Off The Hook - 1992-11-18
[00:01.810 --> 00:03.050] [SPEAKER_05]: 7 a.m.
[00:03.130 --> 00:10.070] [SPEAKER_05]: on Hour of the Wolf for Jack Womack, William Gibson, Laurie Anderson, and of course, Steel Eye Spam.
[00:21.900 --> 00:25.580] [SPEAKER_00]: The New York Times called the Panama Deception canny filmmaking.
[00:25.860 --> 00:28.240] [SPEAKER_00]: The San Francisco Chronicle called it riveting.
[00:28.420 --> 00:36.760] [SPEAKER_00]: And on Sunday, November 22nd, you can see it for yourself at a special screening for WBAI at the New Community Cinema in Huntington, Long Island.
[00:37.180 --> 00:44.840] [SPEAKER_00]: The Panama Deception is a powerful documentary which exposes the real story behind the 1989 invasion produced by the Empowerment Project.
[00:45.640 --> 00:56.020] [SPEAKER_00]: Join invited guest Umberto Brown, the former UN representative of Panama, Ramsey Clark, WBAI's Valerie Van Isler, and others for this special benefit screening of the Panama Deception.
[00:56.300 --> 00:58.880] [SPEAKER_00]: Sunday, November 22nd at 2 p.m.
[00:59.160 --> 01:01.680] [SPEAKER_00]: at the New Community Cinema in Huntington, Long Island.
[01:01.680 --> 01:07.800] [SPEAKER_00]: For ticket and transportation information, you can call 212-279-0707.
[01:07.820 --> 01:10.840] [SPEAKER_00]: That's 212-279-0707.
[01:11.000 --> 01:14.220] [SPEAKER_00]: Or 516-423-7610.
[01:14.600 --> 01:17.380] [SPEAKER_00]: 516-423-7610.
[01:17.760 --> 01:18.940] [SPEAKER_00]: The Panama Deception.
[01:19.180 --> 01:21.340] [SPEAKER_00]: A film you can't afford to miss.
[01:25.410 --> 01:32.170] [SPEAKER_04]: And it's 9 o'clock on a Wednesday night, and that means it's time for high-tech on WBAI, and off the hook.
[01:39.150 --> 01:43.150] [SPEAKER_02]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:44.060 --> 01:48.650] [SPEAKER_02]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[01:49.270 --> 01:53.960] [SPEAKER_02]: It couldn't get much worse, but if they could, they would.
[01:54.220 --> 01:56.860] [SPEAKER_12]: Bum-diddly-bump, but the best, expect the worst.
[01:57.440 --> 01:59.360] [SPEAKER_12]: I hope that's understood.
[01:59.600 --> 02:00.440] [SPEAKER_12]: Bum-diddly-bump!
[02:29.220 --> 02:32.420] [SPEAKER_04]: And a good evening to everybody out there.
[02:32.580 --> 02:43.980] [SPEAKER_04]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein, and the program is Off the Hook, where we talk about the newest innovations in telephone technology, computers, security holes, hackers, you name it.
[02:44.040 --> 02:49.740] [SPEAKER_04]: And of course, we always try to take listener phone calls at 212-279-3400.
[02:49.740 --> 02:50.920] [SPEAKER_04]: It's been a busy week.
[02:51.140 --> 03:01.380] [SPEAKER_04]: It's been eventful in many parts of the country, as far as the fight for freedom, the fight for spreading information, and meeting publicly, and things like that.
[03:01.480 --> 03:13.000] [SPEAKER_04]: We'll have some updates on the story that we had last week, and also some news items, some listener mail, and a continuation of the debate we started two weeks ago.
[03:13.000 --> 03:16.480] [SPEAKER_04]: So, that's all coming up this hour on Off the Hook.
[03:17.680 --> 03:21.740] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, we always try to throw in some music where it's applicable.
[03:22.160 --> 03:24.900] [SPEAKER_04]: There's occasionally good telephone songs.
[03:24.900 --> 03:29.860] [SPEAKER_04]: If you know of any good telephone songs, feel free to write us and let us know about them, so we can share them with others.
[03:30.480 --> 03:34.180] [SPEAKER_04]: This is one that I just happened to literally stumble across.
[04:09.900 --> 04:12.640] [SPEAKER_03]: Don Quijote y Sancho Panza
[04:17.540 --> 04:20.540] [SPEAKER_03]: Hoy también siguen duchando
[04:36.640 --> 04:38.000] [SPEAKER_03]: Vaya poliquito
[05:03.820 --> 05:06.640] [SPEAKER_08]: Hello, can I speak to Mr. Don Quijote, please?
[05:07.100 --> 05:07.760] [SPEAKER_05]: No, señor.
[05:08.160 --> 05:10.260] [SPEAKER_05]: Don Quijote y Sancho Panza no están aquí.
[05:25.970 --> 05:28.590] [SPEAKER_03]: Don Quijote y Sancho Panza
[05:58.000 --> 06:22.300] [SPEAKER_01]: No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, señor.
[06:26.240 --> 06:50.460] [SPEAKER_03]: Don Quijote y Sancho Panza Don Quijote y Sancho Panza Hoy también siguen luchando Don Quijote y Sancho Panza Hoy también siguen luchando Vaya poliquito Vaya poliquito Vaya poliquito Vaya poliquito But
[07:11.080 --> 07:12.480] [SPEAKER_03]: what's going on?
[07:12.760 --> 07:15.820] [SPEAKER_03]: You've got to hold your brain, I feel crazy No, señor.
[07:15.960 --> 07:17.720] [SPEAKER_03]: Don Quijote y Sancho Panza no están aquí.
[08:38.210 --> 08:39.610] [SPEAKER_04]: Hello.
[08:39.610 --> 08:44.050] [SPEAKER_04]: on the soundtrack to Northern Exposure, which has just been released.
[08:44.710 --> 08:49.970] [SPEAKER_04]: And it's called Don Quixote, performed by Magazine 60.
[08:50.730 --> 08:53.870] [SPEAKER_04]: And a couple of interesting telephone bits there.
[08:54.030 --> 09:00.790] [SPEAKER_04]: Again, if you have songs that have telephone bits in them, please give us a call or write to us.
[09:01.250 --> 09:04.890] [SPEAKER_04]: WBAI, 505 8th Avenue, New York, New York, 10018.
[09:05.410 --> 09:07.050] [SPEAKER_04]: Care of Off the Hook.
[09:08.710 --> 09:12.610] [SPEAKER_04]: Our phone number is 212-279-3400.
[09:14.070 --> 09:19.350] [SPEAKER_04]: We have some information on computerized voting.
[09:19.610 --> 09:23.490] [SPEAKER_04]: Something that people have been asking about in weeks past.
[09:23.870 --> 09:28.750] [SPEAKER_04]: Something that we will be growing accustomed to in years ahead.
[09:29.390 --> 09:32.330] [SPEAKER_04]: Here are a couple of problems that popped up.
[09:33.710 --> 09:43.530] [SPEAKER_04]: A misaligned Votomatic machine may have caused hundreds of Berkeley voters to cast their ballots for candidates and propositions they never intended to support.
[09:43.970 --> 09:49.030] [SPEAKER_04]: That's according to Alameda County Registrar of Voters, Emmy Hill.
[09:50.510 --> 09:56.530] [SPEAKER_04]: Votomatic machines align a pre-scored data card with numbers on a printed picture of the ballot.
[09:57.410 --> 10:03.750] [SPEAKER_04]: And voters make their choices by punching a stylus through designated holes, thereby punching a data card.
[10:04.450 --> 10:11.850] [SPEAKER_04]: In this case, the holes were still within the printed squares on the ballot, but were actually causing holes to be punched in other locations on the card.
[10:12.590 --> 10:26.850] [SPEAKER_04]: An alert voter reviewed her completed ballot and noticed the discrepancy, but precinct workers did nothing until late afternoon, when a troubleshooter from the registrar's office, acting on the voter's complaint, checked the unit and confirmed the voter's complaint.
[10:30.170 --> 10:34.350] [SPEAKER_04]: Also, a group of Boulder residents has been actively campaigning for phone voting.
[10:34.610 --> 10:38.670] [SPEAKER_04]: As a consequence, the Boulder media has followed phone voting efforts elsewhere.
[10:39.770 --> 10:49.090] [SPEAKER_04]: Here's a summary and excerpts from an article by Carol Trury in the Boulder Daily Camera on November 9, 1992, about phone voting developments in New Mexico.
[10:51.310 --> 10:56.850] [SPEAKER_04]: New Mexico was spurred to develop a phone voting system by lots of voter frustration in getting to the polls.
[10:56.870 --> 11:03.630] [SPEAKER_04]: That, according to Russell Barnes, director for information systems with the New Mexico Secretary of State's office.
[11:04.330 --> 11:16.030] [SPEAKER_04]: Members of his office started talking to the security experts at Sandia National Labs in Albuquerque last March because, quote, we thought we had the expertise, was Sandia Labs so close at hand, unquote.
[11:16.890 --> 11:20.270] [SPEAKER_04]: Scientists there took on the work as a commercial project rather than a federal one.
[11:20.730 --> 11:26.230] [SPEAKER_04]: The labs are converting from federal to commercial work because they have lost so much of their funding, but that's another story.
[11:26.890 --> 11:33.670] [SPEAKER_04]: The goal is to have phone voting as an option to voting at the polls in the same way that voting absentee by mail is currently an option.
[11:33.930 --> 11:38.510] [SPEAKER_04]: Thus, one would have to apply to vote by phone and the presumption is that not everyone would do so.
[11:39.610 --> 11:46.850] [SPEAKER_04]: Just like absentee voters, phone voters would have two to three weeks to call in their votes before Election Day so phone lines won't be overloaded.
[11:47.470 --> 11:49.810] [SPEAKER_04]: And presumably you could do it 24 hours a day, too.
[11:50.490 --> 11:53.890] [SPEAKER_04]: Wouldn't that be something to go out and get drunk somewhere and then go vote?
[11:54.510 --> 11:55.310] [SPEAKER_04]: Four in the morning?
[11:55.490 --> 11:55.690] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[11:56.410 --> 11:58.270] [SPEAKER_04]: That's the way this country should be run.
[11:59.550 --> 12:02.410] [SPEAKER_04]: Voting by phone is not really the issue.
[12:02.410 --> 12:04.390] [SPEAKER_04]: It's a simple technology, according to Barnes.
[12:04.390 --> 12:08.990] [SPEAKER_04]: The problem is people feel it is very unsafe because it's so easy to tap into the phone system.
[12:09.510 --> 12:17.230] [SPEAKER_04]: With the help of computer security experts, the Secretary of State's office is developing a system officials say will be...
[12:18.930 --> 12:19.490] [SPEAKER_04]: uncrackable.
[12:21.010 --> 12:30.830] [SPEAKER_04]: As a test, the prototype system was used in a mock election involving 2,300 high school students and their parents on a facsimile of this year's New Mexico ballot.
[12:31.630 --> 12:35.830] [SPEAKER_04]: During the week-long mock election, Sandia Black Hatters...
[12:36.690 --> 12:40.110] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, that's a word that means experts at breaking into telephone systems.
[12:40.190 --> 12:41.230] [SPEAKER_04]: I'll bet you didn't know that.
[12:41.690 --> 12:44.170] [SPEAKER_04]: That's another one of these terms they come up with, like sneakers.
[12:44.310 --> 12:45.670] [SPEAKER_04]: No one ever heard that term before, either.
[12:46.270 --> 12:46.970] [SPEAKER_04]: Black Hatters.
[12:47.090 --> 12:47.630] [SPEAKER_04]: That's another one.
[12:47.710 --> 12:50.950] [SPEAKER_04]: So you guys writing films out there, guess you want to write that one down, too.
[12:51.730 --> 12:57.230] [SPEAKER_04]: Anyway, Sandia's Black Hatters were unable to crack the identification system and could not create duplicate votes.
[12:57.650 --> 12:58.950] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, give it to us.
[12:59.110 --> 13:05.110] [SPEAKER_04]: Let us play around with it for a little while here, and then we'll make some some judgments on the system.
[13:05.710 --> 13:08.210] [SPEAKER_04]: An interesting question arises out of all of this.
[13:08.330 --> 13:14.410] [SPEAKER_04]: Now, let's say that we were able to figure out how to get into the system.
[13:15.430 --> 13:17.810] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's say you were able to figure out how to get into the system.
[13:17.990 --> 13:27.450] [SPEAKER_04]: How to change votes, how to look at people's votes, how to create false data, how to do all kinds of potentially horrendous things.
[13:27.750 --> 13:31.110] [SPEAKER_04]: What should you do with that knowledge?
[13:31.610 --> 13:48.390] [SPEAKER_04]: And keep in mind that many times in the past, computer hackers and similar kinds of people have gone to media sources, have gone to the companies in charge, have gone to the public, and by and large, they've been ignored.
[13:49.270 --> 13:54.030] [SPEAKER_04]: In fact, that's one of the things we do on this program, not be ignored, although I'm sure we get a fair amount of that.
[13:54.450 --> 13:59.470] [SPEAKER_04]: But we try to expose things before it reaches a crisis state.
[13:59.650 --> 14:05.990] [SPEAKER_04]: And a lot of people think that just by mentioning something is wrong, you're the cause of it.
[14:08.330 --> 14:13.050] [SPEAKER_04]: It's a debate that's been going on in the hacker world now for, I guess, decades.
[14:13.730 --> 14:15.310] [SPEAKER_04]: As long as the hacker world has been around.
[14:16.090 --> 14:25.010] [SPEAKER_04]: But this is a perfect example of how such knowledge can be used in a positive way if we are allowed to do it.
[14:27.010 --> 14:34.490] [SPEAKER_04]: One more story, actually two more stories on voting fraud or potential voting fraud.
[14:35.310 --> 14:43.390] [SPEAKER_04]: According to Ray Todd Stevens, our voting machines are a series of buttons on the outside of a continuous sheet of paper.
[14:43.570 --> 14:45.190] [SPEAKER_04]: You can go page to page with buttons.
[14:45.690 --> 14:49.070] [SPEAKER_04]: Each button is supposed to point at a candidate or a proposal.
[14:49.850 --> 14:51.550] [SPEAKER_04]: But it didn't work that way.
[14:52.810 --> 15:01.790] [SPEAKER_04]: When I went through the ballot, I found several pages that pointed at the lines between the selections and not at a selection.
[15:02.970 --> 15:06.610] [SPEAKER_04]: I found that it was not possible to push the button for Clinton.
[15:08.190 --> 15:09.430] [SPEAKER_04]: Imagine the frustration.
[15:09.810 --> 15:14.210] [SPEAKER_04]: Not possible to push Clinton's button, but it was possible to push the button above Bush.
[15:15.170 --> 15:21.570] [SPEAKER_04]: I also found that when I paged forward and back, that the lid buttons didn't point at the people I had voted for.
[15:23.290 --> 15:25.950] [SPEAKER_04]: It can get kind of frustrating, I'd say.
[15:28.270 --> 15:36.390] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, I pointed this out to the election judges and was told that they only deal with the totals and therefore it would all average out.
[15:39.010 --> 15:39.570] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[15:40.490 --> 15:48.630] [SPEAKER_04]: Meanwhile, the Yamhill County Clerk discovered a computer programming error that reverses the election results of the county's district attorney's race.
[15:50.530 --> 15:54.230] [SPEAKER_04]: incumbent district attorney John Mercer didn't lose in the November election.
[15:54.230 --> 15:55.710] [SPEAKER_04]: He won by a landslide.
[15:57.190 --> 16:05.170] [SPEAKER_04]: Clerk Charles Stern said the computer error occurred because the program failed to list the candidates in alphabetical order as they were on the ballot.
[16:05.530 --> 16:11.390] [SPEAKER_04]: Mercer had supposedly lost to Burnt Owl Hanson It's not a joke.
[16:11.510 --> 16:12.030] [SPEAKER_04]: That's really his name.
[16:12.130 --> 16:18.090] [SPEAKER_04]: Burnt Owl Hanson by 16,539 votes to 8,519.
[16:20.110 --> 16:23.950] [SPEAKER_04]: Then on Monday the clerk's office told him Hanson's votes were actually his votes.
[16:25.510 --> 16:27.610] [SPEAKER_04]: Mercer said he was astounded at the turn of events.
[16:28.710 --> 16:35.190] [SPEAKER_04]: The feedback I was getting everywhere during the campaign was very positive and that's why it was such an emotional extreme to see that I'd lost.
[16:35.990 --> 16:38.430] [SPEAKER_04]: But this is really just as shocking the other way.
[16:40.490 --> 16:45.050] [SPEAKER_04]: No one's been able to find Hanson to get his take on this sudden swing in the election.
[16:48.690 --> 16:55.550] [SPEAKER_04]: And finally this story comes from an Internet contributor.
[16:56.730 --> 17:02.250] [SPEAKER_04]: In high school I campaigned for a democrat in a town near Buffalo with a republican machine.
[17:03.730 --> 17:15.590] [SPEAKER_04]: He said the single most important thing to do on election day is to get someone to every voting machine at the very hour the polls open to cast their own votes but also to test the machines.
[17:16.770 --> 17:22.370] [SPEAKER_04]: And if any problem is found you demand the machines closure and telephone the board of elections just to make sure.
[17:24.470 --> 17:29.110] [SPEAKER_04]: In our case every voting machine in town was set up to allow only straight party line voting.
[17:30.850 --> 17:31.990] [SPEAKER_04]: That's incredible.
[17:33.570 --> 17:44.210] [SPEAKER_04]: Hurried calls to the county board of elections which was run by the democrats got the machines closed until they were set right which was later the same morning.
[17:44.820 --> 17:58.470] [SPEAKER_04]: To keep this relevant it was quite evident that the voting system was not working properly but in general can electronic voting and tabulating systems be checked by users for correct operation?
[18:00.470 --> 18:05.010] [SPEAKER_04]: If not don't be surprised when accidents occur.
[18:12.710 --> 18:16.610] [SPEAKER_04]: the world of high tech is just one great big accident waiting to happen sometimes.
[18:17.210 --> 18:35.690] [SPEAKER_04]: There can be a lot of good that comes out of it but only if we know what we're doing and we're willing to listen and look and not grow over confident and over trusting which a lot of us seem to want to do for some reason it's such a tragedy when that happens.
[18:36.330 --> 18:44.410] [SPEAKER_04]: We were talking a couple of weeks ago about various analogies one can draw to computer hacking.
[18:45.070 --> 19:07.790] [SPEAKER_04]: One analogy that we brought was the golf course analogy where if you're walking around on a private golf course late at night where you're obviously not supposed to be or even in the middle of the day when there's lots of rich people logged in as it were doing their various things well what's the worst thing that can happen to you?
[19:08.370 --> 19:35.810] [SPEAKER_04]: You turn that golf course into a computer and you can go to jail for five years every time you access one or every time you even write down the address of one it's quite an analogy and not everybody agrees with it but it's one way of getting the point across I think because computers are simply another step in the environment another place to visit another place to go another place to be
[19:35.810 --> 19:58.750] [SPEAKER_04]: adventurous explorer and if you're not changing your attitude your mentality just because the scene has changed a little bit do we really want to change the rules so much to say that well you can explore a golf course and just get kicked out but if you explore a computer system That's a serious crime.
[20:00.630 --> 20:08.890] [SPEAKER_04]: When the intention is exactly the same in both instances, mainly to explore, to learn, to figure things out.
[20:10.590 --> 20:12.530] [SPEAKER_04]: And maybe get some fresh air, too.
[20:13.350 --> 20:19.870] [SPEAKER_04]: We got a few letters on the subject, and I'd like to go through a couple of them.
[20:19.950 --> 20:26.590] [SPEAKER_04]: And this one comes from... I'm just going to read the first name to save people embarrassment.
[20:26.810 --> 20:32.590] [SPEAKER_04]: And possible liability and retribution from employers and things like that.
[20:33.130 --> 20:34.330] [SPEAKER_04]: It really does happen.
[20:35.110 --> 20:38.650] [SPEAKER_04]: This is from Alex of Stewart Manor, New York.
[20:40.210 --> 20:41.970] [SPEAKER_04]: On many things I agree with you.
[20:42.110 --> 20:48.590] [SPEAKER_04]: I agree that we should have the right to explore various things, such as computers and the physical world.
[20:49.070 --> 20:56.050] [SPEAKER_04]: If for no better reason than our curiosity and the fact that only explorers...
[20:56.590 --> 20:57.510] [SPEAKER_04]: ever discover.
[20:58.910 --> 21:04.650] [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, if you enter someone's system and find a mistake, they could treat you as if you discovered a cure for the common cold.
[21:04.810 --> 21:07.670] [SPEAKER_04]: Because they really benefitted from this discovery.
[21:09.370 --> 21:11.510] [SPEAKER_04]: This is preferable to treating you like a criminal.
[21:12.510 --> 21:15.830] [SPEAKER_04]: Also, the system may belong to the company, but...
[21:15.830 --> 21:18.950] [SPEAKER_04]: ultimately, the company belongs to us, because we support it.
[21:19.910 --> 21:25.570] [SPEAKER_04]: I would also like to suggest that one of the reasons the hacker movement is taking such a rap...
[21:25.570 --> 21:27.650] [SPEAKER_04]: is because you get knowledge.
[21:29.110 --> 21:33.750] [SPEAKER_04]: I don't think the powers that be really want us to have the knowledge to tell other people...
[21:33.750 --> 21:36.950] [SPEAKER_04]: what kind of data files they actually have on us.
[21:39.130 --> 21:44.910] [SPEAKER_04]: Finally, I thought that it was illegal for any non-government body to have files on people.
[21:46.610 --> 21:48.450] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, Alex, it should be illegal.
[21:49.610 --> 21:51.030] [SPEAKER_04]: Unfortunately, it's not.
[21:51.450 --> 21:56.950] [SPEAKER_04]: There are so many files out there by private companies, by governmental agencies...
[21:57.810 --> 21:59.170] [SPEAKER_04]: it's not even funny.
[22:00.450 --> 22:06.670] [SPEAKER_04]: And those files are, I think, what they're really concerned about us finding out.
[22:06.970 --> 22:12.010] [SPEAKER_04]: About us stumbling and seeing what kind of information is being kept on us.
[22:12.090 --> 22:14.150] [SPEAKER_04]: There's databases of every kind.
[22:14.530 --> 22:18.930] [SPEAKER_04]: Databases of people by religion, by sexual preference, by...
[22:19.550 --> 22:24.570] [SPEAKER_04]: as far as how good a tenant they are, how good a credit risk, how good a driver.
[22:26.850 --> 22:27.690] [SPEAKER_04]: You name it.
[22:27.690 --> 22:33.050] [SPEAKER_04]: Whatever people want to know, they now have the right to know.
[22:34.310 --> 22:40.170] [SPEAKER_04]: That's called freedom, but trying to find out, for some reason, that's looked upon as a threat.
[22:41.070 --> 22:43.430] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, here's another letter.
[22:43.530 --> 22:45.590] [SPEAKER_04]: This one is from Leonard of New York.
[22:46.610 --> 22:52.710] [SPEAKER_04]: Dear Mr. Blank, I'm afraid your name is on the tip of my tongue, but I can't seem to remember it.
[22:53.430 --> 22:59.470] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, as a footnote to that, I realize that not remembering your name is somewhat discourteous, and I apologize.
[22:59.690 --> 23:00.670] [SPEAKER_04]: That's fine, no problem.
[23:01.350 --> 23:03.110] [SPEAKER_04]: The important thing is that you remember what is said.
[23:04.390 --> 23:06.130] [SPEAKER_04]: And that you participate in the process.
[23:06.470 --> 23:07.150] [SPEAKER_04]: So, here we go.
[23:07.470 --> 23:11.730] [SPEAKER_04]: I listened to your program from time to time, and I was particularly amused by the most recent one.
[23:12.290 --> 23:16.470] [SPEAKER_04]: George Orwell once said it was a waste of time to argue with vegetarians and communists.
[23:17.170 --> 23:18.690] [SPEAKER_04]: But I will give it a shot nonetheless.
[23:19.290 --> 23:21.470] [SPEAKER_04]: We have our George Orwell person look that up.
[23:21.850 --> 23:23.430] [SPEAKER_04]: I just want to make sure he really said that.
[23:24.170 --> 23:32.210] [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know for sure if you are a member of either category, but WBAI is sufficiently leftist in nature that I believe Orwell's dictum is applicable.
[23:34.390 --> 23:39.390] [SPEAKER_04]: Your rationalizations for backing hackers who break into other people's computer systems was unbelievable.
[23:39.950 --> 23:45.930] [SPEAKER_04]: The caller who pointed this out to you was treated rather shabbily, and you put him down with some rather fancy intellectual dancing.
[23:46.490 --> 23:51.210] [SPEAKER_04]: The hypothetical you gave of trespassing onto a golf course is not very apropos.
[23:53.290 --> 23:54.690] [SPEAKER_04]: So, try this on for size.
[23:55.650 --> 24:03.730] [SPEAKER_04]: Suppose I broke into WBAI with no intent to do damage or steel, but merely to look around and rummage through its files.
[24:04.130 --> 24:05.550] [SPEAKER_04]: How would you feel about that?
[24:05.990 --> 24:08.110] [SPEAKER_04]: How would your fellow staff members feel?
[24:08.330 --> 24:09.810] [SPEAKER_04]: How about the Pacifica board?
[24:10.030 --> 24:12.430] [SPEAKER_04]: How about the WBAI membership and contributors?
[24:13.550 --> 24:22.430] [SPEAKER_04]: I won't try to answer all those questions, but I will hazard a guess that if word got out that this was happening from time to time, you'd lose a fair number of members and contributors.
[24:23.350 --> 24:30.130] [SPEAKER_04]: I'm sure that you would rationalize your way out of it, but I believe this is very much more like the hacker situation than the golf course hypothetical.
[24:30.670 --> 24:33.670] [SPEAKER_04]: All right, well, let me do the rationalization now before I finish the letter.
[24:33.950 --> 24:49.830] [SPEAKER_04]: If someone were to break into WBAI and rummage through our files, and they were able to do this from time to time, over and over again, and look at all personal information about our members, our supporters, our listeners, and staff members as well, yeah,
[24:50.010 --> 24:50.790] [SPEAKER_04]: I'd be angry at that.
[24:50.890 --> 24:54.530] [SPEAKER_04]: I'd be angry at the people that are dumb enough to leave things wide open around here.
[24:55.370 --> 24:57.470] [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, who would you be mad at?
[24:57.550 --> 25:15.630] [SPEAKER_04]: As a WBAI listener, and I presume we have supporters out there, would you be upset at the person that simply walked in off the street and started going through everything, or would you be a little bit upset at us for leaving the doors wide open and allowing them to do it repeatedly and not learning from our mistakes and,
[25:15.790 --> 25:19.510] [SPEAKER_04]: at the same time, violating your privacy?
[25:19.710 --> 25:20.470] [SPEAKER_04]: That's right.
[25:20.610 --> 25:23.590] [SPEAKER_04]: We would be violating your privacy by not protecting it.
[25:24.430 --> 25:34.590] [SPEAKER_04]: Don't you see there's a certain responsibility that you must uphold when you store information about people?
[25:34.590 --> 25:38.310] [SPEAKER_04]: If you're a credit agency, you have to keep that information confidential.
[25:39.590 --> 25:46.030] [SPEAKER_04]: If you're a court, a governmental agency, you have to make sure people can't just walk in and go through private files.
[25:47.570 --> 25:55.590] [SPEAKER_04]: And if it happens all the time, yeah, you can make all the laws you want saying it's illegal, but the fact of the matter is, it's very easy.
[25:56.350 --> 25:59.390] [SPEAKER_04]: And a lot of people are able to do it without ever being traced.
[26:01.090 --> 26:09.190] [SPEAKER_04]: So, uh, this rationale of blaming the people that, uh, that show you how it's done, it's, it's absurd.
[26:09.770 --> 26:18.010] [SPEAKER_04]: To continue with the letter, uh, the phone company and other private companies and individuals often have data which they and their customers regard as confidential.
[26:18.870 --> 26:22.130] [SPEAKER_04]: Wandering around the golf course doesn't raise the confidentiality problem.
[26:22.370 --> 26:25.610] [SPEAKER_04]: You indicated that no one goes to jail for trespassing on a golf course.
[26:25.610 --> 26:33.810] [SPEAKER_04]: It's probably true enough, but it is not a major problem for golf courses, and it probably isn't worth their time, trouble, and expense to prosecute and or sue.
[26:34.350 --> 26:50.010] [SPEAKER_04]: I suspect they would feel very different if, uh, someone broke into their locked clubhouse, and particularly if that someone went even further and broke into their files, even if he had no intent to steal or do damage, but just look around or test how good their security system was.
[26:50.150 --> 27:02.390] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, I was including the, uh, the clubhouse in my analogy, and I suspect that if you broke into a golf course clubhouse, you would, uh, not be sentenced to five years in jail, or threatened with such.
[27:02.750 --> 27:09.350] [SPEAKER_04]: And you would not be, uh, be, uh, linked to all the other people around the world that have ever broken into a golf course as some kind of mass conspiracy.
[27:10.290 --> 27:11.850] [SPEAKER_04]: That is what happens today.
[27:11.850 --> 27:16.430] [SPEAKER_04]: That is what's happening with the, uh, computer underground, with the computer hacker world.
[27:17.430 --> 27:19.750] [SPEAKER_04]: It's all thought of as one big conspiracy.
[27:21.050 --> 27:25.470] [SPEAKER_04]: And conspiracy is, uh, it's a wonderful word for people that don't understand what's really going on.
[27:26.590 --> 27:32.330] [SPEAKER_04]: Think of all the conspiracy people out there that have their various conspiracies of one sort or another.
[27:32.330 --> 27:33.530] [SPEAKER_04]: Oh yeah, that's conspiracies.
[27:33.690 --> 27:34.310] [SPEAKER_04]: There's all kinds.
[27:35.690 --> 27:43.750] [SPEAKER_04]: But, uh, at some point, you get a little bit, uh, frenzied, and you start thinking that there are all these things going on that you don't know about, and everybody's out to get you.
[27:44.550 --> 27:47.550] [SPEAKER_04]: And unfortunately, that's the way the federal government seems to be right now.
[27:48.150 --> 27:50.430] [SPEAKER_04]: They think all the hackers are out to get them.
[27:51.870 --> 27:55.130] [SPEAKER_04]: And that's why they want to lock them up before that happens.
[27:56.890 --> 27:58.050] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's finish this letter here.
[27:58.210 --> 27:58.930] [SPEAKER_04]: One final point.
[27:59.570 --> 28:06.170] [SPEAKER_04]: The phone company and others have made it plain to the world that they do not want anyone breaking into their systems and that they regard it seriously.
[28:07.130 --> 28:13.370] [SPEAKER_04]: I don't believe that most golf courses have made it clear explicitly by so stating or implicitly by undertaking prosecutions and lawsuits.
[28:13.610 --> 28:22.070] [SPEAKER_04]: In my humble judgment, anyone who breaks into another system is justly prosecuted, and any reasonable punishment, including jail time, is perfectly proper.
[28:22.510 --> 28:28.130] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, where we differ here, Leonard, the third is our definition of what is reasonable.
[28:29.110 --> 28:33.930] [SPEAKER_04]: And we also differ in our analysis of the phone companies.
[28:34.410 --> 28:39.130] [SPEAKER_04]: You say the phone company makes it plain to the world they don't want anyone breaking into their systems.
[28:39.130 --> 28:40.550] [SPEAKER_04]: They regard it seriously.
[28:41.070 --> 28:46.610] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, if they regard it seriously, how come people are still able to get in within minutes?
[28:47.690 --> 28:50.610] [SPEAKER_04]: Why is it so easy to infiltrate their system?
[28:50.850 --> 28:52.830] [SPEAKER_04]: Why is it so easy to manipulate their system?
[28:52.830 --> 28:55.170] [SPEAKER_04]: Do they understand their own system?
[28:55.330 --> 28:56.470] [SPEAKER_04]: Do they even care?
[28:56.970 --> 29:00.270] [SPEAKER_04]: That's the question that should be asked.
[29:01.090 --> 29:03.770] [SPEAKER_04]: Not what could the hacker have done if he was malicious.
[29:04.130 --> 29:07.430] [SPEAKER_04]: The fact of the matter is, 99% of hackers are not malicious.
[29:08.230 --> 29:11.810] [SPEAKER_04]: That doesn't mean 99% of people are not malicious.
[29:13.270 --> 29:18.330] [SPEAKER_04]: And if you leave the holes there, all kinds of people will get in eventually.
[29:18.650 --> 29:20.710] [SPEAKER_04]: And yes, there will be malicious things done.
[29:22.970 --> 29:24.210] [SPEAKER_04]: One final letter.
[29:25.190 --> 29:27.870] [SPEAKER_04]: And this one is from Gordon of Danbury, Connecticut.
[29:28.930 --> 29:39.510] [SPEAKER_04]: Dear Manuel, I believe the point you were making tonight, which some callers didn't seem to get, is that the punishment should fit the crime, whether you're on a golf course or in a computer environment.
[29:40.150 --> 29:44.290] [SPEAKER_04]: If you were caught exploring a golf course without authorization, you'd probably be asked to leave.
[29:44.850 --> 29:51.830] [SPEAKER_04]: If you were caught destroying the grounds in the clubhouse, you'd probably have to pay for the damage, pay a hefty fine, and possibly even do some jail time.
[29:52.350 --> 29:56.770] [SPEAKER_04]: You certainly wouldn't have to be worried about the criminality of knowing how to get onto the grounds without permission.
[29:58.390 --> 30:02.130] [SPEAKER_04]: However, I don't think a golf course is completely analogous to a computer environment.
[30:02.670 --> 30:11.350] [SPEAKER_04]: It is possible to explore a computer system and without causing any damage to current or future operations to steal something just by looking at it, i.e.
[30:11.470 --> 30:11.910] [SPEAKER_04]: information.
[30:12.910 --> 30:17.650] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's say instead of a golf course, you were caught exploring an office at IBM headquarters.
[30:18.630 --> 30:22.990] [SPEAKER_04]: Even though you didn't destroy anything, I'm sure you'd be charged with criminal trespassing or something.
[30:22.990 --> 30:25.710] [SPEAKER_04]: And how about if you were caught reading the personnel files?
[30:26.350 --> 30:33.150] [SPEAKER_04]: The charges may be even more severe, though still perhaps not as severe as those you mentioned for hackers merely possessing access tools.
[30:33.710 --> 30:40.070] [SPEAKER_04]: And remember, folks, access tools, writing down a password on a piece of paper, that is an access tool.
[30:40.550 --> 30:42.970] [SPEAKER_04]: You're caught with 15 of those, you go to jail.
[30:44.790 --> 30:52.310] [SPEAKER_04]: Yet, if you were stopped on the street and were found to be carrying a card key that could give you unauthorized access to the IBM building, would you be charged with anything?
[30:52.990 --> 30:53.730] [SPEAKER_04]: Not likely.
[30:55.330 --> 31:00.590] [SPEAKER_04]: Also, I should bring up an interesting difference in the IBM analogy.
[31:00.590 --> 31:08.690] [SPEAKER_04]: If you were inside an office in the IBM building, rummaging through personnel files, odds are you're not an explorer.
[31:09.010 --> 31:14.670] [SPEAKER_04]: Odds are you weren't just wandering around to see how many different kinds of file cabinets you can get into.
[31:14.670 --> 31:22.870] [SPEAKER_04]: People that go into a specific file cabinet and look at a specific file usually know what it is they're looking for, and they usually have some reason for doing it.
[31:23.030 --> 31:24.630] [SPEAKER_04]: Perhaps they're corporate spies.
[31:25.070 --> 31:27.070] [SPEAKER_04]: Perhaps they're international spies.
[31:27.510 --> 31:28.310] [SPEAKER_04]: Who knows?
[31:28.450 --> 31:30.150] [SPEAKER_04]: Perhaps they're just extremely nosy people.
[31:31.450 --> 31:40.090] [SPEAKER_04]: But if a computer hacker is wandering around files, you can't always assume that because they're looking at something that they know what it is they're looking at.
[31:40.090 --> 31:43.350] [SPEAKER_04]: Most of the time, it's simply wandering around.
[31:44.010 --> 31:48.530] [SPEAKER_04]: Wandering around this big, crazy world that is so new to all of us.
[31:51.840 --> 32:03.900] [SPEAKER_04]: I don't think there's been a single case proven yet of a computer hacker working for another company and using his abilities to get into a system and infiltrate and read personnel files and things like that.
[32:03.960 --> 32:08.460] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, people read personnel files just to see what's there.
[32:10.220 --> 32:16.860] [SPEAKER_04]: Anyway, to finish this letter, I have been a programmer for nine years now, though I would not consider myself a hacker.
[32:17.300 --> 32:22.760] [SPEAKER_04]: And while I respect the spirit of exploration and self-education, I've never had the urge to gain access to another system.
[32:23.120 --> 32:26.860] [SPEAKER_04]: I consider it trespassing in private property and feel it should be treated as such.
[32:27.340 --> 32:30.920] [SPEAKER_04]: Anyone causing damage to a system or operation should be punished more severely.
[32:31.300 --> 32:32.960] [SPEAKER_04]: And I'm in full agreement with that.
[32:33.020 --> 32:34.740] [SPEAKER_04]: I think most hackers are in full agreement with that.
[32:34.740 --> 32:40.260] [SPEAKER_04]: But anyone doing any kind of damage to a system deserves whatever it is they get.
[32:40.440 --> 32:44.580] [SPEAKER_04]: Although, they shouldn't be drawn and quartered, but you get the idea.
[32:44.840 --> 32:53.340] [SPEAKER_04]: The possession of passwords or other access devices, while perhaps implying the intent to gain unauthorized access, should not be punishable as a crime.
[32:53.780 --> 32:56.200] [SPEAKER_04]: Clearly, the current laws go way too far.
[32:56.760 --> 33:05.140] [SPEAKER_04]: Probably, as the caller who works in the judicial system noted, because the computer hacker's world is so foreign to those who are making and enforcing the laws.
[33:05.280 --> 33:18.040] [SPEAKER_04]: It's unfortunate that in an age when technological advancement is becoming an increasingly important factor in our country's ability to compete globally, we are putting some of our most talented people behind bars unnecessarily.
[33:20.700 --> 33:23.120] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, we welcome your letters.
[33:23.440 --> 33:26.360] [SPEAKER_04]: Again, the address to send letters on this topic.
[33:26.860 --> 33:29.180] [SPEAKER_04]: The address is off the hook.
[33:29.340 --> 33:35.200] [SPEAKER_04]: Care of WBAI, 505 8th Avenue, New York, New York, 10018.
[33:35.960 --> 33:40.480] [SPEAKER_04]: We like to open up the phones for your opinions on this and other matters.
[33:41.120 --> 33:45.100] [SPEAKER_04]: Our phone number, as always, 212-279-3400.
[33:45.200 --> 33:45.940] [SPEAKER_04]: The program is off the hook.
[33:45.940 --> 33:47.420] [SPEAKER_04]: We're on the air until 10 o'clock.
[33:47.720 --> 33:49.080] [SPEAKER_04]: Special programming note.
[33:50.320 --> 33:54.300] [SPEAKER_04]: Not next week, but I believe in two weeks.
[33:54.500 --> 33:59.860] [SPEAKER_04]: Two weeks from now, we are flipping, flipping slots with the Personal Computer Show.
[34:00.380 --> 34:02.480] [SPEAKER_04]: So you might want to jot that down someplace.
[34:03.000 --> 34:04.680] [SPEAKER_04]: We'll be going on at 10 o'clock.
[34:04.820 --> 34:07.860] [SPEAKER_04]: The Personal Computer Show will be going on at 9 o'clock.
[34:09.500 --> 34:19.620] [SPEAKER_04]: There'll be more reminders and things of that nature coming in the weeks ahead, but we only have one more show at this time slot, then we move up an hour, or back an hour, or whatever the phrase is.
[34:20.600 --> 34:39.740] [SPEAKER_04]: All right, to update what we talked about last week, if you recall, last week we had three guests on concerning a most ominous development in Washington, D.C., a public gathering of computer hackers, part of the monthly 2600 meetings that take place on the first Friday of the month throughout the United States.
[34:40.260 --> 34:46.740] [SPEAKER_04]: That gathering was broken up by Pentagon City Mall Police.
[34:47.080 --> 34:54.840] [SPEAKER_04]: Basically, mall cops came and told everybody they had to submit to a search and wrote down everybody's names.
[34:54.840 --> 34:57.480] [SPEAKER_04]: Clearly something that is illegal.
[34:57.740 --> 35:05.080] [SPEAKER_04]: You can't just search somebody and say, if you don't submit to a search, you're going to be arrested without having anything to charge them with.
[35:05.080 --> 35:11.620] [SPEAKER_04]: You can't just write down people's names because they appeared with other people in a public shopping area.
[35:13.400 --> 35:23.040] [SPEAKER_04]: And while a mall may be private property, and while you might be able to kick people out for no good reason at all, it should be noted when that happens.
[35:24.140 --> 35:26.800] [SPEAKER_04]: But that was not the full story.
[35:28.960 --> 35:39.900] [SPEAKER_04]: Because reporters for various newspapers were able to determine, without any doubt, that the Secret Service was on the scene, the Secret Service was behind the entire thing.
[35:40.880 --> 35:50.320] [SPEAKER_04]: The head of mall security at Pentagon City Mall said as much, said that the Secret Service had set up the entire thing.
[35:50.780 --> 35:54.400] [SPEAKER_04]: And that raises a lot of very disturbing questions.
[35:54.560 --> 36:11.420] [SPEAKER_04]: The Secret Service acting against the people of the United States, spying on them, intimidating them, making mall police do their dirty work, and do the illegal things, such as search people without warrants, and throw people out of places for no reason at all.
[36:12.680 --> 36:16.680] [SPEAKER_04]: Obviously, the Secret Service can't go around doing that, but they can get other people to do it for them.
[36:17.560 --> 36:23.240] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, last week, the story had pretty much hidden the computer underground and over the airwaves.
[36:23.460 --> 36:30.260] [SPEAKER_04]: I'm happy to say that late last week, this story made page one of the Washington Post.
[36:30.980 --> 36:33.660] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, page one of the Washington Post last Thursday.
[36:34.380 --> 36:36.200] [SPEAKER_04]: The story could have been a lot better.
[36:37.360 --> 36:40.720] [SPEAKER_04]: It really missed the boat on a couple of things.
[36:41.120 --> 36:42.740] [SPEAKER_04]: It mentioned all the facts.
[36:42.900 --> 37:06.360] [SPEAKER_04]: It said the Secret Service was involved, but rather than focus on that particular issue, this horrible thing of the Secret Service actually spying on teenage kids in a public setting and intimidating them when these people are meeting in a public place in the first place and obviously have nothing to hide kind of reminds me of the infiltration of various anti-war groups by the FBI back in the 60s
[37:06.360 --> 37:06.960] [SPEAKER_04]: and 70s.
[37:08.140 --> 37:10.540] [SPEAKER_04]: But the Washington Post didn't focus on that.
[37:10.700 --> 37:12.560] [SPEAKER_04]: They just mentioned it, but they didn't focus on it.
[37:12.640 --> 37:26.760] [SPEAKER_04]: Rather, they thought it was ironic that computer hackers were complaining that their privacy was being violated because computer hackers violate everybody's privacy, which is another fallacy.
[37:27.780 --> 37:33.940] [SPEAKER_04]: If anybody has a sense of how valuable and how fragile privacy is, it's computer hackers.
[37:34.520 --> 37:39.180] [SPEAKER_04]: And if anybody can tell you how to protect your privacy, it's computer hackers.
[37:39.580 --> 37:42.400] [SPEAKER_04]: Certainly not the people keeping files on you.
[37:42.500 --> 37:48.820] [SPEAKER_04]: They cannot tell you anything about how to preserve your privacy because privacy to them is a dirty word.
[37:48.820 --> 37:50.880] [SPEAKER_04]: So the story has gotten out.
[37:50.980 --> 37:55.840] [SPEAKER_04]: The story made the front page of the Washington Post and is being talked about all over the place.
[37:56.040 --> 38:00.100] [SPEAKER_04]: All kinds of internal memos are being sent around various governmental offices.
[38:01.560 --> 38:07.640] [SPEAKER_04]: And next month, December 4th, there'll be more hacker meetings than ever before.
[38:08.800 --> 38:11.300] [SPEAKER_04]: In as many as nine U.S.
[38:11.380 --> 38:14.420] [SPEAKER_04]: cities and several cities abroad as well.
[38:15.780 --> 38:17.320] [SPEAKER_04]: It just keeps getting bigger.
[38:19.020 --> 38:21.760] [SPEAKER_04]: 212-279-3400, that's our phone number.
[38:22.440 --> 38:23.720] [SPEAKER_04]: We'd like to hear from you.
[38:25.040 --> 38:27.740] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's take our first listener phone call.
[38:27.940 --> 38:28.900] [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening, you're on.
[38:29.760 --> 38:30.100] [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[38:31.180 --> 38:41.900] [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, I wanted to discuss the issue that you had raised regarding, or your letter had raised regarding the break-in analogy into WBAI.
[38:44.400 --> 38:54.440] [SPEAKER_07]: You seem to be blaming the victim for the crime in your counter to what the author of the letter had stated.
[38:54.680 --> 39:01.220] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, now, would you consider WBAI to be a victim if we allowed people to walk in and rummage through our files?
[39:02.040 --> 39:06.120] [SPEAKER_07]: Again, you're using the same analogy of allowing people to walk in.
[39:06.140 --> 39:08.280] [SPEAKER_07]: That was not what the letter writer had said.
[39:08.280 --> 39:10.220] [SPEAKER_07]: He had said that somebody had broken in.
[39:11.400 --> 39:17.480] [SPEAKER_07]: You had used terms such as blaming WBAI for leaving files quote, wide open.
[39:17.680 --> 39:20.700] [SPEAKER_07]: But that wasn't what the letter writer had brought up.
[39:20.780 --> 39:37.920] [SPEAKER_07]: What he had stated was, let's say that WBAI had locked their doors, locked their files, whatever, somebody still had broken in through whatever means of lockpicking and had overcome whatever defenses WBAI or whoever else had put up.
[39:39.260 --> 39:46.180] [SPEAKER_07]: That is the analogy because any computer system has some level of security.
[39:47.040 --> 39:59.580] [SPEAKER_07]: And it seems that hackers, unfortunately, and I think you are in defending the actions of hackers, you are really reinforcing the stereotype, a negative stereotype of hackers, which I think is unfortunate.
[40:01.900 --> 40:03.880] [SPEAKER_07]: Let's take the analogy of neighborhoods.
[40:04.080 --> 40:09.080] [SPEAKER_07]: It used to be in some areas of the country, you could leave your door unlocked and people often did.
[40:10.120 --> 40:12.260] [SPEAKER_07]: And no one came in and robbed them.
[40:12.320 --> 40:20.060] [SPEAKER_07]: What you are saying is that if they had done that, that if somebody came in and robbed them, whatever, that it is their fault.
[40:20.420 --> 40:23.500] [SPEAKER_07]: And I don't see that that in any way makes any kind sense.
[40:23.780 --> 40:32.620] [SPEAKER_04]: Now, you're making a jump here that I always don't like to make, the jump to private homes and private people, because that is not what this is about.
[40:32.740 --> 40:35.380] [SPEAKER_04]: We're not breaking into personal computers here.
[40:35.500 --> 40:43.760] [SPEAKER_04]: We're talking about huge systems, TRW and NASA and all kinds of governmental agencies that keep all kinds of information.
[40:43.980 --> 40:46.020] [SPEAKER_04]: They should be safeguarding that information.
[40:46.260 --> 40:47.500] [SPEAKER_04]: And obviously they're not.
[40:47.580 --> 40:53.060] [SPEAKER_04]: If 14-year-old kids can get in in a matter of minutes, obviously they are doing something wrong.
[40:53.780 --> 40:59.640] [SPEAKER_04]: And, you know, if somebody goes in there with malicious intent, I'm the first to say they should be punished for that.
[40:59.800 --> 41:05.740] [SPEAKER_04]: But if somebody just wanders in because the door happens to be open, you gotta start closing the door, you know?
[41:05.880 --> 41:11.720] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, you're saying again, you're defending somebody leaving their door unlocked and you're saying if someone walks in the street into their house...
[41:11.720 --> 41:13.100] [SPEAKER_04]: No, no, you're saying house again.
[41:13.400 --> 41:15.440] [SPEAKER_04]: Say something, say NSA, okay?
[41:15.440 --> 41:20.060] [SPEAKER_04]: If the NSA left all their doors unlocked, would you blame people for walking in?
[41:20.300 --> 41:20.740] [SPEAKER_07]: Absolutely.
[41:21.040 --> 41:21.440] [SPEAKER_04]: You would.
[41:21.440 --> 41:25.920] [SPEAKER_04]: Would you have any sympathy at all for the NSA for saying, why do people keep walking into our offices?
[41:26.720 --> 41:27.800] [SPEAKER_07]: Into our offices?
[41:28.100 --> 41:28.320] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[41:29.060 --> 41:30.800] [SPEAKER_07]: I was talking about somebody's home.
[41:30.920 --> 41:36.420] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, well, I mean, somebody's home does not enter into this because computer hackers don't break into personal systems.
[41:36.520 --> 41:37.460] [SPEAKER_04]: They have no interest in that.
[41:37.560 --> 41:42.300] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, okay, you're saying that there's no personal aspect to it, but this is a privacy issue to some extent.
[41:42.320 --> 41:49.040] [SPEAKER_07]: You talk about protecting privacy, but you're at the same time encouraging behavior where people are going to invade...
[41:54.070 --> 41:56.050] [SPEAKER_07]: Could be credit information, could be anything.
[41:56.150 --> 41:59.510] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, yes, but those files obviously aren't very private if they're so easy to be gotten into.
[41:59.570 --> 42:06.150] [SPEAKER_04]: I'll tell you, if somebody can get into a private file about me, I want them to do it because I want to know how secure it is in the first place.
[42:06.250 --> 42:07.990] [SPEAKER_04]: And I will be very upset if they get in.
[42:08.110 --> 42:10.950] [SPEAKER_04]: I'll be upset at the people that are supposed to be keeping it confidential.
[42:10.950 --> 42:14.710] [SPEAKER_07]: But you don't seem to be upset about the person who is actually doing the breaking in.
[42:15.050 --> 42:16.890] [SPEAKER_04]: It depends what their motives are.
[42:17.030 --> 42:22.430] [SPEAKER_04]: If they're breaking in to cause damage and to mess things up for somebody, obviously that's a very bad thing.
[42:22.650 --> 42:29.070] [SPEAKER_04]: But if they're breaking in to see if it's possible to be done, I look upon that as a challenge, as something stimulating to the mind.
[42:29.370 --> 42:35.070] [SPEAKER_04]: And if they're able to do it and actually show somebody what they did, that's something you should pay attention to and learn from.
[42:35.310 --> 42:36.890] [SPEAKER_07]: Well, I think we totally disagree.
[42:37.210 --> 42:38.290] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, I would agree with that.
[42:38.430 --> 42:38.590] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[42:40.630 --> 42:45.590] [SPEAKER_04]: I know a lot of people do disagree and it's a volatile issue and that's why we need to talk about it.
[42:46.190 --> 42:47.090] [SPEAKER_04]: You'll feel better.
[42:47.610 --> 42:48.210] [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening.
[42:48.530 --> 42:54.510] [SPEAKER_08]: Hi, I'd like to say some different things about what you're talking about, but some discovery I made.
[42:55.350 --> 42:55.790] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[42:56.490 --> 43:02.690] [SPEAKER_08]: Did you know that Russia, I think, and I believe, that Russia has a digital switch in their phone system?
[43:03.390 --> 43:05.610] [SPEAKER_04]: I believe they have several digital switches.
[43:05.950 --> 43:14.530] [SPEAKER_08]: I heard on a news show that US West is sending some people over there to help them with their infrastructure.
[43:15.110 --> 43:15.270] [SPEAKER_04]: Uh-huh.
[43:16.410 --> 43:18.070] [SPEAKER_04]: There's digital switches all over the place.
[43:18.210 --> 43:19.530] [SPEAKER_04]: There's even some out in Long Island now.
[43:20.410 --> 43:20.670] What?
[43:21.130 --> 43:23.190] [SPEAKER_04]: No, that's a joke.
[43:23.310 --> 43:25.250] [SPEAKER_04]: But, you know, they're getting around.
[43:25.450 --> 43:25.950] [SPEAKER_08]: Which is, are there?
[43:26.030 --> 43:28.410] [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, are there no more crossbows in New York city?
[43:28.950 --> 43:32.510] [SPEAKER_04]: Um, there, there, wait, we have an expert here.
[43:32.770 --> 43:33.750] [SPEAKER_04]: Fiber, what is it?
[43:33.790 --> 43:34.250] [SPEAKER_04]: Is there one?
[43:34.670 --> 43:37.090] [SPEAKER_06]: Uh, there was still the one in the Bronx.
[43:37.510 --> 43:38.570] [SPEAKER_06]: There's one in the Bronx.
[43:38.990 --> 43:41.250] [SPEAKER_08]: If I know 411, when you call that, it seems like...
[43:41.250 --> 43:43.710] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, 411 is still a crossbar, isn't it?
[43:44.530 --> 43:46.390] [SPEAKER_08]: Well, no, it depends where you are.
[43:46.650 --> 43:46.890] Right.
[43:47.210 --> 43:50.250] [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, from my house, it's not, but from Manhattan, it is.
[43:50.430 --> 43:51.570] [SPEAKER_08]: And what is a diverter?
[43:52.230 --> 43:53.510] [SPEAKER_04]: Ah, what is a diverter?
[43:53.630 --> 43:56.790] [SPEAKER_04]: Diverter is something very, uh, very dangerous to possess.
[43:57.070 --> 44:00.450] [SPEAKER_04]: That's if you, uh, a lot of, a lot of professional people have that.
[44:00.530 --> 44:15.270] [SPEAKER_04]: A lot of doctors and, uh, and, uh, plumbers, uh, they, they have somebody call a particular number, and if they're not at that particular number, a physical device that they buy and install themselves routes the call on the second phone line and kind of connects the two together.
[44:15.730 --> 44:24.550] [SPEAKER_04]: Now, that's what it's for, is to connect one phone line to another and, in effect, forward a call by conferencing it to, to another line.
[44:24.690 --> 44:26.710] [SPEAKER_04]: But, but, let me finish here.
[44:27.010 --> 44:39.590] [SPEAKER_04]: When the, uh, person that you call hangs up, many, many times, and I have one of these myself, I have a Radio Shack version of this, and it, it, it does it very, very well, and it's not supposed to do this, it drops down to a dial tone.
[44:39.670 --> 44:49.230] [SPEAKER_04]: It drops down to the dial tone of the first line that you made the call from, and the diverter can be used in that manner to make all kinds of phone calls on somebody else's dial tone.
[44:49.230 --> 45:03.070] [SPEAKER_08]: Okay, now, it reminds me of a special phone that is in the, um, New York Telephone Payment Center where I could just dial, I cannot dial zero because it'll give me a recording, nor can I dial any local number, but I could dial one zero access codes.
[45:03.930 --> 45:06.710] [SPEAKER_04]: You're saying that you were able to make free phone calls from the telephone company?
[45:07.390 --> 45:18.030] [SPEAKER_08]: From, not from the phone company, but you know where you pay your bill, like, uh, there's a place, there are places like 1095 6th Avenue, you could pay your bill there, and there's a phone that you could call the business office on.
[45:18.130 --> 45:25.350] [SPEAKER_08]: You dial one one for a particular business office, and maybe like a call, uh, speed calling type of thing.
[45:25.490 --> 45:29.250] [SPEAKER_04]: And you're saying that, that, that kind of phone you can use to actually make real phone calls?
[45:29.670 --> 45:31.890] [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, if you use one O access codes only.
[45:32.210 --> 45:33.890] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, well, I'm sure the phone company would be very interesting.
[45:33.890 --> 45:35.710] [SPEAKER_08]: I have a phone song that I'd like to play you.
[45:35.870 --> 45:39.150] [SPEAKER_04]: Uh, hold on, uh, Fiber's got a comment here, and then you can play your phone song.
[45:39.350 --> 45:40.530] [SPEAKER_06]: Just, uh, just on?
[45:40.810 --> 45:41.430] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, it's on.
[45:41.630 --> 45:42.050] [SPEAKER_06]: Oh, okay.
[45:42.550 --> 45:48.030] [SPEAKER_06]: A little note is that, uh, 1095 6th Avenue is, uh, NYNEX World Headquarters.
[45:49.250 --> 45:50.910] [SPEAKER_08]: Uh, actually, that's 9th Avenue.
[45:51.490 --> 45:55.750] [SPEAKER_06]: No, it's 1095 Avenue of the Americas is NYNEX World Headquarters.
[45:55.890 --> 45:58.030] [SPEAKER_06]: I don't suggest, uh, doing anything foolish in there.
[45:58.110 --> 45:59.970] [SPEAKER_04]: It's sort of like a 9, except it's upside down.
[46:00.170 --> 46:01.770] [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, it's, it's, it's 6th Avenue.
[46:02.090 --> 46:02.210] [SPEAKER_06]: Right.
[46:02.270 --> 46:06.490] [SPEAKER_06]: And, uh, aside from that, uh, back to the, uh, the little crossbar issue.
[46:06.870 --> 46:10.650] [SPEAKER_06]: The, uh, crossbar in the Bronx at Trapman Avenue, we believe, was already cut over.
[46:11.110 --> 46:16.350] [SPEAKER_06]: So, uh, that would mean, unless, uh, if I remember, there might have been one or two that may or may not still be in Manhattan.
[46:16.770 --> 46:21.270] [SPEAKER_06]: Other than that, all of New York City, including, uh, Nassau and Suffolk, there are no more crossbars.
[46:21.750 --> 46:22.110] [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[46:22.430 --> 46:29.650] [SPEAKER_08]: Now, I just want to say that the, um, homeless people still stuff payphones, and they now take the number off of the phone, the phone number, so that people can't report it.
[46:29.790 --> 46:31.050] [SPEAKER_08]: And I just want to tell people...
[46:31.050 --> 46:33.230] [SPEAKER_04]: How do you know that there are homeless people that do that?
[46:33.470 --> 46:34.190] [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know.
[46:34.270 --> 46:35.270] [SPEAKER_08]: I shouldn't say they're homeless people.
[46:35.390 --> 46:39.610] [SPEAKER_08]: There are people that take the phone number off so nobody could report this, and they just stuff the phone.
[46:39.770 --> 46:49.010] [SPEAKER_08]: People should dial Dial 958, and when I get the number, dial the 1-800-NEW-YORK-TEL-COIN, the NYT coin, and report it as a VIP.
[46:49.330 --> 46:49.970] [SPEAKER_08]: That's my point.
[46:50.110 --> 46:50.890] [SPEAKER_08]: Now I want to play my telephone.
[46:50.890 --> 46:54.170] [SPEAKER_04]: And go back the next day and check it, because sometimes they ignore those reports.
[46:54.310 --> 46:54.870] [SPEAKER_08]: I know that.
[46:54.970 --> 46:56.190] [SPEAKER_08]: Now, can I play my telephone for you?
[46:56.250 --> 46:57.130] [SPEAKER_04]: As long as it's not too long.
[46:57.230 --> 46:57.450] [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead.
[47:09.720 --> 47:09.800] Okay.
[47:20.210 --> 47:22.390] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, well, we've had enough of that.
[47:23.350 --> 47:25.090] [SPEAKER_04]: That's a telephone song, all right.
[47:25.170 --> 47:26.350] [SPEAKER_04]: Let me clarify, folks.
[47:27.250 --> 47:31.950] [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, we are interested in telephone songs, but not played over the telephone, for one thing.
[47:32.610 --> 47:39.710] [SPEAKER_04]: For another thing, they should be on either vinyl or CD, or, you know, something that's been put out.
[47:40.890 --> 47:42.870] [SPEAKER_04]: I'd like to see what record company that was on.
[47:43.270 --> 47:44.250] [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening, you're on.
[47:44.650 --> 47:45.510] [SPEAKER_04]: Dude, what's up?
[47:45.650 --> 47:45.970] [SPEAKER_04]: How you doing?
[47:46.370 --> 47:46.890] [SPEAKER_04]: Give me any codes.
[47:48.450 --> 47:50.970] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, we're going to be distributing those after the show.
[47:52.810 --> 47:56.190] [SPEAKER_04]: So, we're using the special blue codes this week.
[47:56.330 --> 48:01.750] [SPEAKER_04]: So, those of you with the little handbooks that get sent out to the elite people, go to the blue pages.
[48:02.410 --> 48:03.030] [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[48:03.750 --> 48:04.150] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[48:04.350 --> 48:05.830] [SPEAKER_04]: We all know what we're talking about now, right?
[48:06.530 --> 48:08.790] [SPEAKER_04]: If you're not part of the problem, you're part of the conspiracy.
[48:09.430 --> 48:12.350] [SPEAKER_04]: All right, let's figure this out, first of all.
[48:12.870 --> 48:18.930] [SPEAKER_04]: We had some disagreement on whether or not a certain line...
[48:18.930 --> 48:20.590] [SPEAKER_04]: I have to set this up in order for this to work.
[48:20.710 --> 48:24.850] [SPEAKER_04]: But crossbars are being wiped out faster than hackers.
[48:24.850 --> 48:27.610] [SPEAKER_04]: And that's a sad fact.
[48:27.610 --> 48:30.090] [SPEAKER_04]: You won't hear crossbar rings very often anymore.
[48:31.530 --> 48:32.830] [SPEAKER_04]: But it's rumored...
[48:32.830 --> 48:38.770] [SPEAKER_04]: It's said that the one place where you can still hear a crossbar is when you call information.
[48:38.890 --> 48:40.030] [SPEAKER_04]: So, let's call information now.
[48:40.390 --> 48:41.230] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's get our dial tone.
[48:41.710 --> 48:42.010] [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[48:42.590 --> 48:43.010] [SPEAKER_04]: We'll dial...
[48:43.750 --> 48:44.190] [SPEAKER_04]: What should we dial?
[48:44.310 --> 48:44.710] [SPEAKER_04]: 411?
[48:45.110 --> 48:45.550] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[48:47.010 --> 48:48.710] [SPEAKER_04]: 411, see if we get a crossbar ring.
[48:53.050 --> 48:54.010] [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, no, no.
[48:54.110 --> 48:55.290] [SPEAKER_04]: They picked up too fast.
[48:56.310 --> 48:57.350] [SPEAKER_04]: No, I'm sorry, too.
[48:57.790 --> 48:59.110] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's try that one more time.
[48:59.530 --> 49:00.590] [SPEAKER_04]: Sometimes they're just too efficient.
[49:00.750 --> 49:04.310] [SPEAKER_04]: You know, last night I had an information operator ring 17 times before she picked up.
[49:05.130 --> 49:06.890] [SPEAKER_04]: And this one didn't even let the phone ring once.
[49:07.370 --> 49:07.630] [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[49:07.630 --> 49:11.710] [SPEAKER_04]: I'm going to try 555-1212, which is really the same thing.
[49:12.090 --> 49:15.110] [SPEAKER_04]: But it's for people that like to dial extended digits.
[49:16.730 --> 49:17.110] Okay.
[49:17.390 --> 49:18.190] [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening, Michael.
[49:18.250 --> 49:18.470] [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[49:18.610 --> 49:20.810] [SPEAKER_04]: Obviously, we're at a peak period here where we can't...
[49:20.810 --> 49:21.530] [SPEAKER_04]: experiment.
[49:22.150 --> 49:24.970] [SPEAKER_04]: We just have very efficient operators on duty.
[49:25.090 --> 49:26.210] [SPEAKER_04]: But you might want to try this yourself.
[49:26.430 --> 49:31.530] [SPEAKER_04]: Try it from a payphone, though, because it costs something like 40 cents if you try it from your home phone.
[49:32.570 --> 49:36.010] [SPEAKER_04]: But that's a dying breed crossbar phones.
[49:36.130 --> 49:39.150] [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know why information is still routed that way.
[49:39.670 --> 49:41.330] [SPEAKER_04]: But it probably won't be for very long.
[49:42.670 --> 49:42.870] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[49:43.010 --> 49:45.670] [SPEAKER_04]: 212-279-3400 is our phone number.
[49:45.830 --> 49:46.930] [SPEAKER_04]: Let's take another phone call.
[49:47.470 --> 49:48.090] [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening.
[49:49.110 --> 49:49.710] [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead.
[49:50.130 --> 49:50.430] [SPEAKER_10]: Good evening.
[49:51.090 --> 49:52.910] [SPEAKER_10]: I'm trying to get two kids of information.
[49:53.130 --> 49:54.850] [SPEAKER_10]: First of all, I've been trying to get a copy...
[49:54.850 --> 49:56.070] [SPEAKER_04]: Speak up a little bit, please.
[49:56.350 --> 49:56.530] [SPEAKER_10]: Hello?
[49:56.870 --> 49:57.250] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, go ahead.
[49:57.330 --> 49:57.930] [SPEAKER_04]: Just speak up a little bit.
[49:58.150 --> 50:00.510] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I'm trying to get a copy of the latest issue, 2600.
[50:00.650 --> 50:01.110] [SPEAKER_10]: Is it out yet?
[50:02.190 --> 50:03.450] [SPEAKER_04]: What do you mean by the latest issue?
[50:03.470 --> 50:05.390] [SPEAKER_04]: The last issue that was put out was the autumn issue.
[50:06.230 --> 50:07.070] [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah, I can't...
[50:07.510 --> 50:09.750] [SPEAKER_10]: I have the summer issue, but I can't find the autumn issue.
[50:10.210 --> 50:15.070] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, it's at various bookstores throughout Manhattan, you know, the cool ones.
[50:17.330 --> 50:18.550] [SPEAKER_04]: I'll give you a phone number.
[50:18.650 --> 50:21.050] [SPEAKER_04]: You can just get subscription information if that's what you want.
[50:21.610 --> 50:23.570] [SPEAKER_04]: And then we can leave it at that.
[50:23.570 --> 50:33.150] [SPEAKER_10]: The second thing is your information provided on the new caller ID situation is quite informative.
[50:33.190 --> 50:42.130] [SPEAKER_10]: And I was wondering if this was published anywhere, or is this something that just the God consent you're able to gain access to?
[50:42.330 --> 50:43.870] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, it's public information.
[50:44.050 --> 50:47.930] [SPEAKER_04]: In fact, the phone company just yesterday put out a very interesting ad for Call ID.
[50:49.290 --> 50:51.450] [SPEAKER_04]: It seemed almost plaintive in a way.
[50:53.150 --> 50:55.290] [SPEAKER_04]: They say it's not just for bad guys.
[50:55.290 --> 50:58.430] [SPEAKER_04]: It's not just to catch, you know, obscene phone calls and all that.
[50:58.430 --> 51:02.270] [SPEAKER_04]: It's to see if, you know, you want to talk to your sister because that's an important call.
[51:02.370 --> 51:06.210] [SPEAKER_04]: You don't want to talk to your nosy neighbor because she'll just waste time, so you let the phone ring.
[51:06.210 --> 51:12.490] [SPEAKER_04]: You know, it's for everybody to use, and it makes everybody's life better and more enriched and all that kind of thing.
[51:12.770 --> 51:14.590] [SPEAKER_04]: So it sounds to me like they're getting desperate.
[51:14.810 --> 51:23.210] [SPEAKER_04]: They want everybody to sign up for this service because if a lot of people don't sign up for it, it doesn't really pay for them to offer it in the first place.
[51:24.090 --> 51:29.750] [SPEAKER_10]: So you're saying that the types of things that you've been talking about over the last few weeks are available from the...
[51:29.750 --> 51:32.270] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, they're out there, and you'll see it more and more.
[51:32.330 --> 51:35.890] [SPEAKER_04]: In fact, we'll be bombarded with TV commercials real soon now from New York Telephone.
[51:35.890 --> 51:39.290] [SPEAKER_04]: We've all seen the New Jersey Bell commercials with James Earl Jones.
[51:40.350 --> 51:45.190] [SPEAKER_04]: I don't know who we're going to get to do New York Telephone commercials, but they're coming.
[51:45.370 --> 51:47.830] [SPEAKER_04]: They're coming, and there'll be things in your phone bill every month.
[51:47.970 --> 51:55.970] [SPEAKER_04]: But at the same time, look to consumer groups, look to programs like this one to tell you the other side of the story.
[51:56.370 --> 52:03.310] [SPEAKER_10]: Now, you mentioned in an earlier program that if you dial a star 6-7, you can protect the number that you're calling from.
[52:03.310 --> 52:08.190] [SPEAKER_04]: Only if the line you're calling from sends the number every time you dial.
[52:08.410 --> 52:16.010] [SPEAKER_04]: If you have all-call blocking, which doesn't send your number, dialing star 6-7 will have the exact opposite effect and will send your number.
[52:16.110 --> 52:17.950] [SPEAKER_04]: So it's really kind of an absurd system.
[52:18.130 --> 52:19.670] [SPEAKER_10]: And there's no way of telling which is which.
[52:19.790 --> 52:21.030] [SPEAKER_04]: There's no way of telling, for sure.
[52:21.190 --> 52:24.770] [SPEAKER_04]: You just have to believe what they tell you, but there's no recording.
[52:24.770 --> 52:26.530] [SPEAKER_04]: All you get is just a little pulsing dial tone.
[52:26.750 --> 52:29.570] [SPEAKER_04]: And that's one of the things that I certainly hope they change.
[52:29.710 --> 52:37.650] [SPEAKER_04]: The Public Service Commission was able to get them to change the call-return policy, where you can now block your number from being call-return.
[52:37.690 --> 52:41.110] [SPEAKER_04]: I'm not quite sure how, but I understand that they have made some progress in that.
[52:41.710 --> 52:43.110] [SPEAKER_10]: One last question on this subject.
[52:43.330 --> 52:54.490] [SPEAKER_10]: I was told that the technology, as attractive or unattractive as it may be, certainly it's fashionable, everyone's talking about it, has been available to private industry for some time.
[52:54.670 --> 53:00.090] [SPEAKER_10]: Certain radio stations and other people, private industries and things like that, have been using it for a long time.
[53:00.330 --> 53:03.450] [SPEAKER_10]: Why did it take so long for this to come into the public domain?
[53:04.030 --> 53:05.130] [SPEAKER_04]: First of all, is that true?
[53:05.130 --> 53:06.010] [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, it is.
[53:06.210 --> 53:16.510] [SPEAKER_04]: Within certain phone switches, PBXs, there are all kinds of features that are probably never going to be available in the public phone system, at least not in our lifetimes.
[53:17.310 --> 53:20.650] [SPEAKER_04]: And that's the reason right there, because we're talking about the public phone system.
[53:20.770 --> 53:26.570] [SPEAKER_04]: We're talking about New York Telephone running the whole show, and they move as fast as they want to move.
[53:27.030 --> 53:29.650] [SPEAKER_04]: When you have a private phone switch, you can do whatever you want.
[53:29.810 --> 53:40.890] [SPEAKER_04]: And since they're in competition with each other, since you don't know whether to buy a Merlin or a Rome switch or whatever it is that you want to put for your company or institution, they compete with each other.
[53:41.010 --> 53:45.350] [SPEAKER_04]: They offer better things, or cheaper things, as the case may be.
[53:45.670 --> 53:47.690] [SPEAKER_04]: New York Telephone is the only game in town for us, though.
[53:49.960 --> 53:50.560] You've got to get me.
[53:51.200 --> 53:55.420] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay, for the magazine, it's 516-751-2600.
[53:55.640 --> 53:57.720] [SPEAKER_04]: And that should tell you everything you need to know, and then some.
[53:58.320 --> 53:58.740] [SPEAKER_10]: All right.
[53:58.820 --> 54:06.320] [SPEAKER_10]: But, I mean, just in terms of Manhattan, there's no place that I can go and say, well, gee, every time I go somewhere, they say, well, we've never heard of it, or we just sold out.
[54:06.760 --> 54:09.480] [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, well, never heard of it.
[54:09.520 --> 54:10.580] [SPEAKER_04]: That's a new one.
[54:10.860 --> 54:12.340] [SPEAKER_04]: Try downtown.
[54:13.020 --> 54:20.660] [SPEAKER_04]: Most bookstores, like Towers, St. Mark's, Hudson News, those kind of places, they almost always have copies.
[54:21.920 --> 54:26.220] [SPEAKER_04]: And while you're there, check out the other magazines, too, because there's all kinds of neat things being printed.
[54:26.720 --> 54:26.860] Right.
[54:27.640 --> 54:27.980] Okay.
[54:28.280 --> 54:29.120] [SPEAKER_04]: Support zines.
[54:29.120 --> 54:31.120] [SPEAKER_04]: It's a good way to support democracy.
[54:31.400 --> 54:31.680] [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[54:31.760 --> 54:32.400] [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks for your call.
[54:33.500 --> 54:35.000] [SPEAKER_04]: 212-279-3400.
[54:35.100 --> 54:36.400] [SPEAKER_04]: We have time for a couple more calls.
[54:36.740 --> 54:37.400] [SPEAKER_04]: Good evening.
[54:38.500 --> 54:39.260] [SPEAKER_04]: Anybody there?
[54:39.780 --> 54:40.000] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah.
[54:40.460 --> 54:40.700] [SPEAKER_04]: Go ahead.
[54:41.560 --> 54:50.720] [SPEAKER_09]: I just want to say there was an article in the Sunday Times about two hackers being charged with breaking into a government and Boeing system.
[54:50.860 --> 54:52.660] [SPEAKER_04]: This is the Seattle case, I believe.
[54:52.660 --> 54:52.960] [SPEAKER_04]: Right.
[54:53.160 --> 54:55.860] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, I heard very sketchy bits of information about that.
[54:56.640 --> 55:05.020] [SPEAKER_09]: According to a federal agent, these two people were network navigating.
[55:05.740 --> 55:14.880] [SPEAKER_09]: And they got into the federal court computer and used the Boeing computer to break the passwords.
[55:15.920 --> 55:24.440] [SPEAKER_04]: You mean they copied a password file and put it onto a powerful machine to decrypt or rather just figure out what the passwords were?
[55:24.680 --> 55:24.880] [SPEAKER_09]: Right.
[55:25.200 --> 55:27.700] [SPEAKER_09]: They copied it to the Boeing system.
[55:27.840 --> 55:28.100] [SPEAKER_04]: Uh-huh.
[55:28.480 --> 55:29.980] [SPEAKER_09]: And then broke the passwords.
[55:32.460 --> 55:38.660] [SPEAKER_09]: And according to these guys, according to the newspaper, they were charged with conspiracy throughout the government.
[55:39.180 --> 55:42.100] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, were they planning on, what were they going to do with these passwords?
[55:42.920 --> 55:43.840] [SPEAKER_09]: It doesn't say.
[55:44.440 --> 55:46.140] [SPEAKER_09]: I assume they were just hacking.
[55:46.380 --> 55:46.920] [SPEAKER_04]: Uh-huh.
[55:47.220 --> 55:49.740] [SPEAKER_04]: Well, again, that's something that we need to look at.
[55:49.820 --> 55:59.320] [SPEAKER_04]: If they were out there to, you know, to somehow cheat people and make money off of it, obviously that's quite different than somebody just trying to see how many passwords they can crack.
[55:59.600 --> 56:01.620] [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, you know, I've done the same thing.
[56:01.760 --> 56:03.700] [SPEAKER_04]: I have looked at password files.
[56:03.840 --> 56:05.460] [SPEAKER_04]: I haven't put it on Boeing's computers.
[56:05.480 --> 56:06.680] [SPEAKER_04]: I put it on my own.
[56:06.800 --> 56:09.560] [SPEAKER_04]: And I've seen how easy it is to crack a password file.
[56:09.560 --> 56:19.580] [SPEAKER_04]: And it's really something, especially when you use your brain a little bit and try to figure out different ways people might encrypt their passwords, different kinds of patterns they may use.
[56:19.920 --> 56:22.760] [SPEAKER_04]: And when you can sort of, you know, some people check against a dictionary.
[56:22.980 --> 56:25.460] [SPEAKER_04]: Some people put a number at the end of the word.
[56:25.600 --> 56:28.740] [SPEAKER_04]: Some people attach two words together or put a special character someplace.
[56:28.740 --> 56:34.800] [SPEAKER_09]: Well, these two guys were convicted last month of theft of computer equipment from the University of Washington.
[56:35.040 --> 56:35.280] [SPEAKER_04]: Uh-huh.
[56:35.420 --> 56:39.700] [SPEAKER_09]: So I assume that the feds were watching them closely.
[56:39.940 --> 56:40.940] [SPEAKER_09]: I'll send you the article.
[56:41.180 --> 56:42.840] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, if you could do that, that would be very helpful.
[56:43.160 --> 56:43.460] [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[56:43.700 --> 56:44.240] [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks for calling.
[56:44.560 --> 56:44.840] [SPEAKER_04]: Thank you.
[56:45.580 --> 56:48.580] [SPEAKER_04]: And that's pretty much going to bring us to the end of our time.
[56:53.500 --> 56:55.560] [SPEAKER_04]: The program is off the hook.
[56:56.040 --> 56:58.770] [SPEAKER_04]: You know, this hour seems to have gone faster than any other hour.
[56:59.620 --> 57:03.770] [SPEAKER_04]: The discussion is going to continue throughout the next few weeks because there's so much to talk about.
[57:03.900 --> 57:05.120] [SPEAKER_04]: Yeah, there's something going on in Seattle.
[57:05.300 --> 57:06.220] [SPEAKER_04]: There are things going on everywhere.
[57:06.640 --> 57:09.300] [SPEAKER_04]: And, of course, we have the unfolding Washington, D.C.
[57:09.600 --> 57:12.480] [SPEAKER_04]: situation and things happening here in New York as well.
[57:13.440 --> 57:15.680] [SPEAKER_04]: The issue is very much open to discussion.
[57:15.680 --> 57:22.850] [SPEAKER_04]: And, by all means, no matter what your feelings on the matter, feel free to express them and talk to others about them as well.
[57:23.220 --> 57:34.500] [SPEAKER_04]: Again, if you have articles or contributions of any sort to send in to us, our address is off the hook, care of WBAI, 505 8th Avenue, New York, New York, 10018.
[57:36.230 --> 57:37.600] [SPEAKER_04]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein.
[57:37.900 --> 57:41.200] [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks to Phiber Optik for stopping in, and I'll see you next week.
[57:41.200 --> 57:45.640] [SPEAKER_02]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[57:46.600 --> 57:51.180] [SPEAKER_02]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[57:51.980 --> 57:56.460] [SPEAKER_02]: It couldn't get much worse, but if it could, it would.
[57:56.680 --> 57:59.300] [SPEAKER_12]: Bum, Bum, Bum, for the best, expect the worst.
[58:00.020 --> 58:02.620] [SPEAKER_12]: I hope that's understood, but Bum, Bum!
[58:15.580 --> 58:17.270] [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, we're going to take us.
[58:17.380 --> 58:19.600] [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, it's going to be a total mismatch.
[58:19.790 --> 58:21.140] [SPEAKER_09]: It's going to be a mis...
[58:21.140 --> 58:21.180] It's going to be a full test.
[58:21.180 --> 58:21.360] It's going to be a shot because you are going to take the two S...
[58:21.360 --> 58:21.400] of course...
[58:21.400 --> 58:21.860] ...so go down for a single fiber, RU Mem hook.
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