Off The Hook - 1993-05-12

[00:02.540 --> 00:07.120]  [SPEAKER_00]: ...wbai and Michio Kaku joining us on the morning show and talking about the future of technology.
[00:07.320 --> 00:08.640]  [SPEAKER_00]: In fact, the future is here.
[00:09.060 --> 00:10.820]  [SPEAKER_00]: 212-279-3400.
[00:10.980 --> 00:16.620]  [SPEAKER_00]: If you didn't understand 500 channel cable systems before, maybe you have a slightly better understanding.
[00:16.760 --> 00:23.900]  [SPEAKER_00]: And if you don't and you didn't hear Michio Kaku talking about it about 7 o'clock this morning, give us a call and you can get a copy of the tape of the show along with his books.
[00:24.280 --> 00:26.320]  [SPEAKER_00]: 212-279-3400.
[00:26.540 --> 00:28.360]  [SPEAKER_00]: Please keep the phone calls coming in right now.
[00:28.360 --> 00:28.880]  [SPEAKER_22]: Okay.
[00:29.240 --> 00:32.380]  [SPEAKER_22]: And you know the number, 212-279-3400.
[00:32.440 --> 00:33.980]  [SPEAKER_22]: But it's time for us to get out of here now.
[00:34.160 --> 00:45.360]  [SPEAKER_22]: I want to thank all of you who subscribed this morning, who became a part of this listener-sponsored non-commercial radio station, who are going to make it possible that we can continue to broadcast here.
[00:45.780 --> 00:47.500]  [SPEAKER_22]: And thank you very much for that.
[00:47.520 --> 00:50.860]  [SPEAKER_22]: If you had any difficulty calling earlier, please call back right now.
[00:50.860 --> 00:53.020]  [SPEAKER_22]: Coming up next is Emmanuel Goldstein.
[00:53.200 --> 00:54.580]  [SPEAKER_22]: Don't forget, at 7 p.m.
[00:54.820 --> 01:01.620]  [SPEAKER_22]: tonight, Ivan Van Sertima, Professor Ivan Van Sertima, will talk about blacks in the field of science and invention.
[01:01.620 --> 01:04.400]  [SPEAKER_22]: And at 8 o'clock, he'll be followed by Michio Kaku.
[01:04.720 --> 01:07.580]  [SPEAKER_22]: Plus, a whole lot of interesting things today.
[01:07.840 --> 01:09.440]  [SPEAKER_22]: So, please stay tuned.
[01:09.680 --> 01:10.640]  [SPEAKER_22]: My name is Bernard White.
[01:10.780 --> 01:11.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: I'm Amy Goodman.
[01:11.500 --> 01:15.900]  [SPEAKER_22]: And until next time, stay strong and pay close attention.
[01:15.900 --> 01:45.880]  [SPEAKER_06]: I'm Amy Goodman.
[02:12.700 --> 02:15.800]  [SPEAKER_06]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein.
[02:17.120 --> 02:19.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: And this is also WBAI in New York.
[02:19.560 --> 02:28.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, as a token of how much this place means to me, I've dragged myself up out of bed at this ungodly hour for me anyway.
[02:31.380 --> 02:33.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: 9.34 in the morning.
[02:34.460 --> 02:38.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Usually, the program Off the Hook is on the air Wednesday nights at 10 p.m.
[02:38.780 --> 02:41.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: But today, today is a very special day.
[02:41.580 --> 02:46.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: Today is the first of WBAI's marathon.
[02:46.820 --> 02:48.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: The first day of WBAI's marathon.
[02:48.640 --> 02:52.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we want this to be a big day in our history.
[02:52.800 --> 02:59.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're going to be talking about all kinds of fascinating bits of technology and things that will affect you.
[02:59.760 --> 03:06.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: Whether you want them to or not, we'll be answering questions and raising some issues that you might know about.
[03:06.480 --> 03:07.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: And again, you might not know about it.
[03:07.920 --> 03:11.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: But odds are, most people around you don't know about them.
[03:12.060 --> 03:14.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you're on your way to work, you might not want to go today.
[03:14.280 --> 03:17.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: You might want to sit and listen to your radio all day long because it's going to be fascinating.
[03:18.060 --> 03:21.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is not the kind of thing you hear on any other radio station.
[03:21.920 --> 03:22.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Stay tuned.
[03:22.840 --> 03:24.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Off the Hook is around the corner.
[04:27.450 --> 04:29.470]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, it used to be so simple.
[04:29.710 --> 04:36.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: It used to be that we just had our rotary dial telephones to connect us to a limited number of places and people.
[04:36.550 --> 04:40.250]  [SPEAKER_21]: But now, you know, now it's become so difficult, so complicated.
[04:40.250 --> 04:42.030]  [SPEAKER_21]: You have different long-distance companies.
[04:42.030 --> 04:46.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: You have different services, banking by phone, ATM machines, computers, networks.
[04:47.290 --> 04:49.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: The list just never seems to end.
[04:49.410 --> 04:52.310]  [SPEAKER_21]: And they just keep coming up with more things every day.
[04:52.570 --> 04:54.290]  [SPEAKER_21]: Every day, something new.
[04:54.710 --> 04:56.210]  [SPEAKER_21]: ISDN around the corner.
[04:56.890 --> 04:57.490]  [SPEAKER_21]: Videotapes.
[04:57.850 --> 04:59.210]  [SPEAKER_21]: No, no more videotapes.
[04:59.210 --> 05:01.570]  [SPEAKER_21]: You simply choose your movies from your house.
[05:02.870 --> 05:03.530]  [SPEAKER_21]: You don't have to go out anymore.
[05:04.250 --> 05:06.990]  [SPEAKER_21]: When you go to the grocery store, everything is logged.
[05:07.130 --> 05:08.830]  [SPEAKER_21]: And people know what it is you like to buy.
[05:08.950 --> 05:10.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you'll get junk mail.
[05:10.650 --> 05:12.050]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, but you won't get it in the mail.
[05:12.110 --> 05:17.110]  [SPEAKER_21]: You'll get it on your computer, popping up on your screen, saying what it is that you like to eat and drink.
[05:17.190 --> 05:18.110]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because they know.
[05:18.210 --> 05:19.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because they keep track of everything.
[05:20.950 --> 05:22.650]  [SPEAKER_21]: And it's all logged.
[05:23.450 --> 05:25.750]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, is it the future or is it the present?
[05:26.750 --> 05:27.910]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't really know.
[05:28.210 --> 05:30.670]  [SPEAKER_21]: In some places, it's kind of mixing between the two.
[05:30.670 --> 05:34.430]  [SPEAKER_21]: But we're going to hash out some of the questions, answers today.
[05:35.530 --> 05:41.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: And a lot of concerns that many of you have expressed over the past couple of years, as long as this program has been on the air.
[05:41.570 --> 05:45.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're on the air at a special time today because of the WBAI Marathon.
[05:45.850 --> 05:48.330]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we are, of course, asking for your support.
[05:48.330 --> 06:03.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: And as a token of our appreciation for this place, the good people at 2600 Magazine, the Hacker Quarterly, have donated subscriptions and T-shirts to the station as part of the fundraiser here.
[06:04.310 --> 06:07.150]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, we are computer hackers.
[06:07.150 --> 06:15.350]  [SPEAKER_21]: We are those evil people that infiltrate computer systems and cause all the chaos that you're told about on the evening news.
[06:15.350 --> 06:19.190]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's not quite the way you're told about on the evening news.
[06:19.290 --> 06:24.650]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, it's like everything that you see on the news, they get certain fundamental facts wrong.
[06:25.310 --> 06:35.710]  [SPEAKER_21]: And one of the things that we're going to try to do here is right those wrongs, let you know how things really are, and let you know just what computer hackers are all about.
[06:37.090 --> 06:38.610]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of people have fear.
[06:38.890 --> 06:40.850]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of people have fear of just about anything unknown.
[06:41.070 --> 06:52.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: But computer hackers in particular represents something that is scary, represents technology out of control, something that we don't understand that is controlling our everyday lives.
[06:52.810 --> 06:54.170]  [SPEAKER_21]: Take, for example, the phone company.
[06:54.450 --> 06:57.990]  [SPEAKER_21]: The phone company does not understand their own system.
[06:58.390 --> 07:01.550]  [SPEAKER_21]: And if you don't believe it, just call them and ask them a question.
[07:01.550 --> 07:03.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: They won't be able to give you a straight answer.
[07:04.030 --> 07:05.170]  [SPEAKER_21]: They'll give you the wrong answer.
[07:05.330 --> 07:08.070]  [SPEAKER_21]: But computer hackers do understand.
[07:08.070 --> 07:11.010]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's part of the problem in the phone company's eyes.
[07:11.190 --> 07:20.190]  [SPEAKER_21]: These computer hackers are going around, not only getting into their computer systems, but worse, worse than that, spreading information.
[07:20.470 --> 07:30.890]  [SPEAKER_21]: Spreading information at meetings, over the telephone, ironically enough, in magazines, and now on radio stations.
[07:31.850 --> 07:35.170]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, they just keep getting bolder and bolder.
[07:36.030 --> 07:44.250]  [SPEAKER_21]: And in a moment, you're going to meet one of the premier hackers of the world, and we'll tell you what's going on in other parts of the globe.
[07:44.590 --> 07:48.650]  [SPEAKER_21]: But for now, we do want you to give us a call and pledge your support.
[07:48.770 --> 07:58.090]  [SPEAKER_21]: For a pledge of $75, you can get a full year of 2600 Magazine, which is really the primary voice of computer hacking in the world.
[07:58.430 --> 08:02.470]  [SPEAKER_21]: It comes out four times a year, 48 pages of all kinds of information.
[08:02.690 --> 08:09.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we'll go into some of that over the next couple of hours, because a lot of it is causing some controversy in and of itself.
[08:09.670 --> 08:13.070]  [SPEAKER_21]: Some legal papers are being filed, even as we speak, I think.
[08:13.650 --> 08:24.810]  [SPEAKER_21]: And also, in addition to that one year of 2600 Magazine, a 2600 T-shirt, which no doubt will make you the subject of all kinds of attention, some of it wanted, some of it unwanted.
[08:24.810 --> 08:30.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: Those two items come with your support of WBAI, 212-279-3400.
[08:30.890 --> 08:41.510]  [SPEAKER_21]: Give us a call and pick up those particular things and start the process of learning about something that will affect you, whether you want it to or not.
[08:41.830 --> 08:42.590]  [SPEAKER_21]: Stay tuned.
[08:52.680 --> 09:15.460]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it if you really want You can get it if you really want You can get it if you really want But you must try Try and try Try and try You'll succeed at last Mm-hmm.
[09:19.820 --> 09:21.940]  [SPEAKER_05]: Persecution, you must fear.
[09:22.840 --> 09:25.720]  [SPEAKER_05]: Win and lose, you've got to get your share.
[09:26.460 --> 09:29.420]  [SPEAKER_05]: You've got your mind set on a dream.
[09:30.220 --> 09:33.600]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it, you're hot if they seem now.
[09:33.980 --> 09:36.860]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it if you really want.
[09:37.580 --> 09:40.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it if you really want.
[09:40.500 --> 09:44.200]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it if you really want.
[09:44.400 --> 09:49.420]  [SPEAKER_05]: But you must try, try and try, try and try.
[09:50.460 --> 09:52.880]  [SPEAKER_05]: You'll succeed at class.
[09:54.800 --> 09:56.840]  [SPEAKER_05]: I know it.
[09:59.820 --> 10:02.820]  [SPEAKER_05]: Rome was not built in a day.
[10:03.860 --> 10:06.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: Opposition will come your way.
[10:07.320 --> 10:10.220]  [SPEAKER_05]: But the hotter the battle you see.
[10:10.220 --> 10:14.400]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's the sweeter, the victory now.
[10:14.760 --> 10:17.500]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it if you really want.
[10:18.080 --> 10:21.360]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it if you really want.
[10:24.380 --> 10:30.260]  [SPEAKER_05]: But you must try, try and try, try and try.
[10:31.260 --> 10:33.540]  [SPEAKER_05]: You'll succeed at last.
[10:47.800 --> 10:51.040]  [SPEAKER_05]: You can get it if you really want.
[10:57.730 --> 11:03.660]  [SPEAKER_05]: But you must try, try and try, try and try.
[11:04.620 --> 11:06.920]  [SPEAKER_05]: You'll succeed at last.
[11:19.140 --> 11:22.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: The fact is, anything is within our reach.
[11:22.080 --> 11:24.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: We just have to know enough to want it.
[11:25.320 --> 11:28.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: And the same holds true for all these new gimmicks that are coming out.
[11:28.620 --> 11:29.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, they're gimmicks.
[11:29.640 --> 11:32.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, they're meant for people maybe not like you.
[11:32.960 --> 11:34.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: They're meant for the businessman.
[11:34.300 --> 11:35.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: They're meant for the privileged.
[11:35.700 --> 11:38.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: But, you know, you have the right to take it.
[11:38.300 --> 11:41.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: You have the right to reach out and grab things as they come at you.
[11:41.440 --> 11:42.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's not stealing.
[11:42.700 --> 11:43.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's learning.
[11:44.100 --> 11:46.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes, stealing tangible objects is, of course, stealing.
[11:46.980 --> 11:50.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: But reaching out to learn something cannot be considered stealing.
[11:50.300 --> 11:54.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: Reading books, trading information, asking questions.
[11:54.140 --> 11:55.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: These are all healthy things.
[11:55.560 --> 11:58.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: These are all things that we are put on this earth to do.
[11:58.840 --> 12:01.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's part of what we do here at WBAI.
[12:01.120 --> 12:03.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's part of what every good computer hacker does.
[12:04.220 --> 12:17.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: And speaking of good computer hackers, we have live on the phone from Amsterdam, one of the world's, I guess, most dangerous hackers in the world, in the eyes, certainly, of Interpol and the NSA and all those kind of people.
[12:18.040 --> 12:22.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Rop from Hack-Tic, the editor of Hack-Tic magazine, which is the Dutch equivalent of 2600.
[12:22.600 --> 12:23.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Rop, are you there?
[12:23.660 --> 12:24.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, I'm here.
[12:24.560 --> 12:24.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: Hello there.
[12:25.200 --> 12:25.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: How are you?
[12:26.180 --> 12:31.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, you have quite an event coming up this August in Amsterdam.
[12:31.440 --> 12:34.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is something that's going to be involving hackers all over the world.
[12:34.000 --> 12:44.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: And perhaps you could share the information for the first time, I might add, with the general public of the New York, or really any part of the United States, on a major radio station, I believe.
[12:44.400 --> 12:45.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's break the story right here.
[12:46.380 --> 12:46.800]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[12:47.020 --> 12:50.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: We're organizing an event called Hacking at the End of the Universe.
[12:51.600 --> 13:02.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it's really unique in its kind because it's going to bring together lots of hackers, in other words, people that are interested in exploring computer technology.
[13:02.540 --> 13:08.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: There's going to be phone freaks, people that enjoy playing with the phones, as you may know.
[13:09.440 --> 13:19.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: And there's also going to be people that come from Dutch law enforcement, which has recently started to crack down on hacking and phone freaking.
[13:19.940 --> 13:21.800]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'll talk about that a little bit more later.
[13:23.220 --> 13:30.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: But we're going to bring together a lot of different people, people from the Dutch computer industry, and people from all over the world.
[13:31.200 --> 13:41.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: And this Congress is going to take place, and this is where it really gets interesting, it's going to take place on a large campground, where almost everybody's going to stay in tents.
[13:41.960 --> 13:48.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: And then we have a large building where some of the computers are, but if you want, it's going to be very sunny.
[13:48.900 --> 13:52.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: This is the start of August, which is always very warm in Holland.
[13:52.740 --> 13:57.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: And we can even bring Ethernet to your tent if you want.
[13:57.420 --> 14:05.160]  [SPEAKER_03]: So we are hooked up to all these international computer networks, like the Internet, and you can be connected to it from your tent.
[14:05.340 --> 14:07.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, this is reminiscent of...
[14:08.280 --> 14:11.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: except for the tents, of course, for the Galactic Hacker Party of 1989.
[14:11.640 --> 14:13.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: How is it going to be different from that?
[14:14.280 --> 14:24.620]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's going to be the same in some ways that some of the topics that we are discussing and the stresses that we put on certain things are going to be the same.
[14:24.800 --> 14:26.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: But the setting is going to be different.
[14:28.580 --> 14:29.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: Uh-huh.
[14:29.660 --> 14:34.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, as far as the international scene, could you describe that for the...
[14:34.600 --> 14:41.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: There are some people listening this morning, I'm sure, that have not heard of hackers from the hacker point of view.
[14:41.700 --> 14:42.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: Who are these people?
[14:43.060 --> 14:47.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: And how do they have the audacity to meet in public areas?
[14:49.460 --> 14:57.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, up till, let's say, half a year ago or a year ago, hacking wasn't really viewed as anything dangerous in Holland.
[14:58.520 --> 15:08.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: But, of course, the big corporate world caught up with this tiny island of freedom out there on the other side of the ocean.
[15:09.160 --> 15:17.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: And Holland had to adopt laws to ban hacking, to ban looking around in computer systems without breaking something.
[15:17.760 --> 15:30.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like, there's this group of people here in Holland that is just hanging around in university computers and going from one computer to the next and trying to find ways to connect between computers that aren't directly connected.
[15:32.540 --> 15:37.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, well, that's now illegal, even here in Holland, even though these people are not...
[15:37.400 --> 15:45.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, breaking things, deleting files, changing files, has always been a criminal offense here in Holland.
[15:45.320 --> 15:48.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: But just looking around was not, and now it is as well.
[15:48.780 --> 15:57.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I think that's not a very good development because the hacking world and the computer security world here were closely linked.
[15:57.720 --> 15:58.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: People knew each other.
[15:59.280 --> 16:01.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the whole thing was fairly open.
[16:01.900 --> 16:04.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: And my fear is that that's all going to disappear.
[16:05.100 --> 16:07.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, when did things actually begin to change?
[16:07.540 --> 16:15.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: We've talked to you a couple of times over the years, and Holland has always been kind of the last bastion of freedom for those people that were exploring computer systems.
[16:16.860 --> 16:20.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: So now things seem to be a lot more restrictive.
[16:20.860 --> 16:21.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: But when did it actually happen?
[16:22.900 --> 16:23.200]  Hello?
[16:23.540 --> 16:25.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, we're getting loud clicks on the line.
[16:25.200 --> 16:25.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah.
[16:25.840 --> 16:27.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: The WBAI phone system here.
[16:27.320 --> 16:29.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: But when did things begin to change?
[16:29.500 --> 16:30.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: When did things begin to change?
[16:32.120 --> 16:41.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, about after the Galactic Hacker Party, the Dutch government said that they intended to make hacking illegal.
[16:41.560 --> 16:52.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it took them until 1992 to put any real effort behind it to get it through Parliament and everything, this new computer crime law that they have adopted.
[16:53.420 --> 17:08.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: And at the time that they were making the last moves, you also saw articles in tabloid newspapers of dangerous hackers doing lots of damage to systems, which later all turned out to be nonsense.
[17:09.540 --> 17:18.200]  [SPEAKER_03]: But because they influenced the public at large, there was no real trouble in getting these laws through Parliament.
[17:18.980 --> 17:33.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: And now we're facing the situation where one of our staff members of the magazine was just held for 38 days for just hanging around in university computer systems doing no damage whatsoever.
[17:34.940 --> 17:36.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, it seems like...
[17:37.400 --> 17:42.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, it's hard to say, but an element of fear and suspicion seems to have taken root over there.
[17:42.540 --> 17:44.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I guess you got a lot of that from us, didn't you?
[17:45.560 --> 17:46.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[17:46.480 --> 17:57.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, a lot of the initial hacker paranoia was started because the Internet was being hacked a lot from Holland in...
[17:57.960 --> 18:00.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: I guess it was 1990, 1991.
[18:00.740 --> 18:08.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: And some places on the military network were being hacked from Holland.
[18:08.840 --> 18:14.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: And that caused a lot of angry reaction from the U.S.
[18:14.920 --> 18:15.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: public opinion.
[18:17.460 --> 18:17.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Uh-huh.
[18:17.900 --> 18:21.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, what is the Dutch public opinion, though, of hackers?
[18:22.940 --> 18:26.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it has changed over the last few years.
[18:26.620 --> 18:37.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: Dutch public opinion used to see hackers as, well, people that were exploring computer systems and that could potentially tell them where the mistakes were.
[18:37.980 --> 18:43.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: We had a very good PR going for up to one and a half, two years ago.
[18:43.840 --> 18:49.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: But the nice thing is that it's beginning to change the other direction again.
[18:49.240 --> 18:51.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: We are not just getting bad press anymore.
[18:51.260 --> 18:53.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: We have been for the last one and a half years.
[18:53.380 --> 19:01.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: But people see that it's ridiculous to lock up somebody for 38 days for basically just hanging around.
[19:02.680 --> 19:09.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, as far as that particular person who is detained for 38 days, what has the reaction been to that?
[19:09.480 --> 19:13.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: Is that likely to be a catalyst for some sort of a change?
[19:13.440 --> 19:14.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yes, it is.
[19:14.500 --> 19:18.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: I spoke to the people at the university that helped in his apprehension.
[19:18.740 --> 19:23.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they're just system administrators trying to do their job.
[19:23.600 --> 19:32.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: But they told me that they are not going to participate in apprehending hackers if this is what happens to them.
[19:32.340 --> 19:34.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: They don't view hacking that seriously.
[19:34.960 --> 19:36.280]  [SPEAKER_03]: They see it as a nuisance.
[19:36.640 --> 19:39.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they definitely don't see it the way I see it.
[19:40.100 --> 19:48.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: But they don't want to participate in locking somebody up for a month plus for something like this either.
[19:48.340 --> 19:50.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: They don't see it that seriously.
[19:50.920 --> 20:00.920]  [SPEAKER_03]: So the police is basically biting themselves because they are reacting so fiercely to it that they're alienating the people that should be helping them in apprehending the hackers.
[20:01.880 --> 20:03.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's never a good thing to do.
[20:03.440 --> 20:06.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, we haven't seen much of that kind of thing over here.
[20:07.080 --> 20:10.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: There seems to be a lot of ignorance on all fronts here.
[20:10.480 --> 20:16.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: The universities, the law enforcement, and even the public to a large degree because of the media.
[20:16.980 --> 20:20.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: They all seem to be affected by one another.
[20:21.120 --> 20:26.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, you've got a fairly good way of reaching out to the media and to the public.
[20:26.480 --> 20:28.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: I mean, do they listen to you over there?
[20:30.220 --> 20:31.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: That's beginning to change, as I said.
[20:32.800 --> 20:39.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: We've had fairly bad press for about a year and a half, but now people are beginning to see...
[20:39.520 --> 21:00.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it's hard not to see that something is wrong if you see somebody locked up for looking around in a public computer system and then hearing stories from him where he sees murderers, rapists, bank robbers go in and then go out three days later and new ones come in.
[21:00.960 --> 21:09.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, he's seen like ten generations of people that stab other people go in and out of prison while he was there.
[21:10.160 --> 21:11.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's shocking.
[21:11.460 --> 21:22.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's really hard to imagine how people could consider hackers to be criminals of the sort that, you know, rapists and murderers would be, but there are people that believe that.
[21:22.900 --> 21:28.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm sure there's people listening now that actually think all hackers should be locked away because they're dangerous people.
[21:29.040 --> 21:30.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: What would you say to somebody like that?
[21:31.540 --> 21:31.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: Sorry?
[21:32.040 --> 21:35.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: What would you say to somebody that believes hackers are actually dangerous people?
[21:35.520 --> 21:38.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: You say it's hard to believe that people see hackers as dangerous criminals.
[21:38.840 --> 21:40.880]  [SPEAKER_03]: I don't find that hard to believe at all.
[21:41.860 --> 21:55.820]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you look at society as becoming more and more computerized and more and more dependent on information technology, then people that understand the information technology better than the government are dangerous.
[21:55.860 --> 21:58.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: Very, very dangerous in the eyes of the government.
[21:58.460 --> 22:05.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the government is using the media to portray this fear.
[22:05.200 --> 22:07.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they're using very simple techniques.
[22:08.080 --> 22:19.160]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, if you have a hacker that can break into computer systems, all you need to tell the media is, well, imagine what this guy could have done if he broke into a hospital computer system.
[22:19.420 --> 22:23.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: Your child with cancer could have been radiated with ten times the normal dose.
[22:23.460 --> 22:24.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: And there you go.
[22:24.740 --> 22:26.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: The general public says, yeah, these guys are dangerous.
[22:26.900 --> 22:27.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hang them, hang them.
[22:28.660 --> 22:29.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's very easy.
[22:29.960 --> 22:35.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: The emotions being played out, the tricks that are being played are very cheap and very easy.
[22:36.140 --> 22:46.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I do understand the genuine fear at the sight of the government or the people in power, whether you believe that's the government or not.
[22:48.100 --> 23:03.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, you know, I find that it's easy to overcome those fears if you become educated, if you start talking to people and become part of the forum yourself, whether it be by participating in the Internet, going to a hacker meeting, calling in on the radio and asking questions.
[23:04.540 --> 23:12.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: I think people will find that hackers are generally very open with information, and that's, of course, one of the reasons why they're considered so dangerous.
[23:13.160 --> 23:16.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: But as you said, most of it is what if.
[23:16.420 --> 23:19.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: What if somebody had done this to the hospital computer system?
[23:19.940 --> 23:29.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: I remember one time back in the Martin Luther King Day AT&T crash a couple of years ago, it was said from the very beginning that it was a software glitch.
[23:29.120 --> 23:30.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: It had nothing to do with hackers.
[23:30.500 --> 23:38.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I remember one of the trade magazines, I'm not sure if it was Information Week or Communications Daily, or they all, you know, they all confuse me with their titles.
[23:38.720 --> 23:47.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: But they put out an editorial saying something to the effect of, well, it wasn't caused by a hacker, but it could have been.
[23:47.300 --> 23:52.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: And therefore, we have to make the laws stronger so that the penalty for this kind of thing will be even stricter.
[23:53.080 --> 23:57.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: Something that wasn't even caused by a hacker, and they want to penalize people even more for it.
[23:57.500 --> 24:02.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it seems to me that stealing is always going to be stealing.
[24:02.240 --> 24:04.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Vandalism is always going to be vandalism.
[24:04.880 --> 24:07.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: Crime is easily defined.
[24:07.120 --> 24:18.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: So when you add the computer aspect to it and say, well, if you used a computer, you committed a worse crime, I think that's simply going to make people afraid of computers, make people suspicious of technology, and it's a very unhealthy thing.
[24:18.840 --> 24:27.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: However, if you want to keep technology out of the hands of the have-nots, then that's exactly the path that you will choose to lead if you're a government official.
[24:28.580 --> 24:39.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's a very... by making somebody totally afraid of something and totally uncomprehensive towards it, it's a very good way of making sure that they don't mess around with it.
[24:39.400 --> 24:40.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: Sure.
[24:40.500 --> 24:43.160]  [SPEAKER_03]: There has to be a myth surrounding it.
[24:43.300 --> 24:48.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, take computer fraud, the term in itself.
[24:50.640 --> 25:13.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: We had, well, what was it, 15, 20 years ago, people committing fraud by using the book that they wrote down the company figures in, and they did it in pencil instead of in pen, and then they erased it and put new figures in by pen, and then they could steal money that way from the company.
[25:13.720 --> 25:21.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: Now, this same person, not by his own will, because he hated the things at first, this same person has a PC on his desk.
[25:22.360 --> 25:26.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: And five years down the road, he found out, hey, this is really much easier.
[25:26.640 --> 25:29.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: I can erase figures much easier, change them much nicer.
[25:30.620 --> 25:33.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: This thing is a much nicer tool for my fraud.
[25:34.480 --> 25:37.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: And suddenly this person is a computer criminal.
[25:38.800 --> 25:41.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: This person has to be treated in a completely new way.
[25:41.640 --> 25:43.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hey, we need new laws to treat him.
[25:43.580 --> 25:44.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: No, we don't.
[25:44.900 --> 25:47.280]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's the same old person doing the same old fraud.
[25:47.280 --> 25:49.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: He's just using the tool that's in front of him.
[25:49.700 --> 25:52.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: When we gave him a pen and a pencil, he used a pen and a pencil.
[25:53.140 --> 25:55.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: And when we gave him a PC, he used his PC.
[25:55.960 --> 26:03.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: And now they're trying to tell us that we need a whole new ethics and a whole new way of thinking to combat this new type of crime.
[26:03.780 --> 26:04.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's no new type of crime.
[26:05.180 --> 26:06.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's always been there.
[26:06.220 --> 26:07.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: It will always be there.
[26:07.540 --> 26:09.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: Crime really doesn't tend to change.
[26:10.140 --> 26:14.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: The devices for committing crime changes, but that doesn't change the actual crime in itself.
[26:15.140 --> 26:21.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: I found that the vast majority of hackers, and I know quite a few of them, have a good sense of values.
[26:21.980 --> 26:30.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: They know what is right, they know what is wrong, and that doesn't come from anything but your upbringing, your society values that are instilled into you.
[26:30.840 --> 26:40.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, somebody on a computer system is not going to suddenly lose that sense of values if they're wandering around in some huge corporate machine.
[26:42.100 --> 26:52.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: One thing that always comes up in these discussions and debates and things like that are the analogies, the inevitable analogies of, well, I don't want somebody walking around inside my house.
[26:52.960 --> 26:57.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: How do you respond to those analogies as far as breaking into computer systems?
[26:57.440 --> 27:04.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: I usually respond to them by saying, a university computer is like a university library, it's not like your personal house.
[27:06.620 --> 27:14.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I'd like breaking into a university computer to be treated like breaking into the university library and just reading books.
[27:15.280 --> 27:16.800]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you're not breaking anything.
[27:16.920 --> 27:21.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you do, it has to be treated like breaking into the university library and destroying books.
[27:22.740 --> 27:27.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: But it shouldn't be treated like breaking into somebody's house, because it is not.
[27:27.440 --> 27:33.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: In the case of Internet-connected main computers of universities, they are public facilities.
[27:33.720 --> 27:35.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: Students are allowed to log in there.
[27:35.420 --> 27:45.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: Students are allowed to walk into that place, which makes it a public place owned by the university in the case of that type of system.
[27:45.300 --> 27:50.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's interesting, too, when you mention that it's not like breaking into a house.
[27:51.000 --> 28:07.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's strange how hackers have gotten this image of not respecting people's privacy, when in actuality, I think computer hackers respect people's privacy more than anybody else, because they're so aware of how fragile it is and how easy it is to manipulate and corrupt.
[28:07.600 --> 28:22.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: In fact, hackers have been the leading proponents of encryption, of ways of sending mail back and forth so that other people cannot read it, ways of scrambling telephones so that other people cannot listen in to you.
[28:22.400 --> 28:24.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: All of those things are very, very possible today.
[28:24.940 --> 28:26.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: People are constantly listening in.
[28:26.820 --> 28:29.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's more ways to listen in on phone calls today than ever before.
[28:29.300 --> 28:32.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's more ways to intercept mail today undetected than ever before.
[28:33.100 --> 28:34.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: And hackers know this.
[28:35.000 --> 28:38.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Hackers know how to prevent this, and hackers know what kind of things to push for.
[28:39.180 --> 28:51.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: However, they're not being given credit for that, and rather, they're being thwarted in those efforts by government, among other concerns, that want to be able to continue to monitor, eavesdrop, listen in.
[28:51.300 --> 28:58.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I just think it's very ironic that these people, the hackers, are the ones being cast as the people that don't care about privacy.
[28:58.860 --> 29:03.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: In actuality, they know a lot about privacy, and if it were in their hands, I think we'd all be a lot better off.
[29:04.080 --> 29:04.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[29:04.620 --> 29:10.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, I don't know if you've discussed this with your listeners, but there's this hideous plan by the U.S.
[29:10.460 --> 29:13.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: government to market a chip called the Clipper Chip.
[29:13.520 --> 29:13.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes.
[29:13.980 --> 29:28.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: In fact, we have been talking about that, and I should point out that in about an hour, around 11 o'clock, we're going to be speaking with Phil Zimmerman, who developed PGP, which is an encryption program that's causing a bit of a stir in the U.S.
[29:28.280 --> 29:29.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: government, among other places.
[29:29.500 --> 29:30.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: So we'll be talking to him in about an hour.
[29:30.820 --> 29:35.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: But yes, Rop, I'm kind of concerned as to what your reaction to the Clipper Chip was.
[29:35.760 --> 29:42.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, the Clipper Chip, I'll explain it briefly, because you're going to go into all this much further with Phil Zimmerman, I'm sure.
[29:43.520 --> 29:46.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: The Clipper Chip is a device that the U.S.
[29:47.140 --> 29:49.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: government is going to offer to people that want secure encryption.
[29:50.360 --> 29:59.140]  [SPEAKER_03]: Because right now, there is no real secure encryption algorithm that is allowed for use by private people in the United States.
[29:59.480 --> 30:06.880]  [SPEAKER_03]: Because the only encryption that is officially government-certified is DES, the Data Encryption Standard.
[30:06.880 --> 30:23.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: But over the last 10 years, people have become to realize that it has been made faulty from the beginning by the National Security Agency just to be able to listen in to conversations and digital secrets that are being kept.
[30:24.780 --> 30:32.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: So right now, what they're doing is they're developing a chip that is more secure, but they're keeping the keys themselves.
[30:33.480 --> 30:39.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: So two separate agencies that still have to be set up are keeping the keys.
[30:39.660 --> 30:47.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: So if somebody is using a pair of these chips to communicate, these chips are also sending their serial numbers.
[30:47.860 --> 31:03.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if they have a wiretap license, or there is an intelligence reason for tapping the phone conversation or whatever, then they can get the two halves of the keys at these two agencies and listen in to the conversation anyway.
[31:03.780 --> 31:09.620]  [SPEAKER_03]: Which means you can have secure encryption, but you shall not use encryption to keep secrets from your government.
[31:11.000 --> 31:12.460]  [SPEAKER_03]: Because that is what they fear.
[31:12.580 --> 31:15.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: They fear that if they don't come up with a standard, somebody else will.
[31:15.900 --> 31:19.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it may be a standard that they're not able to listen in to.
[31:19.520 --> 31:23.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: And their next move is going to be to make encryption illegal.
[31:24.340 --> 31:26.880]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they've been preparing that move for quite a while.
[31:27.080 --> 31:32.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they're going to use the argument, well, what if drug dealers use encryption?
[31:33.080 --> 31:35.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: We need to be able to listen in to their communication.
[31:37.020 --> 31:40.820]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, what they're going to do is they're going to make all other forms of encryption illegal.
[31:41.080 --> 31:44.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, it's a necessary move to make encryption impossible.
[31:44.660 --> 31:56.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's to supply their own form of encryption that is sort of secure against, well, what is it, business, espionage, that type of thing.
[31:57.760 --> 32:06.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, that's something that's definitely a cause for concern, because what happens when that day arrives?
[32:06.280 --> 32:10.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Do you think that day is far away where they'll actually say encryption is illegal?
[32:11.480 --> 32:18.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it's kind of pointless to develop this chip and to set up these agencies and to do all this work.
[32:18.340 --> 32:26.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: If somebody can just buy another chip and do it in a form of encryption that is secure and that they do have to go through a lot of trouble for it to crack it.
[32:27.220 --> 32:35.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: But I'm going to ask this of Phil later on in the program, but how in the world are they going to be able to prevent somebody from encrypting a file?
[32:36.020 --> 32:37.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: How are they going to be able to do that?
[32:37.140 --> 32:42.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: If I want to send you a message on the Internet and I encrypt it in a particular way, am I going to be arrested for it?
[32:42.980 --> 32:45.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: And how are they going to know that I'm using a program like that?
[32:45.020 --> 32:47.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, they can just try to decrypt it.
[32:47.320 --> 32:50.220]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if they can't decrypt it, you must be encrypting it.
[32:50.460 --> 32:58.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you're encrypting it and the data stream does not contain the serial number for your clipper chip, it means you're using an illegal encryption technique.
[32:59.200 --> 33:01.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: And yes, that is going to be illegal.
[33:01.600 --> 33:07.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's the only way they have to keep their privilege of listening in to everybody's secrets.
[33:08.240 --> 33:14.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, you know, those words are probably the scariest I've heard in a long time, that they're actually going to attempt something like that.
[33:14.740 --> 33:25.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, I can't say for sure that I'm 100% convinced that they are going to do that because it just seems like such a losing proposition for the government to try that.
[33:25.440 --> 33:33.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, would you buy the clipper chip if law allowed you to use an encryption algorithm that the government could not listen into?
[33:33.320 --> 33:41.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: I think even companies would rather have an encryption algorithm that had no backdoor than an encryption algorithm that only the government had the backdoor to.
[33:43.120 --> 33:47.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: I think even commercial people would rather buy something else if they had the choice.
[33:48.320 --> 33:53.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: So the logical conclusion is that you can only market the clipper chip if you take away the choice.
[33:53.300 --> 33:57.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: In other words, all other means of encryption are going to be illegal.
[33:57.360 --> 34:03.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, but you don't take away the freedom of choice to make something succeed in the marketplace.
[34:03.940 --> 34:08.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, something has to win out because it's a superior product, because it's cost-effective.
[34:09.180 --> 34:10.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: You don't simply...
[34:10.280 --> 34:11.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: No, no, no, no, no, no, no.
[34:11.220 --> 34:30.800]  [SPEAKER_03]: You just scare the public by saying, look, we found this one drug dealer, and he's using this encryption program called PGP, and he's encrypting his communication, and therefore he's poisoning your children with all these hideous chemicals, and we cannot do anything about it because he's hiding all his evidence with this hideous program called PGP,
[34:30.880 --> 34:33.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: and all this could be stopped if we just make it illegal.
[34:34.340 --> 34:37.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, that's certainly something we have to keep an eye out for.
[34:37.960 --> 34:40.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: What do you suggest for people that aren't technologically inclined?
[34:40.920 --> 34:42.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: What should they be watching for here?
[34:43.640 --> 34:45.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: What do you mean, what should they be watching for?
[34:45.240 --> 34:55.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, how does somebody that's not as active as the two of us, as far as computer hackers and things like that, how do they have any input in this?
[34:55.400 --> 34:57.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: How do they follow the news?
[34:58.140 --> 34:59.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: What do they look out for?
[34:59.460 --> 35:11.500]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, they should look into the existing encryption programs and read what is being written about them, because quite a lot is being written about them on public forums, on the Internet, and elsewhere on computer networks.
[35:11.500 --> 35:20.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, I guess what I'm asking is, somebody, say, that doesn't really have a need for encryption right now, someone that maybe doesn't even have a computer, should they even be concerned about this?
[35:20.400 --> 35:23.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: Is this something that's going to affect other people besides us?
[35:24.200 --> 35:26.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it affects everybody's right to keep secrets.
[35:27.660 --> 35:33.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you don't feel you need the right to keep secrets ever, then this doesn't concern you, really.
[35:34.440 --> 35:34.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: Uh-huh.
[35:36.140 --> 35:51.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: I guess it boils down to if you believe that only guilty people keep secrets, and if you want every single aspect of your life to be on display, if you believe what Ed Meese said about only the guilty having something to hide, and everybody else should not have anything to worry about.
[35:55.280 --> 35:56.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm sorry.
[35:56.240 --> 35:58.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: You overcome with emotion over there.
[35:59.420 --> 36:03.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: But these are hard decisions, hard questions to ask.
[36:03.780 --> 36:08.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, folks, they do concern all of us, not just those of us in the computer world.
[36:08.340 --> 36:09.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're talking about freedom of speech here.
[36:10.120 --> 36:14.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're talking about the future, and it's going to be decided electronically, because that's where we're headed.
[36:15.580 --> 36:17.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Rop, I want to thank you very much for being on the show today.
[36:17.820 --> 36:22.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: And also, give the information again about the Hacker event in August in Amsterdam and how people can get over there.
[36:24.200 --> 36:33.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: The Hacker event in August is called Hacking at the End of the Universe, and it's happening the 4th, the 5th, and the 6th of August here in Holland.
[36:33.680 --> 36:46.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they can get in touch with us by dialing country code 31, city code 20, and then the number 600, 1480.
[36:47.800 --> 36:49.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: So I'll repeat that.
[36:49.260 --> 36:57.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, that is country code 31, city code 20, and then the number is 600, 1480.
[36:58.980 --> 37:04.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, just stick an 011 in front of that and a pound sign at the end, and they'll probably go through real speedy-like.
[37:04.520 --> 37:05.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[37:05.760 --> 37:07.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, and the actual dates again?
[37:08.100 --> 37:11.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: The actual date, it's 4th, 5th, and 6th of August.
[37:11.540 --> 37:18.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: And the total cost is about, what is it these days, $60, 100 Dutch guilders for the three days.
[37:19.100 --> 37:25.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: That does not include your food, but it does include, you can stay at our place in your own tent.
[37:26.400 --> 37:27.440]  [SPEAKER_03]: What else does it include?
[37:27.480 --> 37:28.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: You can go to the lectures.
[37:30.060 --> 37:33.920]  [SPEAKER_03]: We have, we are organizing some public panel discussions.
[37:35.340 --> 37:36.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: There's interesting workshops.
[37:37.940 --> 37:39.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, everything you can imagine, really.
[37:39.900 --> 37:46.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, and just a good way to meet the hackers and find out what it's all about, and also to see a fascinating city at the same time.
[37:46.480 --> 37:49.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, and lie in the sun in front of your tent with your laptop.
[37:49.560 --> 37:49.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah.
[37:50.160 --> 37:50.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: Not to forget that.
[37:51.100 --> 37:52.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: You can't get more 90s than that.
[37:52.540 --> 37:56.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Rop, again, thank you very much for being part of the program today, and good luck with that.
[37:56.920 --> 37:58.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: We'll be hearing from you in future programs, I'm sure.
[37:59.180 --> 37:59.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, okay.
[37:59.880 --> 38:00.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right, take care.
[38:00.160 --> 38:00.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Have a nice program.
[38:00.940 --> 38:01.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right, so long.
[38:01.900 --> 38:02.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Bye.
[38:02.300 --> 38:08.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: That was Rop from Hack-Tic in Amsterdam, one of the leading hacker magazines of the world.
[38:10.160 --> 38:17.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: And Holland was formerly one of the last bastions of free hacking, and that's kind of changed now, and it's a sad thing.
[38:17.580 --> 38:19.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: It doesn't necessarily have to be a permanent change.
[38:20.420 --> 38:24.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, sometimes things go bad, and then they get good again after they get bad.
[38:24.900 --> 38:26.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, that's how it goes sometimes.
[38:26.980 --> 38:29.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: But the key to that is awareness.
[38:29.760 --> 38:31.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, things here look kind of hopeless.
[38:31.700 --> 38:34.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: I mean, we're talking about encryption being made illegal.
[38:34.640 --> 38:36.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's a scary situation.
[38:36.560 --> 38:44.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you don't realize how scary it is, just think about having everything that you write being subject to scrutiny by the authorities.
[38:45.240 --> 38:51.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: Everything you think about writing, everything you store someplace, no secrets, no secrets allowed.
[38:52.220 --> 38:57.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Everything has to be able to be listened in on, monitored, and decrypted.
[38:57.380 --> 39:00.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's scary, but we can't overcome this with education.
[39:00.900 --> 39:02.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's where we come in here at WBAI.
[39:02.860 --> 39:11.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's why we need you to support us now in our time of need, because if this radio station were not here, you wouldn't know about any of this, would you?
[39:12.300 --> 39:21.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: And imagine if you had to only rely upon the major media outlets that would have maybe 30 seconds devoted to a story like this, if that much.
[39:21.800 --> 39:25.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: When was the last time you heard about the Clipper chip on...
[39:25.700 --> 39:28.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, I don't want to pick on anybody in particular, but on the evening news.
[39:28.600 --> 39:31.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, on one of those evening news programs with all the glitter and glamour.
[39:31.780 --> 39:33.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: You never heard it there, did you?
[39:33.660 --> 39:35.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you're lucky, you might see it in the New York Times.
[39:36.000 --> 39:38.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: You might be able to dig through it and find it there.
[39:39.220 --> 39:40.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's places like WBAI.
[39:40.760 --> 39:41.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: You find out about these things.
[39:41.860 --> 39:46.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: You find out about what's going on in the rest of the world, what's going on here, and the implications.
[39:46.400 --> 39:48.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: And also, you can ask questions.
[39:48.720 --> 39:49.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: You can find out.
[39:49.500 --> 39:51.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: You can judge for yourself.
[39:52.760 --> 39:54.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: But there's a catch.
[39:54.240 --> 39:55.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's always a catch.
[39:55.740 --> 39:57.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's not a very big catch, you see.
[39:58.280 --> 40:00.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're able to do this because we don't have any commercials.
[40:01.400 --> 40:14.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: If we had commercials, we couldn't do this because just the things we've said already in this program would annoy the phone companies, would annoy big business and the government so much that nobody would sponsor us.
[40:14.460 --> 40:17.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: And a commercial station needs sponsors more than it needs anything else.
[40:18.680 --> 40:20.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't have those kind of sponsors.
[40:20.380 --> 40:21.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: Our sponsors are you.
[40:21.760 --> 40:37.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you've gotten anything out of this in the last half hour or so, if we've been talking to Rop over in Amsterdam about the implications of the continuing trends that we see in the world, if you've gotten anything out of that, please give us a call now,
[40:37.540 --> 40:39.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[40:39.840 --> 40:47.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Show your support for this radio station and take advantage of our special offer here where we will show our thanks to you.
[40:47.180 --> 40:52.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: For a pledge of $75, you'll get a full year of 2600 Magazine, The Hacker Quarterly.
[40:52.120 --> 40:56.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: You'll be kept abreast of all of the latest developments in the hacker world.
[40:56.300 --> 41:00.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: And a lot of things that you might not think have to do with computer hackers.
[41:00.260 --> 41:03.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's not all gibberish that you cannot understand.
[41:03.720 --> 41:04.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: I mean, some of it might be.
[41:05.000 --> 41:13.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's a fair degree of gibberish in our everyday lives, but a vast majority of that particular magazine is applicable to just about all of our lives.
[41:14.000 --> 41:18.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I can give some examples of that, but first, I have to stress that it's important to give us a call.
[41:18.840 --> 41:20.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[41:20.940 --> 41:22.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's no calls on the line right now.
[41:22.760 --> 41:23.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: Absolutely zero.
[41:23.720 --> 41:26.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I'm sure there are people out there that have gotten something out of this.
[41:27.340 --> 41:29.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[41:30.000 --> 41:40.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: For $75, you'll get a year subscription of that magazine and a t-shirt, a black, white lettering on the black background, 2600 t-shirt.
[41:40.700 --> 41:41.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's got a schematic.
[41:41.980 --> 41:42.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Get this.
[41:42.740 --> 41:45.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's got a schematic of a blue box on the front.
[41:45.800 --> 41:47.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, a blue box...
[41:48.000 --> 41:51.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Actually, you know, we'll be demonstrating some of this a little bit later on this hour.
[41:51.720 --> 42:00.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: A blue box is a device used by phone freaks in the 60s to make free phone calls, not only to make free phone calls, but to explore the telephone system.
[42:00.600 --> 42:05.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's what a lot of it was all about, just maneuvering around and checking things out and learning.
[42:06.920 --> 42:09.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: And there's a schematic of that on the front of that t-shirt.
[42:09.420 --> 42:13.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: In fact, you know, some parts of the world it might even be illegal to wear that.
[42:13.480 --> 42:20.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: On the back are all these news clippings that are kind of collaged from around the world about the hackers and phone freaks and things like that.
[42:20.920 --> 42:28.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: So it's a very interesting-looking shirt, something that will certainly make you the object of all kinds of attention, most of it positive, I would imagine.
[42:29.400 --> 42:30.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[42:30.820 --> 42:40.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: Remember, we do take Visa and MasterCard, and we definitely need every single call that we can get at this time because we have all kinds of other things that we want to get into.
[42:40.280 --> 42:47.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have two calls on the line, but we have room for five more, and I know there's people in there that feel left out because they're not on the phone right now.
[42:47.420 --> 42:49.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[42:49.600 --> 42:50.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have a room full of volunteers.
[42:51.220 --> 42:56.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's please make them busy and help support the radio station at the same time.
[42:56.180 --> 43:04.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, it's a theme we keep putting back to here at the radio station that every individual counts for something.
[43:04.320 --> 43:06.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: Every individual makes a difference.
[43:07.220 --> 43:09.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: And this is the perfect time to prove that.
[43:10.160 --> 43:16.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Everybody that calls in to pledge, and $75 is only the amount if you want those particular items.
[43:17.060 --> 43:20.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: Any amount is actually quite acceptable to us.
[43:20.540 --> 43:27.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: You'll get the WBAI folio, and your number will help add up towards our final goal.
[43:27.620 --> 43:40.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: But every individual pitches in a little bit, you know, and it just kind of adds up one after the other until you suddenly have a couple of thousand dollars in a couple of minutes.
[43:41.260 --> 43:42.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we can prove that.
[43:42.840 --> 43:45.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: We can prove that by calling up now.
[43:46.360 --> 43:49.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[43:50.380 --> 43:52.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: Join those people on the phone.
[43:52.980 --> 43:54.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Add your bit.
[43:54.600 --> 43:57.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: And then we'll come up with a large pile.
[43:57.940 --> 44:01.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we'll be able to pull those numbers together.
[44:01.780 --> 44:04.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we'll be that much closer.
[44:05.880 --> 44:07.230]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[44:07.880 --> 44:08.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: Same thing with knowledge.
[44:08.940 --> 44:11.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, you pool your resources.
[44:11.480 --> 44:12.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: You share information.
[44:13.420 --> 44:15.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: And suddenly you become a force to be reckoned with.
[44:16.260 --> 44:20.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Suddenly you become a threat because you have information.
[44:20.100 --> 44:21.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: You have knowledge.
[44:21.700 --> 44:22.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: You have power.
[44:23.440 --> 44:26.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's that's when the authorities get scared.
[44:28.900 --> 44:35.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: The one thing that is always a pain for any government is freedom of speech.
[44:35.460 --> 44:36.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: People sharing information.
[44:36.840 --> 44:42.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: People spreading secrets around that the government does not want to have spread around.
[44:42.220 --> 44:43.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'll give you a couple of examples.
[44:43.960 --> 44:51.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: And this doesn't involve the government per se, but it involves the phone company, which a lot of people would think is part of the government.
[44:51.940 --> 44:55.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: But we won't really get into the politics of that.
[44:55.160 --> 44:59.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: But the phone company is probably one of the scariest entities in the world.
[45:00.000 --> 45:09.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: And now after 1984 when Ma Bell was broken up well suddenly you had a lot of phone companies.
[45:09.800 --> 45:12.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: You had a dozen phone companies where you only had one before.
[45:12.900 --> 45:14.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: And they didn't get any less evil.
[45:15.120 --> 45:15.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh no.
[45:16.060 --> 45:18.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: AT&T is every bit as evil as New York Telephone.
[45:18.620 --> 45:20.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: Sprint is every bit as evil as MCI.
[45:20.900 --> 45:23.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's just so many more to choose from now.
[45:23.860 --> 45:34.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: And occasionally at 2600 Magazine which is what we are offering today for that $75 pledge at 212-279-3400.
[45:35.400 --> 45:43.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: Occasionally 2600 Magazine prints something that raises some consternation at one of the phone companies.
[45:43.220 --> 45:43.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we get a letter.
[45:44.800 --> 45:45.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's right.
[45:45.480 --> 45:48.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: We get a letter from one of the phone companies.
[45:48.340 --> 45:55.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: A very angry certified registered letter from a lawyer saying, you know we don't appreciate what you did.
[45:55.440 --> 46:09.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't like having that information spread about and if you continue to spread that information about we will smite you with our power because we've got the power.
[46:09.840 --> 46:13.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: We've got the power and we can crush you like an ant.
[46:13.880 --> 46:16.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: That, my friends, is corporate speak.
[46:18.020 --> 46:23.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: But what they don't know is that we have the power too except our power is much stronger.
[46:23.840 --> 46:29.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: We've got the power of lots and lots of individuals sticking together sharing their resources.
[46:30.560 --> 46:32.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, what do you think is more powerful?
[46:32.960 --> 46:44.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: One huge mainframe computer that takes up an entire room and requires air conditioning and special outlets or a whole chain of PCs linked together.
[46:51.410 --> 46:55.750]  [SPEAKER_21]: Back in 1984, it created seven regional Bell operating companies.
[46:55.750 --> 47:01.330]  [SPEAKER_21]: In our particular area, there's only two we should be concerned with and that's NYNEX and Bell Atlantic.
[47:02.290 --> 47:07.130]  [SPEAKER_21]: NYNEX encompasses the Northeast and it encompasses New York Telephone.
[47:07.390 --> 47:12.450]  [SPEAKER_21]: Bell Atlantic encompasses well, various other parts, New Jersey included.
[47:12.650 --> 47:16.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, New Jersey Bell is to Bell Atlantic what New York Telephone is to NYNEX.
[47:17.610 --> 47:24.790]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, so Bell Corps continues to be the research entity for those particular companies.
[47:25.210 --> 47:26.890]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of power we're talking about here.
[47:26.890 --> 47:47.290]  [SPEAKER_21]: a lot of power and they sent us a letter saying it has come us meaning the magazine 2600 magazine it has come to our attention that you have somehow obtained and published in the 1991-92 winter edition of 2600 magazine portions of certain Bell Corps proprietary internal documents.
[47:48.530 --> 48:12.450]  [SPEAKER_21]: This letter is to formally advise you that if at any time in the future you or your magazine come into possession of publish or otherwise disclose any Bell Corps information or documentation which either you have any reason to believe is proprietary to Bell Corps or has not been made publicly available by Bell Corps or is marked proprietary confidential restricted or with any other legend
[48:36.810 --> 48:39.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: That, my friends, is a threat.
[48:39.510 --> 48:41.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: A Class A threat.
[48:43.910 --> 48:46.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: Telling us to stop what we're doing or else.
[48:48.370 --> 48:49.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, we didn't.
[48:50.010 --> 48:51.210]  [SPEAKER_21]: We didn't stop it.
[48:51.310 --> 48:52.190]  [SPEAKER_21]: We printed the letter.
[48:52.570 --> 49:07.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: We printed our response, which, to sum up, said basically, in fact, if you choose to challenge our First Amendment rights to disseminate important information about the telephone infrastructure, we will be compelled to respond by seeking all legal remedies against you,
[49:07.670 --> 49:12.610]  [SPEAKER_21]: which may include sanctions provided for in federal and state statutes and rules of civil procedure.
[49:13.130 --> 49:19.390]  [SPEAKER_21]: We will also be compelled to publicize your use of lawsuits and the threat of legal action to harass and intimidate.
[49:20.150 --> 49:21.550]  [SPEAKER_21]: You've got to fight back.
[49:23.090 --> 49:24.430]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's what we're doing.
[49:24.590 --> 49:25.750]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's what we're constantly doing.
[49:25.910 --> 49:28.490]  [SPEAKER_21]: But we can't do it alone.
[49:29.210 --> 49:37.390]  [SPEAKER_21]: No, we don't expect our listeners to come in and stand in court as various First Amendment issues are decided.
[49:38.810 --> 49:40.750]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of us are perfectly willing to do that.
[49:40.910 --> 49:42.610]  [SPEAKER_21]: But we need to know you're there.
[49:42.770 --> 49:44.290]  [SPEAKER_21]: We need to know that this matters to you.
[49:44.490 --> 49:48.210]  [SPEAKER_21]: And the best way right now to let us know is to call us.
[49:48.350 --> 49:50.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[49:51.250 --> 49:55.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is the only radio station like this that I know of anywhere in the area.
[49:56.510 --> 50:07.250]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's important that we remain strong so that we can continue to bring you news like this so we can continue to spread the word and keep power in the hands of individuals.
[50:07.790 --> 50:11.490]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're going to be talking about the phone company a lot during this particular hour.
[50:12.350 --> 50:17.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we're going to be showing you a few things that happen with telephones that you might not know about.
[50:18.370 --> 50:21.690]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of things that we spread around.
[50:21.810 --> 50:23.170]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of information.
[50:24.490 --> 50:30.090]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you know, when the phone companies say that this is proprietary information, they want everything to be proprietary information.
[50:30.090 --> 50:33.350]  [SPEAKER_21]: They want to be able to charge for every digit that you dial.
[50:33.490 --> 50:35.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: They want to be able to keep things secret.
[50:36.550 --> 50:38.010]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's not how we work.
[50:38.170 --> 50:41.070]  [SPEAKER_21]: We believe in telling you how things are.
[50:41.350 --> 50:42.650]  [SPEAKER_21]: How your telephone works.
[50:42.730 --> 50:43.870]  [SPEAKER_21]: How the networks operate.
[50:44.690 --> 50:45.610]  [SPEAKER_21]: People are curious.
[50:45.750 --> 50:46.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: People want to know.
[50:46.510 --> 50:47.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: People have the right to know.
[50:48.630 --> 50:50.190]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[50:50.350 --> 50:51.150]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please give us a call.
[50:51.370 --> 50:52.250]  [SPEAKER_21]: Show your support.
[50:52.790 --> 50:54.550]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have open lines right now.
[50:54.670 --> 50:58.710]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I know there are people out there that are getting something out of this.
[50:59.590 --> 51:16.450]  [SPEAKER_21]: Remember, for a $75 pledge, a full year of 2600 Magazine, if you already subscribe, a year on top of whatever your subscription expires with, as well as a T-shirt, a 2600 T-shirt that certainly is historical, if nothing else.
[51:17.890 --> 51:18.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[51:18.810 --> 51:20.150]  [SPEAKER_21]: Keep those calls coming in.
[51:20.270 --> 51:22.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[51:22.810 --> 51:25.690]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're going to be back with a couple other things.
[51:26.470 --> 51:29.310]  [SPEAKER_21]: Some demonstrations as to how the phone system works.
[51:29.550 --> 51:32.910]  [SPEAKER_21]: Some explanations as to why some things don't work.
[51:33.130 --> 51:34.430]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's all part of Off the Hook.
[51:35.250 --> 51:36.210]  [SPEAKER_21]: Stay with us.
[51:37.970 --> 51:42.330]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[54:16.840 --> 54:21.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: This transmission is coming to you approximately halfway between the moon and the earth.
[54:25.570 --> 54:26.350]  [SPEAKER_16]: McDonald's, may I help you?
[54:26.530 --> 54:26.910]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, hi.
[54:26.990 --> 54:27.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm sorry to bother you.
[54:27.810 --> 54:30.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, I'm on a special diet, so I can't have some foods.
[54:30.990 --> 54:34.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: But I wanted to taste the McDonald's for a while now.
[54:34.650 --> 54:38.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: Could you possibly tell me what exactly goes into a Big Mac?
[54:39.830 --> 54:44.490]  [SPEAKER_16]: Okay, on a Big Mac, it has the beef, the, um, hamburger meat, right?
[54:44.930 --> 54:45.310]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh-huh.
[54:45.530 --> 54:46.750]  [SPEAKER_16]: And it has a special sauce.
[54:48.110 --> 54:55.630]  [SPEAKER_16]: It has a special sauce with onions and lettuce and two pickles and a slice of cheese.
[54:57.390 --> 54:59.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, do you know what the special sauce is this is of?
[55:00.090 --> 55:01.690]  [SPEAKER_16]: Um, could you hold on for one second?
[55:01.910 --> 55:02.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, I can hold on.
[55:02.670 --> 55:02.950]  All right.
[55:15.640 --> 55:18.440]  [SPEAKER_16]: You want to know when the Mac's sauce is made of?
[55:18.820 --> 55:19.460]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, no, wait.
[55:19.680 --> 55:20.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: That ain't got to be done.
[55:20.520 --> 55:21.080]  [SPEAKER_16]: No, it's not.
[55:21.300 --> 55:21.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: It's made.
[55:21.660 --> 55:23.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: It saved a better one customer from here.
[55:23.360 --> 55:23.840]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh-huh.
[55:24.320 --> 55:24.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: Wait here, man.
[55:25.020 --> 55:26.280]  [SPEAKER_06]: You don't tell the best you can do that?
[55:26.480 --> 55:27.380]  [SPEAKER_06]: No, you can't do that?
[55:27.680 --> 55:30.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's not required information for us to be given after.
[55:31.620 --> 55:31.980]  [SPEAKER_06]: Right.
[55:32.180 --> 55:32.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: I can't do that.
[55:32.360 --> 55:33.140]  [SPEAKER_06]: That's big reading.
[55:33.360 --> 55:33.700]  [SPEAKER_20]: That's no.
[55:34.080 --> 55:34.420]  [SPEAKER_20]: All right.
[55:34.500 --> 55:35.480]  [SPEAKER_20]: You can't get that information.
[55:42.640 --> 55:45.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: Why don't you ask him what he can't eat?
[55:45.200 --> 55:47.260]  [SPEAKER_16]: And if it's there, then that's how we'll do it.
[55:47.380 --> 55:47.800]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's okay.
[55:48.340 --> 55:48.520]  Right?
[55:48.720 --> 55:51.000]  [SPEAKER_16]: Hello, um, what can you not eat?
[55:51.200 --> 55:54.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, I'm supposed to have low-sodium foods with, like, not a lot of salt.
[55:54.820 --> 55:55.240]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh-huh.
[55:55.640 --> 55:57.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I can't have things with iodine.
[55:58.060 --> 55:58.500]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh-huh.
[55:58.780 --> 56:00.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Or glycerin.
[56:00.740 --> 56:01.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh-huh.
[56:03.440 --> 56:04.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Or hypoglycerates.
[56:05.420 --> 56:05.860]  [SPEAKER_16]: Hypoglycerates?
[56:05.980 --> 56:06.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[56:06.820 --> 56:07.180]  [SPEAKER_16]: Uh-huh.
[56:07.500 --> 56:09.320]  [SPEAKER_16]: Well, you can have a Big Mac, then.
[56:09.820 --> 56:11.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, thank you very much.
[56:15.340 --> 56:19.520]  [SPEAKER_15]: The number you have reached, one, has been changed.
[56:19.560 --> 56:22.060]  [SPEAKER_15]: The new number is two.
[56:22.540 --> 56:23.920]  [SPEAKER_15]: Please make a note of it.
[56:24.460 --> 56:25.580]  [SPEAKER_15]: Please make a note of it.
[56:25.800 --> 56:28.760]  [SPEAKER_15]: The number you have reached has been changed.
[56:28.980 --> 56:31.040]  [SPEAKER_15]: The new number has been disconnected.
[59:38.270 --> 59:40.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: Thanks go out to the people that have been calling in.
[59:40.790 --> 59:43.150]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[59:43.450 --> 59:48.270]  [SPEAKER_21]: We do need your support to keep this program and others like it coming your way.
[59:48.270 --> 59:50.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is a special edition of Off the Hook.
[59:51.110 --> 59:53.670]  [SPEAKER_21]: Usually we're on the air Wednesday nights at 10 p.m.
[59:53.710 --> 01:00:01.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: But today we're doing this special program up until noontime to reach out to other people.
[01:00:03.230 --> 01:00:06.350]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because there's all kinds of people that listen to WBAI.
[01:00:08.350 --> 01:00:17.910]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we want as many of you as possible to come together and spread the various bits of knowledge that we put out in a normal broadcast day.
[01:00:17.910 --> 01:00:24.790]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, a normal broadcast day here is unlike anything else anywhere on any other radio station in the country.
[01:00:26.250 --> 01:00:33.050]  [SPEAKER_21]: Ranging from international news to local affairs, alternative music, you name it.
[01:00:33.430 --> 01:00:35.830]  [SPEAKER_21]: And it's all brought to us by you.
[01:00:35.830 --> 01:00:39.330]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:00:39.650 --> 01:00:41.090]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please show your support.
[01:00:41.370 --> 01:00:45.490]  [SPEAKER_21]: Again, for $75, you'll get a full year of the Hacker Quarterly.
[01:00:46.370 --> 01:00:51.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: You'll be up to date on all the hacker news and all the new technology that's going on.
[01:00:52.050 --> 01:00:53.430]  [SPEAKER_21]: Big Brother events.
[01:00:53.870 --> 01:00:55.570]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, Big Brother is everywhere.
[01:00:58.130 --> 01:01:11.570]  [SPEAKER_21]: Registering what videos you take out, logging your phone calls, keeping track of your computer messages, decrypting, just watching through the cameras 24 hours a day.
[01:01:12.510 --> 01:01:23.710]  [SPEAKER_21]: But you can be one-up on Big Brother by knowing where he is, by knowing when he's likely to strike next, and maybe by being able to do something about it.
[01:01:27.340 --> 01:01:29.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:01:30.980 --> 01:01:37.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: Also, I should point out Ghost in the Machine with Victoria Starr will be back after our fundraiser.
[01:01:37.180 --> 01:01:42.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: So for all those tuning in for that particular program, it's coming back.
[01:01:42.900 --> 01:01:43.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Have no fear.
[01:01:45.720 --> 01:01:46.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right.
[01:01:46.360 --> 01:01:47.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Time for some news.
[01:01:48.320 --> 01:01:49.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: And there's always news.
[01:01:52.020 --> 01:01:54.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is something we mentioned last week.
[01:01:54.100 --> 01:01:57.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we feel we should get a little bit more detail.
[01:01:58.300 --> 01:02:07.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: The Chinese government has said that it has executed convicted hacker Xi Biao as a warning to others that computer crime does not pay.
[01:02:08.460 --> 01:02:09.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's right.
[01:02:09.140 --> 01:02:10.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Things can always get worse.
[01:02:10.980 --> 01:02:22.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Biao, who worked as an accountant at the Agricultural Bank of China, embezzled more than 122,000 pounds over three months in 1991 by forging bank deposit slips.
[01:02:22.100 --> 01:02:27.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: He was caught when he and an accomplice tried to transfer some of the money to the province of Shenzhen in southern China.
[01:02:28.500 --> 01:02:32.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, you know, I think it's wrong to execute somebody for that kind of a crime.
[01:02:32.400 --> 01:02:37.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: But I also think it's wrong to call them a hacker because stealing money really doesn't have anything to do with hacking.
[01:02:37.800 --> 01:02:40.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, maybe figuring out how to do it, that might be a clever hack in itself.
[01:02:41.060 --> 01:02:43.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: But stealing is still stealing.
[01:02:44.140 --> 01:02:45.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: Make no mistake about that.
[01:02:47.840 --> 01:02:50.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400 is our telephone number.
[01:02:50.400 --> 01:02:51.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please give us a call and show your support.
[01:02:52.980 --> 01:02:54.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: In other news...
[01:02:54.760 --> 01:02:56.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Actually, this is kind of like an offering.
[01:02:57.020 --> 01:02:58.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: Something that maybe...
[01:02:58.560 --> 01:03:00.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Maybe a couple of you out there might be interested in.
[01:03:01.220 --> 01:03:10.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: The San Diego Computer Fair of 1993 is looking for the most awful, woeful tale of abuse suffered by a human at the hands of a computer.
[01:03:11.080 --> 01:03:12.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Think you might qualify?
[01:03:12.160 --> 01:03:19.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: The suffering human will win a weekend in beautiful San Diego to try and forget that horrible episode in his or her life.
[01:03:19.640 --> 01:03:26.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Send your 1,000-word submission to Computer Nightmare Contest, Computer Edge Magazine, P.O.
[01:03:26.620 --> 01:03:32.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: Box 83086, San Diego, California, 92138.
[01:03:35.800 --> 01:03:39.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: The worst tale of abuse suffered by a human at the hands of a computer.
[01:03:40.400 --> 01:03:52.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, I'm sure this story is out there and we always welcome your cards and letters telling us what's being done, what's happening, how people are being victimized, whether it be by caller ID or TRW.
[01:03:55.720 --> 01:03:58.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: We'll be talking a little bit about caller ID, too, this hour.
[01:03:58.720 --> 01:03:59.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: We always do.
[01:03:59.620 --> 01:04:00.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's a favorite topic around here.
[01:04:02.740 --> 01:04:06.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: Here's a submission to the Risk Digest concerning caller ID.
[01:04:06.560 --> 01:04:09.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: The other evening I received a number from an upset woman.
[01:04:09.200 --> 01:04:13.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Actually, this person meant I received a call, I imagine that's what he's trying to say.
[01:04:13.300 --> 01:04:18.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: It appears that her caller ID box told her she had just received a call from my number.
[01:04:18.880 --> 01:04:23.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: The only call I had made that evening yielded me a pizza and the number did not resemble hers.
[01:04:24.340 --> 01:04:30.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: I did not ask her to describe the call because she seemed upset, but I gather I would not have wanted to be accused of making it.
[01:04:30.780 --> 01:04:32.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Does anybody know whether this happens often?
[01:04:33.000 --> 01:04:35.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: Does the caller ID report include an error check?
[01:04:37.620 --> 01:04:40.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Are all boxes required to verify this check?
[01:04:40.620 --> 01:04:43.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, right now, I don't know if there is such a check.
[01:04:43.680 --> 01:04:52.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: The data is sent across in a 1,200 baud stream of data that comes after the first ring.
[01:04:53.260 --> 01:04:56.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: So if you're able to listen in on that somehow, you will hear the data.
[01:04:56.600 --> 01:05:00.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're going to be broadcasting a sample of that next week on the program.
[01:05:01.240 --> 01:05:04.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's really how it is transmitted, how it's interpreted.
[01:05:04.700 --> 01:05:08.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's really up to the machine that you have connected to the other end.
[01:05:09.740 --> 01:05:11.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: So we're still learning about that.
[01:05:11.660 --> 01:05:14.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: And as we learn more, we'll share the information.
[01:05:15.140 --> 01:05:24.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're looking for all kinds of caller ID stories and stories about the new phone company features that have recently been introduced in our area, have been in New Jersey for quite some time.
[01:05:26.020 --> 01:05:28.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: And what is fair and what is not fair about that?
[01:05:30.980 --> 01:05:32.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, what else is happening?
[01:05:35.200 --> 01:05:38.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, this is a story that has hit the papers recently.
[01:05:39.540 --> 01:05:44.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: Everyone knows you're supposed to be very careful about not revealing your PIN number for your ATM card.
[01:05:46.700 --> 01:05:49.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: But how are you supposed to stop this new trick?
[01:05:51.420 --> 01:05:58.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: At the Buckland Hills Mall in Manchester, Connecticut last week, some scam artist installed a fake ATM machine.
[01:05:59.940 --> 01:06:01.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's right, a fake ATM machine.
[01:06:01.940 --> 01:06:06.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: They had negotiated with the mall, pretending to be bank officials.
[01:06:07.580 --> 01:06:11.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: And they had gotten permission to install this ATM machine.
[01:06:11.460 --> 01:06:14.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Apparently, they even got the phone company to come in and lay down some lines.
[01:06:15.200 --> 01:06:18.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Then they installed an ATM machine that they had stolen.
[01:06:20.020 --> 01:06:27.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: It was programmed to read off the account numbers, remember the PIN as it was typed, then claim some kind of error and refuse to give out money.
[01:06:28.400 --> 01:06:34.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: They left the machine in the mall for a week, collecting PINs, and they came back.
[01:06:35.400 --> 01:06:38.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: Took the machine back to, quote-unquote, repair it.
[01:06:38.980 --> 01:06:44.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: And since then, they've printed up new cards, and they've been using the PINs to siphon off money all over the country.
[01:06:45.160 --> 01:06:48.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: As far away as Florida, from what I understand, and it's still going on today.
[01:06:49.960 --> 01:06:51.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Fake ATM machines.
[01:06:52.600 --> 01:06:54.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: You just can't be too careful, can you?
[01:06:55.560 --> 01:06:56.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: How about this?
[01:06:57.420 --> 01:06:59.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: Those of you that do your banking by phone.
[01:07:00.180 --> 01:07:07.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you use an automated telephone transaction system to do your banking, you may be interested in this particular experience.
[01:07:09.040 --> 01:07:19.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: This contributor says he dialed in and was connected to a session in progress that belonged to another user who probably hung up after receiving whatever information he or she requested.
[01:07:20.540 --> 01:07:24.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, this person could have transferred all of their money into his account.
[01:07:24.460 --> 01:07:27.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: It could have been done, and it would not have been very difficult.
[01:07:30.300 --> 01:07:38.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: This contributor writes, I would like to suggest to anyone using these types of services, including voicemail services, to back all the way out of the system before hanging up.
[01:07:38.880 --> 01:07:44.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: Some systems allow you to disconnect using a command of some sort before hanging up, but many do not.
[01:07:45.680 --> 01:07:55.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: My banking system does not allow me to disconnect without hanging up, but it does allow me to back out of the menus until I reach the main menu, which prompts me for user password before proceeding.
[01:07:56.740 --> 01:08:00.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: From now on, I'm going to make sure I back out to that level before hanging up.
[01:08:03.220 --> 01:08:06.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: Ah, it's a scary world out there, folks.
[01:08:06.560 --> 01:08:07.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: Scary world.
[01:08:08.860 --> 01:08:11.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: People can transfer your money over the phone.
[01:08:11.780 --> 01:08:14.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: People can capture your ATM cards.
[01:08:15.320 --> 01:08:16.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: And your pins.
[01:08:17.000 --> 01:08:21.070]  [SPEAKER_21]: And once they have that information, they can get you a social security number.
[01:08:21.620 --> 01:08:24.530]  [SPEAKER_21]: And then, there's nothing they can't find out about you.
[01:08:25.770 --> 01:08:32.270]  [SPEAKER_21]: Your privacy is a very sacred thing, but something that is very hard to maintain.
[01:08:34.860 --> 01:08:38.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, we have no secrets here.
[01:08:39.400 --> 01:08:43.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're sharing the information that we get as we get it.
[01:08:44.120 --> 01:08:50.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we're passing it all around to listeners and to readers and people like that.
[01:08:52.030 --> 01:08:54.570]  [SPEAKER_21]: And all we ask is a little support and exchange.
[01:08:55.650 --> 01:08:58.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:09:00.030 --> 01:09:02.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: We've got a couple of things to demonstrate here.
[01:09:02.570 --> 01:09:07.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: And then we will get back to other things.
[01:09:08.770 --> 01:09:15.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: We talk about certain terminologies, and it's important, I think, to define our terms.
[01:09:16.660 --> 01:09:18.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: To tell people what it is that we're talking about.
[01:09:20.770 --> 01:09:31.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: When we mention certain magic tones and certain methods of doing things, it's important that we explain exactly what it is we're talking about.
[01:09:34.120 --> 01:09:36.230]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, today, we're going to do just that.
[01:09:41.310 --> 01:09:43.010]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes, we're going to do just that.
[01:09:43.230 --> 01:09:43.670]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[01:09:46.470 --> 01:09:58.390]  [SPEAKER_21]: In your telephones are capabilities of doing all kinds of incredible things that you've never been told about For obvious reasons, some not-so-obvious reasons.
[01:09:59.290 --> 01:10:05.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: For instance, do you know that every Touch-Tone phone has extra keys?
[01:10:06.890 --> 01:10:08.210]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, let's take a listen to this.
[01:10:09.730 --> 01:10:10.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: No, that wasn't what I wanted to hear.
[01:10:11.430 --> 01:10:12.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's listen to this.
[01:10:15.090 --> 01:10:16.530]  [SPEAKER_21]: Regular Touch-Tones, you know?
[01:10:17.190 --> 01:10:20.810]  [SPEAKER_21]: Some of you might be able to even tell what these are, but I'll go across the rows.
[01:10:22.070 --> 01:10:31.570]  [SPEAKER_21]: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, star, zero, pound.
[01:10:32.950 --> 01:10:36.190]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, everybody has four extra keys.
[01:10:37.230 --> 01:10:39.070]  [SPEAKER_21]: But they don't know they have these four extra keys.
[01:10:39.150 --> 01:10:40.890]  [SPEAKER_21]: It takes a little bit of wiring to get them to come out.
[01:10:40.990 --> 01:10:43.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: But the Touch-Tone pad is actually a 4x4 grid.
[01:10:44.330 --> 01:10:50.590]  [SPEAKER_21]: Here are the four extra keys, which would show up on the right-most column, going down.
[01:10:50.590 --> 01:10:52.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: And they're called A, B, C, D.
[01:10:52.570 --> 01:10:53.490]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is what they sound like.
[01:10:54.990 --> 01:10:58.870]  [SPEAKER_21]: A, B, C, and D.
[01:10:59.550 --> 01:11:00.430]  [SPEAKER_21]: A little bit higher.
[01:11:00.530 --> 01:11:01.270]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's try it one more time.
[01:11:03.210 --> 01:11:05.030]  [SPEAKER_21]: See, the tones are just a little bit higher.
[01:11:05.310 --> 01:11:07.870]  [SPEAKER_21]: And those are known as silver box tones.
[01:11:08.910 --> 01:11:10.830]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, what are silver box tones used for?
[01:11:10.970 --> 01:11:12.690]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, not much.
[01:11:12.910 --> 01:11:14.090]  [SPEAKER_21]: Not much yet, anyway.
[01:11:14.370 --> 01:11:22.010]  [SPEAKER_21]: But your telephone has the capability of using these particular tones and of doing nice magical things.
[01:11:22.030 --> 01:11:28.950]  [SPEAKER_21]: Imagine how secure, for instance, your voicemail system or your answering machine would be if your access code was one of those four digits.
[01:11:30.630 --> 01:11:33.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: Nobody would be able to get into that because nobody has those tones.
[01:11:34.570 --> 01:11:39.970]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's very hard to imagine why they're not installed on our telephones.
[01:11:40.130 --> 01:11:42.590]  [SPEAKER_21]: But the capability is certainly there.
[01:11:43.110 --> 01:11:49.310]  [SPEAKER_21]: And if you are in the business of designing telephones, you might want to consider putting those numbers back in.
[01:11:49.490 --> 01:11:50.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: Four extra digits.
[01:11:50.750 --> 01:11:51.130]  [SPEAKER_21]: Think of it.
[01:11:53.390 --> 01:11:57.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: Of course, when you play tones for people, they naturally assume that they're illegal.
[01:11:57.870 --> 01:11:58.990]  [SPEAKER_21]: That there's something wrong with that.
[01:12:00.050 --> 01:12:04.650]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's probably people out there now that think we've broken some sort of law by playing those tones over the air.
[01:12:04.810 --> 01:12:07.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: But that's technophobia.
[01:12:08.890 --> 01:12:09.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: Plain and simple.
[01:12:10.890 --> 01:12:11.230]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right.
[01:12:11.370 --> 01:12:12.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: A couple of other more...
[01:12:13.230 --> 01:12:17.050]  [SPEAKER_21]: I guess you'd call these evil tones.
[01:12:17.710 --> 01:12:18.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right.
[01:12:18.510 --> 01:12:23.390]  [SPEAKER_21]: Here's an evil tone that's a favorite among quite a few people.
[01:12:24.970 --> 01:12:26.350]  [SPEAKER_21]: Anybody know what this is?
[01:12:30.220 --> 01:12:32.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's a 2600 hertz tone.
[01:12:33.800 --> 01:12:34.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: 2600 hertz tone.
[01:12:34.860 --> 01:12:38.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of people ask why the magazine is called 2600.
[01:12:38.200 --> 01:12:50.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, years ago, before the advent of SS7 and all the sophistication of the modern era, if you made a long-distance phone call and you did this...
[01:12:52.420 --> 01:12:57.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: Apart from all the static, you would actually seize a long-distance trunk.
[01:12:58.860 --> 01:12:59.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's right.
[01:12:59.480 --> 01:13:03.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: You'd seize a long-distance trunk and you'd be able to control it.
[01:13:03.260 --> 01:13:06.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: And magically, the billing computer would not take notice of any of it.
[01:13:06.480 --> 01:13:09.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: So that's how phone freaks got their start.
[01:13:09.120 --> 01:13:11.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's how they would begin...
[01:13:13.040 --> 01:13:14.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Freaking, as the term is called.
[01:13:15.000 --> 01:13:15.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Freaking with a PH.
[01:13:16.140 --> 01:13:17.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: So that's a 2600 hertz tone.
[01:13:17.880 --> 01:13:25.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: And then, by pressing a couple of other keys, they were able to manipulate their way around.
[01:13:25.640 --> 01:13:27.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's see if we can actually show you what that means.
[01:13:28.000 --> 01:13:35.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, by doing that, they would be able to press MF tones, multi-frequency tones, and make sounds kind of like this.
[01:13:35.800 --> 01:13:39.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you probably have heard these in the old days, these particular tones.
[01:13:39.720 --> 01:13:40.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Take a listen.
[01:13:41.900 --> 01:13:52.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, that's basically what you have is your KP tone, which begins a string, the telephone number, and then it finishes off with a start tone.
[01:13:52.300 --> 01:13:55.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's how the actual phone company process calls.
[01:13:57.640 --> 01:14:04.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: And if you hit the 2600 hertz, followed by that particular string, you could route a call anywhere in the world.
[01:14:04.820 --> 01:14:05.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Plain and simple.
[01:14:06.780 --> 01:14:13.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have an old-time phone freak slash hacker, one of the original people of 2600 Magazine.
[01:14:13.860 --> 01:14:14.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: Dave, welcome.
[01:14:15.000 --> 01:14:16.020]  [SPEAKER_18]: Good morning, Emmanuel.
[01:14:16.040 --> 01:14:17.400]  [SPEAKER_18]: I heard you playing my tone.
[01:14:17.860 --> 01:14:18.040]  [SPEAKER_18]: Yeah.
[01:14:19.120 --> 01:14:20.600]  [SPEAKER_18]: It's a magical sound, isn't it?
[01:14:20.600 --> 01:14:22.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's what a lot of people...
[01:14:22.560 --> 01:14:24.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of people are afraid of that sound.
[01:14:24.900 --> 01:14:26.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: People work in the phone company, certainly.
[01:14:26.300 --> 01:14:30.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: But for a lot of other people, it evokes fond memories of past days.
[01:14:31.240 --> 01:14:33.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, I should stress that it's not...
[01:14:33.120 --> 01:14:35.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is not about stealing service or things like that.
[01:14:35.660 --> 01:14:39.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is about exploration, figuring things out.
[01:14:39.260 --> 01:14:40.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I can explain what I mean by that.
[01:14:42.380 --> 01:14:45.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Dialing certain numbers and finding operators that you never even heard of.
[01:14:45.600 --> 01:14:46.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: An inward operator.
[01:14:46.580 --> 01:14:47.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: What's an inward operator?
[01:14:47.720 --> 01:14:53.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, you could wander around the internal mechanisms of the phone system for quite a while.
[01:14:53.420 --> 01:14:53.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: Exploring.
[01:14:54.060 --> 01:14:59.160]  [SPEAKER_18]: I mean, imagine finding operators, finding tones in people who you never knew existed.
[01:14:59.440 --> 01:15:04.740]  [SPEAKER_18]: Finding these strange people who existed in cavernous telephone company offices.
[01:15:05.180 --> 01:15:05.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah.
[01:15:05.860 --> 01:15:10.240]  [SPEAKER_18]: Who only responded to these strange tones and you weren't supposed to dial them.
[01:15:10.380 --> 01:15:11.600]  [SPEAKER_18]: You could make their phone ring.
[01:15:12.200 --> 01:15:13.120]  [SPEAKER_18]: Simple as that.
[01:15:13.120 --> 01:15:17.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: And sometimes they're very happy to make, you know, their phone ring.
[01:15:17.200 --> 01:15:19.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: They're very happy to hear from somebody.
[01:15:20.140 --> 01:15:21.380]  [SPEAKER_18]: Very lonely job.
[01:15:21.940 --> 01:15:22.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'll say.
[01:15:23.320 --> 01:15:25.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: So that's what those tones are.
[01:15:26.780 --> 01:15:27.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Magical tones.
[01:15:28.000 --> 01:15:30.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: The magical tones that a phone freak uses.
[01:15:31.500 --> 01:15:35.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: And this is a tone that I think a lot of people need to hear.
[01:15:35.460 --> 01:15:36.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because it's...
[01:15:37.500 --> 01:15:39.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's something that is such a...
[01:15:39.580 --> 01:15:41.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Such an incredible scandal.
[01:15:41.980 --> 01:15:43.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Such an incredible...
[01:15:43.580 --> 01:15:43.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Sorry?
[01:15:44.000 --> 01:15:44.780]  [SPEAKER_18]: It's an enigma.
[01:15:44.960 --> 01:15:46.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, yeah, I suppose it's that too.
[01:15:46.260 --> 01:15:47.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's...
[01:15:48.520 --> 01:15:51.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's unbelievable how long this has lasted.
[01:15:52.520 --> 01:15:53.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Simply by holding...
[01:15:54.360 --> 01:15:54.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Holding...
[01:15:54.840 --> 01:15:55.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Holding this, uh...
[01:15:55.100 --> 01:15:56.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: This particular device up to...
[01:15:56.940 --> 01:15:58.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: The microphone here.
[01:15:58.440 --> 01:15:59.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: And playing it over the radio.
[01:16:01.900 --> 01:16:04.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: It enables people to make free phone calls.
[01:16:04.560 --> 01:16:05.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's that simple.
[01:16:06.880 --> 01:16:07.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Just by...
[01:16:07.840 --> 01:16:08.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: These little beeps.
[01:16:09.220 --> 01:16:09.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: And take a listen.
[01:16:09.940 --> 01:16:11.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I'm sure you'll recognize what these beeps are.
[01:16:13.280 --> 01:16:14.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: No, you won't because it didn't work.
[01:16:14.880 --> 01:16:15.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's...
[01:16:15.140 --> 01:16:15.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's try that again.
[01:16:16.800 --> 01:16:17.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[01:16:17.920 --> 01:16:18.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: We...
[01:16:18.400 --> 01:16:19.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Hit that.
[01:16:19.040 --> 01:16:20.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: Here we go.
[01:16:20.560 --> 01:16:21.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: No, it didn't work this time either.
[01:16:21.900 --> 01:16:22.920]  [SPEAKER_18]: You used it to my ears.
[01:16:23.200 --> 01:16:24.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: I don't know why it's not working.
[01:16:24.520 --> 01:16:25.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's, um...
[01:16:25.420 --> 01:16:26.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: Sometimes we have...
[01:16:26.220 --> 01:16:27.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have problems.
[01:16:27.420 --> 01:16:27.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, okay.
[01:16:27.780 --> 01:16:28.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's why it didn't work.
[01:16:28.700 --> 01:16:29.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's try this.
[01:16:31.260 --> 01:16:31.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[01:16:32.040 --> 01:16:33.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: That particular sound...
[01:16:34.720 --> 01:16:36.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Is what is known as a...
[01:16:36.080 --> 01:16:37.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Actually, five red box tones.
[01:16:37.820 --> 01:16:39.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: What a red box is...
[01:16:39.060 --> 01:16:41.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: Is a simple way of defeating any payphone.
[01:16:41.900 --> 01:16:44.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: Any NYNEX or New Jersey Bell payphone.
[01:16:44.640 --> 01:16:46.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: When it asks you for money...
[01:16:46.960 --> 01:16:51.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: All it's really listening for, and the computer is quite happy when it hears these tones.
[01:16:51.940 --> 01:16:52.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's a quarter.
[01:16:53.140 --> 01:16:54.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: Five of them is a quarter.
[01:16:54.360 --> 01:16:55.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: Music to my ears.
[01:16:55.540 --> 01:16:56.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's a dime.
[01:16:56.340 --> 01:16:56.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's a nickel.
[01:16:57.620 --> 01:16:58.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's all it is.
[01:16:58.940 --> 01:16:58.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes.
[01:16:59.960 --> 01:17:01.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, you may say to yourself...
[01:17:01.860 --> 01:17:04.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, you know, it's horrible that, um...
[01:17:04.320 --> 01:17:05.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: That these, uh...
[01:17:05.160 --> 01:17:07.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: Kids are wandering around the streets...
[01:17:07.060 --> 01:17:08.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: Making all these, uh...
[01:17:08.480 --> 01:17:10.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: Fraudulent calls, and...
[01:17:10.460 --> 01:17:11.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Ripping off the phone company.
[01:17:12.000 --> 01:17:13.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, there's, uh...
[01:17:13.960 --> 01:17:15.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's something to be said for that.
[01:17:15.500 --> 01:17:16.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, stealing is, uh...
[01:17:16.800 --> 01:17:17.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Is always stealing.
[01:17:18.800 --> 01:17:20.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: But, you have to ask yourself, you know...
[01:17:20.640 --> 01:17:23.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: How much stealing does the phone company itself do?
[01:17:24.720 --> 01:17:25.440]  [SPEAKER_18]: Quite a bit.
[01:17:25.440 --> 01:17:26.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: Ask yourself that.
[01:17:26.960 --> 01:17:28.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: They charge you for Touch-Tones.
[01:17:28.840 --> 01:17:31.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: In New Jersey, they charge you to block call waiting.
[01:17:32.040 --> 01:17:35.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: They charge you for whatever it is they feel they can get away with.
[01:17:36.380 --> 01:17:38.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, I'm gonna prove something here.
[01:17:38.800 --> 01:17:41.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm gonna prove why this is a problem.
[01:17:43.100 --> 01:17:43.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's, uh...
[01:17:43.860 --> 01:17:44.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: See if we can get a dial tone.
[01:17:46.340 --> 01:17:47.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, we got a dial tone here.
[01:17:47.740 --> 01:17:48.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, let's...
[01:17:49.440 --> 01:17:51.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: See if we can actually get an operator.
[01:17:51.660 --> 01:17:52.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: A New York telephone...
[01:17:53.940 --> 01:17:54.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: Operator.
[01:17:57.580 --> 01:17:58.680]  [SPEAKER_15]: New York telephone.
[01:17:59.560 --> 01:18:00.940]  [SPEAKER_15]: Mrs. Hasfield, may I help you?
[01:18:01.280 --> 01:18:02.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: Uh, yes, hello.
[01:18:02.440 --> 01:18:04.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm, uh, trying to find out something about rates.
[01:18:06.200 --> 01:18:07.900]  [SPEAKER_10]: Rates, are we a local or a long distance?
[01:18:08.000 --> 01:18:09.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: Uh, actually, these are long distance rates.
[01:18:09.720 --> 01:18:10.840]  [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, hold on for the operator.
[01:18:11.060 --> 01:18:11.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: Thank you.
[01:18:13.080 --> 01:18:13.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: One moment.
[01:18:14.040 --> 01:18:16.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: For a long distance operator who can assist you.
[01:18:17.520 --> 01:18:18.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: This ought to be fun.
[01:18:22.800 --> 01:18:25.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: Welcome to Metromedia Operator Services.
[01:18:26.240 --> 01:18:29.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: Please enter the area code and telephone number you are calling.
[01:18:30.540 --> 01:18:32.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, you see, this doesn't help us much at all now, does it?
[01:18:34.140 --> 01:18:34.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: Please hold.
[01:18:35.080 --> 01:18:37.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: Your call is being transferred to a live operator.
[01:18:37.500 --> 01:18:38.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, joy.
[01:18:39.380 --> 01:18:42.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, you know, somehow I have a feeling this company isn't going to be able to help us.
[01:18:42.700 --> 01:18:44.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: Metromedia Operator Carol, may I help you?
[01:18:44.400 --> 01:18:47.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes, I'm trying to find out information about payphone rates.
[01:18:47.780 --> 01:18:48.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Payphone rates?
[01:18:48.900 --> 01:18:51.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, I asked my local operator for long distance and they gave me you.
[01:18:51.620 --> 01:18:52.480]  [SPEAKER_10]: Okay, sir.
[01:18:52.840 --> 01:18:57.760]  [SPEAKER_10]: For payphone rates, it's very, it's weird, but the person has to be on that payphone.
[01:18:58.200 --> 01:19:05.560]  [SPEAKER_10]: There's a dial number, area code number they want, and then the operator will speak the amount that they have to pay because it's different from a private phone.
[01:19:06.140 --> 01:19:06.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: Aha.
[01:19:07.200 --> 01:19:07.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[01:19:07.820 --> 01:19:08.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right.
[01:19:08.140 --> 01:19:09.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, thank you very much for your help.
[01:19:09.400 --> 01:19:10.440]  [SPEAKER_10]: Thank you for calling Metromedia.
[01:19:10.740 --> 01:19:11.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, boy.
[01:19:11.980 --> 01:19:13.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: So that's how you find out how much it costs.
[01:19:13.620 --> 01:19:14.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: You make a call from a payphone.
[01:19:14.940 --> 01:19:19.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: Boy, you know, the genius that they excrete on these telephone calls.
[01:19:19.320 --> 01:19:21.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: Obviously, we're not going to get the information that way.
[01:19:21.460 --> 01:19:25.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, is there another number we can call AT&T direct at?
[01:19:25.100 --> 01:19:28.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: We can dial 10288 to zero?
[01:19:28.380 --> 01:19:29.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: No, we can't do that here.
[01:19:29.460 --> 01:19:30.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, we can't do that here.
[01:19:30.940 --> 01:19:31.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah.
[01:19:31.600 --> 01:19:31.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Hmm.
[01:19:32.520 --> 01:19:33.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: How about that 800 number?
[01:19:35.540 --> 01:19:37.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, I think we can...
[01:19:37.960 --> 01:19:38.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's give it a whirl.
[01:19:39.140 --> 01:19:39.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah.
[01:19:39.660 --> 01:19:40.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Is it call AT&T?
[01:19:42.600 --> 01:19:43.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: I think that's it.
[01:19:44.820 --> 01:19:45.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's hope so.
[01:19:45.580 --> 01:19:48.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: Anyway, there's always a way to get through to operators.
[01:19:48.520 --> 01:19:49.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: When you need to.
[01:19:50.920 --> 01:19:54.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: To complete your call, please press or dial 1 now.
[01:19:55.220 --> 01:19:55.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, alright.
[01:19:57.380 --> 01:20:00.120]  [SPEAKER_08]: Thank you for calling AT&T.
[01:20:00.200 --> 01:20:00.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: Boy, she sounds happy.
[01:20:00.800 --> 01:20:04.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: For information on how to place an AT&T call, press 1.
[01:20:05.200 --> 01:20:09.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: For dialing instructions on how to place an AT&T call, press 2.
[01:20:09.980 --> 01:20:17.040]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you are calling regarding your AT&T Universal MasterCard or Visa credit cards, press 3.
[01:20:17.400 --> 01:20:24.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you receive a separate bill from AT&T for your calling card calls and have billing questions, press 4.
[01:20:24.840 --> 01:20:29.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you are calling to order an AT&T calling card, report...
[01:20:29.800 --> 01:20:31.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: I just want to speak to a human.
[01:20:31.560 --> 01:20:40.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: ...at your AT &T calling card, advise of an address or telephone number change, or any other reason concerning your AT&T calling card, press 5.
[01:20:41.260 --> 01:20:43.520]  [SPEAKER_08]: Otherwise, press 6 now.
[01:20:43.520 --> 01:20:45.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: What happens if I press 6?
[01:20:45.560 --> 01:20:46.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, I'll press it.
[01:20:47.480 --> 01:21:00.620]  [SPEAKER_08]: If you are attempting to place an AT&T call for quick and easy call completion, please dial our new number, 1-800-321-0288.
[01:21:00.820 --> 01:21:06.440]  [SPEAKER_08]: That's 1-800-321-0288.
[01:21:06.700 --> 01:21:08.500]  [SPEAKER_08]: Otherwise, stay on the line.
[01:21:09.760 --> 01:21:11.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, now, I don't understand.
[01:21:12.460 --> 01:21:14.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Either call our new number or stay on the line.
[01:21:14.260 --> 01:21:14.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: I don't understand.
[01:21:15.440 --> 01:21:20.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: AT&T, please dial the number you are calling, or zero for an operator, now.
[01:21:21.260 --> 01:21:22.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: Zero for an operator, yes!
[01:21:23.240 --> 01:21:24.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's all I wanted to do.
[01:21:28.710 --> 01:21:31.130]  [SPEAKER_26]: AT&T, Mr. James, how may I help you?
[01:21:31.270 --> 01:21:31.850]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes, hi.
[01:21:31.950 --> 01:21:32.870]  [SPEAKER_21]: You an AT&T operator?
[01:21:33.110 --> 01:21:33.950]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes, I am, sir.
[01:21:34.030 --> 01:21:34.310]  [SPEAKER_21]: Great.
[01:21:34.470 --> 01:21:36.110]  [SPEAKER_21]: I just need some rate information.
[01:21:36.230 --> 01:21:36.990]  [SPEAKER_21]: I was hoping you could help me.
[01:21:37.290 --> 01:21:38.290]  [SPEAKER_26]: I'll certainly try.
[01:21:38.550 --> 01:21:47.930]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, I needed to know what the rate would be to place a direct dial call between a particular number in New York and a particular number in Washington, D.C.
[01:21:50.170 --> 01:21:50.690]  [SPEAKER_26]: Okay, sir.
[01:21:50.790 --> 01:21:53.830]  [SPEAKER_26]: Will you be dialing directly or billing to a calling card?
[01:21:54.190 --> 01:21:55.850]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, I'll be making the call two ways.
[01:21:55.850 --> 01:22:03.190]  [SPEAKER_21]: One would be dialing directly from a residential phone, and the other would be calling through a payphone using coins.
[01:22:05.330 --> 01:22:05.790]  [SPEAKER_26]: All right.
[01:22:05.870 --> 01:22:07.430]  [SPEAKER_26]: Well, it depends on the time of day, sir.
[01:22:07.510 --> 01:22:10.390]  [SPEAKER_26]: If you're making a call from New York to Washington, D.C.
[01:22:10.570 --> 01:22:16.530]  [SPEAKER_26]: between the hours of 9 to 5, paying by coin, it's $2.30 for the first minute.
[01:22:17.170 --> 01:22:21.110]  [SPEAKER_26]: If you're calling from a residence, it should be no more than $0.25 a minute.
[01:22:21.450 --> 01:22:27.010]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, okay, so if I make the call from a payphone, it's going to cost $2.30 for the first minute...
[01:22:27.010 --> 01:22:29.370]  [SPEAKER_26]: It's plus $0.25 for each additional.
[01:22:29.850 --> 01:22:32.810]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, but if I make it from my house, it'll just cost $0.25.
[01:22:33.170 --> 01:22:36.770]  [SPEAKER_26]: It's approximately $0.25, probably less, plus tax.
[01:22:36.770 --> 01:22:37.730]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, how about at night?
[01:22:39.550 --> 01:22:42.550]  [SPEAKER_26]: Night between the hours of 5 to 11?
[01:22:42.770 --> 01:22:44.030]  [SPEAKER_21]: After 11, actually.
[01:22:44.970 --> 01:22:45.430]  [SPEAKER_26]: Pardon me?
[01:22:45.810 --> 01:22:46.830]  [SPEAKER_21]: After 11 p.m.
[01:22:48.190 --> 01:22:49.370]  [SPEAKER_26]: One moment, please.
[01:22:49.710 --> 01:22:51.730]  [SPEAKER_26]: By coin, sir, or again residential?
[01:22:51.870 --> 01:22:52.470]  [SPEAKER_21]: By both.
[01:22:54.150 --> 01:22:54.750]  [SPEAKER_26]: Residential...
[01:22:55.770 --> 01:22:56.870]  [SPEAKER_26]: One moment, please.
[01:22:59.830 --> 01:23:03.230]  [SPEAKER_26]: The coin would be probably maybe $0.25 lower.
[01:23:03.230 --> 01:23:07.930]  [SPEAKER_26]: So it would be $2.25 or $2.20 for the first minute.
[01:23:08.310 --> 01:23:09.490]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, so there's a discount then.
[01:23:09.850 --> 01:23:10.490]  [SPEAKER_26]: Right, sir.
[01:23:10.630 --> 01:23:15.030]  [SPEAKER_26]: And then again, with the residential, it should be no more than $0.15 a minute plus tax.
[01:23:15.290 --> 01:23:15.850]  [SPEAKER_21]: $0.15.
[01:23:16.230 --> 01:23:16.590]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[01:23:17.310 --> 01:23:18.610]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right, thank you very much for your help.
[01:23:19.070 --> 01:23:19.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: Bye-bye.
[01:23:19.750 --> 01:23:21.050]  [SPEAKER_26]: For calling with AT&T.
[01:23:22.310 --> 01:23:22.990]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh, yes.
[01:23:23.090 --> 01:23:32.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, now, maybe that, my friends, is why people are going around doing that.
[01:23:33.300 --> 01:23:34.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: Maybe that's why.
[01:23:34.700 --> 01:23:37.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because it costs $2.30 for one minute.
[01:23:37.720 --> 01:23:40.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: A one-minute phone call to Washington, D.C.
[01:23:40.700 --> 01:23:42.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: virtually any time of the day or night.
[01:23:43.760 --> 01:23:44.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's not right.
[01:23:44.860 --> 01:23:46.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: That is a rip-off.
[01:23:47.060 --> 01:23:48.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: And they prove it themselves.
[01:23:48.960 --> 01:23:49.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: I mean, how...
[01:23:50.200 --> 01:23:57.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: What do you think is going through that guy's head where he has to tell me that if I go to a payphone to make the same call, it's going to cost $2.30 for one minute.
[01:23:57.340 --> 01:23:59.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: And if I do it for my house, it's going to cost $0.25.
[01:23:59.280 --> 01:24:00.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's the same call.
[01:24:02.140 --> 01:24:04.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Why does it cost so much more?
[01:24:06.040 --> 01:24:14.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: Maybe with all the people going around playing with red boxes, the company is still making enough money because of the one or two people that don't.
[01:24:15.240 --> 01:24:19.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: I don't know, but it's an awfully strange way of doing business.
[01:24:19.580 --> 01:24:21.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's actually a very typical way that the phone companies do business.
[01:24:23.720 --> 01:24:27.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's not how we do business here at WBAI, is it?
[01:24:29.280 --> 01:24:30.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:24:30.960 --> 01:24:31.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: Give us a call.
[01:24:31.680 --> 01:24:32.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: Show your support.
[01:24:32.400 --> 01:24:35.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, we're lagging pretty far behind on this particular program.
[01:24:35.240 --> 01:24:36.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: We only have $475.
[01:24:36.860 --> 01:24:39.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: We need to raise $2,000 by noontime.
[01:24:39.600 --> 01:24:47.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: And the way we're going to reach that particular goal is through the help of people like you, people that can pick up the telephone and give a call.
[01:24:48.220 --> 01:24:49.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:24:50.420 --> 01:24:52.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: Show your support for the radio station.
[01:24:52.720 --> 01:24:55.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you can pledge whatever amount you wish.
[01:24:55.320 --> 01:24:57.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you pledge a $75 amount, though, you will...
[01:24:57.640 --> 01:25:06.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you want, that is, you will get the full year of 2600 Magazine, the Hacker Quarterly, and also a 2600 Hacker T-shirt.
[01:25:07.520 --> 01:25:09.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: Those two items will come to you in the mail.
[01:25:10.240 --> 01:25:14.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: And along with our thanks for supporting this radio station, for keeping us going, for keeping us on the air.
[01:25:15.160 --> 01:25:16.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have one call on the line.
[01:25:16.700 --> 01:25:22.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I'd sure like to make that seven, because seven is the maximum number of lines we have.
[01:25:22.480 --> 01:25:25.500]  [SPEAKER_18]: That's 212-279-3400.
[01:25:25.720 --> 01:25:27.580]  [SPEAKER_18]: And we do take Visa and MasterCard.
[01:25:27.660 --> 01:25:29.460]  [SPEAKER_18]: But unfortunately, you can't play tones.
[01:25:29.720 --> 01:25:31.360]  [SPEAKER_18]: You do have to call up and pledge.
[01:25:31.500 --> 01:25:32.400]  [SPEAKER_18]: And you have to talk to a human.
[01:25:32.560 --> 01:25:35.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have human beings in the tally room there.
[01:25:35.320 --> 01:25:36.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: Real human beings.
[01:25:36.300 --> 01:25:41.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you know, when you call up, you're not going to get those machines that say, press one to do this, press two to do that.
[01:25:41.740 --> 01:25:43.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: Man, I couldn't believe that.
[01:25:43.220 --> 01:25:45.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: They were taking me all over the place, weren't they?
[01:25:45.260 --> 01:25:45.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Oh.
[01:25:45.660 --> 01:25:46.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: I was going on a little trip there.
[01:25:46.840 --> 01:25:47.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's ridiculous.
[01:25:47.680 --> 01:25:48.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: All I wanted to do was talk to an operator.
[01:25:49.000 --> 01:25:49.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's all I wanted to do.
[01:25:51.460 --> 01:25:52.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:25:52.960 --> 01:25:54.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't give you the runaround here.
[01:25:54.180 --> 01:25:55.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't give you any of that.
[01:25:55.380 --> 01:25:56.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're human beings.
[01:25:57.100 --> 01:25:58.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're a real radio station.
[01:25:58.440 --> 01:25:59.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're real people.
[01:25:59.940 --> 01:26:01.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: And so are you.
[01:26:01.220 --> 01:26:04.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's why we have to come together, pool our resources, share our knowledge.
[01:26:04.720 --> 01:26:07.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, this program doesn't usually come to you at this particular time of day.
[01:26:07.860 --> 01:26:09.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is a special outing for us.
[01:26:11.140 --> 01:26:18.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: And the reason we're doing this is because there are a lot of you out there that have never heard this program, that have never heard of the various things that we talk about.
[01:26:18.720 --> 01:26:19.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: We talk about privacy.
[01:26:19.880 --> 01:26:20.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: We talk about encryption.
[01:26:20.860 --> 01:26:24.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: In fact, we're going to be speaking to a real expert on the subject in just a couple of minutes.
[01:26:25.020 --> 01:26:29.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: But we do this because there's a need for this kind of information.
[01:26:29.160 --> 01:26:31.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's a definite lack of it around.
[01:26:31.580 --> 01:26:34.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: How many technical programs do you see on television?
[01:26:34.680 --> 01:26:37.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: How many technical columns are there in the daily newspapers?
[01:26:37.880 --> 01:26:46.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, there's one program at least that brings you this particular frame of the news that is not focused upon in other places.
[01:26:46.840 --> 01:26:48.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:26:48.800 --> 01:26:49.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have three calls on the line.
[01:26:49.880 --> 01:26:53.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we're almost halfway to the seven that we need to...
[01:26:53.720 --> 01:26:57.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, to make me happy anyway, to get everybody in the tally room busy.
[01:26:57.380 --> 01:27:02.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: You see, there's a bunch of people in the tally room, and they all have a phone.
[01:27:02.200 --> 01:27:09.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: But the person that sits in front of phone number seven is really depressed because that phone doesn't ring, because they ring in order, you know?
[01:27:09.820 --> 01:27:13.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you have to fill up the first six before number seven rings.
[01:27:13.660 --> 01:27:17.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, I mean, yeah, we want to make that person happy.
[01:27:17.180 --> 01:27:26.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: But most importantly, by making that person happy, we're making everybody happy, because we're adding to the numbers that have already come in.
[01:27:26.180 --> 01:27:32.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, the reason we are doing this is because you are our sponsors.
[01:27:32.780 --> 01:27:36.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: One thing you have not heard on this radio station in the past couple hours...
[01:27:36.780 --> 01:27:41.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: In fact, one thing you have not heard in the past couple of decades is a commercial.
[01:27:41.540 --> 01:27:42.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't have any.
[01:27:42.920 --> 01:27:44.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't have commercials.
[01:27:44.340 --> 01:27:46.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, not only that, we take that a couple of steps further.
[01:27:46.780 --> 01:27:50.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't have underwriting, corporate sponsorships.
[01:27:50.860 --> 01:27:55.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: Never will you hear the phrase, this program has been underwritten by mobile foundation or whatever.
[01:27:55.860 --> 01:27:58.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: You won't hear that here because it's not.
[01:27:58.640 --> 01:27:59.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't accept it.
[01:28:00.140 --> 01:28:01.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: Sure, they would want to do that.
[01:28:01.560 --> 01:28:03.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: They would want to buy this station.
[01:28:03.460 --> 01:28:08.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: They would want to take us off the air and put some kind of Muzak on in our place.
[01:28:09.360 --> 01:28:12.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: But we don't think that's what New York needs.
[01:28:12.540 --> 01:28:14.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: New York needs a station like WBAI.
[01:28:14.740 --> 01:28:17.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: And WBAI needs a person like you.
[01:28:17.320 --> 01:28:19.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:28:19.640 --> 01:28:21.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: Remember, we take credit cards.
[01:28:21.500 --> 01:28:24.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we take whatever you can afford to give us.
[01:28:24.320 --> 01:28:39.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: For a pledge of $75, however, you will get the full year of 2600 Magazine, The Hacker Quarterly, where we stomp on the foot of authority a bit, and spread some information around, and educate people on all kinds of interesting things.
[01:28:39.380 --> 01:28:48.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, the most recent thing that happened to us over at the magazine, we printed a list in the winter issue.
[01:28:48.160 --> 01:28:50.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: I believe it was winter 9293.
[01:28:51.460 --> 01:28:59.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: And this list has basically a collection of AT&T offices, and where they are located, and their phone numbers.
[01:28:59.460 --> 01:29:01.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, AT&T, they have offices everywhere.
[01:29:02.940 --> 01:29:04.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: For instance, let's give you an example here.
[01:29:04.800 --> 01:29:08.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's go to, well, Newark, New Jersey.
[01:29:08.720 --> 01:29:09.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: How's that?
[01:29:09.760 --> 01:29:10.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay?
[01:29:10.440 --> 01:29:15.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: In Newark, New Jersey, we have an office on 95 Williams Street.
[01:29:15.940 --> 01:29:17.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: 95 Williams Street in Newark.
[01:29:17.500 --> 01:29:20.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, these are locations of AT&T offices.
[01:29:21.120 --> 01:29:26.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Would you believe that we got a threatening letter in the mail from AT&T saying, You're printing proprietary information.
[01:29:26.300 --> 01:29:27.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Stop it, or we'll sue you.
[01:29:28.180 --> 01:29:31.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is the mentality that the phone companies have.
[01:29:31.200 --> 01:29:32.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: That you cannot even print their addresses.
[01:29:33.400 --> 01:29:35.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let alone how their phone systems work.
[01:29:35.960 --> 01:29:37.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's the kind of thing that we have to fight.
[01:29:38.080 --> 01:29:40.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we all fight that together.
[01:29:40.380 --> 01:29:42.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: We all fight that by remaining strong.
[01:29:43.360 --> 01:29:44.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: Different entities come together.
[01:29:45.300 --> 01:29:47.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Whether it be magazines, radio stations.
[01:29:48.200 --> 01:29:53.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: The more of us out there that are battling this kind of injustice, the stronger we are.
[01:29:53.080 --> 01:29:55.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: Remember, we're individuals banding together.
[01:29:56.240 --> 01:29:57.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Band with us.
[01:29:58.940 --> 01:30:01.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:30:01.200 --> 01:30:03.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, we had a flurry of calls there.
[01:30:03.560 --> 01:30:07.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: And they seem to have faded away.
[01:30:07.320 --> 01:30:09.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, let's get another flurry coming in.
[01:30:10.020 --> 01:30:11.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:30:11.820 --> 01:30:14.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Remember, we have to make that goal by noon.
[01:30:14.700 --> 01:30:16.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we do want to get on with the program.
[01:30:16.380 --> 01:30:22.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have Phil Zimmerman, who has created quite a controversy with his PGP program.
[01:30:22.360 --> 01:30:23.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: He'll be coming on in just a couple of minutes.
[01:30:25.100 --> 01:30:28.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we have all kinds of other bits of information we want to share with you.
[01:30:29.500 --> 01:30:32.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Hey, we shared these magical tones.
[01:30:32.320 --> 01:30:34.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: We shared other magical tones.
[01:30:35.140 --> 01:30:37.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: News events that are going on throughout the world.
[01:30:37.880 --> 01:30:44.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: Instances of technology fouling up and hurting people and doing all kinds of nasty things.
[01:30:44.460 --> 01:30:52.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: There's an article in today's New York Times about a new kind of technology that's being put into place on the front page of the New York Times.
[01:30:52.460 --> 01:30:55.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you've got to admire the Times for putting stories like this on the front page occasionally.
[01:30:56.080 --> 01:31:01.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's basically a story about record stores and how they're going to be changing over the next few years.
[01:31:02.100 --> 01:31:06.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: We can actually walk into a record store and order a CD by computer.
[01:31:06.460 --> 01:31:09.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: And the CD will be made right there for you.
[01:31:09.760 --> 01:31:11.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: They will never be able to run out of CDs again.
[01:31:13.040 --> 01:31:16.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because you will pick a certain thing over a computer.
[01:31:16.000 --> 01:31:19.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: It will be transmitted down these magical phone lines.
[01:31:19.460 --> 01:31:23.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: And then digitally inscribed onto a blank CD.
[01:31:24.420 --> 01:31:26.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, that's what we're moving down to.
[01:31:26.780 --> 01:31:27.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: Everything is going to be digital.
[01:31:28.340 --> 01:31:35.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Digital movies, digital tapes, digital video, digital life, you know.
[01:31:36.080 --> 01:31:36.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's also digital.
[01:31:37.660 --> 01:31:40.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's how it's going to work.
[01:31:40.320 --> 01:31:41.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: They have a little diagram here.
[01:31:44.260 --> 01:31:49.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: Basically, participating record companies will be putting their recordings in digital form into a master computer library.
[01:31:49.820 --> 01:31:52.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Which will be called a regional server.
[01:31:53.540 --> 01:31:57.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: There will be little booths installed at retail stores.
[01:31:58.180 --> 01:32:03.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: You go into this booth and they have permanent high-speed data links to the regional servers.
[01:32:03.760 --> 01:32:09.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: A customer inside the booth slips a credit card through a swipe card reader.
[01:32:09.540 --> 01:32:16.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: The computer built into the booth checks the store's database for information about the customer's past purchases.
[01:32:17.420 --> 01:32:20.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: And displays a menu of choices tailored to the customer.
[01:32:22.120 --> 01:32:23.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I already see a problem with that.
[01:32:25.060 --> 01:32:26.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: I mean, I don't know.
[01:32:26.240 --> 01:32:30.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: What is it about our past purchases always being part of our permanent record?
[01:32:30.620 --> 01:32:32.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's happening everywhere.
[01:32:32.660 --> 01:32:33.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: No matter what you buy.
[01:32:33.920 --> 01:32:34.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: No matter what you do.
[01:32:34.900 --> 01:32:36.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: Someone's got a record of it somewhere.
[01:32:37.580 --> 01:32:38.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: Anyway, next step.
[01:32:38.880 --> 01:32:40.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: The customer navigates through menus.
[01:32:41.140 --> 01:32:43.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: Hopefully not as much navigation as we had to just do.
[01:32:43.220 --> 01:32:47.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: And makes various selections by touching the screen.
[01:32:48.520 --> 01:32:53.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Video clips and sample cuts can be played to help the customer choose an album.
[01:32:53.480 --> 01:32:57.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: The computer in the booth then signals the regional server to transmit the customer's selection.
[01:32:58.080 --> 01:33:01.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: And charge the cost to the customer's credit card.
[01:33:01.840 --> 01:33:03.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: The selection is transmitted to the booth.
[01:33:04.120 --> 01:33:05.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: Where it is recorded onto a blank CD.
[01:33:06.160 --> 01:33:08.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: While labels and packaging are printed by a color printer.
[01:33:09.840 --> 01:33:13.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: The manufacturing process takes at least six minutes.
[01:33:13.920 --> 01:33:15.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: Then while the customer waits.
[01:33:15.700 --> 01:33:17.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: The booth computer may offer related merchandise.
[01:33:18.120 --> 01:33:18.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Like concert tickets.
[01:33:19.240 --> 01:33:20.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Or posters.
[01:33:20.540 --> 01:33:21.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Or...
[01:33:21.100 --> 01:33:22.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Might even show video clips if you're lucky.
[01:33:23.140 --> 01:33:25.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: Then when the CD and it's packaging are ready.
[01:33:25.600 --> 01:33:28.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: They appear in the booth for the customer to take.
[01:33:30.140 --> 01:33:32.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, you know...
[01:33:35.740 --> 01:33:38.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: ...article about cellular telephones.
[01:33:38.140 --> 01:33:42.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we're very specific as to the frequencies that cellular telephones are on.
[01:33:43.300 --> 01:33:45.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: That would be illegal to listen to them.
[01:33:45.500 --> 01:33:48.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, this is the mentality of government regulations.
[01:33:50.020 --> 01:33:52.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's very easy to listen.
[01:33:52.620 --> 01:33:54.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's illegal to listen.
[01:33:54.600 --> 01:33:59.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: They've actually gone and made a law saying you cannot tune to...
[01:33:59.980 --> 01:34:00.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, let's see.
[01:34:00.900 --> 01:34:01.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's pick a frequency.
[01:34:02.080 --> 01:34:04.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: To 875.820 megahertz.
[01:34:04.780 --> 01:34:05.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: But...
[01:34:05.180 --> 01:34:08.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: You cannot tune to that and listen to what you hear.
[01:34:09.180 --> 01:34:09.720]  [SPEAKER_18]: Unencrypted.
[01:34:09.920 --> 01:34:10.540]  [SPEAKER_18]: Unencrypted mind you.
[01:34:10.540 --> 01:34:12.140]  [SPEAKER_18]: I get that on my old television set.
[01:34:12.260 --> 01:34:13.020]  [SPEAKER_18]: Yeah, well...
[01:34:13.020 --> 01:34:17.280]  [SPEAKER_18]: I tune to Channel 83 and I start hearing people's cellular telephone calls.
[01:34:17.340 --> 01:34:17.900]  [SPEAKER_18]: Would that be illegal?
[01:34:18.040 --> 01:34:18.660]  [SPEAKER_18]: Yeah, that is illegal.
[01:34:18.860 --> 01:34:22.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's illegal to listen to cellular telephone calls on your old TV set.
[01:34:22.140 --> 01:34:24.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, but those old UHF channels were converted.
[01:34:25.400 --> 01:34:28.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: And old TV sets, yeah, you can hear that.
[01:34:28.100 --> 01:34:29.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: And it's illegal.
[01:34:29.200 --> 01:34:35.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, rather than put some kind of encryption that is actually secure, they come up with these bizarre laws.
[01:34:35.880 --> 01:34:40.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's enough to make you really wonder if these people have any knowledge whatsoever.
[01:34:40.940 --> 01:34:48.470]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, from what people listening are getting out of this, perhaps they can share that with their elected representatives.
[01:34:48.470 --> 01:34:50.850]  [SPEAKER_21]: If we can educate them, there might be hope.
[01:34:51.710 --> 01:34:53.330]  [SPEAKER_21]: But no one's going to do it for us.
[01:34:53.430 --> 01:34:56.290]  [SPEAKER_21]: And just like no one's going to call for you, please give us a call now.
[01:34:56.450 --> 01:34:58.910]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:34:59.430 --> 01:35:02.310]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're going to go into a bit of music here.
[01:35:02.390 --> 01:35:03.630]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're going to come back with Phil Zimmerman.
[01:35:03.630 --> 01:35:07.790]  [SPEAKER_21]: But by the time we get back, I expect some calls to come in.
[01:35:08.050 --> 01:35:09.550]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm trusting you folks out there.
[01:35:09.730 --> 01:35:13.970]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:35:14.210 --> 01:35:17.890]  [SPEAKER_21]: Show your support for WBAI New York.
[01:35:28.530 --> 01:35:29.970]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:29.970 --> 01:35:30.010]  We'll be right back.
[01:35:31.170 --> 01:35:31.810]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:32.830 --> 01:35:33.550]  We'll be right back.
[01:35:33.550 --> 01:35:33.630]  We'll be right back.
[01:35:35.070 --> 01:35:36.590]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:36.930 --> 01:35:37.130]  We'll be right back.
[01:35:38.730 --> 01:35:39.210]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:39.630 --> 01:35:40.110]  We'll be right back.
[01:35:40.110 --> 01:35:40.550]  We'll be right back.
[01:35:41.310 --> 01:35:41.790]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:41.790 --> 01:35:41.850]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:41.850 --> 01:35:41.910]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:42.430 --> 01:35:43.530]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:48.070 --> 01:35:49.190]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll be right back.
[01:35:49.190 --> 01:35:49.990]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stop the fight.
[01:35:51.330 --> 01:35:54.090]  [SPEAKER_20]: You preach a man, don't tell me.
[01:35:54.810 --> 01:35:57.510]  [SPEAKER_20]: Heaven is under the earth.
[01:35:58.410 --> 01:36:04.070]  [SPEAKER_20]: You are dubby and you don't know what life is really worth.
[01:36:04.970 --> 01:36:08.010]  [SPEAKER_20]: It's not all that glitter is gold.
[01:36:08.470 --> 01:36:11.650]  [SPEAKER_20]: And half a story has never been told.
[01:36:11.970 --> 01:36:14.430]  [SPEAKER_20]: So now we see the light.
[01:36:14.690 --> 01:36:17.610]  [SPEAKER_20]: We gonna stand up for our rights.
[01:36:18.030 --> 01:36:19.110]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on.
[01:36:19.190 --> 01:36:19.690]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up.
[01:36:19.890 --> 01:36:20.590]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:36:21.470 --> 01:36:22.130]  [SPEAKER_20]: Brothers.
[01:36:22.850 --> 01:36:24.350]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up for your rights.
[01:36:25.190 --> 01:36:25.790]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on.
[01:36:26.050 --> 01:36:26.510]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up.
[01:36:26.750 --> 01:36:27.390]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:36:27.690 --> 01:36:28.550]  [SPEAKER_20]: Sit down.
[01:36:29.190 --> 01:36:31.110]  [SPEAKER_20]: Don't give up the fight.
[01:36:31.490 --> 01:36:33.310]  [SPEAKER_20]: I'm begging you to get up.
[01:36:33.570 --> 01:36:34.150]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:36:35.770 --> 01:36:37.950]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up for your rights.
[01:36:39.250 --> 01:36:40.150]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up.
[01:36:40.490 --> 01:36:40.990]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:36:42.050 --> 01:36:44.830]  [SPEAKER_20]: I said don't give up the fight.
[01:36:45.410 --> 01:36:48.850]  [SPEAKER_20]: Cause you know most people think.
[01:36:49.190 --> 01:36:52.330]  [SPEAKER_20]: A great God will come from the skies.
[01:36:52.990 --> 01:36:56.310]  [SPEAKER_20]: And take away every little thing.
[01:36:56.730 --> 01:36:58.930]  [SPEAKER_20]: And let everybody dry.
[01:36:59.770 --> 01:37:03.350]  [SPEAKER_20]: But if you know what life is worth.
[01:37:03.650 --> 01:37:06.770]  [SPEAKER_20]: You would look for yours right here on earth.
[01:37:07.030 --> 01:37:08.870]  [SPEAKER_20]: And now we see the light.
[01:37:09.410 --> 01:37:12.350]  [SPEAKER_20]: We gonna stand up for our rights.
[01:37:12.990 --> 01:37:13.770]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on.
[01:37:13.930 --> 01:37:14.330]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up.
[01:37:14.570 --> 01:37:15.170]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:37:15.470 --> 01:37:17.070]  [SPEAKER_20]: Don't make them push you around.
[01:37:17.290 --> 01:37:18.930]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up for your rights.
[01:37:19.190 --> 01:37:20.210]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on brothers.
[01:37:20.510 --> 01:37:21.130]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up.
[01:37:21.390 --> 01:37:22.030]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:37:22.690 --> 01:37:23.930]  [SPEAKER_20]: Be brave now.
[01:37:24.110 --> 01:37:25.990]  [SPEAKER_20]: Don't give up the fight.
[01:37:26.870 --> 01:37:28.010]  [SPEAKER_20]: I say get up.
[01:37:28.290 --> 01:37:28.910]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:37:30.530 --> 01:37:32.670]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up for your rights.
[01:37:32.970 --> 01:37:34.270]  [SPEAKER_20]: Don't let them hold you down.
[01:37:34.470 --> 01:37:34.870]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up.
[01:37:35.230 --> 01:37:35.750]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:37:37.910 --> 01:37:39.830]  [SPEAKER_20]: Don't give up for the fight.
[01:37:50.960 --> 01:37:51.920]  [SPEAKER_20]: We'll see you next time.
[01:37:51.920 --> 01:37:54.220]  [SPEAKER_20]: I'm getting up for your rights.
[01:37:54.760 --> 01:37:55.520]  [SPEAKER_20]: We gonna stand up for our rights.
[01:37:55.520 --> 01:37:55.600]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on.
[01:37:55.640 --> 01:37:56.340]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up.
[01:37:56.640 --> 01:37:57.460]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up.
[01:37:57.960 --> 01:38:03.580]  [SPEAKER_20]: And now we see the light.
[01:38:04.040 --> 01:38:08.040]  [SPEAKER_20]: We gonna stand up for our rights.יא.
[01:38:08.040 --> 01:38:10.020]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on, get up, stand up.
[01:38:11.520 --> 01:38:13.560]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up for your eyes.
[01:38:13.840 --> 01:38:14.860]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on, our brothers.
[01:38:15.260 --> 01:38:16.620]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up, stand up.
[01:38:17.960 --> 01:38:20.360]  [SPEAKER_20]: I said, don't give up the fight.
[01:38:20.660 --> 01:38:21.420]  [SPEAKER_20]: Don't let them push.
[01:38:21.420 --> 01:38:23.420]  [SPEAKER_20]: I said, get up, stand up.
[01:38:25.080 --> 01:38:27.200]  [SPEAKER_20]: Stand up for your eyes.
[01:38:27.460 --> 01:38:28.520]  [SPEAKER_20]: Come on, our sisters.
[01:38:28.920 --> 01:38:30.240]  [SPEAKER_20]: Get up, stand up.
[01:38:39.960 --> 01:38:40.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: Good evening.
[01:38:41.300 --> 01:38:43.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: You've reached our voice-activated switchboard.
[01:38:43.820 --> 01:38:45.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please speak in a loud, clear tone of voice.
[01:38:47.560 --> 01:38:49.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please tell me your telephone number.
[01:38:53.580 --> 01:38:54.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: 718-6134
[01:38:57.970 --> 01:38:59.790]  [SPEAKER_21]: Your telephone number is...
[01:39:04.030 --> 01:39:06.370]  [SPEAKER_21]: 718-6164 No.
[01:39:06.670 --> 01:39:08.110]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is correct, say yes.
[01:39:08.350 --> 01:39:10.110]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is not correct, say no.
[01:39:10.510 --> 01:39:11.110]  [SPEAKER_14]: No.
[01:39:11.890 --> 01:39:13.770]  [SPEAKER_21]: Your telephone number is incorrect.
[01:39:16.070 --> 01:39:17.870]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please tell me your telephone number.
[01:39:24.030 --> 01:39:28.510]  [SPEAKER_14]: 718-6134 718-6134 Your telephone number is...
[01:39:32.570 --> 01:39:36.350]  [SPEAKER_21]: 718-6134 If this is correct, say yes.
[01:39:36.530 --> 01:39:38.150]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is not correct, say no.
[01:39:38.490 --> 01:39:38.870]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:39:40.370 --> 01:39:42.210]  [SPEAKER_21]: Your telephone number is correct.
[01:39:42.670 --> 01:39:43.310]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:39:44.350 --> 01:39:46.870]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please tell me your social security number.
[01:39:48.130 --> 01:39:48.690]  [SPEAKER_14]: What?
[01:39:52.730 --> 01:39:54.950]  [SPEAKER_21]: Your social security number is...
[01:39:54.950 --> 01:39:57.990]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is correct, say yes.
[01:39:58.190 --> 01:39:59.790]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is not correct, say no.
[01:40:00.110 --> 01:40:00.870]  [SPEAKER_11]: Say yes.
[01:40:01.010 --> 01:40:01.710]  [SPEAKER_11]: Oh, God.
[01:40:03.550 --> 01:40:05.670]  [SPEAKER_21]: Your social security number is correct.
[01:40:06.790 --> 01:40:08.870]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please describe the nature of your problem.
[01:40:14.440 --> 01:40:16.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: The nature of your problem is wrong number.
[01:40:17.320 --> 01:40:18.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is correct, say yes.
[01:40:19.120 --> 01:40:20.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is not correct, say no.
[01:40:20.600 --> 01:40:21.660]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes.
[01:40:24.560 --> 01:40:25.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes.
[01:40:53.030 --> 01:40:53.850]  [SPEAKER_14]: Your problem is correct.
[01:40:53.850 --> 01:40:54.810]  [SPEAKER_14]: Whatever the call cost.
[01:40:57.150 --> 01:40:59.410]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm sorry, I must have a number in your answer.
[01:41:02.540 --> 01:41:03.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, Jesus.
[01:41:06.060 --> 01:41:09.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you would like us to calculate the credit, please say yes at this point.
[01:41:10.380 --> 01:41:10.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:41:10.820 --> 01:41:11.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:41:12.720 --> 01:41:15.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please tell me what number you were trying to call.
[01:41:16.620 --> 01:41:18.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: 2-0-1.
[01:41:18.400 --> 01:41:18.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: 2-0-1.
[01:41:20.920 --> 01:41:23.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: 6-1-3-2.
[01:41:35.120 --> 01:41:37.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is correct, say yes.
[01:41:37.320 --> 01:41:38.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is not correct, say no.
[01:41:39.140 --> 01:41:39.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:41:40.320 --> 01:41:40.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:41:41.500 --> 01:41:43.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please hold while I calculate the credit.
[01:41:47.090 --> 01:41:49.710]  [SPEAKER_13]: I can't believe they waste this much time to do this.
[01:41:56.100 --> 01:42:00.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: The amount of credit required is $17.63.
[01:42:01.240 --> 01:42:03.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is acceptable, say yes.
[01:42:03.160 --> 01:42:04.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is not acceptable, say no.
[01:42:06.060 --> 01:42:06.820]  [SPEAKER_13]: So, yes.
[01:42:08.540 --> 01:42:10.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: We will mail you a check for the amount of money.
[01:42:12.580 --> 01:42:14.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is acceptable, say yes.
[01:42:14.480 --> 01:42:16.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: If this is not acceptable, say no.
[01:42:16.120 --> 01:42:17.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:42:18.200 --> 01:42:20.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Thank you for calling and for being so patient.
[01:42:21.140 --> 01:42:22.760]  [SPEAKER_13]: Oh, God, help me.
[01:42:25.020 --> 01:42:26.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please call again.
[01:42:26.760 --> 01:42:27.740]  [SPEAKER_13]: Do I hang up now?
[01:42:28.140 --> 01:42:28.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yes, you do.
[01:42:29.160 --> 01:42:29.720]  [SPEAKER_13]: Thank you.
[01:42:30.240 --> 01:42:30.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: Goodbye.
[01:42:31.160 --> 01:42:31.440]  [SPEAKER_13]: Goodbye.
[01:42:34.160 --> 01:42:34.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[01:42:35.620 --> 01:42:36.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's, uh...
[01:42:36.720 --> 01:42:39.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's something from the past, let's just put it that way.
[01:42:41.280 --> 01:42:41.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Somehow...
[01:42:41.840 --> 01:42:46.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: Somehow that person got the impression that the other person was a computer.
[01:42:46.860 --> 01:43:00.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, I don't know how many times you've had conversations with people on the telephone and you're not sure if they're a computer or if they're real, but in that particular case, I think it was pretty clear that that person somehow thought the other person was a computer.
[01:43:00.260 --> 01:43:07.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, I can't really say how that happened, but it's quite possible to fool people a lot of the time.
[01:43:07.520 --> 01:43:08.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Don't be fooled.
[01:43:09.520 --> 01:43:12.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's not easy to, uh...
[01:43:12.200 --> 01:43:14.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Actually, it's not hard to be fooled, but, uh...
[01:43:14.960 --> 01:43:16.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: A little education.
[01:43:17.560 --> 01:43:19.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you'll be able to, uh...
[01:43:19.820 --> 01:43:20.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: overcome these things.
[01:43:21.540 --> 01:43:22.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Funny as they may be.
[01:43:22.900 --> 01:43:23.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: All right.
[01:43:23.460 --> 01:43:24.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: The program is off the hook.
[01:43:24.600 --> 01:43:25.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is Emmanuel Goldstein.
[01:43:25.580 --> 01:43:29.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're together until null or noon or what have you.
[01:43:29.560 --> 01:43:35.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we require your help to get us through these difficult times.
[01:43:35.520 --> 01:43:39.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because these are difficult times, as most of our pledge drives usually turn out to be.
[01:43:40.080 --> 01:43:40.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Uh...
[01:43:40.720 --> 01:43:41.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: But that's...
[01:43:41.340 --> 01:43:43.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's why we have them three times a year.
[01:43:44.460 --> 01:43:46.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[01:43:46.620 --> 01:43:49.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're asking for your support to keep this station going.
[01:43:49.580 --> 01:43:50.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: To keep, uh...
[01:43:50.340 --> 01:43:55.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: The kinds of things that we have on the airwaves coming your way.
[01:43:55.860 --> 01:43:58.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have on the phone with us somebody who, uh...
[01:43:58.640 --> 01:44:00.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: Who knows what it is to, uh...
[01:44:00.340 --> 01:44:01.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: To fight the powers that be.
[01:44:02.520 --> 01:44:04.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: Phil Zimmerman, who, uh...
[01:44:04.620 --> 01:44:05.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Joins us from Colorado.
[01:44:06.580 --> 01:44:07.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: Uh...
[01:44:07.060 --> 01:44:09.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: He's written a program called PGP.
[01:44:09.620 --> 01:44:13.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: That has caused quite a bit of consternation and, uh...
[01:44:13.520 --> 01:44:15.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: A bit of a moral dilemma for various people.
[01:44:16.780 --> 01:44:17.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, uh...
[01:44:17.660 --> 01:44:18.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: Phil, perhaps you could...
[01:44:18.320 --> 01:44:20.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: You could start off by describing to us...
[01:44:20.800 --> 01:44:23.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: And in layman's terms, because considering...
[01:44:23.360 --> 01:44:25.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: Probably most people listening don't even have a computer.
[01:44:26.560 --> 01:44:28.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: What is it that PGP does?
[01:44:29.560 --> 01:44:30.080]  [SPEAKER_27]: Uh...
[01:44:30.080 --> 01:44:31.240]  [SPEAKER_27]: PGP, uh...
[01:44:31.240 --> 01:44:34.080]  [SPEAKER_27]: Which stands for Pretty Good Privacy, is a program that...
[01:44:34.080 --> 01:44:34.660]  [SPEAKER_27]: That, uh...
[01:44:34.660 --> 01:44:36.460]  [SPEAKER_27]: Does data encryption for your computer.
[01:44:37.660 --> 01:44:38.180]  [SPEAKER_27]: Um...
[01:44:38.180 --> 01:44:40.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's used to send electronic mail, mostly.
[01:44:41.560 --> 01:44:42.080]  [SPEAKER_27]: Um...
[01:44:42.080 --> 01:44:44.120]  [SPEAKER_27]: And the nice thing about it, uh...
[01:44:44.120 --> 01:44:44.860]  [SPEAKER_27]: Is that it can...
[01:44:44.860 --> 01:44:47.040]  [SPEAKER_27]: You can use it to send electronic mail, uh...
[01:44:47.400 --> 01:44:52.420]  [SPEAKER_27]: Encrypted electronic mail, or scrambled up electronic mail, to somebody who, um...
[01:44:52.420 --> 01:44:57.820]  [SPEAKER_27]: You've never met, and you haven't had any prior exchange of, uh... keys through secure channels with.
[01:44:58.550 --> 01:44:59.160]  [SPEAKER_27]: Uh...
[01:44:59.160 --> 01:45:01.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: The problem with cryptography, um...
[01:45:01.800 --> 01:45:03.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: Which is the, uh...
[01:45:03.340 --> 01:45:03.980]  [SPEAKER_27]: The, uh...
[01:45:03.980 --> 01:45:05.320]  [SPEAKER_27]: The art of, um...
[01:45:05.320 --> 01:45:09.260]  [SPEAKER_27]: Of scrambling up information so that nobody can recognize it without, uh...
[01:45:09.260 --> 01:45:11.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: The proper key to unscramble it, uh...
[01:45:11.800 --> 01:45:14.560]  [SPEAKER_27]: Usually requires, um...
[01:45:14.560 --> 01:45:16.660]  [SPEAKER_27]: That these, uh...
[01:45:16.660 --> 01:45:19.660]  [SPEAKER_27]: Scrambling and unscrambling keys be transmitted over...
[01:45:19.660 --> 01:45:24.980]  [SPEAKER_27]: Some kind of secure channel between the communicating parties before the communication happens.
[01:45:25.780 --> 01:45:26.400]  [SPEAKER_27]: Um...
[01:45:26.400 --> 01:45:27.650]  [SPEAKER_27]: And, um...
[01:45:28.520 --> 01:45:29.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: PGP, uh...
[01:45:29.960 --> 01:45:34.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: Uses a new kind of technology called public key cryptography, uh...
[01:45:34.140 --> 01:45:35.680]  [SPEAKER_27]: Which doesn't require this...
[01:45:35.680 --> 01:45:37.560]  [SPEAKER_27]: These secure channels to exchange keys.
[01:45:37.560 --> 01:45:40.440]  [SPEAKER_27]: This allows people for the first time, uh...
[01:45:40.440 --> 01:45:41.280]  [SPEAKER_27]: I mean, for the...
[01:45:41.280 --> 01:45:41.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: Not...
[01:45:41.800 --> 01:45:43.900]  [SPEAKER_27]: This is not the first piece of software to, uh...
[01:45:43.900 --> 01:45:45.220]  [SPEAKER_27]: Allow this to happen, but...
[01:45:45.220 --> 01:45:47.980]  [SPEAKER_27]: Relatively speaking, over the centuries, uh...
[01:45:47.980 --> 01:45:48.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: Um...
[01:45:48.140 --> 01:45:49.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: It is now possible for the first time...
[01:45:49.800 --> 01:45:51.220]  [SPEAKER_27]: To, um...
[01:45:51.220 --> 01:45:53.420]  [SPEAKER_27]: Communicate with people, um...
[01:45:53.420 --> 01:45:53.840]  [SPEAKER_27]: In...
[01:45:53.840 --> 01:45:55.260]  [SPEAKER_27]: In mass, in million- to...
[01:45:55.260 --> 01:45:56.900]  [SPEAKER_27]: You can send a message to any...
[01:45:56.900 --> 01:45:58.240]  [SPEAKER_27]: Anybody that you can make...
[01:45:58.720 --> 01:46:00.440]  [SPEAKER_27]: That you can send electronic mail to.
[01:46:01.540 --> 01:46:02.020]  Uh...
[01:46:02.020 --> 01:46:02.320]  [SPEAKER_27]: Uh...
[01:46:02.320 --> 01:46:08.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: You can send a message that's encrypted to anyone that you can send electronic mail to without having to get the keys straightened out beforehand.
[01:46:10.320 --> 01:46:10.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: I see.
[01:46:11.100 --> 01:46:19.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: So for the average person, then, this is a way to just maintain their privacy, or is this something above and beyond what we're used to?
[01:46:21.980 --> 01:46:27.480]  [SPEAKER_27]: Well, if you look at paper mail, people send their paper mail in envelopes.
[01:46:27.820 --> 01:46:29.840]  [SPEAKER_27]: And people are used to that kind of privacy.
[01:46:29.840 --> 01:46:35.160]  [SPEAKER_27]: If the authorities wanted to open your mail, they could do it.
[01:46:35.340 --> 01:46:38.600]  [SPEAKER_27]: They could target you for investigation and open your mail.
[01:46:38.920 --> 01:46:41.540]  [SPEAKER_27]: But they would have to be targeting you for investigation.
[01:46:43.160 --> 01:46:48.220]  [SPEAKER_27]: This is sort of like going fishing with a hook and a line.
[01:46:49.020 --> 01:46:55.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: But with electronic mail, it's possible for the government to do driftnet fishing, catching millions of fish.
[01:46:55.660 --> 01:47:01.980]  [SPEAKER_27]: The government can scan tens of millions of pieces of electronic mail every day if it's not encrypted.
[01:47:02.460 --> 01:47:16.020]  [SPEAKER_27]: And that means they can look at everyone's electronic mail and find anyone communicating with subversive keywords or anything that looks suspicious to whoever is in power in the government at the time.
[01:47:16.020 --> 01:47:27.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, you seem to think that the government is what we should be aware of, whereas if you listen to the government, if you listen to the media, you would think that hackers are the people that you should be wary of.
[01:47:27.840 --> 01:47:31.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: They're the ones that are out there trying to read your electronic mail.
[01:47:31.240 --> 01:47:32.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: What do you think is the bigger threat?
[01:47:35.000 --> 01:47:42.940]  [SPEAKER_27]: Well, I think that historically, governments have been more dangerous to their own people than hackers.
[01:47:45.640 --> 01:47:47.480]  [SPEAKER_27]: I guess hackers can read your mail.
[01:47:47.600 --> 01:47:48.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: In fact, I'm sure that that happens.
[01:47:50.380 --> 01:47:53.060]  [SPEAKER_27]: But if you encrypt it, you'll be protecting it from both.
[01:47:53.060 --> 01:48:08.160]  [SPEAKER_27]: And more importantly, if you lay down a technology infrastructure where everyone encrypts their mail, you'll be strengthening democracy by making it more difficult for government to surveil its citizenry.
[01:48:08.480 --> 01:48:09.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, it's interesting.
[01:48:09.700 --> 01:48:13.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: As I pointed out before, hackers are pushing for this kind of thing.
[01:48:13.940 --> 01:48:18.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: So I don't think they're really the threat as far as reading private mail.
[01:48:18.200 --> 01:48:21.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: But the government is not exactly pushing this.
[01:48:21.580 --> 01:48:24.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: In fact, the most recent thing is the introduction of the clipper chip.
[01:48:24.300 --> 01:48:27.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, what is your take on that particular revelation?
[01:48:29.040 --> 01:48:29.860]  [SPEAKER_27]: Well, okay.
[01:48:30.600 --> 01:48:36.880]  [SPEAKER_27]: I don't know how much background you've covered earlier on the clipper chip, but I guess I can do a quick review.
[01:48:37.840 --> 01:48:56.540]  [SPEAKER_27]: On April 16th, the Clinton administration unveiled a plan that has been in the works for the past four years by the NSA for making available to industry an integrated circuit called the clipper chip that does data encryption.
[01:48:56.820 --> 01:49:14.080]  [SPEAKER_27]: And they want everyone in industry to put this into secure telephones, secure fax machines, their computers, anything that's involved in data communication or voice communication, or maybe video conferencing, or anything that involves electronic communication where privacy is desired.
[01:49:15.440 --> 01:49:19.020]  [SPEAKER_27]: This clipper chip encrypts the data that passes through it.
[01:49:19.600 --> 01:49:29.660]  [SPEAKER_27]: And when it's manufactured for the government, the government puts into the chip the keys that are used for decrypting the traffic.
[01:49:29.940 --> 01:49:31.740]  [SPEAKER_27]: And they keep a copy of that key.
[01:49:32.220 --> 01:49:46.240]  [SPEAKER_27]: So that means that if AT&T, for example, installs this in one of their products, which they are currently doing, if you buy one of those products, a secure telephone, and you talk on it, the government will be able to listen in.
[01:49:46.380 --> 01:49:50.040]  [SPEAKER_27]: Maybe no one else can listen in, but the government can listen in.
[01:49:50.120 --> 01:50:01.160]  [SPEAKER_27]: And it's not entirely clear that no one else can listen in, because if the government keeps a database of these keys, it's not clear that no one else can get at that database.
[01:50:02.920 --> 01:50:05.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, we're talking about something here.
[01:50:05.160 --> 01:50:11.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, first of all, AT&T has said that they're going to manufacture clipper chips or use clipper chips.
[01:50:12.680 --> 01:50:15.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: They said it the same day that it was announced, didn't they?
[01:50:15.440 --> 01:50:17.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Do you think they had some inside knowledge about this?
[01:50:17.500 --> 01:50:21.540]  [SPEAKER_27]: Well, I'm sure that AT&T was advised of the program before it was unveiled.
[01:50:23.080 --> 01:50:27.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: The chips are being manufactured by a defense contractor in California.
[01:50:29.200 --> 01:50:33.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: I suppose other manufacturers will be allowed to manufacture it as well.
[01:50:33.940 --> 01:50:37.280]  [SPEAKER_27]: But the algorithm that's used to do the encryption is classified.
[01:50:37.580 --> 01:50:45.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's unlike the federal data encryption standard, which has been around since the late 1970s, and all the banks use it.
[01:50:45.140 --> 01:50:47.720]  [SPEAKER_27]: But the data encryption standard is a public algorithm.
[01:50:47.880 --> 01:50:51.720]  [SPEAKER_27]: Everyone knows what the algorithm is, or everyone can know it if they go to their library and look it up.
[01:50:53.060 --> 01:50:59.460]  [SPEAKER_27]: And so people can scrutinize it and see if it has any holes in it, or more importantly, backdoors in it.
[01:51:00.220 --> 01:51:05.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: The algorithm used in the clipper chip was designed by NSA, and it's called Skipjack by NSA.
[01:51:06.740 --> 01:51:09.120]  [SPEAKER_27]: The Skipjack algorithm is classified.
[01:51:09.380 --> 01:51:12.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: Well, you're not allowed to review it to see if it's a good algorithm.
[01:51:12.140 --> 01:51:21.640]  [SPEAKER_27]: The government has said that they'll allow cryptographic experts to review the algorithm, and then they can make their report to the public without disclosing what the algorithm is.
[01:51:21.740 --> 01:51:24.420]  [SPEAKER_27]: They can say whether they thought it was a good algorithm or not.
[01:51:25.360 --> 01:51:35.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: I actually don't think that the algorithm needs to have any backdoors, because if the government has the keys, it doesn't matter how strong the algorithm is.
[01:51:36.220 --> 01:51:38.300]  [SPEAKER_27]: The government can read the traffic no matter what.
[01:51:39.300 --> 01:51:40.920]  [SPEAKER_27]: So probably it's a good algorithm.
[01:51:42.920 --> 01:51:45.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, let's take a look at a typical...
[01:51:45.500 --> 01:51:45.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Excuse me.
[01:51:46.220 --> 01:51:46.400]  [SPEAKER_27]: Yeah.
[01:51:46.620 --> 01:51:47.200]  [SPEAKER_27]: There's a...
[01:51:47.200 --> 01:51:48.820]  [SPEAKER_27]: Your voice keeps fading in and out.
[01:51:48.920 --> 01:51:51.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: Is my voice also fading in and out at your end?
[01:51:51.600 --> 01:51:58.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: No, your voice is fine, but the WBAI phone system is unique in that it fades out superfluous noise on its own discretion.
[01:51:59.220 --> 01:52:00.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: Can you hear me all right, though?
[01:52:00.780 --> 01:52:02.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: I can hear you on and off.
[01:52:02.680 --> 01:52:02.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[01:52:03.200 --> 01:52:03.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, that's about...
[01:52:03.840 --> 01:52:05.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: I hear you clearly, and then you're gone.
[01:52:05.820 --> 01:52:30.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: I hear that complaint a lot, actually, but basically what I'd like to ask you, then, is if a best-case scenario from the government's point of view, the way this particular clipper chip would work, they have their drug dealer or child molester or what have you that they want to hone in on and get more data.
[01:52:31.120 --> 01:52:31.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: How do they do it?
[01:52:31.920 --> 01:52:32.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: What do they do?
[01:52:32.440 --> 01:52:33.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: Do they get a court order of some sort?
[01:52:33.920 --> 01:52:35.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: How does the clipper chip come into effect here?
[01:52:36.880 --> 01:52:37.440]  [SPEAKER_27]: Okay.
[01:52:38.000 --> 01:52:44.760]  [SPEAKER_27]: When the chip is manufactured, the key is put into the chip, the cryptographic key.
[01:52:44.920 --> 01:52:51.300]  [SPEAKER_27]: And the key is split into two parts and given to two escrow agencies.
[01:52:53.200 --> 01:52:56.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: One of the escrow agencies will probably be in the government.
[01:52:56.480 --> 01:53:02.620]  [SPEAKER_27]: The other escrow agency may not be in the... might possibly not be in the government.
[01:53:02.620 --> 01:53:05.520]  [SPEAKER_27]: The escrow agencies have not been selected yet.
[01:53:06.160 --> 01:53:09.040]  [SPEAKER_27]: The attorney general will select the escrow agencies.
[01:53:10.540 --> 01:53:16.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: So these two escrow agencies will hold these key fragments.
[01:53:17.960 --> 01:53:30.240]  [SPEAKER_27]: And when the government presents the escrow agencies with a court order at some time to do a wiretap, the escrow agencies will surrender the key for that particular person who's the target of the court ordered wiretap.
[01:53:30.820 --> 01:53:40.740]  [SPEAKER_27]: And then the FBI can put together the pieces of the keys from the two escrow agencies and then have the entire key.
[01:53:40.740 --> 01:53:44.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: And then they can read the traffic from the target of the wiretap.
[01:53:45.380 --> 01:53:46.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: Just like that.
[01:53:47.120 --> 01:53:47.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: Just like that.
[01:53:48.080 --> 01:53:51.280]  [SPEAKER_27]: However, there are some risks here.
[01:53:52.680 --> 01:53:57.880]  [SPEAKER_27]: One is that court ordered wiretaps are easy to come by.
[01:53:58.040 --> 01:53:59.320]  [SPEAKER_27]: Court orders are easy to come by.
[01:54:00.250 --> 01:54:08.760]  [SPEAKER_27]: And actually, there is a mention in the policy directive that says a court order or any other lawful order.
[01:54:09.520 --> 01:54:13.980]  [SPEAKER_27]: I don't remember the exact words, but they did mention other lawful orders.
[01:54:14.480 --> 01:54:24.640]  [SPEAKER_27]: So it could be that there may be other legal mechanisms within the government besides a court order to obtain the keys from the escrow agencies.
[01:54:26.840 --> 01:54:47.860]  [SPEAKER_27]: Now, considering the political history of the United States from COINTELPRO, the counterintelligence program from the FBI, which surveilled and harassed civil rights groups in the 1960s and 70s, anti-war groups, peace and justice groups for Central America,
[01:54:47.860 --> 01:54:59.860]  [SPEAKER_27]: the FBI burglaries of CIS-based, the Committee in Solidarity with the people of El Salvador, where they broke into their offices in something like...
[01:55:00.680 --> 01:55:03.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: I think there was more than 50 break-ins across the country.
[01:55:04.020 --> 01:55:07.760]  [SPEAKER_27]: And all they took was computer disks containing membership lists and donor lists.
[01:55:09.420 --> 01:55:12.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: By the way, that came out in a Freedom of Information Act request.
[01:55:12.340 --> 01:55:21.640]  [SPEAKER_27]: The government has a long history of illegal wiretaps and harassment of political opposition groups.
[01:55:23.460 --> 01:55:30.700]  [SPEAKER_27]: And look at Watergate and Nixon's enemies list and the wiretap on Martin Luther King's phone and the bugging of his hotel room.
[01:55:30.900 --> 01:55:34.740]  [SPEAKER_27]: All this adds up to a history of...
[01:55:36.920 --> 01:55:38.420]  [SPEAKER_27]: We can't trust the government.
[01:55:40.480 --> 01:55:48.400]  [SPEAKER_27]: And so if you put the clipper chip in that context, it has a lot more sinister implications than just trying to catch child molesters and drug dealers.
[01:55:48.620 --> 01:55:51.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, no government really should be trusted.
[01:55:51.400 --> 01:55:53.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: And certainly in a democracy, that should not be an exception.
[01:55:54.780 --> 01:55:58.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: And I think any government that claims to be democratic would understand that.
[01:55:58.940 --> 01:56:03.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's why it's hard for a lot of us to take faith in this particular plan.
[01:56:04.740 --> 01:56:07.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Do you think it's naivete on the Clinton administration's party?
[01:56:07.960 --> 01:56:13.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: Do you think there's an actual agenda here and that they're one day going to make any other form of encryption illegal?
[01:56:14.320 --> 01:56:21.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: Well, making other forms of encryption illegal would cause quite a controversy if that were proposed.
[01:56:22.280 --> 01:56:32.060]  [SPEAKER_27]: The next logical step after introducing the clipper chip and spending all that money to deploy that technology would have to be making other cryptography illegal.
[01:56:32.060 --> 01:56:42.920]  [SPEAKER_27]: Because if they don't make other cryptography illegal, then the government will not be reaching its objective of being able to monitor communications when authorized by a court order.
[01:56:43.760 --> 01:57:02.680]  [SPEAKER_27]: If the criminals encrypt their traffic before they feed it through their secure telephones equipped with the clipper chip, then the government, if they get the court order and decrypt the outer layer of encryption that the clipper chip provides, they will find another layer of encryption inside that was created by the criminals running it.
[01:57:03.860 --> 01:57:05.160]  [SPEAKER_27]: Presumably criminals, right?
[01:57:05.440 --> 01:57:10.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: And that means that the clipper chip will not be effective in catching the real criminals.
[01:57:10.440 --> 01:57:24.780]  [SPEAKER_27]: All the law-abiding citizens will use the products equipped with the clipper chip like they're supposed to, but the real terrorists and drug dealers and whatever will be doing their own encryption underneath the clipper chip.
[01:57:25.200 --> 01:57:28.180]  [SPEAKER_27]: So the government would have to make it illegal to do that.
[01:57:30.240 --> 01:57:44.200]  [SPEAKER_27]: And if that's true, then that raises some serious constitutional issues about freedom of speech, our right to privacy, maybe even our right to bear arms.
[01:57:44.680 --> 01:57:50.060]  [SPEAKER_27]: Ironically enough, the State Department classifies encryption technology as a form of munitions.
[01:57:51.580 --> 01:58:05.400]  [SPEAKER_27]: I say ironically that they do that because they may not have intended it, but by classifying it as munitions, it kind of makes a striking comparison between the right to bear arms and the right to encrypt your messages.
[01:58:06.440 --> 01:58:16.220]  [SPEAKER_27]: A lot of anti-gun control people are also anti-cryptography control.
[01:58:18.300 --> 01:58:20.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's an interesting parallel.
[01:58:20.500 --> 01:58:26.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: You don't have to necessarily subscribe to one to recognize the importance of the other, obviously, but it's scary.
[01:58:26.660 --> 01:58:32.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: I said this a couple of hours ago when we talked to Rop from Holland, and I'll say it again now.
[01:58:32.440 --> 01:58:40.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: These are scary words that I'm hearing where we're looking at the possibility of actually outlawing certain forms of encryption.
[01:58:40.900 --> 01:58:50.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's kind of a sick way of dealing with citizens of a democratic country to put them under constant surveillance.
[01:58:50.560 --> 01:59:08.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: Last week, we raised the parallel to brainwaves, and we raised a scenario where imagine a government that was able to listen to its citizens' brainwaves and had been able to do this for, say, 50 years or so.
[01:59:08.880 --> 01:59:12.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: And, you know, this is how they're able to find criminals.
[01:59:12.100 --> 01:59:13.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: They can read their thoughts.
[01:59:13.120 --> 01:59:24.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, let's say that all of a sudden, through the acts of people like you and me, this was made illegal, and they were no longer allowed to listen to our brainwaves.
[01:59:26.140 --> 01:59:34.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, imagine the uproar that we'd be hearing right now, how it would be impossible, absolutely impossible, to catch a criminal if you can't read their brainwaves.
[01:59:34.720 --> 01:59:35.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: How can you possibly?
[01:59:35.620 --> 01:59:39.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: How can you listen in on their thoughts, their innermost thoughts?
[01:59:39.720 --> 01:59:41.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: How will you know where they're going to strike next?
[01:59:41.180 --> 01:59:42.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: You need this technology.
[01:59:42.400 --> 01:59:43.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: You need to be able to do this.
[01:59:43.780 --> 01:59:51.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: And you can apply this to just about any form of surveillance or monitoring that the government comes up with.
[01:59:51.520 --> 01:59:55.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: They have to be able to have the clipper chip so they can monitor people.
[01:59:55.900 --> 01:59:56.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: They have to have standards.
[01:59:57.020 --> 01:59:57.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: They have to have the same thing.
[01:59:57.860 --> 02:00:04.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: They have to be able to wiretap at will and listen in on whatever they feel like listening in on and decrypt any message they feel a need to.
[02:00:06.240 --> 02:00:09.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: But, I don't know, my way of looking at it is that certain things are private.
[02:00:10.340 --> 02:00:11.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: Brainwaves are private.
[02:00:11.660 --> 02:00:15.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: Maybe letters and phone calls should also be considered as private.
[02:00:16.360 --> 02:00:19.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Criminals, after all, are still criminals.
[02:00:19.100 --> 02:00:21.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: They are going to commit crimes at some point.
[02:00:21.680 --> 02:00:26.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: and if you suspect somebody is going to commit a crime you can usually find them doing that at some point.
[02:00:26.980 --> 02:00:31.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: I just think there's other ways other ways of catching criminals.
[02:00:31.400 --> 02:00:44.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: And there's a lot more harm to this a lot more harm to this standard way of monitoring everybody than any good that can come out of it.
[02:00:46.120 --> 02:00:46.600]  [SPEAKER_27]: Yeah.
[02:00:47.280 --> 02:00:51.440]  [SPEAKER_27]: In fact, that's an interesting analogy that you're drawing with the brainwaves.
[02:00:51.520 --> 02:00:52.280]  [SPEAKER_27]: I hadn't heard that one.
[02:00:53.200 --> 02:01:10.800]  [SPEAKER_27]: Although, I think that a better analogy would be not that we're going to make it illegal to monitor brainwaves, but that people are manufacturing little helmets that everybody can wear and they're available for free that they can put on their heads and they would shield their own brainwaves from being broadcast to the government.
[02:01:11.880 --> 02:01:14.160]  [SPEAKER_27]: That's what my program does, PGP.
[02:01:14.160 --> 02:01:16.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, tell us more about the program.
[02:01:17.060 --> 02:01:20.720]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's just people to take unilateral steps to protect their own privacy.
[02:01:20.860 --> 02:01:21.360]  [SPEAKER_27]: And it's free.
[02:01:21.380 --> 02:01:26.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's just available everywhere on bulletin boards and all over Internet.
[02:01:26.380 --> 02:01:33.280]  [SPEAKER_27]: And so people can take their own steps to improve their privacy on their electronic mail.
[02:01:33.480 --> 02:01:40.440]  [SPEAKER_27]: What we need is secure telephones like that that people could make themselves out of their computers.
[02:01:40.600 --> 02:01:42.680]  [SPEAKER_27]: And there is some work being done in that area.
[02:01:43.760 --> 02:01:58.420]  [SPEAKER_27]: So that kind of thing is certain to irritate the government who wants to mandate backdoors in cryptographic infrastructures.
[02:01:58.620 --> 02:02:02.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: I want to read something to you that might seem a bit ominous as well.
[02:02:03.440 --> 02:02:06.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: Something that just came our way.
[02:02:06.280 --> 02:02:07.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: A press release of sorts.
[02:02:08.440 --> 02:02:13.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: This comes from computer professionals for social responsibility and they sent this over to us.
[02:02:14.280 --> 02:02:29.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: Less than three weeks after the White House announced a controversial initiative to secure the nation's electronic communications with government approved cryptography, newly released documents raised serious questions about the process that gave rise to the administration's proposal.
[02:02:30.220 --> 02:02:52.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: The documents released by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit suggest that the super secret national security agency, NSA, dominates the process of establishing security standards for civilian computer systems in contravention of the intent of legislation Congress enacted in 1987.
[02:02:52.780 --> 02:03:07.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: The released material concerns the development of the digital signal standard, DSS, a cryptographic method for authenticating the identity of the sender of an electronic communication and for authenticating the integrity of the data data in that communication.
[02:03:07.980 --> 02:03:20.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: NIST publicly proposed the DSS in August 1991 and initially made no mention of any NSA role in developing the standard which was intended for use in unclassified civilian communication systems.
[02:03:20.460 --> 02:03:31.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: NIST finally conceded that NSA had in fact developed the technology after computer professionals for social responsibility filed suit against the agency for withholding relevant documents.
[02:03:31.540 --> 02:03:42.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: The proposed DSS was widely criticized within the computer industry for its perceived weak security and inferiority to an existing authentication technology known as the RSA algorithm.
[02:03:42.380 --> 02:03:54.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Many observers have speculated that the RSA technique was disfavored by NSA because it was in fact more secure than the NSA proposed algorithm and because the RSA technique could also be used to encrypt data very securely.
[02:03:54.900 --> 02:04:04.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: The newly disclosed documents released in heavily censored form at the insistence of NSA suggest that NSA was not merely involved in the development process but dominated it.
[02:04:04.940 --> 02:04:10.400]  [SPEAKER_21]: NIST and NSA worked together on the DSS through an intra-agency technical working group.
[02:04:10.800 --> 02:04:20.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: The documents suggest that the NIST-NSA relationship was contentious but with NSA insisting upon secrecy throughout the deliberations.
[02:04:20.920 --> 02:04:25.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: An NIST report dated January 31, 1990, states the following.
[02:04:25.700 --> 02:04:39.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: The members of the TWG acknowledged, that's technical working group acknowledged that the efforts expended to date in the determination of a public key algorithm, which would be publicly known, have not been successful.
[02:04:40.200 --> 02:04:51.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's increasingly evident that it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the concerns and requirements of NSA, NIST, and the general public through using this approach.
[02:04:52.460 --> 02:05:02.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: The civilian agency's frustration is also apparent in a July 21, 1990, memo from the NIST members of the TWG to NIST Director John W.
[02:05:03.120 --> 02:05:03.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: Lyons.
[02:05:03.700 --> 02:05:08.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: The memo suggests that national security concerns hampered efforts to develop a standard.
[02:05:08.700 --> 02:05:15.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Quote, the NIST-NSA technical working group has held 18 meetings over the past 13 months.
[02:05:15.380 --> 02:05:21.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: A part of every meeting has focused on the NIST intent to develop a public key standard algorithm standard.
[02:05:22.160 --> 02:05:22.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[02:05:22.940 --> 02:05:23.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Redundant, too.
[02:05:23.600 --> 02:05:31.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: We are convinced that the TWG process has reached a point where continuing discussions of the public key issue will yield only marginal results.
[02:05:32.100 --> 02:05:44.280]  [SPEAKER_21]: Simply stated, we believe that over the past 13 months, we have explored the technical and national security equity issues to the point where a decision is required on the future direction of digital signature standards.
[02:05:45.980 --> 02:05:58.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: On an October 19, 1990, NIST memo discussing possible patent issues surrounding DSS, it was noted that those questions would need to be addressed if we ever get our NSA problems settled.
[02:05:58.860 --> 02:06:12.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Although much of the material remains classified and withheld from disclosure, the, quote, NSA problem, unquote, was apparently the intelligence agency's demand that perceived national security considerations take precedence in the development of the DSS.
[02:06:12.840 --> 02:06:16.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: From the outset, NSA cloaked the deliberations in secrecy.
[02:06:16.440 --> 02:06:25.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: For instance, at the March 22, 1990 meeting of the TWG, NSA representatives presented NIST with NSA's classified proposal for a DSS algorithm.
[02:06:26.660 --> 02:06:38.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: NIST's report of the meeting notes that, quote, the second document classified top secret code word was a position paper which discussed reasons for the selection of the algorithms identified in the first document.
[02:06:39.300 --> 02:06:44.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: This document is available at NSA for review by properly cleared senior NIST officials, unquote.
[02:06:44.940 --> 02:06:58.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: In other words, NSA presented highly classified material to NIST justifying NSA's selection of the proposed algorithm, an algorithm intended to protect and authenticate unclassified information in civilian computer systems.
[02:06:58.340 --> 02:07:06.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: The material was so highly classified that properly cleared senior NIST officials were required to view the material at NSA's facilities.
[02:07:06.740 --> 02:07:10.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.
[02:07:10.600 --> 02:07:12.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: Phil, what's your take on all that?
[02:07:12.840 --> 02:07:18.660]  [SPEAKER_27]: Okay, well, fortunately, I read that same report a few days ago.
[02:07:19.500 --> 02:07:25.600]  [SPEAKER_27]: I say fortunately because approximately 10% of the words that you spoke were completely dropped out in this phone linkage here.
[02:07:25.980 --> 02:07:29.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: I do apologize for that, but I don't know how to fix that.
[02:07:30.360 --> 02:07:34.020]  [SPEAKER_27]: Okay, well, you know, this is a very complicated business here.
[02:07:34.060 --> 02:07:35.420]  [SPEAKER_27]: Let me explain a few things.
[02:07:37.860 --> 02:07:50.300]  [SPEAKER_27]: First of all, if you hear me say anything that sounds like I think that the digital signature standard is good, keep in mind that you can ask other people that have worked with me that nobody distrusts the government.
[02:07:51.620 --> 02:07:56.880]  [SPEAKER_27]: Nobody distrusts the government's involvement in cryptographic standards more than I do.
[02:07:57.880 --> 02:08:03.480]  [SPEAKER_27]: I think that I have well-established credentials in that area, political credentials.
[02:08:03.920 --> 02:08:18.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: Having said that, though, I'd like to say that all of the cryptographers that I've talked with, I mean real cryptographers, not just software engineers who like to write cryptographic code, but the mathematical cryptologists that I've talked to at conferences from all over the world,
[02:08:18.740 --> 02:08:22.000]  [SPEAKER_27]: all think that the digital signature standard is a good, strong algorithm.
[02:08:22.200 --> 02:08:23.200]  [SPEAKER_27]: And I agree.
[02:08:24.100 --> 02:08:43.480]  [SPEAKER_27]: The reason why this NSA involvement is a problem is because of the political process that went into it, their control over the process with the NIST trying to make a standard, and the fact that they've created a signature algorithm that cannot be used to hide messages,
[02:08:43.480 --> 02:08:44.720]  [SPEAKER_27]: but only sign messages.
[02:08:45.420 --> 02:08:55.880]  [SPEAKER_27]: See, public key cryptography has different algorithms that can be used for making a signature, a digital signature that can authenticate who sent the message.
[02:08:56.460 --> 02:09:01.400]  [SPEAKER_27]: And it can also be used to encrypt messages so no one can read them except for the intended recipient.
[02:09:03.000 --> 02:09:05.860]  [SPEAKER_27]: Some public key encryption algorithms can do both of these.
[02:09:06.060 --> 02:09:08.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: They can both sign documents and hide documents.
[02:09:10.020 --> 02:09:14.880]  [SPEAKER_27]: Some public key algorithms can only sign documents without hiding them.
[02:09:15.140 --> 02:09:17.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: Some others can only hide them without signing them.
[02:09:18.260 --> 02:09:21.120]  [SPEAKER_27]: There are several public key algorithms to choose from.
[02:09:21.320 --> 02:09:29.540]  [SPEAKER_27]: The RSA algorithm, which is in wide use, and in fact that's the algorithm that I use in PGP, can both hide
[02:09:35.410 --> 02:09:43.300]  [SPEAKER_27]: The digital signature standard from NIST, which was actually designed by NSA, can sign documents, but it cannot hide them.
[02:09:43.580 --> 02:09:45.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: Now, that is the NSA's involvement.
[02:09:45.760 --> 02:09:58.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: They made it so that, since their charter is to spy on people, they don't want to create an encryption standard that lets people encrypt their messages without the NSA being able to read them.
[02:09:58.140 --> 02:10:05.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: So, they made it so that the digital signature standard can only sign messages, but it can't hide messages.
[02:10:05.520 --> 02:10:07.460]  [SPEAKER_27]: And it's called the digital signature standard.
[02:10:07.620 --> 02:10:09.520]  [SPEAKER_27]: That's all it's supposed to do is sign messages.
[02:10:11.220 --> 02:10:13.340]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's a very good algorithm for signing messages.
[02:10:13.340 --> 02:10:14.780]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's a good, strong algorithm.
[02:10:14.960 --> 02:10:17.740]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's been extensively reviewed by mathematicians.
[02:10:17.940 --> 02:10:24.020]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's a mathematical algorithm in that it relies on number theory, which is what RSA relies on.
[02:10:25.200 --> 02:10:34.640]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's based on one of the classic hard problems in number theory, that of computing discrete logarithms, that mathematicians for a long time have been trying to crack unsuccessfully.
[02:10:37.980 --> 02:10:44.180]  [SPEAKER_27]: And all of the mathematical cryptologists that I've talked with say that it's a very good, strong algorithm.
[02:10:44.680 --> 02:10:58.280]  [SPEAKER_27]: Now, the NSA has a charter to spy on people, but it doesn't interfere with their charter to make a good, strong digital signature standard that lets people sign their messages without encrypting their messages.
[02:11:00.340 --> 02:11:01.900]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's not... it doesn't interfere.
[02:11:02.180 --> 02:11:07.080]  [SPEAKER_27]: In fact, it's better for them because they, you know, they know who they're spying on because all their messages are signed by the sender.
[02:11:09.900 --> 02:11:19.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: Now, some of what you read from the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility mentioned that there has been some industry criticism of it being a weak standard.
[02:11:19.980 --> 02:11:21.560]  [SPEAKER_27]: Well, it isn't a weak standard.
[02:11:21.720 --> 02:11:22.720]  [SPEAKER_27]: It's a strong standard.
[02:11:23.100 --> 02:11:27.120]  [SPEAKER_27]: Its only problem is that it will only sign messages without encrypting them.
[02:11:28.860 --> 02:11:36.480]  [SPEAKER_27]: Some... a lot of people, myself included, would have preferred to see the government create a standard that would allow you to encrypt messages and sign messages.
[02:11:36.680 --> 02:11:37.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: But that's not what they did.
[02:11:38.600 --> 02:11:46.140]  [SPEAKER_27]: So, you know, I think the NSA's involvement in creating cryptography standards wouldn't be so bad if they acted in an advisory capacity.
[02:11:46.820 --> 02:11:53.360]  [SPEAKER_27]: NSA employs a lot of very good cryptographers, and they have a lot of in-house skill in making and breaking codes.
[02:11:53.600 --> 02:11:59.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: If they were to supply technical advice on making cryptography standards, it wouldn't be such a bad thing.
[02:11:59.620 --> 02:12:01.080]  [SPEAKER_27]: People could review that advice.
[02:12:01.080 --> 02:12:05.100]  [SPEAKER_27]: It could be open, and it could go through a lot of peer review.
[02:12:05.720 --> 02:12:10.220]  [SPEAKER_27]: The problem here is that the NSA did a lot of it secretly.
[02:12:10.480 --> 02:12:17.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: And I think that we're probably going to see some things come out that might show what the criterion was.
[02:12:17.960 --> 02:12:31.080]  [SPEAKER_27]: And I suspect the reason why they classified a lot of it was because they didn't want people to know of the politics of how they wanted to ensure that a digital signature standard came out that would not allow anyone to encrypt their messages but only to sign their messages.
[02:12:32.000 --> 02:12:35.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, it's a job of people like us to find out what it is.
[02:12:35.160 --> 02:12:39.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: They don't want us to find out, and I'm sure that we're going to be doing that in the months ahead.
[02:12:39.840 --> 02:12:43.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: Phil, we're pretty much out of time, but I just wanted to ask you one final question.
[02:12:43.840 --> 02:12:56.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: In terms of people out there that don't really have computers, that don't really use them on a day-to-day basis, and don't really see a need for encryption, why is this important to them?
[02:12:56.840 --> 02:12:59.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: Should they even care about what's going on here?
[02:12:59.000 --> 02:13:00.220]  [SPEAKER_27]: Okay, I'm glad you asked me that.
[02:13:02.700 --> 02:13:17.720]  [SPEAKER_27]: You know, if you're trying to form public policy regarding technology, you should look at what kinds of technology infrastructures you can deploy that will have a great deal of utility to some police state in the future.
[02:13:18.400 --> 02:13:34.960]  [SPEAKER_27]: If you're considering the deployment of a cryptographic technology, for example, or some other technology, such as fingerprint machines in every police car that can electronically take your fingerprints right there by the roadside and find out if you're wanted by the FBI or maybe you're Abby Hoffman on the lam or something like that,
[02:13:35.660 --> 02:13:46.580]  [SPEAKER_27]: just take a look at all the various technologies that are going to be deployed and ask yourself, which technologies would be maximally useful to an efficient police state?
[02:13:47.880 --> 02:13:51.760]  [SPEAKER_27]: And then don't deploy those technologies.
[02:13:52.200 --> 02:14:02.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, I think another good way to ask that question is to just imagine it in the hands of the Nazis and what they'd be happy with, whatever they'd be happy with, you know, think twice about.
[02:14:02.860 --> 02:14:06.220]  [SPEAKER_27]: Yeah, it's just a matter of good civic hygiene.
[02:14:06.580 --> 02:14:16.720]  [SPEAKER_27]: Don't deploy technologies that are directly useful mainly for making a police state run more efficiently.
[02:14:16.720 --> 02:14:18.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: And it's very...
[02:14:18.120 --> 02:14:20.040]  [SPEAKER_27]: So, you know, it's not that I'm against certain
[02:14:29.780 --> 02:14:39.060]  [SPEAKER_27]: massive technology infrastructure like this clipper chip, which will probably end up, over decades from now, putting a clipper chip in everybody's telephone.
[02:14:39.860 --> 02:14:44.500]  [SPEAKER_27]: That will be possible to extricate ourselves from.
[02:14:44.720 --> 02:14:50.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, once you implement these things, it is generally very difficult to un-implement them.
[02:14:51.640 --> 02:14:58.260]  [SPEAKER_21]: Phil Zimmerman, who has created PGP, an encryption program that's gotten very popular.
[02:14:58.260 --> 02:15:01.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: Thanks so much for joining us today and lending your insight.
[02:15:01.720 --> 02:15:04.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: Is there a way people can get a hold of you if they want more information?
[02:15:05.920 --> 02:15:11.160]  [SPEAKER_27]: Yeah, I am a consultant who specializes in cryptography and data security.
[02:15:11.520 --> 02:15:15.060]  [SPEAKER_27]: And so, this is a shameless commercial plug here.
[02:15:15.100 --> 02:15:19.300]  [SPEAKER_27]: If anybody wants to talk to me about cryptography, you can give me a call in Boulder, Colorado.
[02:15:20.100 --> 02:15:24.360]  [SPEAKER_27]: My phone number is 303-541-0140.
[02:15:24.360 --> 02:15:27.980]  [SPEAKER_27]: Oh, that's 303-541-0140.
[02:15:29.320 --> 02:15:36.660]  [SPEAKER_27]: I know that New York City has a lot of computers in it, and a lot of them need cryptography.
[02:15:37.500 --> 02:15:38.600]  [SPEAKER_27]: So, that's it.
[02:15:39.020 --> 02:15:41.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, thanks very much for joining us again, and good luck in the future.
[02:15:41.940 --> 02:15:45.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm sure we'll be talking to you on future programs as this heats up even more.
[02:15:46.620 --> 02:15:47.040]  Okay.
[02:15:47.340 --> 02:15:47.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay.
[02:15:47.880 --> 02:15:48.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: Bye.
[02:15:48.260 --> 02:15:49.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: Have a good day.
[02:15:49.780 --> 02:15:54.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we have a couple of minutes left, and we have a bit of a problem here, folks.
[02:15:54.940 --> 02:16:03.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're up to $1,300, but our goal is $2,000 for this particular program, which ends in only about seven minutes.
[02:16:04.200 --> 02:16:09.800]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's about $100 a minute we've got to pull in here, and we're going to need your help to do it.
[02:16:10.100 --> 02:16:25.340]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, we've just heard some very scary predictions here for the future, some rather ominous predictions, ominous things ahead, encryption being made illegal, the government watching your every move.
[02:16:26.000 --> 02:16:27.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: Total control.
[02:16:27.620 --> 02:16:28.760]  [SPEAKER_21]: Total manipulation.
[02:16:30.520 --> 02:16:32.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's not good.
[02:16:32.320 --> 02:16:33.520]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's not good news at all.
[02:16:33.760 --> 02:16:38.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: And it's something that, fortunately, we've learned about in the early stages.
[02:16:38.900 --> 02:16:54.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: NSA involvement in encryption of various forms of communication, and only their particular way of doing it will be the accepted way, and everything else, presumably, will be made illegal.
[02:16:55.240 --> 02:17:02.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's something that is not healthy, something that will lead, as Phil Zimmerman told us, to an efficient police state.
[02:17:04.080 --> 02:17:06.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, we need you to call us up.
[02:17:06.180 --> 02:17:10.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Now, you calling us up is not going to necessarily keep a police state from forming.
[02:17:10.680 --> 02:17:16.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's not going to keep evil things from happening in the future, but it is going to be a step.
[02:17:16.360 --> 02:17:25.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's going to be a step towards keeping us on the air, keeping us strong, keeping us bringing programs like this to you, and bringing knowledge like this to you.
[02:17:25.020 --> 02:17:29.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, 212-279-3400, two callers on the line, which is very good.
[02:17:29.780 --> 02:17:31.020]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have seven lines.
[02:17:31.160 --> 02:17:32.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: We only have a couple of minutes left.
[02:17:32.900 --> 02:17:39.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, we want to fill up those lines as kind of our last hurrah here on this special edition of Off the Hook.
[02:17:40.700 --> 02:17:42.580]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[02:17:42.880 --> 02:17:47.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Show your support for WBAI, for freedom of speech, for the kinds of things that we're talking about.
[02:17:47.960 --> 02:17:54.940]  [SPEAKER_21]: I know a lot of people out there are not technically inclined, and a lot of this talk of encryption may have gone straight past you.
[02:17:55.020 --> 02:18:06.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: I know it's kind of a confusing subject for a lot of us, but the basic ideas of freedom of speech, the basic ideas of privacy, those are things that I think we should hold very close to us.
[02:18:06.920 --> 02:18:18.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: And when we see a threat to that, whether it be a technical threat or a threat of any other sort, we simply have to recognize that, and we have to know what it is that we're standing up for.
[02:18:18.080 --> 02:18:24.220]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have to know that we believe in our individuality, we believe in our freedom of speech, we believe in our freedom of assembly.
[02:18:24.220 --> 02:18:27.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: Those are things that WBAI has always stood for.
[02:18:27.720 --> 02:18:31.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: Those are things that a lot of our listeners are heavily involved in.
[02:18:32.300 --> 02:18:34.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is a case.
[02:18:34.480 --> 02:18:46.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: This and all the other things that we have brought you on this program have to do with spreading information, being allowed to talk freely about various things, and keeping our privacy intact.
[02:18:47.060 --> 02:18:53.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: Those are things that, while technical in nature, the actual content is very, very basic.
[02:18:53.680 --> 02:18:56.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, well, you don't have to understand every single word, you know?
[02:18:56.240 --> 02:19:00.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: You don't have to understand everything that is being said on this particular program.
[02:19:01.220 --> 02:19:03.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: But understand the basic fundamentals.
[02:19:04.180 --> 02:19:09.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: And by showing your support, you're giving your vote to those basic fundamentals.
[02:19:09.220 --> 02:19:11.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[02:19:11.380 --> 02:19:13.700]  [SPEAKER_21]: I see a bunch of phones ringing in no particular order.
[02:19:13.800 --> 02:19:15.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: I'm not sure how many calls we have.
[02:19:15.100 --> 02:19:16.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: But we do have a couple of open lines.
[02:19:16.560 --> 02:19:19.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: So please, 212-279-3400.
[02:19:19.240 --> 02:19:21.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: We only have a couple of minutes left, and we've got a ways to go.
[02:19:21.840 --> 02:19:24.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: So help us reach our goal.
[02:19:24.920 --> 02:19:25.800]  [SPEAKER_18]: And come on, folks.
[02:19:25.900 --> 02:19:41.540]  [SPEAKER_18]: For a pledge of only $75, you can walk proud on the streets in your 2600 T-shirt, letting everybody see the symbol of your understanding of technology, that blue box, and your understanding of Encrystin, and how important that is to be able to be in charge of your own encryption,
[02:19:42.030 --> 02:19:47.320]  [SPEAKER_18]: and how nobody can stop you from keeping secrets and from keeping information.
[02:19:47.800 --> 02:19:49.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: Secrets are not bad.
[02:19:49.780 --> 02:19:53.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: Secrets are not things that criminals... I mean, yeah, some criminals keep secrets.
[02:19:53.660 --> 02:19:55.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: But a lot of us keep secrets.
[02:19:55.200 --> 02:19:56.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: A lot of us want to keep secrets.
[02:19:56.580 --> 02:19:59.180]  [SPEAKER_21]: We don't want our innermost thoughts broadcast to the world.
[02:19:59.260 --> 02:20:08.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: If you use that particular train of thought, then one day when it is possible to read brainwaves, only criminals will want to keep their thoughts secret.
[02:20:09.380 --> 02:20:10.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, that's not healthy.
[02:20:10.760 --> 02:20:12.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's not a healthy way to look at things.
[02:20:12.360 --> 02:20:17.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're entitled to our privacy, and we're certainly a lot happier when our every move is not being scrutinized.
[02:20:17.860 --> 02:20:19.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[02:20:19.700 --> 02:20:20.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have open lines.
[02:20:20.620 --> 02:20:21.820]  [SPEAKER_21]: We need your call.
[02:20:21.980 --> 02:20:23.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: Please, 212-279-3400.
[02:20:24.020 --> 02:20:27.480]  [SPEAKER_21]: A full year of 2600 in addition to that T-shirt for a pledge of $75.
[02:20:28.240 --> 02:20:45.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: And 2600 is really the only magazine out there that will update you on these vital instances of civil liberties abuses and privacy curtailments and also technological advances, things that are being developed, things like the...
[02:20:45.680 --> 02:20:46.420]  [SPEAKER_18]: Plenty of secrets.
[02:20:46.900 --> 02:20:58.740]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, the CD machine, the CD machine in record stores, all kinds of other telephone-type things, caller ID, ISDN, all these things that are being developed.
[02:20:58.740 --> 02:21:03.840]  [SPEAKER_21]: But, you know, you see it in the industry newspapers, and they're all boring as hell.
[02:21:03.840 --> 02:21:06.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, they put you to sleep, even if you're into this kind of thing.
[02:21:08.500 --> 02:21:11.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: But, 2600 is written from a human perspective.
[02:21:11.180 --> 02:21:16.120]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, you'll be able to see how this applies to you and why it's important to you.
[02:21:16.160 --> 02:21:19.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: And that's what we're trying to always bring out, both in this program and in the magazine.
[02:21:19.380 --> 02:21:21.160]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[02:21:22.540 --> 02:21:25.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: We need to hear from a couple more people in the...
[02:21:25.500 --> 02:21:26.920]  [SPEAKER_21]: It looks like we have one minute left.
[02:21:27.260 --> 02:21:27.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: One minute left.
[02:21:27.980 --> 02:21:29.420]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, let's get those calls in.
[02:21:30.100 --> 02:21:35.060]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is the last minute of this particular radio program, a special edition of Off the Hook.
[02:21:35.060 --> 02:21:37.880]  [SPEAKER_21]: We usually come your way Wednesday nights at 10 p.m.
[02:21:37.960 --> 02:21:44.000]  [SPEAKER_21]: We won't be on tonight, but we will be on next week as well, bringing you all kinds of other fascinating tidbits of information.
[02:21:44.000 --> 02:22:01.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: But if you've gotten anything out of this program today, if you've learned something, if you've said to yourself, Hey, I didn't know that, consider how much your call will mean to us now and what you've gotten out of this radio program in that one particular period of time.
[02:22:01.320 --> 02:22:02.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: How much that costs you per day.
[02:22:02.800 --> 02:22:07.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, if you pledge $50, that's like a dollar a week for the entire year.
[02:22:08.480 --> 02:22:09.720]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, that's something to consider.
[02:22:09.920 --> 02:22:11.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: Okay, we have four open lines.
[02:22:11.420 --> 02:22:12.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: We have three lines in use.
[02:22:12.620 --> 02:22:13.380]  [SPEAKER_21]: Four open lines.
[02:22:13.520 --> 02:22:14.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's see if we can fill those up.
[02:22:14.980 --> 02:22:17.360]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[02:22:17.720 --> 02:22:19.200]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's not much to ask, you know.
[02:22:19.420 --> 02:22:27.080]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's just what we call a bingo here at the radio station to get all the lines lit up at once to get everybody in the tally room busy.
[02:22:27.920 --> 02:22:29.320]  [SPEAKER_21]: We're closing in on our goal.
[02:22:29.620 --> 02:22:31.300]  [SPEAKER_21]: 212-279-3400.
[02:22:31.420 --> 02:22:36.040]  [SPEAKER_21]: Remember, $75 pledge is a year of the magazine and a t-shirt as well.
[02:22:36.340 --> 02:22:43.680]  [SPEAKER_21]: And any other pledge will get you a full year of the WVAI folio so you know what's on, what kind of special programs are coming your way on this radio station.
[02:22:44.320 --> 02:22:45.060]  [SPEAKER_18]: Yeah, that's right.
[02:22:45.200 --> 02:22:46.780]  [SPEAKER_18]: So, let's get those seven lines lit.
[02:22:47.000 --> 02:22:47.940]  [SPEAKER_18]: $100 a line.
[02:22:48.060 --> 02:22:49.340]  [SPEAKER_18]: And you can be proud.
[02:22:49.500 --> 02:22:54.900]  [SPEAKER_18]: You can say, I helped WBAI and I'm going to get information as a reward.
[02:22:55.120 --> 02:22:57.460]  [SPEAKER_21]: Yeah, it's like voting, I like to say.
[02:22:57.540 --> 02:22:58.100]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it's different.
[02:22:58.260 --> 02:23:00.860]  [SPEAKER_21]: You know, it's more important than voting because...
[02:23:00.860 --> 02:23:02.960]  [SPEAKER_21]: Well, I don't know if I really want to say it's more important than voting.
[02:23:03.080 --> 02:23:03.440]  [SPEAKER_21]: But it is.
[02:23:03.780 --> 02:23:07.140]  [SPEAKER_21]: It's something where you'll see the results a lot quicker than if you elect somebody.
[02:23:07.140 --> 02:23:07.780]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's for sure.
[02:23:09.200 --> 02:23:10.660]  [SPEAKER_21]: Because every little bit...
[02:23:10.660 --> 02:23:13.560]  [SPEAKER_21]: Let's say five people call in now and pledge $100.
[02:23:13.860 --> 02:23:14.500]  [SPEAKER_21]: That's $500.
[02:23:15.100 --> 02:23:17.980]  [SPEAKER_21]: But one person isn't going to call and pledge $500.
[02:23:18.400 --> 02:23:20.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: So, 212-279-3400.
[02:23:20.480 --> 02:23:22.240]  [SPEAKER_21]: I want to thank everybody for calling in.
[02:23:22.340 --> 02:23:26.540]  [SPEAKER_21]: And we'll see you again a week from today at 10 p.m.
[02:23:26.620 --> 02:23:28.620]  [SPEAKER_21]: Stay tuned for Gary Null.
[02:23:28.880 --> 02:23:30.900]  [SPEAKER_21]: And thanks everybody for calling.
[02:23:30.900 --> 02:23:32.640]  [SPEAKER_21]: This is WBAI New York.
[02:23:32.740 --> 02:23:33.600]  [SPEAKER_21]: This has been Off the Hook.