[00:00.000 --> 00:06.220]  So this will be a serious crowd control situation for safety reasons.
[00:06.420 --> 00:12.080]  We really need to get people distributed in all these rooms come keynote time.
[00:12.540 --> 00:14.080]  But I want to track from this talk.
[00:14.380 --> 00:15.860]  We all know who the EFF is.
[00:16.160 --> 00:17.020]  We all love them.
[00:17.300 --> 00:19.300]  Four of them are here.
[00:19.480 --> 00:23.320]  The fifth one is en route by a cab right now and we'll be here momentarily.
[00:23.560 --> 00:38.320]  But a lot has happened in our community over the past couple years since the most recent hope, hope number nine, which it's almost mind-boggling to think back just what all has happened in the past couple of years that EFF has been involved with, we've all been following.
[00:38.740 --> 00:48.940]  So you've all read the description of this talk, but basically we've got a group here of some of the finest lawyers, activists, technologists, and policy analysts from the EFF.
[00:49.380 --> 00:51.900]  And this is going to be not just a talk.
[00:52.020 --> 00:53.620]  This is going to be largely Q&A.
[00:53.820 --> 01:01.260]  So I'm going to let them introduce themselves and you will all have an opportunity to ask the EFF EFF about things that are on your mind.
[01:01.460 --> 01:01.820]  Thank you.
[01:10.160 --> 01:11.380]  Good morning, everybody.
[01:11.700 --> 01:12.540]  Thank you for coming.
[01:13.380 --> 01:22.680]  I assume that most of you are familiar with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, but for that one person who's not, I'll give a brief introduction of what we are.
[01:22.760 --> 01:27.480]  We are a nonprofit civil liberties organization that's dedicated to defending your rights online.
[01:27.660 --> 01:28.520]  We fight for privacy.
[01:28.680 --> 01:29.460]  We fight for fair use.
[01:29.480 --> 01:37.880]  We fight for freedom online to allow people to express themselves and make the world a better place, a future that you want to live in.
[01:38.640 --> 01:43.800]  And we have, we've had an interesting year over the last 12 months.
[01:44.080 --> 01:47.100]  A lot of that having to do with the national security space.
[01:47.120 --> 01:50.840]  You'll probably be seeing a lot about that over the course of this conference.
[01:51.580 --> 01:58.760]  So we're going to go and each of us will give a few minutes, a description of what we've been up to over the last year.
[01:58.760 --> 02:03.900]  Talking about some of the EFF projects briefly, but then we'll get into your questions pretty quickly.
[02:04.180 --> 02:08.660]  So we can have basically this talk directed by you to your interests.
[02:10.000 --> 02:11.740]  And so let me, let me start out.
[02:11.940 --> 02:13.480]  I am Kurt Opsahl.
[02:13.640 --> 02:16.020]  I am an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[02:16.520 --> 02:21.940]  So I work on several of our cases, our NSA cases.
[02:22.100 --> 02:32.780]  We now have actually, as of earlier this week, we have three cases that we're working on against the National Security Surveillance Program.
[02:32.780 --> 02:39.660]  Uh, first one was, uh, uh, uh, Juul, or is Juul, uh, Juul versus NSA.
[02:39.920 --> 02:53.140]  Uh, that was filed in 2008, uh, based on, uh, information that came out at that time, including information from a whistleblower, Mark Klein, about AT&T's cooperation and collaboration with the NSA Surveillance Program.
[02:53.140 --> 02:57.020]  Uh, and that suit has been going on for quite some time.
[02:57.200 --> 03:01.160]  It went, uh, up to the Appeals Court, back down to the District Court, where it is right now.
[03:01.900 --> 03:12.400]  Uh, last summer, after, uh, uh, some of the new, uh, uh, information and, uh, additional details were being released, uh, through, uh, Edward Snowden's leaks.
[03:12.400 --> 03:18.560]  Uh, we had, uh, another lawsuit filed, uh, first Unitarian versus, uh, uh, NSA.
[03:18.960 --> 03:23.140]  Uh, this is, uh, a case that is focused on the right of association.
[03:23.360 --> 03:31.560]  The right of you as a part of an organization to not have the membership of that organization, who you're associating with, known by the government.
[03:31.700 --> 03:32.980]  Preserve your anonymity in that.
[03:33.080 --> 03:44.280]  So a group of 20, uh, organizations from all across, uh, political spectrums joined together with, uh, to sue the NSA, to protect their right of association from the phone records program.
[03:44.520 --> 03:47.820]  Because the phone record program was able to look at all of their calls.
[03:47.960 --> 03:52.740]  And from that you could derive who's a member of the organization and who, how often they're chatting with each other.
[03:53.540 --> 04:01.440]  Uh, and then just earlier this week, uh, we announced that together with the, uh, ACLU, we were going to be helping with a, uh, another case, uh, Smith v.
[04:01.580 --> 04:02.020]  Obama.
[04:02.300 --> 04:08.720]  This was a case that was, uh, filed and, uh, uh, actually had gone through the, the district court.
[04:09.260 --> 04:20.380]  Unfortunately, uh, the district court, uh, said, uh, that, uh, well, dismissed the case saying that, uh, the program, uh, 215 phone records program was okay and now that is being appealed.
[04:20.500 --> 04:27.900]  So we came in with the ACLU to help on that appeal and try and get the appellate court to realize that it is unconstitutional, that it is illegal.
[04:28.540 --> 04:34.980]  Uh, in addition to, uh, the NSA cases, I've been working on a case, uh, for national security letters.
[04:34.980 --> 04:41.560]  These are letters that the FBI can issue without a judge, without a warrant, uh, without really much process at all.
[04:41.660 --> 04:44.840]  Issue them to a service provider to find out information about the customers.
[04:45.100 --> 04:49.020]  And the service provider is not allowed to say that they even have received one.
[04:49.360 --> 04:55.960]  Uh, so we got a court to declare them unconstitutional, uh, back in March, uh, of last year.
[05:04.580 --> 05:07.420]  Uh, the government has appealed that, as you might expect.
[05:07.620 --> 05:08.900]  So we are defending that appeal.
[05:09.060 --> 05:16.360]  We just finished the briefing, uh, and we're expecting to go to, uh, oral argument probably in five or six months.
[05:16.680 --> 05:20.240]  Uh, things move at a very stately pace, uh, in the appellate process.
[05:20.720 --> 05:26.140]  Uh, so that's just, uh, a small sampling of some of the litigation work that we've been doing.
[05:26.420 --> 05:29.280]  Uh, but now let me see my colleague, Peter.
[05:30.240 --> 05:30.720]  Peter.
[05:30.720 --> 05:31.160]  Hi, everyone.
[05:31.420 --> 05:32.620]  Uh, my name is Peter Eckersley.
[05:32.860 --> 05:48.580]  Uh, I lead EFF's team of technologists who are, uh, both advisors to the organization in terms of making sure that it understands how the Internet works, how, how technology works, all of the theoretical computer scientific underpinnings of the policy work that we do,
[05:48.680 --> 05:51.600]  so that we know which battles are the most important ones to fight.
[05:51.980 --> 05:57.600]  Uh, and we also build, uh, actual products and systems that we put out into the world.
[05:57.600 --> 05:59.980]  Um, so good things to ask me about.
[06:00.160 --> 06:02.360]  You could, uh, talk about some of those projects.
[06:02.480 --> 06:15.940]  There's, uh, our efforts to encrypt the web, both by persuading companies to offer, uh, HTTPS when they didn't beforehand, uh, through offering client upgrade support via HTTPS everywhere, uh, for Firefox, Chrome, and other browsers.
[06:16.660 --> 06:21.280]  Um, our efforts to make sure that once the web is actually encrypted, it's genuinely secure.
[06:21.280 --> 06:30.280]  We've had projects like, uh, uh, uh, the SSL observatory, uh, to find weak points in that TLS encryption infrastructure and, and get them fixed.
[06:31.020 --> 06:46.240]  Uh, we have projects to try and, uh, we have a new project that's just starting called, uh, uh, start TLS everywhere that tries to offer the same kind of, uh, authentication options for email server to email server encryption that have been lacking until now.
[06:46.900 --> 06:49.460]  Uh, so that's one large effort we have.
[06:49.580 --> 06:58.180]  You know, the, the, the, the slogan version of it, uh, starting in about 2009 was, uh, let's try to encrypt the entire web in about five years.
[06:58.680 --> 07:00.560]  Uh, we're probably not gonna do it in five.
[07:00.820 --> 07:04.860]  It'll, it might take seven or eight, but we, we are actually making a huge amount of progress there.
[07:05.560 --> 07:13.540]  Um, other good projects to talk about include the, uh, open wireless, um, uh, router project that we launched here at, uh, HOPE.
[07:13.940 --> 07:27.700]  Uh, and another thing that I'm gonna be talking about is, uh, at length on Sunday at 6 PM, uh, is privacy badger, which is a browser extension that figures out which third parties on the web are tracking you without your consent and then automatically blocks them,
[07:27.840 --> 07:32.020]  whether they're visible advertisers or invisible JS or widgets.
[07:32.920 --> 07:41.160]  Um, and then on the policy side, you can, uh, it's great to ask questions about the way that, uh, that the technical perspective informs what EFF does.
[07:41.300 --> 07:55.700]  Uh, and a good examples of that over the years include our role in the fight against SOPA and PIPA, the Internet blacklist bills a few years ago, where the ability to show up and make technical arguments seem to actually make a big difference to that policy fight.
[07:56.020 --> 07:58.660]  Uh, the current fights around network neutrality are very interesting.
[08:00.220 --> 08:07.960]  Um, and, uh, you know, that's actually been something that, you know, years ago we, we fought with Comcast around reset injection into BitTorrent traffic.
[08:07.960 --> 08:14.060]  Now, again, we're seeing more subtle discrimination by ISPs usually around peering contracts and, and other subtle things.
[08:14.280 --> 08:17.320]  Uh, so all of that is, uh, the stuff that I work on day to day.
[08:20.430 --> 08:25.270]  Hi, my name is Eva Galperin and I'm a global policy analyst for the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
[08:25.570 --> 08:34.310]  Um, I work on EFF's international team, which means that I spend all of my time worrying about all the places that are not the United States.
[08:35.170 --> 08:37.610]  So, I have a lot to worry about.
[08:38.250 --> 08:45.950]  Um, over the last year, I have really spent a lot of time focusing on vulnerable populations, both inside and outside the U.S.
[08:46.170 --> 08:50.470]  And that's usually, uh, journalists, dissidents, and activists.
[08:51.390 --> 08:56.130]  Uh, my work has primarily been focused in the post-Soviet states.
[08:56.130 --> 08:57.910]  I've done some work in Vietnam.
[08:57.910 --> 09:03.510]  I did, uh, a bunch of work, uh, with, uh, Ethiopian dissidents, uh, this year.
[09:03.990 --> 09:10.250]  Uh, later, uh, you can ask Nate about that time that we sued the government of Ethiopia, which is an ongoing case.
[09:10.510 --> 09:19.330]  I spend a lot of my time working on the privacy and security advice that EFF gives to these vulnerable populations.
[09:19.470 --> 09:26.410]  So, I've spent time working on revamping EFF's long, out-of-date, uh, surveillance self-defense guide.
[09:26.410 --> 09:44.150]  I have just helped launch, uh, the digital first aid kit along with a bunch of other NGOs, which I hope will be useful for, for people who have, um, sort of, uh, digital emergencies, but are not really sure exactly what is going on or how they can be asking.
[09:44.450 --> 09:52.230]  Um, if you have questions about, uh, surveillance not just in the United States, but surveillance of non-U.S.
[09:52.370 --> 09:56.470]  persons, surveillance by countries other than the U.S., I am the person to ask.
[09:56.690 --> 10:06.910]  Uh, if you have questions about, you know, phone development or exploits or, uh, surveillance software, I'm also the person to talk to about that.
[10:07.270 --> 10:09.170]  Uh, I think that's about it.
[10:10.230 --> 10:11.070]  Uh, cool.
[10:11.270 --> 10:11.690]  Hey, everyone.
[10:11.950 --> 10:13.050]  I'm Adi Kamdar.
[10:13.230 --> 10:15.370]  I'm, uh, on the activism team at EFF.
[10:15.370 --> 10:18.370]  Uh, the activism team, what, what does that mean?
[10:18.870 --> 10:29.710]  Um, we, uh, everybody at EFF is an activist, but our team is focused on creating the campaigns, doing a lot of the, the public facing, take action, uh, side of, uh, of what we do.
[10:29.710 --> 10:41.450]  If ever you have, uh, called your congressman or, or, or, or signed a petition or done something like that, joined a, a, a march, something that we've, we've organized, um, that is my team.
[10:41.790 --> 10:46.330]  Um, recently, over the last year, it's been, it's been a, it's been a crazy one.
[10:46.790 --> 10:55.230]  Um, but, uh, a lot of what I've been focusing on, uh, apart from, uh, the campaigns that we've been working on is, um, uh, patent reform.
[10:55.230 --> 11:00.330]  Uh, that's an issue that, uh, oh man, um, we could talk about that.
[11:00.490 --> 11:07.770]  Uh, a lot of what we've been doing over the last year has been, um, pushing back against patent trolls and trying to, uh, actually pass patent reform.
[11:08.030 --> 11:25.050]  Uh, this is something that, um, when a lot seemed stalled and broken, uh, in Congress, and a lot is stalled and broken in Congress, um, this was kind of a, a glimmering beacon of hope as it was flying through and then it got killed, uh, murdered.
[11:25.310 --> 11:28.430]  So, uh, we can, uh, we can talk about that and how to move forward from there.
[11:28.950 --> 11:39.830]  Um, other things that I work on are things like open access to research, which is, um, a very, uh, important issue for us and something we've picked up, uh, in the last, uh, year, year and a half.
[11:40.130 --> 11:43.990]  Um, uh, especially since, uh, our friend, uh, Aaron Schwartz's death.
[11:44.110 --> 11:45.310]  This was something he was passionate about.
[11:45.690 --> 11:51.310]  Um, and, uh, I do a lot of work on consumer privacy and on state-level legislation.
[11:53.410 --> 11:55.250]  Hey, my name is Nate Cardozo.
[11:55.430 --> 12:00.090]  I'm a staff attorney, uh, at EFF, as you might imagine since I'm sitting up here on the Ask EFF panel.
[12:00.710 --> 12:07.290]  Uh, I do, uh, free speech and privacy generally, um, uh, working with Curt a lot.
[12:07.590 --> 12:13.370]  Uh, some of the things that I do, uh, is I participate in some of EFF's FOIA litigation.
[12:13.730 --> 12:23.370]  Um, for instance, we just sued, uh, the NSA and the DOJ, uh, uh, for access to their so-called vulnerabilities equities process.
[12:23.730 --> 12:30.570]  This is the balancing test that, uh, NSA uses to decide whether to report a vulnerability or sit on it.
[12:30.730 --> 12:45.950]  Um, as Eva mentioned, I, uh, am the lead attorney in the case where we are suing the government of Ethiopia, uh, for wiretapping our client, an American citizen who, uh, goes by his pseudonym, Mr. Kidane, uh, at his home in Silver Spring, Maryland, uh,
[12:46.490 --> 12:51.130]  and shipping all of his Skype calls back to a command and control server in Ethiopia.
[12:51.910 --> 12:55.750]  Um, I also work on EFF's Who Has Your Back project.
[12:56.070 --> 13:03.930]  Uh, this is a project where EFF awards gold stars, um, to the nice little companies that treat user data well when the government comes knocking.
[13:04.170 --> 13:15.770]  Uh, we, we award good practices for things like posting law enforcement guidelines, transparency report, always demanding a content for data, and fighting for your rights in the courts and Congress.
[13:16.350 --> 13:18.230]  Um, so that's the sort of thing that I do.
[13:18.390 --> 13:24.310]  Uh, and then one thing that Kurt didn't mention that the two of us work on together, uh, is we work on EFF's Coders Rights Project.
[13:24.310 --> 13:47.270]  And this is the project, uh, that if you are a security researcher, uh, a developer, an academic who wants to do security research or has done security research or wants to present about their research at a conference, uh, or publish a paper on it, and you have legal questions about what you've done or what you want to do or what you're about to do or what you're about to talk about on stage in
[13:47.270 --> 13:53.570]  front of a whole bunch of feds, uh, and you want legal If you have legal advice, please email us before you do that.
[13:53.930 --> 13:56.890]  Info at EFF.org is a great way to get in touch with us.
[13:57.150 --> 13:57.870]  Thank you.
[13:58.230 --> 13:58.850]  You're welcome.
[14:00.190 --> 14:01.090]  So that's about it.
[14:01.590 --> 14:01.690]  Cool.
[14:02.270 --> 14:02.530]  All right.
[14:02.650 --> 14:04.510]  Well, so now we'll turn to your questions.
[14:05.610 --> 14:13.350]  As we said, as Nate was saying, we do advise a lot of people about issues that they may have, but this is not the forum for that.
[14:13.510 --> 14:16.870]  You want to have a privileged conversation with us if you're looking for legal advice.
[14:16.870 --> 14:21.710]  And going up to a microphone in front of a crowd of people is not a privileged situation.
[14:22.610 --> 14:26.750]  So what we're about to say is, you know, about EFF, but it will not be legal advice.
[14:26.750 --> 14:36.310]  If you need legal advice, come talk to us elsewhere, and we will try and see what we can do in a more private circumstance.
[14:36.770 --> 14:40.390]  So I believe that there is a microphone in the middle here.
[14:40.670 --> 14:43.630]  It's in this middle row here.
[14:43.630 --> 14:48.010]  So if anybody has a question, we can begin.
[14:49.530 --> 14:50.110]  Hi.
[14:50.450 --> 14:51.030]  Hi.
[14:51.110 --> 14:52.750]  I have a question about FOIA.
[14:53.010 --> 14:57.190]  Now, you mentioned that the EFF is currently involved in several FOIA suits.
[14:57.590 --> 14:59.450]  I've filed FOIA requests myself.
[14:59.450 --> 15:01.390]  I've filed a couple of appeals.
[15:02.310 --> 15:13.010]  Could you just outline the process by which, you know, how something goes from just a FOIA request into an actual, you know, a lawsuit against a federal agency?
[15:13.010 --> 15:13.530]  Sure.
[15:14.550 --> 15:16.890]  So the question is about FOIA.
[15:17.190 --> 15:18.810]  FOIA is a federal law.
[15:18.970 --> 15:24.070]  So as the question assumes, you can only file a FOIA request for a federal agency.
[15:24.270 --> 15:25.910]  Every state has an equivalent.
[15:26.550 --> 15:27.830]  California is the Public Records Act.
[15:27.850 --> 15:30.110]  A lot of states, it's called FOIA.
[15:30.270 --> 15:31.610]  Sometimes it's a sunshine bill.
[15:32.130 --> 15:34.490]  But what you do is you write a letter, generally.
[15:34.750 --> 15:37.650]  It can be very informal, saying, this is my FOIA request.
[15:37.710 --> 15:38.370]  Here's what I want.
[15:38.670 --> 15:41.610]  In the federal system, they have 20 working days to respond.
[15:42.010 --> 15:45.530]  If they don't respond within 20 working days, you can just plain sue.
[15:45.990 --> 15:47.330]  And sometimes that's what we do.
[15:47.430 --> 15:51.530]  And that's what we did in the vulnerabilities equities process FOIA that I mentioned.
[15:51.530 --> 15:56.290]  We didn't wait for their response, because they blew their statutory deadline, so we just plain sued.
[15:57.370 --> 16:05.030]  Sometimes they do give you a response, which says, we're working on it, and therefore you have the right to sue then and there.
[16:05.690 --> 16:08.190]  Sometimes they give you a response saying, go fly a kite.
[16:08.310 --> 16:09.230]  We're not giving you anything.
[16:09.690 --> 16:15.990]  There are nine exemptions to the FOIA, which I will be happy to get into, but this is probably not the context.
[16:17.270 --> 16:19.970]  And they say that the documents that you wanted are exempt.
[16:20.530 --> 16:22.830]  And at that point, you can appeal.
[16:23.330 --> 16:27.590]  The appeal is just another letter that you write saying, hey, you guys, you're wrong.
[16:27.590 --> 16:29.110]  They're not exempt for these reasons.
[16:29.630 --> 16:32.530]  And then sometimes they actually turn around and say, oh, yeah, you're right.
[16:32.730 --> 16:33.450]  Here it is.
[16:34.250 --> 16:37.270]  But usually they say, no, go fly a kite, and then you can sue.
[16:39.250 --> 16:41.890]  So that's pretty much the way you do it.
[16:44.230 --> 16:45.950]  We're lawyers, so we know how to write a complaint.
[16:46.130 --> 16:49.730]  It's not that hard to sue in federal court.
[16:50.470 --> 16:54.450]  I would recommend if you want to do it, talk to a lawyer, get a lawyer.
[16:54.570 --> 16:59.970]  Or if you want to do it by yourself, just go to EFF.org and look at some of our FOIA complaints and crib from them.
[17:00.550 --> 17:01.930]  They're yours for the cribbing.
[17:04.190 --> 17:04.790]  Hi.
[17:05.030 --> 17:21.390]  I just wanted to get a general feeling from you all about how safe it is to be doing DDOS, using the Internet for free speech to protest different companies.
[17:21.390 --> 17:23.670]  Just kind of a general feeling.
[17:23.830 --> 17:27.370]  I'm sure you've been involved in many, many litigations.
[17:27.570 --> 17:30.270]  But is it getting safer or more dangerous?
[17:32.210 --> 17:43.210]  I'm not really sure that I understand your question, but I'm going to start by answering it in the way that we traditionally answer questions at EFF.
[17:43.210 --> 17:45.070]  Which is that it depends.
[17:48.070 --> 17:49.470]  And it's complicated.
[17:51.290 --> 18:03.030]  But I would start by saying that your free speech rights online are definitely under threat, no matter where you are on the planet right now, no matter whose jurisdiction you are in.
[18:03.030 --> 18:09.530]  In some places, your free speech rights are more under threat than others.
[18:09.790 --> 18:20.830]  If, for example, you would like to come out and write something online opposing the Chinese government while located in Beijing, this is not going to work out well for you.
[18:21.750 --> 18:29.430]  If, on the other hand, you are in the United States, you are protected by the First Amendment.
[18:29.730 --> 18:33.410]  But there are also a number of ways in which the First Amendment is really under attack.
[18:33.590 --> 18:39.690]  And I imagine that Daniel Ellberg will discuss this at length in his keynote.
[18:40.370 --> 18:49.430]  Furthermore, we're actually seeing some really interesting developments in countries that you wouldn't normally think of as big opponents of free speech online.
[18:49.430 --> 18:52.910]  like Australia and the UK.
[18:53.390 --> 19:07.770]  Just in the last couple of days, we have seen some legislation in the UK which has really vastly expanded the surveillance capabilities of GCHQ.
[19:08.010 --> 19:12.290]  And that's the British equivalent of the NSA.
[19:12.290 --> 19:30.610]  We've seen some legislative proposals in Australia just earlier this week that would essentially make it illegal to do the kind of reporting that the Washington Post and the Intercept and the Guardian have done on the Snowden leaks.
[19:30.610 --> 19:34.970]  If these leaks were about national security issues in Australia.
[19:36.530 --> 19:49.090]  So, if you think that threats to free speech only exist in authoritarian regimes and that the world is really divided up into the West and the rest, this is simply not true.
[19:49.790 --> 19:51.950]  So, I think that's an important point to make.
[19:51.950 --> 19:55.230]  The other is you asked a quick question about DDoS.
[19:55.670 --> 20:15.730]  It is true that one of the ways in which free speech online is under attack, especially in certain countries, especially in the post-Soviet states, is that if somebody uses a platform or service to speak out against the government in some sort of political way,
[20:15.730 --> 20:24.210]  the pro-political forces will turn around and launch a distributed denial of service attack against that platform.
[20:24.550 --> 20:31.070]  There have been some really interesting developments in sort of anti-DDoS services recently.
[20:31.670 --> 20:41.950]  There is a non-profit organization called Deflect that offers DDoS protection for journalists and dissidents and NGOs.
[20:41.950 --> 20:53.970]  There is also a company called Cloudflare that has started up a service that will, under some circumstances, give their services for free to certain startups.
[20:54.270 --> 20:58.950]  Sorry, not to startups, to dissidents and journalists and NGOs.
[20:59.890 --> 21:11.090]  So, we're starting to see this sort of stuff made much more available and hopefully this will make sort of speech which is being targeted by DDoS attacks much more robust.
[21:11.910 --> 21:23.470]  In the United States, have there been any important legal decisions in the past couple of years that indicate things are getting more safe or significantly less safe?
[21:26.650 --> 21:28.050]  Safer on what?
[21:28.230 --> 21:28.970]  First Amendment.
[21:29.230 --> 21:29.990]  On the First Amendment.
[21:32.450 --> 21:32.890]  First Amendment.
[21:32.890 --> 21:33.170]  I asked a couple of questions.
[21:33.170 --> 21:34.330]  You want to say something about the legal?
[21:35.650 --> 21:36.090]  I asked a couple of questions.
[21:36.090 --> 21:36.230]  All right.
[21:36.430 --> 21:45.770]  So, the question was whether or not things, decisions over the last couple of years that things are getting more or less safe for the First Amendment online.
[21:45.770 --> 21:53.770]  I think that, on the whole, the First Amendment has been doing well in the courts online.
[21:54.770 --> 22:14.020]  There have been probably not too many major First Amendment Internet decisions, but this is also because that has generally worked out well at a lower court level where it comes up primarily, actually, where the First Amendment is interacting with IP.
[22:14.020 --> 22:14.620]  Well, yeah, IP.
[22:14.880 --> 22:23.840]  There are cases where people are using, like, the DMCA Copyright Act to take down speech and that comes up in the context of fair uses.
[22:24.760 --> 22:42.240]  So, probably the, one of the more troubling decisions that we've seen in the last year was one, Garcia versus Google, where this ended up where Google had to take down a video, The Innocents of Muslims.
[22:42.540 --> 22:45.200]  This video was very controversial when it first came out.
[22:45.740 --> 22:53.140]  One of the actresses involved in that sued Google saying that she had a copyright in it on account of being in the film.
[22:53.140 --> 22:56.120]  This is a non-standard way of looking at copyright.
[22:56.280 --> 23:00.080]  Usually, it's the person who makes the film that has the copyright in it, not the people in the film.
[23:00.960 --> 23:12.240]  But, nevertheless, on the basis of that copyright, the court ordered Google to remove all traces of that film, no links to it, take it off of YouTube.
[23:13.740 --> 23:20.440]  And that was a little bit disturbing from a free speech perspective, because say what you will about the film, or whether it was a good or a bad film.
[23:20.800 --> 23:23.320]  It is an interesting, controversial issue.
[23:23.960 --> 23:31.380]  And if people are going to discuss the newsworthiness of the film, or whether or not it's a good or a bad film, having a reference point is useful.
[23:34.060 --> 23:43.180]  It was the appeals court who did this, but, nevertheless, their decision is being appealed to the larger Ninth Circuit Court, and we will see how that decision goes.
[23:43.180 --> 23:51.980]  So, there are sort of two other major threats to free speech online that I think are worth mentioning.
[23:52.300 --> 24:02.120]  The first is that, in the United States, the great exception to free speech is frequently copyrighted material.
[24:02.120 --> 24:24.080]  And one of the interesting things that we've really seen in the last couple of years is a movement to sort of export this view of free speech to other countries, in the form of free trade agreements and multilateral trade agreements, such as ACTA, which we killed last year.
[24:29.440 --> 24:37.420]  But, just in case you thought that the coast is clear, now we're seeing a lot of the same language come up in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
[24:38.000 --> 24:44.040]  So, much like a zombie, this is an idea that just keeps getting up and trying to eat our brains.
[24:46.040 --> 25:06.900]  So, one of the things that we're really doing a lot of on the international team is we send people all over the world opposing these free trade agreements and talking about the ways in which normalizing copyright law across countries actually just exports these attacks on free speech and often normalizes a level of protection for free speech,
[25:07.000 --> 25:13.740]  which is less than the protection that already exists in the United States and less than the protection that already exists in many other countries.
[25:13.940 --> 25:18.900]  So, this is sort of one way that attacks on free speech make it through the sort of IP back door.
[25:19.600 --> 25:27.220]  The other big threat to free speech that we're really seeing in the last couple of years is that free speech isn't really free on the Internet.
[25:27.620 --> 25:32.860]  Most of the time, if you are speaking, you are using somebody else's platform to do so.
[25:33.060 --> 25:40.460]  And you're pretty much at their mercy because it's not about your free speech rights, it's about their free speech rights as the owner of the platform.
[25:40.760 --> 25:44.940]  So, if you are using Twitter, you do not have free speech rights on Twitter.
[25:44.940 --> 25:51.140]  Twitter can decide what you are allowed to say based on their terms of service and they may change that at any time.
[25:51.360 --> 25:57.020]  The same is true on Facebook, the same is true on Google Plus for both of you who use that.
[26:00.560 --> 26:19.320]  And so, one of the things that EFF has been working on is a site called OnlineCensorship.org, which we've just gotten a big grant from the Knight Foundation to work on, where people can report sort of take downs of material on these sort of third-party platforms,
[26:19.320 --> 26:28.380]  so that we can get some idea of what their policies really are and what they're like and find out whether or not there are kind of biases within these policies.
[26:28.380 --> 26:36.620]  Because frequently these companies are very opaque about what they will and will not take down and under what circumstances because they're really worried about people gaming the system.
[26:37.200 --> 26:47.820]  But this lack of transparency also means that you can have all kinds of hidden bias and people are constantly having stuff taken down and have absolutely no idea why that is the case.
[26:47.820 --> 26:54.220]  So, this is something that we spend a lot of time working on at EFF and I think it's one of the biggest threats to free speech online.
[26:55.180 --> 27:01.620]  That actually has nothing to do with the First Amendment at all because it never comes down to a court case.
[27:01.780 --> 27:03.980]  You're really at the mercy of these third-party platforms.
[27:06.420 --> 27:09.360]  You mentioned national security letters earlier.
[27:10.900 --> 27:24.120]  One of the techniques for working around that is by saying you have not received a national security letter on your website and having that disappear when you have.
[27:24.360 --> 27:28.840]  I was wondering if you could elaborate on the effectiveness of that, if any.
[27:29.440 --> 27:33.900]  All right, so the question was about warrant canaries, as they're sort of colloquially called.
[27:34.080 --> 27:38.720]  And this is the notion that when you're doing a transparency report, you say zero NSLs.
[27:38.720 --> 27:44.740]  Because until you get an NSL, you're not under any obligation to not say anything about NSLs.
[27:44.760 --> 27:48.400]  Because the obligation comes with receiving the NSL.
[27:48.760 --> 27:56.620]  And then in your next transparency report, because you are not allowed to say that you have received an NSL, you say nothing on the subject.
[27:56.640 --> 27:59.820]  And then maybe people make some inferences based on that absence.
[28:00.480 --> 28:05.800]  So a number of companies and service providers have put up warrant canaries.
[28:06.680 --> 28:10.260]  And it has yet to be tested in a court.
[28:10.520 --> 28:18.040]  The basic theory behind it is the notion that compelled speech is one of the things that's very difficult for courts to order.
[28:18.380 --> 28:31.920]  To say that you must say a lie is also a little bit unusual within our legal tradition to force someone to say, for example, they've gotten zero NSLs when in fact they have received one.
[28:33.140 --> 28:35.060]  It will be an interesting test case.
[28:35.300 --> 28:40.760]  And, you know, I hope that if it comes up, someone will get in touch with us so that we can have that test case.
[28:41.320 --> 28:49.360]  And hopefully fairly long before it will have to come to either be said or not said.
[28:49.360 --> 28:58.000]  Because courts, when they're in a rush, are more likely to come to a decision that might be unfortunate.
[28:58.980 --> 29:05.340]  So I think there are some good legal arguments why the courts and the government could not compel you to say a lie.
[29:06.300 --> 29:11.280]  But we'll have to have a test case to find out and bring that forward.
[29:11.680 --> 29:12.180]  Thank you.
[29:12.640 --> 29:14.800]  And I'll elaborate just a tiny bit on that.
[29:15.560 --> 29:23.160]  Two of the companies that did this this year that posted Warrant Canaries in a way that we really liked were Tumblr and Pinterest.
[29:23.160 --> 29:33.480]  Both of those companies said that they got zero FISA requests, zero NSLs, I think that just about...oh, and like zero 215 orders or something like that.
[29:34.820 --> 29:42.420]  They are releasing those reports every six months and on a three or four month delay.
[29:43.340 --> 29:53.000]  We actually appreciate that because if they got one of those sorts of orders, as Kurt mentioned, it could be litigated in sort of the cool light of morning, right?
[29:53.240 --> 30:03.660]  It wouldn't be an up all night trying to get a federal judge to rule that you're allowed to do something with no notice when the government's on the other side screaming about terrorism and national security.
[30:03.880 --> 30:09.400]  It would be an actual reasoned...we would have time to write a good brief.
[30:10.960 --> 30:17.640]  Because writing a good brief takes...you can do it in a single night and we've had to do that from time to time.
[30:18.180 --> 30:19.980]  But a couple of weeks really helps.
[30:20.400 --> 30:34.720]  So if you're considering doing a Warrant Canary at your own service provider or your startup or your company, think about whether you want to do the sort of daily, you know, we didn't get any FISA requests today.
[30:34.980 --> 30:36.540]  We didn't get any FISA requests today.
[30:36.540 --> 30:38.460]  Or if you want to do it every six months.
[30:39.260 --> 30:42.900]  Because we think that we at least would appreciate the time.
[30:43.620 --> 30:48.300]  If we're going to be the ones briefing it, think about giving us six months to do it.
[30:49.160 --> 30:49.880]  Thank you.
[30:51.440 --> 30:57.120]  Most everybody here, I expect, understands the importance of freedom, anonymity, privacy.
[30:57.120 --> 30:59.980]  My question is about outreach.
[31:00.300 --> 31:07.120]  When I try to get people interested in EFF, for example, they tell me privacy is dead.
[31:07.380 --> 31:09.480]  The government knows everything about you.
[31:09.660 --> 31:10.340]  Get over it.
[31:10.580 --> 31:12.120]  What do you say to that?
[31:14.080 --> 31:17.460]  Man, you're hanging out with Scott Neely from Sun Microsystems.
[31:19.940 --> 31:23.620]  So, I spend a lot of time answering this question.
[31:24.000 --> 31:33.200]  And you would think that this is a sort of more compelling statement in the United States than in other countries, especially given the Snowden revelations.
[31:33.920 --> 31:47.540]  But I have talked to activists in Egypt that, you know, before the uprising and the revolution and the counter-revolution said, Oh, we just do everything in public because the government knows everything all the time anyway.
[31:47.880 --> 31:50.580]  I've talked to people in China who say this.
[31:50.720 --> 31:52.060]  People in Vietnam.
[31:52.840 --> 31:56.800]  Places where it is very clear that the government wants everybody to think that they know everything.
[31:56.800 --> 32:03.520]  And what I tell them is this, especially if these are people who are, you know, actively opposed to the government.
[32:04.340 --> 32:09.060]  I tell them, this is what the government wants you to think because it makes you powerless.
[32:10.720 --> 32:17.880]  When you give in to privacy nihilism and you decide that you're not going to do anything, you've let the government win already.
[32:27.940 --> 32:39.440]  And for people who are inside of the United States who may lead more comfortable lives and may, you know, genuinely think that they have nothing to hide or don't spend their time, you know, violently denouncing the government.
[32:41.560 --> 32:44.640]  There are still a couple of reasons why you still have something to hide.
[32:44.740 --> 32:55.160]  There is a reason why you lock your door, there is a reason why you shut your curtains, there is a reason why you don't walk around naked or give me all of your passwords or your, uh, or your, you know, credit card information.
[32:55.160 --> 32:58.940]  You have things to hide, you just haven't really thought about them.
[32:59.360 --> 33:08.740]  And furthermore, even if you have nothing to hide, you have a duty to protect the rights of people who do have something to hide.
[33:08.740 --> 33:25.300]  One of the most interesting things that's really come out of the Snowden revelations, especially in these latest reports from the Washington Post and from the Intercept, is that Muslims have been disproportionately targeted by the government simply for being Muslim.
[33:25.980 --> 33:32.940]  I, for example, very rarely hear American Muslims telling me that they have nothing to hide and therefore they should do everything out in the open.
[33:32.940 --> 33:37.900]  So, for the people who really need it, you need to fight for these people.
[33:38.120 --> 33:40.100]  It's not just enough to cover your own ass.
[33:47.840 --> 33:58.740]  I think the truth is, speaking to a room full of hackers, it's up to you guys whether the government has all of the information about every person in the United States or in fact in many other countries.
[33:59.120 --> 34:14.620]  If we go out and we build technologies that are structurally secure, especially against dragnet surveillance where someone can just tap a fiber and get everyone's email, get everyone's browsing history, get everything from a single or a handful of points of collection,
[34:14.910 --> 34:16.890]  then that's the world we are going to live in.
[34:17.300 --> 34:26.100]  Whereas if we go out and we build systems where there aren't those single points that can be tapped so easily, then that's not going to be the world we'll live in.
[34:26.100 --> 34:35.310]  There is always going to be a cat and mouse game, a fight where your device gets hacked by some ode somewhere if someone targets you and governments are going to use that.
[34:35.460 --> 34:46.140]  But that's a very different game and it's very much more costly for governments to be going around and figuring out how to launch exploits against everyone's devices.
[34:47.200 --> 34:50.850]  And there are defenses we can start to put in place when that happens.
[34:51.060 --> 34:59.430]  So I think the answer is, you know, your friend is right only if she gives up, only if the people in this room give up.
[34:59.520 --> 35:05.350]  But if we turn around and we build a secure Internet and secure devices, governments won't know everything about us.
[35:05.500 --> 35:09.810]  And one other quick thing to build upon what the gentleman said.
[35:09.810 --> 35:16.730]  He started off by saying, when I try to do outreach to my friends, and that's music to my ears, that's music to all of our ears.
[35:17.180 --> 35:18.410]  Because that's what we need.
[35:19.250 --> 35:32.930]  The nice thing, one of the nice things of all the news stories of the last year is that all of a sudden this thing that we've been clamoring about for the last seven, eight years now, if not longer, is part of the conversation.
[35:32.930 --> 35:34.810]  It's part of everyday conversation.
[35:34.810 --> 35:47.040]  And that only happens when you guys make it part of the conversation, when you actually talk about this with other people, when you actually share these stories and our blog posts and actually take action.
[35:47.640 --> 35:50.430]  So, you know, thank you for doing this sort of outreach.
[35:50.560 --> 35:56.870]  You may run into these obstacles and walls, but I encourage all of you to follow what he's doing.
[35:58.680 --> 35:59.180]  All right.
[35:59.450 --> 36:00.950]  First question is actually for the audience.
[36:01.230 --> 36:04.120]  How many of you have actually had to call the EFF about something?
[36:04.120 --> 36:06.450]  You know, whether it's just asking a question or anything.
[36:07.660 --> 36:08.140]  Just...
[36:08.140 --> 36:09.270]  No, not as many as I thought.
[36:09.410 --> 36:09.620]  Curious.
[36:10.210 --> 36:12.960]  I've had to phone you guys a couple of times on things.
[36:13.290 --> 36:13.770]  Happens.
[36:13.870 --> 36:18.310]  Just mostly questions because I'm from Canada and so coming down here with interpretation of laws.
[36:18.730 --> 36:22.830]  If any of you find me outside of one of the talks, I owe you drinks.
[36:23.450 --> 36:23.930]  So...
[36:25.020 --> 36:25.980]  Second thing...
[36:25.980 --> 36:26.730]  Pleasure to work with you.
[36:27.310 --> 36:29.540]  You had mentioned you do a lot of work internationally.
[36:29.540 --> 36:33.020]  I'm curious what sort of efforts you've got going in Canada.
[36:33.290 --> 36:34.660]  Just out of curiosity as a Canadian.
[36:35.410 --> 36:48.550]  Well, the majority of my work in Canada is done in conjunction with Citizen Lab, which is a academic institution affiliated with the University of Toronto and the Munk School of International...
[36:49.520 --> 36:50.950]  I think it's just the Munk International School.
[36:51.870 --> 36:54.070]  Anyway, so a lot of what we do is...
[36:54.580 --> 37:02.500]  I work with a group called ASL-19, which is made up largely of sort of Iranian expats.
[37:02.500 --> 37:05.710]  We do some work on Iran based out of Canada.
[37:06.140 --> 37:14.310]  We have also done some work on Canadian surveillance in conjunction with Citizen Lab.
[37:14.540 --> 37:18.960]  We have done work on Canadian IP law.
[37:18.960 --> 37:31.640]  Now, this is an area thoroughly staked out by Michael Geist, who is practically synonymous with Canadian IP law, but we've done a lot of work with him and with CIPIC.
[37:32.330 --> 37:35.600]  So, yes, we are very concerned about Canada.
[37:35.910 --> 37:37.640]  Canada, not just America's hat.
[37:40.210 --> 37:45.040]  And a place where, in fact, the laws are different and you still need to defend human rights.
[37:45.040 --> 37:50.620]  And a few of our colleagues were actually just up there a few weeks ago because there was a TPP meeting up there.
[37:50.980 --> 37:55.520]  And as Eva mentioned earlier, this is one of those trade agreements that is...
[37:55.520 --> 37:58.810]  We're trying to launder off all these bad laws, especially around copyright.
[37:59.580 --> 38:08.330]  And one of these big meetings that happened behind closed doors with no civil society input at all was happening up there.
[38:08.390 --> 38:17.160]  So, we actually had a very awesome campaign up there where signs and flyers and protests and everything.
[38:17.370 --> 38:17.640]  It was great.
[38:18.040 --> 38:22.660]  Just for reference, I prefer to think of Canada as the left apartment over a really loud party.
[38:24.560 --> 38:25.870]  Last questions for the audience.
[38:26.100 --> 38:28.810]  If there's an open seat next to you, I'm getting booted from mine.
[38:28.810 --> 38:30.930]  So, if you just put your hand up so I can go somewhere else.
[38:31.410 --> 38:32.250]  There's one back there.
[38:32.370 --> 38:32.660]  Thank you.
[38:37.750 --> 38:38.180]  Hi.
[38:38.480 --> 38:58.390]  I wasn't going to come up and ask this question, but since you just talked about the critical importance of pseudonymity and anonymity to the work of the EFF and to other advocacy groups like you, and bonus, you're just talking about like, let's go to the closed meeting and like put signs up and fight it.
[38:58.580 --> 38:58.770]  Yeah.
[38:59.000 --> 39:08.330]  So, there's an open process that's been going since 2011 in the United States called the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.
[39:08.390 --> 39:13.290]  I like to say it's almost as bad as it sounds, except it's completely open.
[39:13.290 --> 39:17.810]  There's like, now we have like maybe a hundred folks showing up.
[39:18.390 --> 39:22.480]  And I'm one of the citizen advocates that's been active the whole time.
[39:23.410 --> 39:28.660]  And advocacy groups like yours and others are choosing not to participate.
[39:28.980 --> 39:36.120]  And the strategy explicitly calls out the need to maintain pseudonymity and anonymity online.
[39:36.120 --> 39:49.560]  And my concern is without active engagement from citizens and from knowledgeable folks like you, that we will lose these rights because they will make verified identity online a requirement.
[39:49.850 --> 39:53.770]  And it will become so easy that we won't have free speech online.
[39:53.770 --> 40:11.450]  So, I'm confused by the stance of your organization and several others to not engage in open processes around these issues that are to build the future infrastructure and the future policy to maintain pseudonymity and anonymity online.
[40:11.640 --> 40:26.770]  So, I'd like to understand how you're choosing what you're engaging with and why you're choosing not to be involved in open processes that are shaping the future and being pulled together in these multi-stakeholder ways.
[40:27.080 --> 40:32.000]  So, to answer that, we actually have had some involvement in NISTIC.
[40:32.290 --> 40:52.600]  So, NISTIC is this initiative by the federal government to try and build some set of standards for how when you talk to the government, some government agency, whether it's maybe the IRS or the Veterans Affairs Department or some other department, there's a method that they can authenticate you online.
[40:52.950 --> 41:08.520]  And as you can imagine, this kind of conversation between government and industry about how it's going to do effectively the online version of ID cards or multiple different types of ID cards turns into an incredibly complicated, perhaps like, you know,
[41:08.640 --> 41:20.160]  sometimes pathologically complicated, it's the kind of process that might not produce a result process or, you know, debate around, you know, how governments are going to rely on private identity providers.
[41:20.870 --> 41:29.460]  And so, you know, EFF has actually participated in proposals into that process for anonymized and pseudonymized identity systems.
[41:30.240 --> 41:33.950]  There are grants being given out by the government to try and support that.
[41:34.020 --> 41:46.500]  And so, we've worked with academics who want those grants to say, hey, why don't you build, you know, as part of the response to this call for designs, let's build the real privacy-preserving anonymity system or optional identity system where you can say,
[41:46.580 --> 41:49.350]  yeah, identify me or don't, depending on what you'd prefer.
[41:50.100 --> 41:53.430]  And of course, those things haven't actually been picked in that process.
[41:53.430 --> 42:01.640]  But as an organization, EFF has to be strategic about large, complicated, bureaucratic processes that we do or don't participate in.
[42:01.640 --> 42:08.430]  Because if you look around the world at potential processes like that, that could affect the Internet in bad ways.
[42:08.710 --> 42:16.430]  You know, I could probably give you literally dozens of them inside multiple standard organizations in the Internet standard space, in government activities, etc.
[42:16.730 --> 42:26.810]  And so, if you look at EFF's staff headcount and divided that between all of those processes, we could be, you know, going and arguing about the way the domain name system is architected.
[42:26.810 --> 42:31.810]  We could be arguing about the next generation of standards at the W3C, etc.
[42:31.930 --> 42:32.770]  And we do some of those.
[42:32.950 --> 42:37.290]  We just don't have the headcount to staff every one of those processes.
[42:37.560 --> 42:38.810]  So what we do is more strategic.
[42:38.980 --> 42:44.480]  We look at one, we put in a, you know, a filing or, you know, a comment at the right moment.
[42:44.750 --> 42:57.710]  And then if a big process like that at the end looks like it's producing an outcome that's actually going to be really dangerous to your rights on the Internet, that's when we'll spin up and engage fully and try and make sure that we can deflect the damage.
[42:57.910 --> 42:59.850]  But we, you know, we have to be strategic about that.
[43:00.520 --> 43:07.370]  I'm also confused about why not proactively participate so that it is good.
[43:07.620 --> 43:10.450]  And that's just a challenge I put out there.
[43:10.450 --> 43:11.460]  That's actually what we've done.
[43:11.600 --> 43:15.520]  You know, we filed the proposal for the way we wanted that to happen.
[43:15.950 --> 43:20.830]  Anyways, I'm just naming an issue that I think is a challenge for all of these groups.
[43:20.830 --> 43:25.580]  But I think proactive participation in open process is a good thing.
[43:25.770 --> 43:33.080]  Anyways, Aesthetics and I are presenting about this at 11 tonight if any of you are interested in learning more about what's happened there.
[43:33.310 --> 43:33.660]  Thanks.
[43:34.020 --> 43:34.680]  Thank you.
[43:37.270 --> 43:48.960]  Hi, I was wondering if you could talk about some of the difficulties in arguing the technical aspects of these cases in front of judges that seem to have no idea about these technologies.
[43:48.960 --> 43:56.290]  I mean, some of these judges don't even know how to check their own email, let alone understand the issues that you're arguing.
[43:56.440 --> 44:05.600]  So, what types of strategies do you use in explaining the technology and the more technical aspects of these cases?
[44:05.920 --> 44:10.380]  So, one of the great things about EFF is that we have both lawyers and technologists on staff.
[44:10.660 --> 44:30.820]  I had a case last year where we were defending a number of anonymous and pseudonymous bloggers who were... they were not parties to a lawsuit, but Chevron had subpoenaed their names and IP logs over the course of nine years to do some pretty invasive tracking of these people in order to chill their speech.
[44:31.040 --> 44:36.600]  And so, I had to describe to a federal judge what nine years of IP logs actually meant.
[44:37.420 --> 44:43.160]  And it's great because we have technologists like Peter and a big staff now.
[44:43.270 --> 44:47.600]  I think we have, what, six technologists on staff who help us write those briefs.
[44:47.980 --> 45:01.620]  And so, in that particular brief, our senior staff technologist, Seth Schoen, helped us write a really cogent description of what nine years of IP logs actually meant.
[45:02.400 --> 45:12.270]  So, yeah, it's hard, but we have both lawyers who know a little bit about tech and technologists who know a little bit about law sit down and write the thing together.
[45:12.980 --> 45:15.620]  And it's collaborative and it's sometimes fun.
[45:16.120 --> 45:27.270]  And Seth and Peter and Jan and the rest of the technologists will sit down with the lawyers and, you know, teach us what a fiber optic splitter in DPI means for the NSA.
[45:28.060 --> 45:34.710]  And, you know, what a browser fingerprint looks like in the Panopticlic.
[45:36.100 --> 45:40.440]  And we're able to, hopefully, teach federal judges...
[45:40.440 --> 45:47.920]  I was going to say, do you feel the judges actually understand or do you feel like it's a crapshoot every time on whether or not they're understanding what you're arguing?
[45:47.920 --> 45:55.860]  No, it is rolling the dice, but then we look at decisions like this year out of the Supreme Court was a case called Riley versus California.
[45:56.060 --> 46:01.540]  And this is the case where the Supreme Court says, law enforcement needs a warrant to search your smartphone pursuant to an arrest.
[46:02.020 --> 46:03.500]  The court got it.
[46:05.220 --> 46:13.800]  And the court cited our amicus brief a couple of times, actually, in describing exactly how invasive a smartphone search is.
[46:13.800 --> 46:21.000]  So, yeah, we have had some noted success in explaining to courts what it means, what the technology means.
[46:21.380 --> 46:22.740]  Sometimes they don't get it.
[46:23.160 --> 46:27.220]  But we have had, especially this year, the courts are starting to get it.
[46:27.380 --> 46:32.420]  You know, Judge Sotomayor knows what 30 days' worth of GPS tracking is.
[46:42.190 --> 46:43.650]  I was writing my question.
[46:43.790 --> 46:44.590]  I thought he was in line.
[46:44.590 --> 46:44.850]  Okay.
[46:45.170 --> 47:01.170]  So I was most recently in Ecuador, where there is sort of a growing Internet freedom community that is linking up with other UNASUR countries, like Argentina, Brazil is pretty exciting right now, and Chile.
[47:01.630 --> 47:14.090]  And so I just wanted to find out sort of what is going on with you guys connecting to UNASUR, because it's sort of not just within civil society, but within government.
[47:14.090 --> 47:25.070]  There is an increasing interest for drafting alternative laws that protect privacy and protect freedom on the Internet in those countries.
[47:25.330 --> 47:26.830]  So I thought I'd ask.
[47:27.330 --> 47:27.910]  All right.
[47:28.090 --> 47:28.190]  Yeah.
[47:28.190 --> 47:42.190]  Well, your question was, well, I suppose not specifically about Ecuador, but as a matter of fact, one of my colleagues, Katitza Rodriguez, is currently on a Latin American tour.
[47:42.530 --> 47:56.130]  She is originally from Peru, speaks fluent Spanish, and is incredibly well connected throughout the Latin American sort of netizen sphere.
[47:56.130 --> 48:05.170]  And so she is traveling throughout Latin America right now, talking to grassroots groups all over, specifically about this issue.
[48:05.310 --> 48:11.810]  She's talking to them about surveillance, and she's talking to them about, you know, drafting sort of alternative legislation.
[48:12.170 --> 48:35.230]  She was also very much involved in the drafting of the 13 principles of the application of human rights law to mass surveillance, which is a document which was written and signed by hundreds of NGOs all over the world, and which we're sort of holding up as our answer to, so what should surveillance law look like in countries in both U.S. and outside of the U.S.?
[48:41.190 --> 48:55.310]  And she's been very influential in the latest U.N. report, which essentially said, we don't think that mass surveillance is really consistent with human rights law and your right to free speech and privacy.
[48:55.990 --> 49:02.370]  So, yeah, we've made a lot of progress in this area, and I hope that we will make more as Katitza's Latin American tour continues.
[49:03.190 --> 49:07.370]  All right, we were just told that was the last question, so thank you very much for coming.
[49:17.070 --> 49:21.150]  We'll be around the rest of the weekend, so come swing by our booth downstairs.
[49:21.610 --> 49:22.030]  Thank you guys.
[49:22.430 --> 49:26.150]  We had a request for you to go and visit the press area down here.
[49:26.650 --> 49:27.010]  Okay.