Off The Hook - 1992-01-01

[00:07.210 --> 00:14.110]  [SPEAKER_03]: Happy Holidays from the staff of WBAI Pacifica Radio to all our members, listeners, and friends.
[00:14.450 --> 00:19.250]  [SPEAKER_03]: And many thanks again for your support, which makes our programming possible.
[00:19.850 --> 00:36.250]  [SPEAKER_03]: This is Valerie Vannisler, General Manager of the station, wishing you the blessings of the season and a peaceful, productive new year from everyone at WBAI, your community station, which delivers news that really matters to you and to the world.
[00:45.680 --> 00:48.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: And you are listening to WBAI in New York.
[00:48.760 --> 00:54.760]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's just about 9 o'clock now, and that means, since it's Wednesday night, it's time for Off the Hook.
[01:01.030 --> 01:05.570]  [SPEAKER_05]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:06.470 --> 01:11.070]  [SPEAKER_05]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[01:12.010 --> 01:13.930]  [SPEAKER_05]: It couldn't get much worse.
[01:16.630 --> 01:19.350]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bum-diddly-bum for the best, it's back the worst.
[01:19.890 --> 01:21.850]  [SPEAKER_05]: I hope that's understood.
[01:22.050 --> 01:22.810]  [SPEAKER_05]: Bum-diddly-bum!
[01:53.750 --> 01:55.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: And good evening to one and all.
[01:56.010 --> 01:57.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: The program is Off the Hook.
[01:57.510 --> 01:58.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: My name's Emmanuel Goldstein.
[01:59.170 --> 02:17.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're on until 10 o'clock, talking about all kinds of fun and games in the world of high tech, and what we have to look forward to in this brand new year, the year of 1992, the year that Western Europe becomes unified, the year that Eastern Europe becomes disunified,
[02:18.410 --> 02:25.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: and the year that we all continue to look for answers here in whatever this place is.
[02:25.450 --> 02:34.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, some of the fun things that are going on, that we've culled from various news reports and newsletters and things like that.
[02:35.170 --> 02:36.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: Listen to this one.
[02:36.650 --> 02:54.270]  [SPEAKER_06]: Jean-Paul Barrett, a convict serving 33 years for forgery and fraud in a Pima County Jail in Tucson, Arizona, was released on December 13, 1991, after receipt of a forged fax ordering his release.
[02:54.270 --> 03:00.270]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, it appears that a copy of a legitimate release order was altered to bear his name.
[03:00.730 --> 03:11.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: Apparently, no one noticed that the fax document lacked an originating phone number, or that there was no formal cover sheet.
[03:12.670 --> 03:17.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: The error was discovered when Barrett failed to show up for a court hearing.
[03:20.420 --> 03:25.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: The jail releases about 60 people each day, and faxes have become standard procedure.
[03:27.980 --> 03:40.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: Sheriff Sergeant Rick Castigar has said, procedures are being changed, so the error will not occur again.
[03:43.450 --> 03:47.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: That came from the San Francisco Chronicle of December 18.
[03:50.510 --> 03:51.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's amazing.
[03:51.670 --> 03:58.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: Even something as crude as a fax is enough to convince a lot of people that something is authentic.
[03:58.690 --> 04:01.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: And, you know, you can change that little phone number.
[04:01.210 --> 04:03.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know how many of you out there are familiar with faxes, have seen them.
[04:04.090 --> 04:13.830]  [SPEAKER_06]: But, uh, most faxes come with the phone number of the person who sent you the fax as the top line of every page.
[04:14.630 --> 04:18.990]  [SPEAKER_06]: And what a lot of people don't seem to realize is that that's a programmable feature.
[04:19.850 --> 04:24.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's not the voice of God saying where that particular fax came from.
[04:24.970 --> 04:29.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's simply you typing in what your phone number is.
[04:31.310 --> 04:41.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: So if you were to put in let's just say Dan Quayle's phone number a lot of people would believe that the fax actually came from him.
[04:43.730 --> 04:44.830]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's that simple.
[04:46.130 --> 04:46.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[04:46.710 --> 04:47.990]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[04:48.870 --> 04:50.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: Here's some, uh, news from overseas.
[04:51.990 --> 04:53.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: This comes from the Risks Digest.
[04:54.570 --> 05:05.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: A contributor from the Netherlands, Erling Christensen, who was complaining about something that I think maybe we have, uh, a right to complain about here too.
[05:06.390 --> 05:08.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let's do what they have to put up with.
[05:08.550 --> 05:17.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: In the Dutch telephone numbering plan, all area codes starting with 06 were unused until a few years ago.
[05:18.010 --> 05:20.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: Presumably reserved for future use.
[05:22.230 --> 05:28.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: When this empty can was finally opened, well, it quickly turned into a can of worms.
[05:30.670 --> 05:37.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: You see, within the 06 prefix today, you'll find toll-free services, like our 800 numbers.
[05:38.130 --> 05:45.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: You'll find services carrying a surcharge, like party lines, sex lines, things like our 900 numbers.
[05:46.850 --> 05:58.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: You'll find phone company, known as PTT, special services, such as information, fault reporting, or repair service, time, weather, that kind of thing.
[06:00.010 --> 06:06.050]  [SPEAKER_06]: And you'll also find private and public companies and institutions wanting a nationwide number.
[06:07.290 --> 06:08.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: And that's not all.
[06:08.610 --> 06:15.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: since mid-1991, the nationwide emergency number is 0611.
[06:17.910 --> 06:22.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: So that little 06 area code has become quite popular for many different reasons.
[06:26.550 --> 06:31.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, the first digit following the 06 does provide some classification.
[06:31.670 --> 06:43.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: For instance, 06-0 and 06-4 are the beginning of what are toll-free numbers, equivalent of our 800 numbers.
[06:43.430 --> 06:45.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: But this is not consistent.
[06:48.610 --> 06:53.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: Obviously, 0611, the nationwide emergency number, is toll-free, as you might assume.
[06:55.170 --> 07:02.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: But the number, as such, is not in the 06-0 or 06-4 number group.
[07:03.650 --> 07:04.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: Sound confusing?
[07:04.750 --> 07:06.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, well, that's part of the point here.
[07:09.160 --> 07:13.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, the significance of the third digit is not widely publicized.
[07:16.420 --> 07:23.180]  [SPEAKER_06]: So, it's not obvious what the charge for a certain number will be unless you study the subject rather carefully.
[07:25.220 --> 07:41.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, many companies have programmed their their PBXs, private branch exchanges, phone systems, fax machines, to disallow calling 06 numbers because most of these have little or no relevance to the company.
[07:42.860 --> 07:48.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: And many carry rather heavy surcharges, sort of like our companies here blocking 900 numbers.
[07:50.280 --> 07:56.280]  [SPEAKER_06]: But by doing this, they've also blocked the 0611 emergency number.
[08:01.500 --> 08:07.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, some companies have started to realize the problem and have started to do something about it.
[08:10.280 --> 08:14.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: But obviously, the real problem is a bad numbering plan.
[08:15.880 --> 08:21.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: After all, an emergency number should really stand out from common numbers and not be grouped together with surcharge numbers.
[08:24.690 --> 08:29.830]  [SPEAKER_06]: And this person goes on to say that he believes more standardization is called for in numbering.
[08:30.910 --> 08:38.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: After all, I travel quite a lot to several countries and often have difficulty remembering the international prefix when calling out from a particular country.
[08:42.570 --> 08:46.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's just one of the confusing things.
[08:46.510 --> 08:47.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: here in this country.
[08:49.030 --> 08:50.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: A lot of confusion also prevails.
[08:52.330 --> 09:00.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: When you pick up the phone these days, you don't know if you're going to be charged some outrageous amount for calling what looks like an innocent number.
[09:00.850 --> 09:08.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: For instance, how many people there know how much a call to the 970 exchange will cost?
[09:11.910 --> 09:13.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: How many of you actually know that?
[09:13.710 --> 09:15.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I've got an idea.
[09:16.670 --> 09:18.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: This will just take a moment to set up.
[09:19.230 --> 09:21.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let's see if we can get a straight answer.
[09:22.450 --> 09:28.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: A straight answer from a telephone company person.
[09:32.410 --> 09:37.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: Alright, we're going to actually reach out and call an operator using our magic dial tone.
[09:40.730 --> 09:43.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: And we'll see if we can get a reply to this.
[09:47.260 --> 09:51.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, unfortunately, the BAI phone system has hung up on us again, so we're going to try that one more time.
[09:53.200 --> 09:55.160]  [SPEAKER_06]: That happens far too frequently.
[09:57.600 --> 09:58.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: Alright, I think it went through.
[09:59.980 --> 10:01.880]  [SPEAKER_10]: Can you telephone Rodriguez for any help please?
[10:02.120 --> 10:03.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, hello, operator.
[10:03.320 --> 10:07.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're trying to find out how much a call to the 970 exchange costs.
[10:07.540 --> 10:13.100]  [SPEAKER_10]: The 970 you must contact the business office tomorrow to verify the charges for those numbers.
[10:13.340 --> 10:14.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: What if I wanted to call it tonight?
[10:15.120 --> 10:20.780]  [SPEAKER_10]: If you want to call it tonight, sir, then you dial the number, you'll be charged in whatever cost I assume you have to pay, sir.
[10:21.200 --> 10:25.020]  [SPEAKER_10]: You don't have the rates for 974, only the business office has that information.
[10:25.620 --> 10:25.980]  [SPEAKER_06]: 974?
[10:26.160 --> 10:27.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: I mean 970.
[10:27.440 --> 10:27.800]  [SPEAKER_10]: 970.
[10:28.280 --> 10:28.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: Ah.
[10:28.740 --> 10:33.040]  [SPEAKER_10]: But I meant to say the business office has the number, the rates for the 970 numbers.
[10:33.760 --> 10:34.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: So they're all different.
[10:35.640 --> 10:36.660]  [SPEAKER_10]: Different rates I assume.
[10:37.080 --> 10:37.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[10:38.000 --> 10:38.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[10:39.300 --> 10:41.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: Would you know the 540 exchange?
[10:41.760 --> 10:42.900]  [SPEAKER_10]: What, the rates for those calls?
[10:43.020 --> 10:43.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[10:44.020 --> 10:44.380]  [SPEAKER_10]: Rates?
[10:44.620 --> 10:44.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: Uh-huh.
[10:45.100 --> 10:45.380]  [SPEAKER_10]: No, sir.
[10:45.560 --> 10:46.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: You don't know that either?
[10:46.360 --> 10:49.540]  [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, see, those numbers are special numbers that the business office has the rates for.
[10:49.620 --> 10:50.540]  [SPEAKER_10]: We do not have those rates.
[10:50.800 --> 10:51.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: I see.
[10:51.240 --> 10:55.300]  [SPEAKER_10]: I only have the rate for 976 numbers, like the lotto or the time.
[10:55.660 --> 10:56.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: Right.
[10:56.200 --> 10:58.080]  [SPEAKER_10]: But not the other numbers that you're talking about, sir.
[10:58.080 --> 10:59.740]  [SPEAKER_10]: not even the 900 numbers.
[10:59.900 --> 11:00.660]  [SPEAKER_10]: I don't have that information.
[11:01.120 --> 11:01.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[11:01.620 --> 11:02.640]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, thank you so much anyway.
[11:02.860 --> 11:03.180]  [SPEAKER_06]: You're welcome.
[11:03.460 --> 11:03.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: Bye-bye.
[11:04.580 --> 11:06.200]  [SPEAKER_06]: They don't have that information.
[11:07.240 --> 11:09.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: Remember, the operator used to know everything.
[11:09.320 --> 11:12.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: You could call the operator and ask what the capital of Peru was and they'd know.
[11:13.800 --> 11:17.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: But lately when you call the operator, they can't help you.
[11:17.920 --> 11:20.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: There's so much they cannot do.
[11:21.720 --> 11:24.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: Imagine not being able to tell you how much a phone call costs.
[11:24.620 --> 11:27.240]  [SPEAKER_06]: I have to wait till tomorrow, call the business office.
[11:28.080 --> 11:28.980]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's absurd.
[11:29.920 --> 11:38.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: So, the problem that they're having over there in Holland is the same problem that we're having here in this country as far as confusion goes.
[11:39.020 --> 11:47.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: You dial an 06 number and you don't know for sure what you're being connected to and how much it's going to cost unless you really understand how those numbers are put together.
[11:47.620 --> 11:55.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: Same thing with our 900 numbers, 970 numbers, 540 numbers, and 550 numbers.
[11:55.580 --> 11:58.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: And the last three, by the way, are only within New York.
[11:59.120 --> 12:01.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: You folks in New Jersey, I can't help you.
[12:01.480 --> 12:02.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: You folks in Connecticut, sorry.
[12:04.340 --> 12:07.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: You might have some special exchanges there that charge a certain amount.
[12:08.200 --> 12:17.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I know there's lots of places in the country where people's home phone numbers begin with 970 or 540 or 550.
[12:18.340 --> 12:19.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: Think nothing of it.
[12:20.880 --> 12:25.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: 970, but if you call a number like that here, you better know what you're getting into.
[12:28.260 --> 12:43.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, 976 is another story, because that's your mass announcement service that uniformly charges you 36 cents per call, which in itself is a bit of a ripoff, but you may not know this.
[12:43.300 --> 12:47.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: If you run down to your local payphone, it will only cost you a quarter.
[12:50.280 --> 12:51.660]  [SPEAKER_06]: And nobody knows why.
[12:55.470 --> 13:12.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Another thing that perhaps we should also point out as long as we're talking about running down to your local pay phone, while you have to pay outrageous amounts for every call to information, I believe it's 40 cents for local information and 60, maybe even 65 cents for national information.
[13:13.550 --> 13:38.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: If you run down to your local payphone, and I mean your local New York telephone payphone, not one of those other payphones that do all kinds of unpredictable things, it doesn't cost anything within the local area, meaning 516-212-718-914, and soon 917.
[13:38.790 --> 13:51.950]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's right, 1992 will bring a new area code into the New York metropolitan area, the 917 area code, and also the Bronx, New folks in the Bronx, you'll be moving to 718.
[13:52.630 --> 13:55.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: We'll be happy to have you aboard in the 718 area code.
[13:59.750 --> 14:05.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: But 917 will be the most unusual area code in the whole country.
[14:05.650 --> 14:21.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: Never before has an area code been devoted exclusively to beepers and cellular phone calls and other technological things that don't involve real human beings or some such thing.
[14:23.410 --> 14:25.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: So that's something we have to look forward to this year.
[14:26.430 --> 14:33.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: Another thing that just happened, I believe it was only a week ago, and this is very unfortunate for folks like us.
[14:35.510 --> 14:46.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: For years, it was possible to call overseas information and not be charged for that call because it was so complicated.
[14:46.650 --> 14:49.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: They only knew who to charge what and how to collect or anything like that.
[14:50.110 --> 14:52.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: But apparently they figured it all out.
[14:52.150 --> 14:58.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: They've managed to impose a $1.50 charge for every call to overseas information.
[14:58.890 --> 15:01.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: And mind you, you cannot call overseas information directly.
[15:01.390 --> 15:08.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: You have to go through an operator and oftentimes you won't even get the information you were asking for, but that won't charge them.
[15:08.690 --> 15:10.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: That won't stop them, rather, from charging you.
[15:11.410 --> 15:12.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: So keep that in mind.
[15:12.910 --> 15:20.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: However, I am told that if you go through MCI, there still is no charge for overseas information.
[15:20.750 --> 15:29.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: You have to dial 10222 followed by a zero to get the operator unless you already have MCI, in which case you would just dial 00.
[15:31.550 --> 15:36.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: And you ask them for overseas information for the particular city and country you want.
[15:37.250 --> 15:43.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: They're a bit more annoying, though, because they insist on staying on the line and doing all the talking themselves, but what are you going to do?
[15:45.390 --> 15:53.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, a couple more things, then we'll get on to some in-studio and out-of-studio guests and phone calls and other fun things like that.
[15:55.270 --> 16:14.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: According to the AP, on December 18th, 1991, 18 private investigators and social security administration employees in nine states were charged with buying and selling confidential data from SSA and FBI computers.
[16:15.060 --> 16:19.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: The information included earnings histories and criminal records.
[16:22.290 --> 16:25.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: I imagine they added themselves to that database.
[16:26.930 --> 16:33.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: The private investigators, many advertising and legal journals, sold the information to companies.
[16:35.090 --> 16:44.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: And if convicted on all counts, the defendants face sentences of up to 150 years and multi-million dollar fines.
[16:47.910 --> 16:50.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's right, your data is being sold now.
[16:52.490 --> 17:10.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: And an unverified report indicates that a German private detective agency that was thought to be operated by former Stasi members bought a computer database containing the names and salaries of 97,058 members of the Stasi in 1989.
[17:14.100 --> 17:18.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: For those that don't know, the Stasi is the East German secret police.
[17:20.220 --> 17:25.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: The detective agency then pressed charges against the computer specialist who sold them the information.
[17:27.020 --> 17:34.160]  [SPEAKER_06]: The charges are not indicated, although they may be under the strict West German privacy laws.
[17:34.200 --> 17:37.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: If so, Stasi's support for privacy is new.
[17:42.730 --> 17:54.070]  [SPEAKER_06]: In addition to their prying into the lives of East German citizens, the Stasi had Asians actively hacking into West German systems, including Berlin's driver's license agency.
[17:56.570 --> 18:01.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: And that comes to us from Sanford Sherazin off the Risks Digest.
[18:02.490 --> 18:07.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: and finally something out of England from Nick Rothwell.
[18:09.530 --> 18:15.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: There's another phone company in England that's called Mercury Communications, number two to British Telecom.
[18:17.090 --> 18:22.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: And this concerns what we started out with, outgoing fax numbers.
[18:24.070 --> 18:37.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: Mercury offers an alternative long-distance telephone network which is available to ordinary users who have the Standard British Telecom Connections, and which offers improved itemized billing, lower costs, all kinds of things like that.
[18:38.150 --> 18:48.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: And this is implemented by issuing Mercury users a long personal identification number which represents their account, and which is known only by the user.
[18:50.050 --> 18:54.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: Very much like bank card pins, only much longer.
[18:56.730 --> 19:07.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: Mercury calls are made from Standard British Telecom phones by dialing a special prefix followed by the secret Mercury pin.
[19:07.790 --> 19:08.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: Doesn't that sound ominous?
[19:08.810 --> 19:09.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: The secret Mercury pin.
[19:10.710 --> 19:12.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: And then the real phone number.
[19:13.670 --> 19:14.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: See the problem yet?
[19:14.730 --> 19:20.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: I can't send teleport faxes this way because the destination fax number is printed on the cover page.
[19:20.830 --> 19:23.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: And this is not like what we were talking about before.
[19:23.810 --> 19:27.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: This is actually not user programmable.
[19:27.390 --> 19:29.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: This simply reads off whatever it is that you dial.
[19:29.730 --> 19:34.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: And since part of what you dial is your pin number, that gets read into it as well.
[19:34.810 --> 19:40.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: The system doesn't know to distinguish between the pin and the actual phone number.
[19:42.670 --> 19:48.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: So that includes my Mercury pin, which could be compromised by any fax that I sent using it.
[19:48.710 --> 19:50.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: This is a serious drawback, I'll say.
[19:50.770 --> 19:55.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: And also a serious indication of how little thinking goes into some of these things.
[19:56.490 --> 20:02.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: And that's pretty much what's been going on in our exciting world over the past couple of weeks.
[20:02.510 --> 20:30.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: What do we have to look forward to in the weeks and months and year to come, 1992, as more technological advances are introduced, as more hackers find themselves living under the gun, as the government steps up efforts to catch and prosecute people that are asking too many questions and doing things that they don't think is proper.
[20:30.730 --> 20:36.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: We have two guests with us today, and we'll be taking your phone calls also at 212-279-3400.
[20:36.550 --> 20:42.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: On the telephone with us, hopefully still awake from Amsterdam is Rop, the editor of Hacktick.
[20:43.430 --> 20:44.070]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hello there.
[20:44.210 --> 20:46.710]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hi, you're there, and you have a staticky connection, I understand.
[20:47.150 --> 20:50.190]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I have a little bit of a staticky connection, but I could pick up another phone.
[20:50.270 --> 20:50.550]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hang on.
[20:50.910 --> 20:51.150]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[20:51.570 --> 20:52.490]  This is better, right?
[20:52.730 --> 20:55.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, and I imagine over there there's no shortage of telephones.
[20:56.390 --> 20:58.150]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, in this place there's plenty, yeah.
[20:58.270 --> 20:58.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: Go on.
[20:59.190 --> 21:04.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, we also have with us here in the studio FiberOptik, Hacker Extraordinaire, I suppose.
[21:04.950 --> 21:06.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let me make sure that microphone is working there.
[21:06.670 --> 21:07.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hello there.
[21:07.270 --> 21:13.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: Ah, yes, okay, and he is right here in New York City, so we have kind of a meeting of the minds here.
[21:14.770 --> 21:21.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: So, Rob, what is your take on the year that just went by, and what is lying in wait for us in 1992?
[21:21.390 --> 21:31.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let me first tell the folks that Amsterdam is one of the last remaining places where computer hackers are not seen as something evil, or it's actually encouraged in a way, is it not?
[21:32.210 --> 21:33.950]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, encouraged is a strong sentence.
[21:34.130 --> 21:39.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: They are thinking about making it illegal here as well, although there has been some opposition to that.
[21:39.910 --> 21:48.590]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's quite funny to see that the American authorities are, at least part of them, are fairly pissed off about the fact that it's not illegal here.
[21:48.990 --> 22:00.950]  [SPEAKER_08]: The FBI was said to be less than amused when they came to the Dutch authorities with the request to catch somebody that they had traced as playing with their military computer systems.
[22:01.470 --> 22:02.190]  [SPEAKER_06]: I see.
[22:04.210 --> 22:10.010]  [SPEAKER_08]: And they were basically told that there was no law against it, and there was not much that the Dutch authorities could do for them.
[22:10.170 --> 22:15.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, this is the first incursion of 1991 into the military systems, correct?
[22:16.590 --> 22:24.170]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, there's been constant breaking into American systems, not just military, but anything that was funny enough to do.
[22:24.330 --> 22:28.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: Right, I mean the first publicized one, because there were two, if you recall.
[22:30.030 --> 22:31.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: Two publicized ones in 1991.
[22:32.530 --> 22:36.150]  [SPEAKER_08]: I think there was one that was in 1990 still, but yeah, there could be.
[22:36.290 --> 22:38.010]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't really keep tabs.
[22:38.470 --> 22:42.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, I was trying to clarify which ones they're interested in, anyway.
[22:43.270 --> 22:46.350]  [SPEAKER_08]: I have some interesting information from 1990 still.
[22:46.710 --> 22:47.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do you?
[22:47.350 --> 22:51.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, well, sometimes it takes information a couple of years to get to us, so tell us what you have.
[22:52.490 --> 23:04.910]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, this is a document that comes from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, and although they don't say that it's not real, but they say that they distanced themselves from the people that wrote it and from the document itself.
[23:05.270 --> 23:14.930]  [SPEAKER_08]: In other words, it's from Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, it's from their computer security department, but they themselves would rather not have written this article in the present time.
[23:16.450 --> 23:17.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, that's a good lead-in.
[23:18.310 --> 23:19.950]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let's hear what they have to say now.
[23:20.170 --> 23:28.070]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, it's a long story about, I only have one page of the page that leaked out that everybody has, more or less.
[23:28.430 --> 23:35.830]  [SPEAKER_08]: And the document describes break-ins into military computer systems, among which the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories computer systems.
[23:36.570 --> 23:57.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: And then it goes on to say, our hacker sources claim that two Dutch individuals, Rop, alias Ron Honkleb, which is me, and another guy that I know but I'm not really familiar with, are principal players in these attacks, although there is allegedly a contributor or co-editor of Hacktick,
[23:57.830 --> 23:59.430]  [SPEAKER_08]: a magazine for hackers in Amsterdam.
[23:59.990 --> 24:02.510]  [SPEAKER_08]: He is linked with the second set of attacks.
[24:02.710 --> 24:07.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: He is the individual who allegedly has bragged about his ability to break into the Autobahn system.
[24:08.630 --> 24:13.510]  [SPEAKER_08]: Army intelligence describes him as hardened and capable of making considerable trouble.
[24:14.610 --> 24:24.170]  [SPEAKER_08]: In one electronic conversation two months ago with a system manager at the University of Chicago, a person identifying himself as Ron claimed that he has spent one year in jail.
[24:24.790 --> 24:28.630]  [SPEAKER_08]: Three days ago, the FBI informed me that Honkreip is an alias.
[24:30.150 --> 24:37.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: Honkreip is, according to our hacker's sources, presently, this is the summer of 1990, in the United States on business.
[24:38.390 --> 24:42.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Actually, at that particular time, I believe we were traveling around California together, weren't we?
[24:42.330 --> 24:43.010]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yes, we were.
[24:43.010 --> 24:45.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: We were sitting in a car driving around California and Mexico.
[24:46.270 --> 24:49.570]  [SPEAKER_08]: But this source said that I was on business there.
[24:49.870 --> 24:53.510]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, the funny part is at the end of this document where it says...
[24:53.510 --> 24:55.150]  [SPEAKER_06]: Rob, if I could just break in here.
[24:55.310 --> 24:59.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: We weren't in Mexico because we weren't supposed to take that rented car into Mexico, if you remember.
[25:00.070 --> 25:00.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: Ah, yeah, okay.
[25:00.670 --> 25:01.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: No, we weren't.
[25:01.410 --> 25:01.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: We weren't.
[25:01.770 --> 25:03.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: So, we were definitely not in Mexico.
[25:03.010 --> 25:11.570]  [SPEAKER_08]: The hacker sources have informed us that both individuals, so me and the other guy, have had a substantial increase in standard of living over the last few months.
[25:12.510 --> 25:17.830]  [SPEAKER_08]: Both are said, for example, to travel more frequently and to now travel first class.
[25:19.530 --> 25:21.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, that's quite an improvement.
[25:22.270 --> 25:23.190]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yes, it is.
[25:23.570 --> 25:29.450]  [SPEAKER_08]: Especially since that flight I took to you was like lower than standby.
[25:29.450 --> 25:32.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: It was like you're flying Turkish airlines out of Belgium.
[25:32.630 --> 25:35.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, and I believe they even spat on you at one point, didn't they?
[25:35.730 --> 25:36.050]  [SPEAKER_08]: Sorry?
[25:36.250 --> 25:38.270]  [SPEAKER_06]: They even spat upon you at one point on that airline.
[25:38.410 --> 25:39.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's how low you are in the rungs.
[25:39.930 --> 25:40.930]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
[25:41.050 --> 25:41.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's real funny.
[25:41.910 --> 25:43.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: Did you get any food at all on that flight?
[25:43.390 --> 25:52.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: They suggest that German magazines are paying Dutch hackers and they are not publishing anything of it because they are not really in it for the publishing.
[25:52.550 --> 25:56.910]  [SPEAKER_08]: They're just fumbling money for the Iraqi intelligence.
[25:57.170 --> 25:59.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, where do these people get their information?
[25:59.550 --> 26:00.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: Any idea about that?
[26:01.610 --> 26:04.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, it says our hacker sources.
[26:05.490 --> 26:10.050]  [SPEAKER_08]: It basically, wherever they say something that's really outrageous, it says anonymous sources.
[26:10.690 --> 26:11.830]  [SPEAKER_06]: Make-believe sources.
[26:12.010 --> 26:16.430]  [SPEAKER_08]: Not much you can make of it, but I mean, I'm in the phone book here with my real name.
[26:16.570 --> 26:21.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: And they say here three days ago the FBI informed me that Hong Sheib is an alias.
[26:22.330 --> 26:24.130]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now, the FBI is pretty stupid.
[26:24.130 --> 26:26.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: I will not say anything about that.
[26:27.310 --> 26:32.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: But I think they could find somebody on the planet if he was in the phone book.
[26:32.470 --> 26:33.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, that's true.
[26:33.290 --> 26:38.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: But keep in mind it is a foreign country and sometimes they get disoriented as we all do.
[26:38.210 --> 26:38.770]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's true.
[26:39.030 --> 26:39.630]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's true.
[26:39.950 --> 26:43.050]  [SPEAKER_08]: But I mean, it's like a picture.
[26:43.390 --> 26:47.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: They've heard a few things from here and there and they've made their own nice picture to go with it.
[26:48.750 --> 27:00.270]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, if you can prove that you have Iraqi spies in your computers, it's a lot more interesting and it brings in a lot more money and extra knowledge than if you can prove that some kids are hanging around in your computer and having a party in there.
[27:00.270 --> 27:02.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: So are you saying Lawrence Livermore would somehow benefit from this?
[27:05.290 --> 27:07.490]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I would say so.
[27:08.250 --> 27:11.150]  [SPEAKER_08]: You benefit because you are more important.
[27:11.370 --> 27:12.070]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's easier.
[27:12.250 --> 27:14.970]  [SPEAKER_08]: You benefit because you keep your status.
[27:15.390 --> 27:23.030]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, there's not much you can do against ultra-high-tech teenagers that are paid by the Iraqis to do damage to your computer system.
[27:23.230 --> 27:27.950]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's something else if some kids from the suburbs are having fun in your computer system.
[27:27.950 --> 27:29.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: You're supposed to stop that.
[27:31.110 --> 27:31.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: Most interesting.
[27:32.030 --> 27:34.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: I should say we've got Fiberoptic with us in the studios here.
[27:34.970 --> 27:40.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: He's no stranger to defamation of character by various anonymous sources.
[27:40.970 --> 27:43.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: Any comments on what Rob has been telling us?
[27:43.370 --> 27:43.890]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes.
[27:44.010 --> 27:50.350]  [SPEAKER_00]: Not surprising that people from such an organization or organizations would fabricate such nonsense.
[27:51.110 --> 28:12.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: Since the fall of the so-called evil empire being the Soviet Union, I think the American government is eager to find a new scapegoat to point the finger at because if they're not constantly reminding who the bad guy is to the general public, then they might just snap out of it and really realize that the bad guy is the government.
[28:14.630 --> 28:16.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's quite an observation.
[28:16.330 --> 28:17.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: What do you think of that, Rob?
[28:17.990 --> 28:22.270]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, I'm grabbing the lousy mouthpiece again because some other people are trying to hear the phone here.
[28:22.590 --> 28:23.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: I'll grab the other one.
[28:23.770 --> 28:26.030]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, this is really much better.
[28:27.750 --> 28:28.970]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, that's true.
[28:29.230 --> 28:36.070]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's completely true that things are being fabricated here and they are being fabricated to keep a machine intact.
[28:36.590 --> 28:44.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: And the machine has trouble admitting that some parts of it have no knowledge whatsoever about computers, let alone, about computer security.
[28:47.390 --> 28:50.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, it's difficult for us to...
[28:50.850 --> 29:07.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: a lot of us who are just entering into this particular field, you know, the field of computers, telephones, that kind of thing, to think of government agents constantly looking at us and interrogating us and, you know, writing memos about us and that kind of thing.
[29:08.750 --> 29:15.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: You know, why are they so concerned with the actions of people that are really just interested in learning how things work?
[29:17.390 --> 29:23.610]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, because if you admit that such people are inside your computer system, it means that you've done something wrong.
[29:25.090 --> 29:37.390]  [SPEAKER_08]: And big companies that make their money off the government thinking that they are trustworthy, like defense contractors, don't want the image of kids hanging around in their computer system, even if that's exactly what's happening.
[29:38.570 --> 29:42.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, you run a multi-million dollar defense contractor.
[29:42.610 --> 29:42.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: I do?
[29:43.230 --> 29:43.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, okay.
[29:44.290 --> 29:45.230]  [SPEAKER_08]: Suppose you do.
[29:45.370 --> 29:45.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[29:45.750 --> 29:52.070]  [SPEAKER_08]: And then these kids hang out in your computer system, or just anybody can hang out in your computer system because it's not protected well.
[29:52.330 --> 29:52.490]  [SPEAKER_09]: Right.
[29:52.590 --> 29:53.430]  [SPEAKER_08]: You have two options.
[29:53.530 --> 30:03.270]  [SPEAKER_08]: Either you write a memo saying, well, it's just a bunch of people that wanted to learn about how our system worked, or you write a memo that says, well, it's Iraqi secret agents and they're out to destroy all of society.
[30:04.530 --> 30:10.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: So they kind of take the blame off themselves by doing that, but in the process, they make a very scary situation.
[30:11.070 --> 30:11.470]  [SPEAKER_08]: Sure.
[30:11.810 --> 30:27.990]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, if somebody anywhere believes all this nonsense that's written about me, I am an Iraqi agent with a very high standard of living that flies first class, and that brags about breaking into the Audubon network, and was in jail for a year.
[30:29.630 --> 30:32.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: You would know if you were in jail for a year, would you not?
[30:33.110 --> 30:36.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: I must have been hella stoned if I didn't remember that.
[30:37.490 --> 30:52.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, over there in Holland, is there any kind of conception of what it's like to be woken up at gunpoint by federal agents as we are here in this country, simply for tapping into a computer system or making a few phone calls without paying for them or things like that?
[30:52.730 --> 30:54.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: Does that kind of thing ever happen over there?
[30:55.050 --> 30:57.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, authority misbehaves anywhere.
[30:57.310 --> 30:59.730]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's just, it's it's just a matter of proportions.
[31:00.050 --> 31:02.550]  [SPEAKER_08]: It happens, I think it happens less here, but it happens.
[31:02.910 --> 31:23.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: There's been the case at Radio 100, a Dutch or Amsterdam radio station that was raided a couple months ago under Article 140, which is an infamous article in our law that says that it's illegal to participate in a, in an association that has, as its crime
[31:28.210 --> 31:29.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: in this case, was making radio.
[31:30.970 --> 31:36.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: That has been considered a crime many times around here.
[31:36.490 --> 31:42.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: I know that a lot of people feel that way about BAI, but you know, it's also called freedom of speech.
[31:43.590 --> 31:44.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, yeah, of course.
[31:44.470 --> 31:51.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, but I mean, authorities misbehave anywhere, and if you bother them enough, if you're enough of a pain in the ass, they will come after you.
[31:51.430 --> 31:54.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's just that in some systems it's easier than in others.
[31:54.850 --> 31:58.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, Rob, I want to get a prediction from you as to what's going to happen in the future over there.
[31:58.090 --> 31:59.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: Then we're going to go to some phone calls.
[32:01.550 --> 32:07.370]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you want my hopes, I'd say things are going to stay as they were a year ago.
[32:07.650 --> 32:16.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you want my predictions, things are basically changing into one Europe politically as well, even though people aren't noticing it very much.
[32:16.670 --> 32:20.890]  [SPEAKER_08]: And if that's going to happen, if that's going to continue, it's not going to be good for Holland.
[32:21.710 --> 32:27.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, what exactly does the EC mean for an open society like Holland?
[32:27.570 --> 32:34.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: How open will you be able to remain as a unified part of a bigger nation, in effect?
[32:35.490 --> 32:40.090]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, that all depends on how much power the central European government is going to get.
[32:40.210 --> 32:49.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, for now, they're planning on a complete European governmental structure that has all sorts of authorities, but they haven't even planned a real European parliament.
[32:49.410 --> 32:54.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: There is a parliament, but it doesn't have any real power.
[32:54.430 --> 33:02.790]  [SPEAKER_08]: So they're planning on a complete new layer on our government, and they haven't planned on any democratic controls on it.
[33:02.930 --> 33:03.810]  [SPEAKER_08]: So it's really...
[33:03.810 --> 33:04.850]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, considering this is...
[33:04.850 --> 33:07.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's not traveling in the right direction here, that's for sure.
[33:07.230 --> 33:11.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: Considering this is the year that it's going to be taking effect, how could they not have planned for this yet?
[33:12.150 --> 33:18.210]  [SPEAKER_08]: Well, the year that the first step is really going into effect is the 1st of January 1993.
[33:19.050 --> 33:20.850]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's when the borders actually disappear.
[33:21.030 --> 33:24.170]  [SPEAKER_08]: This is just the year that they've chosen as the symbol year.
[33:24.810 --> 33:27.450]  [SPEAKER_08]: But really not much is going to happen in the course of this year.
[33:27.670 --> 33:32.170]  [SPEAKER_08]: And one European currency is going to happen from 1997 onwards.
[33:32.570 --> 33:33.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: The ECU.
[33:33.690 --> 33:34.690]  [SPEAKER_08]: So it's really...
[33:34.690 --> 33:35.710]  [SPEAKER_08]: This is just the beginning.
[33:35.890 --> 33:40.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: From this year on, a number of regulations will go into effect.
[33:40.470 --> 33:42.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's going to move slower than most people think.
[33:42.750 --> 33:44.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do you think there's any kind of positive thing?
[33:45.170 --> 33:51.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: Can Holland's way of looking at things be perhaps spread to other countries so that they'll live a little bit more openly as well?
[33:51.990 --> 33:52.890]  [SPEAKER_08]: I doubt it.
[33:52.950 --> 33:53.350]  [SPEAKER_08]: I doubt it.
[33:53.390 --> 33:54.610]  [SPEAKER_08]: I hope so, but I doubt it.
[33:55.210 --> 33:55.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: Uh-huh.
[33:56.070 --> 33:56.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[33:56.410 --> 33:58.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let me ask FiberOptic the same question.
[33:58.250 --> 34:03.150]  [SPEAKER_06]: If you have any thoughts on what lies ahead, then we'll go to the phones.
[34:04.530 --> 34:08.190]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I should start off with a somewhat interesting story in brief.
[34:08.190 --> 34:22.850]  [SPEAKER_00]: And that's that on December 6th, 1991, I was awoken at about 11 o'clock in the morning by two men pointing automatic pistols at my head, claiming to be FBI agents.
[34:23.930 --> 34:26.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: And they were rather jumpy at that.
[34:26.590 --> 34:36.690]  [SPEAKER_00]: And once they had secured the fact that I didn't have any weapons on me, I don't know how many people sleep with weapons, but they threw me a pair of jeans and escorted me downstairs.
[34:37.970 --> 34:46.970]  [SPEAKER_00]: And basically, I was confined to my couch for a period of about three hours while they proceeded to clear me out of all my valuable possessions.
[34:47.470 --> 34:52.070]  [SPEAKER_00]: And no reason was ever given of why they were there and what I was accused of doing.
[34:52.770 --> 35:01.550]  [SPEAKER_00]: They left a copy of the search warrant that they had gotten, and they left a copy of all the things that they had taken from me, which are valued at many hundreds of dollars.
[35:02.110 --> 35:03.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: Actually, a couple of thousands of dollars.
[35:04.750 --> 35:06.690]  [SPEAKER_00]: And there was no reason ever given.
[35:07.570 --> 35:18.250]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's as if all the people that have been complaining about the authorities overstepping their bounds, it's as if these organizations weren't even paying attention ever.
[35:18.930 --> 35:21.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: Because the exact same thing seemed to have happened all over again.
[35:21.490 --> 35:41.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: I know on this program numerous times we've asked the question, why is it necessary for authorities to point the gun at somebody who's, you know, accused of being a computer hacker when there has never been a case of computer hackers ever having a firearm in the first place or any kind of weapon or even resisting anything in any way.
[35:41.870 --> 35:46.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: So the response to this was to use two guns on the latest series of raids.
[35:46.830 --> 35:55.010]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, you'd be... you'd probably be surprised if you saw some of the propaganda, which was just a small sample of what Rob was saying, that was fabricated about him.
[35:55.770 --> 36:00.690]  [SPEAKER_00]: There's some horrible propaganda that's circulated and recirculated concerning hackers.
[36:01.450 --> 36:10.230]  [SPEAKER_00]: And if what all these people or all these organizations are saying is true, then they are justified to point guns at people.
[36:10.450 --> 36:16.230]  [SPEAKER_00]: But what they're forgetting is the fact that they're making up the propaganda and they're using it to their advantage.
[36:16.990 --> 36:21.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: This is indeed scary stories to be telling.
[36:21.390 --> 36:30.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: And we actually mentioned that a couple of weeks ago, what happened on December 6th, having happened to a bunch of people around the country.
[36:30.310 --> 36:40.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: We had one system operator who had his entire next computer system taken because he allegedly committed the crime of having a hacker have an account on his system.
[36:40.950 --> 36:42.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: In other words, he wasn't accused of anything.
[36:42.310 --> 36:46.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: He was simply accused of allowing somebody to be on his system.
[36:46.570 --> 36:49.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: And for that, he lost everything to the federal government.
[36:49.690 --> 37:00.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: And we have all kinds of other instances of abuses, people being ordered not to speak Spanish in their home when that's the language that they speak in their home because it made the FBI agents nervous.
[37:00.930 --> 37:08.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: Other people having personal property intentionally destroyed in front of them just to kind of aggravate them some more and kind of taunt them, I suppose.
[37:09.310 --> 37:10.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: All kinds of other things as well.
[37:11.050 --> 37:15.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: This was the first coordinated raid between the Secret Service and the FBI.
[37:16.350 --> 37:19.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: And it does not portend well for the future.
[37:20.230 --> 37:26.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: A lot of people out there might wonder why should they care about what happens to a bunch of computer nerds.
[37:26.950 --> 37:28.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, you know, what is it for them?
[37:28.950 --> 37:32.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: But you see, there's always a first step to something.
[37:32.430 --> 37:46.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: And if the first step is against those people that have figured out how the system works and aren't afraid to ask questions and persist in finding those answers, you have to wonder where that is going to lead us.
[37:46.290 --> 37:48.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: And that's why we need your support.
[37:48.470 --> 38:00.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: We need people's support that are not the hackers themselves, but understand the danger of such actions against people that really are just in for free speech, freedom of information.
[38:00.630 --> 38:10.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: No hacker has ever been found to have sold secrets and profited and done evil things that you would expect people to do.
[38:10.250 --> 38:12.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, I'm sure there's people out there that would do that.
[38:12.290 --> 38:14.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: But for the most part, hackers are simply interested in learning.
[38:15.210 --> 38:16.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, one more comment here.
[38:16.730 --> 38:18.390]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, I'd like to make one quick comment.
[38:18.390 --> 38:29.530]  [SPEAKER_00]: And that was going along with what Rob had said earlier about his document relating to the fact that they had gotten information, propaganda type information, from their hacker sources.
[38:30.230 --> 38:32.590]  [SPEAKER_00]: I'd just like to make a quick comment about that.
[38:32.730 --> 38:39.450]  [SPEAKER_00]: And that's the fact that unlike Europe, America is plagued with many people who I wouldn't call them hackers.
[38:39.810 --> 38:44.350]  [SPEAKER_00]: The only thing even coming close is that they own a computer and a modem, which doesn't say very much.
[38:44.910 --> 38:55.310]  [SPEAKER_00]: But these people or youngsters, whichever term you want to choose, think that if they can get in good with the other side, that they'll be free to do what they wish.
[38:56.090 --> 38:59.170]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, they're going to be surprised to find out that this is not the case.
[38:59.210 --> 39:03.690]  [SPEAKER_00]: And I'd like some of these individuals to keep in mind that I know who they are.
[39:04.010 --> 39:07.290]  [SPEAKER_00]: And they should remember that and consider what they do in the future.
[39:08.070 --> 39:10.470]  [SPEAKER_00]: Because sooner or later, things will come to light.
[39:10.730 --> 39:11.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, it's interesting.
[39:12.170 --> 39:25.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: One of the first, in fact, the very first issue of 2600 that came out back in January 1984, almost 10 years old, by the way, was to reveal somebody that was doing just that.
[39:25.570 --> 39:30.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I refer to John Maxfield, who was known as Cable Pair, operating out of Detroit.
[39:30.450 --> 39:34.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: He was an FBI informant, and he had been a very trusted hacker for so long.
[39:35.310 --> 39:57.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: But he, as Fiber has told us, was one of those people that thought they were going to gain something by doing this horrendous thing of entrapping kids that were curious about learning something, getting them onto computer systems, and getting them to talk freely and openly,
[39:57.330 --> 40:03.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: and all the time recording what they were saying, writing down everything, and using it all against them, and hauling them into federal court.
[40:04.910 --> 40:06.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: It didn't do him any good.
[40:06.610 --> 40:20.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: It didn't do him any good at all because the federal government never trusted him, and he was never... he never profited in any way by being a double agent, so to say.
[40:20.370 --> 40:24.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's not that there's... you know, we're talking about spies here.
[40:24.970 --> 40:30.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're simply talking about curious people that are not being trusted or encouraged in any way.
[40:31.030 --> 40:34.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's something that we see a lot different in Holland.
[40:34.430 --> 40:37.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: The, you know, the atmosphere is just a lot healthier.
[40:38.510 --> 40:41.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I think, you know, we can learn something from that.
[40:42.410 --> 40:44.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hopefully, 92 will be the year that we learn something.
[40:44.690 --> 40:51.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, let's go to some phone calls now because we do have a full switchboard, and I don't want to hog the whole hour here and let our listeners get in a little bit.
[40:52.350 --> 40:54.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: 279-3400 is our telephone number.
[40:54.450 --> 40:55.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: We've got Fiber Optic in the studio.
[40:56.550 --> 41:00.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: Rob from Amsterdam over there in Holland, and let's see who's out there.
[41:00.810 --> 41:01.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[41:01.290 --> 41:02.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[41:02.370 --> 41:14.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'd like to make a point about the fact that just because the numericalness changes from 1991 to 1992 doesn't mean that there's any kind of, you know, abruptness of change of life.
[41:14.890 --> 41:24.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: There could be, you know, in a way, they could have waited with the Russian thing to happen exactly, you know, December 31st into January 1st of the new year.
[41:24.370 --> 41:34.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: But the thing about it is that it seems that the human creature, you know, there's like one of those bell-shaped curves.
[41:34.510 --> 41:38.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: And most of them think that this is some sort of a great phenomenon.
[41:38.490 --> 41:38.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know what I mean?
[41:39.150 --> 41:44.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's just 365 continued again, another 365 or so.
[41:44.330 --> 41:50.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it doesn't really have that significance to rally and to get excited.
[41:50.910 --> 42:07.570]  [SPEAKER_01]: If the people wouldn't put their energies to teaching others to read and how to fish or whatever, you know, to make life better than to, like, show a kind of feigned enthusiasm for something that, you know, it may just be a numerical jumping up of one digit.
[42:07.850 --> 42:09.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, that's really true.
[42:09.290 --> 42:11.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: You know, the new year is a completely human thing.
[42:11.790 --> 42:18.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: And then in terms of, since we're talking to people overseas in Holland, you know, I always have the best feeling about the Netherlands.
[42:19.030 --> 42:21.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: But, of course, I'm sure that there's a negative side to it.
[42:21.430 --> 42:23.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: But we have to be one world now.
[42:23.730 --> 42:29.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: We have to think in terms that we have to, in a sense, plan because we don't want pollution coming on our heads.
[42:29.630 --> 42:37.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: We have to plan for working together in such a harmony that everyone is, shall we say, a happy flower.
[42:37.350 --> 42:37.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know what I mean?
[42:37.910 --> 42:41.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: A happy organism, a happy human being.
[42:41.670 --> 42:43.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I couldn't have said it better myself.
[42:43.810 --> 42:45.830]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I don't think I would have wanted to.
[42:45.990 --> 42:46.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[42:46.910 --> 42:47.230]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hi there.
[42:47.310 --> 42:47.750]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, Goldstein.
[42:47.870 --> 42:48.690]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is Jordy from Berkeley.
[42:49.090 --> 42:49.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hey, how you doing?
[42:49.810 --> 42:50.210]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, pretty good.
[42:50.290 --> 42:50.790]  [SPEAKER_04]: Rob, are you there?
[42:51.470 --> 42:52.150]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, I am.
[42:52.290 --> 42:52.850]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hi, are you there?
[42:53.150 --> 42:53.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yes, I am.
[42:53.890 --> 42:55.310]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, Rob, I still owe you an intercom switch.
[42:55.410 --> 43:02.450]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, you guys, I was going to call up tonight and bug about the local service competition, but I guess you got off on the thing about hacker raids, and I got a couple of interesting data points.
[43:02.630 --> 43:04.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: You're not in Berkeley now, are you?
[43:04.430 --> 43:05.010]  [SPEAKER_04]: No, I'm in New York.
[43:05.150 --> 43:06.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, I didn't know that.
[43:06.250 --> 43:06.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, go ahead.
[43:06.950 --> 43:08.550]  [SPEAKER_04]: Anyway, let's see.
[43:08.630 --> 43:23.990]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, first of all, my mom listens to right-wing radio, WABC, and some commentator was on there talking about the idea that there's a study that's been conducted based on some things that happened in Europe where they're planning to start going to the use of fines instead of jail sentences as a means of punishing certain types of offenders,
[43:24.190 --> 43:30.770]  [SPEAKER_04]: particularly nonviolent ones like white-collar criminals, and I presume that they would say that kids who are too curious about computers fall into that category.
[43:30.970 --> 43:34.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, what do you do with those poor kids that are too curious?
[43:34.750 --> 43:46.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: You know, we see a lot of computer hackers these days that fall under the high income, you know, a lot of computer hackers in the early days were high-income kids, but now you see a lot of lower-income kids that are finally getting into it.
[43:47.010 --> 43:54.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I see sort of a coinciding with the really heavy sentencing now that these kids are getting involved.
[43:54.590 --> 43:56.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: You know, people haven't started to go to jail.
[43:56.390 --> 43:57.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: Robert Morris never went to jail.
[43:57.970 --> 44:00.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: He came from a, you know, an upper-class family and all that.
[44:00.230 --> 44:07.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: But now that you have some of the, you know, Main Street America kids getting involved, all of a sudden, huge fines, long jail sentences.
[44:07.390 --> 44:08.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do you see a connection?
[44:08.450 --> 44:08.990]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, sure.
[44:09.090 --> 44:12.510]  [SPEAKER_04]: But see, what they're talking about is an escalating structure, but then an escalating fine structure.
[44:12.570 --> 44:18.930]  [SPEAKER_04]: But the other thing is, all this business about confiscating computers, where those computers ultimately end up, is in the police department headquarters being used.
[44:19.210 --> 44:20.270]  [SPEAKER_04]: It's a revenue measure.
[44:20.370 --> 44:30.350]  [SPEAKER_04]: And the thing that we've really got to watch out for here is that the government is going to start taking advantage of civil forfeatures and other things as a revenue enhancement measure to get themselves things that they need, or money that they need,
[44:30.450 --> 44:32.790]  [SPEAKER_04]: because they can't get it from the taxpayers.
[44:34.970 --> 44:37.630]  [SPEAKER_04]: So I guess that's thing number one, which was kind of interesting to bring up tonight.
[44:37.710 --> 44:39.830]  [SPEAKER_04]: Thing number two, I seem to have forgotten.
[44:39.950 --> 44:42.530]  [SPEAKER_04]: So on to thing number three, local service competition.
[44:42.810 --> 44:45.670]  [SPEAKER_04]: They're talking about having competing phone companies here for local dial tone.
[44:45.950 --> 44:56.770]  [SPEAKER_04]: And what I start to see happening here is before the end of 1992, we're going to see the beginning of redlining of poor neighborhoods to the point where, you know, neighborhoods that, you know, you've got a lot of residents, customers, a lot of people on welfare,
[44:56.910 --> 44:57.650]  [SPEAKER_04]: lifeline subscribers.
[44:57.990 --> 44:59.610]  [SPEAKER_04]: Hey, why bother taking over those switches?
[44:59.670 --> 45:04.250]  [SPEAKER_04]: Just, you know, keep them, hand them off to 9X or whoever it might be and let the rates go through the ceiling.
[45:04.850 --> 45:06.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: Sort of like what we have with co-cuts right now.
[45:07.010 --> 45:07.570]  [SPEAKER_04]: Right, exactly.
[45:07.570 --> 45:11.410]  [SPEAKER_04]: Like what we've got with co-cuts, because the co-cuts in the poor neighborhoods will say no incoming calls.
[45:11.870 --> 45:18.170]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, a lot of these people don't have phones in their houses, and so they'll call someone and leave a message on the answering machine and say, call me back and wait around the phone.
[45:18.610 --> 45:20.230]  [SPEAKER_04]: And then they can't get the call coming in.
[45:20.330 --> 45:21.750]  [SPEAKER_04]: And I think we're going to start seeing that.
[45:22.230 --> 45:27.030]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, it's like, I was hoping to see if we, you know, it sounded as if, whoops, I've got a bad phone here.
[45:27.470 --> 45:38.410]  [SPEAKER_04]: We didn't have any other debates going on tonight to get you guys on the subject of, on the subject of local competition, because I know it's a, it tends to be a consensus in the community that people are in favor of that.
[45:38.730 --> 45:48.010]  [SPEAKER_04]: But lately I've been coming more and more to think that maybe the bell system, you know, there were some aspects of the bell system, here you go with the big heresy, that the bell system wasn't as bad as some of us were afraid it was in some ways.
[45:48.370 --> 45:52.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, of course it worked a whole lot better than it does now because people weren't all that confused.
[45:53.030 --> 45:57.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: But what would you call something along the lines of mandatory competition?
[45:57.390 --> 46:03.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: In other words, every company has to serve every area and allow service to be installed wherever it's requested.
[46:03.710 --> 46:12.190]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, I wouldn't mind that as a matter of fact, because what I'm trying to do is retain the structure under which you can still have long distance rates paying for local service.
[46:12.290 --> 46:25.470]  [SPEAKER_04]: In other words, once you unbundle the cost, which is a big thing they're pressing for these days, what suddenly happens is the cost of local service is the highest component of the telephone service altogether, because you don't have things like multiplex carriers and stuff that your lay people out there won't understand.
[46:25.590 --> 46:32.710]  [SPEAKER_04]: But anyway, and so if local service rises, that red lines a lot of poor people out of the pool entirely.
[46:32.910 --> 46:38.470]  [SPEAKER_04]: In fact, in Connecticut, Southern New England Telephone did a survey and found out that poor black families use the telephone.
[46:39.850 --> 46:45.670]  [SPEAKER_04]: Black families below the poverty line use the telephone with ten times as much local service usage as white families in the same category.
[46:46.010 --> 46:50.730]  [SPEAKER_04]: And poor families generally use the telephone a whole lot more than rich families do or middle class families do.
[46:51.910 --> 47:00.210]  [SPEAKER_04]: And what I'm afraid of here is a sort of an information age class structure, which basically excludes a lot of these people, totally disenfranchises them.
[47:00.370 --> 47:07.990]  [SPEAKER_04]: So if there's some way under a regulatory structure to sort of force these carriers to provide the same grade of service.
[47:08.130 --> 47:14.730]  [SPEAKER_04]: Now, I've talked to people in the bell system about this, and they say, oh, sure, there'll always be some kind of lifeline plan, but maybe they won't get full featured service.
[47:14.870 --> 47:15.450]  [SPEAKER_04]: Well, what does that mean?
[47:15.510 --> 47:18.550]  [SPEAKER_04]: Does that mean commercials between the rings, which is another thing that someone's proposing now?
[47:18.870 --> 47:23.710]  [SPEAKER_04]: Does that mean someone just got a patent for a device that puts commercial messages between the rings while you're waiting for the phone to answer?
[47:23.850 --> 47:25.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: I knew that would happen sooner or later.
[47:25.310 --> 47:28.350]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, I was predicting that stuff back in the early part of the last decade.
[47:28.490 --> 47:30.070]  [SPEAKER_04]: But, you know, is it going to mean that?
[47:30.150 --> 47:31.610]  [SPEAKER_04]: Is it going to mean they can't have call blocking?
[47:31.630 --> 47:36.970]  [SPEAKER_04]: Is it going to mean that they are subject to additional, you know, what kind of, how are we going to cripple the service?
[47:37.090 --> 47:38.370]  [SPEAKER_04]: Are we going to not allow them to use modems?
[47:38.510 --> 47:40.270]  [SPEAKER_04]: You know, are we going to keep them out of the information age?
[47:40.570 --> 47:42.590]  [SPEAKER_04]: I really see the makings of a monster out there.
[47:42.790 --> 47:44.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, very good points there.
[47:44.230 --> 47:44.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: Very good points.
[47:44.810 --> 47:47.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: Listen, George, we're going to have to move on because we have a whole lot of calls here.
[47:47.970 --> 47:49.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: But it's good hearing from you.
[47:49.110 --> 47:49.590]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, you too.
[47:49.670 --> 47:49.910]  [SPEAKER_04]: Too bad.
[47:50.450 --> 47:51.530]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'm going to be in town until Saturday.
[47:51.590 --> 47:53.070]  [SPEAKER_04]: I wonder if there's a way we can get together or something like that.
[47:53.170 --> 47:54.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, call me at the office.
[47:54.230 --> 47:55.150]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm sure we can work something out.
[47:55.370 --> 47:56.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, in fact, there's a very good way.
[47:56.850 --> 47:58.270]  [SPEAKER_06]: There's a 2600 meeting this Friday.
[47:58.350 --> 47:58.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: You should come to it.
[47:59.030 --> 47:59.550]  [SPEAKER_04]: I definitely will.
[48:00.170 --> 48:02.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, well, I don't have a phone number for 2600 meetings.
[48:03.130 --> 48:07.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: I have a phone number for 2600, if that's what you mean, which is 516-751-2600.
[48:08.730 --> 48:23.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: But for those interested in going to the 2600 meeting, which is basically a gathering of hackers and people that are, you know, considered strange in mainstream society, it happens at the CityCore Center in the lobby area by the payphones, where else,
[48:23.510 --> 48:25.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: between the hours of 5 and 8 p.m.
[48:25.830 --> 48:30.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's this Friday at CityCore Center, 53rd Street, and Lexington Avenue.
[48:30.650 --> 48:32.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: So hopefully we'll see people there.
[48:32.230 --> 48:34.370]  [SPEAKER_04]: Before I sign off, Rob, call me next week in Berkeley sometime.
[48:34.410 --> 48:35.370]  [SPEAKER_04]: We'll be back in Berkeley then.
[48:36.030 --> 48:36.450]  [SPEAKER_04]: Will do.
[48:36.730 --> 48:37.070]  [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks a lot.
[48:37.170 --> 48:37.730]  [SPEAKER_04]: I'll see you guys around.
[48:37.910 --> 48:38.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, take care.
[48:38.630 --> 48:38.890]  [SPEAKER_04]: Bye.
[48:39.170 --> 48:39.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: Bye-bye.
[48:41.070 --> 48:44.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, we have a lot more calls, so we're going to try to race through them as quickly as possible.
[48:45.090 --> 48:45.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[48:46.450 --> 48:46.890]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, hi.
[48:47.790 --> 48:48.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: How you doing?
[48:48.470 --> 48:48.710]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[48:49.310 --> 48:50.170]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'm on the ER, right?
[48:50.230 --> 48:50.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: You certainly are.
[48:50.950 --> 48:51.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead.
[48:51.210 --> 48:51.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[48:52.670 --> 49:01.950]  [SPEAKER_02]: I am just barely getting into what's known as a multi-level marketing setup of a competitor of AT&T on long-distance rates.
[49:02.210 --> 49:09.710]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I had, yesterday I came in contact with a person from Miami who does a tremendous amount of phone calls to a South American country.
[49:10.730 --> 49:11.410]  [SPEAKER_02]: A couple of things.
[49:11.510 --> 49:18.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: He says, first of all, between the high usage time period, 12 to 2, he has tried other competitors of AT&T.
[49:19.110 --> 49:22.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: He finds AT&T to be unsurpassed in quality and service.
[49:22.550 --> 49:27.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: They still, 10 years after deregulation, have a lion's share, about 75% of the market.
[49:28.270 --> 49:33.850]  [SPEAKER_02]: And he claims that when he used Sprint or MCI that he would get the circuits were busy during the peak periods.
[49:33.990 --> 49:34.490]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's one thing.
[49:34.570 --> 49:45.370]  [SPEAKER_02]: The other thing was when I suggested he try just one phone line to set it up and see what kind of quality my company could give him, he says, well, AT&T could make it difficult for him.
[49:45.450 --> 49:49.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: And he was implying some kind of retribution that he really didn't get into.
[49:50.390 --> 49:50.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: Really?
[49:51.170 --> 49:53.030]  [SPEAKER_02]: If you know of anything like that.
[49:53.710 --> 49:59.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I don't know if AT&T really doing any kind of, you know, retribution for switching your lines.
[50:00.390 --> 50:09.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: Just that they might make somebody feel uncomfortable about shifting, saying that there'll be charges for coming back, that their service might not be as good.
[50:09.830 --> 50:15.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: But certainly if they came back afterwards, I don't think there'd be any hard feelings.
[50:15.750 --> 50:15.990]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know.
[50:16.130 --> 50:17.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: Does anybody here have any different stories?
[50:19.310 --> 50:19.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: Apparently not.
[50:20.470 --> 50:26.710]  [SPEAKER_02]: And as far as the circuits being busy during peak periods, does AT&T have larger volume abilities to go into foreign countries?
[50:26.830 --> 50:31.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I'm sure they have the lion's share, both of the marketplace and the technological capability.
[50:31.810 --> 50:34.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: But that's something that's not going to remain that way forever.
[50:35.010 --> 50:40.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: You see, there's a lot of hesitation towards going into South American countries and also Middle Eastern countries.
[50:41.270 --> 50:48.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: Reason being that there tends to be, and, you know, it's just the way that the phone companies perceive it, there tends to be a lot of fraudulent calls made to those places.
[50:49.150 --> 50:53.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: In fact, you cannot use your AT&T calling card to call lots of those countries as well.
[50:54.390 --> 50:56.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: For instance, say, the Dominican Republic.
[50:57.350 --> 51:01.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: Hundreds of thousands of dollars in, you know, illegal calls made on people's credit cards.
[51:01.830 --> 51:07.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: So they block all calling cards to that, kind of biting off your nose to spite your face kind of thing.
[51:08.170 --> 51:12.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: So that might be a reason why those countries aren't moving in there.
[51:12.250 --> 51:23.930]  [SPEAKER_02]: The perception, apparently, if they do have 75% of the market, how do you break the businessman's perception that AT&T has, can deliver the service and the quality, whereas MCI or Sprint or even the smaller carriers cannot?
[51:24.550 --> 51:29.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, the real way to do it is to get a good relationship with the company.
[51:29.430 --> 51:39.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: So that when something goes wrong, you can speak to somebody and not get the royal run around, like we do with so many companies that have sprung up.
[51:40.530 --> 51:50.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: You might actually be better off with a smaller company than Sprint or MCI as well, because they'll adjust themselves rather than having you adjust yourself to meet their needs.
[51:51.670 --> 51:56.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: So, you know, basically experiment, because this is a prime time for experimentation.
[51:56.610 --> 51:58.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: There's all kinds of different services out there.
[51:58.410 --> 52:06.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: You might be the first person to find something that really works, and then obviously you'll tell more people, and you'll be very valuable to them, just as they'll be valuable to you.
[52:07.010 --> 52:09.570]  [SPEAKER_02]: And then I'll become rich and I'll no longer have to listen to WBAI.
[52:09.650 --> 52:13.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, you can always listen, but we'll just hit on you a little harder at pledge time.
[52:13.830 --> 52:14.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[52:14.390 --> 52:14.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[52:14.610 --> 52:15.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: Thanks for calling.
[52:16.350 --> 52:17.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: It is a good time, though.
[52:17.430 --> 52:18.810]  [SPEAKER_08]: That line didn't sound very good.
[52:18.910 --> 52:20.310]  [SPEAKER_08]: I wonder if he was using AT&T.
[52:21.310 --> 52:24.470]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, unless it was a local call, then it's all New York Telephone's fault.
[52:24.990 --> 52:28.270]  [SPEAKER_06]: But, you know, it's a good time for experimentation, for trying something different.
[52:28.490 --> 52:35.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: You know, I found lots of things that way, just by, you know... If you stick with the mainstream all the time, I think that's what we always say here on this radio station.
[52:35.430 --> 52:37.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: If you stick with the mainstream, you're never going to learn anything, right?
[52:38.030 --> 52:41.190]  [SPEAKER_06]: And yeah, you'll have bad experiences too, but at least you'll learn something.
[52:41.710 --> 52:42.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: Does that make sense, Rob?
[52:43.250 --> 52:44.450]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, it makes sense.
[52:44.650 --> 52:50.370]  [SPEAKER_08]: But it's kind of funny to think of the phone system as something that has to be commercial.
[52:51.050 --> 52:53.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: Something that has to be... They're doing it here, too.
[52:53.770 --> 52:57.330]  [SPEAKER_08]: The PTT Telecom is now a company.
[52:57.590 --> 53:03.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: It used to be just another ministry, just another telecommunications ministry, sort of.
[53:03.270 --> 53:12.270]  [SPEAKER_08]: It used to resort under traffic and waterways, and it was another... just another part of the bureaucracy that happened to be into phones.
[53:12.570 --> 53:18.970]  [SPEAKER_08]: And now this world trend seems to be to make everything profitable and to get rid of everything that is not profitable.
[53:19.830 --> 53:19.990]  [SPEAKER_06]: Uh-huh.
[53:20.130 --> 53:21.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, we see the same thing here.
[53:21.310 --> 53:27.790]  [SPEAKER_08]: I live in a house somewhere, and there's a road next to my house, and they decide to take it away because it's not profitable.
[53:28.570 --> 53:29.050]  [SPEAKER_06]: Uh-huh.
[53:29.130 --> 53:35.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: People should look at the telephone system as something more like a road than like, you know, a luxury of sorts.
[53:35.450 --> 53:36.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's essential.
[53:36.310 --> 53:36.730]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's an infrastructure.
[53:37.550 --> 53:53.110]  [SPEAKER_08]: But the funny thing is that that the way roads are built and where they run and how they run and how wide they are and how much you pay to drive on them, everything of that sort is determined by parts of our democracy, if things are running well.
[53:53.750 --> 53:56.990]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, parts of our democracy decide where those roads will be.
[53:57.130 --> 53:59.790]  [SPEAKER_08]: There's democratic control on how and when and why.
[53:59.950 --> 54:06.230]  [SPEAKER_08]: And yet there's very little, if any, democratic control on where new phone lines are going to be who gets what services.
[54:07.030 --> 54:11.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's all done on a what is profitable basis.
[54:11.710 --> 54:12.570]  [SPEAKER_08]: That doesn't work.
[54:12.930 --> 54:15.730]  [SPEAKER_08]: You can't build infrastructure as in what is profitable.
[54:15.850 --> 54:21.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think a lot of people see the way that it is and think that it can never be changed, that they don't really have a say.
[54:21.270 --> 54:28.050]  [SPEAKER_06]: But that's really not true, because once something changes in one part of the country, and it works, it tends to catch on in other parts.
[54:28.230 --> 54:31.190]  [SPEAKER_06]: So if we can change the rules somehow, who knows?
[54:31.290 --> 54:33.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: It might catch on, but we'll never know if we don't try.
[54:33.750 --> 54:35.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: I want to race through a couple of more calls, so let's see if we can do it.
[54:36.230 --> 54:36.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[54:37.450 --> 54:37.810]  [SPEAKER_07]: Hi.
[54:38.110 --> 54:38.650]  [SPEAKER_07]: Am I on the air?
[54:38.730 --> 54:39.390]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yes, go ahead, please.
[54:39.570 --> 54:39.750]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[54:40.290 --> 54:47.430]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, first of all, don't think that I have any sympathy for large corporations that you break into, or military establishments, or any of that stuff.
[54:47.890 --> 54:57.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: But you do seem to not accept the fact that breaking into and looking around information in somebody else's property is a crime.
[54:57.150 --> 55:05.670]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't know whether it is a crime in America or not, but do you understand the rationale of FBI agents when they break in?
[55:05.750 --> 55:07.150]  [SPEAKER_07]: I mean, why they're sent to do that?
[55:07.470 --> 55:09.950]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, maybe Fiber Optic would like to take that one?
[55:10.130 --> 55:14.650]  [SPEAKER_00]: Perhaps you can explain why they need heavy firearms in order to break into someone's house.
[55:15.190 --> 55:16.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: Sure, that's unnecessary.
[55:17.270 --> 55:22.890]  [SPEAKER_07]: But the point is, you understand why they're pissed that you're doing that?
[55:22.890 --> 55:25.550]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think they're pissed because they don't understand.
[55:25.910 --> 55:29.550]  [SPEAKER_00]: And what the federal government does not understand makes them afraid.
[55:30.670 --> 55:32.770]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I have another question.
[55:33.910 --> 55:39.530]  [SPEAKER_07]: Sure, maybe none of you guys have had any contact with anybody who wants to buy information.
[55:40.130 --> 55:53.130]  [SPEAKER_07]: But don't you think it's likely that anybody or any country that would want to get this information would approach somebody like yourselves, who has the skill to break in?
[55:53.330 --> 55:55.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I certainly believe that's possible.
[55:55.150 --> 55:56.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: What is the solution to that?
[55:56.190 --> 56:06.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: To lock all of us up or to improve the safeguards and learn something from those people that have got nothing to hide and are not trying to hurt the country or the establishment in any way?
[56:07.050 --> 56:08.670]  [SPEAKER_07]: Right now they're making a lot of interest.
[56:08.670 --> 56:14.610]  [SPEAKER_07]: And, you know, there's a certain... I'm not saying that laws are made for public good, but they're made for order.
[56:15.050 --> 56:18.450]  [SPEAKER_07]: I'm not saying that's good, but it's an order that's imposed.
[56:18.850 --> 56:28.070]  [SPEAKER_07]: And if it's a crime to break into a computer system and get that knowledge, then you're saying, you know, what do you expect them to do to lock us up?
[56:28.250 --> 56:31.210]  [SPEAKER_07]: If you commit a crime in a society, then there's a punishment.
[56:32.830 --> 56:34.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: Rob, it sounds like you want to say something over there.
[56:35.290 --> 56:40.070]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, well, the thing is that it's all a matter of how you conceive it.
[56:40.170 --> 56:47.370]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you conceive it as a crime, and parts of the American authorities do, then you must lock people up for sure.
[56:47.790 --> 56:50.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: But it's not seen as much as a crime here.
[56:50.510 --> 57:04.150]  [SPEAKER_08]: But the thing that all the laws against computer crime have in common is that they all go out of the idea that you have already done the worst thing to your information that you could have, which again goes out of the idea that they don't know what you could have done.
[57:05.270 --> 57:13.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: Read any government piece about any computer break-in and they all say, this hacker could have done so-and-so.
[57:14.850 --> 57:15.290]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[57:15.470 --> 57:21.010]  [SPEAKER_08]: I never... if somebody breaks into a building and just looks around and goes out again, sure, he may get a slap on the wrist.
[57:21.350 --> 57:23.290]  [SPEAKER_08]: He may even get arrested or anything.
[57:23.590 --> 57:34.130]  [SPEAKER_08]: But they will never in his, uh, uh, in, in the papers for the, for the, for the, for the, god, how do you call that, um, um, um, where he gets arrested.
[57:34.370 --> 57:37.490]  [SPEAKER_08]: He, you, they will never say this person could have thrown a bomb in there.
[57:37.730 --> 57:40.530]  [SPEAKER_08]: But you don't... This person could have set the place on fire.
[57:40.650 --> 57:42.150]  [SPEAKER_08]: They just say, well, this person was in there.
[57:42.290 --> 57:44.830]  [SPEAKER_07]: But you don't accept that hacking is a crime of any sort.
[57:45.590 --> 57:47.330]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, in this country, it is not.
[57:47.710 --> 57:52.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: And in, and in the USA, do you guys... Well, there's, uh, there's a big division here.
[57:52.810 --> 57:55.050]  [SPEAKER_06]: Obviously, law enforcement people believe it is a crime.
[57:55.270 --> 58:01.390]  [SPEAKER_06]: And obviously, a lot of us believe that it should not be considered a crime, at least not a serious crime, if it is, in fact, a crime at all.
[58:01.530 --> 58:01.950]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm sorry.
[58:02.030 --> 58:04.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're going to have to end it there because we, we've run over.
[58:04.450 --> 58:12.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: I want to thank, uh, Rob over there in Amsterdam and Fiber Optic for coming into here in New York, all the callers that called in and, uh, everybody else who was listening.
[58:17.390 --> 58:21.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's going to just about do it for us here, uh, tonight for Off the Hook.
[58:22.190 --> 58:24.070]  [SPEAKER_06]: Stay tuned for the, uh, personal computer show.
[58:24.150 --> 58:25.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein.
[58:25.010 --> 58:27.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: We'll be back again next Wednesday night at nine o'clock.