Off The Hook - 1992-04-15

[00:03.980 --> 00:15.160]  [SPEAKER_05]: Call 212-465-3167, 212-465-3167, New Yorican Nights, at the New Yorican Poets Cafe.
[00:18.450 --> 00:24.990]  [SPEAKER_05]: This has been a public service announcement by WBAI on behalf of the New Yorican Poets Cafe.
[00:29.040 --> 00:31.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: And this is WBAI New York.
[00:32.120 --> 00:36.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: The time is almost precisely 9 o'clock on a Wednesday night.
[00:36.320 --> 00:38.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: That means it's time for Off The Hook.
[00:44.740 --> 00:46.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: The telephone keeps ringing.
[00:47.060 --> 00:49.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: So I ripped it off the wall.
[00:50.280 --> 00:52.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: I cut myself while shaving.
[00:52.920 --> 00:54.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: Now I can't make a cough.
[00:55.640 --> 00:57.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: It couldn't get much worse.
[00:58.360 --> 01:00.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: But if they could, they would.
[01:00.580 --> 01:03.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: Bum-diddly-bum for the best, expect the worst.
[01:03.840 --> 01:05.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: I hope that's understood.
[01:06.160 --> 01:06.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: Bum-diddly-bum!
[01:25.010 --> 01:26.750]  [SPEAKER_06]: And a very good evening to one and all.
[01:26.810 --> 01:28.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: The program is Off The Hook.
[01:28.270 --> 01:29.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: We look at technology.
[01:29.490 --> 01:35.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: We look at telephones, computers, and Big Brother, and see if he's looking at us.
[01:35.770 --> 01:38.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: And we take phone calls, among other things.
[01:40.310 --> 01:42.690]  [SPEAKER_06]: Tonight, we have a rather interesting program.
[01:43.310 --> 01:50.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: Something we don't usually do is talk to what might be referred to as the other side of law enforcement.
[01:50.870 --> 01:56.950]  [SPEAKER_06]: We have Don Delaney from New York State Police here, along with Phiber Optik, who is a well-known computer hacker.
[01:57.050 --> 02:00.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: And sometimes the two of them are unopposing sides, sometimes not.
[02:00.530 --> 02:06.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: And tonight, we'll have a forum for both sides, law enforcement and hackers.
[02:07.090 --> 02:10.050]  [SPEAKER_06]: We'll see if there's common ground to stand upon.
[02:10.250 --> 02:16.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: And we'll take calls from listeners at 212-279-3400.
[02:16.930 --> 02:22.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: Don Delaney is in the studio with us from New York State Police, correct?
[02:22.750 --> 02:23.210]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's correct.
[02:23.410 --> 02:29.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: And you head the computer fraud department, or is it just technology in general?
[02:29.230 --> 02:41.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, I supervise the Major K-Squad, and we have a separate unit up in Albany, which has two men assigned, and they do the investigation strictly on computer crimes, and it's a service provided to all the law enforcement in New York State.
[02:42.190 --> 02:42.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: I see.
[02:42.570 --> 02:45.070]  [SPEAKER_06]: And how long have you been involved with that particular aspect?
[02:45.070 --> 02:45.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, for two years.
[02:47.550 --> 02:52.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: And you must have learned quite a deal with this kind of thing.
[02:52.510 --> 02:57.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: When you first started, what did you imagine high-tech criminals to be like?
[02:58.550 --> 03:01.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I didn't really have any idea what they were like.
[03:01.310 --> 03:08.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: I hadn't done any of those types of investigations until we got a complaint, and we worked on the case and eventually made an arrest.
[03:08.530 --> 03:17.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: And from there, we began to get more and more calls from corporate America that were suffering losses, and we continued to investigate, and we haven't stopped.
[03:18.010 --> 03:20.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, you mentioned the calls come from corporate America.
[03:21.130 --> 03:25.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: It only comes from that kind of complainant, not individuals.
[03:25.370 --> 03:32.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: The great majority of them come from the big companies, such as the telephone companies that are losing a lot of money.
[03:32.330 --> 03:38.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: And small companies also, they lose money also when their PCs or their small systems are attacked.
[03:39.310 --> 03:42.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do you see many cases where personal computers are attacked?
[03:42.870 --> 03:43.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: No.
[03:43.650 --> 03:44.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: We have had...
[03:44.450 --> 03:56.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: Up in Albany, we had a case where there were five different PCs that were attacked by what I call a malicious hacker, and he actually was able to do hardware damage to the systems.
[03:57.290 --> 04:00.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, the first case that you were involved in, what was that?
[04:01.070 --> 04:03.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: It was American SOAR up in Massachusetts.
[04:03.830 --> 04:13.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: An individual on Long Island was dialing into their Unix mainframe on an 800 number trying to put a bulletin board system up in their computer system.
[04:13.170 --> 04:25.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: And he had erased some files, done some damage, and we traced it back, did some surveillances, determined who it was, executed a search warrant at his house, and arrested him eventually.
[04:25.830 --> 04:26.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: And what became of that?
[04:27.310 --> 04:32.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: He pled guilty to a Class A misdemeanor, which... and then got probation and community service.
[04:33.710 --> 04:47.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, of course, lots of people in the hacker world look upon law enforcement as misguided, as devoting too much firepower towards executing these warrants and tracking people down.
[04:47.510 --> 04:48.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: How do you respond to that?
[04:48.650 --> 04:55.530]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I don't think we have spent too much time or used too many people for it, or too much firepower.
[04:55.790 --> 05:02.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: We generally go in on our search warrants by knocking on the door and having the people in the residence open the door to us.
[05:02.910 --> 05:08.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: We've done that in almost every single case, and we've done more than 30 search warrants in the past two years.
[05:08.290 --> 05:09.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: There's been a couple of exceptions.
[05:10.830 --> 05:18.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, being involved in this kind of field, computer hackers are not really the people that you're after most of the time, it would seem.
[05:18.570 --> 05:26.550]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's people selling phone codes and making modifications to cellular phones and drug deals and that kind of thing.
[05:26.590 --> 05:28.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: Those are the people you're after more often, is that right?
[05:28.570 --> 05:38.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: Much more often now, from a few of the cases that we started, there was not the tremendous PBX fraud or cellular phone fraud two years ago when I first started doing these types of cases.
[05:38.870 --> 05:53.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: But what happened was, when people on the East Coast had learned how to rechip cellular phones, specific phones, that industry took off wildly in a call-selling type of industry, on the streets and out of apartments.
[05:53.790 --> 06:01.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we had also the people that are using the PBXs of the companies that they dial into and then out-dial long distance, and the companies received the bills.
[06:02.810 --> 06:10.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: Also, those that have call diverters, some of the individuals, such as plumbers that have call diverters, they have also been complainants.
[06:12.150 --> 06:15.490]  [SPEAKER_01]: But most of it right now is telephone fraud, more so than computer crime.
[06:15.490 --> 06:18.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: And how much of this would you say is preventable?
[06:18.570 --> 06:26.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, diverters are things that have been around now for years, yet they still have the same flaws, where they drop to a dial tone and allow you to call anywhere in the world.
[06:26.690 --> 06:27.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: Why don't they just fix it?
[06:28.630 --> 06:29.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, it's...
[06:29.430 --> 06:32.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: You know, the manufacturers will say they're spread out all over the place.
[06:32.210 --> 06:33.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: We don't know who have them.
[06:34.390 --> 06:54.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: Certainly, with the problems that the PBXs are experiencing, the companies that have these, I think that the corporations that make these things and the vendors that sell them have a moral, ethical responsibility to go back to these corporations that they sold them to and give them the fixes for the holes in the system and tell them how to properly secure their system.
[06:54.530 --> 07:03.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: Clearly, they're not doing it because the average complainant that's calling in to me in a one-month period is suffering somewhere between $35,000 and $100,000 in loss.
[07:04.950 --> 07:05.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: Interesting.
[07:06.130 --> 07:09.950]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let me ask you something, and I'm going to ask the same question, to Phiber Optik.
[07:10.210 --> 07:11.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: What's your definition of a hacker?
[07:13.030 --> 07:15.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, it means a lot of different things to many people.
[07:15.870 --> 07:30.190]  [SPEAKER_01]: I use it generally referring to the computer criminal who's into somebody else's system where he doesn't belong, and he's trying one of many different methods of trying something new in that system.
[07:30.350 --> 07:33.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: It can be a telephone company computer that he's hacking.
[07:33.330 --> 07:37.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: Some of those will call the person doing that a freak, a telephone freak.
[07:38.530 --> 07:39.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: Or a cracker.
[07:40.090 --> 07:43.310]  [SPEAKER_01]: But it has a number of different meanings to different people.
[07:43.450 --> 07:46.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do you see the meaning as overall negative?
[07:47.670 --> 07:53.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, the news media has given it a terribly negative connotation in the past few years.
[07:53.790 --> 08:09.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: Originally, it had to do with those in MIT and Stanford who were hacking, which were to advance their abilities in computer systems and are really thought of pretty as a noble group of people and consider themselves that way too, not malicious.
[08:09.830 --> 08:12.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: But today, the word has a connotation of maliciousness.
[08:13.750 --> 08:13.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[08:13.950 --> 08:17.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: With that, I'd like to introduce Phiber Optik, who's been in the studio before.
[08:18.630 --> 08:20.870]  [SPEAKER_06]: And let's start with your definition of a hacker.
[08:21.030 --> 08:23.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is it anything similar to what Don Delaney's is?
[08:23.890 --> 08:25.410]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, my definition of a hacker.
[08:26.230 --> 08:44.150]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, before I go into that, I just want to mention about a lot of people aren't aware of the fact that back at MIT and Berkeley and Stanford in the 60s, a lot of the individuals who became known as the classic hackers or the noble hackers were, you know,
[08:44.230 --> 08:49.410]  [SPEAKER_00]: while being very moralized people, let's remember how they gained access to the machines that they were accessing.
[08:49.990 --> 09:08.910]  [SPEAKER_00]: They actually gained access to the machines through physical means, whether it was picking a lock to a computer lab, whether it was borrowing pieces of equipment in which to hack, whether it was hardware hacking if they were designing some electronic gizmo or doodad.
[09:09.170 --> 09:17.950]  [SPEAKER_00]: The fact remains that they were doing something they shouldn't have been doing, you know, for whatever purpose of their own, which is similar to the modern meaning.
[09:18.170 --> 09:25.030]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it's not without its pseudo-illegal overtones.
[09:25.350 --> 09:32.110]  [SPEAKER_00]: And that should be kept in mind, that these weren't the perfect citizens or the perfect individuals.
[09:32.770 --> 09:38.470]  [SPEAKER_00]: Although, you know, people could argue they were geniuses and extremely intelligent people, which many of them were.
[09:38.750 --> 09:52.610]  [SPEAKER_00]: The fact remains that the means at which they gained access to things did involve in, you know, using loose terms, getting into or breaking into in order to access the things that they did.
[09:52.610 --> 09:59.170]  [SPEAKER_00]: The reason this came about at the time period in the 60s was that computers were a lot different.
[09:59.410 --> 10:01.370]  [SPEAKER_00]: They didn't fit on someone's table.
[10:01.410 --> 10:03.190]  [SPEAKER_00]: They filled entire rooms.
[10:03.630 --> 10:08.270]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it was necessary to run these machines.
[10:08.270 --> 10:13.890]  [SPEAKER_00]: They needed large staffs of people and large amounts of electricity and air conditioning units.
[10:14.470 --> 10:27.410]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, the people who maintained these machines were often very bureaucratic in their way of thinking and were often decrepit of all creativity and or intelligence.
[10:28.070 --> 10:37.170]  [SPEAKER_00]: And their only task was, the one they were entrusted with, was to keep people in an orderly fashion on lines, long lines you'd have to wait on.
[10:37.170 --> 10:47.030]  [SPEAKER_00]: After filling in a piece of graph paper with your program, you'd wait on a long line of students to hand your program to someone that was known as one of the high priesthood.
[10:48.130 --> 10:55.410]  [SPEAKER_00]: And then they'd feed it through a card punching machine to print out, to punch out a holo-rith card.
[10:55.670 --> 11:01.730]  [SPEAKER_00]: Then you'd wait on another line to which they'd take your card and feed it into the huge mammoth of a machine.
[11:02.130 --> 11:05.150]  [SPEAKER_00]: And then you'd have the results of your program sent to you.
[11:05.770 --> 11:09.490]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, the original hackers in the 60s thought this was ridiculous.
[11:10.050 --> 11:11.810]  [SPEAKER_00]: There was no creativity involved.
[11:11.810 --> 11:14.250]  [SPEAKER_00]: It was batch-processed bureaucratic nonsense.
[11:14.710 --> 11:20.610]  [SPEAKER_00]: So what they did was that they broke into the computer labs late at night to play with these machines and they did some pretty amazing things with them.
[11:22.250 --> 11:29.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: So, what you're basically saying is that sometimes it's necessary not to follow the rules in order to further progress?
[11:30.050 --> 11:32.090]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, and I think that's true throughout history.
[11:33.330 --> 11:34.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: Where do you draw the line, though?
[11:34.610 --> 11:36.910]  [SPEAKER_06]: Who makes the rules?
[11:37.070 --> 11:38.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: Who says this is going too far?
[11:39.770 --> 11:40.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: Where do you draw the line?
[11:41.130 --> 11:46.670]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I draw the line if there was some physical, reasonable, noticeable damage.
[11:46.670 --> 11:52.690]  [SPEAKER_00]: And I'm not talking about where some foolish company claims, well, the damage was the fact that they were on there at all.
[11:52.870 --> 11:53.650]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's nonsense.
[11:54.490 --> 12:06.170]  [SPEAKER_00]: Damage is done where there's some huge monetary loss, where there's some sort of downtime because someone destroyed a system or did something malicious, whether they intended to or not.
[12:06.250 --> 12:07.850]  [SPEAKER_00]: The fact remains, it still happened.
[12:08.190 --> 12:10.230]  [SPEAKER_00]: It caused the company to lose money.
[12:10.610 --> 12:13.110]  [SPEAKER_00]: Whether they actually physically damaged something.
[12:13.590 --> 12:16.350]  [SPEAKER_00]: Like, say, for instance, these guys broke into the computer lab.
[12:16.390 --> 12:17.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: And I'm not saying they were bumbling idiots.
[12:18.090 --> 12:21.610]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's very unlikely that these people would have said, whoops, and broke something.
[12:22.370 --> 12:24.410]  [SPEAKER_00]: Because it simply didn't happen.
[12:24.750 --> 12:26.630]  [SPEAKER_00]: But, say, for instance, they did.
[12:26.970 --> 12:35.810]  [SPEAKER_00]: These were huge, expensive machines that were given to the university, which were funded by the government for government research projects.
[12:36.770 --> 12:42.330]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it would require large sums of money to repair the machines in the event that a piece of equipment was broken.
[12:42.930 --> 12:50.710]  [SPEAKER_00]: I've heard stories where they would play tricks on the people that they called the high priests, who were the people that maintained these machines with an iron grip.
[12:52.230 --> 13:06.850]  [SPEAKER_00]: And what they would do is that when they would sneak in there and someone with authority would walk into the lab, they'd take a component that looks like it belonged in the machine, and they'd open one of the panels and they'd throw the component on the floor.
[13:07.330 --> 13:09.890]  [SPEAKER_00]: And they'd say, whoops, I think I broke something.
[13:10.250 --> 13:14.250]  [SPEAKER_00]: And it would make one of these authoritative individuals go crazy.
[13:14.370 --> 13:15.690]  [SPEAKER_00]: But it was a good joke, though.
[13:16.650 --> 13:33.150]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, Don Delaney, let me ask you, do you think the reason that computer crime or people trespassing into computers is looked upon with such horror is because the victims don't really know what it is that's been done?
[13:33.290 --> 13:41.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: Unlike walking into a room where you can see what's been broken, with a computer system, you don't know what they've planted, what they've seen, things like that?
[13:41.650 --> 13:41.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: Not at all.
[13:42.850 --> 13:45.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: Most of the time, the systems administrator can tell exactly what happened.
[13:46.190 --> 13:58.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: He knows who's been in there, and I think that the corporations or the systems administrator of any system that's been hit is annoyed because someone's in a system and they don't belong in there, and they have the potential for doing damage, wiping out that,
[13:58.990 --> 14:00.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: or whether or not the system is backed up.
[14:00.590 --> 14:02.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: If the person doesn't belong there, they don't belong there.
[14:02.730 --> 14:05.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: And it goes back to the same argument that's been used over and over again.
[14:05.610 --> 14:06.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: Somebody shouldn't be in your house.
[14:06.690 --> 14:07.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: They shouldn't be there.
[14:08.030 --> 14:21.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: Admittedly, at Stanford or any of the universities where hacking occurred, if the person picked a lock and he went into the computer room and was spending time in an area where he didn't belong, the university could have had the person arrested for trespass.
[14:22.070 --> 14:26.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: The laws were in a place for that, but not specifically for computer hacking.
[14:27.310 --> 14:36.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Today we have all sorts of computer crime laws, both federally and on the state level, which involve computer trespass and computer tampering and illegal access on the federal law side.
[14:36.930 --> 14:38.850]  [SPEAKER_01]: So now there are specific laws.
[14:39.350 --> 14:43.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: And Fiverr can say what he believes would be the right thing, but it's not in accordance with the law.
[14:44.810 --> 14:52.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: And asking me the same question, I would have to answer when it is against the law, it is illegal.
[14:52.150 --> 14:54.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if there is a complaint, we take action.
[14:56.370 --> 15:02.010]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, you brought up the analogy of being in somebody's home, which is a very popular one.
[15:03.150 --> 15:10.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: But the penalties are not quite the same when somebody breaks into a house and when they break into a computer system.
[15:10.250 --> 15:19.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: A good example is the hackers in Atlanta, Georgia, who went to jail for a couple of them over a year for accessing a system that didn't have a password.
[15:19.970 --> 15:26.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: Other people that have downloaded information and been sentenced as if they had stolen things worth millions of dollars.
[15:27.490 --> 15:31.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do you think we're approaching the point where they'll be dealt with the same?
[15:31.670 --> 15:37.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: In other words, if you trespass onto a computer system, you'll be dealt with the same way as if you trespass onto somebody's property.
[15:37.970 --> 15:39.670]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, I don't think so at all.
[15:39.790 --> 15:44.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that the laws are going to be pretty much in New York State stay the same as they are.
[15:45.430 --> 15:50.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: Burglary in New York State is a more significant and with much higher degree penalties than computer trespass.
[15:51.570 --> 15:55.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: With Riggs and Darden, they were arrested for certain crimes.
[15:55.150 --> 15:56.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: They went to trial.
[15:56.690 --> 15:57.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: They were found guilty.
[15:58.130 --> 16:03.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: There were federal sentencing guidelines that were followed and they were put in jail for a certain period of time.
[16:05.090 --> 16:09.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: On the federal level, those were laws that were broken and that's what was followed.
[16:09.670 --> 16:13.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't think that the judicial system in the United States can do otherwise.
[16:13.630 --> 16:27.290]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, even though at the same time that they were pleading guilty, their co-defendant, so to say, was being found not to have a case against him because the document said it was worth $80,000 was only worth $14,000.
[16:27.330 --> 16:31.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, a Craig Neidwoff case is a separate issue, totally.
[16:32.090 --> 16:37.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: And the case was dropped by the prosecutor in that case because of the dollar value difference that they discovered.
[16:37.830 --> 16:41.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: But were they not sentenced in Atlanta as if that document had been worth $80,000?
[16:42.130 --> 16:42.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm not sure.
[16:43.270 --> 16:47.990]  [SPEAKER_06]: It seems to me that if it had been $14, they wouldn't have gotten over a year.
[16:47.990 --> 16:48.850]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't think so.
[16:48.930 --> 16:49.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: Prison.
[16:49.790 --> 16:50.230]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[16:51.210 --> 17:00.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, as far as future laws, do you think there will be any future laws in New York State and what laws are being modified?
[17:00.370 --> 17:27.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, there's several proposals on the board that I've seen which specifically target certain types of telecommunications fraud such as going into using a rechipped cellular phone such as going into a corporation's system and then out dialing obtaining dial tones that don't belong to you and then having someone else charged back because these very quickly add up to tremendous bills.
[17:27.850 --> 17:32.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: The long-distance carriers are making the small company responsible to pay those bills.
[17:33.030 --> 17:45.350]  [SPEAKER_01]: There's many lawsuits going back and forth now between the long-distance carriers and other corporations which refuse to pay the large bills such as the Mitsubishi and AT&T suit along with others.
[17:45.590 --> 17:49.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that the FCC is going to rewrite some legislation.
[17:49.750 --> 17:55.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: There's going to beat some decisions in some of these federal suits and we will have new law as a result.
[17:55.710 --> 18:19.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, a few days ago, in the New York Times, there was an article about the cellular problems where people are able to simply use a device and read identity codes of cars passing by and people using cellular phones nearby and that knowledge alone is enough for them to build their own clone.
[18:19.370 --> 18:32.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: If you use one of several different types of equipment that's available, when the phone call is being made, you can capture the ESN and the MIN, which are the two numbers which identify to the billing company who's to get the bill for the phone call.
[18:33.110 --> 18:42.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: If you take your computer or laptop or any PC and a prom burner with a fresh EPROM, you can duplicate that ESN MIN onto that.
[18:42.390 --> 18:45.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: Any calls then you have going out will be billed to the customer.
[18:45.330 --> 19:01.330]  [SPEAKER_01]: At the end of a 30-day period, if we have 40 of these phones out on a call selling operation working all day long on the streets, the bills get very high and you'll have bills coming in $50,000, $60,000 to a customer and they are shocked.
[19:01.530 --> 19:05.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, what kind of equipment do you need to be able to read this information in the first place?
[19:05.850 --> 19:15.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, there's a number of different types of people, a number of pieces of equipment, but I wouldn't on the air tell people what they are because I fear that people would be running around tomorrow looking to buy them.
[19:15.870 --> 19:16.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: But it is fairly simple.
[19:17.130 --> 19:17.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[19:18.290 --> 19:25.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: With that in mind, how much blame would you put on the people in charge of the cellular industry for making it so easy in the first place?
[19:26.150 --> 19:30.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, obviously, they jumped into the industry too fast looking to make money.
[19:31.090 --> 19:38.430]  [SPEAKER_01]: They have been trying desperately for the past year, year and a half, to do something about the fraud that they are incurring.
[19:38.890 --> 19:52.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: The cellular companies have to pay to the long-distance carriers for the money the money the long-distance carriers charge them for the calls that are laid off from the cellular industry to the calls going out of the country or long-distance.
[19:52.750 --> 19:55.770]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, the cellular people have been getting hurt.
[19:55.770 --> 20:00.390]  [SPEAKER_01]: So, what they've done is they've come up with several different systems to prevent the fraud.
[20:01.030 --> 20:25.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: They will block out whole countries in an area that have a lot of fraud, such as in Elmhurst or Jackson Heights, where you have a large Colombian population which is engaged in a large amount of fraud out of that area on that cell site to the degree that in a 24-hour period not a single legitimate call went out through that cell site in a given weekend that they block all access.
[20:25.550 --> 20:34.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: If you want to have access and you're a legitimate customer using a cellular phone in that area, you can simply tell your cellular carrier, I would like to have it.
[20:34.690 --> 20:37.710]  [SPEAKER_01]: This is how much I want my maximum to be on a monthly basis.
[20:38.150 --> 20:42.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: And these are the numbers that I'm going to be calling in Columbia and they'll set it up on the computer for you.
[20:43.510 --> 20:44.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: Most interesting.
[20:44.850 --> 20:48.350]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're going to be opening up the telephone lines 212-279-3400.
[20:48.530 --> 20:53.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're speaking with Don Delaney, New York State Police Department and Phiber Optik Computer Hacker.
[20:53.430 --> 21:01.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: Phiber, I'd like to ask you if you have any comments or maybe corrections on this cellular problem.
[21:01.470 --> 21:04.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is it really as easy as we're making it out to be here?
[21:04.450 --> 21:05.790]  [SPEAKER_00]: Oh yeah, it surely is.
[21:05.890 --> 21:28.770]  [SPEAKER_00]: And I'm just glad that Mr. Delaney is making the distinction that it is not hackers who are perpetrating these crimes, but that they're outright criminals who are selling these phone calls for monetary gain, whether it's for the purpose of illegal drugs or whether it's some sort of crime ring or mafia or organized crime who's benefiting from the selling of these phone calls.
[21:28.850 --> 21:32.790]  [SPEAKER_00]: And they have a pretty competitive market on the street and they're killing each other over territory.
[21:33.850 --> 21:42.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: What's interesting is in New York City in several different areas you have different types of telecommunications fraud.
[21:42.630 --> 22:01.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: In the PBX fraud area, being that Phiber mentions hackers, there are people who just use a telephone which goes into the computers of the telephone companies or the corporations that they dial into on their 800 numbers and they use the keypad to hack the system or crack the system.
[22:02.350 --> 22:04.250]  [SPEAKER_01]: They are not computer knowledgeable.
[22:04.270 --> 22:20.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: They are not computer hackers but they know enough about the different type of PBX systems that are out there that they know that they need to put a certain number of digits in a code in a certain place after a pound sign or whatever and they will hack away at these things until they get a code which they can use.
[22:20.490 --> 22:45.650]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now what we've seen is codes that have been hacked out and as it was hacked out after a two-week try at 7.10 in the evening excuse me at 5.10 in the evening at 7.05 an hour and 55 minutes later telephone booths in the neighborhood started using that code and from there the code spread to the other phone booths of Manhattan like a virus until hundreds literally were using this and thousands of
[22:45.650 --> 22:57.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: calls were going through the PBX in the period of a month that were all fraudulent and in the particular case of data products that that happened to that was on NBC News they lost $35,000 quickly.
[22:58.210 --> 23:02.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's amazing and you were able to track it as it happens or the month later?
[23:02.410 --> 23:21.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, when the bill came in when the call detailing comes in it shows each hack into an 800 number because every attempt is registered so they know where all the calls are coming from and it was apparent that they were using initially a 9,600 board modem because they were coming in at 3 second intervals after that you could see when they stopped using the computer and they were using only the
[23:21.370 --> 23:27.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: keyboard and they don't have the computer now and they don't know where it is.
[23:27.250 --> 23:32.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, would you say that just figuring out the system is that a crime in itself?
[23:32.690 --> 23:32.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: No.
[23:33.130 --> 23:38.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: Figuring out how what codes work if you hack a code out for instance right now is that a crime?
[23:38.890 --> 23:44.790]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, first of all dialing into the 800 number is certainly in and of itself not a crime.
[23:46.470 --> 23:56.030]  [SPEAKER_01]: Once you start using the crime trying to get out through the remote access unit on the PBX you may be committing a crime.
[23:56.850 --> 23:57.110]  [SPEAKER_01]: Mm-hmm.
[23:58.430 --> 23:58.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: Barbara?
[23:59.230 --> 24:31.830]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I'd just like to point out that we should use a better choice of words and that would be scanning and not hacking since a hack is a quite clever action that's usually achieved through some sort of intelligence like committing some sort of clever feat or something that's amusing using some sort of knowledge that was put to some sort of creative use mindlessly dialing numbers in sequence on a
[24:31.830 --> 24:40.650]  [SPEAKER_00]: telephone I wouldn't consider hacking because if we start calling that Hacking codes, then it must be a hacker who's hacking these codes, since hackers hack.
[24:40.850 --> 24:49.770]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, you know, to a lot of people, the simple act of picking up a phone and dialing and knowing what you're doing is hacking, because so many people don't understand what's there.
[24:49.930 --> 24:59.610]  [SPEAKER_06]: And if you can call up a particular 800 number and mindlessly dial for 10 minutes and figure out a code, there are people that will think you're the greatest hacker of all time.
[24:59.730 --> 25:02.230]  [SPEAKER_01]: Right, but I think we shouldn't use those words.
[25:02.230 --> 25:11.830]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, the term scanning has been widely used also for the sequential number of dial-out programs that are used for doing exactly what we're talking about.
[25:12.050 --> 25:18.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: Every telephone call just goes to the next digit in the code, and that is referred to quite often as scanning.
[25:18.410 --> 25:20.930]  [SPEAKER_01]: So it may be more appropriate to call it scanning than hacking.
[25:21.070 --> 25:29.910]  [SPEAKER_01]: But I think by saying you're hacking the system by trying different code, I think more people understand that because it's more widely used in the media.
[25:29.910 --> 25:35.050]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, you mentioned that calling an 800 number is not illegal, but at what point does it become...
[25:35.610 --> 25:40.970]  [SPEAKER_06]: if the person on the other end of the 800 number does not want you to call them, when does it turn into harassment of sorts?
[25:41.050 --> 25:47.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: Once you attempt to go out through their PBX, out through their remote access unit, you're attempting to commit a crime.
[25:48.550 --> 25:50.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: An attempt to commit a crime is a crime.
[25:50.750 --> 26:07.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: And we have not charged anybody yet specifically with attempting it because we're only getting the people that are getting through the systems and out-dialing and generating thousands of dollars' worth of bills, and we have to follow up on those people that complain to us.
[26:07.290 --> 26:22.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: If somebody called me and said somebody was dialing into their 800 number but never successfully got out, and I got a bill for each of those 800 number calls for a total of $20,000, and it all came from one place, well, we may start doing an investigation on that residence also as an attempted crime.
[26:22.750 --> 26:29.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, what I was referring to, though, was simply somebody calling up, as in the case of Jerry Fowlwell years ago, an 800 number.
[26:29.930 --> 26:34.310]  [SPEAKER_06]: And since when you call an 800 number, you're in effect making a collect call to that number.
[26:34.410 --> 26:44.050]  [SPEAKER_06]: And since also these days it's very easy to figure out where the call is coming from, if not instantaneously, can a company say you're not allowed to call this 800 number?
[26:44.050 --> 26:53.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is there anything on their particular side that would allow them to charge you with some kind of a crime just for calling, just to see what's there?
[26:53.330 --> 27:06.690]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, not the initial call, but once you arrived, once the machine or the person answered the other phone at the other end, if there was a banner or warning which said, if you're not authorized to use a remote access unit or go any further in the system,
[27:06.850 --> 27:15.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: hang up now, otherwise you're subject to arrest, well, certainly that would meet the legal requirement that if the person did anything after that, if they weren't authorized to be in the system, they could be arrested.
[27:16.430 --> 27:18.530]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, and I'm not trying to trap you here or anything.
[27:18.550 --> 27:20.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: No, that's not a trap, but that's the law.
[27:20.410 --> 27:23.110]  [SPEAKER_06]: But, well, my next question might be inferred as a trap.
[27:23.370 --> 27:29.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: Are you saying then that it's not illegal to do a scan of 800 numbers?
[27:29.570 --> 27:32.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: It is because it's an, oh, a scan on each one of them.
[27:32.450 --> 27:34.730]  [SPEAKER_01]: On each one, going from one to the other to see what's out there.
[27:34.730 --> 27:47.810]  [SPEAKER_01]: Looking for code, if you're using a program which is attempting to hack out a code just to obtain the code but never use it, it may be construed as an attempted crime or it may not be.
[27:47.850 --> 27:48.290]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know.
[27:48.470 --> 27:49.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I'm not even going that far.
[27:49.690 --> 27:54.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm saying just to call the number just to see what answers, see if a computer answer's here, if a fax answer's there.
[27:54.590 --> 27:56.590]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, scanning sequentially all 800 numbers.
[27:56.630 --> 27:57.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: Absolutely not.
[27:57.370 --> 27:58.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's quite legal.
[27:58.270 --> 27:58.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's quite legal.
[27:59.290 --> 28:00.930]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, that's some good news.
[28:01.210 --> 28:02.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: Under New York state law.
[28:02.390 --> 28:02.590]  [SPEAKER_06]: Right.
[28:02.750 --> 28:04.370]  [SPEAKER_06]: Under federal law, I'm not really sure.
[28:04.370 --> 28:07.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: And local municipalities as well might have something to say about that.
[28:07.630 --> 28:10.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Our phone number is 212-279-3400.
[28:10.230 --> 28:12.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: We're going to go to a phone call in one minute.
[28:12.270 --> 28:14.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: I just wanted to ask one more question of Don Delaney here.
[28:15.650 --> 28:24.570]  [SPEAKER_06]: A couple of weeks ago, we made reference to an 800 number that gave you the opportunity to charge $120 to your phone number.
[28:24.630 --> 28:30.410]  [SPEAKER_06]: It would read you back your phone number and say, press 1 if you want to be billed $120 to have your fortune read.
[28:30.570 --> 28:31.890]  [SPEAKER_06]: We called it on the air.
[28:31.890 --> 28:34.790]  [SPEAKER_06]: It came within one touchstone of causing complete mayhem.
[28:35.030 --> 28:37.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: That number has since, by the way, been disconnected.
[28:37.570 --> 28:38.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: It no longer exists.
[28:39.230 --> 28:46.330]  [SPEAKER_06]: However, I'd like to know, is that kind of a thing, from the consumer point of view, something that could be looked upon as illegal?
[28:47.050 --> 28:54.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: As far as an 800 number actually being used to bill somebody a huge amount of money, it seems, from the outset, rather deceptive.
[28:55.190 --> 28:59.270]  [SPEAKER_01]: Sure, it's deceptive because everybody believes when you dial an 800 number, it's going to be for free.
[28:59.410 --> 29:11.410]  [SPEAKER_01]: You have a legal requirement that if you're going to charge the person back for the call into the system, just as on a 900 number or a 540 number, that within 10 seconds, you tell them the price of the call and give them the opportunity to hang up.
[29:11.810 --> 29:17.150]  [SPEAKER_01]: And right now, the big scam is the 540 numbers that people are using.
[29:17.310 --> 29:34.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: They'll give you the price of the telephone call so fast, in between the number of the telephone number being repeated over and over again, and promise you things such as vacations, that although they are staying on the legal side of the law, it is what I would refer to as a scam.
[29:34.550 --> 29:40.070]  [SPEAKER_06]: And these are recordings that call you and say you've won something, called this number, and they don't tell you how much it costs to call you.
[29:40.070 --> 29:44.130]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, if they don't, they'll be arrested, as we did last year, in the $55 beeper scam.
[29:44.390 --> 29:46.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: He would dial out to blocks of beeper numbers.
[29:46.890 --> 29:54.870]  [SPEAKER_01]: And when the people would dial back to his telephone number, the computer would answer, give them a lot of gibberish about real estate deals, etc.
[29:55.610 --> 29:58.450]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, is the only reason he got in trouble because he didn't say what the price was?
[29:58.530 --> 29:58.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's correct.
[29:59.150 --> 30:00.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: If he had said what the price was...
[30:00.670 --> 30:08.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: If he had said it's $55, if you stay on this line, past the 10-second limit, you're going to be charged $55 on your telephone bill, he would not have gotten into trouble.
[30:09.250 --> 30:10.250]  [SPEAKER_06]: I have an interesting question here.
[30:10.310 --> 30:17.630]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, supposing the person that called him back only spoke Spanish and didn't understand that, or supposing he said it in Spanish, what's the laws as far as that goes?
[30:18.010 --> 30:28.090]  [SPEAKER_01]: Not a law specifically, but I'm sure that if you made that case to the telephone company, you'd probably find someone who listened to you.
[30:28.270 --> 30:32.010]  [SPEAKER_01]: They have to write off an awful lot of fraud, people being...
[30:34.990 --> 30:42.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: companies, PBXs, or any other way that a person gets billed for calls that they didn't make, and the telephone company eats an awful lot of that.
[30:42.510 --> 30:50.490]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, do you think the phone company shares some culpability here, because they make it hard for people to understand what gets charged and what doesn't?
[30:51.050 --> 30:53.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know that the telephone company does.
[30:53.310 --> 30:54.950]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know that they sign agreements.
[30:55.130 --> 30:57.750]  [SPEAKER_01]: They have agreements with the people that buy these 540 lines.
[30:57.890 --> 31:04.450]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's the customers who then change these things after they set them up initially with the agreements and then engage in the fraud.
[31:04.610 --> 31:08.170]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, what I'm saying is just the idea of a 540 line.
[31:08.730 --> 31:12.210]  [SPEAKER_06]: In Baltimore, for instance, 540 is a valid exchange.
[31:12.210 --> 31:14.670]  [SPEAKER_06]: So I might know somebody that has 540 as their phone.
[31:18.360 --> 31:19.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: Conversation in New York State legally.
[31:20.100 --> 31:26.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's illegal to do any overhearing of a voice communication without having one-party consent.
[31:26.500 --> 31:30.740]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if they do and it's brought to the attention of law enforcement, yes, we would absolutely make an arrest.
[31:30.960 --> 31:33.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: But how can you possibly enforce something like that?
[31:33.800 --> 31:37.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Somebody can walk down the street with a scanner and overhear something.
[31:37.320 --> 31:38.540]  [SPEAKER_06]: Cellular calls are the same.
[31:38.540 --> 31:44.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's very, very simple to just tune on the scanner and overhear them and hear all kinds of personal information.
[31:44.220 --> 31:52.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: I've heard this on occasion myself where people discuss the most intimate details, and I really don't think they know that they're broadcasting all over the place.
[31:53.080 --> 31:54.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think some of them don't care.
[31:54.600 --> 31:56.220]  [SPEAKER_01]: But, yes, it's easy to do.
[31:56.340 --> 31:59.140]  [SPEAKER_01]: You can get a scanner and tune in certain frequencies.
[31:59.440 --> 32:02.140]  [SPEAKER_01]: The scanner will find a frequency for you that's active.
[32:02.540 --> 32:05.080]  [SPEAKER_01]: But that is illegal in New York State, totally.
[32:05.080 --> 32:13.200]  [SPEAKER_10]: Even worse than that, aren't there devices which allow people to hook into regular wired landlines?
[32:13.300 --> 32:13.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, obviously.
[32:13.840 --> 32:16.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: That would be very illegal, though, if that were to occur.
[32:17.840 --> 32:19.720]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't know anybody that's doing it.
[32:19.900 --> 32:21.120]  [SPEAKER_01]: If I did, I'd lock them up.
[32:22.320 --> 32:22.760]  [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[32:22.920 --> 32:23.580]  [SPEAKER_10]: Well, thank you very much.
[32:23.920 --> 32:24.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: Thanks for calling.
[32:25.320 --> 32:25.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[32:26.920 --> 32:28.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: Good evening, Emmanuel.
[32:28.200 --> 32:33.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: I have a brief observation and then a question for Phiber Optik, if I might.
[32:33.020 --> 32:48.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: The observation is, sort of in the humorous vein, the whole concept of this debate in a left-handed way reminds me of the old Dragnet episode in which marijuana legalization was debated, which ended in a bust.
[32:49.660 --> 32:52.620]  [SPEAKER_07]: But that's neither hand nor there was just an association.
[32:53.060 --> 32:55.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: This is my question for Phiber Optik.
[32:55.240 --> 33:17.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: Mr. Optik, do you feel that if the penalty of, quote-unquote, landing in jail didn't exist, some of the challenge in terms of adrenaline-fueled genius or insight or fun would be removed from the hacker game, and hence it wouldn't have the challenge that would motivate people who have,
[33:17.520 --> 33:21.180]  [SPEAKER_07]: in the past and present, gone beyond themselves.
[33:21.480 --> 33:27.020]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I'd like the officer to rebuke also, and now I'm hanging up and going to put back on the radio.
[33:27.180 --> 33:27.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: Good evening.
[33:27.820 --> 33:28.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[33:28.520 --> 33:28.760]  [SPEAKER_06]: Thanks.
[33:28.760 --> 33:44.140]  [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I think it might be true for some individuals, however immature, but that's kind of silly to think that the only thrill of learning something new is the fact that you're challenging authority.
[33:44.140 --> 33:45.820]  [SPEAKER_00]: I think that's a ridiculous notion.
[33:46.340 --> 33:53.600]  [SPEAKER_00]: And that I think that the human race wouldn't achieve what it has if that were true.
[33:53.600 --> 34:02.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: Does that mean that we'd only discover new things or be motivated to use technology in new and different ways if only we were challenging authority?
[34:02.640 --> 34:03.440]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's ridiculous.
[34:03.880 --> 34:06.420]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't see that it holds water at all.
[34:06.520 --> 34:15.100]  [SPEAKER_01]: I don't see anybody that we've been involved with, arrested, or discussed these things with that were motivated just because it's against the law or because of the hype associated with it.
[34:15.180 --> 34:17.020]  [SPEAKER_01]: I think that there's a lot of people that are out there.
[34:17.020 --> 34:30.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: And I'm separating now the traditional hacker, which is out there trying to advance his base of knowledge, but the great majority of the people that we're dealing with are actually out there doing malicious things, either with computers or on telephone networks,
[34:30.180 --> 34:38.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: or which actually the great majority of computer crimes are committed by employees against their employer, both on a federal level and in corporations.
[34:39.980 --> 34:45.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: And none of this is done for the hype or because it's against the law or a lot of it's greed.
[34:46.480 --> 34:50.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: As far as the hacker, though, do you see very many malicious hackers?
[34:51.700 --> 35:02.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: We have had some right here from New York City that we've spoken about in the past who would do things when they would have an argument with a friend of theirs or an ex-friend of theirs.
[35:02.320 --> 35:10.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: They would go in and then call forward their parents' telephone number to a 900 line, things like that, which is malicious behavior more than anything else.
[35:10.880 --> 35:14.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, where do you separate maliciousness from mischievousness?
[35:14.740 --> 35:22.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, as far as... I know it's a lot easier these days to make the dollars rack up, but is that the fault of the person doing it or is that the fault of the technology?
[35:22.620 --> 35:40.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, if I would make a distinction between a person that dials into a system to look around and see if he can explore holes in a Unix system without doing any damage or without doing anything once he became super user and got out of the system and maybe have done something mischievous like leaving a message,
[35:40.640 --> 35:42.520]  [SPEAKER_01]: ha-ha, for the systems administrator.
[35:42.520 --> 35:53.080]  [SPEAKER_01]: However, it is malicious when the person goes in there and plants a logic bomb or does intentionally delete data from a competitor's computer.
[35:53.300 --> 36:04.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: As we've investigated a case of that, naturally, any type of sabotage of another system or corporate espionage is definitely malicious.
[36:04.700 --> 36:14.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that's more of what we see than the traditional hacker type that just goes into a system and doesn't do anything wrong because then you don't have anybody that's really complaining.
[36:15.200 --> 36:16.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, let's take another call.
[36:17.000 --> 36:17.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: Good evening.
[36:18.260 --> 36:18.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yes, good evening.
[36:19.180 --> 36:19.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hello?
[36:19.860 --> 36:20.640]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, go ahead, you're on.
[36:21.140 --> 36:24.900]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, I saw an advertisement on a pornographic magazine.
[36:24.920 --> 36:26.720]  [SPEAKER_08]: It said free samples and I called.
[36:26.840 --> 36:28.560]  [SPEAKER_08]: It was a 319 number.
[36:30.160 --> 36:32.600]  [SPEAKER_06]: A 319 within a particular area code?
[36:32.780 --> 36:33.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: Yeah, 212.
[36:33.900 --> 36:34.140]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[36:34.880 --> 36:40.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: And she started talking and whatever and then she said, this girl will charge you $120 for this girl.
[36:40.820 --> 36:42.420]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I hung up, right?
[36:43.000 --> 36:45.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I'm wondering if I'm going to get charged that amount of money.
[36:46.000 --> 36:46.480]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's ridiculous.
[36:46.580 --> 36:47.820]  [SPEAKER_01]: Were you on more than 10 seconds?
[36:48.780 --> 36:49.680]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't think so.
[36:49.680 --> 36:51.200]  [SPEAKER_08]: I hung up real fast.
[36:51.340 --> 36:56.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, how can something in the 319 exchange charge more than whatever it costs to call the 319 exchange?
[36:57.000 --> 36:58.420]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't believe it's a special exchange.
[36:59.100 --> 37:00.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: We may have a new one.
[37:00.120 --> 37:00.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: We may have a new one.
[37:00.940 --> 37:01.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's true.
[37:01.520 --> 37:09.760]  [SPEAKER_06]: I know there are some cases, some 800 numbers you can call that will charge you, quote-unquote, both discreetly as a collect call.
[37:09.840 --> 37:15.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: And what that does is it shows up on your phone bill about a month or so later as if they had called you collect.
[37:15.700 --> 37:18.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I question the legality of that as well.
[37:18.260 --> 37:23.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: However, to do this with a local number is something kind of different.
[37:23.920 --> 37:25.660]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm not really sure if that's...
[37:26.240 --> 37:38.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: It really tricked me because 212319, it seemed like not only local, but, I mean, it didn't sound like 540 or 976 or anything like that, right?
[37:39.000 --> 37:41.640]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, did you attempt to call New York Telephone Security?
[37:42.420 --> 37:43.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: No, I didn't.
[37:43.380 --> 37:49.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: They have a special person that takes care of complaints at the New York Telephone Company with regards to these pay lines.
[37:49.580 --> 37:51.740]  [SPEAKER_01]: If you call him, he'll be able to assist you.
[37:51.820 --> 37:52.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: You don't have to have the number, do you?
[37:55.160 --> 37:56.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, no, I don't.
[37:56.280 --> 37:57.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: I know it's a 395 exchange.
[37:58.180 --> 38:00.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: But they can get it from either the operator or the phone or the phone book.
[38:00.720 --> 38:02.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: What's the name of the office?
[38:02.760 --> 38:04.640]  [SPEAKER_01]: Um, it's Telephone Security.
[38:05.340 --> 38:06.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: Telephone Security.
[38:06.300 --> 38:16.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think a lot of people might feel somewhat abashed calling after they've called one of these lines saying, you know, I called the dominance line and they wanted to charge me $120 for that.
[38:16.480 --> 38:17.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: I just didn't think it was worth it.
[38:17.420 --> 38:19.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know if, you know, a lot of people would admit that.
[38:19.800 --> 38:22.380]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, some people may think that it's worth it.
[38:22.920 --> 38:26.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: What we need is some kind of a standardized way of reporting these things.
[38:26.740 --> 38:31.660]  [SPEAKER_06]: For instance, with customer-owned coin-operated telephones known as CoCOTs, there's all kinds of abuses.
[38:31.940 --> 38:38.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: I can guide you to some that charge $9.95 to call an 800 number, among other things, refusing access to 911.
[38:39.920 --> 38:41.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do you get many kinds of complaints?
[38:41.920 --> 38:42.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is that in your field?
[38:43.200 --> 38:53.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: We would handle one of those complaints if it were to come to us, but we have not had a single complaint from anybody against any of the CoCOT companies for anything that was criminal in nature.
[38:53.320 --> 38:57.780]  [SPEAKER_01]: If it's something to do with negligence and there's a bill involved, it's a civil matter.
[38:57.940 --> 39:00.420]  [SPEAKER_01]: If it's an intentional crime by the company...
[39:00.420 --> 39:02.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: What would a good example of an intentional crime be?
[39:03.980 --> 39:08.760]  [SPEAKER_01]: That they put something out there that's going to cause the customer to dial a number.
[39:08.960 --> 39:19.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: When the customer dials a number, he's going to get a bill grossly in excess of what the posted standard would be on the face of the phone or the tariffs that are imposed for this, the day of agreements for.
[39:19.900 --> 39:24.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: How about deception and making it difficult for you to get...
[39:24.860 --> 39:31.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: For instance, not allowing access to an operator or billing you an incredible amount and saying you're going to bill an incredible amount.
[39:31.200 --> 39:32.980]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, these things are controlled by the FCC.
[39:33.500 --> 39:35.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: They have rules and regulations which govern these things.
[39:35.800 --> 39:47.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: If they're beyond the rules and regulations of the FCC, then a complaint can be brought, and we would assist a customer that had that complaint with speaking with someone at the FCC who would take action if appropriate.
[39:47.480 --> 39:48.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: Or the Public Service Commission.
[39:48.760 --> 39:49.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[39:50.380 --> 39:51.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[39:51.180 --> 39:51.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: You're on the air.
[39:52.440 --> 39:52.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, hi.
[39:53.000 --> 39:55.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: I wanted to know how to order 2,600.
[39:55.920 --> 39:56.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[39:56.380 --> 39:57.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'll give you a phone number.
[39:57.440 --> 39:57.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right?
[39:57.880 --> 39:58.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: All the information is there.
[39:59.200 --> 39:59.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[39:59.720 --> 40:04.760]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's area code 516-516-751-2600.
[40:04.780 --> 40:07.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: And you can also write to 2,600 P.O.
[40:07.460 --> 40:11.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: Box 752, Middle Island, New York, 11953.
[40:12.800 --> 40:13.240]  [SPEAKER_06]: 11953.
[40:13.240 --> 40:13.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: Thanks a lot.
[40:14.040 --> 40:14.200]  [SPEAKER_06]: Sure.
[40:15.760 --> 40:16.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[40:16.400 --> 40:20.300]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, I am very interested in oral history, you know, with a tape recorder.
[40:20.620 --> 40:26.060]  [SPEAKER_13]: And I had my machine on for record, and I had it on pause, and I released the pause.
[40:26.300 --> 40:30.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: I was talking to this wonderful elderly gentleman about 80 years old or 85.
[40:30.920 --> 40:31.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: Hello?
[40:31.400 --> 40:32.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, I hear a dial tone.
[40:33.220 --> 40:34.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is that your dial tone?
[40:34.540 --> 40:35.180]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, dear.
[40:36.000 --> 40:36.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: Wow, he hung up.
[40:37.040 --> 40:37.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: He hung up.
[40:37.960 --> 40:38.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: Everybody hear this?
[40:39.100 --> 40:42.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Once and for all, I finally figured out how to get Monroe to hang up.
[40:42.240 --> 40:43.180]  [SPEAKER_06]: It never happened before.
[40:43.980 --> 40:44.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: Wow.
[40:44.620 --> 40:46.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm going to play that one back.
[40:46.300 --> 40:47.420]  [SPEAKER_01]: Sounded like he was off the hook.
[40:47.420 --> 40:47.960]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[40:48.160 --> 40:48.460]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[40:49.740 --> 40:50.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: You're on the air.
[40:50.580 --> 40:50.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: Go ahead.
[40:51.460 --> 40:51.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: Hi.
[40:51.960 --> 40:52.360]  [SPEAKER_09]: Hey, Edwin.
[40:52.580 --> 40:54.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: I have a double-edged question here.
[40:54.480 --> 40:55.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, we like this kind.
[40:55.800 --> 40:57.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: Technical and legal.
[40:57.780 --> 40:58.400]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right, go ahead.
[40:58.580 --> 41:03.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: I know that 800 numbers are basically just local numbers, correct?
[41:04.240 --> 41:05.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: Um, say that again?
[41:06.180 --> 41:11.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, if there's an 800 number, say 800-555-5555.
[41:12.440 --> 41:14.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's interesting you should pick that number, but...
[41:14.280 --> 41:15.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, they're not local numbers at all.
[41:15.440 --> 41:17.780]  [SPEAKER_01]: Usually when you dial into them, they're in some other state.
[41:18.060 --> 41:21.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think maybe what you mean is they translate to local numbers in the end?
[41:21.320 --> 41:21.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's correct.
[41:22.000 --> 41:22.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: No, they don't.
[41:22.760 --> 41:22.980]  [SPEAKER_00]: Okay.
[41:23.080 --> 41:23.860]  [SPEAKER_00]: They could be anywhere in the country.
[41:24.000 --> 41:25.400]  [SPEAKER_00]: They could be anywhere in the world, actually.
[41:25.400 --> 41:27.680]  [SPEAKER_00]: You could have AT&T International 800 service.
[41:27.720 --> 41:31.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, I think what he's trying to say is that in the end, they wind up ringing a regular telephone.
[41:32.480 --> 41:33.100]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's correct.
[41:33.100 --> 41:34.420]  [SPEAKER_00]: What do you mean by regular telephone?
[41:34.420 --> 41:36.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: A regular phone that's on the desk.
[41:37.000 --> 41:40.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: An 800 number goes to another phone number, is what he's trying to say.
[41:41.180 --> 41:41.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: Right.
[41:41.520 --> 41:46.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: You could have an 800 number that actually rings on 279-2300.
[41:46.660 --> 41:47.000]  [SPEAKER_00]: Absolutely.
[41:47.120 --> 41:47.820]  [SPEAKER_00]: 3400, right.
[41:48.100 --> 41:51.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: My question is, do 900 numbers work the same way?
[41:51.660 --> 41:52.760]  [SPEAKER_00]: They can and they cannot.
[41:52.960 --> 41:54.400]  [SPEAKER_00]: Same as an 800 number.
[41:54.480 --> 41:59.480]  [SPEAKER_00]: An 800 number can connect to a computer, it can connect to a telephone, it can connect to anything.
[41:59.780 --> 42:05.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: There are cases where both 800 and 900 numbers connect to numbers that you cannot dial any other way.
[42:06.220 --> 42:09.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think what the caller... I seem to have some sort of mind meld with this caller here.
[42:09.720 --> 42:21.740]  [SPEAKER_06]: But I think what he's trying to say is that it might be possible to find backdoors into 900 numbers where you call a particular phone number and you're connected and they say it costs a dollar a minute.
[42:21.940 --> 42:26.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: But in actuality, since you didn't call over the 900 line, you're not being charged anything more than a local call.
[42:26.860 --> 42:27.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's right.
[42:27.620 --> 42:28.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, that's correct.
[42:28.640 --> 42:31.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: But is the legality involved in that?
[42:31.420 --> 42:33.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: Would that be considered a crime?
[42:33.340 --> 42:33.520]  [SPEAKER_01]: No.
[42:34.760 --> 42:35.160]  No.
[42:35.160 --> 42:36.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: Because I would be paying for the regular...
[42:36.880 --> 42:46.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: If the number is out there and you know what that backdoor number is and you did not obtain it illegally and you dial it and there's nothing that tells you you can't dial it, then you can.
[42:46.360 --> 42:48.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if you get the service, then you get the service.
[42:48.620 --> 42:58.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: What if you circulate that information that this particular telephone number goes to this particular service because you're not paying the exact amount that they want you to pay?
[42:58.900 --> 42:59.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: Is that a crime?
[42:59.500 --> 43:05.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, if you circulate it and you mean publish it, publishing in and of itself I don't think would be a crime, no.
[43:05.920 --> 43:07.060]  [SPEAKER_01]: First Amendment protects that.
[43:08.080 --> 43:08.920]  [SPEAKER_06]: Does that answer your question?
[43:09.120 --> 43:09.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yes, thank you.
[43:09.940 --> 43:10.660]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right, thanks for calling.
[43:11.700 --> 43:12.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: Good evening, you're on.
[43:12.880 --> 43:16.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: Emmanuel, I don't know why you treat me the way you do, but I just would like to end the question.
[43:16.160 --> 43:17.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: How many phones do you have?
[43:17.680 --> 43:26.040]  [SPEAKER_13]: With an oral history where you have your tape recorder and you have it on pause and then you release it and you're taping a person, what are the rights of an individual?
[43:26.260 --> 43:31.060]  [SPEAKER_13]: Supposing this person had called the police on me and said he taped our conversation.
[43:31.340 --> 43:33.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: Now, could you just go into it for a sec?
[43:33.560 --> 43:33.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[43:34.080 --> 43:35.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: You want to tackle that one?
[43:35.900 --> 43:39.420]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think what he's asking is how...
[43:39.420 --> 43:40.760]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, I don't know what he's asking.
[43:42.700 --> 43:47.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: How much warning do you have to give somebody if you're taping someone?
[43:49.100 --> 43:49.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know.
[43:51.840 --> 43:54.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: Books have been written about this, I'm sure.
[43:55.600 --> 43:56.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening, you're on.
[43:56.960 --> 43:57.680]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, Emmanuel.
[43:57.920 --> 43:58.060]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[43:58.560 --> 44:05.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, first of all, I keep getting cut off by my phone company every time it rings.
[44:05.460 --> 44:06.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: You must be in New Jersey.
[44:06.760 --> 44:09.840]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, I am, but I figured out if you dial 10NJB, it just rings and rings.
[44:09.940 --> 44:11.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: You can beat the AT&T.
[44:11.440 --> 44:14.980]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, to explain that to callers, the people calling us here...
[44:14.980 --> 44:20.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: In New Jersey, you dial 10NJB, then 1-2-1-2-2-7-9-3-4-100.
[44:20.940 --> 44:24.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: Right, and it won't cut off after how many minutes does it usually cut off?
[44:24.700 --> 44:25.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know.
[44:25.280 --> 44:28.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: I think it was like 25 or 40 rings it ends.
[44:28.100 --> 44:31.600]  [SPEAKER_12]: It says your caller is not there, is not answering, and then it disconnects you.
[44:31.680 --> 44:33.140]  [SPEAKER_06]: And what company is that that disconnects you?
[44:33.140 --> 44:35.520]  [SPEAKER_12]: I have AT&T, so I guess it's AT&T.
[44:35.540 --> 44:37.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, we've heard MCI does the same thing.
[44:37.500 --> 44:40.620]  [SPEAKER_12]: I have, and what's the other one I have is... I have three phones.
[44:40.760 --> 44:43.500]  [SPEAKER_12]: The other one is Metromedia.
[44:43.900 --> 44:44.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: Metromedia does it, too.
[44:45.040 --> 44:45.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: Metromedia does it, too.
[44:45.960 --> 44:47.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, you found one way around it.
[44:47.160 --> 44:48.160]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let's hope it lasts.
[44:48.160 --> 44:52.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: Let's hope the other companies go back to the way they used to do things and make it a little bit more fair.
[44:52.400 --> 44:53.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: Now, you had a question?
[44:53.100 --> 44:54.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: Yes, for the officer.
[44:54.720 --> 44:57.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: Just the other day, I was using...
[44:57.080 --> 44:57.860]  [SPEAKER_12]: In fact, it was yesterday.
[44:57.860 --> 45:02.800]  [SPEAKER_12]: I was in Queens out by Kennedy Airport, and I had to use a pay phone.
[45:02.800 --> 45:06.080]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I dialed an 800 number in Nashville.
[45:06.940 --> 45:10.160]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I was on the phone about three minutes when...
[45:10.160 --> 45:12.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: It was an 800 number when the...
[45:13.980 --> 45:20.380]  [SPEAKER_12]: Either Integritell or one of these fly-by-night phone companies started asking me for a quarter a minute to stay on there.
[45:21.560 --> 45:23.040]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I just...
[45:23.040 --> 45:26.320]  [SPEAKER_12]: You know, these are the sort of things that the police should be...
[45:26.320 --> 45:33.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: I don't know if it's what they should focus on, but it's one of the things that they should do something about.
[45:33.380 --> 45:37.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: I mean, these phones are blocked all over the city, all over everywhere.
[45:37.820 --> 45:44.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: I routinely try to dial the, you know, 1-0-2-8-8 to access AT&Tamp; because I have an AT&T credit card.
[45:44.600 --> 45:45.740]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I can never get it.
[45:45.820 --> 45:46.460]  [SPEAKER_06]: No, it never works.
[45:46.500 --> 45:48.440]  [SPEAKER_06]: I don't know why they bother advertising that in commercials.
[45:48.620 --> 45:49.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: It never works from co-cats.
[45:49.820 --> 45:53.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, they're especially tough when you're talking about it in New York City because there's so much fraud.
[45:53.400 --> 45:57.220]  [SPEAKER_01]: The telephone companies have done a lot to try to block the fraud.
[45:57.660 --> 46:03.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: I've tried to make telephone calls out of LaGuardia Airport and couldn't find a phone that was working because they've had so much shutoff.
[46:04.080 --> 46:10.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: They're taking phones out of neighborhoods that have the touchpads and putting back rotary telephones to eliminate some of the fraud.
[46:10.980 --> 46:12.180]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, how is that fraud?
[46:12.580 --> 46:14.200]  [SPEAKER_12]: I'm trying to access...
[46:14.200 --> 46:16.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: No, you're not engaged in fraud.
[46:16.180 --> 46:21.380]  [SPEAKER_01]: I'm talking about some of the ways that they've engaged in to block fraud.
[46:21.380 --> 46:33.380]  [SPEAKER_01]: But your problem is that the AT&T was broken up and the fine working phone system that we used to have now is divided up among a lot of different companies that aren't all policing itself the way it should.
[46:33.820 --> 46:43.600]  [SPEAKER_01]: And you have to dial from one telephone into an 800 number, but you may end up going through a couple of other telephone companies before you get out of the system.
[46:43.880 --> 46:48.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: And someone of them on the line is going to bill you, wants you to put a quarter in.
[46:48.700 --> 46:49.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, that's terrible.
[46:50.020 --> 46:51.240]  [SPEAKER_01]: You shouldn't have that problem.
[46:51.380 --> 46:54.120]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, I guess what I'm asking is, is that under your jurisdiction?
[46:54.820 --> 46:56.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, I don't see that it's a crime.
[46:56.680 --> 47:00.480]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's a type of thing that can be covered regulatorily by the FCC.
[47:00.860 --> 47:08.760]  [SPEAKER_12]: Well, you had mentioned to a previous caller that, for instance, I use credit cards 8, 12 times a day.
[47:09.000 --> 47:23.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, you should, first of all, be watching over your shoulder for the shoulder surface, because if you're using PIN numbers in a lot of areas of New York, there are people stealing them by watching over your shoulder from afar, either using binoculars,
[47:23.560 --> 47:24.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: telescopes.
[47:24.800 --> 47:30.680]  [SPEAKER_01]: They record these numbers into tape recorders as fast as you use them, and this is becoming a big problem.
[47:30.760 --> 47:34.460]  [SPEAKER_01]: They use these codes, steal them, and then use them for call-selling operations in the city.
[47:34.560 --> 47:41.420]  [SPEAKER_06]: There is one case where a payphone owner actually had rigged up his payphone to capture the numbers of calling cards.
[47:41.420 --> 47:42.180]  [SPEAKER_01]: Now, that's illegal.
[47:42.560 --> 47:44.440]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, that strikes me as being a bit illegal.
[47:44.460 --> 47:47.700]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's illegal, but what you're referring to is not illegal.
[47:48.020 --> 48:04.560]  [SPEAKER_12]: What I'm trying to find out, though, is you had mentioned that if they are exorbitant rates, for instance, I see calls on my credit card bills that I have to use their zero number, and I can't access AT&T, which for AT&T might have cost me $2, and their call was $7.
[48:05.500 --> 48:07.240]  [SPEAKER_12]: And I don't even know who to go to.
[48:07.240 --> 48:12.560]  [SPEAKER_01]: Those costs are determined by the FCC tariffs that they enable these people to charge.
[48:12.720 --> 48:13.400]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's controlled.
[48:13.980 --> 48:17.660]  [SPEAKER_01]: The police department doesn't have anything to do with the actual price that they charge you.
[48:17.700 --> 48:21.200]  [SPEAKER_06]: By the way, sir, you might have an answer if you want to use your AT&T card.
[48:21.220 --> 48:32.080]  [SPEAKER_06]: You can call 1-800-CALL-ATT, and that will give you the option of if you cannot get 10288 to work, they can route your call through that 800 number.
[48:32.500 --> 48:32.900]  [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, good.
[48:33.060 --> 48:43.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, it's very rare that a co-cut will block access to an 800 number, although with these new 800 numbers that start charging back, it's a matter of time before they start blocking 800 numbers now, too.
[48:43.520 --> 48:45.440]  [SPEAKER_12]: And that is, is there...
[48:45.440 --> 48:52.580]  [SPEAKER_12]: And what I've done is I've started recording them, because as I get a vomita phone and it's blocked for AT&T, I don't know who to tell about it.
[48:52.720 --> 48:57.620]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, you can tell us at the magazine, because we're good at spreading word like that around, and eventually it gets to the right person.
[48:57.720 --> 48:59.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, because I just got the address from the previous caller.
[48:59.760 --> 49:00.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: In other words, that's the only...
[49:00.660 --> 49:03.060]  [SPEAKER_12]: I can't... there's no agency that I can just...
[49:03.060 --> 49:07.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, the Public Service Commission is the agency for New York State.
[49:08.060 --> 49:10.680]  [SPEAKER_06]: The Federal Communications Commission is the agency for interstate.
[49:11.340 --> 49:18.500]  [SPEAKER_06]: However, we haven't had very much success getting through to them and getting an answer, or even getting somebody who understands what we're talking about.
[49:18.580 --> 49:22.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: We get lots of busy signals and lots of puzzled people on the other end of the phone, so...
[49:22.000 --> 49:23.640]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's not supposed to be blocked, is that correct?
[49:24.040 --> 49:25.000]  [SPEAKER_06]: What's not supposed to be blocked?
[49:25.100 --> 49:33.780]  [SPEAKER_12]: In other words, you're not... it's... these independent, long-distance companies are not really allowed to block a phone from AT&T or any other caller.
[49:34.480 --> 49:35.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: They're not supposed to.
[49:35.600 --> 49:37.980]  [SPEAKER_06]: However, I don't believe there's a law that says they have to.
[49:38.020 --> 49:42.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: I know there's a law that says they have to get to 911, and I'm not sure if it goes much further beyond that.
[49:43.060 --> 49:44.700]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay, I was on the impression that...
[49:44.700 --> 49:57.000]  [SPEAKER_12]: because I think I got something in the mail from AT&T telling me that, but when I called AT&T, they had no office or anyone to report it to, and I'm looking for a number or some service to report it to, and I'll send them in at 2600.
[49:57.340 --> 49:58.300]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'll be honest, sir.
[49:58.560 --> 50:02.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: I've never yet found a co-cut that allows you 10XXX access.
[50:03.760 --> 50:05.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: 950 access, I consider to be an accomplishment.
[50:05.940 --> 50:09.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: I can get an access number through that without any hassle.
[50:09.620 --> 50:11.660]  [SPEAKER_12]: There are some that do, but quite a few don't.
[50:11.780 --> 50:17.140]  [SPEAKER_12]: It's, you know, I'd say 40%, 60%, you know, 40 do, and 60% don't, but I do find them to do.
[50:17.240 --> 50:17.980]  [SPEAKER_12]: Anyway, thanks a lot.
[50:18.160 --> 50:18.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: Thanks for calling.
[50:19.160 --> 50:21.180]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think we have time for one more call.
[50:21.480 --> 50:22.020]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good evening.
[50:22.700 --> 50:23.140]  [SPEAKER_11]: Hello.
[50:23.400 --> 50:34.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: Regarding the 540 numbers, there was one company that mentioned the number many times, and they say it's a 0100 to make it sound like the radio station of Z100.
[50:34.580 --> 50:37.620]  [SPEAKER_11]: They'd say 0100, and then they'd say, and the call is being billed at 540.
[50:38.040 --> 50:41.300]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, I finally figured out they're billing those calls at $5.40.
[50:42.100 --> 50:43.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: And there's a new one.
[50:43.320 --> 50:44.280]  [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, that's pretty clever.
[50:44.460 --> 50:46.160]  [SPEAKER_01]: It's from Huntington, Long Island.
[50:46.260 --> 50:47.600]  [SPEAKER_11]: That's it, Eagleton.
[50:48.620 --> 50:51.800]  [SPEAKER_01]: There's many 540 numbers running out of Huntington.
[50:51.800 --> 50:53.480]  [SPEAKER_11]: Yeah, it's out of a mail drop.
[50:53.640 --> 50:55.160]  [SPEAKER_11]: I think it's Eagleton Enterprises.
[50:55.320 --> 51:06.620]  [SPEAKER_11]: They just started a new one about a week ago, so new, that when I called up the telephone business office to find out who owned it, they didn't even have that 540 number in their records yet.
[51:06.820 --> 51:09.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: It starts with 540, and I think it's 99-something.
[51:09.700 --> 51:12.120]  [SPEAKER_11]: Then I realized I had taped the call.
[51:12.120 --> 51:16.740]  [SPEAKER_11]: I played it back, and it's the same address as the 0100.
[51:16.900 --> 51:19.540]  [SPEAKER_01]: They called my office phone in the police station today.
[51:20.100 --> 51:21.760]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's a big mistake, isn't it?
[51:22.760 --> 51:25.420]  [SPEAKER_11]: Did you call... did you dial up to see if you won the binoculars?
[51:26.140 --> 51:26.560]  [SPEAKER_01]: No.
[51:26.940 --> 51:27.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: No.
[51:28.100 --> 51:31.280]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, I have three lines at home, and they get two or three sometimes.
[51:31.800 --> 51:32.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Wow.
[51:32.300 --> 51:35.140]  [SPEAKER_06]: Listen, sir, we're out of time, but thanks for calling in.
[51:35.780 --> 51:37.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: One final question, the 540 numbers.
[51:38.020 --> 51:43.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: Have you seen the 540 signs for apartment for rent that are plastered on telephone poles?
[51:43.900 --> 51:47.700]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's big enough so you can see the phone number, but not big enough so you can see the charge.
[51:47.700 --> 51:49.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: We printed one in the last issue of 2600.
[51:49.960 --> 51:55.960]  [SPEAKER_01]: I didn't see it, but certainly if they don't tell you what the price of the call is when you make the call, it would be in violation.
[51:55.980 --> 52:00.000]  [SPEAKER_01]: If we found that, we would go after the person who has the account with New York Tell.
[52:00.280 --> 52:00.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay.
[52:00.700 --> 52:05.560]  [SPEAKER_06]: Don Delaney, New York State Police Department, and a Phiber Optik well-known computer hacker.
[52:05.660 --> 52:11.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: I think we've got some common ground to stand on here as far as tracking down the real rip-offs out there.
[52:11.980 --> 52:16.740]  [SPEAKER_06]: And I think a lot of hackers out there are the ones that are going to find these rip-offs before anybody else.
[52:17.260 --> 52:23.660]  [SPEAKER_06]: Want to give any kind of number, way people can get a hold and report things if they see something that should not be right?
[52:23.920 --> 52:31.300]  [SPEAKER_01]: Well, if it falls into the area of computer crime or telecommunications fraud, certainly you can call my office out on Long Island.
[52:31.300 --> 52:35.320]  [SPEAKER_01]: And that'll be at the New York State Troop L headquarters in Farmingdale.
[52:35.540 --> 52:41.580]  [SPEAKER_01]: The telephone number there is area code 516-756-3390.
[52:42.300 --> 52:53.900]  [SPEAKER_01]: Or if it's outside of the New York City area, anywhere else in the state of New York, you call our number in Albany, which is 518-457-5712.
[52:53.900 --> 52:55.220]  [SPEAKER_01]: And they will help you.
[52:56.100 --> 52:57.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: Okay, thanks very much for being on the show.
[53:02.770 --> 53:05.650]  [SPEAKER_06]: And that's going to just about do it for us here tonight on Off the Hook.
[53:05.830 --> 53:07.130]  [SPEAKER_06]: Next week, we are not on.
[53:07.210 --> 53:10.510]  [SPEAKER_06]: Next week is Earth Day, but we will be back in two weeks.
[53:10.670 --> 53:11.430]  [SPEAKER_06]: So we'll see you then.
[53:11.790 --> 53:14.030]  [SPEAKER_06]: Stay tuned for The Personal Computer Show.
[53:14.030 --> 53:15.090]  [SPEAKER_06]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein.
[53:15.310 --> 53:15.810]  [SPEAKER_06]: Good night.