Off The Hook - 1993-08-25
[00:04.740 --> 00:19.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, if you're an avid comics fan, or just interested in the recent press the field has generated and want to know more, tune in to Jim Freund's Hour of the Wolf, Saturday, August 28th, for an insight into one of comics' most influential creators, Jim Shooter.
[00:30.040 --> 00:32.160]  [SPEAKER_00]: Hetepu, alafia, peace and blessings.
[00:32.520 --> 00:38.220]  [SPEAKER_00]: I am Amina Akua Brown, host of African Spiritual Vibes, with emanations.
[00:38.220 --> 00:44.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: Please open your spirits, hearts, and ears to hear holistic spiritual conversations.
[00:45.100 --> 00:50.780]  [SPEAKER_00]: We bring you health, meditation, herbs, instants, crystals, and more.
[00:51.360 --> 00:56.860]  [SPEAKER_00]: African Spiritual Vibes will relieve stress and uplift your spirits with love and harmony.
[00:57.260 --> 01:06.980]  [SPEAKER_00]: Every first and last Sunday, from 9 to 11 p.m., right here on WBAI 99.5 FM.
[01:14.780 --> 01:21.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it's just about 10 o'clock here on Radio Station WBAI New York time again for Off the Hook.
[01:27.450 --> 01:32.010]  [SPEAKER_08]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[01:32.890 --> 01:37.490]  [SPEAKER_08]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a call.
[01:38.310 --> 01:42.810]  [SPEAKER_08]: It couldn't get much worse, but if it could, it would.
[01:43.050 --> 01:45.690]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bundyly bump for the best, expect the worst.
[01:46.290 --> 01:48.230]  [SPEAKER_08]: I hope the thunder's good.
[01:48.450 --> 01:49.150]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bundyly bump!
[02:30.540 --> 02:31.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: And a good evening to one and all.
[02:32.120 --> 02:40.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is Off the Hook, where we explore the unknown and, unlike certain spacecraft, we report back to you on our findings.
[02:42.860 --> 02:46.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's kind of like, you know, paging somebody and not getting a return call.
[02:46.500 --> 02:48.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's what the four folks at NASA are going through right now.
[02:48.880 --> 02:55.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hopefully, that wayward spacecraft out there will answer the call or think to call home on its own.
[02:56.460 --> 03:05.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: But there are all kinds of other things going on that we need to be kept abreast on as far as our telephones, our computers, and various things like that.
[03:05.180 --> 03:08.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're going to have a special guest tonight talking about something that could affect you.
[03:08.760 --> 03:09.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: We've talked about it before.
[03:09.860 --> 03:15.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're going to talk about it again until we pound it into the ground or until it becomes history, one or the other.
[03:15.120 --> 03:18.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, of course, we'll be taking your telephone calls.
[03:18.060 --> 03:22.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: But first, before we do anything, we're going to have a little bit of fun.
[03:23.100 --> 03:23.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's right.
[03:23.860 --> 03:33.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: A little bit of fun here at the radio station where we're going to reach out and do some actual participation in the hacking world.
[03:34.040 --> 03:39.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're going to find out what it's like to experiment, to take part in an adventure.
[03:39.580 --> 03:53.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes, we're going to actually demonstrate what is known as scanning, where we take our telephone line and we reach out and try and find something interesting.
[03:53.420 --> 03:57.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: What we have are a whole series of 800 numbers.
[03:57.840 --> 03:59.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: I guess a million of them out there?
[03:59.720 --> 04:00.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: Something like that.
[04:01.260 --> 04:03.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Seven-digit numbers, virtually unlimited.
[04:04.080 --> 04:10.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: And what we're going to do, is call a bunch of them and see how long it takes to find something interesting.
[04:10.440 --> 04:14.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, we have someone who's going to give us a random exchange.
[04:15.400 --> 04:16.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: Anybody want to give us a random exchange?
[04:18.700 --> 04:19.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: 2-2-2?
[04:21.120 --> 04:22.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is that the best you can do?
[04:23.640 --> 04:25.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: 8-4-3, that's much better.
[04:25.140 --> 04:28.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, we're going to scan the 8-4-3 exchange.
[04:29.100 --> 04:30.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're not going to tell you what we're dialing.
[04:30.820 --> 04:34.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're not going to give you any particular bits of information.
[04:34.060 --> 04:40.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're just going to show you how the wonderful world of hacking just kind of keeps taking care of itself.
[04:42.040 --> 04:42.440]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[04:43.080 --> 04:43.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[04:43.680 --> 04:44.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's get our dial tone.
[04:44.740 --> 04:48.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's dial our first number.
[04:48.100 --> 04:53.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Of course, those of you that can decode touch tones will be able to understand what we're dialing.
[04:53.680 --> 04:56.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: But I'm going to start and go sequentially.
[04:57.340 --> 04:58.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's see what we get.
[04:59.940 --> 05:01.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: A busy signal.
[05:01.200 --> 05:01.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[05:02.160 --> 05:03.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, you see, that's something you come across quite a bit.
[05:04.420 --> 05:07.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, we simply hang up and try again.
[05:11.220 --> 05:11.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: What was it again?
[05:11.980 --> 05:12.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: 8-4-3?
[05:12.560 --> 05:13.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: 8-4-3.
[05:14.400 --> 05:14.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[05:14.900 --> 05:15.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's try this one.
[05:19.250 --> 05:19.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: Second number.
[05:27.400 --> 05:29.040]  [SPEAKER_11]: Thanks for calling GTW.
[05:29.460 --> 05:30.740]  [SPEAKER_11]: At the sound of the beep.
[05:30.880 --> 05:32.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: Will you please leave your message?
[05:32.280 --> 05:33.520]  [SPEAKER_11]: And when we return, we will...
[05:34.100 --> 05:34.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: Ah.
[05:38.710 --> 05:42.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, what we found there was an answering machine that does something when you hit a tone.
[05:42.430 --> 05:44.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: If you hit the star key, it jumps to the beep.
[05:45.030 --> 05:47.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: Of course, that means it's a hackable answering machine.
[05:47.010 --> 05:51.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can get into whatever this company is and listen to their messages, perhaps.
[05:52.110 --> 05:54.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: Doesn't seem very sophisticated in and of itself.
[05:54.190 --> 05:55.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's try the next one down.
[05:58.710 --> 06:00.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Notice how quickly these calls are going through, too.
[06:11.980 --> 06:12.840]  [SPEAKER_10]: We're sorry.
[06:13.160 --> 06:15.400]  [SPEAKER_10]: Your call cannot be completed as dialed.
[06:15.560 --> 06:17.440]  [SPEAKER_10]: Please check the number and dial again.
[06:18.480 --> 06:21.660]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, we're going to encounter that fairly often.
[06:21.880 --> 06:24.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know, most numbers don't work.
[06:25.720 --> 06:27.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's a fact of the telecommunications industry.
[06:42.110 --> 06:43.910]  [SPEAKER_17]: Real live scanning.
[06:46.330 --> 06:48.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, we know what that is, so we can skip the message.
[06:52.810 --> 06:53.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: Go on to the next one.
[06:56.850 --> 06:57.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's forwarding somewhere.
[06:59.010 --> 07:00.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's taking longer to go through.
[07:06.930 --> 07:07.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Strange ring.
[07:18.610 --> 07:19.270]  [SPEAKER_10]: TomCast satellite.
[07:19.610 --> 07:21.030]  [SPEAKER_10]: Meridian office, may I help you?
[07:21.310 --> 07:22.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, gosh.
[07:22.430 --> 07:22.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm sorry.
[07:23.010 --> 07:24.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: I seem to have reached the wrong number.
[07:24.710 --> 07:25.070]  [SPEAKER_10]: Sir?
[07:25.450 --> 07:25.810]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes.
[07:27.350 --> 07:29.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't think I was supposed to reach this company.
[07:29.170 --> 07:29.590]  [SPEAKER_04]: Oh, okay.
[07:29.670 --> 07:30.870]  [SPEAKER_04]: This is the satellite office.
[07:31.070 --> 07:31.570]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, okay.
[07:31.630 --> 07:32.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, I don't need any satellites.
[07:32.530 --> 07:33.390]  [SPEAKER_17]: Thanks anyway.
[07:33.670 --> 07:33.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: Bye-bye.
[07:35.310 --> 07:35.830]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[07:35.950 --> 07:37.110]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, that was a mistake.
[07:37.450 --> 07:37.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[07:38.210 --> 07:39.250]  [SPEAKER_17]: What I'm going to...
[07:39.250 --> 07:45.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm not going to allow that to go out over the air, but possibly, if you notice, that transferred someplace.
[07:45.770 --> 07:51.430]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's quite possible that when they hang up, it'll trip down to a dial tone up there since it transferred.
[07:51.430 --> 07:58.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: If it used the regular telephone company transferring mechanisms, then in all likelihood it won't do that.
[07:58.070 --> 08:06.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: But if you use some cheap manufacturer design of something that will...
[08:06.890 --> 08:22.370]  [SPEAKER_17]: like a call forwarding system by, dare I say it, Radio Shack, which I have one, you plug it into your phone line and you call line A, line A automatically forwards to line B, and then when line B hangs up, the caller who called in the first place gets line A's dial tone.
[08:22.370 --> 08:24.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's as simple as that, and it's been going on for years.
[08:24.630 --> 08:28.410]  [SPEAKER_17]: And anybody that still uses archaic equipment like that, I guess, deserves what they get.
[08:29.050 --> 08:31.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: But we're not going to promote that kind of activity here.
[08:32.050 --> 08:33.050]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's go on to the next number.
[08:35.730 --> 08:36.750]  [SPEAKER_17]: Which, there it is.
[08:36.850 --> 08:36.990]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[08:51.100 --> 08:53.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, we know what that is, so let's go on to the next one.
[08:58.340 --> 09:04.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Ordinarily, this would be much faster because you can dial your phone a lot faster than you can do it over the radio.
[09:26.490 --> 09:32.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: The hacker rule is always to give something five rings before giving up.
[09:32.770 --> 09:35.490]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we've done that, now we're giving up, so we're going on to the next one.
[09:38.830 --> 09:44.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is this amazing, the expectation of what we might find?
[09:50.810 --> 09:51.410]  [SPEAKER_05]: Harpswell Inn.
[09:52.070 --> 09:52.870]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, I'm sorry.
[09:53.030 --> 09:53.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: What city am I reaching?
[09:54.690 --> 09:55.350]  [SPEAKER_05]: Harpswell Inn.
[09:55.490 --> 09:56.330]  [SPEAKER_05]: Lookout Point House.
[09:56.650 --> 09:57.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, no, I didn't need that.
[09:58.030 --> 09:58.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, sorry.
[09:59.010 --> 09:59.530]  [SPEAKER_17]: Bye-bye.
[10:00.610 --> 10:01.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, you'll get a lot of wrong numbers.
[10:02.990 --> 10:05.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: And sometimes you'll annoy people, but most of the time you won't.
[10:05.950 --> 10:10.190]  [SPEAKER_17]: Especially if it's 800 numbers because those are going to businesses in the first place.
[10:12.050 --> 10:19.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: And there isn't any real harm to one particular person since you're not calling their 800 number over and over again.
[10:19.030 --> 10:23.690]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is something that's been going on in the hacker world for almost generations.
[10:24.350 --> 10:27.970]  [SPEAKER_17]: What we're doing here tonight is simply showing you what is already happening.
[10:28.150 --> 10:30.930]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're not telling people this is what you should do with your lives.
[10:31.030 --> 10:34.770]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is how you should spend every waking moment of the day.
[10:35.290 --> 10:41.350]  [SPEAKER_17]: But it's a fact of what happens and the fact that many things out there are interesting to people.
[10:41.350 --> 10:46.590]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm surprised we haven't found something like a voicemail system or a computer.
[10:48.190 --> 10:50.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, remember, we're not going to give out the numbers we're calling.
[10:50.510 --> 10:52.110]  [SPEAKER_17]: We just picked an exchange at random.
[11:12.200 --> 11:13.960]  [SPEAKER_05]: Hi, thanks for calling the Harpswell Inn.
[11:14.500 --> 11:15.640]  [SPEAKER_05]: Margaret, come on over here.
[11:15.800 --> 11:16.780]  [SPEAKER_05]: We're out watching the sunset.
[11:16.800 --> 11:19.720]  [SPEAKER_05]: And we'll give you a key to get back into the Dyers Road Cottage.
[11:20.420 --> 11:22.480]  [SPEAKER_05]: We do have vacancies tonight at the Harpswell Inn.
[11:23.020 --> 11:24.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't think we should be listening to this.
[11:28.890 --> 11:32.170]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, just a regular answering machine there.
[11:32.310 --> 11:33.890]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't know what we found there.
[11:33.950 --> 11:36.330]  [SPEAKER_17]: It seems like we found someone's personal line, which is very unusual.
[11:37.190 --> 11:41.150]  [SPEAKER_17]: But more and more people have 800 numbers these days, so there's no telling what you'll find out there.
[11:42.190 --> 11:43.090]  [SPEAKER_17]: Shall we try one more?
[11:43.590 --> 11:44.450]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's try one more.
[12:02.460 --> 12:04.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, that's going to happen more often than not.
[12:04.940 --> 12:08.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: But there are so many 800 numbers out there.
[12:08.260 --> 12:12.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is something that I think every hacker has done at some point.
[12:13.700 --> 12:16.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it's something that you really can't legislate away.
[12:16.880 --> 12:20.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: I know people are trying to pass laws saying that scanning is illegal.
[12:20.960 --> 12:21.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, it's not illegal.
[12:22.320 --> 12:26.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's something that is incredibly easy to do and there's no criminal intent.
[12:27.380 --> 12:28.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's just curiosity.
[12:28.580 --> 12:32.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: How many of you listened just now wondering what it was we were going to find?
[12:33.280 --> 12:34.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, we didn't find much.
[12:35.440 --> 12:38.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: We found out that Margaret doesn't have the key to the cottage or whatever.
[12:38.360 --> 12:40.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Usually you find out things more interesting than that.
[12:40.680 --> 12:44.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: You find voicemail systems that allow you to wander around all over the place.
[12:44.720 --> 12:49.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: Virtually any company that answers at night without a human being is a voicemail system.
[12:49.040 --> 12:51.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that allows for endless exploration.
[12:52.780 --> 12:59.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: However, a word of caution if people are intending on doing things that are not quite legal.
[13:00.060 --> 13:04.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: Such as charging phone calls to people that don't want you to charge phone calls to.
[13:04.800 --> 13:07.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: First of all, we certainly don't condone things like that.
[13:08.020 --> 13:09.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: But the facts should be known.
[13:09.860 --> 13:13.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: And the facts are that your number is transmitted whenever you make an 800 phone call.
[13:13.920 --> 13:17.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, just be careful of that particular fact.
[13:17.420 --> 13:20.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: Remember, an 800 call is like making a collect phone call.
[13:20.480 --> 13:24.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, it's all well and good.
[13:25.660 --> 13:26.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: 800 scanning.
[13:26.920 --> 13:28.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's a first right here on off the hook.
[13:29.640 --> 13:33.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: And some other things that are happening that are first.
[13:35.060 --> 13:45.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: Of course, we talked about the potential for AT&T getting into the local phone business last week.
[13:45.960 --> 13:47.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: And now there's all kinds of other things happening.
[13:48.120 --> 13:55.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: The local phone companies, which are affected by AT&T merging with the largest cellular operator in the country.
[13:56.300 --> 13:57.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, they're affected by that.
[13:57.460 --> 13:59.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: They want to get into the long distance market now.
[13:59.360 --> 14:07.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: But not only that, a judge has ruled that the phone companies, or at least one particular phone company, can now become more involved with cable TV programming.
[14:08.580 --> 14:11.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, the cable TV companies are upset by this.
[14:11.580 --> 14:18.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: But they say, okay, well, if you're going to allow this, then you have to allow the cable TV companies to make local phone calls.
[14:18.720 --> 14:23.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, now you're going to have cable TV companies providing dial tones for local phone calls.
[14:23.620 --> 14:27.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're going to have local phone companies providing long distance services.
[14:27.080 --> 14:29.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: And you are going to have long-distance companies providing cellular service.
[14:30.720 --> 14:32.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, it's hard enough making a phone call.
[14:32.640 --> 14:35.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now you are going to need a chart just to be able to navigate your way through it all.
[14:36.320 --> 14:39.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't think the average person really cares all that much.
[14:39.240 --> 14:41.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: They just want it to be easy and they want it to be cheap.
[14:41.980 --> 14:48.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: The question is, are all these court cases, is all this competition going to make it so?
[14:49.760 --> 14:56.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is it going to make it so that we can make calls easily, not be ripped off, and understand what we are doing?
[14:56.080 --> 14:57.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: And at the same time, have a choice.
[14:57.960 --> 14:58.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: It sure would be nice.
[15:01.140 --> 15:03.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: But only time will tell, I suppose.
[15:03.860 --> 15:05.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: We'd like your opinions on that, as always.
[15:05.820 --> 15:15.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can either call us later or send them into the program off the hook here at WBAI, 505 8th Avenue, New York, New York, 10018.
[15:15.260 --> 15:25.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'd also like to read something that appeared in today's Newsday concerning governmental actions or inactions of the past.
[15:25.380 --> 15:28.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's an editorial called Keep Government Honest.
[15:28.600 --> 15:29.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Preserve the email.
[15:30.480 --> 15:32.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: The email, of course, is electronic mail.
[15:33.300 --> 15:35.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: And the editorial reads as follows.
[15:35.240 --> 15:39.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: The federal courts have officially taken notice that the government has entered the computer age.
[15:39.700 --> 15:41.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: And not a moment too soon.
[15:41.660 --> 15:50.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: Some White House computer tapes from the Reagan and Bush years were illegally erased before a three-judge appellate panel ruled unanimously that the law requires their preservation.
[15:51.300 --> 15:59.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: The messages on those tapes may have been perfectly innocuous, unlike the ones that were useful to investigators and prosecutors in the Iran-Contra affair.
[15:59.500 --> 16:00.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: But that's not the point.
[16:01.220 --> 16:08.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled this month that the standards for preserving federal documents apply to tapes as well as papers.
[16:09.920 --> 16:14.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: Journalists and historians should be no less grateful for this decision than investigators and prosecutors.
[16:14.680 --> 16:20.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: While the government isn't necessarily in business to make life easier for them, it is supposed to be accountable to the people.
[16:20.580 --> 16:29.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: And if the people have no reliable way of finding out what their government has been up to, well, how do we know which rascals deserve to be thrown out, or for that matter, who the White Hats really were?
[16:29.260 --> 16:29.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: Sure.
[16:30.030 --> 16:42.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: The Clinton administration had taken a more moderate stand on preserving computer records than its predecessors, but it had still argued that the law's requirement could be met by printing out copies of selected messages and memos it deemed important.
[16:43.260 --> 16:53.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Not good enough, the judges decided, because printouts of electronic messages on the White House and National Security Council systems wouldn't normally show who had sent them to whom.
[16:53.980 --> 16:55.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that's a rather important part of it all.
[16:55.920 --> 16:59.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: In other words, the paper trail tells only part of the story.
[16:59.860 --> 17:06.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: The complete record is only in the computer, and erasing a message there is essentially no different from shredding an original document.
[17:07.450 --> 17:10.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: The court's ruling doesn't solve all the government's record-keeping problems.
[17:11.080 --> 17:19.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: Computer tapes degrade over time, for instance, but it does make it harder for politicians to rewrite history to suit their own convenience, and the court deserves our thanks for that.
[17:19.220 --> 17:21.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's today's editorial and news day.
[17:22.280 --> 17:25.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good for the most part, but it misses the boat on a couple of things.
[17:25.160 --> 17:36.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: One being that information inside a computer is extremely easy to modify, and to say that the complete record is only in the computer, I don't know if that's necessarily true.
[17:36.380 --> 17:44.950]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, yeah, we could have printouts say they don't tell the full story, but once you have something inside a computer, that's the truth.
[17:45.360 --> 17:50.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's awfully easy to modify who you sent something to, when it was created, what is said inside it.
[17:50.920 --> 17:54.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: And that's something that we should never lose sight of.
[17:54.990 --> 18:00.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Also, the other point being, how do we preserve all this deteriorating data?
[18:00.780 --> 18:07.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, why not distribute it freely and openly to all the people of this country, who will be more than happy to store it on their PCs?
[18:08.580 --> 18:10.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: After all, it's data.
[18:10.200 --> 18:11.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's zeros and ones.
[18:11.200 --> 18:18.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: We can store it in any form, and the odds of it being changed or altered on everybody's machine in exactly the same way would be extremely small.
[18:18.760 --> 18:30.010]  [SPEAKER_17]: So that would be a very good way to entrust the history of this nation to the citizens of the country, and also to allow the citizens of the country to take an interest in what's going on.
[18:30.010 --> 18:37.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, you could read some email for the White House and the National Security Council, but it's not exactly private, you know.
[18:37.470 --> 18:39.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: It concerns matters that involve us all.
[18:41.010 --> 18:42.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, get involved.
[18:43.140 --> 18:44.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: Learn how it all works.
[18:45.360 --> 18:47.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hands-on access, that kind of thing.
[18:47.540 --> 18:49.030]  [SPEAKER_17]: One day, it's breaking the rules.
[18:49.320 --> 18:52.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: The next day, it's the rules of the game.
[18:52.560 --> 18:58.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: We'll be back in a couple of minutes, talking about the Clipper chip with an expert.
[18:58.300 --> 19:00.640]  [SPEAKER_08]: People say these songs lead the way.
[19:00.800 --> 19:03.240]  [SPEAKER_08]: It's the art of your day from Boss DJ, Don.
[19:10.910 --> 19:15.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[19:16.690 --> 19:21.590]  [SPEAKER_08]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[19:23.290 --> 19:27.750]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now I got a headache, or maybe it's a tooth.
[19:28.130 --> 19:28.850]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, no.
[19:29.330 --> 19:31.010]  [SPEAKER_08]: This couldn't get much worse.
[19:31.630 --> 19:33.610]  [SPEAKER_08]: I've got to tell the truth.
[19:33.610 --> 19:36.670]  [SPEAKER_08]: No, we couldn't get much worse.
[19:37.390 --> 19:39.410]  [SPEAKER_08]: But if they could, they would.
[19:39.690 --> 19:42.490]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb, but the best is back for us.
[19:43.150 --> 19:44.870]  [SPEAKER_08]: I hope that's understood.
[19:45.390 --> 19:46.210]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[19:52.220 --> 19:54.180]  [SPEAKER_08]: I just ran out of milk.
[19:54.770 --> 19:56.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: There's no paper in the news.
[19:57.140 --> 19:57.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[19:57.940 --> 20:00.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now it started raining.
[20:00.880 --> 20:02.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: Light had done the truth.
[20:03.080 --> 20:03.770]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[20:04.240 --> 20:05.940]  [SPEAKER_08]: And now we begin to wonder.
[20:06.820 --> 20:07.380]  Hey!
[20:18.630 --> 20:20.610]  [SPEAKER_08]: Listen to some sounds.
[20:21.470 --> 20:23.490]  [SPEAKER_08]: Set my house on fire.
[20:24.570 --> 20:26.250]  [SPEAKER_08]: Burged it to the ground.
[20:27.310 --> 20:29.170]  [SPEAKER_08]: Couldn't get much worse.
[20:29.950 --> 20:30.470]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[20:30.470 --> 20:31.830]  [SPEAKER_08]: But if they could, they would.
[20:32.050 --> 20:32.890]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[20:33.050 --> 20:34.930]  [SPEAKER_08]: But the best is back for us.
[20:35.690 --> 20:37.550]  [SPEAKER_08]: But if they could, they would.
[20:37.810 --> 20:38.770]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[20:44.870 --> 20:46.770]  [SPEAKER_08]: Now I've got a console.
[20:47.330 --> 20:49.450]  [SPEAKER_08]: My brother's on the run.
[20:56.440 --> 20:58.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: Couldn't get much worse.
[20:58.960 --> 21:00.960]  [SPEAKER_08]: But if they could, they would.
[21:01.270 --> 21:01.970]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[21:01.970 --> 21:02.860]  [SPEAKER_08]: Come for the best.
[21:02.970 --> 21:04.050]  [SPEAKER_08]: Expect the worst.
[21:04.900 --> 21:06.820]  [SPEAKER_08]: I hope the sun is good.
[21:07.140 --> 21:07.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bambini Bomb!
[21:13.360 --> 21:14.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, I can't understand it either.
[21:15.050 --> 21:17.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: But it seems like one of our turntables is dying.
[21:18.100 --> 21:19.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: It sounds really, really slow.
[21:20.290 --> 21:23.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: But that's the way things go sometimes here at WBAI.
[21:24.320 --> 21:24.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[21:25.270 --> 21:26.210]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is off the hook.
[21:26.360 --> 21:27.470]  [SPEAKER_17]: Emanuel Goldstein with you.
[21:27.620 --> 21:28.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: Enough of that.
[21:28.580 --> 21:29.050]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's...
[21:29.050 --> 21:31.270]  [SPEAKER_17]: Boy, never heard it sound quite that bad.
[21:32.320 --> 21:32.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[21:33.120 --> 21:34.230]  [SPEAKER_17]: Couldn't get much worse than that.
[21:35.660 --> 21:42.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: We are now going to talk about the clipper chip and how it affects each and every one of us.
[21:42.210 --> 21:46.990]  [SPEAKER_17]: What I'd like to do first is read something that came out of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.
[21:47.140 --> 21:49.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: And then we'll be talking to somebody from that organization.
[21:50.760 --> 21:55.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: This is a call for comments on the clipper chip that went out over the internet.
[21:56.860 --> 21:59.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: It goes, I am writing to you because of your interest in the clipper chip.
[21:59.760 --> 22:03.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: Simply stated, we need your help.
[22:03.140 --> 22:07.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: As you know, the administration announced the clipper key escrow proposal on April 16th.
[22:07.540 --> 22:10.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: Many organizations and companies raised concerns about the proposal.
[22:11.260 --> 22:12.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: Congress held hearings.
[22:12.640 --> 22:14.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: A government advisory panel is reviewing the proposal.
[22:15.120 --> 22:16.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: The White House is studying the issue.
[22:16.980 --> 22:18.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: Much is being said about the plan.
[22:19.180 --> 22:24.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: Recently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology announced a formal call for public comments on clipper.
[22:24.420 --> 22:27.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: However, that announcement is reprinted.
[22:27.640 --> 22:30.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: We won't get into that announcement because it will go on for some time, but we'll talk about it.
[22:31.760 --> 22:45.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: We at CPSR believe that this administrative process may provide the best opportunity for the public to be heard on this proposal, probably the dumbest privacy idea to come out of Washington since the 1965 proposal for a single national database.
[22:46.540 --> 22:56.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: In 1989, when we raised concerns about the Lotus Marketplace product, Lotus Chief Executive Officer Jim Manzi received more than...
[22:56.100 --> 22:58.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: I believe the number here is 730,000 messages.
[22:59.240 --> 23:01.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Something along those lines.
[23:01.480 --> 23:02.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Got kind of garbled on the print out here.
[23:03.240 --> 23:04.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: Lotus withdrew the product.
[23:04.960 --> 23:06.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're trying to top that number.
[23:06.660 --> 23:11.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: We issued a public call this week on the network and asked people to send their comments to NIST.
[23:11.440 --> 23:13.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: We expressed some of our concerns.
[23:13.460 --> 23:16.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: No doubt other issues will be raised, and some people will disagree.
[23:17.440 --> 23:24.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'm writing to you to ask specifically that you write a story over the next month about the current state of Clipper and encourage your readers and listeners to send their comments to NIST.
[23:25.720 --> 23:26.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Time is critical.
[23:26.740 --> 23:29.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Comments must be received by September 28th.
[23:30.550 --> 23:31.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[23:31.290 --> 23:37.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's an important issue, and it's something that I think all of us do have some say in.
[23:37.340 --> 23:41.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: We have Mark Rotenberg from Computer Professions for Social Responsibility on the line with us.
[23:42.520 --> 23:48.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: And Mark, can you possibly tell us, first of all, what is this whole Clipper chip thing for those people that have been asleep for the past several months?
[23:49.580 --> 23:52.100]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, thanks for having me on the program, Emmanuel.
[23:52.640 --> 23:54.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: Clipper is about cryptography.
[23:55.100 --> 23:59.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's about the privacy of computer messages that go through networks.
[23:59.420 --> 24:23.100]  [SPEAKER_13]: And basically what this boils down to is a government proposal, specifically a proposal from the intelligence agencies, to make sure that the cryptography that's used on the network can be broken by the government, so that no one in the United States can be using a technology that provides privacy that the government can't break.
[24:23.940 --> 24:28.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: We think this is a very dangerous proposal.
[24:28.460 --> 24:35.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: We were, frankly, surprised that the Clinton administration put this out a few months ago.
[24:35.290 --> 24:41.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: It had all the markings of a good Cold War era idea.
[24:41.860 --> 24:47.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: And why we're doing this now in the 1990s is very hard to understand.
[24:47.220 --> 24:50.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, as far as you can tell, who is behind the Clipper chip?
[24:50.360 --> 24:56.290]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is this something that's been in the makings for years, or something that was totally devised by the Clinton administration?
[24:56.620 --> 24:59.500]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, it certainly wasn't devised by the Clinton administration.
[25:00.440 --> 25:03.860]  [SPEAKER_13]: They put it out and made it public, and I think that was a mistake.
[25:04.340 --> 25:10.500]  [SPEAKER_13]: But the battle over cryptography has been going on since before World War II.
[25:11.340 --> 25:16.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: Basically, it has to do with the ability of the government to intercept communications.
[25:16.980 --> 25:25.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: And the two agencies, two federal agencies that are most interested in this, are, of course, the FBI and the National Security Agency.
[25:26.100 --> 25:31.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: The FBI has authority to intercept communications within the United States.
[25:31.550 --> 25:40.290]  [SPEAKER_13]: The NSA has authority under our law, not necessarily foreign government law, but under our law, to intercept communications overseas.
[25:41.240 --> 25:56.920]  [SPEAKER_13]: And I think what's happened over the last few years is that the FBI and the NSA got together, and they said some of these new technologies might make it more difficult for us to do the interception we want to do, and we have to get out in front.
[25:57.320 --> 26:06.520]  [SPEAKER_13]: And the way we're going to get out in front is to try to impose a technical standard, a cryptography standard that we know that we can break.
[26:07.280 --> 26:14.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: And they sold the National Security Council on the idea, and eventually sold the White House on the idea.
[26:14.620 --> 26:26.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: And mid-April, a document went out over the president's signature that said that the White House was formally considering the adoption of this proposal.
[26:28.440 --> 26:34.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, if you could give our listeners a worst-case scenario, what is the big threat with the clipper chip?
[26:34.740 --> 26:37.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: What could it potentially do to our privacy?
[26:39.260 --> 27:02.600]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, it's a little bit like saying if you want to put, you know, a lock on your door or a lock on your car, if you want to have a bank deposit box somewhere with a key on it, you have a responsibility to make sure that a copy of the key for that lock is deposited with the government.
[27:03.260 --> 27:17.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: In the, you know, possible situation where you become the subject of a criminal investigation, you have to be sure that the government has the capability to open those doors, to open those locks.
[27:18.650 --> 27:38.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: And it seems to me the problem here is that it suddenly treats every one of us as if we are each potential suspects in criminal investigations, as if any time you or I might pick up the telephone to make a call or to connect our computer to a network,
[27:38.900 --> 27:41.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: we might be engaging in some criminal enterprise.
[27:42.590 --> 27:45.790]  [SPEAKER_13]: And we just haven't operated that way in the past in this country.
[27:45.960 --> 27:49.050]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, you know, of course we have in, you know, some circumstances.
[27:49.050 --> 27:52.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: I don't want to be quite so bold about that.
[27:52.780 --> 28:02.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: But for the most part, these kinds of proposals, you know, are dragged out in the sunlight and eventually die the death that they should.
[28:02.680 --> 28:10.050]  [SPEAKER_13]: This one, for whatever reason it may be, seems to have a lot of support in the White House.
[28:10.280 --> 28:23.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: And I think the consequence for us is that our privacy will be diminished and our treatment as citizens with certain rights will be lessened.
[28:23.580 --> 28:34.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: But we seem to be moving in a direction where, as Edwin Mies once said, if you have nothing to hide, then if you're not guilty, you have nothing to hide or something along those lines.
[28:35.990 --> 28:42.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: With caller ID now, suddenly we are expected to advertise our presence when we make a telephone call.
[28:42.320 --> 28:45.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: And if we have nothing to hide, we have nothing to worry about.
[28:45.480 --> 28:48.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: If we're not guilty of anything, it doesn't matter if we announce who we are.
[28:48.020 --> 28:57.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: I see sort of the same mentality with the clipper chip in that, you know, you have nothing to fear if you haven't done anything wrong.
[28:57.340 --> 29:00.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's, you know, it's all part of the game now.
[29:00.340 --> 29:03.790]  [SPEAKER_17]: People will be able to look at what you've said, what you are doing.
[29:05.040 --> 29:07.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, do you see a connection between the mentality there?
[29:07.460 --> 29:11.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: Certainly a connection, but in fact, it goes even a step further than what you describe.
[29:11.340 --> 29:20.320]  [SPEAKER_13]: Because here we're talking about technical standards for telecommunications equipment that will be used across the United States.
[29:20.580 --> 29:27.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: This is not, you know, specialized, top-secret, classified networks.
[29:27.120 --> 29:34.720]  [SPEAKER_13]: This is a proposal for a certain chip that's supposed to be included in all voice telephones in the United States.
[29:35.840 --> 29:44.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: That means that any time you or I pick up a phone, you know, as I said, we're going to be treated as potential suspects.
[29:44.680 --> 29:55.640]  [SPEAKER_13]: And I guess what's so ironic about this in the 1990s is that this is exactly the type of telecommunications equipment that is being dismantled in East Germany.
[29:55.640 --> 30:15.940]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, this was, you know, what governments tried to set up that didn't trust their citizens, that wanted to design networks for surveillance rather than privacy, that built in the ability to eavesdrop, and in that manner tried to control, though as history has shown not very successfully,
[30:16.580 --> 30:17.790]  [SPEAKER_13]: political protest.
[30:18.480 --> 30:20.380]  [SPEAKER_13]: And here we are in the U.S.
[30:21.460 --> 30:26.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: talking about building this into our systems with the Cold War at an end.
[30:26.920 --> 30:31.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, you say that every time you pick up the phone, this is going to be taking effect.
[30:32.360 --> 30:37.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: I think the average person out there is saying, well, when I pick up the phone now, there's no encryption at all.
[30:37.290 --> 30:40.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: So wouldn't this system be a bit more secure?
[30:40.880 --> 30:44.140]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, you know, that's certainly a consideration.
[30:44.140 --> 30:46.620]  [SPEAKER_13]: The telephone network is changing.
[30:46.900 --> 31:04.540]  [SPEAKER_13]: We're moving from a hardwired network, where information used to travel solely through copper wire, to a network that's wireless, that uses cellular networks and satellites and many new technologies.
[31:04.760 --> 31:13.280]  [SPEAKER_13]: The natural development with these new wireless technologies is the inclusion of cryptography.
[31:14.290 --> 31:25.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: And communication service providers are moving in that direction, Motorola and others saying we need to incorporate cryptography to make sure that these, you know, these signals won't be intercepted.
[31:25.940 --> 31:38.480]  [SPEAKER_13]: The problem is that when the government steps in and says, if you're going to do that, we need to make sure we have the ability to break it, suddenly the rules of technological development have been changed.
[31:39.280 --> 31:50.660]  [SPEAKER_13]: Because now, instead of designing for privacy, as the companies would do normally, they're designing for surveillance, because the government is telling them that's what they're required to do.
[31:52.220 --> 31:54.790]  [SPEAKER_13]: And, you know, that's a very different approach.
[31:55.360 --> 31:57.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: What is AT&T's role in all this?
[31:57.360 --> 31:59.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: They seem to have been involved right from the start.
[31:59.920 --> 32:04.050]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, AT&T, you know, it's very complicated.
[32:04.320 --> 32:15.720]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, I've been here in Washington and following these issues closely and meeting with representatives of the White House and testifying at hearings with representatives from AT&T.
[32:15.820 --> 32:16.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: And frankly, it's just not clear.
[32:17.640 --> 32:24.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: On the one hand, they say they want to see if this proposal is going to be accepted by the private sector.
[32:24.080 --> 32:31.040]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's not clear that they're prepared to, you know, endorse it for many of the reasons I just described.
[32:31.440 --> 32:47.240]  [SPEAKER_13]: But on the other hand, the same day that the White House announced the Clipper proposal back in April, AT&T was ready to go with its new voice data product that incorporated the Clipper technology.
[32:47.240 --> 32:50.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: The White House had described that same day.
[32:50.920 --> 33:10.790]  [SPEAKER_13]: And what was obvious, of course, was that there had been some negotiations between AT&T and the National Security Agency prior to the announcement of Clipper where the National Security Agency said, in effect, if you agree to incorporate this new technical standard that we're proposing,
[33:11.180 --> 33:18.440]  [SPEAKER_13]: we won't give you any hassle on including cryptography in your new telephone services.
[33:19.340 --> 33:26.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: So the fact that AT&T had advanced knowledge of this, is there anything illegal about that?
[33:26.500 --> 33:36.920]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, there are certainly, you know, smaller communications service providers and companies in the cryptography business that weren't very pleased about this.
[33:37.520 --> 33:40.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: There was one company in D.C.
[33:41.440 --> 33:47.480]  [SPEAKER_13]: that said it was anti-competitive and improper for the government to be engaging in these kinds of arrangements.
[33:47.720 --> 33:55.980]  [SPEAKER_13]: I don't know of any formal legal challenge along those lines, but certainly it raises some questions.
[33:57.120 --> 34:00.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: Why the sudden call to arms now?
[34:00.280 --> 34:01.550]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is something looming on the horizon?
[34:01.860 --> 34:04.820]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, the sudden call to arms is...
[34:05.400 --> 34:12.860]  [SPEAKER_13]: We think this is perhaps the most significant privacy issue in the United States at the moment.
[34:13.220 --> 34:16.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: It seems, you know, to some people sort of the...
[34:16.400 --> 34:34.260]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, you know, people are concerned about FBI or they're concerned about civil liberties, but this is the first time, really the first time, that the federal government has attempted to impose a technical standard to facilitate surveillance.
[34:35.160 --> 34:44.040]  [SPEAKER_13]: You read about it in 1984 and you read about it in science fiction, but before April of 1993, the U.S.
[34:44.160 --> 34:49.550]  [SPEAKER_13]: government never said, we need to make sure that telephones in this country can be wiretapped.
[34:49.550 --> 35:08.760]  [SPEAKER_13]: And that's why we've encouraged people, particularly people who are interested in computers and networking technology, to express their views on the proposal, to contact the president, to contact the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which,
[35:08.820 --> 35:16.020]  [SPEAKER_13]: in fact, I think has done an admirable job trying to sort through all these issues, because there are some difficult issues here.
[35:16.540 --> 35:18.240]  [SPEAKER_13]: But they need to hear from more people.
[35:19.340 --> 35:25.100]  [SPEAKER_13]: They need to see this as the type of issue which affects a lot of people, which it does.
[35:25.740 --> 35:28.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: How can people make their views known?
[35:28.960 --> 35:34.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, I think, Emmanuel, you probably have in front of you the contact information for NIST.
[35:34.500 --> 35:36.620]  [SPEAKER_13]: I don't have that here.
[35:37.640 --> 35:39.550]  [SPEAKER_13]: Certainly, that information will be helpful.
[35:39.760 --> 35:42.380]  [SPEAKER_13]: They can also contact the White House.
[35:43.460 --> 35:51.820]  [SPEAKER_13]: And you can put on the cover of the envelope, clipper, and then write to the president and say that you have some concerns about the proposal.
[35:53.280 --> 35:54.860]  [SPEAKER_13]: Describe what your concerns are.
[35:56.180 --> 35:57.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Actually, this is kind of embarrassing.
[35:57.440 --> 36:01.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: The printer jammed right at the point where the NIST information is being given out.
[36:01.400 --> 36:03.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: But we do have information for CPSR.
[36:03.840 --> 36:06.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: In fact, could you tell us something about CPSR?
[36:06.960 --> 36:07.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: Sure.
[36:07.240 --> 36:08.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: What kind of group is it?
[36:08.440 --> 36:09.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: How long have you been around for it?
[36:09.640 --> 36:11.300]  [SPEAKER_13]: A national membership organization.
[36:11.300 --> 36:12.760]  [SPEAKER_13]: We started in 1982.
[36:13.000 --> 36:19.780]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's people in the computing profession who are interested in the impact of technology on society.
[36:20.900 --> 36:34.050]  [SPEAKER_13]: Over the last few years, we've become particularly involved in privacy and civil liberties issues and trying to ensure that new communication technologies protect values that are important, such as privacy.
[36:34.960 --> 36:36.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: And as I said, it's membership-based.
[36:37.620 --> 36:46.500]  [SPEAKER_13]: We've had a lot of support and input from our members in the development of our positions on issues such as Clipper.
[36:46.980 --> 36:55.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: And in fact, several of our members now are reviewing various technical aspects of the proposal.
[36:55.980 --> 36:59.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're talking to Mark Rotenberg of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.
[36:59.780 --> 37:00.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: He's in Washington, D.C.
[37:01.180 --> 37:09.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: And we're talking about the Clipper chip and the importance of people like you speaking out, either in favor or in opposition to it.
[37:09.840 --> 37:17.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'd certainly like to hear some arguments in favor of it because they've certainly been few and far between among the computer users that I've seen anyway.
[37:17.980 --> 37:23.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Mark, have you seen any spontaneous showings of support among the computer users?
[37:23.320 --> 37:24.040]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, no.
[37:25.380 --> 37:44.000]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, as I said at the beginning, there's strong concern within the FBI and the National Security Agency that a fundamental part of what they do, which involves the interception of electronic communications, could be jeopardized by new encryption technology.
[37:45.120 --> 37:47.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: And people are sensitive to that concern.
[37:47.340 --> 37:50.000]  [SPEAKER_13]: I don't think you can dismiss it.
[37:50.300 --> 38:09.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: But like a lot of issues that we face regarding proper scope of government authority and the balance between individual liberty and public safety, sometimes the proposals bring many unforeseen costs.
[38:10.500 --> 38:22.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: And one of the costs with this particular proposal is giving the government the authority to determine how much privacy people in the United States are entitled to.
[38:23.210 --> 38:32.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: By virtue of the technical design of the communication network, that's a very high cost.
[38:33.150 --> 38:40.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're taking phone calls at 212-279-3400 if you have any questions or comments on this issue or other technological things.
[38:41.630 --> 38:48.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: And Mark, can we just ask you, this is a commonly asked question to me as well as to other people on the net, I would imagine.
[38:49.280 --> 38:56.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: Can the Clipper chip be expanded to encompass more than just cordless telephones and things like that?
[38:56.360 --> 38:57.480]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, I think so.
[38:57.880 --> 39:24.050]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, I think the long-term goal is that there would be something based on the Clipper design or more specifically what's called the key escrow requirement, which means leaving a copy of the key with the government in every telephone and telecommunications equipment in the United States.
[39:25.120 --> 39:27.880]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, that's the intent.
[39:29.200 --> 39:32.610]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, again, our phone number is 212-279-3400.
[39:32.740 --> 39:35.110]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's see who's out there.
[39:35.300 --> 39:36.670]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening, you're on Off the Hook.
[39:36.670 --> 39:38.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: Yes, I have a couple of questions.
[39:38.520 --> 39:44.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: They don't pertain to the Clipper, but I was wondering if I could ask them now.
[39:44.860 --> 39:45.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, if you make it quick.
[39:46.520 --> 39:49.280]  [SPEAKER_04]: One, about abusive messages on bulletin board systems.
[39:49.550 --> 40:01.070]  [SPEAKER_04]: If, let's say, a user pulls up a bulletin board system and leaves abusive messages to the sysop and also makes, like, aliased fake accounts on there, is it possible to be sued for that?
[40:01.690 --> 40:10.130]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, it could be considered a form of harassment if you're constantly barraging somebody with obscene or harassing messages.
[40:10.300 --> 40:13.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, I mean, they could conceivably do something along those lines.
[40:13.940 --> 40:16.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's the same as making a phone call in that respect.
[40:16.500 --> 40:17.050]  [SPEAKER_04]: Mm-hmm.
[40:17.550 --> 40:19.590]  [SPEAKER_04]: Also, one more question.
[40:19.720 --> 40:23.020]  [SPEAKER_04]: Does the combo red box DTMF styler still work?
[40:23.520 --> 40:25.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: Any red box still works, yes.
[40:26.460 --> 40:27.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: In certain areas.
[40:27.540 --> 40:29.150]  [SPEAKER_04]: Things that operators can...
[40:29.650 --> 40:32.610]  [SPEAKER_04]: Computers can recognize a fake coin tone.
[40:33.800 --> 40:35.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Computers aren't quite as good as humans.
[40:35.960 --> 40:41.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: But there are some levels of standards and some pay phones that are better than others.
[40:41.240 --> 40:45.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: But things haven't improved all that much as far as that kind of security goes.
[40:45.240 --> 40:49.610]  [SPEAKER_04]: Also, do you know an automatic number identification for number for the 516 area code?
[40:49.960 --> 40:53.590]  [SPEAKER_17]: Are you talking about just a number to call to find out your phone number?
[40:53.700 --> 40:53.840]  Yes.
[40:53.840 --> 40:54.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[40:54.520 --> 40:58.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, there's one called ANAC, which is Automatic Number Announcement.
[40:58.070 --> 41:03.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't want to quibble about terms, but ANI is something that you get in a different manner.
[41:03.340 --> 41:03.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: It is...
[41:03.980 --> 41:06.000]  [SPEAKER_04]: I mean, something that I call up and I find out the number I'm down.
[41:06.110 --> 41:06.170]  [SPEAKER_04]: Okay.
[41:06.520 --> 41:08.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can dial 958 in this area to get that.
[41:08.800 --> 41:10.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can also dial 511.
[41:10.550 --> 41:10.900]  [SPEAKER_04]: All right.
[41:10.920 --> 41:11.340]  [SPEAKER_04]: Thanks a lot.
[41:11.440 --> 41:11.650]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[41:11.820 --> 41:12.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: Bye-bye.
[41:12.780 --> 41:14.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes, the quest for knowledge.
[41:14.610 --> 41:22.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: I hope people aren't harassing bulletin board operators because it's a labor of love in some manner of insanity.
[41:24.090 --> 41:25.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: 212-279-3400.
[41:25.940 --> 41:26.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[41:26.980 --> 41:27.880]  [SPEAKER_01]: 212-279-3400.
[41:27.880 --> 41:27.980]  [SPEAKER_01]: Hello.
[41:28.340 --> 41:28.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes, go ahead.
[41:28.960 --> 41:29.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: Do you have a question?
[41:29.630 --> 41:30.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Yes.
[41:31.570 --> 41:52.500]  [SPEAKER_01]: I've been listening for the past 10 minutes and I missed the first part of the show, but I was wondering if there is any thought as to the possibility that the government will I will not actually listen to objections, but will go ahead with this policy of forced entry,
[41:52.800 --> 42:06.550]  [SPEAKER_01]: you know, forced exposure to tapping at all costs because of their ability to stonewall, to hold up type certification, to harass in any number of ways.
[42:06.550 --> 42:27.040]  [SPEAKER_01]: And in the face of that possibility, is there much thought in the computer community on independently developing ways of encryption that can be done regardless of government policies or prohibitions?
[42:27.040 --> 42:29.440]  [SPEAKER_01]: Because it may come to that.
[42:29.700 --> 42:47.610]  [SPEAKER_01]: It seems that it's going to be pretty impossible to keep a measured gradation or balance in the national security aspects and protecting privacy of reasonable people and so forth.
[42:47.610 --> 42:49.860]  [SPEAKER_01]: Either... it'll tend to absolutes.
[42:49.980 --> 42:51.630]  [SPEAKER_01]: It'll swing one way or the other.
[42:52.300 --> 43:04.340]  [SPEAKER_01]: And if the government tries to tilt it one way, it seems that we have to be prepared to do things independently, regardless of government, you know, prohibition or permission.
[43:04.540 --> 43:06.630]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'll let Mark answer that question on the radio.
[43:06.800 --> 43:07.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Thanks for your call.
[43:07.670 --> 43:08.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, thank you.
[43:08.460 --> 43:08.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: Mark?
[43:09.050 --> 43:25.240]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, I think the caller raises a very fair point, and certainly there are people, particularly in the cryptography community, who have said, you know, I'll go ahead and design my keys and my algorithms and, you know, let the government try to beat it if they can.
[43:26.590 --> 43:28.070]  [SPEAKER_13]: There's a problem with that.
[43:28.170 --> 43:32.000]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, that's almost a form of privacy survivalism.
[43:32.700 --> 43:40.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: And that is that, you know, we're hoping to develop laws and policies that respect and
[43:45.360 --> 43:52.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: that people can say, you know, these are good rules for all of us to live by.
[43:53.160 --> 44:01.360]  [SPEAKER_13]: The system breaks down at the point that we can't develop those rules or live by those rules.
[44:01.360 --> 44:10.800]  [SPEAKER_13]: And the problem, which I think your caller is absolutely right about, is if the government pushes too far in one direction, people are going to start to push back.
[44:11.640 --> 44:14.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: And, you know, I don't know where that takes us.
[44:14.740 --> 44:22.520]  [SPEAKER_13]: I'm hoping that we can continue in the spirit of the federal wiretap law, which basically, it's a good law.
[44:22.520 --> 44:31.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, there's abuse, but the federal wiretap law says about wiretap that this is an investigative method of last resort.
[44:32.500 --> 44:35.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: You do this after everything else has failed.
[44:35.900 --> 44:48.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: And if nothing else has worked and you still need to pursue the investigation, at that point only is a judge in the United States allowed to give a law enforcement agent authority to conduct the wiretap.
[44:49.340 --> 44:52.640]  [SPEAKER_13]: You know, from a privacy viewpoint, I think that's a great principle.
[44:53.400 --> 44:58.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: And the problem with Clipper is it pretty much stands it on its head.
[44:58.840 --> 45:03.620]  [SPEAKER_13]: It says, no, it's not an investigative method of last resort.
[45:04.000 --> 45:06.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's a design goal of first consideration.
[45:07.020 --> 45:15.380]  [SPEAKER_13]: And if you want to put a telecommunications product out there, you've got to be sure that it can be wiretapped or else we're not going to let you sell it.
[45:15.380 --> 45:20.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Do you think there are any inherent insecurities in the system?
[45:20.820 --> 45:23.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: Will unauthorized people be able to decrypt these things?
[45:23.520 --> 45:24.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, that's a problem.
[45:25.280 --> 45:43.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: The key escrow proposal, which basically requires that two government agencies or quasi-government agencies be found that will hold half of each key, has been a real stumbling block for the proponents.
[45:44.940 --> 45:50.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: Because it's not clear what federal agencies you would put in this role.
[45:51.620 --> 46:01.360]  [SPEAKER_13]: You say to the FBI, you know, well, why don't you hold the keys, but be sure not to give the keys to the agents until the courts have authorized the search.
[46:02.220 --> 46:05.600]  [SPEAKER_13]: That's certainly not adequate protection.
[46:06.280 --> 46:17.920]  [SPEAKER_13]: But for other agencies that aren't in the law enforcement business, who might be asked to hold the keys, they're suddenly facing an enormous responsibility if their systems were compromised.
[46:18.580 --> 46:25.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, one thing that I'm trying to picture in my mind is how such a massive undertaking would be handled.
[46:25.600 --> 46:33.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, are they going to keep a list of everybody and what particular model of phone they have and match that up when they want to do a wiretap?
[46:33.160 --> 46:34.240]  [SPEAKER_13]: You know, I don't know.
[46:34.380 --> 46:36.840]  [SPEAKER_13]: And I don't think they've thought about that either.
[46:37.000 --> 46:55.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, you imagine that if this thing really were to play out, somewhere in the United States, there'd almost have to be a Fort Knox of privacy where all the copies of the keys were being held for all the telecommunications that were authorized to move through the network and that someone could go to,
[46:55.100 --> 47:05.300]  [SPEAKER_13]: you know, this giant database and find the appropriate key for a particular communication for an authorized law enforcement investigation.
[47:05.960 --> 47:14.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: And then you start to wonder, well, what were to happen if all that data were ever publicly disclosed or misused or compromised?
[47:16.420 --> 47:20.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right, let's go on to our next phone call, 212-279-3400.
[47:20.640 --> 47:28.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: We're talking to Mark Rotenberg, computer professionals with social responsibility about the threat of the clipper chip and what you can do to voice your opinion.
[47:28.660 --> 47:29.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[47:29.300 --> 47:29.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're on the air.
[47:30.360 --> 47:30.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hello.
[47:30.960 --> 47:31.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, go ahead.
[47:32.300 --> 47:32.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Emanuel?
[47:33.220 --> 47:34.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, you don't have to shout.
[47:34.500 --> 47:37.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, Emanuel, there was a couple of comments.
[47:37.680 --> 47:43.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: I was making some phone calls and I found some numbers I thought you listeners might enjoy.
[47:43.280 --> 47:44.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: What kind of numbers are these?
[47:45.180 --> 47:47.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, I found one that's like an information service.
[47:48.040 --> 47:53.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: They give information like the same type of stuff a 900 number would give you except for the sex calls.
[47:54.020 --> 47:54.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: They don't provide that.
[47:55.220 --> 48:02.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: Time of day, weather, video game tips, games, soap opera updates, stuff like that without the cost of the 900 call.
[48:03.120 --> 48:04.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: All it is is a call to Brooklyn.
[48:05.780 --> 48:07.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, what kind of service is this then?
[48:08.940 --> 48:10.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: They call it the Talking Yellow System.
[48:11.140 --> 48:12.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: They're a little like advertisements.
[48:12.740 --> 48:15.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, so you have to listen to an advertisement before you hear the information.
[48:15.960 --> 48:18.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, advertisement of like a local drugstore or whatever.
[48:18.360 --> 48:18.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: I see.
[48:18.820 --> 48:21.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, that's certainly much better than paying 36 cents to get the time.
[48:22.460 --> 48:22.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: Absolutely.
[48:23.120 --> 48:23.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Give us that phone number.
[48:23.900 --> 48:27.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: Like I said, whatever it costs you to make a call to Brooklyn, that's what it costs.
[48:28.020 --> 48:29.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, so give us that phone number.
[48:29.380 --> 48:32.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right, that's 718-920...
[48:32.120 --> 48:33.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, that was called 921...
[48:33.340 --> 48:34.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, they're interfering with you, aren't they?
[48:35.120 --> 48:38.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's the phone company trying to prevent you from getting your message across.
[48:38.500 --> 48:42.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, it's 921-1400, if I remember correctly.
[48:42.860 --> 48:46.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: And if you don't remember correctly, a bunch of people will be waking up some poor old lady in Brooklyn.
[48:47.740 --> 48:50.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: And the second number I found, there's one in Manhattan.
[48:50.240 --> 48:51.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's called Ralphie's Bob City.
[48:51.980 --> 48:58.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: And all it basically is, is a place to like leave comments to a question of the month type of thing.
[48:59.020 --> 49:00.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's kind of like a little click, like a club.
[49:01.060 --> 49:03.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, people have been calling for 15 years.
[49:03.560 --> 49:04.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: 15 years, huh?
[49:04.440 --> 49:04.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[49:04.580 --> 49:08.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, well, why don't you help them get all kinds of new callers now and give out the number?
[49:08.760 --> 49:14.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's 212-505-5091.
[49:14.700 --> 49:14.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[49:15.320 --> 49:15.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[49:16.140 --> 49:16.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: And a question.
[49:16.940 --> 49:17.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[49:17.740 --> 49:19.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: Where can I get a demon dialer?
[49:20.220 --> 49:23.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: You'd have to get the demon dialer through Hactic Technologies in Holland.
[49:23.540 --> 49:23.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[49:23.980 --> 49:25.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I can give you a phone number for them.
[49:25.500 --> 49:26.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, hold on a sec.
[49:27.140 --> 49:28.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, it'll be on the air.
[49:28.260 --> 49:28.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'll record it that way.
[49:29.080 --> 49:29.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: Go ahead.
[49:29.240 --> 49:29.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[49:29.960 --> 49:32.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's overseas, of course, so you'd have to dial 011.
[49:32.440 --> 49:33.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: The country code is 31.
[49:33.420 --> 49:34.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: The city code is 20.
[49:35.220 --> 49:37.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: And the phone number is 600-1480.
[49:38.400 --> 49:42.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: And don't be afraid by the Dutch recordings because it turns into English eventually.
[49:43.120 --> 49:43.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[49:43.680 --> 49:44.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Another question.
[49:44.780 --> 49:49.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: The so-called red box or black box, where could one acquire something like that?
[49:50.360 --> 49:56.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, you have to look in, you know, in magazines like 2600, catalogs like Lumpanix, things like that.
[49:56.460 --> 49:59.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: And there's generally kits floating around.
[50:00.340 --> 50:05.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: But there is no one entity that sells that kind of material that I know of or have an address for.
[50:06.560 --> 50:08.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: Is there a number for 2600?
[50:08.780 --> 50:09.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'll give you the phone number.
[50:09.740 --> 50:12.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's 516-751-2600.
[50:12.920 --> 50:13.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: What was the end of that?
[50:14.240 --> 50:14.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: 2600.
[50:15.020 --> 50:15.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: 2600?
[50:15.560 --> 50:15.700]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[50:16.000 --> 50:16.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'd appreciate it.
[50:16.940 --> 50:17.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[50:17.340 --> 50:18.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Emmanuel, love the show.
[50:18.500 --> 50:19.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, thanks for calling.
[50:19.480 --> 50:20.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: By the way, one more thing.
[50:22.020 --> 50:23.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, make it quick, please.
[50:23.720 --> 50:28.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think you should have a disgruntled phone company employee on the air to give us all the juicy little secrets.
[50:28.640 --> 50:31.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, our door is always open to any disgruntled phone company.
[50:32.860 --> 50:35.700]  [SPEAKER_17]: Any disgruntled phone company, you know, there are so many of them.
[50:35.700 --> 50:41.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: A lot of people don't know about, like, you know, a lot of people know about making the phone ring back and the 958 and the 511.
[50:41.540 --> 50:44.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: But, I mean, you know, we want to know the real stuff.
[50:44.580 --> 50:46.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, we want to know what's really going on behind those doors.
[50:46.460 --> 50:47.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: Let you look over their shoulder for.
[50:47.260 --> 50:47.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[50:47.780 --> 50:48.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[50:48.180 --> 50:49.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, our doors are open.
[50:50.020 --> 50:50.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: I appreciate it.
[50:50.920 --> 50:51.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[50:51.260 --> 50:51.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: Thanks for calling.
[50:53.100 --> 50:55.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, you know, that raises an interesting point.
[50:55.760 --> 50:58.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: I was going to bring this up before, but this sort of clinches it.
[50:59.380 --> 51:03.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: When I woke up today, I found that our neighborhood had suffered a power failure.
[51:04.240 --> 51:09.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, unfortunately, due to my wisdom, everything in my house runs on electricity.
[51:10.040 --> 51:12.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, I had no idea what time it was.
[51:12.140 --> 51:14.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: I could not even find out what time it was.
[51:14.240 --> 51:17.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Because the clock is electric, the radio is plugged into the wall.
[51:17.940 --> 51:19.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: There's no batteries to be found anywhere.
[51:19.140 --> 51:21.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: The computers all have time on them.
[51:21.540 --> 51:23.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: But, of course, they're run by AC.
[51:24.240 --> 51:25.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: VCRs, no chance.
[51:25.740 --> 51:27.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't even have a wristwatch.
[51:27.460 --> 51:31.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: There was no way to find out what time it was other than looking at the sun and trying to figure that out.
[51:31.600 --> 51:38.820]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, you would say, okay, break down, spend the 36 cents, and call the time.
[51:39.100 --> 51:42.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Call the time and find out what time it is for 36 cents.
[51:42.960 --> 51:46.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, do we ever stop to think how ridiculous that is?
[51:46.220 --> 51:48.040]  [SPEAKER_17]: 36 cents for someone...
[51:48.040 --> 51:51.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, do people charge you in the street when you ask them what time is it?
[51:51.160 --> 51:51.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, of course not.
[51:51.880 --> 51:53.240]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's considered a common courtesy.
[51:53.620 --> 51:58.780]  [SPEAKER_17]: But, with the phone company, everything that's a common courtesy is worthy of a fee.
[51:59.720 --> 52:03.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: And, for that reason, I have 976 numbers blocked on my phone.
[52:03.920 --> 52:10.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, even if I had succumbed to that temptation, I couldn't have done it anyway, because there's no way to break through that security barrier.
[52:11.300 --> 52:12.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, folks, you know what I did?
[52:12.900 --> 52:18.520]  [SPEAKER_17]: You know what I did to break through and figure out what time it is for absolutely nothing?
[52:20.660 --> 52:21.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, you'd like to know, wouldn't you?
[52:22.020 --> 52:22.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, I'll tell you.
[52:22.840 --> 52:23.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: I'll tell you.
[52:24.040 --> 52:28.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: I got on line 2, and I called line 1.
[52:28.660 --> 52:30.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: And line 1 has caller ID.
[52:30.580 --> 52:34.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: And on my caller ID box is the time of day.
[52:34.840 --> 52:37.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Supplied free of charge by New York Telephone.
[52:37.400 --> 52:37.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: Isn't that something?
[52:38.160 --> 52:39.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: They send it as part of the data stream.
[52:39.960 --> 52:41.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: They send the time of day.
[52:41.620 --> 52:44.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: So, all I have to do is dial a number.
[52:44.720 --> 52:45.500]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't even have to pick it up.
[52:45.580 --> 52:46.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: I don't have to pay for the phone call.
[52:46.780 --> 52:48.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: I just dial that caller ID box.
[52:49.720 --> 52:51.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I see the time of day.
[52:51.300 --> 52:54.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I see the date, too, in case I'm really out of it and I don't know what date it is.
[52:54.420 --> 52:55.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: And who knows?
[52:55.160 --> 52:58.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: They haven't figured out a way to charge you to find out what date it is.
[52:58.380 --> 52:59.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: But if they could, they would.
[53:00.480 --> 53:06.000]  [SPEAKER_17]: Now, you might say it costs $6.50, right, per month to have caller ID.
[53:06.000 --> 53:09.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: But, if you make... I calculated this before.
[53:09.200 --> 53:15.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: I think if you make 18 phone calls a month to the time, it pays for itself.
[53:15.800 --> 53:16.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: That's right.
[53:16.480 --> 53:18.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: 18 phone calls to $0.36 each.
[53:19.440 --> 53:28.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: More than pays for the $6.50 a month for caller ID, which in itself is an outrageous charge, but it's a question of what is the most economical rip-off.
[53:29.060 --> 53:30.380]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right, let's take another phone call.
[53:30.600 --> 53:31.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[53:31.360 --> 53:31.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: You're on.
[53:31.880 --> 53:32.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: Hi, Emmanuel.
[53:33.020 --> 53:33.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: How are you?
[53:33.380 --> 53:43.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Regarding that earlier caller, calling for free for the time and stuff, the Talking Yellow book, I used to call to find out about where the weather was, and I started getting $0.36 charges on my bill.
[53:44.000 --> 53:44.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[53:44.900 --> 53:49.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: And I called him up and I asked him, I said, hey, I'm just calling this regular 718 number.
[53:49.800 --> 53:51.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: And they said, no, that costs.
[53:51.940 --> 53:52.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Couldn't believe it.
[53:52.820 --> 53:54.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, just putting it out there.
[53:54.360 --> 53:54.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh-huh.
[53:54.600 --> 54:01.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: The other thing is, as far as this clipper chip goes, a very important issue over here, don't mean to skirt it, and you have a very important guest over here.
[54:01.640 --> 54:05.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: And if you could just go into a little bit more detail as far as what else we could do on a practical level.
[54:05.620 --> 54:08.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, that would be appreciated, and great show.
[54:08.960 --> 54:09.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[54:09.400 --> 54:10.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, thanks for calling.
[54:10.080 --> 54:11.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: I forgot to tell you, but that's it.
[54:11.660 --> 54:12.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: More on a practical level, you say?
[54:13.380 --> 54:13.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[54:13.900 --> 54:14.080]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[54:14.560 --> 54:16.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Mark, do you have anything more on a practical level?
[54:16.580 --> 54:34.180]  [SPEAKER_13]: Well, I think I have an address here for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the reason that it's important to contact them is because they're the federal agency that's really supposed to do the evaluation for the White House.
[54:34.340 --> 54:35.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: I said before, you can write to the president.
[54:35.900 --> 54:40.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's not a bad thing to do, and those letters do get read by somebody.
[54:40.500 --> 54:50.760]  [SPEAKER_13]: But if you want to go to the people who are making the decision right now, that's the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and you can call them up.
[54:50.760 --> 54:56.240]  [SPEAKER_13]: The number is 301-975-2913.
[54:57.220 --> 55:26.940]  [SPEAKER_13]: And ask for Dr. Dennis Branstad, D-R-A-N-S-T-A-D, or you can write to Dr. Branstad at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gatysburg, G-A-I-T-H-E-R-S-B-U-R-G, Gatysburg, Maryland, 20899-L-A-S-T.
[55:27.220 --> 55:29.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: Now, what is his position in all of this?
[55:29.300 --> 55:36.660]  [SPEAKER_13]: He's the senior fellow, the person who's in charge of making the review, coordinating the review of the Clipper proposal.
[55:39.280 --> 55:46.980]  [SPEAKER_13]: He's received comments from a number of people so far, and we're encouraging more people to send their views as well.
[55:48.400 --> 55:53.580]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's take one more phone call, then we'll give out the information on how to contact CPSR, and then we're out of here.
[55:53.740 --> 55:55.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: I have a feeling this is Rebel on the phone.
[55:55.860 --> 55:57.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: I just have this feeling.
[55:57.560 --> 55:58.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Let's see.
[55:58.580 --> 55:59.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: Good evening.
[55:59.600 --> 55:59.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hello?
[56:00.220 --> 56:00.700]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, it's not.
[56:00.820 --> 56:01.480]  [SPEAKER_17]: Hi, how are you?
[56:01.680 --> 56:01.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: Hi.
[56:02.440 --> 56:07.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: I'd like to know, what do you think is more successful, Call ID or Call Trace?
[56:08.940 --> 56:10.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, I don't know what you mean by more successful.
[56:11.060 --> 56:12.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: Do you mean more people...
[56:12.260 --> 56:18.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like, say, because you know Call ID can tell the person that's calling, can tell you the number of the person that's calling.
[56:19.080 --> 56:19.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh-huh.
[56:19.640 --> 56:25.440]  [SPEAKER_03]: And if you do pick it up for Call Trace, it can tell you where they're at.
[56:25.920 --> 56:28.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: Call Trace, you can put out a number, and it'll tell you where they're at.
[56:29.020 --> 56:30.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: Sounds like you have call waiting.
[56:30.560 --> 56:30.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[56:31.720 --> 56:32.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[56:32.320 --> 56:38.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, I don't think many people use Call Trace because it costs $1.50 every time you dial star 5-7.
[56:39.500 --> 56:47.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: Caller ID is a one-time, once-per-month charge, and it gives you basically all the information right there.
[56:47.320 --> 56:50.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Whereas if you dial star 5-7, you don't ever find out the number of the person you're tracing.
[56:51.540 --> 56:58.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: But if you harass the phone company enough, they'll send some sort of a letter to this person and tell them to stop harassing you.
[56:58.420 --> 57:02.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: Incidentally, they will tell that person who you are, but they won't tell you who the person harassing you is.
[57:03.420 --> 57:06.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: Is there a way that you could prevent Call ID to find out your number?
[57:08.020 --> 57:08.640]  [SPEAKER_17]: Say that again?
[57:08.740 --> 57:09.720]  [SPEAKER_17]: Is there a way to prevent Call...
[57:09.720 --> 57:09.880]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[57:10.140 --> 57:13.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Star 6-7 will block your number from showing up.
[57:13.620 --> 57:14.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: It'll show a private number instead.
[57:14.840 --> 57:17.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: However, you can still be called back with star 6-9.
[57:17.620 --> 57:19.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can still be traced with star 5-7.
[57:19.860 --> 57:20.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, okay.
[57:20.760 --> 57:21.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right?
[57:21.220 --> 57:21.540]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[57:21.680 --> 57:21.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[57:21.960 --> 57:22.460]  [SPEAKER_17]: Thanks for calling.
[57:22.680 --> 57:22.920]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[57:23.560 --> 57:26.980]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, that's pretty much all the time we have as far as phone calls.
[57:28.020 --> 57:31.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: Mark, if you can give us information on computer professionals for social responsibility.
[57:31.560 --> 57:32.900]  [SPEAKER_17]: I understand they have a chapter here in New York.
[57:33.460 --> 57:34.140]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yes, we do.
[57:34.280 --> 57:36.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: I'm sorry I don't have the name for the contact person.
[57:36.880 --> 57:37.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, I do.
[57:37.320 --> 57:37.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's David Friedlander.
[57:38.580 --> 57:38.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: Oh, good.
[57:39.320 --> 57:40.740]  [SPEAKER_13]: Okay, I'm glad David's still doing it.
[57:40.860 --> 57:41.500]  [SPEAKER_13]: All the information I have.
[57:41.500 --> 57:52.200]  [SPEAKER_13]: If people can reach me in Washington, my number is, telephone number is 202-544-9240.
[57:53.240 --> 57:55.020]  [SPEAKER_13]: That's CPSR by telephone.
[57:55.020 --> 58:05.040]  [SPEAKER_13]: If you're on a computer network and have an email account, the easiest way to reach us is probably cpsr at cpsr.org.
[58:05.420 --> 58:10.320]  [SPEAKER_13]: And we'd be happy to send you more information about us and also about the Clipper proposal.
[58:10.320 --> 58:13.320]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right, this is a topic, of course, we'll be covering in weeks ahead.
[58:14.040 --> 58:16.400]  [SPEAKER_17]: Do you expect anything concrete to happen this year?
[58:16.660 --> 58:17.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: Oh, absolutely.
[58:17.800 --> 58:25.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: The NIST review process wraps up at the end of September, and the White House has said they're going to make a decision shortly afterward.
[58:25.820 --> 58:28.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right, these are exciting times ahead of us, then.
[58:28.200 --> 58:30.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: We'll have to follow this very closely.
[58:30.340 --> 58:39.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: And if any listeners, of course, find out anything, they can contact us here at the radio station, Off the Hook, care of WBAI, 505 8th Avenue, New York, New York, 10018.
[58:40.820 --> 58:45.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: Mark, I want to thank you very much for being with us tonight, and I'm sure we'll be talking again in the future.
[58:45.560 --> 58:45.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: Thank you.
[58:46.100 --> 58:50.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, we'll be back again next week with another edition of Off the Hook next Wednesday night at 10 o'clock.
[58:50.640 --> 58:54.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: Stay tuned for a rebroadcast of the evening news here on WBAI New York.
[58:55.020 --> 58:59.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's Emmanuel Goldstein saying good night and have a pleasant week.
[59:05.540 --> 59:10.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: The telephone keeps ringing, so I ripped it off the wall.
[59:11.000 --> 59:15.660]  [SPEAKER_08]: I cut myself while shaving, now I can't make a cough.
[59:16.580 --> 59:20.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: It couldn't get much worse, but if it could, it would.
[59:21.240 --> 59:23.880]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bumbin' it bombed for the best, expect the worst.
[59:24.420 --> 59:26.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: I hope that's understood.
[59:26.720 --> 59:27.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: Bumbin' it bombed!
[59:53.130 --> 01:00:07.930]  [SPEAKER_12]: On the eve of the 30th anniversary March on Washington for Jobs, Justice, and Peace, Building Bridges will talk with special guest, NAACP Executive Director Dr. Benjamin Chavis, about the march, the NAACP, and the issues before the nation.
[01:00:08.750 --> 01:00:15.490]  [SPEAKER_12]: Also, a cultural preview of the Do the Right Thing Festival, a multicultural festival to be held in Prospect Park, Bandshell, in September.
[01:00:15.830 --> 01:00:21.790]  [SPEAKER_12]: So tune in to Building Bridges, your community labor report, Thursday, August 26th, at 7.30 p.m.
[01:00:22.130 --> 01:00:24.890]  [SPEAKER_12]: over WBAI 99.5 FM.
[01:00:31.070 --> 01:00:49.410]  [SPEAKER_15]: This is Robin Field, host of Broadway Time Capsule, where we spend two hours every Saturday morning listening to highlights from virtually every musical that ever made it to Broadway, before 1940, featuring hundreds of original cast performances, as well as commentary by the show's creators and stars.
[01:00:49.830 --> 01:00:55.370]  [SPEAKER_15]: You'll hear Al Jolson, Fanny Bryce, Fred Astaire, and Ethel Waters singing their greatest hits.
[01:00:55.590 --> 01:01:02.090]  [SPEAKER_15]: Helen Morgan, Eddie Cantor, Jimmy Durante, and Ethel Merman offering personal reminiscences and anecdotes.
[01:01:02.390 --> 01:01:11.690]  [SPEAKER_15]: And Richard Rogers, Lawrence Hart, Oscar Hammerstein, George Gershwin, and Cole Porter, even Ziegfeld himself, discussing their careers in productions.
[01:01:12.150 --> 01:01:22.750]  [SPEAKER_15]: So wake up to the American Musical Theater with Broadway Time Capsule, Saturday mornings at 8.30, over WBAI New York, 99.5 FM.
[01:01:33.600 --> 01:01:34.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: Good evening.
[01:01:34.740 --> 01:01:43.820]  [SPEAKER_16]: In the news tonight, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman tops the list of alleged terrorists in a sweeping new federal indictment that spans years and oceans in its scope.
[01:01:44.140 --> 01:01:44.960]  [SPEAKER_16]: The U.S.
[01:01:45.060 --> 01:01:49.520]  [SPEAKER_16]: slaps sanctions on China and Pakistan for a 1992 sale of missile parts.
[01:01:49.760 --> 01:01:53.600]  [SPEAKER_16]: Middle East peace talks resume next week under a cloud of controversy.
[01:01:53.600 --> 01:01:58.840]  [SPEAKER_16]: And is a magazine targeted at inmates a sensitive concept or exploitation?
[01:01:59.360 --> 01:02:08.060]  [SPEAKER_16]: With these and other stories, I'm David Sears in New York with Verna Avery-Brown in Washington, and this is the news for Wednesday, August 25, 1993.
[01:02:09.340 --> 01:02:16.980]  [SPEAKER_16]: The radical Muslim cleric whose followers have been charged in two terror bombing plots in Manhattan was himself indicted in the case today.
[01:02:17.300 --> 01:02:29.580]  [SPEAKER_16]: Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman and three others, including the man accused of assassinating militant Rabbi Meir Kahane, also were charged in the federal indictment with conspiring to murder Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
[01:02:30.120 --> 01:02:35.340]  [SPEAKER_16]: Kahane's alleged assassin, El Saeed Noser, is being indicted on new charges in that killing.
[01:02:35.800 --> 01:02:40.780]  [SPEAKER_16]: Noser was acquitted of state murder charges, but is in state prison on related weapons convictions.
[01:02:41.060 --> 01:02:47.900]  [SPEAKER_16]: The federal indictment charges Noser with racketeering for having murdered Kahane by shooting him to death in a Manhattan hotel.
[01:02:48.040 --> 01:02:50.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: It says that he also attempted to kill a U.S.
[01:02:50.820 --> 01:02:52.380]  [SPEAKER_16]: postal officer as he fled.
[01:02:52.620 --> 01:03:05.100]  [SPEAKER_16]: The new indictment alleges that 11 men previously charged with a failed plot to bomb the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and a building housing the FBI offices, were also involved in the World Trade Center blast.
[01:03:05.320 --> 01:03:12.220]  [SPEAKER_16]: The February 26th attack killed six people, injured more than 1,000, and displaced hundreds of businesses for weeks.
[01:03:12.220 --> 01:03:18.960]  [SPEAKER_16]: Many of the defendants were followers of the 55-year-old Abdel Rahman, who preached at mosques in Brooklyn and Jersey City.
[01:03:19.200 --> 01:03:26.720]  [SPEAKER_16]: The Egyptian cleric has been in federal custody in Otisville, New York, since July 2nd, after an immigration judge ordered him deported.
[01:03:27.320 --> 01:03:40.560]  [SPEAKER_16]: Named with Abdel Rahman and Noser in the alleged plot to assassinate Mubarak were Mohammed Abu Hulima, the brother of a defendant in the Trade Center bombing, and Abdo Mohammed Hagag, who was arrested on a similar charge last month.
[01:03:40.560 --> 01:03:48.660]  [SPEAKER_16]: The new indictment had been promised a month ago by prosecutors who were transcribing hundreds of hours of tape recordings captured by a government informant.