09:14.120]  And so, yeah, we were on strike for eight months because we wanted it to remain affordable.
[01:09:16.620 --> 01:09:20.080]  Whereas elsewhere in Canada, you don't have that same...
[01:09:20.080 --> 01:09:22.880]  People aren't willing to do that.
[01:09:23.140 --> 01:09:23.240]  Yeah.
[01:09:29.000 --> 01:09:39.580]  And what would happen to, you know, OCA or October 70 or something now given the surveillance environment?
[01:09:40.220 --> 01:09:42.720]  It wouldn't even happen.
[01:09:45.080 --> 01:09:46.160]  I don't know.
[01:09:49.720 --> 01:09:50.120]  No?
[01:09:50.540 --> 01:09:51.300]  Good question.
[01:09:51.620 --> 01:09:52.600]  What was the question?
[01:09:54.640 --> 01:09:57.640]  Where would, you know, point...
[01:09:57.640 --> 01:10:09.440]  Like, times when civil society in Canada has reached crisis historically, like October 1970 or the OCA crisis, like, where would that even happen now?
[01:10:10.220 --> 01:10:14.740]  Based on the level of surveillance and apathy.
[01:10:16.580 --> 01:10:19.440]  So, not to be a troll, but I don't have enough...
[01:10:19.440 --> 01:10:21.060]  I might be trolling myself, I'm not sure.
[01:10:21.060 --> 01:10:23.160]  I don't have enough context, but...
[01:10:23.160 --> 01:10:25.280]  So, the trucking strike in Canada...
[01:10:25.280 --> 01:10:26.280]  It's a really good example.
[01:10:26.480 --> 01:10:26.580]  Yeah.
[01:10:27.000 --> 01:10:34.020]  I think they froze the bank balances of all the truckers or whatever.
[01:10:35.280 --> 01:10:35.720]  But...
[01:10:35.720 --> 01:10:36.680]  Was there any...
[01:10:36.680 --> 01:10:37.340]  Some outrage, right?
[01:10:37.540 --> 01:10:37.680]  Yeah.
[01:10:37.900 --> 01:10:39.060]  But was there any, like, surveillance...
[01:10:40.140 --> 01:10:42.260]  I'm from Ottawa, so I lived it.
[01:10:43.260 --> 01:10:47.040]  It's very different because they are right-wing.
[01:10:47.500 --> 01:10:47.660]  Right.
[01:10:48.000 --> 01:10:52.620]  Like, state suppression of right-wing protesters is practically non-existent.
[01:10:52.860 --> 01:10:58.780]  Like, the reason it lasted almost a month was because, like, the police services literally refused to do anything.
[01:10:59.240 --> 01:11:10.420]  The only reason they were gotten rid of is because local organizers organized against them, and I think the city started to realize we're gonna have riots if, like, we don't get rid of them first.
[01:11:10.600 --> 01:11:11.820]  Well, there was the border as well.
[01:11:12.660 --> 01:11:12.800]  Mm.
[01:11:13.960 --> 01:11:14.880]  Like Alberta, right?
[01:11:15.280 --> 01:11:15.380]  Yeah.
[01:11:15.500 --> 01:11:16.240]  Several borders.
[01:11:16.980 --> 01:11:17.480]  Yeah.
[01:11:17.480 --> 01:11:17.600]  Yeah.
[01:11:18.120 --> 01:11:21.920]  But was there surveillance involved, or was it strictly, uh, sort of...
[01:11:21.920 --> 01:11:23.740]  The cops were very buddy-buddy with them.
[01:11:23.880 --> 01:11:29.080]  Like, they were giving me copies, and they were not adversarial at all.
[01:11:29.520 --> 01:11:33.760]  Um, there was, like, the bank account stuff and things, but it was not...
[01:11:33.760 --> 01:11:36.940]  Like, the Ottawa police services flew...
[01:11:36.940 --> 01:11:40.380]  Like, the police union flew the thin blue line flag in 2020.
[01:11:40.960 --> 01:11:43.480]  Like, it's very right-wing, it's very polarized.
[01:11:43.480 --> 01:11:49.900]  I have personally seen state violence on my friends because of left-wing politics.
[01:11:50.420 --> 01:11:54.880]  I've been friends with charges and shit, and they are very right-wing.
[01:11:55.640 --> 01:12:00.500]  And so, yeah, I don't think comparing to the convoy is helpful.
[01:12:01.020 --> 01:12:02.480]  It's still a...
[01:12:05.260 --> 01:12:13.820]  Like, the question, the question is, like, how, you know, who came up with the idea when, maybe, is what you're saying is problematic.
[01:12:14.480 --> 01:12:22.180]  But, like, they still shut down bank accounts, and surveilled transactions of who is supporting them, so they can do that to anybody.
[01:12:22.400 --> 01:12:22.700]  Yep, absolutely.
[01:12:23.380 --> 01:12:41.180]  Yeah, well, but in contrast, though, um, ever since, like, fall when things started to really heat up with Palestine, like, the Canadian government decided to just, um, force every single Palestinian in Canada to disclose a bunch of personal information,
[01:12:41.980 --> 01:12:51.880]  um, including all of, every phone number they've ever had, every social media account they've ever had, emails, yes, and then any identifiable marks on their bodies, like, scars and things.
[01:12:52.600 --> 01:12:52.620]  What?
[01:12:52.620 --> 01:12:57.060]  And all of this personal data was collected by the Canadian government of all Palestinian people.
[01:12:57.700 --> 01:13:01.920]  And then they, the massive amounts of surveillance of the, like, pro-Palestine protests...
[01:13:01.920 --> 01:13:02.140]  Canadian citizens?
[01:13:02.140 --> 01:13:02.540]  Canadian citizens?
[01:13:03.120 --> 01:13:06.920]  Um, no, Palestinians, like, migrants who have come to Canada.
[01:13:08.020 --> 01:13:16.380]  Um, but I, I don't know, like, if you still have Palestinian citizenship and then also Canadian citizenship, whether, like, that was, I don't know if an exception was made or not.
[01:13:16.740 --> 01:13:19.420]  But still, it was, like, very, very disturbing stuff.
[01:13:19.640 --> 01:13:29.500]  And, like, during the protests, I even, I was, like, going, like, following drones to, like, see which agency was, like, operating it, but I couldn't, like, figure this out.
[01:13:29.540 --> 01:13:34.800]  And that's why I was gonna ask you about government contracts later, because it's very difficult to find out what they're using for.
[01:13:34.960 --> 01:13:48.400]  And also, when I was looking through some federal contracts, I, like, found, um, a contract for a lot of money with, I think the Department of National Defense, or maybe it was RCMP, um, with an Israeli spyware company, Cognite.
[01:13:48.720 --> 01:13:55.240]  And, like, I was just, like, wondering, like, because they won't say what they bought from Cognite, how can I get that information?
[01:13:55.660 --> 01:13:58.820]  Just, like, first of all, and then, like, also just generally, like, how do you go about it?
[01:13:58.820 --> 01:14:00.720]  So you got the contract, but it was redacted?
[01:14:00.920 --> 01:14:04.500]  Well, like, they just, they say, like, we bought, like, information technology.
[01:14:04.860 --> 01:14:07.340]  Oh, so, like, the proactive disclosure company?
[01:14:07.360 --> 01:14:09.440]  Like, they just don't say, like, what they bought.
[01:14:11.360 --> 01:14:13.260]  So, like, what do you know about the contract?
[01:14:13.440 --> 01:14:14.460]  Do you have the contract number?
[01:14:14.760 --> 01:14:15.020]  Yeah.
[01:14:15.320 --> 01:14:17.320]  Like, it's on the database on their website.
[01:14:17.540 --> 01:14:17.700]  Okay.
[01:14:17.860 --> 01:14:19.300]  Like, you can file an ATI.
[01:14:19.820 --> 01:14:25.660]  Just file a very boring ATI saying, I, like, they'll have the procurement number, the contract number.
[01:14:26.000 --> 01:14:26.220]  Yeah.
[01:14:26.320 --> 01:14:31.400]  Just give them the basic numbers and say, and the date that the contract happened, I want this.
[01:14:32.160 --> 01:14:33.340]  And, like, that's what I do.
[01:14:33.560 --> 01:14:35.380]  It's the most boring shit to file.
[01:14:36.100 --> 01:14:39.820]  But I had it, I've had stuff come back in a month with no redactions.
[01:14:40.060 --> 01:14:41.900]  And you're saying the cost is really very low.
[01:14:42.120 --> 01:14:42.860]  The cost is $5.
[01:14:44.940 --> 01:14:52.180]  And the more boring you make your request, the more boring it is for them to just do the paperwork and say, I'm just passing a contract on.
[01:14:53.600 --> 01:14:54.020]  Interesting.
[01:14:54.520 --> 01:15:02.240]  And, like, how do you figure out, like, if you're just, like, in the moment, like, at a protest, can you find out which agencies are doing the surveillance?
[01:15:02.420 --> 01:15:09.640]  Like, is there any way to know if it's, like, Toronto Police Service, like, OPS, or RCMP, or even, like...
[01:15:09.640 --> 01:15:10.520]  That's a really good question.
[01:15:10.680 --> 01:15:13.840]  I mean, I'd say collect license plate numbers, badge numbers.
[01:15:14.760 --> 01:15:15.900]  Badge numbers can be difficult.
[01:15:16.120 --> 01:15:22.820]  I know when I've been arrested in Quebec, I had, like, cops with black uniforms with black numbers on their black uniforms.
[01:15:25.540 --> 01:15:27.860]  And then, like, they have numbers on their helmets.
[01:15:28.100 --> 01:15:31.220]  But, like, I filed an ethics complaint against the cops for beating me up.
[01:15:32.020 --> 01:15:38.040]  And I wound up talking with a chronologist who said to me, you know what, it used to be worse.
[01:15:38.040 --> 01:15:40.980]  They used to trade helmets back and forth to totally mess people up.
[01:15:43.500 --> 01:15:46.580]  Also, like, what are the, like, ethical concerns if...
[01:15:46.580 --> 01:15:52.200]  So, for example, the, like, spy vehicle that I was talking about earlier, it's, like, completely unmarked.
[01:15:52.340 --> 01:15:54.620]  Like, we don't know what agency that could have been.
[01:15:54.740 --> 01:16:00.920]  And then, like, trying to find, like, the contracts with the camera operating company was, like, it didn't... it went nowhere.
[01:16:01.100 --> 01:16:07.380]  But I was just wondering, like, so I did have some photos of the people who were operating said vehicle.
[01:16:08.420 --> 01:16:14.940]  And so I was wondering, like, what are, like, the ethical issues with, like, if I wanted to try to, like, find out who that person was.
[01:16:15.160 --> 01:16:16.400]  And, like, who they worked for.
[01:16:17.020 --> 01:16:18.120]  Like, is that wrong?
[01:16:18.840 --> 01:16:19.300]  To, like...
[01:16:20.620 --> 01:16:24.520]  Is that, like, wrong to, like, reverse image search, like, their face and, like...
[01:16:24.520 --> 01:16:25.600]  I'd say it's wonderfully ironic.
[01:16:32.320 --> 01:16:34.680]  Like, how do you deal with, like, that kind of stuff?
[01:16:34.720 --> 01:16:37.900]  I don't know, but I would totally reverse image search them and find them on LinkedIn.
[01:16:39.000 --> 01:16:41.240]  It's, like, they're not wearing uniforms or anything.
[01:16:41.300 --> 01:16:42.300]  I don't see any badges.
[01:16:42.640 --> 01:16:43.080]  Like, how...
[01:16:43.080 --> 01:16:44.040]  I can't find out.
[01:16:44.400 --> 01:16:44.520]  So that...
[01:16:44.520 --> 01:16:44.980]  Yeah, I mean, that's...
[01:16:44.980 --> 01:16:45.760]  Or what this is.
[01:16:47.200 --> 01:16:53.820]  Do you remember in Toronto, so we had a number of homeless encampments in the city during and after the pandemic.
[01:16:54.460 --> 01:16:56.420]  And the city started to evict people.
[01:16:56.820 --> 01:16:59.440]  And there was one that a friend of mine was at in the West End.
[01:17:00.920 --> 01:17:02.240]  I think maybe Liberty Village.
[01:17:02.660 --> 01:17:05.000]  And one of these vans was there.
[01:17:05.480 --> 01:17:06.500]  And he took some pictures.
[01:17:06.660 --> 01:17:10.660]  And he was like, there's an FRT van at this eviction for some reason.
[01:17:11.500 --> 01:17:12.620]  Here are some pictures.
[01:17:12.880 --> 01:17:13.820]  It might be the same van.
[01:17:14.560 --> 01:17:16.100]  Yeah, I think they just have one.
[01:17:16.280 --> 01:17:18.480]  Because every time I've seen it, they have the same...
[01:17:18.480 --> 01:17:19.540]  It has the same license plate.
[01:17:19.760 --> 01:17:21.420]  So, I think they just have one.
[01:17:21.640 --> 01:17:22.440]  They didn't buy more than that.
[01:17:22.440 --> 01:17:22.700]  Probably.
[01:17:23.060 --> 01:17:23.660]  It is Canada.
[01:17:24.080 --> 01:17:24.720]  It is Canada.
[01:17:28.900 --> 01:17:34.260]  But I'm just wondering, like, do you think that that type of surveillance is conducted by the Toronto Police?
[01:17:34.360 --> 01:17:35.620]  Or do you think that's like RCMP?
[01:17:35.880 --> 01:17:36.520]  Like, who are they?
[01:17:36.980 --> 01:17:37.940]  Who are these people?
[01:17:38.180 --> 01:17:39.360]  The official recognition, it could be either.
[01:17:39.500 --> 01:17:40.420]  It could be also private.
[01:17:42.240 --> 01:17:45.880]  But they seemed like they were speaking with the Toronto Police.
[01:17:46.140 --> 01:17:47.240]  Like, they were working together.
[01:17:48.160 --> 01:17:49.700]  But, like, that doesn't mean anything.
[01:17:50.000 --> 01:17:51.040]  No, they could be private.
[01:17:51.140 --> 01:17:51.980]  They could be Toronto Police.
[01:17:52.080 --> 01:17:52.820]  They could be RCMP.
[01:17:52.820 --> 01:17:57.380]  Like, a lot of Canadian police forces will also call in the RCMP.
[01:17:57.880 --> 01:18:02.200]  For those of you who came in later, the RCMP is our national police force slash FBI.
[01:18:03.280 --> 01:18:04.000]  They're the Mounties.
[01:18:04.180 --> 01:18:04.800]  They ride the horses.
[01:18:04.900 --> 01:18:05.280]  Exactly.
[01:18:05.920 --> 01:18:06.160]  Yeah.
[01:18:08.740 --> 01:18:09.680]  And so, they...
[01:18:09.680 --> 01:18:11.500]  For instance, they'll call in...
[01:18:11.500 --> 01:18:13.820]  Most Canadian police forces don't own MC catchers.
[01:18:14.120 --> 01:18:18.260]  But they'll call in the RCMP with MC catchers when they want to use them.
[01:18:19.160 --> 01:18:19.480]  Are...
[01:18:19.480 --> 01:18:25.080]  Are you allowed to, like, ask those, like, people, like, who they are and who they work for?
[01:18:25.180 --> 01:18:25.940]  Do they have to tell you?
[01:18:26.240 --> 01:18:26.560]  Or...
[01:18:26.560 --> 01:18:27.240]  They don't need...
[01:18:27.240 --> 01:18:27.500]  They don't need...
[01:18:27.500 --> 01:18:28.140]  You're not a cop.
[01:18:28.240 --> 01:18:28.860]  They don't need to tell you.
[01:18:29.040 --> 01:18:29.360]  But...
[01:18:29.360 --> 01:18:29.620]  Yeah.
[01:18:30.080 --> 01:18:30.980]  But you can ask them.
[01:18:31.200 --> 01:18:31.220]  Yeah.
[01:18:31.260 --> 01:18:31.620]  You can ask them.
[01:18:32.020 --> 01:18:32.300]  Of course.
[01:18:32.700 --> 01:18:32.880]  Okay.
[01:18:33.140 --> 01:18:33.880]  You can ask anybody anything.
[01:18:34.420 --> 01:18:35.480]  They might be proud of it.
[01:18:36.880 --> 01:18:37.520]  It's true.
[01:18:39.860 --> 01:18:40.220]  Yeah.
[01:18:40.220 --> 01:18:41.540]  They totally might be proud of...
[01:18:41.540 --> 01:18:42.500]  They might try and recruit you.
[01:18:42.500 --> 01:18:43.600]  That's when you say...
[01:18:45.580 --> 01:18:46.100]  Yeah.
[01:18:46.260 --> 01:18:47.900]  I'm a cyber security professional.
[01:18:48.120 --> 01:18:49.360]  I love to work for you guys.
[01:18:50.740 --> 01:18:52.400]  I love your camera.
[01:18:52.740 --> 01:18:53.660]  It's so nice.
[01:18:54.500 --> 01:18:55.420]  Where'd you get it?
[01:18:56.060 --> 01:18:57.060]  What'd you get it?
[01:18:58.160 --> 01:18:59.580]  I've got the older model.
[01:18:59.740 --> 01:19:00.300]  Which one is that?
[01:19:02.960 --> 01:19:03.940]  Social engineering.
[01:19:04.180 --> 01:19:04.460]  Yeah.
[01:19:05.640 --> 01:19:06.820]  Hacker tools in real life.
[01:19:07.420 --> 01:19:09.400]  I've got my own illegal MC catcher.
[01:19:09.460 --> 01:19:10.080]  Can we compare it?
[01:19:13.520 --> 01:19:15.340]  But actually, on the subject of MC catchers.
[01:19:15.440 --> 01:19:16.300]  Since then, I know there's some...
[01:19:16.300 --> 01:19:17.560]  Probably some coders in the room.
[01:19:17.680 --> 01:19:18.420]  Has anybody heard of...
[01:19:18.420 --> 01:19:19.420]  That's a thing called Sitch?
[01:19:19.740 --> 01:19:20.500]  S-I-T-C-H?
[01:19:23.120 --> 01:19:24.740]  Came out maybe eight years ago.
[01:19:24.920 --> 01:19:25.680]  A guy named Ash Wilson.
[01:19:27.420 --> 01:19:32.420]  I found him after this revelation in 2017 of MC catchers being used in Ottawa.
[01:19:33.200 --> 01:19:33.600]  But...
[01:19:33.600 --> 01:19:37.800]  The journalist I was working with on this project had used...
[01:19:37.800 --> 01:19:39.060]  She had a crypto phone.
[01:19:39.060 --> 01:19:43.360]  It's a $2,000 German cell phone that lets you know there's MC catchers around you.
[01:19:43.600 --> 01:19:46.760]  And then there's a group out of...
[01:19:47.320 --> 01:19:49.440]  Yeah, Las Vegas called EOS Overwatch.
[01:19:50.100 --> 01:19:54.200]  And they came and let her use their gear to hunt down MC catchers in Ottawa.
[01:19:55.140 --> 01:20:03.160]  So Sitch was this software package, software, hardware thing put together by a cloud security developer to hunt down MC catchers.
[01:20:03.340 --> 01:20:07.700]  Basically, it's a Raspberry Pi with a software-defined radio, GSM modem.
[01:20:07.700 --> 01:20:10.380]  Does that only work with the 2G older models?
[01:20:10.540 --> 01:20:11.780]  Or does that work with...
[01:20:11.780 --> 01:20:12.900]  No, 3G, 4G.
[01:20:13.200 --> 01:20:13.760]  Because it basically...
[01:20:14.360 --> 01:20:17.060]  It downloads a...
[01:20:17.060 --> 01:20:22.240]  The spreadsheet from the FCC, or in our case I said, of the towers.
[01:20:22.700 --> 01:20:28.180]  You tell it what state you're in, it just sucks down those tower details from that state.
[01:20:28.960 --> 01:20:31.280]  And then on the back end, it's running an Elk stack.
[01:20:32.600 --> 01:20:34.800]  And searches through and shows you if anything's anomalous.
[01:20:34.980 --> 01:20:37.340]  If it's presenting like a tower, but not in your database.
[01:20:38.660 --> 01:20:41.060]  So I started working with this in Canada in 2017.
[01:20:41.680 --> 01:20:45.340]  And then wrote a book chapter with a friend on this.
[01:20:45.580 --> 01:20:48.280]  And then the developer backed out, because Trump had just gotten elected.
[01:20:49.000 --> 01:20:51.600]  And he was like, shit's gotten too hot in the U.S.
[01:20:51.600 --> 01:20:52.940]  I can't do this anymore.
[01:20:54.040 --> 01:20:55.880]  And so I took it over, but I'm not a coder.
[01:20:56.140 --> 01:20:57.440]  So it pays people to work on it.
[01:20:57.520 --> 01:21:03.480]  So if anybody's interested in working on MCcatcher catchers, get in touch with me, because we have a thing going.
[01:21:04.280 --> 01:21:07.040]  And it would be fun to break it up more.
[01:21:07.300 --> 01:21:07.600]  Huh.
[01:21:08.760 --> 01:21:11.020]  Have you found that they have fingerprints?
[01:21:12.000 --> 01:21:13.000]  Like different ones?
[01:21:13.620 --> 01:21:13.980]  So...
[01:21:14.760 --> 01:21:17.020]  I got to test it live once.
[01:21:17.300 --> 01:21:19.080]  And the University of Toronto was part of the picture.
[01:21:19.080 --> 01:21:20.000]  The G...
[01:21:20.000 --> 01:21:21.120]  What year was it?
[01:21:21.220 --> 01:21:22.300]  Like 2010, I think.
[01:21:23.280 --> 01:21:23.420]  No.
[01:21:24.940 --> 01:21:25.460]  2018.
[01:21:25.460 --> 01:21:34.700]  I think the G8, G7 was meeting in Quebec, but they were having security meetings at University of Toronto, building up to the real meeting.
[01:21:35.120 --> 01:21:37.440]  And so I went biking around the city.
[01:21:37.960 --> 01:21:42.780]  And you get feedback from this device as it's pinging self-towers and looking at what's going on.
[01:21:43.240 --> 01:21:48.300]  And as I biked by a bunch of embassies, consulates in Toronto, things got weird.
[01:21:48.300 --> 01:21:49.260]  So I think it was...
[01:21:49.260 --> 01:21:51.400]  I had to have no alerts going through the city normally.
[01:21:51.400 --> 01:21:55.300]  When I got near consulates, weird shit popping up.
[01:21:55.320 --> 01:21:56.680]  So in real time it gives you...
[01:21:56.680 --> 01:21:57.060]  In real time, yeah.
[01:21:57.320 --> 01:22:00.080]  Oh, I didn't know if you had to like upload it and then process it.
[01:22:00.080 --> 01:22:00.360]  No, no.
[01:22:00.580 --> 01:22:00.920]  It...
[01:22:00.920 --> 01:22:01.720]  So it's...
[01:22:01.720 --> 01:22:09.100]  I run a pie off on a hotspot and then have a server backend that's doing the analysis and then sending out...
[01:22:09.540 --> 01:22:10.660]  Like Slack alerts.
[01:22:10.940 --> 01:22:11.120]  Yeah.
[01:22:12.460 --> 01:22:14.060]  There's no website for it really anymore.
[01:22:14.160 --> 01:22:14.380]  Oh.
[01:22:14.960 --> 01:22:15.360]  Unfortunately.
[01:22:15.940 --> 01:22:16.660]  I actually took it down.
[01:22:16.660 --> 01:22:17.260]  But...
[01:22:17.260 --> 01:22:17.600]  That sucks.
[01:22:17.740 --> 01:22:18.340]  I was looking for it.
[01:22:18.460 --> 01:22:18.600]  Yeah.
[01:22:18.740 --> 01:22:20.780]  But the coders I've been working with have it somewhere, but I forget where.
[01:22:22.100 --> 01:22:23.100]  But we can definitely...
[01:22:23.100 --> 01:22:26.680]  Is there a list of like component parts you need for the Raspberry Pi as well?
[01:22:27.000 --> 01:22:29.760]  Because I imagine you probably need some kind of add-ons or attachments, right?
[01:22:29.760 --> 01:22:30.380]  Yeah.
[01:22:30.500 --> 01:22:30.880]  It's pretty cheap.
[01:22:31.020 --> 01:22:31.920]  It's like $100 a year.
[01:22:32.120 --> 01:22:35.720]  It's a Pi, a GPS, a GSM modem, and an SDR.
[01:22:38.460 --> 01:22:39.260]  But I...
[01:22:39.260 --> 01:22:48.340]  When I took it out to test it, I went by U of T, where all the security, like ministers of the G8 G7 were meeting, and I remember having this moment standing outside the U.S.
[01:22:48.420 --> 01:22:59.020]  consulate, watching my Pi being connected to a legitimate cell tower, disconnect, connect to, I was pretty damn sure, an MC catcher inside the U.S.
[01:22:59.100 --> 01:23:03.560]  consulate, and then disconnect and connect back to the legitimate tower.
[01:23:04.280 --> 01:23:06.340]  I was like, wow, this thing works.
[01:23:08.540 --> 01:23:10.220]  And there's an MC catcher in the U.S.
[01:23:10.260 --> 01:23:13.460]  consulate that knows that I'm here.
[01:23:15.900 --> 01:23:17.380]  But also the range is different.
[01:23:17.620 --> 01:23:24.160]  So Ash, this guy I was working with, in the GSM specs, GSM can travel like 35 kilometers.
[01:23:25.100 --> 01:23:27.880]  And so with the MC catcher-catcher, you can...
[01:23:27.880 --> 01:23:31.720]  The range is pretty far, but also MC catchers can have a really far range.
[01:23:33.000 --> 01:23:34.120]  I'm sure you can calibrate.
[01:23:34.440 --> 01:23:35.600]  What email should I use?
[01:23:36.880 --> 01:23:37.240]  Yeah.
[01:23:38.600 --> 01:23:39.520]  Here, I'll put it back down.
[01:23:42.080 --> 01:23:42.440]  Overseas.
[01:23:45.240 --> 01:23:48.280]  I know there was an Android app, supposedly, at one point.
[01:23:48.420 --> 01:23:51.540]  They claimed to find them, but I'm not sure how accurate it was.
[01:23:53.120 --> 01:23:57.680]  And you had to have like a cracked, like a worded Android phone, I think, in order to work.
[01:24:00.140 --> 01:24:01.020]  Oh, the...
[01:24:01.020 --> 01:24:02.060]  I forget what it was called.
[01:24:02.920 --> 01:24:07.260]  Yeah, the MC catcher-catcher for Android.
[01:24:08.220 --> 01:24:09.580]  Yeah, I never had much love with that.
[01:24:10.200 --> 01:24:12.080]  Is that a capital O or a zero?
[01:24:12.380 --> 01:24:12.800]  It's a zero.
[01:24:13.040 --> 01:24:13.760]  Thought so.
[01:24:13.960 --> 01:24:14.120]  Cool.
[01:24:23.110 --> 01:24:26.910]  Yeah, and I also had a couple other projects on facial recognition.
[01:24:27.710 --> 01:24:30.550]  I do work creating art to achieve people about surveillance.
[01:24:31.310 --> 01:24:38.030]  So a project that I actually put together with some of my graduate students two years ago, with money from the Federal Privacy Regulator in Canada.
[01:24:38.150 --> 01:24:41.950]  We got a grant from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to make art around facial recognition.
[01:24:41.950 --> 01:24:51.750]  So a big immersive installation where people walk in and walk up to an Amazon ring and watch their face being charted out in biometrics on the screen next to them.
[01:24:52.510 --> 01:24:54.750]  And then we gradually shrunk it down and gamified it.
[01:24:54.830 --> 01:24:59.510]  So now people can push a button and print out a sticker with their biometric rendering of their face.
[01:25:00.030 --> 01:25:03.610]  But also the software guesses your age and gender and your affect.
[01:25:05.290 --> 01:25:09.210]  And then another project starting up on eye tracking as an emerging form of biometrics.
[01:25:10.570 --> 01:25:11.870]  Like, is anybody here a gamer?
[01:25:13.070 --> 01:25:14.270]  Do you have a VR headset?
[01:25:15.750 --> 01:25:18.110]  Does it follow your eyes?
[01:25:19.330 --> 01:25:20.050]  Are you sure?
[01:25:20.230 --> 01:25:21.590]  Is this a Venetic Quest 2?
[01:25:22.510 --> 01:25:25.070]  Or it's technically an Oculus Quest 2.
[01:25:26.990 --> 01:25:27.650]  I don't think so.
[01:25:27.730 --> 01:25:28.090]  Oh, okay.
[01:25:28.150 --> 01:25:28.650]  Yeah, probably not.
[01:25:28.650 --> 01:25:31.850]  But the newer ones totally follow your eyes.
[01:25:32.590 --> 01:25:38.490]  And I'm working with a psychologist at University of Toronto who's been working on eye tracking for a couple of decades.
[01:25:39.250 --> 01:25:45.810]  And in the next couple of years, we're pretty sure we'll get to the point where we can identify people based on their eye movements.
[01:25:46.050 --> 01:25:46.270]  Wow.
[01:25:47.590 --> 01:25:48.130]  Because she...
[01:25:48.130 --> 01:25:49.930]  The Apple VR headset is like that though.
[01:25:50.110 --> 01:25:53.970]  Because they use it to focus on whatever it is you're looking at.
[01:25:54.090 --> 01:25:54.270]  Yeah.
[01:25:54.710 --> 01:25:54.870]  Yeah.
[01:25:54.870 --> 01:25:56.350]  And then some of them in processes.
[01:25:56.710 --> 01:25:58.210]  The new meta one is like that too.
[01:25:58.210 --> 01:25:59.430]  Yeah, I think a lot of modern ones are.
[01:25:59.550 --> 01:26:04.170]  Because they do like focal resolution where like only what you're looking at is high res.
[01:26:04.270 --> 01:26:06.730]  And then the further out is lower res because your eyes don't notice.
[01:26:13.580 --> 01:26:13.900]  Yeah.
[01:26:14.880 --> 01:26:15.880]  This is not Canada.
[01:26:16.140 --> 01:26:16.800]  Well, maybe it is.
[01:26:17.840 --> 01:26:18.720]  Surveillance Studies Network.
[01:26:18.860 --> 01:26:20.860]  Can you just explain a little bit more?
[01:26:20.980 --> 01:26:21.660]  That was fascinating.
[01:26:22.180 --> 01:26:22.600]  Yeah, sure.
[01:26:22.600 --> 01:26:27.560]  Because as someone who tried to understand these things 25 years ago, that's what we're missing, right?
[01:26:27.680 --> 01:26:29.560]  The real international collaboration.
[01:26:29.920 --> 01:26:30.960]  So I just...
[01:26:30.960 --> 01:26:31.360]  Might be happening.
[01:26:31.720 --> 01:26:32.700]  I just joined it.
[01:26:32.820 --> 01:26:34.520]  It's been around for at least 20 years.
[01:26:35.480 --> 01:26:37.320]  You remember David Lyon, L-Y-O-N?
[01:26:38.220 --> 01:26:40.800]  He's known as like the godfather of surveillance studies.
[01:26:41.800 --> 01:26:44.540]  British sociologist who worked at Queen's University in Canada for a long time.
[01:26:45.000 --> 01:26:46.320]  Just retired a year or two ago.
[01:26:47.600 --> 01:26:51.020]  But essentially, it's this network of academics around the world that work on surveillance.
[01:26:51.020 --> 01:26:52.620]  And it used to be...
[01:26:52.620 --> 01:26:53.820]  I think it started in the UK maybe.
[01:26:54.840 --> 01:26:57.240]  It's historically been heavily European.
[01:26:58.060 --> 01:27:00.000]  And now there are more people in Canada who are part of it.
[01:27:00.440 --> 01:27:02.640]  They just had a big conference in Ljubljana, Slovenia.
[01:27:02.780 --> 01:27:03.500]  That I went to in May.
[01:27:04.380 --> 01:27:10.460]  About 300 people from around North America, Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East.
[01:27:11.960 --> 01:27:13.500]  So pretty big.
[01:27:13.680 --> 01:27:14.780]  It was mostly academics.
[01:27:14.840 --> 01:27:18.120]  But also a decent amount of social society people too.
[01:27:19.040 --> 01:27:20.500]  So they released talks online?
[01:27:23.340 --> 01:27:25.980]  Do you have somewhere to access now and stuff like that?
[01:27:27.160 --> 01:27:28.220]  But yeah, if you look them up.
[01:27:28.300 --> 01:27:29.240]  Surveillance Studies Network.
[01:27:29.340 --> 01:27:31.780]  I think it's surveillance-studies.com maybe.
[01:27:40.210 --> 01:27:44.250]  And like here, it's a group that's sort of innately critical.
[01:27:45.910 --> 01:27:50.650]  But doing a critical academic work on surveillance to ideally change things.
[01:27:55.540 --> 01:28:01.020]  What about, you know, I'm not trying to like necessarily go back to the truckers.
[01:28:01.200 --> 01:28:03.740]  But they were kind of symptomatic of...
[01:28:05.060 --> 01:28:09.280]  To me, like didn't everything go too far with COVID?
[01:28:10.640 --> 01:28:17.240]  Like as an American coming in, like I was one of the first people in like the little window that you could get across the border.
[01:28:17.240 --> 01:28:20.100]  And so I had my COVID card.
[01:28:20.460 --> 01:28:22.400]  Like I had a paper card.
[01:28:22.400 --> 01:28:24.880]  Which was like...
[01:28:24.880 --> 01:28:37.180]  Which was like...
[01:28:37.180 --> 01:28:37.300]  So...
[01:28:37.300 --> 01:28:52.240]  Like everybody was like...
[01:28:52.240 --> 01:28:55.520]  You know, I actually like injured myself trying to fucking get there.
[01:28:55.700 --> 01:28:56.120]  You know what I mean?
[01:28:56.660 --> 01:28:57.020]  Like...
[01:28:57.020 --> 01:28:57.800]  But like...
[01:28:57.800 --> 01:28:58.820]  Yeah, I just...
[01:28:58.820 --> 01:29:00.120]  I mean...
[01:29:00.120 --> 01:29:15.580]  Has there not been more of a development of like awareness and culture around the surveillance economy in Canada as a result of everybody being like, Hey, how come I need to like have this app in my phone and like go to the gas station or whatever?
[01:29:16.540 --> 01:29:21.060]  So there wasn't really an app to show that you had been vaccinated?
[01:29:21.640 --> 01:29:23.360]  No, but they had the...
[01:29:23.360 --> 01:29:26.000]  Wasn't there the tracking thing that...
[01:29:26.000 --> 01:29:26.520]  No, it was...
[01:29:26.520 --> 01:29:27.480]  Contact tracing.
[01:29:27.700 --> 01:29:27.800]  Sorry.
[01:29:28.140 --> 01:29:29.760]  Yeah, that was a total failure of...
[01:29:29.760 --> 01:29:30.640]  But that was also...
[01:29:30.640 --> 01:29:31.580]  Yeah, that was opt-in.
[01:29:31.720 --> 01:29:32.580]  That was required.
[01:29:33.140 --> 01:29:34.860]  And none of it was actually required.
[01:29:35.240 --> 01:29:36.720]  And the thing that the truckers...
[01:29:37.100 --> 01:29:39.900]  Like vaccine passports was not actually like...
[01:29:39.900 --> 01:29:40.860]  No, no, I know.
[01:29:40.900 --> 01:29:42.080]  It was in the U.S.
[01:29:42.480 --> 01:29:42.600]  Right.
[01:29:43.060 --> 01:29:43.420]  Right.
[01:29:44.220 --> 01:29:44.860]  So I don't know.
[01:29:44.860 --> 01:29:48.200]  They were complaining about a lot of policies that were not actually Canadian policies.
[01:29:48.280 --> 01:29:48.300]  Right.
[01:29:48.860 --> 01:29:51.800]  You know, everything they were complaining about was conspiratorial.
[01:29:51.940 --> 01:29:53.380]  Yeah, it was total nonsense.
[01:29:54.760 --> 01:29:56.420]  I'm not disagreeing with that.
[01:29:56.540 --> 01:30:00.680]  But I'm just saying like, now it's in the psyche a little bit.
[01:30:00.800 --> 01:30:02.000]  The collective psyche.
[01:30:02.200 --> 01:30:02.740]  I don't think so.
[01:30:02.940 --> 01:30:05.800]  Because the people that are sane sign them off as nut jobs.
[01:30:06.100 --> 01:30:08.280]  And the people who aren't are already crazy nut jobs.
[01:30:08.740 --> 01:30:09.140]  So...
[01:30:09.140 --> 01:30:09.220]  Yeah.
[01:30:09.520 --> 01:30:09.800]  Fair enough.
[01:30:10.380 --> 01:30:10.520]  Yeah.
[01:30:11.600 --> 01:30:12.000]  Too bad.
[01:30:13.100 --> 01:30:15.380]  It's tragic fucking waste on all fronts, I guess.
[01:30:18.880 --> 01:30:23.500]  Yeah, it's hard to get people in Canada to really care viscerally about things.
[01:30:23.780 --> 01:30:24.000]  I know.
[01:30:26.720 --> 01:30:28.960]  I find it scarier than the U.S., in a way.
[01:30:30.060 --> 01:30:30.500]  Although...
[01:30:30.500 --> 01:30:31.440]  It's a little creepy.
[01:30:31.440 --> 01:30:33.140]  Do you have a political situation here now?
[01:30:33.140 --> 01:30:33.660]  I'm not sure.
[01:30:33.840 --> 01:30:35.360]  I have a tax inspector that I had to let in my home.
[01:30:36.300 --> 01:30:37.040]  Like, I've never...
[01:30:37.040 --> 01:30:39.300]  Like, as an American, that was kind of like...
[01:30:39.300 --> 01:30:39.740]  For why?
[01:30:40.760 --> 01:30:43.400]  For like, for how much to charge me property tax.
[01:30:43.520 --> 01:30:45.400]  Like, she actually walks through my fucking house.
[01:30:45.560 --> 01:30:46.100]  Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[01:30:46.360 --> 01:30:47.040]  Like, that's crazy.
[01:30:47.240 --> 01:30:47.740]  Where do you live?
[01:30:48.240 --> 01:30:48.860]  Quebec City.
[01:30:49.140 --> 01:30:49.380]  Oh.
[01:30:49.380 --> 01:30:49.640]  Oh.
[01:30:50.020 --> 01:30:50.880]  I like...
[01:30:50.880 --> 01:30:54.860]  And granted, I live, like, in the, like, world hit the UNESCO zone.
[01:30:55.280 --> 01:30:56.660]  But like, I think they...
[01:30:56.660 --> 01:30:58.980]  She acted like it was business as usual.
[01:30:58.980 --> 01:30:59.600]  Yeah.
[01:30:59.720 --> 01:31:02.600]  And she was so nice and so accommodating, too.
[01:31:02.720 --> 01:31:05.600]  Like, I was like, dude, I'm not in Quebec for like, months.
[01:31:05.640 --> 01:31:08.100]  She's like, that's okay, just call me and we'll have an appointment.
[01:31:08.100 --> 01:31:08.420]  You know?
[01:31:08.820 --> 01:31:10.980]  And like, you know, and I suck at French.
[01:31:11.400 --> 01:31:16.560]  And like, she was so patient and like, almost like, you know, like, literally like a teacher.
[01:31:16.900 --> 01:31:17.320]  You know?
[01:31:17.580 --> 01:31:30.340]  And I was like, well, I guess, you know, I mean, you know, that's the front line of like, you know, if you're going to insist on, on, on, you know, Francophonie, then, you know, you have to like, have, you know, some people are going to have to be patient.
[01:31:30.840 --> 01:31:31.380]  You know?
[01:31:31.560 --> 01:31:33.220]  I think you were lucky, but not usually that patient.
[01:31:35.460 --> 01:31:37.280]  I spent a lot of fucking money on that house.
[01:31:37.680 --> 01:31:39.100]  It better be nice to me.
[01:31:42.560 --> 01:31:44.940]  Silly question, but also relevant.
[01:31:45.780 --> 01:31:52.860]  It was claimed to me that between 100,000 and 200,000 U.S. draft dodgers moved to Toronto.
[01:31:52.860 --> 01:31:55.540]  Maybe that's a BS, but I've heard that claim.
[01:31:55.680 --> 01:31:57.080]  With Vietnam or Iraq?
[01:31:57.900 --> 01:32:00.200]  Yeah, I had a couple of uncles that did, yeah.
[01:32:01.120 --> 01:32:03.000]  Now, naturally, they're not all still alive.
[01:32:03.660 --> 01:32:06.820]  You can include Jane Jacobs and other Americans who were alive.
[01:32:08.480 --> 01:32:08.880]  Right.
[01:32:10.120 --> 01:32:11.040]  I think we all do.
[01:32:11.520 --> 01:32:12.540]  In this room, probably.
[01:32:14.720 --> 01:32:18.860]  But, you know, so civil society, like, it was naturally...
[01:32:18.860 --> 01:32:20.540]  It had other opportunities.
[01:32:20.840 --> 01:32:23.120]  There were big consequences for that, at least in the 70s and 80s.
[01:32:23.240 --> 01:32:25.000]  And, like, some of those folks are still alive, right?
[01:32:25.100 --> 01:32:25.260]  Yeah.
[01:32:25.820 --> 01:32:31.640]  But, so, in my experience of the, you know, sort of scatter effect of that is...
[01:32:32.480 --> 01:32:34.340]  The effect ended up back in the U.S., though.
[01:32:34.620 --> 01:32:40.700]  You know, because now I have an uncle that he, you know, he goes around doing workshops on how to become a conscientious objector.
[01:32:40.700 --> 01:32:41.760]  But that's in the U.S.
[01:32:42.640 --> 01:32:48.240]  He didn't, you know, for all I know, he didn't necessarily leave his mark on civil society in Canada.
[01:32:48.400 --> 01:32:49.980]  He just stayed out there, right?
[01:32:59.270 --> 01:33:02.090]  So, I'm excited that there are some of you who are here from Canada.
[01:33:02.970 --> 01:33:04.470]  Who are, I'm guessing, going back?
[01:33:04.970 --> 01:33:05.170]  Yep.
[01:33:05.830 --> 01:33:06.890]  Just here for the week.
[01:33:07.550 --> 01:33:11.730]  Which side of the border, like, which crossing do you, do you get more grief?
[01:33:12.650 --> 01:33:13.650]  If I can ask.
[01:33:13.650 --> 01:33:14.930]  Tell me a question.
[01:33:15.410 --> 01:33:16.010]  Yeah, me too.
[01:33:16.230 --> 01:33:18.150]  Yeah, I'm a, I'm a dual citizen.
[01:33:18.570 --> 01:33:23.310]  I still get more grief coming to the U.S. because they just don't like it that I live in Canada.
[01:33:23.910 --> 01:33:24.030]  Yeah.
[01:33:25.150 --> 01:33:26.590]  What kind of grief do you guys get?
[01:33:26.810 --> 01:33:28.030]  Like, what, what do they see?
[01:33:28.850 --> 01:33:38.310]  You're showing eight months for three hours, and the canine officer got in a freaking physical confrontation with my case officer because he was so pissed he had to keep searching my car.
[01:33:41.350 --> 01:33:44.210]  I used to have more trouble until I was in my 40s and well-employed.
[01:33:45.770 --> 01:33:46.830]  And now I don't have...
[01:33:46.830 --> 01:33:47.570]  What do they say, though?
[01:33:47.650 --> 01:33:52.090]  Like, what's the, what's the premise for them, like, harassing you?
[01:33:54.730 --> 01:33:57.350]  Um, yeah, I mean, I would, I, I had...
[01:33:57.350 --> 01:34:00.590]  If I ever explained I was a dual citizen, that would be...
[01:34:00.590 --> 01:34:01.030]  Oh...
[01:34:01.030 --> 01:34:02.450]  And they were fucking cough drops.
[01:34:02.990 --> 01:34:03.570]  With Ty!
[01:34:03.870 --> 01:34:04.530]  Ty writing!
[01:34:04.830 --> 01:34:07.050]  And I said to the guy, I was like, oh, I think that's Ty.
[01:34:07.310 --> 01:34:08.590]  And he said, no, it's definitely Arab.
[01:34:11.770 --> 01:34:13.810]  But they can't not admit to you, right?
[01:34:15.310 --> 01:34:15.950]  That, so...
[01:34:16.790 --> 01:34:17.670]  I think you're right.
[01:34:17.890 --> 01:34:18.010]  Yeah.
[01:34:18.130 --> 01:34:19.250]  I was...
[01:34:19.250 --> 01:34:20.630]  Not trying to understand, because I...
[01:34:20.630 --> 01:34:23.970]  I was too, I, you know, I was young and inexperienced or whatever.
[01:34:24.090 --> 01:34:26.810]  I didn't want to, you know, I was like, okay, just walk all over me.
[01:34:26.810 --> 01:34:29.290]  And then I was back at work complaining about it.
[01:34:29.390 --> 01:34:32.590]  And my boss was like, I would've been like, I'm an American fucking citizen!
[01:34:34.690 --> 01:34:35.890]  Which is a valid point.
[01:34:36.350 --> 01:34:38.330]  I think, I think you can insist on your rights.
[01:34:38.490 --> 01:34:38.770]  I don't know.
[01:34:38.930 --> 01:34:42.270]  This is a real bummer, you know, because I'm an Indian citizen and everywhere...
[01:34:42.270 --> 01:34:45.270]  Every water crossing is, like, really stressful and, like, full of harassment.
[01:34:45.730 --> 01:34:54.230]  And I think, like, American and Canadian citizens, I think they have, like, a really glamorous, like, they show up, they scan the popcorn, like, yeah, all right, just...
[01:34:54.730 --> 01:34:56.670]  There's certainly, there's certainly white privilege.
[01:34:56.890 --> 01:34:58.910]  Do you ever seen that episode of Silicon Valley?
[01:34:59.770 --> 01:35:05.210]  Where the, uh, the Canadian guy and the Indian guy both go to get their, uh, visa renewed?
[01:35:07.590 --> 01:35:11.310]  And, like, the Indian guy's not out of his car yet, and the Canadian guy's already done.
[01:35:15.230 --> 01:35:24.710]  I was, I was married to a brown Asian, and she, uh, she got pulled into secondary at, uh, at a Canadian crossing.
[01:35:25.290 --> 01:35:28.150]  That, uh, you know, I was, I watched her.
[01:35:28.710 --> 01:35:33.070]  And then, and then I walked up, and, uh, and the guy, and the guy was like, do you know that woman?
[01:35:33.170 --> 01:35:34.270]  I was like, that's my wife, dude!
[01:35:34.270 --> 01:35:35.130]  You know?
[01:35:35.190 --> 01:35:36.050]  And he's like, oh, sorry.
[01:35:36.390 --> 01:35:36.470]  You know?
[01:35:38.990 --> 01:35:42.610]  I'm just talking to Paul that you guys also have trouble crossing water.
[01:35:42.830 --> 01:35:45.750]  Like, this is completely contrary to my expectations.
[01:35:47.710 --> 01:35:56.910]  I think I've been very fortunate, but I, I have learned, luckily not the hard way, that I'm like, no matter what you do, you never say the word hacking.
[01:35:57.270 --> 01:35:58.810]  I'm not going to do a hacking conference.
[01:35:59.710 --> 01:36:01.370]  What about the stickers on your laptop?
[01:36:02.110 --> 01:36:03.630]  Uh, they don't usually get that far.
[01:36:04.510 --> 01:36:05.890]  Did, did they ask you where you were going?
[01:36:06.090 --> 01:36:06.810]  When you were talking?
[01:36:06.810 --> 01:36:08.130]  Uh, yeah, they asked where I was going.
[01:36:08.270 --> 01:36:09.510]  I said, like, New York, why?
[01:36:09.850 --> 01:36:11.230]  And it said, like, see friends, tech conference.
[01:36:11.910 --> 01:36:12.010]  Yeah.
[01:36:12.390 --> 01:36:13.510]  I think they asked.
[01:36:13.710 --> 01:36:14.470]  Nice and ambiguous.
[01:36:14.830 --> 01:36:14.990]  Yeah.
[01:36:16.010 --> 01:36:18.090]  This was one of the few times they didn't ask me anything.
[01:36:18.930 --> 01:36:20.450]  They scanned my passport, and it was like, see ya.
[01:36:20.710 --> 01:36:20.930]  Mm.
[01:36:21.650 --> 01:36:21.870]  Yeah.
[01:36:21.870 --> 01:36:22.070]  Okay.
[01:36:22.070 --> 01:36:22.510]  Yeah.
[01:36:22.790 --> 01:36:23.510]  I'm not American.
[01:36:24.390 --> 01:36:24.690]  Yeah.
[01:36:26.050 --> 01:36:30.510]  My, a friend, um, he got, like, the border agents can do whatever they want.
[01:36:30.650 --> 01:36:32.070]  He got into an argument with a U.S.
[01:36:32.190 --> 01:36:33.870]  border officer, and he got banned from the U.S.
[01:36:33.890 --> 01:36:34.350]  for life.
[01:36:34.690 --> 01:36:34.950]  What?
[01:36:36.570 --> 01:36:38.430]  So, one argument, one time.
[01:36:38.750 --> 01:36:38.870]  Wow.
[01:36:39.010 --> 01:36:39.230]  Life?
[01:36:39.530 --> 01:36:39.770]  Yeah.
[01:36:40.490 --> 01:36:41.830]  He can never enter the U.S.
[01:36:41.870 --> 01:36:42.010]  again.
[01:36:42.290 --> 01:36:47.450]  I was just about to say, are you obligated to answer that question, like, when they ask you, like, what you're doing, like, when you're leaving the country?
[01:36:48.590 --> 01:36:50.690]  I think you have to do whatever they say, right?
[01:36:51.410 --> 01:36:52.050]  I mean...
[01:36:52.050 --> 01:36:56.910]  Well, I mean, like, you don't have, like, any rights to, like, tell them, like, you know, like, I don't feel comfortable answering that question or anything.
[01:36:57.030 --> 01:36:59.170]  I don't know, but I feel like it's one of those things.
[01:36:59.350 --> 01:37:04.250]  It's the same with police, where it's like, your rights end wherever they want it to.
[01:37:04.250 --> 01:37:09.070]  Like, you know, they'll do what they want, and if they want to screw you over, they can.
[01:37:09.450 --> 01:37:12.730]  So, kind of comply, and if you really don't want to, brace yourself.
[01:37:13.310 --> 01:37:15.450]  There are definitely multiple sets of, like, rules, though, right?
[01:37:15.570 --> 01:37:18.710]  If you're a citizen, like, with the signs about, like, facial recognition, right?
[01:37:18.890 --> 01:37:22.210]  If you're a citizen, you know, it's like, oh, we'll delete it within blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.
[01:37:22.370 --> 01:37:22.650]  Right.
[01:37:22.650 --> 01:37:24.770]  If you're not a citizen, basically get screwed, right?
[01:37:24.890 --> 01:37:25.010]  Yeah.
[01:37:25.150 --> 01:37:25.970]  We'll do what we want.
[01:37:26.350 --> 01:37:30.390]  So, like, there's, I'm not a lawyer, but there are definitely different rules around, like, which you kind of can't do.
[01:37:30.510 --> 01:37:32.250]  Because I know, for a fact, there's a Supreme Court case on it.
[01:37:32.330 --> 01:37:33.410]  They can't not let you in.
[01:37:34.130 --> 01:37:36.570]  They can let you in and arrest you, but they can't not let you in.
[01:37:37.710 --> 01:37:38.190]  Which direction?
[01:37:38.570 --> 01:37:39.150]  To the United States.
[01:37:39.730 --> 01:37:41.030]  Going to Canada was super easy.
[01:37:41.390 --> 01:37:42.730]  I could have just been going weird.
[01:37:43.010 --> 01:37:43.270]  I don't know.
[01:37:44.230 --> 01:37:46.090]  I don't know if you guys have been to, like, Montreal Airport, right?
[01:37:46.210 --> 01:37:50.550]  But, like, you go to this, like, giant hub, and you go to, like, the thing, pick your passport, does the thing, blah, blah, blah.
[01:37:50.550 --> 01:37:55.670]  You can take a receipt, and then you just, like, walk through, and then you hand the receipt to someone who doesn't look at it.
[01:37:56.370 --> 01:37:58.870]  And then you're in the country, and you're like, I could just hand that guy a Starbucks receipt.
[01:38:00.410 --> 01:38:01.750]  What was the point of this?
[01:38:02.750 --> 01:38:03.950]  Maybe I'll try that tomorrow.
[01:38:05.570 --> 01:38:06.670]  You're Canadian citizen, right?
[01:38:08.530 --> 01:38:09.770]  This is what we should give you.
[01:38:10.390 --> 01:38:13.250]  Well, they don't want to let you in without your Canadian passport, though.
[01:38:13.390 --> 01:38:18.350]  For both ways, for dual citizens, I have to enter the United States on an American passport.
[01:38:18.350 --> 01:38:19.870]  They won't, they'll hate me.
[01:38:20.050 --> 01:38:20.630]  Yeah, I did the same.
[01:38:20.730 --> 01:38:24.770]  The same way with the Canadian one, but they only did it in retaliation to the American one.
[01:38:24.910 --> 01:38:27.230]  So, you have to enter Canada on your Canadian passport.
[01:38:28.270 --> 01:38:28.590]  Stupid.
[01:38:28.910 --> 01:38:29.490]  So, it's stupid.
[01:38:29.650 --> 01:38:30.690]  You have to travel with two passports.
[01:38:31.330 --> 01:38:32.130]  Yeah, we have the same thing.
[01:38:32.270 --> 01:38:36.250]  Anyone from Europe has to have an East Day, the electronic visa in the same year.
[01:38:36.570 --> 01:38:38.590]  So, six months later, Europe says, it's what?
[01:38:38.750 --> 01:38:40.250]  All Americans have to have to go to Europe.
[01:38:40.510 --> 01:38:42.990]  Yeah, it was, like, around the Patriot Act time, I think.
[01:38:42.990 --> 01:38:45.830]  Like, that's when I'm gonna start eating a passport to go to Canada.
[01:38:46.010 --> 01:38:46.190]  New.
[01:38:46.470 --> 01:38:47.890]  Yeah, it's not anything implemented yet.
[01:38:48.050 --> 01:38:49.590]  I think it's next year now?
[01:38:49.710 --> 01:38:50.830]  I was just there and I checked.
[01:38:51.050 --> 01:38:52.030]  And you didn't have to do it yet.
[01:38:52.670 --> 01:38:54.310]  I think it was 2025 because they delayed it.
[01:38:54.450 --> 01:38:56.210]  Do Canadians have to, or just Americans?
[01:39:01.070 --> 01:39:01.850]  It's pretty wide.
[01:39:03.130 --> 01:39:05.950]  I think we're 70 countries have to have it to come to the next day.
[01:39:06.290 --> 01:39:10.790]  People that have the right to come without a visa have to get this electronic thing.
[01:39:12.110 --> 01:39:14.950]  Excuse me, Evan, do you know this thing that clones your phone?
[01:39:15.830 --> 01:39:17.190]  Can it also make a copy?
[01:39:18.750 --> 01:39:19.250]  What do you mean?
[01:39:19.430 --> 01:39:22.930]  So, they copy my phone and then they take another phone and they copy it.
[01:39:22.930 --> 01:39:23.270]  No, no, no.
[01:39:23.670 --> 01:39:25.010]  It's like making an image of a CD.
[01:39:25.010 --> 01:39:27.350]  So, they make an image of your phone onto a computer.
[01:39:27.510 --> 01:39:27.790]  Right.
[01:39:28.050 --> 01:39:30.490]  But then, but could then they put that image back onto another phone?
[01:39:30.790 --> 01:39:31.830]  I would suppose so.
[01:39:32.050 --> 01:39:38.570]  It opens up marvelous opportunities for spoofing.
[01:39:38.570 --> 01:39:43.430]  If I'm not mistaken, don't they typically use exploits in order to jailbreak the image?
[01:39:44.350 --> 01:39:45.750]  Isn't that more or less how it works?
[01:39:46.010 --> 01:39:46.790]  I'm not sure.
[01:39:47.470 --> 01:39:49.510]  I think the issue is hardware identifiers.
[01:39:49.510 --> 01:39:54.890]  So, the hardware identifiers might change between different devices.
[01:39:55.990 --> 01:40:01.230]  It's kind of like taking the contents of someone's brain and putting in someone else's body.
[01:40:01.430 --> 01:40:02.370]  So, the body is different.
[01:40:02.570 --> 01:40:07.490]  So, there's always going to be subtle changes and you can tell that it's a spoof.
[01:40:08.230 --> 01:40:11.610]  But there are stuff, there is stuff that you use both of them.
[01:40:11.630 --> 01:40:12.510]  You understand?
[01:40:15.830 --> 01:40:17.410]  That's basically kind of about the answer.
[01:40:17.570 --> 01:40:17.850]  But yeah.
[01:40:20.270 --> 01:40:21.910]  There are tools to copy phones.
[01:40:22.490 --> 01:40:25.630]  But definitely advanced, definitely using those kinds of exploits.
[01:40:37.590 --> 01:40:46.990]  It doesn't sound like they have like an FDI style, like, but they can somehow bypass the
[01:40:53.150 --> 01:41:08.730]  Because I thought when Celebrate, for example, broke it down, they said certain models they could definitely get into, and if I remember correctly, it was because the iOS exploits for that specific model, and then some of them were processor-based exploits.
[01:41:10.710 --> 01:41:15.930]  One of the big ones with Apple was they plugged into the port, and they could take it down.
[01:41:15.930 --> 01:41:17.070]  It was active.
[01:41:17.430 --> 01:41:19.670]  Yeah, and then Apple came out with that.
[01:41:20.070 --> 01:41:20.590]  Apple came out with that.
[01:41:24.870 --> 01:41:27.090]  But it's, you know, it's a little...
[01:41:27.090 --> 01:41:27.570]  It's academy.
[01:41:27.830 --> 01:41:28.550]  You go back and forth.
[01:41:29.190 --> 01:41:34.870]  Is there any Android hardware that put that much effort into defeating these things in the battle?
[01:41:35.130 --> 01:41:36.850]  Or is it just Apple is actually putting in that?
[01:41:37.970 --> 01:41:39.990]  The chip and the Pixel is supposed to be.
[01:41:40.010 --> 01:41:43.990]  I think Apple likes to say that they're out for you.
[01:41:43.990 --> 01:41:50.050]  Well, there's an Android problem that's more secure called Graphene.
[01:41:50.490 --> 01:41:53.190]  That locks it, that's a lot more locked down like iOS.
[01:41:53.590 --> 01:41:57.750]  And it takes advantage of that, whatever the chip is, it's only in the pixels, right?
[01:41:58.010 --> 01:41:59.710]  Yeah, well, yeah, it only runs the pixels.
[01:41:59.930 --> 01:42:04.290]  And now your Apple has a mode that you can do that's very, very limited.
[01:42:05.250 --> 01:42:07.090]  It limits you, too, what you can do.
[01:42:07.230 --> 01:42:09.090]  But it's for journalists and...
[01:42:09.090 --> 01:42:10.250]  Yeah, locked down like that.
[01:42:13.230 --> 01:42:18.350]  But I mean, they do have an advantage, Apple, in that they are not trying to sell...
[01:42:18.350 --> 01:42:21.030]  You know, they're not trying to mine your data and sell to other people.
[01:42:21.190 --> 01:42:21.570]  Not yet.
[01:42:21.570 --> 01:42:21.650]  Yeah.
[01:42:22.750 --> 01:42:24.290]  Or not at great levels.
[01:42:24.390 --> 01:42:25.190]  They still do it.
[01:42:25.410 --> 01:42:30.430]  But, you know, so they do say privacy is our important thing.
[01:42:30.590 --> 01:42:34.690]  We're the, you know, and they do it well but not 100%.
[01:42:34.690 --> 01:42:37.050]  Until they're pressured to have a new revenue stream.
[01:42:37.430 --> 01:42:37.650]  Yeah.
[01:42:39.070 --> 01:42:42.610]  Once, you know, they start eyeing NVIDIA and they're like, damn.
[01:42:42.610 --> 01:42:42.710]  Yeah.
[01:42:44.310 --> 01:42:48.270]  So I think we've got like five minutes before the 9 p.m.
[01:42:48.390 --> 01:42:49.310]  session starts to set up.
[01:42:49.870 --> 01:42:55.450]  Any people in this room who are at U of T must know this.
[01:42:55.630 --> 01:43:05.830]  There was a woman who came from the University of Toronto to Harvard about, God, I can't even remember, like 12 years ago or something, talking about border technologies between Canada and Europe.
[01:43:05.930 --> 01:43:07.290]  So talking about privilege.
[01:43:08.650 --> 01:43:11.470]  I thought we lost three minutes to go back and forth, you know.
[01:43:11.630 --> 01:43:13.710]  But there are some interesting questions baked into that.
[01:43:13.850 --> 01:43:15.310]  And like, I'm just vaguely remembering.
[01:43:15.470 --> 01:43:18.010]  And I, sorry, I don't know who her, what her name is or anything.
[01:43:18.410 --> 01:43:19.570]  I should have bought her book.
[01:43:19.750 --> 01:43:23.130]  But there's a, there's a lot happening as you must know.
[01:43:23.450 --> 01:43:29.510]  You know, like there was, at the time there was something about, you know, they didn't want to build, of course, Canada and U.S.
[01:43:29.790 --> 01:43:31.590]  exit controls as well as entry controls.
[01:43:31.750 --> 01:43:35.390]  So there was a data exchange agreement in place.
[01:43:36.610 --> 01:43:37.850]  Which was creepy at the time.
[01:43:37.950 --> 01:43:41.370]  I'm sure things have evolved a whole lot since this would be 50 years ago or whatever.
[01:43:42.130 --> 01:43:45.670]  So there, and she, she shared all these details that I never even heard about.
[01:43:45.930 --> 01:43:46.030]  Right?
[01:43:46.830 --> 01:43:49.650]  Oh, I remember she, she hadn't written the book yet.
[01:43:49.790 --> 01:43:51.370]  And I was pressuring her, like, he's right.
[01:43:51.770 --> 01:43:55.190]  All this inside information on what really happens on the Canada-U.S.
[01:43:55.230 --> 01:43:55.490]  border.
[01:43:55.670 --> 01:43:56.390]  But that was the answer.
[01:43:56.630 --> 01:43:58.910]  So I don't know if she's still at U.S.
[01:43:58.910 --> 01:43:59.310]  or whatever.
[01:43:59.570 --> 01:44:04.270]  Well, there is the like, I don't remember what the act was called, but it came into effect.
[01:44:04.270 --> 01:44:07.190]  Like, the year after 9-11, I think.
[01:44:07.450 --> 01:44:10.830]  And it was like, this thing where the Canadian and U.S.
[01:44:10.910 --> 01:44:14.010]  border services would like, work together from then on.
[01:44:14.250 --> 01:44:17.890]  And like, they've worked very, very closely with everything and shared a bunch of data.
[01:44:17.890 --> 01:44:21.250]  And they always, and they have for like, ever since then.
[01:44:21.550 --> 01:44:22.750]  And like, they still do.
[01:44:22.890 --> 01:44:28.950]  But a lot of like, Canadian American agencies, especially in law enforcement and intelligence, have always worked very closely together.
[01:44:29.490 --> 01:44:36.250]  So, like, similar agreements exist between like, FBI and RCMP, between NSA and CSC, like...
[01:44:36.250 --> 01:44:40.190]  Sure, but there was a moment in time when suddenly the EDI was turned on.
[01:44:40.350 --> 01:44:43.490]  That electronic data interchange of every single vehicle moving back and forth.
[01:44:43.670 --> 01:44:44.790]  This woman was super cool.
[01:44:44.790 --> 01:44:48.090]  She talked about how you could take a kayak and canoe and all these different ways.
[01:44:48.090 --> 01:44:50.830]  You could go back and forth and just beat all these little corner faces.
[01:44:51.130 --> 01:44:52.310]  So, she was so obsessed.
[01:44:52.510 --> 01:44:53.890]  Like, her talk was super cool.
[01:44:54.110 --> 01:44:54.450]  That's awesome.
[01:44:54.450 --> 01:44:55.590]  I don't know what happened to her.
[01:44:55.670 --> 01:44:59.790]  And she's like, oh, you don't have constitutional rights within a hundred miles or...
[01:45:00.530 --> 01:45:01.830]  A hundred miles of the U.S.
[01:45:01.870 --> 01:45:02.050]  border.
[01:45:02.430 --> 01:45:04.430]  International waters and this and that.
[01:45:04.570 --> 01:45:07.450]  It was like, all this hairy stuff that doesn't matter, but super cool.
[01:45:07.750 --> 01:45:08.550]  And I was at a conference?
[01:45:09.230 --> 01:45:11.590]  She just was giving a talk at Harvard that I just happened to her.
[01:45:11.590 --> 01:45:11.870]  Oh, Harvard.
[01:45:12.310 --> 01:45:17.650]  But I think around that same time, the ACLU put out a report on this hundred-mile situation.
[01:45:17.830 --> 01:45:20.230]  And it was every single large city in the U.S.
[01:45:20.430 --> 01:45:21.950]  is within a hundred miles of the border.
[01:45:22.250 --> 01:45:22.510]  Most of the population, yeah.
[01:45:22.530 --> 01:45:24.130]  And so nobody has any fucking rights.
[01:45:26.170 --> 01:45:29.390]  I was talking to the Restore the Fourth guy about that.
[01:45:30.930 --> 01:45:37.110]  When you're coming up through, you know, Texas and Arizona, you could be a hundred miles to the border and border control will stop you.
[01:45:39.710 --> 01:45:40.070]  Yeah.
[01:45:43.090 --> 01:45:45.010]  And it's also, and it's a very nebulous thing.
[01:45:45.190 --> 01:45:46.810]  Like, what do you have to say, what don't you?
[01:45:46.870 --> 01:45:49.110]  I don't say, like, they let me go on.
[01:45:50.130 --> 01:45:53.210]  So, actually, one of the questions came up, like, ten minutes ago.
[01:45:53.330 --> 01:45:54.870]  I'm looking up on the ACLU website.
[01:45:55.030 --> 01:45:55.910]  Some people know the rights.
[01:45:56.770 --> 01:46:01.750]  If you're an American citizen, you cannot be refused entry into the country.
[01:46:02.030 --> 01:46:07.190]  And you need not answer any questions, except for those establishing your student's individual identity.
[01:46:07.690 --> 01:46:09.410]  If you're not an American citizen, that's wrong.
[01:46:09.730 --> 01:46:10.250]  Oh, that's wrong.
[01:46:10.390 --> 01:46:10.530]  Yeah.
[01:46:10.850 --> 01:46:14.970]  But, as an American citizen, obviously, like, whatever's going to keep you there for a little bit.
[01:46:15.270 --> 01:46:16.010]  A little bit.
[01:46:16.750 --> 01:46:17.170]  Yeah.
[01:46:18.670 --> 01:46:23.590]  By the way, it is, in theory, in the law, illegal for them to divide entry up.
[01:46:23.590 --> 01:46:26.870]  Do you guys remember the last question before leaving?
[01:46:27.330 --> 01:46:27.690]  Right?
[01:46:27.830 --> 01:46:31.170]  Like, I've been in a couple of different countries where you were asking me questions before even before.
[01:46:31.410 --> 01:46:32.510]  And, once again, I'm a citizen.
[01:46:32.770 --> 01:46:34.350]  So, like, once again, it's like, you're not border control.
[01:46:34.510 --> 01:46:34.550]  Why?
[01:46:35.230 --> 01:46:35.850]  You're Delta.
[01:46:37.410 --> 01:46:38.690]  Why do you care where I stayed?
[01:46:38.890 --> 01:46:47.070]  So, if you noticed, I don't know if the U.S. still does this, but the U.S. can post exit controls immediately after large terrorist events.
[01:46:47.070 --> 01:46:48.990]  So, I noticed this in the 2000s.
[01:46:49.210 --> 01:46:54.010]  There would be a person at every gate, every plane leaving internationally during a couple of days.
[01:46:54.670 --> 01:46:56.250]  And they had no electronics.
[01:46:56.510 --> 01:46:58.990]  They were just literally looking for specific people.
[01:46:59.210 --> 01:47:00.710]  So, this was interesting to see.
[01:47:00.990 --> 01:47:02.670]  This backup staff.
[01:47:02.950 --> 01:47:09.130]  This massive backup staff appear at every, apparently, every large international airport.
[01:47:09.130 --> 01:47:12.170]  Well, I'm assuming now you have, like, they just search the flight manifests.
[01:47:12.490 --> 01:47:14.170]  I would assume they have that technology now.
[01:47:14.550 --> 01:47:14.710]  Really?
[01:47:14.910 --> 01:47:15.050]  No?
[01:47:15.410 --> 01:47:20.110]  They can still print on the, like, really old printers for a reason.
[01:47:20.210 --> 01:47:21.510]  Because it's really...
[01:47:21.510 --> 01:47:22.710]  I think there's nothing on it.
[01:47:22.790 --> 01:47:23.870]  The no-fly list?
[01:47:23.970 --> 01:47:26.110]  The no-fly list was based on your name.
[01:47:26.530 --> 01:47:26.810]  Yep.
[01:47:27.070 --> 01:47:28.830]  I know someone answered that, yes.
[01:47:29.210 --> 01:47:34.770]  So, the wife of Senator Stevens from Alaska's name is Catherine, who's Cat Stevens.
[01:47:35.790 --> 01:47:36.110]  Awwww.
[01:47:37.530 --> 01:47:41.110]  His mom, she would always get ganged because her name was Cat Stevens.
[01:47:41.770 --> 01:47:44.830]  They were about the case in the UK where the guy, it was for a passport.
[01:47:45.070 --> 01:47:46.050]  They, like, wouldn't issue it.
[01:47:47.070 --> 01:47:48.990]  And eventually, like, you have to go and they'd issue it.
[01:47:49.050 --> 01:47:49.390]  It was fine.
[01:47:49.470 --> 01:47:50.870]  But he's like, why does this keep happening?
[01:47:51.290 --> 01:47:55.170]  And they're like, well, your name is, like, the same as someone else's, and so it catches.
[01:47:55.650 --> 01:47:57.210]  And he's like, well, how do I stop that from happening?
[01:47:57.390 --> 01:47:58.710]  They're like, well, have you tried changing your name?
[01:47:59.450 --> 01:48:01.690]  I was like, how is that a serious answer?
[01:48:01.850 --> 01:48:02.090]  Oh, yeah.
[01:48:02.090 --> 01:48:03.410]  I don't think of that.
[01:48:03.510 --> 01:48:04.530]  I don't think of that.
[01:48:04.530 --> 01:48:04.590]  I don't think of that.
[01:48:05.270 --> 01:48:05.890]  John Smith.
[01:48:06.130 --> 01:48:06.170]  No.
[01:48:07.770 --> 01:48:08.170]  Yeah.
[01:48:09.150 --> 01:48:15.130]  You know, a friend of mine, he named his son, Mike Jr. And he says, we're singing every day.
[01:48:15.270 --> 01:48:17.210]  He was on the side of the road in handcuffs four times.
[01:48:17.410 --> 01:48:19.390]  And they tried to figure out, it's him or his son.
[01:48:19.810 --> 01:48:22.070]  His son always used, he was a drug angle.
[01:48:22.290 --> 01:48:24.790]  He always used his mom's address, but he got arrested.
[01:48:25.290 --> 01:48:27.090]  And he sounds a big speaker, right?
[01:48:28.570 --> 01:48:29.050]  Yeah.
[01:48:29.170 --> 01:48:33.790]  I heard a story about airports, because they're all running old-ass COBOL mainframes.
[01:48:34.990 --> 01:48:37.210]  And, like, non-ASCII characters.
[01:48:37.490 --> 01:48:41.690]  But there's someone with, like, a Swedish name, which had the two dots above an A.
[01:48:41.690 --> 01:48:45.910]  And, like, the Swedish standard is when you can't type that, you put two A's.
[01:48:46.070 --> 01:48:47.670]  And it's understood to be the same.
[01:48:48.050 --> 01:48:52.270]  So, on the top, there was his name written with UNIX.
[01:48:52.610 --> 01:48:57.410]  And just like, or not UNIX, Unicode, with, you know, the dots and everything.
[01:48:57.410 --> 01:48:59.590]  But then the bottom bar, that's ASCII.
[01:48:59.670 --> 01:49:00.690]  That's what the computers read.
[01:49:00.830 --> 01:49:02.110]  And that didn't match.
[01:49:02.530 --> 01:49:08.050]  And so, like, every time he flew to America, they'd stop him and be really confused, because your passport does not match your name.
[01:49:08.690 --> 01:49:09.950]  And it was a nightmare.
[01:49:11.010 --> 01:49:11.230]  Yeah.
[01:49:11.510 --> 01:49:14.530]  I used to work for a guy whose name was spelled on his license.
[01:49:16.450 --> 01:49:17.870]  And somehow it's never been a problem.
[01:49:17.930 --> 01:49:18.550]  I don't understand.
[01:49:22.830 --> 01:49:37.370]  I don't know if it's not only tangents related to airports, but while we're on the topic, something that's gone away with the age of, like, Apple Law and, like, some recording passes, that I think has not really gotten a lot of attention, is that, you know,
[01:49:37.410 --> 01:49:43.130]  back in the day, you go to the airport, you type in your last name, you book and code, and you get a paper recording pass, right?
[01:49:43.530 --> 01:49:44.390]  Waste of paper, whatever.
[01:49:44.390 --> 01:49:48.750]  But it would tell you, if you're going to get your secondary flux, yeah.
[01:49:49.210 --> 01:49:50.210]  That was really cool.
[01:49:50.390 --> 01:49:54.170]  And now it's like, I walk out of the gate, it's like, oh, how am I going to make my flux?
[01:49:54.310 --> 01:49:55.190]  Yeah, it's a crap shoot.
[01:49:57.470 --> 01:49:59.630]  Yeah, that was the SSSS on there.
[01:49:59.790 --> 01:50:00.410]  Something on the middle street.
[01:50:02.790 --> 01:50:06.610]  And I, back in the early days, I would get a book in a one way.
[01:50:07.810 --> 01:50:10.990]  And so I got to where I would just always book a round trip.
[01:50:11.310 --> 01:50:13.010]  The return trip was always the first class.
[01:50:13.010 --> 01:50:13.610]  And don't make cash.
[01:50:13.610 --> 01:50:15.130]  And then first class.
[01:50:15.290 --> 01:50:16.810]  And then I just refunded it as I landed.
[01:50:18.510 --> 01:50:20.550]  You know, it's gotten good with the terrorists with them too.
[01:50:22.050 --> 01:50:22.450]  Yes.
[01:50:26.110 --> 01:50:27.790]  It's the illusion of security.
[01:50:28.070 --> 01:50:28.950]  Yeah, security.
[01:50:29.570 --> 01:50:29.970]  Security.
[01:50:31.030 --> 01:50:33.950]  You know, the U.S.
[01:50:34.130 --> 01:50:38.310]  has gone through this big deal to try and get everything in alignment with real ID.
[01:50:39.130 --> 01:50:47.550]  Does confederation affect, like, is it really disparate where, like, there's even different information on the different provincial IDs?
[01:50:47.550 --> 01:50:50.510]  And what is the federal form?
[01:50:50.610 --> 01:50:53.710]  I mean, I assume it's about the same, like, passports, military ID.
[01:50:55.090 --> 01:50:56.130]  What am I forgetting?
[01:50:56.870 --> 01:50:57.910]  Something else better.
[01:50:58.010 --> 01:50:58.390]  Driver's life.
[01:50:58.950 --> 01:50:59.470]  Yes.
[01:51:00.930 --> 01:51:04.410]  I can't get a real ID for a little reason.
[01:51:04.910 --> 01:51:08.530]  So I asked the DMV, what should I do?
[01:51:08.730 --> 01:51:09.870]  And they told me literally that.
[01:51:09.970 --> 01:51:11.290]  They said, have you tried changing your name?
[01:51:13.690 --> 01:51:14.090]  Jesus.
[01:51:14.290 --> 01:51:15.370]  That's a bit late in the game.
[01:51:15.550 --> 01:51:17.450]  Like, I'm too old for that.
[01:51:19.170 --> 01:51:23.350]  Unironically, they said, we called Albany, and they said, the only solution is if you change your name.
[01:51:24.710 --> 01:51:26.010]  Are you doing like this?
[01:51:26.990 --> 01:51:28.950]  So I'm going to pack up this 9 p.m.
[01:51:28.970 --> 01:51:29.770]  session getting set up.
[01:51:29.890 --> 01:51:31.510]  If you guys want to email me, feel free.
[01:51:31.770 --> 01:51:32.850]  Addresses are up there.
[01:51:33.210 --> 01:51:34.030]  Signal as well.
[01:51:34.890 --> 01:51:35.790]  It's been awesome.
[01:51:36.050 --> 01:51:36.890]  Thank you so much.