Off The Hook - 1990-12-19
[00:28.080 --> 00:38.440] [SPEAKER_01]: And you're tuned in to Off the Hook, the program about telephones, technology, and the abuses thereof and therein.
[00:38.820 --> 00:39.980] [SPEAKER_01]: Very good evening to you.
[00:40.100 --> 00:45.060] [SPEAKER_01]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein, and we have all kinds of things to talk about tonight.
[00:46.040 --> 00:48.700] [SPEAKER_01]: I'll give you a hint as to what one of them is going to be.
[00:50.320 --> 00:51.660] [SPEAKER_01]: Drake is bad.
[00:52.880 --> 00:55.340] [SPEAKER_01]: That's the hint, and that's all I'm going to say at this moment.
[01:37.850 --> 01:39.970] [SPEAKER_01]: I actually liked it better at that speed.
[01:40.330 --> 01:43.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Jean-Michel Jarré, one of my favorites.
[01:44.730 --> 02:00.990] [SPEAKER_01]: But we have important things to look at tonight, including one thing that we promised we'd focus some time on, and that is the wonderful world of ATM fraud, automatic teller machines.
[02:02.730 --> 02:08.110] [SPEAKER_01]: And then we'll be taking your phone calls at 212-279-3400, a bit later.
[02:10.410 --> 02:12.150] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes, ATM fraud.
[02:13.950 --> 02:22.290] [SPEAKER_01]: A document which was passed on to us over at 2600 Magazine, directly from the Secret Service.
[02:23.010 --> 02:28.690] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think they were the ones actually that passed it to us, as it says in this document.
[02:31.030 --> 02:43.530] [SPEAKER_01]: This document is not intended for distribution outside those having a legitimate professional interest, and is not intended for release to the news media.
[02:45.170 --> 02:53.350] [SPEAKER_01]: So, if there are any members of the press out there, anybody from the media, turn off your radio now.
[02:54.670 --> 02:55.570] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean it.
[02:55.750 --> 03:01.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Turn off your radio and turn back on in about 15 minutes, because this is not intended for the media.
[03:03.350 --> 03:06.510] [SPEAKER_01]: Just for average people out there.
[03:06.670 --> 03:08.150] [SPEAKER_01]: Average people that need to know.
[03:08.610 --> 03:11.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Average people that feel they have a right to this information.
[03:12.950 --> 03:16.330] [SPEAKER_01]: And don't feel that it should be kept from them.
[03:18.350 --> 03:18.790] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[03:19.790 --> 03:21.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Now we got all those media people out of here.
[03:24.880 --> 03:26.400] [SPEAKER_01]: They are something else, aren't they?
[03:27.000 --> 03:28.760] [SPEAKER_01]: But we won't talk about them while they're not here.
[03:28.760 --> 03:30.160] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's get right into this story.
[03:31.520 --> 03:39.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Synopsis of an ATM Fraud Scheme On February 4th, 1989, U.S.
[03:40.020 --> 03:55.340] [SPEAKER_01]: Secret Service agents arrested four individuals in Los Angeles and one in Lincoln, Nebraska for producing counterfeited automated teller machine debit cards and for possession of access device-making equipment.
[03:56.020 --> 04:05.280] [SPEAKER_01]: When the defendants in Los Angeles were arrested, they were in the process of encoding the counterfeit ATM cards with stolen bank account information.
[04:06.020 --> 04:15.980] [SPEAKER_01]: The group was planning to travel to a number of cities throughout the United States to make cash withdrawals from ATMs linked to a specific nationwide ATM network.
[04:16.400 --> 04:30.880] [SPEAKER_01]: They made plans to travel in teams to different geographic areas of the country and to use disguises to defeat ATM surveillance cameras which, excuse me, while using each card to its daily maximum for three to five days.
[04:31.240 --> 04:39.320] [SPEAKER_01]: Each card, generally, depending on the bank, has a maximum withdrawal limit of between $200 and $500.
[04:39.860 --> 04:44.200] [SPEAKER_01]: Some of them have little tricks where you can withdraw $300 and then come back and withdraw $200.
[04:46.420 --> 04:49.160] [SPEAKER_01]: And they're different for just about every bank.
[04:49.300 --> 05:01.480] [SPEAKER_01]: And every bank machine, by the way, in case you don't know this, every bank machine does have a camera somewhere inside it and it takes your picture or just records the whole transaction on videotape.
[05:01.800 --> 05:03.900] [SPEAKER_01]: In fact, they could even record sound.
[05:03.900 --> 05:04.480] [SPEAKER_01]: Who knows?
[05:04.840 --> 05:08.380] [SPEAKER_01]: But they take a very keen interest in that kind of a thing.
[05:08.720 --> 05:10.620] [SPEAKER_01]: You can rest assured of that.
[05:11.500 --> 05:19.400] [SPEAKER_01]: The counterfeit cards were constructed of poster board cut to the appropriate size and affixed with common magnetic tape.
[05:20.140 --> 05:25.840] [SPEAKER_01]: The tape was encoded with stolen cardholder account data on track 2 for use in ATMs.
[05:28.840 --> 05:36.960] [SPEAKER_01]: Seized concurrent with the arrests were a computer, an encoding device, and thousands of counterfeit ATM cards.
[05:38.060 --> 05:45.220] [SPEAKER_01]: The defendants intended to execute the scheme over a five-day period during February 1989.
[05:45.720 --> 05:52.460] [SPEAKER_01]: Test cards had been successfully used in at least three cities which netted the defendants about $5,000.
[05:53.880 --> 06:00.940] [SPEAKER_01]: This case constitutes the first known attack of this magnitude on a major nationwide ATM network.
[06:01.520 --> 06:19.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Bank officials interviewed after the arrests confirmed that the account numbers used in this case would have given the defendants access to the checking accounts, savings accounts, and any line of credit available to the legitimate cardholders.
[06:20.920 --> 06:34.100] [SPEAKER_01]: An audit of those accounts revealed this scheme could have netted the defendants as much as $5.5 million had all gone according to plan and had the scheme gone undetected.
[06:35.830 --> 06:38.200] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, things didn't go according to plan, obviously.
[06:38.460 --> 06:40.280] [SPEAKER_01]: We wouldn't be reading this right now.
[06:40.860 --> 06:58.520] [SPEAKER_01]: One industry expert from outside the bank speculated that it is plausible someone could, using this scheme or one similar to it, access accounts and steal as much as $100 million if carried to the extreme and extended over a 30-day period with careful execution.
[07:01.010 --> 07:05.400] [SPEAKER_01]: And if they don't go around boasting about it in bars and things like that, I guess.
[07:06.300 --> 07:09.680] [SPEAKER_01]: Doesn't say anywhere here how they were caught.
[07:10.000 --> 07:11.500] [SPEAKER_01]: I'd love to know about that.
[07:12.200 --> 07:28.800] [SPEAKER_01]: In the city where this conspiracy began, several, known as La La Land, I think, several national and regional ATM networks share a single telecommunications carrier which routes transactions between ATMs and banks.
[07:29.520 --> 07:37.900] [SPEAKER_01]: In addition, the telecommunications company, which is generally rumored to be GTE, but again, that's only a rumor.
[07:38.240 --> 07:39.240] [SPEAKER_01]: That's why we didn't...
[07:39.240 --> 07:42.680] [SPEAKER_01]: We asked the press people to leave because they take rumors the wrong way.
[07:43.180 --> 07:56.300] [SPEAKER_01]: The telecommunications company, through a subsidiary, maintains a number of ATMs in a proprietary network which they make available on a contractual basis for other networks to use as ATM outlets for their respective cards.
[07:56.560 --> 08:02.420] [SPEAKER_01]: Thus, the role of the subsidiary company is similar to that of any bank on the telecommunications network.
[08:03.280 --> 08:13.320] [SPEAKER_01]: The mastermind of this scheme was a computer programmer employed by a well-established software company specializing in the design and implementation of ATM network software.
[08:13.720 --> 08:21.580] [SPEAKER_01]: His company was contracted by the telecommunications company to update and expand the existing proprietary network.
[08:21.580 --> 08:45.740] [SPEAKER_01]: The primary defendant's function as a programmer was to implement software which drove ATMs and point-of-sale terminals, those are known as POS terminals, on the proprietary network in order to make information compatible with and therefore acceptable to the main electronic switch maintained for all of the participating networks on the communications system.
[08:45.960 --> 08:58.620] [SPEAKER_01]: His position required him to have access to most of the technical data pertaining to software for both the proprietary ATM network as well as the main communication system on which all of the networks were mixed.
[08:59.460 --> 09:13.200] [SPEAKER_01]: In keeping with established industry standards, the telephone carrier subsidiary, in this case, encrypted the personal identification numbers, known as PINs, used in conjunction with ATM cards.
[09:13.740 --> 09:24.380] [SPEAKER_01]: This was done prior to transmitting data from the ATM across the proprietary system to the electronic switch where the transaction would be routed to the appropriate bank.
[09:25.420 --> 09:30.880] [SPEAKER_01]: The system targeted in this case is typical of ATM networks found throughout the United States.
[09:31.220 --> 09:42.100] [SPEAKER_01]: When a cardholder accesses his account through use of a debit or credit card at an ATM machine, the customer is asked to key in his or her personal identification number.
[09:42.680 --> 09:48.460] [SPEAKER_01]: The PIN is encrypted using the Universal Data Encryption Standard, known as DES, D-E-S.
[09:49.400 --> 09:57.570] [SPEAKER_01]: That particular method employing an encryption key known only to the owners of the proprietary system to which that ATM belongs.
[09:59.190 --> 10:13.440] [SPEAKER_01]: The account number and other Track 2 data from the ATM card, encrypted PIN, and information about the requested transaction are then transmitted electronically to a switch maintained by a designated communications carrier.
[10:14.700 --> 10:26.460] [SPEAKER_01]: At the electronic switch, messages from several proprietary systems are received and decrypted using the same DES key as was used to encrypt the data.
[10:27.310 --> 10:37.380] [SPEAKER_01]: At that point, the information is sorted by destination bank and encrypted with the proper DES key provided by the destination bank.
[10:37.380 --> 10:43.250] [SPEAKER_01]: The transaction is then transmitted across the main communications line to the appropriate bank.
[10:44.880 --> 10:52.360] [SPEAKER_01]: Theoretically, upon receipt at the bank, the information is once again decrypted using the key supply to the communications network.
[10:52.510 --> 11:03.620] [SPEAKER_01]: However, in practice, this step may not actually take place as the recipient bank may elect to accept the encrypted version of the PIN and process it in its encrypted form.
[11:04.920 --> 11:14.380] [SPEAKER_01]: Upon receipt at the bank, the account is queried and a determination is made relative to authorization or denial of the requested transaction.
[11:14.960 --> 11:20.920] [SPEAKER_01]: The flow of information is reversed upon return of a message from the bank to the originating ATM.
[11:22.120 --> 11:31.060] [SPEAKER_01]: To illustrate, if Bank A issues ATM cards and maintains their own ATMs at various locations, they are running a proprietary system.
[11:31.820 --> 11:45.100] [SPEAKER_01]: A communications carrier must be employed to tie the system together, but since there are no other participating banks on the system, the sorting process at the previously described electronic switch need not take place.
[11:45.360 --> 11:49.380] [SPEAKER_01]: All transactions are directly between the ATMs and the bank.
[11:50.010 --> 11:53.530] [SPEAKER_01]: No NICE or Cirrus network floating around.
[11:54.880 --> 11:59.960] [SPEAKER_01]: Even on a closed system such as this, the industry encourages the use of PIN encryption.
[12:01.250 --> 12:08.600] [SPEAKER_01]: Furthermore, DES is the preferred standard when PIN encryption is employed.
[12:09.040 --> 12:18.700] [SPEAKER_01]: On the other hand, if Bank A elected to enjoy reciprocity with banks B and C, enjoy, huh?
[12:18.840 --> 12:19.380] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't believe this.
[12:19.480 --> 12:34.380] [SPEAKER_01]: Permitting transactions at all three banks' ATMs, in other words, have a little network like we have here in New York, then an electronic switch would be installed to sort and route transactions between all of the ATMs and banks A, B, and C.
[12:34.820 --> 12:50.770] [SPEAKER_01]: Transactions destined for banks B or C from ATMs owned and operated by Bank A would still be considered to be on the Bank A proprietary system until they reached the electronic switch, where they would be mixed and sorted by the destination bank.
[12:51.530 --> 13:04.960] [SPEAKER_01]: At that point, the proprietary ATM networks from banks A, B, and C combine to share a common communications carrier, but the networks remain independent and do not share encryption keys.
[13:06.340 --> 13:17.300] [SPEAKER_01]: The function of the electronic communications switch is to sort the transactions, determine which encryption key to use, and establish how to route the information to the destination.
[13:18.180 --> 13:29.640] [SPEAKER_01]: The system abused in the case in which these arrests were made was similar to that previously described with the communications carrier subsidiary functioning in the role of Bank A.
[13:31.060 --> 13:43.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Specifically, the subsidiary owned a network of ATMs and, through a contractual arrangement, accepted debit and credit cards issued by various banks and honored by other networks.
[13:44.600 --> 14:04.400] [SPEAKER_01]: When a transaction was requested, the information was handled on the proprietary network until it reached a communications switch where it was decrypted, then encrypted with the proper key for the destination bank and fed into the main communications line used by all of the proprietary systems cooperating in this enterprise.
[14:05.470 --> 14:15.320] [SPEAKER_01]: As a part of their routine business practice, the subsidiary recorded all transactions on the proprietary network before those transactions reached the electronic switch.
[14:15.700 --> 14:24.480] [SPEAKER_01]: The intended purpose was to create a transaction log from which all activities could be reconstructed should a system or other failure occur.
[14:25.900 --> 14:29.770] [SPEAKER_01]: The pins remained encrypted in this recording process.
[14:30.800 --> 14:50.540] [SPEAKER_01]: Either while performing his job or merely by knowing where to look based on his intimate knowledge of the system, the scheme's mastermind discovered that the key used to encrypt pins on the proprietary network was a default key as opposed to a proprietary key selected by network officials.
[14:50.540 --> 15:00.160] [SPEAKER_01]: A default key in an ATM machine encryption device is analogous to a common computer password installed by a mainframe computer manufacturer.
[15:00.480 --> 15:11.700] [SPEAKER_01]: Its intended purpose is for testing during the installation phase, and it is expected that the default password will be removed once the system is installed and accepted by the buyer.
[15:12.200 --> 15:13.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, guess again.
[15:14.730 --> 15:26.440] [SPEAKER_01]: Upon making this accidental discovery, the programmer realized the value of this information and was able to refer to various software manuals and textbook literature to decipher the key.
[15:27.940 --> 15:42.510] [SPEAKER_01]: The programmer knew data was routinely recorded to the transaction log and that he could access the data transmissions as they were being posted to the transaction log and thereby see all transactions on the proprietary network.
[15:42.510 --> 15:51.340] [SPEAKER_01]: It was there at the transaction log that he copied account numbers and the encrypted PIN offsets onto his personal computer.
[15:52.700 --> 16:03.540] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, while it is believed the information was copied in real time, that is, concurrent with it being posted to the transaction log, it could have just as easily been done using another method.
[16:03.770 --> 16:11.790] [SPEAKER_01]: The programmer could have electronically copied data from the computer tape containing the transaction log and extracted the same information.
[16:12.770 --> 16:15.180] [SPEAKER_01]: Either method would have netted the same result.
[16:16.250 --> 16:25.060] [SPEAKER_01]: at this point the programmer made a conscious decision according to his post-arrest statement to use account numbers from only one major bank.
[16:25.860 --> 16:33.440] [SPEAKER_01]: He said he did so because he believed that once the crime was discovered suspicion would center on an internal problem within that bank.
[16:35.120 --> 16:43.860] [SPEAKER_01]: After selecting a generous number of accounts from the targeted bank, the employee wrote a computer program to decrypt the PIN for each of those accounts.
[16:44.060 --> 16:47.640] [SPEAKER_01]: He was able to accomplish this using the default DESC key.
[16:49.030 --> 16:58.700] [SPEAKER_01]: It was later learned that accounts from other banks were also used during the testing phase of the scheme and that those accounts and PINs were obtained in the same manner.
[17:00.220 --> 17:17.420] [SPEAKER_01]: He also realized that the network would be reviewed for potential weaknesses once the crime was completed so he reported the apparent oversight in using the default encryption key on the system and made recommendations to his superiors about how to remedy the situation.
[17:19.190 --> 17:23.600] [SPEAKER_01]: The remedies were put in place ending his access to additional account data.
[17:23.960 --> 17:32.640] [SPEAKER_01]: He also accomplished his goal of shoring up the network so that there would be no apparent weakness in the system from which the information could have been obtained.
[17:34.080 --> 17:43.540] [SPEAKER_01]: As an aside, it was noted by the investigating agents that the network in this case had been in operation when purchased by the communications company subsidiary.
[17:44.540 --> 17:55.880] [SPEAKER_01]: At the time of this writing, it has not been established whether the default key was in use by the company from whom the subsidiary bought the network, or whether a proprietary key had been in use.
[17:59.700 --> 18:09.240] [SPEAKER_01]: next, the defendants constructed counterfeit cards using poster board cut to ATM card size to which magnetic tape was mounted.
[18:09.800 --> 18:21.900] [SPEAKER_01]: The programmer then wrote a program which he used in conjunction with a magnetic encoding device borrowed from his office to write the account number and other data to each of the counterfeit cards.
[18:22.580 --> 18:28.240] [SPEAKER_01]: The data was properly encoded in the appropriate positions on track 2 of the magnetic stripe.
[18:34.710 --> 18:45.190] [SPEAKER_01]: Among the data elements actually copied to the magnetic stripe were the primary account number known as P-A-N and the PIN offset.
[18:46.050 --> 18:58.670] [SPEAKER_01]: In systems where the PIN is assigned to a customer the PIN is a direct derivative of the account number and the DES encryption algorithm and is referred to as a natural PIN.
[19:00.730 --> 19:10.790] [SPEAKER_01]: In systems where the customer selects his own PIN, the customer selected PIN would not match the natural PIN, so an offset number is used to resolve the difference.
[19:11.790 --> 19:19.130] [SPEAKER_01]: When the offset is added to the customer selected PIN, it will equal the natural PIN and the verification is made.
[19:19.890 --> 19:27.410] [SPEAKER_01]: Thus, in this case, an offset was necessary as the system was one in which the customers had selected their own PINs.
[19:28.710 --> 19:39.030] [SPEAKER_01]: At the time of their arrests, the defendants were in possession of more than 7,400 account numbers with PINs and PIN offsets, all from the same bank.
[19:40.010 --> 19:45.790] [SPEAKER_01]: In fact, as previously mentioned, they were in the process of actually encoding the cards when arrested.
[19:46.750 --> 20:03.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Among the items seized during the search and arrest were the programmer's personal computer, an encoding device, and several thousand counterfeit cards in various stages of construction, from uncut poster board stock through finished, encoded cards.
[20:04.730 --> 20:19.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Although a great deal of technology was compromised and used in the execution of this scheme, in the end, this crime was one in which a trusted employee exploited its knowledge and positioned to manipulate and misuse the system.
[20:20.290 --> 20:30.030] [SPEAKER_01]: The only true technical deficiency or error uncovered was that the default key was left in place when the proprietary network was absorbed.
[20:31.210 --> 20:37.150] [SPEAKER_01]: Presumably, it had been in place since the system was first activated, although that has not been established as fact.
[20:37.630 --> 20:45.270] [SPEAKER_01]: At the time of this writing, it is unknown who should have been responsible for replacing the default key with an active proprietary key.
[20:45.950 --> 20:57.950] [SPEAKER_01]: Perhaps this oversight could have prevented, could have been prevented, had a more thorough checklist been used by the communications company subsidiary when they absorbed the system or by the previous owner of the network.
[20:59.150 --> 21:06.990] [SPEAKER_01]: Regardless, had the recognized protocol for securing the respective data been followed, this crime would not have been possible.
[21:08.410 --> 21:21.930] [SPEAKER_01]: Human nature, greed, opportunity, and a willingness by the defendants to commit larceny combined with human error and not properly installing and reviewing system safeguards account for the forming of this scheme.
[21:22.370 --> 21:27.790] [SPEAKER_01]: It is fortunate that the information came to light before the scheme was executed.
[21:28.930 --> 21:34.850] [SPEAKER_01]: The central figure in this case is a high school graduate and was gainfully employed with a substantial salary.
[21:35.590 --> 21:47.350] [SPEAKER_01]: He stated that he was motivated in part by his desire to purchase an expensive home and did not want to wait as many years as it would take to save before he could acquire the property he had in mind.
[21:48.270 --> 21:52.950] [SPEAKER_01]: His wife is a co-defendant and she, too, had been gainfully employed with a good salary.
[21:54.390 --> 22:00.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Another of the defendants is a graduate of the Air Force Academy and has a master's degree from a prominent university.
[22:01.650 --> 22:06.210] [SPEAKER_01]: You just never guess that such prominent people would commit a crime.
[22:07.570 --> 22:08.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Amazing.
[22:09.150 --> 22:10.990] [SPEAKER_01]: None of the defendants has a criminal record.
[22:11.170 --> 22:13.770] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I imagine they do now, but they didn't before.
[22:14.630 --> 22:23.590] [SPEAKER_01]: All have been charged with several counts of violations of Title 18, United States Code Section 1029, Access Device Fraud.
[22:23.750 --> 22:27.750] [SPEAKER_01]: As written, that law provides for substantial penalties.
[22:28.770 --> 22:32.330] [SPEAKER_01]: And no early withdrawals, I can tell you that much.
[22:32.770 --> 22:43.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Each count of producing or using counterfeit cards carries a maximum sentence of 15 years imprisonment and a fine of $50,000.
[22:44.230 --> 22:44.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's see here.
[22:45.390 --> 22:51.430] [SPEAKER_01]: They produced 7,400 cards there.
[22:51.550 --> 22:56.450] [SPEAKER_01]: And each one of those cards carries a maximum of 15 years in jail.
[22:57.970 --> 23:05.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, they could be in for quite a while, actually, if the judge is in a bad mood that day.
[23:05.510 --> 23:10.650] [SPEAKER_01]: The same penalties apply to the possession of device-making equipment.
[23:11.610 --> 23:13.370] [SPEAKER_01]: Possession of device-making equipment.
[23:13.370 --> 23:18.350] [SPEAKER_01]: That's a phrase that has come up a few times in the hacker circles.
[23:20.770 --> 23:24.170] [SPEAKER_01]: Rather nebulous phrase, to say the least.
[23:24.410 --> 23:32.430] [SPEAKER_01]: The possession of 15 or more counterfeit cards carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
[23:33.850 --> 23:42.370] [SPEAKER_01]: Ultimately, upon conviction of the defendants, the recently implemented federal sentencing guidelines were to determine the sentences.
[23:42.630 --> 23:46.330] [SPEAKER_01]: And I don't have what the exact sentences actually turned out to be.
[23:49.120 --> 23:53.900] [SPEAKER_01]: And that's the story as seen by the Secret Service.
[23:54.580 --> 24:00.040] [SPEAKER_01]: This is a document that was distributed within the banking community.
[24:00.380 --> 24:08.120] [SPEAKER_01]: A whole group of bankers who do nothing but talk about banks and how to protect them and things like that.
[24:08.340 --> 24:19.860] [SPEAKER_01]: And now, as I see some of our press people are beginning to rejoin us, you, the average person listening out there, knows a bit more about this.
[24:19.860 --> 24:39.600] [SPEAKER_01]: A bit more about how ATM fraud could work, how you could be victimized by it, how semi-wide open the systems can be if morons are running things and don't change default passwords, and how the whole thing works in the first place.
[24:39.600 --> 24:43.760] [SPEAKER_01]: I think that's essential to pass that kind of knowledge on.
[24:44.800 --> 24:49.560] [SPEAKER_01]: We'll be taking phone calls in just a little bit at 212-279-3400.
[24:49.660 --> 24:50.920] [SPEAKER_01]: The program is off the hook.
[24:51.420 --> 24:53.080] [SPEAKER_01]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein.
[24:53.220 --> 24:59.580] [SPEAKER_01]: We spend our time talking about technology, its abuses, and its oddities.
[26:02.320 --> 26:07.240] [SPEAKER_01]: And in case you missed the clue at the top of the hour, I'll say it again.
[26:07.740 --> 26:09.400] [SPEAKER_01]: Drake is bad.
[26:10.580 --> 26:11.440] [SPEAKER_01]: Real bad.
[26:13.960 --> 26:16.860] [SPEAKER_01]: We'll unlock that door in just a couple of minutes.
[26:16.880 --> 26:19.700] [SPEAKER_01]: Again, the phone number is 279-3400.
[26:35.100 --> 26:40.260] [SPEAKER_01]: And here's an interesting story from the Newark Star-Ledger of December 15th.
[26:40.620 --> 26:41.640] [SPEAKER_01]: H.J.
[26:42.060 --> 26:59.300] [SPEAKER_01]: Kohler, owner of an Elizabeth, New Jersey, armored car service, who pleaded guilty to illegally wiretapping his employees, was placed on probation for five years, fined $25,000, and ordered to perform 250 hours of community service.
[27:00.680 --> 27:08.240] [SPEAKER_01]: Kohler, 61, his brother, and New York electronics consultant Robert Schios, all pleaded guilty last September.
[27:08.460 --> 27:09.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Schios is awaiting sentencing.
[27:10.400 --> 27:11.140] [SPEAKER_01]: Assistant U.S.
[27:11.260 --> 27:20.740] [SPEAKER_01]: Attorney John Lacey said the government found a pattern of illegal wiretaps over two decades by Kohler and people entrusted to him.
[27:21.360 --> 27:32.480] [SPEAKER_01]: Rodriguez pointed out that corporate America must be told that illegally wiretapping employees is a crime for which they will be punished.
[28:00.420 --> 28:03.860] [SPEAKER_01]: And now to the lighter part of the program.
[28:05.200 --> 28:06.760] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I shouldn't say lighter.
[28:06.920 --> 28:09.440] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, everything is really serious if you look at it in the right light.
[28:12.310 --> 28:16.210] [SPEAKER_01]: But this is where we're going to unlock a door.
[28:18.530 --> 28:20.290] [SPEAKER_01]: We did say that Drake is bad.
[28:22.010 --> 28:28.050] [SPEAKER_01]: And we might just as well shorten that, make it a contraction, and just say, Drake's bad.
[28:28.630 --> 28:28.810] [SPEAKER_01]: You know?
[28:29.790 --> 28:30.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Drake's bad.
[28:33.170 --> 28:35.930] [SPEAKER_01]: It doesn't mean a thing to a single person listening.
[28:37.910 --> 28:40.950] [SPEAKER_01]: But in a few moments, it could be a legend.
[28:41.650 --> 28:45.890] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's start by making a liar out of a long-distance phone company.
[28:45.890 --> 28:46.810] [SPEAKER_01]: I love doing that.
[28:47.610 --> 28:50.450] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's, uh, grab a dial tone here.
[28:52.530 --> 28:53.410] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, thank you.
[28:53.490 --> 28:53.830] [SPEAKER_01]: There's one.
[28:54.410 --> 28:56.530] [SPEAKER_01]: And let's call up a long-distance company.
[29:06.950 --> 29:07.730] [SPEAKER_06]: Hey, TNT.
[29:07.870 --> 29:08.450] [SPEAKER_06]: This is Stacy.
[29:08.490 --> 29:10.070] [SPEAKER_06]: My goal is to give you excellent service.
[29:10.190 --> 29:10.910] [SPEAKER_06]: How can I help you?
[29:10.910 --> 29:12.130] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes, hello.
[29:12.410 --> 29:14.790] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, I was just curious about one thing.
[29:14.790 --> 29:18.050] [SPEAKER_01]: I was thinking of getting AT&T as a phone company.
[29:18.230 --> 29:22.570] [SPEAKER_01]: I've just arrived in the country, and I'm not very familiar with the way things work here.
[29:22.730 --> 29:24.970] [SPEAKER_01]: You can probably tell by the way I'm mangling the language.
[29:25.170 --> 29:26.010] [SPEAKER_03]: What could I answer for you?
[29:26.210 --> 29:27.310] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I'm just curious.
[29:27.590 --> 29:32.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Is every telephone in the United States reachable directly by using AT&T?
[29:33.210 --> 29:33.590] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[29:33.890 --> 29:35.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, that's all I wanted to know.
[29:35.150 --> 29:36.290] [SPEAKER_06]: I'll do anywhere from anywhere.
[29:36.550 --> 29:37.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, great.
[29:37.390 --> 29:38.390] [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you very much for your help.
[29:38.450 --> 29:39.490] [SPEAKER_01]: That's all I wanted to know.
[29:41.610 --> 29:43.410] [SPEAKER_01]: They've just made a terrible mistake.
[29:50.730 --> 29:55.350] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, let's go back to Drake's bad here and see what we can find out about it.
[29:55.590 --> 30:00.790] [SPEAKER_01]: And who better to go to than a trusting operator?
[30:01.850 --> 30:02.490] [SPEAKER_01]: All right.
[30:03.690 --> 30:05.410] [SPEAKER_01]: Pick up the phone and...
[30:05.930 --> 30:06.410] [SPEAKER_01]: Whoops.
[30:07.010 --> 30:07.910] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know how that happened.
[30:07.950 --> 30:08.990] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's pick up the phone again.
[30:13.140 --> 30:14.920] [SPEAKER_01]: I might hit one too many digits there.
[30:30.850 --> 30:32.630] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, that doesn't sound like an AT&T operator.
[30:36.980 --> 30:37.880] [SPEAKER_12]: Cable wireless operator.
[30:38.060 --> 30:38.460] [SPEAKER_12]: Do you want to help you?
[30:38.860 --> 30:39.620] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes.
[30:39.700 --> 30:39.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Hi.
[30:39.980 --> 30:40.840] [SPEAKER_01]: Is this AT&T?
[30:41.060 --> 30:42.000] [SPEAKER_12]: This is Cable wireless.
[30:42.220 --> 30:42.880] [SPEAKER_12]: Sir, can I assist you?
[30:43.000 --> 30:43.700] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, no.
[30:43.760 --> 30:44.060] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm sorry.
[30:44.160 --> 30:45.760] [SPEAKER_01]: I thought I was dealing with AT&T.
[30:46.060 --> 30:51.360] [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, so to reach AT&T for your location, please hang up and dial 10-28-80.
[30:51.680 --> 30:52.980] [SPEAKER_01]: There's no 10 on my phone, though.
[30:53.600 --> 30:55.280] [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, 1-0-2-80.
[30:55.280 --> 30:55.920] [SPEAKER_01]: Ah, okay.
[30:56.040 --> 30:56.740] [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you very much.
[30:57.920 --> 30:59.240] [SPEAKER_01]: Boy, I'm so stupid sometimes.
[30:59.240 --> 31:00.400] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, let's, uh...
[31:00.400 --> 31:01.280] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's do it the right way.
[31:02.940 --> 31:04.760] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's see if we can deal with AT&T now.
[31:17.920 --> 31:19.080] [SPEAKER_06]: New York Telephone this month.
[31:19.080 --> 31:19.620] [SPEAKER_06]: Can you help me help you?
[31:19.980 --> 31:20.660] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes.
[31:20.820 --> 31:22.360] [SPEAKER_01]: Can I have AT&T, please?
[31:22.540 --> 31:22.760] [SPEAKER_06]: Certainly.
[31:23.220 --> 31:23.600] [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you.
[31:30.800 --> 31:33.780] [SPEAKER_12]: A moment for an operator who can assist you.
[31:34.500 --> 31:35.200] [SPEAKER_12]: Thank you.
[31:35.620 --> 31:36.960] [SPEAKER_01]: Hey, they changed the voice.
[31:41.780 --> 31:43.260] [SPEAKER_02]: AT&T, how can we help you?
[31:43.540 --> 31:45.780] [SPEAKER_01]: Hi, I'm trying to find out an area code.
[31:45.940 --> 31:48.220] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, I believe it's in California.
[31:49.300 --> 31:52.220] [SPEAKER_01]: And the name is Drake's Bad.
[31:52.800 --> 31:53.780] [SPEAKER_02]: The area code there?
[31:53.960 --> 31:55.560] [SPEAKER_02]: Uh, Drake's Bad, California?
[31:55.780 --> 31:56.060] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[31:56.420 --> 31:57.160] [SPEAKER_01]: Have you ever heard of that?
[31:57.440 --> 31:58.440] [SPEAKER_02]: Uh, I'll check it for you.
[31:58.500 --> 31:58.820] [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you.
[31:59.900 --> 32:01.180] [SPEAKER_02]: D-R-A-K-E-S?
[32:01.420 --> 32:05.040] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, uh, and a contraction apostrophe S.
[32:05.040 --> 32:05.700] [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, I have a lot of Drake's.
[32:05.920 --> 32:06.880] [SPEAKER_01]: You have a lot of Drake's?
[32:06.960 --> 32:08.380] [SPEAKER_02]: You have Drake's Bad, number one.
[32:08.520 --> 32:09.520] [SPEAKER_02]: Drake's Bad, number two.
[32:09.660 --> 32:10.480] [SPEAKER_02]: Drake's Bad, number three.
[32:10.480 --> 32:11.420] [SPEAKER_02]: You're all the way up until nine.
[32:11.860 --> 32:12.720] [SPEAKER_01]: All the way up to nine.
[32:12.740 --> 32:13.720] [SPEAKER_01]: I wonder which one I need.
[32:14.220 --> 32:15.820] [SPEAKER_02]: You have them all the way up until number 17.
[32:16.280 --> 32:16.640] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh-oh.
[32:17.100 --> 32:18.700] [SPEAKER_02]: You got them up to 25.
[32:19.820 --> 32:21.380] [SPEAKER_02]: They're all in the same area code, 916.
[32:21.540 --> 32:22.400] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, they're all 916.
[32:23.100 --> 32:23.420] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[32:23.980 --> 32:25.000] [SPEAKER_02]: All right, what is that?
[32:25.060 --> 32:26.180] [SPEAKER_02]: A special kind of, uh...
[32:26.180 --> 32:29.060] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I thought it was just a place, but apparently there's, uh...
[32:29.060 --> 32:29.960] [SPEAKER_01]: How many of them did you say?
[32:30.440 --> 32:31.480] [SPEAKER_01]: I guess there's a lot of them.
[32:31.580 --> 32:33.180] [SPEAKER_02]: You have a listing up until number 36.
[32:33.660 --> 32:34.700] [SPEAKER_01]: Up to number 36.
[32:34.840 --> 32:37.340] [SPEAKER_02]: Drake's Bad, number one, number two, all the way up to 36.
[32:38.080 --> 32:40.080] [SPEAKER_01]: Boy, I guess they ran out of names for cities, eh?
[32:40.320 --> 32:41.000] [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, right.
[32:41.660 --> 32:42.200] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, thanks for...
[32:42.200 --> 32:43.720] [SPEAKER_02]: I could have 916 for all of them, so...
[32:44.240 --> 32:44.560] [SPEAKER_01]: 916.
[32:44.820 --> 32:45.420] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, thank you.
[32:45.520 --> 32:47.760] [SPEAKER_01]: Can you connect me to, uh, 916 information, please?
[32:47.880 --> 32:48.620] [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, no problem, sir.
[32:48.760 --> 32:49.120] [SPEAKER_02]: Thank you.
[32:49.300 --> 32:50.520] [SPEAKER_02]: If you're the AT&T, have a good night.
[32:50.640 --> 32:50.980] [SPEAKER_01]: You too.
[32:54.920 --> 32:55.240] [SPEAKER_01]: Ah.
[32:56.300 --> 32:56.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Here we go.
[32:57.240 --> 32:59.120] [SPEAKER_05]: This is, I mean, what city, please?
[32:59.500 --> 33:00.400] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes.
[33:00.520 --> 33:00.700] [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[33:01.020 --> 33:03.080] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, is this the 916 area code?
[33:03.480 --> 33:04.060] [SPEAKER_05]: Yes, sir.
[33:04.060 --> 33:07.520] [SPEAKER_01]: Hi, I'm trying to find the number for Drake's Bad.
[33:08.680 --> 33:09.160] [SPEAKER_05]: California?
[33:09.540 --> 33:09.980] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[33:13.120 --> 33:14.900] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay, and what number did you need there?
[33:15.500 --> 33:18.160] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, well, let's see, um...
[33:18.160 --> 33:20.580] [SPEAKER_01]: I believe it's just listed as Drake's Bad.
[33:20.720 --> 33:22.660] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, I don't think it's anything more than that.
[33:24.960 --> 33:33.000] [SPEAKER_05]: Okay, sir, then you need to call the operator first and ask for Drake's Bad number two, or else you could...
[33:33.000 --> 33:35.260] [SPEAKER_05]: If there's no answer there, you could try this.
[33:35.520 --> 33:36.840] [SPEAKER_10]: Thank you for calling.
[33:37.220 --> 33:38.980] [SPEAKER_10]: The number is...
[33:38.980 --> 33:43.240] [SPEAKER_10]: 5-2-9-1-5-1-2.
[33:46.560 --> 33:47.360] [SPEAKER_10]: Once again...
[33:47.360 --> 33:49.880] [SPEAKER_10]: 5-2-9...
[33:49.880 --> 33:52.880] [SPEAKER_01]: I hope this isn't one of those ones that hangs up after they give you the number.
[33:55.200 --> 33:56.960] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, it is one of the ones that hangs up.
[33:57.040 --> 34:02.660] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, that's really horrible, because if you have another question for the operator, you have to pay in the 60 cents to find out.
[34:03.900 --> 34:06.900] [SPEAKER_01]: But, I guess life wasn't meant to be fair.
[34:07.520 --> 34:13.820] [SPEAKER_01]: All right, well, we know now that we have to pick up the telephone and ask the operator for Drake's Bad number two.
[34:14.220 --> 34:14.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's, uh...
[34:14.880 --> 34:15.560] [SPEAKER_01]: Let's give it a shot.
[34:32.060 --> 34:33.700] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, you seem to have lost that operator.
[34:33.880 --> 34:34.700] [SPEAKER_01]: We're getting another one now.
[34:39.680 --> 34:40.400] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes.
[34:40.460 --> 34:41.320] [SPEAKER_01]: Is this New York Telephone?
[34:41.560 --> 34:41.900] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes, sir.
[34:42.080 --> 34:43.620] [SPEAKER_01]: I'm trying to reach, uh...
[34:43.620 --> 34:46.840] [SPEAKER_01]: Drake's Bad number two in California.
[34:47.200 --> 34:47.460] Thank you.
[34:53.410 --> 34:56.630] [SPEAKER_12]: One moment for an operator who can assist you.
[34:57.310 --> 34:58.050] [SPEAKER_12]: Thank you.
[34:58.710 --> 35:00.410] [SPEAKER_01]: I think she just got slowed down or something.
[35:05.260 --> 35:06.820] [SPEAKER_05]: Agent, how can we help you?
[35:06.920 --> 35:07.600] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes, hello.
[35:07.740 --> 35:11.240] [SPEAKER_01]: I'd like to place a call, please, to, uh, Drake's Bad number two, California.
[35:11.580 --> 35:12.740] [SPEAKER_05]: Here you go, the number you're calling.
[35:12.980 --> 35:13.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, that's it.
[35:14.000 --> 35:14.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Drake's Bad number two.
[35:16.060 --> 35:16.820] One second.
[35:17.140 --> 35:17.400] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[35:23.970 --> 35:26.010] [SPEAKER_04]: Come on, I need your help.
[35:26.030 --> 35:28.370] [SPEAKER_04]: He's calling Drake's Bad number two, California.
[35:28.370 --> 35:29.130] [SPEAKER_04]: How do you get that?
[35:39.220 --> 35:39.840] [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, sir.
[35:46.580 --> 35:47.560] [SPEAKER_04]: One second, sir.
[35:48.450 --> 35:49.060] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, no hurry.
[35:49.200 --> 35:49.850] [SPEAKER_01]: No hurry at all.
[35:50.540 --> 35:51.140] [SPEAKER_04]: Drake's Bad.
[36:15.600 --> 36:16.200] [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, sir.
[36:16.390 --> 36:17.360] [SPEAKER_04]: That's 916.
[36:19.540 --> 36:21.620] [SPEAKER_04]: It's 916-028.
[36:27.170 --> 36:27.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Hello, operator?
[36:28.990 --> 36:29.650] [SPEAKER_01]: Are you there?
[36:32.820 --> 36:34.300] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know if the operator is still there.
[36:35.220 --> 36:35.700] [SPEAKER_04]: Still here.
[36:35.940 --> 36:36.520] [SPEAKER_01]: Ah, good.
[36:37.060 --> 36:38.420] [SPEAKER_01]: I, I heard a different number there.
[36:40.500 --> 36:41.200] [SPEAKER_04]: One second.
[36:41.580 --> 36:41.860] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[37:04.140 --> 37:05.560] [SPEAKER_06]: Assistant, Bill, Inwood, may I help you?
[37:05.820 --> 37:08.360] [SPEAKER_05]: Yes, operator, Drake's Bad, California.
[37:09.400 --> 37:10.080] [SPEAKER_06]: What's your number?
[37:10.380 --> 37:11.060] [SPEAKER_06]: Drake's Bad.
[37:11.640 --> 37:13.080] [SPEAKER_06]: Operator, uh, sir, what number?
[37:13.420 --> 37:15.480] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, I was trying to reach Drake's Bad number two.
[37:15.820 --> 37:16.520] [SPEAKER_06]: Certainly, thank you.
[37:16.740 --> 37:17.780] [SPEAKER_01]: How can I dial that direct?
[37:19.500 --> 37:19.900] [SPEAKER_06]: Pardon?
[37:20.100 --> 37:21.100] [SPEAKER_01]: Can I dial that direct?
[37:21.380 --> 37:22.660] [SPEAKER_06]: No, it's a toll station.
[37:22.840 --> 37:24.120] [SPEAKER_06]: We have to key it in for you.
[37:24.120 --> 37:24.200] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[37:24.680 --> 37:26.940] [SPEAKER_01]: You mean there's still places in the United States you can't call direct?
[37:27.700 --> 37:28.060] [SPEAKER_06]: Right.
[37:28.400 --> 37:28.920] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, boy.
[37:29.060 --> 37:29.840] [SPEAKER_06]: Direct Val, Ray.
[37:30.280 --> 37:30.780] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh-huh.
[37:30.940 --> 37:31.300] [SPEAKER_06]: Get him.
[37:32.600 --> 37:33.820] [SPEAKER_01]: And that's it ringing now?
[37:35.680 --> 37:36.720] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I hope it's it ringing.
[37:55.480 --> 37:56.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, well, I guess they're not home.
[37:56.880 --> 37:58.380] [SPEAKER_01]: Ah, well, so much for that.
[37:59.000 --> 38:00.280] [SPEAKER_01]: Drake's Bad number two.
[38:00.500 --> 38:03.680] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes, it is what is known as a toll station.
[38:05.120 --> 38:06.160] [SPEAKER_01]: Toll station.
[38:06.480 --> 38:07.540] [SPEAKER_01]: What is a toll station?
[38:07.660 --> 38:15.000] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, folks, let's journey back to the 1930s or 1940s or whatever.
[38:15.400 --> 38:20.320] [SPEAKER_01]: Toll station is a telephone in a very, very remote area.
[38:20.320 --> 38:30.620] [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, so thinly populated that not even a small exchange can be maintained, or at least profitably maintained.
[38:31.980 --> 38:35.860] [SPEAKER_01]: One, two, maybe three or four phones in the middle of nowhere.
[38:36.360 --> 38:38.320] [SPEAKER_01]: Literally the middle of nowhere.
[38:38.880 --> 38:42.760] [SPEAKER_01]: They're from, they're connected to a very far away exchange.
[38:42.760 --> 38:52.020] [SPEAKER_01]: Most of them are in places like Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and there are some in Idaho and California as well.
[38:52.340 --> 38:58.620] [SPEAKER_01]: And I'm told that you'll find them in places where the population of a town is about six or so.
[39:01.360 --> 39:10.560] [SPEAKER_01]: This particular explanation of a toll station comes from an electronic magazine called Telecom Digest.
[39:12.760 --> 39:15.340] [SPEAKER_01]: Non-dialable points, they're referred to as.
[39:16.140 --> 39:19.780] [SPEAKER_01]: Non-dialable exchanges, toll stations, other strange things.
[39:20.740 --> 39:33.280] [SPEAKER_01]: This person says, I did a search of a BELLCORE database about four years ago for points in North America with a non-dialable flag set, and came up with 4,589 of them.
[39:33.640 --> 39:38.140] [SPEAKER_01]: I then excluded Mexico and had 1,657 left.
[39:39.060 --> 39:43.720] [SPEAKER_01]: After excluding the Caribbean and Canada, there were only 825 left.
[39:45.100 --> 39:53.640] [SPEAKER_01]: And they're located in Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
[39:54.380 --> 39:55.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Most of them are toll stations.
[39:55.880 --> 39:57.440] [SPEAKER_01]: A few are actual exchanges.
[39:58.200 --> 40:09.940] [SPEAKER_01]: And for the doubting ones among you, call 206-555-1212 and ask for the Ross Lake National Recreation Area in New Hallam, Washington.
[40:10.660 --> 40:20.160] [SPEAKER_01]: You will be told to dial your O operator and ask for New Hallam 7735.
[40:21.220 --> 40:26.020] [SPEAKER_01]: This is an automatic exchange which cannot support incoming toll calls.
[40:26.660 --> 40:29.540] [SPEAKER_01]: Local calls are dialed on a four-digit basis.
[40:30.060 --> 40:36.940] [SPEAKER_01]: The incoming restriction may be due to a long-standing requirement that calls be dialable on a seven-digit basis locally.
[40:38.280 --> 40:42.660] [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, more interesting, though, is the system in Shoup, Idaho.
[40:43.280 --> 40:50.200] [SPEAKER_01]: Call 208-555-1212 and ask for the Shoup Salmon River store.
[40:50.420 --> 40:52.940] [SPEAKER_01]: You'll be told to call Shoup 24F3.
[40:53.840 --> 40:54.460] [SPEAKER_01]: That's right.
[40:55.740 --> 40:56.620] [SPEAKER_01]: Shoup 24F3.
[40:56.640 --> 40:57.860] [SPEAKER_01]: I gotta hear that one.
[40:57.940 --> 41:00.980] [SPEAKER_01]: I gotta hear a letter in, uh...
[41:01.680 --> 41:02.840] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, let's see if we can do this.
[41:08.800 --> 41:12.880] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, we are calling Information in Idaho.
[41:15.640 --> 41:17.360] [SPEAKER_01]: And these phones keep disconnecting.
[41:17.480 --> 41:24.960] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, if somebody out there has a phone system they want to donate to WBAI, please do so at once.
[41:36.570 --> 41:38.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh-oh, my secret code.
[41:40.250 --> 41:41.770] [SPEAKER_01]: Have to enter the secret code.
[41:41.850 --> 41:42.690] [SPEAKER_01]: I'll do that off-air.
[41:55.710 --> 41:57.050] [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, this is Connie.
[41:57.570 --> 41:58.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, hi, you okay?
[41:58.850 --> 41:59.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[41:59.430 --> 41:59.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[42:00.270 --> 42:03.210] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, yes, I'm looking for the, uh...
[42:03.210 --> 42:04.090] [SPEAKER_01]: This is Idaho, right?
[42:04.510 --> 42:05.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[42:05.330 --> 42:08.890] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, I'm looking for the, uh, Shoup Salmon River store.
[42:08.990 --> 42:10.830] [SPEAKER_01]: That's S-H-O-U-P.
[42:13.890 --> 42:15.510] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, it's in North Fork.
[42:15.510 --> 42:16.670] [SPEAKER_06]: It's a town, is that it?
[42:17.050 --> 42:18.370] [SPEAKER_01]: I believe so.
[42:18.610 --> 42:18.850] [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[42:19.810 --> 42:24.550] [SPEAKER_10]: The number is three, nine, four, two, one.
[42:24.790 --> 42:27.050] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I guess it's outdated information then, huh?
[42:27.210 --> 42:27.530] Repeat.
[42:27.890 --> 42:28.630] [SPEAKER_01]: It must be.
[42:28.730 --> 42:30.670] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, well, these things do change occasionally.
[42:31.050 --> 42:33.790] [SPEAKER_01]: This is only, uh, only a few months old, though.
[42:34.630 --> 42:40.250] [SPEAKER_01]: Boy, that's sad to think that, uh, toll stations are slowly vanishing.
[42:41.070 --> 42:42.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Shoup two, four, F-three.
[42:42.810 --> 42:43.710] [SPEAKER_01]: You can no longer dial that.
[42:44.570 --> 42:50.250] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, you can dial 212-279-3400, but leave off the 212 if you're in town.
[42:50.650 --> 42:55.890] [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, any comments or questions about telephone-related or ATM-related, uh, things?
[42:56.530 --> 43:07.610] [SPEAKER_01]: And, uh, while you're racing to your phones, I want to read a very brief piece that, uh, has just been put out about hackers and, uh, violation of privacy and that kind of thing.
[43:08.050 --> 43:11.010] [SPEAKER_01]: So, uh, listen up and give us a call.
[43:11.010 --> 43:14.090] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, Operation Sun Devil, remember that?
[43:14.370 --> 43:22.090] [SPEAKER_01]: That was the, uh, most massive raid of hackers that, uh, since the Spanish Inquisition, as far as I can tell.
[43:23.390 --> 43:29.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Arthur, uh, Kessler's novel, Darkness at Noon, tells of the downfall of a Bolshevik.
[43:29.890 --> 43:33.950] [SPEAKER_01]: He is purged by the party, charged with conspiring to assassinate Stalin.
[43:34.530 --> 43:39.290] [SPEAKER_01]: And I'm reading from, uh, a piece called The Sanction of the Victim by Michael E.
[43:39.450 --> 43:39.910] [SPEAKER_01]: Morata.
[43:40.630 --> 43:44.670] [SPEAKER_01]: And this is being distributed electronically all throughout the computer underground.
[43:45.350 --> 43:53.890] [SPEAKER_01]: Um, returning to the downfall of the Bolshevik, of course, he did no such thing, uh, plotting to assassinate Stalin.
[43:54.110 --> 43:57.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Uh, he soon comes to understand the needs of his captors.
[43:57.210 --> 44:08.910] [SPEAKER_01]: As a Bolshevik, he knows the theory of the centralized democracy, and he comes to understand that merely questioning authority is no different than a physical assault on the leader.
[44:10.530 --> 44:17.450] [SPEAKER_01]: The operant theory in this true-to-life example was later enunciated by Anne Rand in her novel, Atlas Shrugged.
[44:17.510 --> 44:19.390] [SPEAKER_01]: She called it The Sanction of the Victim.
[44:19.910 --> 44:27.110] [SPEAKER_01]: In Atlas Shrugged, the heroes are engineers and investors who learn to reject mysticism, altruism, and collectivism.
[44:27.490 --> 44:30.110] [SPEAKER_01]: They learn to be proud of their own achievements.
[44:30.310 --> 44:38.030] [SPEAKER_01]: They identify and reconcile the contradictions that tore them apart and allowed them to be regulated, ruled, taxed, and vilified.
[44:38.470 --> 44:47.250] [SPEAKER_01]: One of the highlights of this novel is the trial of Hank Reardon, a steel industrialist who violated an equalization of opportunity law.
[44:47.590 --> 44:52.010] [SPEAKER_01]: He tells the court that it can sentence him to anything, and he is powerless to prevent that.
[44:52.310 --> 44:54.730] [SPEAKER_01]: But he will not help them by participating.
[44:55.470 --> 45:01.410] [SPEAKER_01]: He does not recognize their right to try him, and he will not help them pretend that the trial is just.
[45:02.570 --> 45:03.650] [SPEAKER_01]: He is acquitted.
[45:04.390 --> 45:12.510] [SPEAKER_01]: If this seems too unreal, consider the case of Craig Neidorf in Chicago, and compare it to the trials of the Legion of Doom in Atlanta.
[45:12.510 --> 45:34.810] [SPEAKER_01]: If you've been listening to this program over the last few weeks, you'll know that Craig Neidorf was a hacker publisher, a publisher of a hacker newsletter, an electronic newsletter out of Missouri, and he was charged with distributing a harmful document in the form of the emergency 911 document.
[45:36.090 --> 45:45.430] [SPEAKER_01]: And the folks in Atlanta, Georgia, from the Legion of Doom were pretty much charged with the same thing, although they were charged with actually walking into a computer and obtaining that document.
[45:45.830 --> 45:50.750] [SPEAKER_01]: So those are the two cases here that we're referring to.
[45:51.570 --> 46:00.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Craig Neidorf stood his ground, prepared a First Amendment defense, and asked for help from the pioneers on the electronic frontier.
[46:01.410 --> 46:03.790] [SPEAKER_01]: The government dropped its charges.
[46:04.390 --> 46:12.630] [SPEAKER_01]: In Atlanta, the hackers cooperated with the government, informed on each other, and even testified against Craig Neidorf, and they were sentenced to prison.
[46:14.010 --> 46:17.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Neidorf incurred legal expenses over $100,000.
[46:18.190 --> 46:19.070] [SPEAKER_01]: This is also...
[46:20.530 --> 46:35.310] [SPEAKER_01]: Actually, it's quite less than the fines that have to be paid by the Legion of Doom Hackers in Atlanta, who, according to who you talk to, it's either $233,000 divided by three or $233,000 for each of the three.
[46:35.550 --> 46:39.030] [SPEAKER_01]: I have yet to hear exactly what that is.
[46:39.650 --> 46:44.510] [SPEAKER_01]: And, of course, the main difference is that Neidorf is free and they will be going to jail.
[46:45.350 --> 46:49.710] [SPEAKER_01]: The decision to go to trial rested on the premise that right makes might.
[46:51.010 --> 46:53.230] [SPEAKER_01]: Neidorf prepared a First Amendment argument.
[46:53.610 --> 46:57.790] [SPEAKER_01]: In point of fact, victory hinged on the demolition of the government's evidence.
[46:58.090 --> 47:01.250] [SPEAKER_01]: A suitable defense could have been created from any perspective.
[47:01.810 --> 47:07.090] [SPEAKER_01]: The First Amendment is a broad shield that protects religion, speech, and assembly in addition to writing.
[47:07.410 --> 47:16.050] [SPEAKER_01]: The Tenth Amendment guarantees all those necessary and proper rights enjoyed by the people that are not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
[47:17.070 --> 47:21.430] [SPEAKER_01]: Neidorf could have claimed that he was performing a challenge commanded of him by the gods of Olympus.
[47:21.970 --> 47:26.330] [SPEAKER_01]: What counted most is that he felt that his accusers were morally wrong.
[47:27.130 --> 47:32.950] [SPEAKER_01]: The Legion of Doom went down the drain in Atlanta because they granted the moral high ground to the government.
[47:33.270 --> 47:38.430] [SPEAKER_01]: They were wrong in their own eyes and they deserved punishment by their own standards.
[47:38.830 --> 47:42.530] [SPEAKER_01]: Their viewpoint and their standards were the same as the government's.
[47:43.230 --> 47:46.650] [SPEAKER_01]: The question then becomes, is hacking right?
[47:47.470 --> 47:52.150] [SPEAKER_01]: Unless you want to go to jail, you better find a lot of reasons to believe that it is.
[47:53.430 --> 47:55.670] [SPEAKER_01]: One, hacking is against the law.
[47:56.770 --> 48:02.510] [SPEAKER_01]: Congress and the states have enacted duly constituted rules against unauthorized access to computers.
[48:03.430 --> 48:05.970] [SPEAKER_01]: Answer, the laws are wrong.
[48:06.250 --> 48:08.730] [SPEAKER_01]: Slavery was once legal, so what?
[48:09.290 --> 48:14.670] [SPEAKER_01]: The opinions of a few hundred politicians do not change the reality of right and wrong.
[48:14.990 --> 48:20.770] [SPEAKER_01]: Historically, freedom from the American Revolution to solidarity is against the established laws.
[48:21.590 --> 48:22.470] [SPEAKER_01]: It's true.
[48:22.730 --> 48:24.390] [SPEAKER_01]: Freedom is against most laws.
[48:24.630 --> 48:25.190] [SPEAKER_01]: Good point.
[48:26.430 --> 48:31.510] [SPEAKER_01]: The laws change when the old kings and dictators are swept away by democratic forces.
[48:32.290 --> 48:35.330] [SPEAKER_01]: Hackers are radical information democrats.
[48:36.410 --> 48:38.550] [SPEAKER_01]: They may not know it, but they are.
[48:39.850 --> 48:42.670] [SPEAKER_01]: Two, hackers violate privacy.
[48:43.370 --> 48:46.070] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, the answer to that is, there is no privacy.
[48:46.290 --> 48:51.610] [SPEAKER_01]: Privacy is what is in your head, your heart, and your home.
[48:52.270 --> 48:54.910] [SPEAKER_01]: Your genitals are your private parts.
[48:55.110 --> 49:05.690] [SPEAKER_01]: Anything on a computer, especially a computer connected to other computers via telephone lines, can be accessed by government employees, corporate clerks, even used car salesmen.
[49:07.090 --> 49:12.290] [SPEAKER_01]: A major book publisher sells a CD-ROM disk of 80 million customers.
[49:12.710 --> 49:15.170] [SPEAKER_01]: Nothing on a computer is private.
[49:17.070 --> 49:20.530] [SPEAKER_01]: Number three, hackers violate property rights.
[49:21.170 --> 49:22.250] [SPEAKER_01]: The answer?
[49:22.550 --> 49:23.690] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, it's another question.
[49:23.890 --> 49:24.710] [SPEAKER_01]: What is property?
[49:25.230 --> 49:30.210] [SPEAKER_01]: During the Middle Ages, land was real property, but books and tools were not.
[49:30.870 --> 49:40.090] [SPEAKER_01]: Today, we still have real estate laws that require title searches as if land were granted by the king of country from the Duke of Earl to the Baron of Grey Matter.
[49:40.090 --> 49:43.690] [SPEAKER_01]: Yet industrialism brought a new understanding.
[49:44.590 --> 49:48.690] [SPEAKER_01]: A machine could be bought or sold independent of the land it rested on.
[49:48.930 --> 49:52.070] [SPEAKER_01]: You did not perform a title search to buy a forklift.
[49:52.550 --> 49:59.570] [SPEAKER_01]: Today, the cybernetic era rests on the fact that data processing is different than computing machinery.
[49:59.810 --> 50:03.130] [SPEAKER_01]: The machine is one thing, the information in it is another.
[50:04.270 --> 50:06.950] [SPEAKER_01]: Number four, hackers cause damage.
[50:07.810 --> 50:08.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Answer?
[50:08.490 --> 50:12.210] [SPEAKER_01]: This is the propaganda of a tottering regime.
[50:12.730 --> 50:20.090] [SPEAKER_01]: Disgruntled employees erase computer files because workers who feel mistreated will always strike back at the people they see as their oppressors.
[50:20.730 --> 50:28.210] [SPEAKER_01]: Also, criminals who want to get their hands on money have learned to use computers as they previously learned to use guns and fountain pens.
[50:28.490 --> 50:30.270] [SPEAKER_01]: This is not hacking.
[50:30.830 --> 50:35.790] [SPEAKER_01]: Hacking is what happens when someone who is interested in computers works to learn more about them.
[50:36.110 --> 50:39.890] [SPEAKER_01]: There have been no documented cases of a hacker destroying data.
[50:40.970 --> 50:43.750] [SPEAKER_01]: Number five, hackers threaten the money supply.
[50:44.030 --> 50:44.290] [SPEAKER_01]: Answer?
[50:44.650 --> 50:49.530] [SPEAKER_01]: This is the reason that the United States Secret Service has been busting computerists.
[50:50.330 --> 50:53.690] [SPEAKER_01]: But hackers are not interested in monetary gain.
[50:54.350 --> 51:02.890] [SPEAKER_01]: The real threat to the economy, I'm sorry, to the economic well-being of America's government monetary and fiscal policy.
[51:03.330 --> 51:06.470] [SPEAKER_01]: Indeed, excuse me, Oh boy.
[51:06.890 --> 51:20.110] [SPEAKER_01]: Indeed, it is no accident that one of the biggest supporters of the government crackdown on hackers was Arizona Senator Dennis Deconcini, the man who was bought by savings and lawn swindler Charles Keating.
[51:21.250 --> 51:29.990] [SPEAKER_01]: The government has targeted hackers in order to cover up the fact that the entire financial fabric of the nation is coming unraveled.
[51:30.850 --> 51:38.390] [SPEAKER_01]: And that that is a piece about Operation Sun Devil written by Michael E.
[51:38.850 --> 51:39.190] [SPEAKER_01]: Murata.
[51:40.890 --> 51:42.470] [SPEAKER_01]: Some food for thought there.
[51:42.830 --> 51:45.750] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, let's turn to our phones and the time we have left.
[51:45.950 --> 51:48.850] [SPEAKER_01]: 212-279-3400.
[51:49.170 --> 51:49.810] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[51:53.650 --> 51:54.090] [SPEAKER_03]: Hmm.
[51:55.710 --> 51:59.430] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, it's sad when the people that call first just sort of fall asleep on the phone.
[51:59.570 --> 52:00.550] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think I was that boring.
[52:00.690 --> 52:01.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[52:01.550 --> 52:01.990] [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[52:02.270 --> 52:02.610] [SPEAKER_01]: How you doing?
[52:03.370 --> 52:08.690] [SPEAKER_14]: I'm really intrigued by this whole hacker thing and, you know, I'm completely computer ignorant.
[52:09.030 --> 52:24.350] [SPEAKER_14]: But I was wondering if you could, you know, like, name a few, like, fun things you can do to, I don't know, take it into, like, like, the billing accounts for, you know, some of the conglomerates, like the telephone or whatever.
[52:24.690 --> 52:28.970] [SPEAKER_14]: You know, just by simple computer hacking devices and screw things up.
[52:29.390 --> 52:35.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, now, the, the goal of a hacker is never to screw things up.
[52:35.710 --> 52:38.990] [SPEAKER_01]: That's a very important distinction we've got to make right here.
[52:39.630 --> 52:44.070] [SPEAKER_01]: The joy of hacking, and every hacker knows this.
[52:44.370 --> 52:45.650] [SPEAKER_01]: Every hacker has felt it.
[52:45.810 --> 52:57.510] [SPEAKER_01]: And the people that have not felt it are usually the ones that are, are after, after the, the, the strongest prosecution of, of anybody who's using another system.
[52:58.210 --> 53:08.650] [SPEAKER_01]: The thrill is exploration, knowing that there's, you're onto something, that there's something that nobody else has found yet.
[53:09.810 --> 53:15.390] [SPEAKER_01]: Just the thrill of the chase, the thrill of finding something different and learning on the way.
[53:15.930 --> 53:18.410] [SPEAKER_01]: You don't have to screw things up to learn things.
[53:18.410 --> 53:20.850] [SPEAKER_01]: And that's, that's a very basic rule.
[53:20.990 --> 53:28.270] [SPEAKER_01]: And, and I think it says something of, of the hackers today that not a whole lot has been messed up.
[53:28.730 --> 53:37.770] [SPEAKER_01]: And what has been messed up is because of, of people like the ones we referred to earlier that want to steal money.
[53:37.930 --> 53:39.390] [SPEAKER_01]: Hackers don't want to steal money.
[53:39.590 --> 53:43.950] [SPEAKER_01]: Hackers want to penetrate systems, see how far they can go, see what they can find.
[53:46.030 --> 53:58.850] [SPEAKER_01]: And what the, the unfortunate case of the three LOD members in Atlanta, what, from what all accounts I've heard, what they were doing was simply exploring a telephone company computer.
[53:58.850 --> 54:04.230] [SPEAKER_01]: They found an interesting document and they read it and they distributed it.
[54:07.390 --> 54:15.650] [SPEAKER_01]: And now they'll be going to jail for two years, up to two years for that, for exploring, for being a little bit mischievous.
[54:15.850 --> 54:18.630] [SPEAKER_01]: But again, no damage was caused.
[54:19.070 --> 54:30.410] [SPEAKER_01]: Very important that aspiring hackers know that that's assumed, that's assumed of you when you go out exploring things, that you won't mess things up.
[54:30.670 --> 54:31.290] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[54:31.670 --> 54:32.710] [SPEAKER_13]: Good evening, how are you doing?
[54:32.810 --> 54:33.030] [SPEAKER_13]: Okay.
[54:33.250 --> 54:34.170] [SPEAKER_13]: I really enjoy your show.
[54:34.310 --> 54:44.470] [SPEAKER_13]: Can you tell me if you have any information with regard to whether 9x is thinking about instituting the core identification number?
[54:44.470 --> 54:47.510] [SPEAKER_13]: I know there are a couple of suits that were pending at one point.
[54:47.710 --> 54:51.590] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, that's got to get by the PSC, the New York State Public Service Commission.
[54:52.550 --> 54:54.770] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't see that happening real soon.
[54:54.890 --> 54:58.270] [SPEAKER_01]: I do think though some form of caller ID is inevitable.
[54:59.030 --> 55:02.670] [SPEAKER_01]: And, you know, it rubs a lot of people the wrong way.
[55:02.790 --> 55:05.510] [SPEAKER_01]: It rubs me the wrong way in quite a few instances.
[55:05.510 --> 55:09.110] [SPEAKER_01]: But it's also something that you can use to your advantage.
[55:11.110 --> 55:13.850] [SPEAKER_01]: don't be fooled though.
[55:14.430 --> 55:24.810] [SPEAKER_01]: New York State does have, just like every state in the union, has some form of identifying calls, particularly if you call an 800 number.
[55:26.010 --> 55:30.530] [SPEAKER_01]: Many, many times your number is displayed as you make the phone call.
[55:30.610 --> 55:34.290] [SPEAKER_01]: It doesn't matter if the state that you're in has caller ID or not.
[55:35.130 --> 55:39.770] [SPEAKER_01]: And that's something that I think a lot of people should become aware of.
[55:39.950 --> 55:45.190] [SPEAKER_13]: Is there some reason why New Jersey Bell was able to institute it so much faster?
[55:45.310 --> 55:46.430] [SPEAKER_01]: They just happen to be first.
[55:46.430 --> 55:50.750] [SPEAKER_01]: I imagine because, you know, Bell Corps is actually in New Jersey.
[55:50.750 --> 55:55.930] [SPEAKER_01]: They have a bit of pull with the legislators and they're able to do things a little quicker maybe.
[56:03.750 --> 56:07.690] [SPEAKER_01]: It's up to the rate payers and how much of a noise they make.
[56:07.810 --> 56:12.770] [SPEAKER_01]: You've got to press for suppression of caller ID.
[56:13.090 --> 56:15.310] [SPEAKER_01]: People say, oh, that defeats the whole purpose of it.
[56:15.450 --> 56:20.210] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, you know, privacy is something that we take for granted on the telephone.
[56:20.450 --> 56:21.810] [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I don't know who you are.
[56:21.910 --> 56:24.950] [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think I have the right to know what your phone number is.
[56:25.870 --> 56:31.370] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, it's not something that you're used to when you're making phone calls, giving out all this information.
[56:32.170 --> 56:33.930] [SPEAKER_01]: It's like what Ed Meese says.
[56:34.110 --> 56:37.910] [SPEAKER_01]: Those who have nothing to hide have nothing to be afraid of.
[56:38.310 --> 56:39.830] [SPEAKER_01]: And you know what I think of that statement.
[56:40.110 --> 56:40.890] [SPEAKER_13]: It's garbage.
[56:41.610 --> 56:45.990] [SPEAKER_13]: No, I mean, in talking to a person, usually you do get their name or whatever.
[56:46.270 --> 56:49.490] [SPEAKER_13]: But I understand what you're saying and you're most helpful.
[56:49.670 --> 56:50.130] [SPEAKER_13]: Thanks a lot.
[56:50.230 --> 56:50.730] [SPEAKER_13]: Thanks for calling.
[56:50.890 --> 56:51.030] [SPEAKER_13]: Great work.
[56:51.330 --> 56:51.550] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay.
[56:52.870 --> 57:05.450] [SPEAKER_01]: And most of those caller ID devices have a particular function where you dial a certain combination of digits and you can institute a trace on a particular call, whether you have caller ID or not.
[57:05.570 --> 57:06.910] [SPEAKER_01]: And I think that should be enough.
[57:07.270 --> 57:15.050] [SPEAKER_01]: You know, if somebody is harassing you, okay, you hit a certain button, their number gets forwarded to the authorities, and if you want to, you file charges.
[57:16.290 --> 57:26.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Now, I think that's a lot better than every time you make a phone call having all that information about you passed on or not passed on.
[57:26.210 --> 57:27.390] [SPEAKER_01]: You never know, do you?
[57:27.850 --> 57:28.510] [SPEAKER_01]: good evening.
[57:29.050 --> 57:29.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Oops.
[57:29.850 --> 57:30.490] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[57:32.530 --> 57:34.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Well, good evening to you too.
[57:34.550 --> 57:35.250] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[57:35.610 --> 57:35.930] [SPEAKER_01]: Hi.
[57:36.110 --> 57:36.490] [SPEAKER_01]: How are you doing?
[57:36.650 --> 57:36.710] [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[57:37.690 --> 57:38.430] [SPEAKER_11]: Hi, how are you?
[57:38.490 --> 57:38.830] [SPEAKER_01]: Go ahead.
[57:39.530 --> 57:40.430] [SPEAKER_11]: I'm enjoying your show.
[57:42.170 --> 57:56.550] [SPEAKER_11]: You understand that IT&T is regulated by the government, and therefore, it comes on the auspices of the National Reconnaissance Office.
[57:58.050 --> 58:00.030] [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, you're going to have to wrap this up.
[58:00.190 --> 58:01.910] [SPEAKER_01]: Are you referring to IT&T or AT&T?
[58:02.010 --> 58:03.050] [SPEAKER_11]: And I'll conclude.
[58:04.630 --> 58:16.850] [SPEAKER_11]: As far as the Privacy Act, we are always being spied on, because communication through the air or through long lines is monitored by the government.
[58:16.850 --> 58:24.250] [SPEAKER_11]: government, and we take advantage of this service, which is wonderful.
[58:24.750 --> 58:33.870] [SPEAKER_11]: However, that is why Mr. Gotti or Mr. Noriega or anyone has problems, because someone is always listening.
[58:34.110 --> 58:34.870] [SPEAKER_01]: Good point.
[58:34.970 --> 58:35.270] [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you very much.
[58:35.410 --> 58:35.830] [SPEAKER_01]: Good point.
[58:35.930 --> 58:41.590] [SPEAKER_01]: Thank you for calling, and that's a very good, if somewhat pessimistic note to end on.
[58:46.670 --> 58:50.590] [SPEAKER_01]: And that's going to just about bring our show to a close for this evening.
[58:50.790 --> 58:53.610] [SPEAKER_01]: The computer show is next.
[58:54.110 --> 58:55.470] [SPEAKER_01]: Personal computer show, that is.
[58:55.670 --> 58:59.590] [SPEAKER_01]: And we'll be back again for another episode of Off the Hook.
[58:59.610 --> 59:06.450] [SPEAKER_01]: We'll probably be talking about the rate increase of New York Telephone next show, which will be in two weeks.
[59:07.190 --> 59:13.910] [SPEAKER_01]: And while it may not be on your mind now, I'm sure it's going to be on your mind then, because it's very likely to be passed within the next two weeks.
[59:13.910 --> 59:16.690] [SPEAKER_01]: So, we will be back at you then.
[59:17.070 --> 59:20.010] [SPEAKER_01]: Until then, Emmanuel Goldstein, good night, and happy holidays.
[59:26.840 --> 59:31.640] [SPEAKER_07]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[59:32.560 --> 59:37.400] [SPEAKER_07]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[59:42.520 --> 59:46.120] [SPEAKER_07]: They would for the best expect the worst.
[59:46.640 --> 59:48.760] [SPEAKER_07]: I hope that's understood.
[59:49.320 --> 59:49.780] [SPEAKER_07]: maybe, no!
[59:53.620 --> 59:58.220] [SPEAKER_09]: 99.5 FM, WBAI, New York.
[59:58.660 --> 01:00:11.320] [SPEAKER_00]: On May 17, 1984, WBAI-FM was granted a license by the Federal Communications Commission to serve the public interest as a public trustee until June 1, 1991.
[01:00:12.040 --> 01:00:15.620] [SPEAKER_00]: Our license will expire on June 1, 1991.
[01:00:16.360 --> 01:00:22.720] [SPEAKER_00]: We must file an application for license renewal with the FCC by February 1, 1991.
[01:00:23.420 --> 01:00:29.860] [SPEAKER_00]: When filed, a copy of this application will be available for public inspection during our regular business hours.
[01:00:30.120 --> 01:00:37.340] [SPEAKER_00]: It contains information concerning this station's performance since our last license grant on May 17, 1984.
[01:00:38.600 --> 01:00:51.560] [SPEAKER_00]: Individuals who wish to advise the FCC of facts relating to our renewal application and to whether this station has operated in a public interest should file comments and petitions with the FCC by May 1, 1991.
[01:00:52.500 --> 01:01:10.900] [SPEAKER_00]: Further information concerning the Commission's broadcast license renewal process is available at the offices of WBA-IFM, 505 8th Avenue, 19th floor, New York, New York, or may be obtained from the FCC, Washington, Washington, D.C., 20554.
[01:01:12.980 --> 01:01:17.260] [SPEAKER_09]: 99.5 FM, WBAI, New York.
[01:01:33.710 --> 01:01:37.990] [SPEAKER_08]: Hi, this is Joe King, and welcome to another edition of the Personal Computer Show.
[01:01:38.670 --> 01:01:51.530] [SPEAKER_08]: Tonight, Steve Terry, the Research Director of Electronic Directions, or Wheeler Hawkins, whatever they're being called this week, we'll find out in a few minutes, is joining Hank Key and myself, and we're going to be talking not about word processing,
[01:01:52.090 --> 01:01:57.750] [SPEAKER_08]: not about the law, we're going to be talking graphics, because it's a graphics time of the year.
[01:01:58.250 --> 01:02:02.310] [SPEAKER_08]: So stay tuned for another edition of the Personal Computer Show.
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