Off The Hook - 1997-03-25

[00:02.660 --> 00:04.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: We'll be back on this topic again.
[00:04.740 --> 00:06.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: This is Jerry Brown for We The People.
[00:06.280 --> 00:07.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: Thanks for listening.
[00:56.730 --> 00:58.370]  [SPEAKER_01]: March 31st at 5 p.m.
[00:58.710 --> 01:02.890]  [SPEAKER_01]: Join thousands in front of City Hall in commemoration of Racial Justice Day.
[01:03.130 --> 01:05.070]  [SPEAKER_01]: Protests legitimize police brutality.
[01:05.610 --> 01:08.510]  [SPEAKER_01]: That is Monday, March 31st, 5 p.m.
[01:08.810 --> 01:09.970]  [SPEAKER_01]: on the steps of City Hall.
[01:10.370 --> 01:18.470]  [SPEAKER_01]: For more information, contact the National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights at 212-631-4263.
[01:18.730 --> 01:23.170]  [SPEAKER_01]: That's 212-631-4263.
[01:31.090 --> 01:32.290]  [SPEAKER_02]: And it's 8 o'clock.
[01:32.290 --> 01:34.390]  [SPEAKER_02]: You're listening to WBAI in New York.
[01:34.510 --> 01:35.950]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's Tuesday night.
[01:36.110 --> 01:36.910]  [SPEAKER_02]: Time for Off the Hook.
[01:43.300 --> 01:45.220]  [SPEAKER_04]: The telephone keeps ringing.
[01:45.660 --> 01:47.680]  [SPEAKER_04]: So I ripped it off the wall.
[01:48.600 --> 01:50.560]  [SPEAKER_04]: I cut myself while shaving.
[01:51.220 --> 01:53.040]  [SPEAKER_04]: Now I can't make a call.
[01:53.980 --> 01:55.780]  [SPEAKER_04]: It couldn't get much worse.
[02:02.480 --> 02:03.540]  That's understood.
[02:03.900 --> 02:03.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: Boom!
[02:54.800 --> 02:56.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: And good evening to everybody.
[02:56.400 --> 03:05.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: This is another exciting edition of Off the Hook, the program about computer hacking and fun technological developments in the world that surrounds us all.
[03:05.180 --> 03:16.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: That concerns the Internet, the phone system, the growing technological advances such as DVD and PCS and CIA and FBI and all that kind of fun stuff.
[03:16.480 --> 03:20.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: So we'll be here for the next hour talking about various developments.
[03:20.300 --> 03:22.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: We'll be taking phone calls a little later on in the show.
[03:24.200 --> 03:26.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: And some interesting things have happened this week.
[03:26.740 --> 03:29.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: One of them we'll be spending quite a bit of time on.
[03:29.460 --> 03:30.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: We'll get to that in just a moment.
[03:31.720 --> 03:40.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: But you may see an article on the front page of the New York Times about how digital cellular phones have been compromised.
[03:41.680 --> 03:45.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: Unfortunately, fiber is not here tonight, so we can't get into the full details of it.
[03:45.840 --> 03:49.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: But suffice to say that there are some major factual errors in the article.
[03:49.780 --> 03:52.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: It does not have anything to do with PCS.
[03:53.260 --> 04:00.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: PCS service that we've been talking about, which includes companies like Omnipoint, Sprint, Bell South.
[04:00.260 --> 04:02.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: That is not affected by this.
[04:02.740 --> 04:08.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: What is affected are digital cellular calls, digital cellular technology, which is a lot older.
[04:09.040 --> 04:09.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: A couple of years.
[04:09.840 --> 04:16.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's a lot older than the PCS and GSM technology that's starting to manifest itself around us.
[04:16.960 --> 04:20.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: So if you have one of those phones, don't panic yet.
[04:20.180 --> 04:22.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, there's always a reason to panic, but this isn't it.
[04:22.500 --> 04:22.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: Not yet.
[04:23.120 --> 04:26.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: We have Manos, the technician here, and Ryan as well.
[04:26.980 --> 04:27.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: Greetings.
[04:27.660 --> 04:29.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: Welcome to the facilities at WBL.
[04:29.420 --> 04:29.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hey, Emmanuel.
[04:29.920 --> 04:30.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hey, what's up?
[04:30.640 --> 04:31.020]  [SPEAKER_00]: How you doing?
[04:32.020 --> 04:38.660]  [SPEAKER_00]: Actually, all this big deal about the digital phones, it's not actually something that everybody has to get scared.
[04:39.320 --> 04:45.240]  [SPEAKER_00]: The only problem is that in the best case, they can get the number that you dialed, and that's about right.
[04:45.340 --> 04:45.580]  [SPEAKER_00]: Uh-huh.
[04:45.760 --> 04:49.960]  [SPEAKER_00]: Meaning they can decode the tones that you dialed.
[04:50.020 --> 04:50.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: That's it.
[04:50.860 --> 04:51.460]  [SPEAKER_00]: Nothing more.
[04:51.620 --> 04:52.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's it.
[04:52.260 --> 04:56.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: You mean, you're saying for the digital cellular as well, they can't actually listen to the conversations?
[04:56.380 --> 04:56.660]  [SPEAKER_00]: Right.
[04:56.880 --> 04:59.080]  [SPEAKER_00]: They can decode only the number that you dialed.
[04:59.640 --> 05:03.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's very different from what the article is implying.
[05:03.720 --> 05:07.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: But you can bet we'll be looking into this more and trying to figure out ways of doing it ourselves.
[05:08.920 --> 05:12.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: And if we get someplace, we will certainly let you know.
[05:12.740 --> 05:17.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Some other news that happened last week has to do with NYNEX.
[05:18.280 --> 05:23.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: Looks like the merger has gotten at least one go-ahead.
[05:23.260 --> 05:28.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: The Public Service Commission gave conditional approval to allow NYNEX to merge with Bell Atlantic.
[05:28.780 --> 05:34.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: It could very well be, friends, that next year at this time, we will be bowing down to Bell Atlantic instead of NYNEX.
[05:35.540 --> 05:36.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: NYNEX won't even be called NYNEX.
[05:36.960 --> 05:38.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: It will just be called Bell Atlantic.
[05:39.400 --> 05:41.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know about you, but that scares me.
[05:41.700 --> 05:41.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right?
[05:41.940 --> 05:42.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: That scares me.
[05:42.540 --> 05:44.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, when the Japanese bought up Rockefeller Center, I could handle that.
[05:45.220 --> 05:45.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right?
[05:45.720 --> 05:48.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: But Bell Atlantic here in New York, I don't know.
[05:48.760 --> 05:52.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: They say the new building is going to be, you know, in New York City.
[05:52.320 --> 05:54.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: And that's going to make things so much better for New Yorkers.
[05:54.700 --> 05:55.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: How is that going to make things better?
[05:56.040 --> 05:57.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, look, look at it this way, okay?
[05:57.600 --> 06:00.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, we're going to have Bell Atlantic Center in New York.
[06:00.340 --> 06:02.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: But guess what's not going to be in New York?
[06:02.260 --> 06:02.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: NYNEX!
[06:02.680 --> 06:03.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: There won't be any more NYNEX.
[06:03.880 --> 06:07.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: So they'll get rid of NYNEX, replace it with Bell Atlantic, and somehow that's going to help us?
[06:07.680 --> 06:08.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know.
[06:08.720 --> 06:14.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't see how it helps to have two giant companies become one mega-giant company.
[06:14.940 --> 06:16.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, who does that benefit?
[06:16.360 --> 06:17.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: It benefits them, obviously.
[06:18.100 --> 06:19.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: But how does it benefit us?
[06:19.460 --> 06:28.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: If I'm missing something here, please, somebody from the PSC or Bell Atlantic or NYNEX or one of you people out there, give us a call and tell us just how this actually benefits.
[06:29.160 --> 06:31.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, didn't we break up the phone company?
[06:31.480 --> 06:33.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, it was one big phone company.
[06:33.040 --> 06:38.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: We broke it up into little giant phone companies, and then they start getting back together again.
[06:38.420 --> 06:41.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, it's like, how about court orders here to, like, keep them away from each other?
[06:42.140 --> 06:43.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, I think that's an order.
[06:44.800 --> 06:47.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, anyway, it's not quite approved yet.
[06:47.760 --> 06:54.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: It was approved by the Public Service Commission, conditionally, you know, I guess subject to certain payoffs and things like that.
[06:54.480 --> 06:58.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: But they still have to get through the Justice Department and the FCC.
[06:58.900 --> 07:03.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: So if you feel that this is an important matter and you want to speak out against it, you still have some time.
[07:04.400 --> 07:08.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: Call your elected representatives and contact people in Washington, D.C.
[07:08.900 --> 07:10.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: and let them know this is not a good idea.
[07:10.200 --> 07:13.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: Or, you know, if you think I'm crazy and you think it is a good idea, tell them that.
[07:13.640 --> 07:14.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: Tell them that, well, don't tell them I'm crazy.
[07:14.980 --> 07:16.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Tell them that you think it's a good idea.
[07:16.360 --> 07:17.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: They don't really care about me.
[07:18.200 --> 07:18.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[07:18.580 --> 07:23.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: As far as other stories in the news, a schoolboy who hacked into the U.S.
[07:23.360 --> 07:31.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: Air Force computer system from his bedroom as a prank was fined $1,900 by magistrates in London on Friday.
[07:32.120 --> 07:33.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: And no, that was not a prank.
[07:34.000 --> 07:40.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Richard Price, 19, of North London, was 16 when he gained access back in 1994 to the U.S.
[07:40.760 --> 07:44.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: military computer network from a personal computer he had bought for 750 pounds.
[07:44.800 --> 07:46.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's about a thousand bucks or so.
[07:46.820 --> 07:53.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: The court heard Price's activities at one point raised fears that a European spy ring had infiltrated the U.S.
[07:53.980 --> 07:55.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: defense intelligence network.
[07:55.260 --> 07:58.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: His actions triggered alarm in the Pentagon and people were running all over the place.
[07:58.940 --> 08:00.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Price was accused by the U.S.
[08:00.140 --> 08:02.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: Senate of causing more harm than the KGP.
[08:03.720 --> 08:04.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: How did the U.S.
[08:04.520 --> 08:06.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Senate manage to accuse a 16-year-old kid of something?
[08:06.540 --> 08:07.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's what I'd like to know.
[08:07.240 --> 08:09.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: Is it a sort of a bill they passed?
[08:10.840 --> 08:11.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, he's in England.
[08:11.880 --> 08:12.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: They can't send him to his room.
[08:13.020 --> 08:13.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know.
[08:14.620 --> 08:15.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: Boy, he got the Senate mad at him.
[08:16.860 --> 08:20.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: The KGB must not have been very harmful if a 16-year-old could have done more harm than they did.
[08:21.380 --> 08:28.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: Price, a brilliant music student who plays double bass, double bass, mind you, admitted 12 offenses of computer misuse.
[08:28.760 --> 08:33.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: His lawyer said after the case, Richard has already paid heavily for what was, in effect, a schoolboy prank.
[08:33.860 --> 08:38.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: It was not his fault that security systems in the computing and defense industries left something to be desired.
[08:40.160 --> 08:48.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Price, who gained fame when his exploits were compared to the 1983 Hollywood movie War Games, about a teenager who nearly starts a third world war by hacking into the U.S.
[08:48.760 --> 08:51.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: defense system, also had to forfeit his computer.
[08:51.960 --> 08:53.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: You notice how they always do that?
[08:53.220 --> 08:57.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: They always take away your computer, and that's the price you pay.
[08:57.220 --> 09:07.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, I think they make their security system weak so that they get to raid people and take their computers because their computers are so lousy that they actually envy 16-year-old kids.
[09:08.240 --> 09:15.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: Anyway, that's nothing, nothing at all compared to the story which has been bobbing around in the media over the past week or so.
[09:15.760 --> 09:16.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do you hear this one?
[09:16.600 --> 09:23.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: In 1991, apparently, Dutch hackers had the ability to win the Gulf War for Saddam Hussein.
[09:23.860 --> 09:32.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: They had the information, and they offered it to Saddam Hussein, and he apparently didn't want to buy it at that point in time.
[09:32.140 --> 09:35.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: He thought it was a hoax because the information was so good that it couldn't possibly be real.
[09:35.740 --> 09:36.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: It had to be fake.
[09:36.900 --> 09:37.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's what they say.
[09:37.900 --> 09:38.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: Now, interesting thing.
[09:38.940 --> 09:41.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: I'm holding two different news stories, both from the Associated Press.
[09:41.820 --> 09:45.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: One of them says, Dutch computer hackers stole U.S.
[09:45.300 --> 09:51.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: military secrets during the Gulf War and offered them to Iraq, but the Iraqis ignored them, fearing a hoax, the Sunday Telegraph reported.
[09:51.360 --> 09:54.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: The second story says, Dutch computer hackers stole U.S.
[09:54.760 --> 09:57.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: military secrets during the Persian Gulf War and offered them to Iraq.
[09:57.500 --> 09:59.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Computer security experts for the United States, said Monday.
[10:00.380 --> 10:06.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Exact same phrase, except once it's a Sunday Telegraph, and then it's computer security experts for the United States.
[10:07.300 --> 10:11.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, I think these people are doing a bit of cutting and pasting with the facts here.
[10:12.320 --> 10:15.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: Anyway, the newspaper... which story should I read?
[10:15.360 --> 10:17.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: The computer security experts or the newspaper version?
[10:17.380 --> 10:18.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: The one on the left.
[10:18.560 --> 10:19.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: The one on the left.
[10:19.100 --> 10:19.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, that's the newspaper one.
[10:19.840 --> 10:22.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: The newspaper said a former head of computer security at the U.S.
[10:23.280 --> 10:34.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: Department of Energy named Eugene Schultz has revealed in a BBC television documentary how he watched helpless as hackers pillaged top-secret information using the Internet.
[10:34.900 --> 10:36.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Apparently he was tied up or something.
[10:36.720 --> 10:39.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: In Washington, several Energy Department officials...
[10:39.840 --> 10:40.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: This is great.
[10:40.880 --> 10:41.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: Listen to this.
[10:41.580 --> 10:49.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: Several Energy Department officials, including two who were at the department during the war, said they never even heard of Schultz or the alleged security breach.
[10:49.260 --> 10:52.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I mean, they can't even verify that this guy even works there.
[10:52.320 --> 10:55.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: And yet it's being reported all over the place as gospel.
[10:55.640 --> 11:04.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: Anyway, according to the newspaper, the hackers traced by Schultz and the FBI to Eindhoven Holland stole enough material potentially to alter the course of the war.
[11:04.820 --> 11:07.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: However, the attacks lasted for months.
[11:07.440 --> 11:10.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: We couldn't do anything about it, Schultz was quoted as saying.
[11:10.400 --> 11:16.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: If we had shut down one machine that they had been getting into, they would have found others to launch the attacks from.
[11:17.420 --> 11:21.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: According to the BBC, this program was aired on Monday on the program Sci-Files.
[11:22.360 --> 11:23.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: Might as well be X-Files.
[11:24.740 --> 11:30.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: BBC spokesman Kevin MacLean said he had no transcript available, but the newspaper's account of the program was broadly correct.
[11:30.840 --> 11:34.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Schultz, who was also responsible for protecting the computers of U.S.
[11:34.620 --> 11:36.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: nuclear weapons sites, does that make you feel good?
[11:37.040 --> 11:41.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: told the BBC that the Dutch hackers plundered the files across 34 U.S.
[11:41.100 --> 11:44.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: military sites in the months before the 1991 conflict.
[11:44.260 --> 11:50.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: He told the BBC that Washington learned for certain in October 1990 that the information was being offered to Iraq.
[11:50.460 --> 11:53.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: The stolen secrets included the exact location of U.S.
[11:53.960 --> 12:00.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: troops, the weapons they had, the movement of American warships into the region, and the capability of the Patriot missile.
[12:01.840 --> 12:07.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: We realize that these files should not have been stored on Internet-capable machines, Schultz was quoted as saying.
[12:07.080 --> 12:12.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: They related to our military systems, they related to Operation Desert Shield at the time, and then Operation Desert Storm.
[12:12.960 --> 12:15.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: This was one huge mistake.
[12:15.680 --> 12:21.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: Once the Dutch hackers gained access to a military computer site, they kept guessing different passwords until the system let them in.
[12:21.520 --> 12:23.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: Once inside, they chose the information they wanted.
[12:24.000 --> 12:29.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's interesting how this story has suddenly, you know, turned to taking everything this guy says as the truth.
[12:30.620 --> 12:50.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: We have on the phone with us probably one of the more famous Dutch people who has dealt with computer hacking, Rop from Amsterdam, who was editor of the former hacker magazine Haktik, and now is involved in Holland's biggest Internet site, Access for All.
[12:50.600 --> 12:51.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: Rop, are you there?
[12:51.360 --> 12:51.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: I'm here.
[12:52.100 --> 12:52.360]  [SPEAKER_09]: Hi there.
[12:52.620 --> 12:57.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: And before we continue, let me just say congratulations, because I just learned that you got married today.
[12:58.380 --> 12:58.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yep.
[12:58.940 --> 12:59.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's something.
[12:59.880 --> 13:06.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: I really want to thank you for talking to us on the night of your wedding, but I guess this is an important issue to address.
[13:07.040 --> 13:13.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: But again, congratulations, and I guess it's another step in a long and strange journey, right?
[13:13.660 --> 13:14.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, yeah.
[13:15.720 --> 13:20.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, so tell us, you guys, you could have won the war for Saddam.
[13:20.620 --> 13:22.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, that's pretty cool.
[13:23.060 --> 13:24.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, if only he had believed us.
[13:24.520 --> 13:25.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: I could be so rich now.
[13:25.820 --> 13:26.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[13:26.360 --> 13:26.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's incredible.
[13:28.480 --> 13:30.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: So should we doubt this kind of a story?
[13:31.560 --> 13:33.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: Can we say goofball on American radio?
[13:33.640 --> 13:34.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: You can say goofball, yes.
[13:34.860 --> 13:35.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[13:35.380 --> 13:36.140]  [SPEAKER_09]: Would you like to say that?
[13:36.460 --> 13:49.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: Eugene Schultz, the guy that worked for CIAC, that was the computer security department, sort of the computer security people for the Department of Energy, Eugene Schultz is a complete and utter goofball.
[13:49.880 --> 13:57.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: He wrote a report back in 1991 about these fearful Dutch hackers that were roaming around in U.S.
[13:57.160 --> 13:57.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: defense systems.
[14:00.420 --> 14:03.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: And, I mean, long-time listeners of this program may remember me.
[14:03.940 --> 14:07.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: I was in New York in 1990, I think.
[14:07.620 --> 14:09.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, New York, California.
[14:09.040 --> 14:11.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: We spread terror across the nation.
[14:11.740 --> 14:22.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, according to that report, I was currently in the United States on business at the time that he was writing the report, and I was flying first class.
[14:22.060 --> 14:25.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Now, you witnessed me fly, and I didn't fly first class.
[14:25.420 --> 14:27.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: Now, you barely got into the part where the people were.
[14:27.900 --> 14:28.120]  Yes.
[14:28.860 --> 14:39.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: But the fun part is that he writes stuff like, Army intelligence describes him, that's me, in other words, as hardened and capable of making considerable trouble.
[14:39.600 --> 14:46.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: And then he says, Today the FBI informed me that Hongkaip, which happens to be my last name, is an alias.
[14:46.740 --> 14:51.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, in other words, I'm hardened, capable of making considerable trouble, and I do not exist.
[14:51.760 --> 14:53.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: Now, your real name is Hannibal Lecter, right?
[14:54.160 --> 14:55.200]  [SPEAKER_09]: Or something, yeah.
[14:55.240 --> 14:55.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: Something like that, yeah.
[14:56.320 --> 15:08.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: And so, that's part of it, and then it goes on about these dangerous individuals, and that German magazines are possibly funneling money for Iraq to get the information.
[15:09.800 --> 15:18.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: I highly doubt that anything of this story is true, but I have a sneaking suspicion as to why it's coming up this year.
[15:18.700 --> 15:20.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, that relates to my question.
[15:21.080 --> 15:28.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: How does somebody, a goofball, as you say, get all the major media to believe him and to put this on the front pages of newspapers everywhere?
[15:28.320 --> 15:28.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: How do you do that?
[15:28.960 --> 15:29.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: Because I'd like to know.
[15:29.820 --> 15:36.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Because this is the year that information terrorism is finally something that's believable.
[15:36.600 --> 15:51.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: For some reason, they've been all waiting for this sort of magic moment out of nothing, and now all these creatures from Understones suddenly decide that 1997 is the year that we're going to make the world believe that information terrorism really exists.
[15:51.240 --> 15:53.640]  [SPEAKER_09]: What is information terrorism?
[15:54.160 --> 15:57.940]  [SPEAKER_09]: Information terrorism is pretty much non-existent.
[15:58.080 --> 16:03.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's the fear that people should have that information terrorists can end the world.
[16:03.460 --> 16:11.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: This BBC documentary, I watched it last night, this whole documentary is about...
[16:11.480 --> 16:20.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know this type of documentary where are we facing an electronic Pearl Harbor type of atmosphere.
[16:21.420 --> 16:24.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: Like, there won't be any three-minute warnings.
[16:24.780 --> 16:29.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: Electronic enemies of the United States can bring down the country.
[16:29.400 --> 16:33.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: The West is vulnerable by its own computer systems.
[16:34.100 --> 16:36.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: And it's without a shred of proof.
[16:37.780 --> 16:54.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: No proof whatsoever besides bringing up this goofball, Eugene Schultz again, and then some, what was it, some rear admiral saying, yeah, something like this could have really happened, and it's really true that our systems are so vulnerable.
[16:54.980 --> 16:56.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is a campaign.
[16:56.300 --> 16:58.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's a deliberately set-up campaign.
[16:58.440 --> 17:05.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they can point to things like the kid in England, they can point to things like the Air Force website hack and say, here's the proof that the American public needs.
[17:06.200 --> 17:09.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: Look, there's a huge industry out there and it's out of threat.
[17:12.060 --> 17:13.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's really out of threat.
[17:13.460 --> 17:18.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, so if this is the threat then, what is going to be the action that follows the threat?
[17:20.520 --> 17:24.360]  [SPEAKER_09]: The action that follows the threat is a global clampdown on hackers.
[17:24.560 --> 17:25.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, there's U.S.
[17:25.960 --> 17:26.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: documents.
[17:26.680 --> 17:29.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: In Europe, it's not even that bad, but there's U.S.
[17:29.400 --> 17:32.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: documents, really scary as hell.
[17:32.260 --> 17:34.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, hackers are the major threat to U.S.
[17:35.080 --> 17:35.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: security.
[17:35.520 --> 17:45.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: And the CIA and the NSA, the world's largest spying organizations, are requesting Congress to change the law so that it can spy on U.S.
[17:46.020 --> 17:46.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: citizens.
[17:47.000 --> 17:56.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: And they're asking to be able to interpret a 16-year-old kid breaking into their computer from some other country.
[17:56.280 --> 18:03.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: They're asking Congress to ratify a law enabling them to see that as an attack on the United States.
[18:04.120 --> 18:15.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: In other words, they then, without any action from Congress, just a presidential okay, can sort of counterattack a 16-year-old boy with military force.
[18:17.760 --> 18:19.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is where we're getting to.
[18:19.200 --> 18:26.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: We're getting to the point where a 19-year-old, some other 19-year-old in the States, what, two weeks ago, was arrested.
[18:27.100 --> 18:32.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: We're getting to the point where they can say that a 19-year-old is the number one threat to U.S.
[18:32.180 --> 18:32.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: security.
[18:34.000 --> 18:34.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is...
[18:35.600 --> 18:36.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: Look, they need this.
[18:36.780 --> 18:37.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: They need this.
[18:37.500 --> 18:40.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: Because this is the only threat that people don't yet understand.
[18:41.100 --> 18:42.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: There'll be a point that they understand.
[18:42.720 --> 18:48.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: There'll be a point that a telnet session is something normal or using the net as something normal.
[18:48.620 --> 18:51.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: But up to that point, this is a threat that people don't understand.
[18:52.080 --> 18:55.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's their last thing that can be unnameably big.
[18:56.200 --> 18:59.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Are people in Holland buying this like people here are?
[19:00.360 --> 19:14.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, there was a newspaper report saying that it was... there was a few newspaper reports before people saw the documentary, but after the documentary came out, I already watched... or I listened to a radio program that was fairly critical of it.
[19:15.380 --> 19:18.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, it's... there is no proof.
[19:18.260 --> 19:20.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: The documentary... if you saw the documentary, you'd laugh.
[19:21.080 --> 19:23.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: There's just... it's people going after each other.
[19:23.840 --> 19:31.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is an old 1991 rumor saying Dutch hackers have sold secret stuff to Saddam.
[19:31.480 --> 19:39.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: But you see, I mean, you can say that there's some sort of a plot to start clamping down on hackers, but why is the BBC a part of this?
[19:39.760 --> 19:41.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Why would they buy into it?
[19:41.980 --> 19:42.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know.
[19:43.340 --> 19:45.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is just some independent documentary makers.
[19:45.500 --> 19:52.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: I was even interviewed for this documentary, but I never said anything useful to them, apparently, because I wasn't in it.
[19:53.420 --> 19:53.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[19:54.520 --> 19:56.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: Who else... who else was Profile?
[19:56.520 --> 19:57.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: This was an hour-long documentary?
[19:58.200 --> 19:59.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, it was like 30 minutes.
[20:00.200 --> 20:00.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[20:01.020 --> 20:02.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: And did they talk to anybody else?
[20:02.300 --> 20:03.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: I imagine probably Wynne Schwartow was in there, right?
[20:04.420 --> 20:08.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: No, both Wynne Schwartow and Steele weren't in there.
[20:08.260 --> 20:08.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Really?
[20:08.580 --> 20:08.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[20:08.940 --> 20:11.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Because when you say Information Warfare, of course, that's the name that pops up.
[20:11.720 --> 20:13.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, both of them do, actually.
[20:14.080 --> 20:29.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: Robert Steele and Wynne Schwartow are both prominent in sort of marketing this whole idea of Information Terrorism and the threat of Information Warfare to the military and civil community.
[20:30.540 --> 20:31.300]  Uh-huh.
[20:31.460 --> 20:34.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: They're pioneers of marketing this fear.
[20:35.700 --> 20:41.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: Now, in 1991, though, there were break-ins from Holland to military computer systems.
[20:41.300 --> 20:41.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, yes.
[20:41.800 --> 20:42.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, yes.
[20:42.780 --> 20:43.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: Tell us what really...
[20:43.700 --> 20:45.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: I witnessed some of these break-ins.
[20:45.260 --> 20:45.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[20:45.440 --> 20:46.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: We even have some on videotape.
[20:46.740 --> 20:48.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: But what was it that really occurred?
[20:49.020 --> 20:57.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: It was 99.99% of these break-ins were unclassified military computer systems that just had really interesting banners.
[20:57.240 --> 21:06.140]  [SPEAKER_09]: Like, if you break into this computer, we will come and get you and raid your house and kill your parents and take all your computer stuff and burn it.
[21:06.460 --> 21:06.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh-huh.
[21:06.900 --> 21:10.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: Sort of... that kind of banners were on all these computers.
[21:10.800 --> 21:16.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: And people here, before any computer crime laws were passed, just thought these banners were really funny.
[21:17.480 --> 21:24.460]  [SPEAKER_09]: And it was... it was sort of a... sort of a fun accomplishment if you could break into more than 10 military computers in one evening.
[21:27.400 --> 21:29.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: And, um... that's the fun part.
[21:30.260 --> 21:32.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: That... that... that was the fun of these people that were doing this.
[21:32.900 --> 21:36.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, you're saying, basically, it was... it was all done for fun, for the most part.
[21:37.000 --> 21:37.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, yes.
[21:38.020 --> 21:43.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: But there was also the occasional... every once in a while, somebody would hit a computer system and would...
[21:43.720 --> 21:48.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: one of the 10,000 text files in a computer system would have something in there that...
[21:48.400 --> 21:50.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: that they stumbled upon that... that was probably secret.
[21:51.780 --> 22:04.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: And I'm... I'm partially guilty to this rumor, probably where it comes down to the Patriot stuff, because I once... out of all these sessions and all these people that were breaking into computer systems that were sort of loosely connected to the U.S.
[22:05.000 --> 22:10.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: military, I once witnessed... uh... uh... people... uh... uh...
[22:10.080 --> 22:13.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: or I didn't actually witness the break-in, but I heard a story of people getting...
[22:14.280 --> 22:18.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: uh... stuff that... about the Patriot missile that... that is probably better left secret.
[22:18.960 --> 22:20.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: And did they call Saddam, then, and offer it to him?
[22:20.980 --> 22:21.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: No!
[22:21.340 --> 22:22.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's how the story goes now.
[22:22.920 --> 22:23.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: You couldn't even call.
[22:23.760 --> 22:25.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: They burned... they burned the floppy disks in their garden.
[22:26.000 --> 22:27.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: So paranoid... that's how paranoid they were.
[22:27.980 --> 22:28.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh-huh.
[22:28.600 --> 22:32.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: But... that's... that's probably where the Patriot missile stuff comes from.
[22:32.420 --> 22:48.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: By the way, we're... we're speaking with Rob from Amsterdam, former editor of, uh... Hack-Tick magazine, and, uh... now one of the co-founders of XS4ALL, Holland's largest internet provider, speaking about the Dutch computer break-ins that have alleged to have occurred back in 1991,
[22:49.520 --> 22:55.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: where Dutch hackers, uh... are said to have offered war-winning material to Saddam Hussein.
[22:55.680 --> 22:59.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: And the thing is that, uh... when you look into the story a little bit, uh... it seems to disappear.
[23:00.100 --> 23:01.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: All the facts seem to disappear.
[23:01.440 --> 23:05.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Joining us now from Philadelphia is Bernie S., and Bernie knows quite a bit about, uh...
[23:05.380 --> 23:07.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: things being, uh... misinterpreted, don't you, Bernie?
[23:08.120 --> 23:08.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: All too well.
[23:09.420 --> 23:09.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[23:10.120 --> 23:13.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, have you... have you heard about this story in the United States, about the Dutch hackers?
[23:14.020 --> 23:19.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, is this a... is this a recent story, or I've heard, you know, I heard about this some time ago.
[23:19.240 --> 23:30.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: Within the last... well, it's always been sort of around, but within the last week, an actual story came out with some guy that nobody seems to know about, who, uh, supposedly, uh, is... is an authority figure on this, and...
[23:30.320 --> 23:31.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: Eugene Schultz.
[23:31.240 --> 23:31.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: Eugene Schultz.
[23:31.860 --> 23:35.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Everyone seems to believe him, and, uh... nobody seems to know why.
[23:35.380 --> 23:39.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: I guess the media decided to seize on an old story again, which really is no story, but...
[23:40.540 --> 23:42.140]  [SPEAKER_07]: that's sometimes what the media does.
[23:42.620 --> 23:42.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[23:43.460 --> 23:45.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, um, Bernie, what's... what's new with you?
[23:46.080 --> 23:47.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Anything... any new developments on...
[23:47.360 --> 23:49.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: on your particular side of the woods?
[23:49.240 --> 23:50.760]  [SPEAKER_07]: Uh, I've been putting together some, uh...
[23:50.760 --> 23:52.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: some plans for the next, uh...
[23:53.640 --> 23:55.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: hacker gathering, or, uh...
[23:55.380 --> 23:56.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: I guess you'd call it, uh...
[23:56.520 --> 23:57.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: hacker congress.
[23:57.680 --> 24:03.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: Let's, uh... let's, in fact, talk about that, because, uh, Beyond Hope is taking place August 8th, 9th, and 10th in New York City.
[24:03.120 --> 24:13.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: It could be one of the, uh, biggest conferences ever involving hackers, but, to make it even bigger still, in Holland, at the exact same time, there will be Hacking in Progress, the HIP conference.
[24:13.360 --> 24:15.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, Rob, why don't you tell us something about that?
[24:16.020 --> 24:23.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, HIP is... is very much like HEU, which we did in 1993, and HEU was an outdoor convention, so it was people intense.
[24:24.240 --> 24:26.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: It was pretty intense, as you can think.
[24:26.200 --> 24:26.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yes, pretty intense.
[24:27.000 --> 24:32.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: And there was Ethernet running all over the field, and at that time, we had 2 times 19.2 kilobits.
[24:33.120 --> 24:33.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh-huh.
[24:33.720 --> 24:37.540]  [SPEAKER_09]: Which, today, is laughable, but, back then, World Wide Web didn't even exist.
[24:37.740 --> 24:39.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: It was people doing telnet sessions.
[24:39.540 --> 24:40.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: That was only three years ago.
[24:40.600 --> 24:41.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: That was 1994...
[24:41.400 --> 24:42.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, no, that was four years ago.
[24:42.480 --> 24:43.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: Four years ago.
[24:43.380 --> 24:44.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Four years ago.
[24:44.020 --> 24:45.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Three years ago for Hope, and that was 1994.
[24:45.800 --> 24:50.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: We had a 28.8 connection to the net, and I think we're going to improve on that quite a bit over this one.
[24:51.000 --> 24:51.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yep.
[24:51.760 --> 24:53.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: But now, we're going to link the two conferences together somehow.
[24:53.940 --> 24:54.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: How are we going to pull this off?
[24:55.480 --> 25:01.940]  [SPEAKER_09]: We're going to have video links and audio links, at least over the internet, and maybe even over other means.
[25:03.560 --> 25:07.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: We're going to share some lectures, and maybe a workshop or two.
[25:08.340 --> 25:10.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: I got mail from one guy that says he's going to go to both.
[25:10.780 --> 25:11.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know how he's going to pull that off.
[25:13.640 --> 25:14.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: He'll fly on the Concorde.
[25:15.020 --> 25:16.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: I guess he'll have to, yes.
[25:16.820 --> 25:19.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe he didn't know that they were happening on the exact same day.
[25:19.360 --> 25:20.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's also a possibility.
[25:21.060 --> 25:23.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe you could rent Russian ICBMs.
[25:24.760 --> 25:29.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, you know, let's not say anything that's going to be misconstrued as being...
[25:29.780 --> 25:31.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, boy, oh, boy, oh, boy.
[25:31.420 --> 25:32.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: I'm sorry.
[25:32.280 --> 25:33.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: Maybe you can rent something else.
[25:33.700 --> 25:34.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know.
[25:34.460 --> 25:45.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: What kind of other things have you seen in, I don't know, recent years, Rob, that have been misinterpreted beyond belief as far as threats that hackers pose?
[25:45.860 --> 25:54.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, I think the whole idea that hackers are this global threat to world security is...
[25:54.620 --> 25:56.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: The whole concept is weird.
[25:57.200 --> 25:59.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: But it's very understandable.
[25:59.820 --> 26:03.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: Because it's the only enemy that cannot be sized.
[26:03.920 --> 26:08.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's invisible, and therefore it's infinitely large.
[26:08.620 --> 26:11.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: Therefore you need infinite funding to fight it.
[26:12.220 --> 26:14.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's the only enemy that justifies infinite funding.
[26:15.160 --> 26:15.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: Think about it.
[26:15.880 --> 26:22.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Is this happening purely because of ignorance, or is there a darker agenda?
[26:22.280 --> 26:26.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do people want to see hackers put away and disappear?
[26:26.480 --> 26:27.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: Read my lips.
[26:27.040 --> 26:28.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: Read my lips.
[26:28.200 --> 26:32.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's the only excuse in these days to get infinite funding for something.
[26:32.880 --> 26:33.340]  [SPEAKER_12]: Okay.
[26:33.620 --> 26:41.180]  [SPEAKER_09]: If you run a part of the defense industry, this is your only enemy that justifies almost infinite or totally infinite funding.
[26:41.180 --> 26:55.900]  [SPEAKER_07]: The government seems to be very good more so lately at coming up with boogeymen to blame things on, which are just some sort of vague, ominous threat that deserve...
[26:55.900 --> 27:01.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: They can justify throwing millions or billions of dollars up to prevent.
[27:01.580 --> 27:04.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I think that the hacker threat is one of those.
[27:04.180 --> 27:10.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: The real threat is not hackers, but they certainly can whip up a good story about it.
[27:11.280 --> 27:14.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: We've been seeing this happening for over a decade.
[27:14.660 --> 27:19.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: Ever since I've gotten involved in the computer hacker world, I've seen this kind of hysteria.
[27:19.300 --> 27:23.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: But the thing now is, it just seems to be, I don't know, all-encompassing.
[27:23.720 --> 27:27.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, everyone looks at it in what seems to be the same way.
[27:27.220 --> 27:28.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hackers can do anything.
[27:28.480 --> 27:29.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: They can cause all kinds of chaos.
[27:29.900 --> 27:32.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: They can make us lose wars and things like that.
[27:32.620 --> 27:40.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: All with no evidence whatsoever, just pure speculation and some wise-ass somewhere that's saying something with no backing up whatsoever.
[27:41.280 --> 27:43.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, they don't even know who this guy is.
[27:43.300 --> 27:46.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: But this last year is the year that it went official.
[27:47.000 --> 27:56.200]  [SPEAKER_09]: I mean, up till now, it's been the Secret Service trying to make a mark for itself or some local bureaucracy trying to make a mark.
[27:56.400 --> 27:58.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: But this year, it's gone official.
[27:58.800 --> 28:03.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's the CIA and the NSA telling government that it's the worst threat ever.
[28:03.400 --> 28:13.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, you know, I was in Europe and I saw that front-page headline in the Herald Tribune and it definitely made me worry because it said, you know, CIA says that computer hackers are the biggest threat right now.
[28:14.480 --> 28:17.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, do you want to go back home to something like that?
[28:17.260 --> 28:19.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, seeing that on the front page of a newspaper, it's scary.
[28:19.560 --> 28:33.520]  [SPEAKER_07]: I think Janet Reno, was it last year, announced that, what was it, over the year that the study was made, which I think was a year or two ago, that, what was it, 250,000 attacks occurred over a period of, uh...
[28:33.520 --> 28:33.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[28:34.120 --> 28:35.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: 250,000 attacks...
[28:35.600 --> 28:38.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Can you imagine how many of us there are?
[28:38.860 --> 28:40.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, not only that.
[28:40.340 --> 28:40.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Two-thirds...
[28:40.540 --> 28:42.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: We are a fifth column of size.
[28:43.080 --> 28:44.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Two-thirds of which were successful.
[28:45.080 --> 28:49.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: Two-thirds of those 250,000 attacks were successful and we still never found out what they mean by attacks.
[28:49.660 --> 28:50.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: I still think they meant web hits.
[28:51.040 --> 28:52.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, and later, they admitted that these were all...
[28:52.840 --> 28:57.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: We may need to preemptively exterminate half the kindergarten population in the Western world.
[28:58.460 --> 28:59.760]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, later, the government...
[28:59.760 --> 29:01.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: I do wonder why they write stories like this.
[29:01.580 --> 29:01.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah.
[29:02.220 --> 29:09.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: Didn't the government later announce that these figures were, were, were, were pure estimates based on simulations that they ran?
[29:09.160 --> 29:11.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, it was their own simulations that they based it on.
[29:11.420 --> 29:15.100]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right, but that didn't come out until several weeks after the story hit the front page.
[29:15.100 --> 29:33.240]  [SPEAKER_07]: And a few weeks after they announced this huge threat, I believe Janet Reno, our Attorney General, announced that our largest intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, which has a budget of about five times the CIA,
[29:33.280 --> 30:01.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: for people who aren't familiar with them, would be joining forces to combat this alleged hacker threat and would be given new powers to investigate domestic, to establish domestic investigations, which up until recently was blatantly illegal for the CIA to investigate citizens in this country.
[30:01.640 --> 30:13.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: So now we have the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency and a whole host of other intelligence agencies now given the green light to investigate American citizens as opposed to foreign threat.
[30:13.760 --> 30:19.700]  [SPEAKER_07]: And this is all based on what the government has admitted was just a simulation without any basis in fact.
[30:20.320 --> 30:24.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: But the best part, I don't know if you had tuned in or if you're just calling in.
[30:24.360 --> 30:25.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: Can you actually hear this?
[30:25.420 --> 30:26.800]  [SPEAKER_09]: Did you hear the show before you came in?
[30:27.460 --> 30:28.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: No, not all of it.
[30:28.520 --> 30:29.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: Just a few minutes.
[30:29.300 --> 30:31.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: The best part is that the U.S.
[30:31.880 --> 30:45.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: armed forces have asked for a law that would make it legal for them to see any computer intrusion from outside the United States as an attack on the United States, as a military attack.
[30:45.600 --> 30:56.640]  [SPEAKER_09]: In other words, they want it to be legal to military, to retaliate by military means if a 16-year-old kid from England or somewhere breaks into a U.S.
[30:57.040 --> 30:57.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: military computer system.
[30:58.080 --> 31:00.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, this is great material for future films.
[31:00.700 --> 31:02.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: I can only imagine how the U.S.
[31:02.220 --> 31:05.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: military is going to strike against a 16-year-old in some foreign country someplace.
[31:06.560 --> 31:09.120]  [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think the answer to this problem is very simple.
[31:09.460 --> 31:13.880]  [SPEAKER_00]: There's no cold war anymore, which means all these agents were out of job.
[31:14.120 --> 31:16.100]  [SPEAKER_00]: They have to find a reason to exist.
[31:16.660 --> 31:19.860]  [SPEAKER_00]: So, the threat is the hackers.
[31:20.120 --> 31:32.900]  [SPEAKER_00]: It's much easier to hire a few good security people and make sure that their computers are difficult to hack in rather than to prosecute every hacker in the world or every curious kid.
[31:35.540 --> 31:36.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Interesting.
[31:36.340 --> 31:38.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: We're taking phone calls I guess right about now.
[31:38.840 --> 31:41.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: 212-279-3400 is our phone number.
[31:42.000 --> 31:59.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: If you have some comment or a question, we're talking about the Dutch hackers who could have made the Gulf War go the other way apparently, according to various media reports and just how accurate these things are in the first place and all kinds of other hacker things that have been going on including,
[32:00.440 --> 32:07.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: well, non-hacker things including the Bell Atlantic, NYNEX merger and, oh, you know, I saw a DVD play.
[32:07.960 --> 32:11.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Rob, do you have DVD players over there in Holland yet?
[32:12.460 --> 32:13.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know.
[32:13.380 --> 32:15.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: I haven't personally held one, but...
[32:15.740 --> 32:17.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Because we just started getting them here.
[32:17.660 --> 32:28.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: In fact, supposedly, supposedly, according to the nice people over at J&R, they said that they would start having actual DVD titles this week and...
[32:28.080 --> 32:35.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: But the best part about DVD that I heard is that they still want to maintain a different standard for different continents.
[32:35.680 --> 32:37.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, that's just crazy.
[32:37.540 --> 32:39.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: They finally have a chance to...
[32:39.220 --> 32:46.000]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, no, no, but they have a reason to do that and that's that movies come out about six months after they come out in the States here.
[32:46.920 --> 32:47.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: U.S.
[32:48.580 --> 32:51.200]  [SPEAKER_09]: movies, Hollywood movies come out six months later.
[32:51.500 --> 32:54.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: So, if these discs were available on the U.S.
[32:54.580 --> 33:00.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: market and could be shipped through Gray Import or something to Europe, it would be a real problem for them.
[33:00.960 --> 33:15.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: Actually, this whole craziness between Palin and TSC, the two current video standards, has given them the option to market the film twice and to market the video introduction twice.
[33:16.000 --> 33:17.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they don't want to lose that opportunity.
[33:19.220 --> 33:28.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: God forbid they figure out ways of having new opportunities and a way of making everything a lot more easily compatible with each other so we can share things.
[33:28.960 --> 33:30.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: But I guess that's just not the way they see it.
[33:31.340 --> 33:35.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, it still should be a good technology once it gets off the ground if it ever does.
[33:35.380 --> 33:37.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I'm looking forward to playing around with it.
[33:38.220 --> 33:39.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, 212-279-3400.
[33:40.020 --> 33:41.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: We have Bernie S.
[33:41.160 --> 33:42.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: and Rop on the phone at once.
[33:42.340 --> 33:44.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hopefully, we can take people at the same time.
[33:44.740 --> 33:45.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: We've never actually done this before.
[33:46.100 --> 33:46.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: So let's see what happens.
[33:47.520 --> 33:48.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: You think this is going to be Rebel?
[33:48.820 --> 33:49.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Or the other guy?
[33:49.820 --> 33:50.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: I don't know.
[33:50.320 --> 33:50.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's bound to be.
[33:52.480 --> 33:53.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Not line one.
[33:53.680 --> 33:54.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: Not line one?
[33:54.340 --> 33:56.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right, I'll take line five.
[33:56.120 --> 33:56.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: How's that?
[33:56.780 --> 33:56.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[33:57.660 --> 33:58.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: Good evening.
[33:58.360 --> 33:58.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: You're on the air.
[33:59.300 --> 34:00.020]  [SPEAKER_13]: Hi, how are you?
[34:00.160 --> 34:00.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[34:00.780 --> 34:01.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: Okay.
[34:01.320 --> 34:02.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: A couple quick questions.
[34:02.560 --> 34:02.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[34:04.020 --> 34:06.360]  [SPEAKER_13]: I've had problems with my phone.
[34:06.680 --> 34:14.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: Now, my question to you guys is, is it possible for somebody to hack into 9x's computers?
[34:15.100 --> 34:18.520]  [SPEAKER_13]: and change my phone bills, even if there's blocks on them?
[34:19.160 --> 34:26.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, okay, by hack in, do you mean hack in with a computer, or hack in by calling over the phone and social engineering somebody?
[34:27.100 --> 34:27.880]  [SPEAKER_13]: I don't know.
[34:28.080 --> 34:29.940]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, it could be either or both.
[34:30.240 --> 34:30.940]  [SPEAKER_13]: I don't even know.
[34:31.140 --> 34:42.060]  [SPEAKER_13]: The problem being that we get phone bills that are out of state, out of country, 800 numbers, 900 numbers, and the blocks are on them.
[34:42.420 --> 34:46.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, so basically you're getting phone bills for phone calls that you have not made.
[34:47.160 --> 34:47.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: Correct.
[34:47.500 --> 34:51.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they're coming directly from your phone line, calling card, anything like that?
[34:51.420 --> 34:52.740]  [SPEAKER_13]: They're coming on my phone bill.
[34:52.940 --> 34:54.040]  [SPEAKER_13]: We don't have a calling call.
[34:54.240 --> 34:56.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, so according to, is this NYNEX?
[34:56.940 --> 34:57.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yes, this is.
[34:57.700 --> 34:59.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: According to NYNEX, they don't know anything.
[34:59.960 --> 35:01.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: You are making these phone calls yourself.
[35:01.720 --> 35:02.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[35:02.240 --> 35:07.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, there's several ways this could be done, and none of them involve hacking into the phone company.
[35:07.940 --> 35:11.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: Simply, have you ever seen the phone wires coming into,
[35:14.980 --> 35:26.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: phone wire has many different junction points, any one of which somebody could just walk up to and clip into and get a dial tone and be able to make phone calls on your line.
[35:26.360 --> 35:31.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: I know people who have junction boxes in closets in their own apartments.
[35:31.260 --> 35:33.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: In other words, they can clip into anybody who's on their floor.
[35:34.120 --> 35:39.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: So there's numerable ways that somebody can make phone calls and make it appear that it's coming from your line.
[35:41.040 --> 35:44.660]  [SPEAKER_13]: They took all those wires out, the multiples and stuff you're talking about?
[35:44.980 --> 35:50.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, every phone wire has to go through many different junctions at some point.
[35:50.340 --> 35:51.360]  [SPEAKER_13]: Everything's been changed.
[35:51.620 --> 35:53.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: The whole house has been rewired.
[35:53.280 --> 35:53.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's not the house.
[35:54.060 --> 35:55.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's before the house.
[35:55.220 --> 35:58.660]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, I mean, even up at where the main place is.
[35:58.840 --> 36:08.760]  [SPEAKER_13]: My real question is, if somebody could get into NYNEX's system, could they overpower the system to where they're doing something without lines?
[36:08.980 --> 36:11.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: It would be a lot harder to do it that way than to do it the way that I described.
[36:12.140 --> 36:15.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: Also, the other thing I wanted to ask you, do you have a cordless phone?
[36:15.880 --> 36:15.980]  [SPEAKER_08]: No.
[36:16.160 --> 36:16.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: You don't have a cordless phone.
[36:16.940 --> 36:20.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, because that's another way people can get your dial tone and do things with it.
[36:20.880 --> 36:24.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, now, when these calls are made, how long are the calls for?
[36:24.360 --> 36:24.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: It depends.
[36:25.060 --> 36:27.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: It varies from a minute to five minutes.
[36:27.320 --> 36:28.380]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, it took...
[36:28.380 --> 36:31.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: But never for very long, never for, like, say, six hours or something?
[36:31.340 --> 36:32.160]  [SPEAKER_07]: No, no, no, no.
[36:32.160 --> 36:32.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[36:32.520 --> 36:37.220]  [SPEAKER_07]: Here's a way of finding out if this is actually being done on your physical phone line.
[36:38.140 --> 36:40.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: You can pick up one of these telephone
[36:44.160 --> 36:57.880]  [SPEAKER_07]: a cheap tape recorder and plug it into your phone jack or your phone there at your apartment or home, and it will record all the phone activity going on over your phone line, whole conversations, everything, even if it's not you.
[36:58.020 --> 37:09.000]  [SPEAKER_07]: If it's someone else clipping onto your phone line anywhere between your house and the telephone company's central office, which is probably what's happening, you will get it all on tape, and then you'll find out for sure what's going on.
[37:09.160 --> 37:10.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, that's the first step.
[37:10.520 --> 37:11.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: Where can they get that?
[37:11.460 --> 37:13.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: You can get what's called a telephone...
[37:13.380 --> 37:17.200]  [SPEAKER_07]: just a telephone dropout relay or telephone recording relay.
[37:17.340 --> 37:27.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: Radio Shack sells them for about $20, and you can just plug it into any cassette recorder, and what it does is it will turn on your tape recorder whenever your phone line goes into an off-hook condition.
[37:27.980 --> 37:38.220]  [SPEAKER_07]: It doesn't have to be any phone in your house, anywhere on your phone line between your apartment and the central office, and it clips on a cheap phone or a test set.
[37:38.460 --> 37:39.500]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, we've had that, too.
[37:39.600 --> 37:41.340]  [SPEAKER_07]: You suction the cup onto the...
[37:41.340 --> 37:43.440]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, no, that's not the same kind of recorder.
[37:43.700 --> 37:45.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: That you have to manually control.
[37:45.640 --> 37:46.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: You want something...
[37:47.180 --> 37:52.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: Obviously, you're not going to know in advance when these calls are being made on your phone line, if indeed they're being made on your phone line.
[37:52.180 --> 37:55.640]  [SPEAKER_07]: So you want to get one of these automatic recording relays.
[37:55.760 --> 37:56.680]  [SPEAKER_07]: Radio Shack sells them again.
[37:56.780 --> 37:57.840]  [SPEAKER_07]: I don't want to plug Radio Shack.
[37:57.940 --> 37:58.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: Other companies sell them.
[37:59.320 --> 38:06.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: But for about $20 or less, you can get one of these little relays that plugs into your phone line and also plugs into your tape recorder.
[38:06.460 --> 38:06.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: It has to be one
[38:12.860 --> 38:17.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, you can set this thing up tomorrow this way and that way you at least know if that is the problem.
[38:17.600 --> 38:22.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: If it doesn't record anything, then we have to look at what it could possibly be beyond that.
[38:22.140 --> 38:25.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: But I think it's the most likely scenario that somebody's clipping in somewhere.
[38:26.120 --> 38:28.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: Another way you can test this out, it's a little bit inconvenient to you.
[38:29.180 --> 38:30.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do these calls take place every day?
[38:31.480 --> 38:32.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: A lot of calls?
[38:32.640 --> 38:33.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: They have been, yes.
[38:33.760 --> 38:33.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[38:34.120 --> 38:38.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: You leave the phone off the hook for a full day and then when you get your phone bill, see if any calls were made during that day.
[38:38.820 --> 38:40.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: Okay, one more quick question.
[38:40.540 --> 38:44.060]  [SPEAKER_13]: Is it possible, because NYNEX did put recorders on those phone lines.
[38:44.240 --> 38:44.520]  [SPEAKER_10]: Okay.
[38:44.680 --> 38:49.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: Is it possible for them to, I mean, the lines have been totally dead at times.
[38:49.760 --> 38:54.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: They've just shut everything down to where if I pick up the phone, there's no dial tone, nothing.
[38:55.000 --> 38:57.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, it's been nuts.
[38:57.740 --> 38:58.220]  Uh-huh.
[38:58.220 --> 38:59.780]  [SPEAKER_13]: You know, it's not just one thing.
[38:59.940 --> 39:00.840]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's like things.
[39:01.060 --> 39:09.840]  [SPEAKER_13]: And the thing that is so aggravating, that's why, you know, I'm listening to you guys and hoping that something can come about from this is, nobody knows anything.
[39:10.360 --> 39:10.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[39:10.880 --> 39:13.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, that's standard NYNEX policy, actually.
[39:13.240 --> 39:15.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: So I wouldn't be too upset at that.
[39:15.300 --> 39:16.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: Everybody gets that.
[39:16.400 --> 39:17.440]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's not just NYNEX, though.
[39:17.500 --> 39:18.980]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, we've gone to government agencies.
[39:19.220 --> 39:20.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: Nobody knows anything.
[39:20.720 --> 39:22.480]  [SPEAKER_07]: Government agencies know even less than NYNEX.
[39:22.820 --> 39:24.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, there's another thing.
[39:24.600 --> 39:37.800]  [SPEAKER_09]: If your line goes dead often, then people intercepting your telephone line manually by just hooking up another phone could have been smart enough to disconnect your line so you wouldn't hear what they were doing.
[39:39.860 --> 39:40.840]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, I wouldn't know what to do.
[39:40.940 --> 39:45.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: Is this happening while you're in the house also, or is this happening only while you are out?
[39:45.600 --> 39:48.940]  [SPEAKER_13]: No, this is happening while I could be on the phone and the phone could go dead.
[39:49.660 --> 39:50.060]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[39:50.200 --> 39:50.920]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, it's happening.
[39:51.100 --> 39:51.560]  [SPEAKER_13]: I'm home.
[39:52.240 --> 39:53.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: That sounds very...
[39:53.500 --> 39:55.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Where could that be happening from?
[39:55.340 --> 40:03.700]  [SPEAKER_07]: Oh, it would have to be happening somewhere out from outside their room where the phones are, somewhere between there and the central office.
[40:03.820 --> 40:07.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's probably what Rob has suggested is probably what's happening.
[40:07.480 --> 40:19.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: If it goes dead while she's talking and then somebody makes a call on that line, it sounds like they're disconnecting the line from where they are to where she is so that they have control of the dial tone and she gets nothing.
[40:19.880 --> 40:21.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: And then that little radio shack device wouldn't work, would it?
[40:21.780 --> 40:26.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: No, she'd hear nothing then because then she wouldn't have a live phone line to record these things.
[40:26.740 --> 40:38.740]  [SPEAKER_13]: And that's my question is somebody obviously I mean if this is happening has to have the ability to get into my line somehow whether it be 9x or whether it be just somebody.
[40:38.860 --> 40:39.920]  [SPEAKER_13]: Somebody is on my line.
[40:40.180 --> 40:45.600]  [SPEAKER_07]: All they'd need would be a cheap set of wire cutters and a $5 phone.
[40:45.800 --> 40:47.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, but there's a whole other thing to this.
[40:47.120 --> 40:49.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Now, you look at the patterns.
[40:49.320 --> 40:51.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: You see, when are these calls being made?
[40:51.500 --> 40:52.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: Are they the same numbers?
[40:53.140 --> 40:54.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: Is it all over the world?
[40:54.560 --> 40:55.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: They're different numbers.
[40:55.300 --> 40:57.280]  [SPEAKER_13]: Parts of the world that I couldn't even say.
[40:57.600 --> 40:58.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Really?
[40:58.020 --> 40:59.280]  [SPEAKER_13]: That I've never even heard of.
[40:59.540 --> 41:01.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, what time of the day mostly are these taking place?
[41:02.240 --> 41:03.300]  [SPEAKER_13]: Any time it happens.
[41:03.300 --> 41:06.320]  [SPEAKER_13]: It could happen 4 o'clock in the morning, it could happen 4 o'clock in the afternoon.
[41:06.700 --> 41:08.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: But how many different numbers?
[41:09.940 --> 41:11.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: Six different numbers.
[41:11.340 --> 41:11.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: Only six?
[41:11.920 --> 41:12.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's not very many.
[41:12.620 --> 41:15.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do you notice the same numbers popping up month after month?
[41:18.140 --> 41:19.600]  [SPEAKER_13]: Um, it's been varied.
[41:19.840 --> 41:24.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, they, like I said, it's not just out of country phone numbers also.
[41:25.260 --> 41:25.500]  Uh-huh.
[41:25.660 --> 41:29.600]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's 800 numbers and the party line numbers, the 900s.
[41:29.620 --> 41:31.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, 900s, Here's the trick.
[41:31.860 --> 41:32.540]  [SPEAKER_13]: Over blocks.
[41:32.720 --> 41:34.660]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, this is happening over blocks.
[41:34.920 --> 41:36.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, you have 900s blocked?
[41:36.480 --> 41:38.620]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, everything blocked and it's still coming over.
[41:39.040 --> 41:43.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, you can get around a 900 block by calling an 800 number and being transferred.
[41:44.140 --> 41:48.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's a very sleazy operation, but they do that sometimes and that's one way of getting around that.
[41:48.220 --> 41:57.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: The fact that these people are doing that indicates that they know they have a free line and just trying to use it as much as they can, which to me would indicate someone kind of like childlike.
[41:58.020 --> 41:59.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: For five years, though?
[41:59.300 --> 42:00.020]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, this is happening.
[42:00.140 --> 42:01.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: Five years has been going on?
[42:01.360 --> 42:04.140]  [SPEAKER_13]: Five years and nobody knows nothing.
[42:04.340 --> 42:04.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: Wow.
[42:04.920 --> 42:06.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Have you been getting credit for these phone bills at least?
[42:06.920 --> 42:07.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yes.
[42:07.580 --> 42:09.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: Have you changed your phone number?
[42:11.300 --> 42:12.040]  [SPEAKER_13]: Six times.
[42:12.460 --> 42:12.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: Really?
[42:13.240 --> 42:20.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right, so it's probably the physical wire that the person is tapping into.
[42:20.840 --> 42:22.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's not you so much.
[42:22.540 --> 42:23.980]  [SPEAKER_13]: No, it's not us, and that's the thing.
[42:24.220 --> 42:25.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: We've been blamed for some of this.
[42:25.960 --> 42:26.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[42:26.560 --> 42:28.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Have any of your neighbors had similar things happen?
[42:28.900 --> 42:29.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: No.
[42:31.160 --> 42:32.820]  [SPEAKER_13]: Friends have, but not us.
[42:33.320 --> 42:34.000]  [SPEAKER_13]: Here's the trick.
[42:34.700 --> 42:48.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Try calling these six numbers, or have somebody that's really good in social engineering call these six numbers and tell them that you found a jacket in New York that had this number on a piece of paper in it, and it's a really expensive jacket.
[42:48.380 --> 42:49.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: I have 50 bucks in the pocket, too.
[42:50.340 --> 42:50.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: That always works.
[42:50.960 --> 42:53.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, and do you have any idea who I should send this jacket to?
[42:54.440 --> 42:54.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[42:56.360 --> 42:58.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: One of these six people must be stupid.
[42:59.380 --> 43:00.200]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's not six.
[43:00.200 --> 43:00.700]  [SPEAKER_13]: I'm sorry.
[43:01.000 --> 43:02.880]  [SPEAKER_13]: We've had six different numbers here.
[43:03.040 --> 43:07.020]  [SPEAKER_13]: We've had all over the country, numerous numbers.
[43:07.160 --> 43:08.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: I couldn't even tell you how many.
[43:08.240 --> 43:10.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: You said that NYNEX had put recorders on your phone line, is that right?
[43:11.200 --> 43:11.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yes.
[43:11.780 --> 43:14.320]  [SPEAKER_07]: Did they say they got anything other than you talking on the line?
[43:14.520 --> 43:14.720]  [SPEAKER_13]: Nope.
[43:15.380 --> 43:16.820]  [SPEAKER_07]: They didn't say, or they said they didn't?
[43:16.980 --> 43:17.660]  [SPEAKER_13]: They didn't.
[43:17.660 --> 43:18.300]  [SPEAKER_13]: They didn't know.
[43:18.500 --> 43:18.760]  [SPEAKER_07]: Okay.
[43:19.040 --> 43:21.380]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, like I said, it's been investigated.
[43:21.460 --> 43:28.460]  [SPEAKER_07]: If they had put a recorder on the line at the central office, that would definitely get any calls made on your line, regardless of whether...
[43:28.460 --> 43:29.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: They put one on there, too.
[43:29.860 --> 43:30.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: No.
[43:30.480 --> 43:31.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: Incoming calls.
[43:31.940 --> 43:34.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do you have any people living in your house that you might not know about?
[43:35.420 --> 43:38.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: Not that I know of, unless we have somebody hanging out near our phones.
[43:38.760 --> 43:38.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[43:39.180 --> 43:40.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: I just had to ask you that.
[43:40.780 --> 43:48.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, you know, this sounds like a real nightmare, one that a lot of people could probably worry about having happen to them.
[43:48.300 --> 43:48.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: Oh, definitely.
[43:49.340 --> 43:49.500]  [SPEAKER_13]: It is.
[43:49.780 --> 43:50.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: My father's had a heart attack.
[43:51.100 --> 43:52.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, it's ridiculous.
[43:52.700 --> 43:53.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Because of this?
[43:53.160 --> 43:53.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: He's had a heart attack?
[43:55.780 --> 43:57.120]  [SPEAKER_13]: on this, but I'm going to say yes.
[43:57.200 --> 43:58.480]  [SPEAKER_13]: A lot of it has to do with this.
[43:58.640 --> 44:01.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, it's been very stressful to wake up and not know.
[44:02.320 --> 44:04.060]  [SPEAKER_13]: Go off if it's somebody broke into the house.
[44:04.240 --> 44:06.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: Am I going to pick up the phone and not have a dial tone?
[44:06.660 --> 44:06.900]  [SPEAKER_11]: Right.
[44:07.140 --> 44:09.100]  [SPEAKER_13]: You know, there's young children in the house.
[44:09.180 --> 44:10.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: I mean, what am I going to do?
[44:12.180 --> 44:16.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: What you should do, since all else has failed, I think you should go right to the top.
[44:16.740 --> 44:17.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Go to...
[44:17.340 --> 44:18.540]  [SPEAKER_02]: Have you called the Public Service Commission?
[44:18.580 --> 44:20.900]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yes, I have, and they've been here, and they found nothing either.
[44:21.660 --> 44:26.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, you know, it would be very helpful if this happened while they were there, you know, and they could see for themselves that this is occurring.
[44:27.000 --> 44:27.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's never happened like that?
[44:28.400 --> 44:37.440]  [SPEAKER_13]: It's happened to where we've had repairmen here, and something has happened, and then all of a sudden, when they go to write their report, they'll come back and tell us what's going on.
[44:37.660 --> 44:38.440]  [SPEAKER_13]: Nothing happened.
[44:39.100 --> 44:39.320]  Uh-huh.
[44:39.920 --> 44:48.160]  [SPEAKER_07]: Well, NYNEX is legally responsible for preventing anyone from accessing your line outside of your place of residence.
[44:48.160 --> 44:51.040]  [SPEAKER_07]: It's their turf outside of your residence.
[44:51.280 --> 44:57.360]  [SPEAKER_07]: So if anything's happening to your phone line from your place to their central office, it's on them.
[44:57.520 --> 45:00.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: You have to fight them, unfortunately, because they don't like to accept that responsibility.
[45:01.060 --> 45:06.160]  [SPEAKER_07]: But that's what you have to hold them to, either through your state's public utilities commission or someone else.
[45:08.080 --> 45:10.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's a tough problem, it really is.
[45:11.160 --> 45:21.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: It involves a lot of persistence, and you know, you might have to keep fighting this for a while longer, and, you know, try and get some, I mean, calling up radio shows definitely is one step.
[45:22.000 --> 45:23.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe 9x will look into this a little bit more.
[45:25.980 --> 45:27.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Contact elected officials, too.
[45:27.260 --> 45:29.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, I hate to always say that, but that does help.
[45:29.360 --> 45:29.660]  [SPEAKER_13]: We did.
[45:30.020 --> 45:30.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: And it didn't do any good?
[45:30.980 --> 45:31.220]  [SPEAKER_13]: Nope.
[45:32.080 --> 45:33.180]  [SPEAKER_13]: You name it, we've done it.
[45:33.360 --> 45:34.400]  [SPEAKER_13]: That's the scary part.
[45:34.500 --> 45:36.340]  [SPEAKER_13]: That's why I'm coming to you guys.
[45:36.440 --> 45:37.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, you know what I would do, though?
[45:37.340 --> 45:39.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, I'd have fun experimenting with this, trying to figure it out.
[45:40.820 --> 45:46.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: I would put in a second, I mean, I don't want you to spend any more money, but I'd put in a second line, see if the same thing started happening to that line as well.
[45:46.800 --> 45:47.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: We did.
[45:47.540 --> 45:47.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: What happened?
[45:48.360 --> 45:48.980]  [SPEAKER_13]: Same thing.
[45:49.180 --> 45:50.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: It happened to that line, too?
[45:50.140 --> 45:50.460]  [SPEAKER_13]: Mm-hmm.
[45:51.280 --> 45:59.820]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, now, it must be happening to your neighbors, then, because if they just are clipping onto wires at random, you know, unless you're being targeted, do you have enemies in the phone company?
[46:00.920 --> 46:02.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: I'm sure we do now.
[46:03.040 --> 46:06.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: Since the first five years, but no, originally, no.
[46:06.460 --> 46:06.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: No.
[46:07.160 --> 46:07.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[46:07.740 --> 46:07.940]  [SPEAKER_13]: No.
[46:08.080 --> 46:10.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: Because this kind of thing is a lot easier to do within the company.
[46:10.840 --> 46:11.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, I'm sure.
[46:11.500 --> 46:12.720]  [SPEAKER_13]: That was my question.
[46:13.100 --> 46:20.500]  [SPEAKER_13]: Can somebody come over there, wires, or can somebody who's working there do this and cover their tracks?
[46:20.960 --> 46:25.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, I'll tell you what it could be, because this happened to me a lot.
[46:25.260 --> 46:32.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Like, every time I move into a different place, I plug a phone into a jack, and there's a phone line there, and it belongs to another house.
[46:32.840 --> 46:34.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do you have any empty, abandoned houses near you?
[46:34.860 --> 46:35.180]  [SPEAKER_13]: Nope.
[46:35.420 --> 46:36.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, well...
[46:36.300 --> 46:37.760]  [SPEAKER_13]: And all the phone jacks have been new.
[46:38.160 --> 46:38.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right.
[46:38.340 --> 46:39.420]  [SPEAKER_13]: They've taken it, you know?
[46:39.800 --> 46:39.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: Right.
[46:39.960 --> 46:42.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, like I said, all the wires have been But you see, the phone company doesn't know this.
[46:43.040 --> 46:47.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: When they have phone lines going to all different houses in the neighborhood, they don't know that they're going there.
[46:47.620 --> 46:48.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: They just go there.
[46:48.500 --> 46:54.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Don't ask me how they run their business this way, but it happens a lot, and that could be what's happening.
[46:54.280 --> 46:59.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: Maybe somebody has this line in their house, and they've just had it for years, and they just wonder why they don't ever get a bill.
[47:00.060 --> 47:01.100]  [SPEAKER_13]: But six different numbers?
[47:01.360 --> 47:01.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: You know what I'm saying?
[47:02.000 --> 47:03.960]  [SPEAKER_13]: This isn't even just happening with one number.
[47:04.200 --> 47:04.480]  [SPEAKER_13]: Right.
[47:04.580 --> 47:06.800]  [SPEAKER_13]: This has happened with the six different numbers that we have.
[47:06.840 --> 47:12.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, it's possible if one number turned into another number, it might follow the same exact routing, you know?
[47:12.500 --> 47:17.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: It might go to the same phone line anyway, so the number might not be the key issue.
[47:17.620 --> 47:20.380]  [SPEAKER_13]: Okay, because this house has been owned by my parents for 30 years.
[47:20.520 --> 47:20.840]  [SPEAKER_02]: Uh-huh.
[47:21.160 --> 47:24.140]  [SPEAKER_13]: So it's like, it's just a big nightmare.
[47:24.400 --> 47:24.520]  [SPEAKER_13]: Right.
[47:24.520 --> 47:29.880]  [SPEAKER_13]: Like I said, I called you guys because, you know, my kind of had to do it.
[47:30.100 --> 47:35.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: Try the thing with the radio shack, because that might do something, that might give you some indication.
[47:35.020 --> 47:41.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: It sounds like they're a little bit more sophisticated than that, but that, you know, if they're that sophisticated, they can't be hiding that well either.
[47:41.760 --> 47:44.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, I think they'll do something that'll call attention to themselves.
[47:44.720 --> 47:46.200]  [SPEAKER_13]: Yeah, that's what I'm waiting for.
[47:46.280 --> 47:48.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: After five years, I'm hoping somebody screws up somewhere.
[47:48.780 --> 47:55.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: But above all, don't give up, because, you know, don't let Ninex tell you that this kind of thing isn't possible, because it most definitely is.
[47:55.480 --> 47:56.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: It most definitely is.
[47:56.720 --> 47:56.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: It is.
[47:57.120 --> 48:02.660]  [SPEAKER_02]: And, you know, I invite other people to call in with similar stories and how they may have solved them, and maybe through that you'll get an answer.
[48:02.800 --> 48:03.160]  [SPEAKER_13]: Great.
[48:03.400 --> 48:03.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right?
[48:03.780 --> 48:04.720]  [SPEAKER_13]: Thank you very much.
[48:04.780 --> 48:05.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right, good luck.
[48:05.360 --> 48:05.840]  [SPEAKER_13]: Thank you.
[48:06.720 --> 48:08.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, oops, we lost Bernie S.
[48:08.740 --> 48:11.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, this phone system doesn't work the way it's supposed to work.
[48:11.420 --> 48:11.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's supposed to
[48:16.140 --> 48:22.960]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's weird, because I hear these kind of stories a lot more than I should, and it's distressing.
[48:23.100 --> 48:24.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do things like that happen overseas, Rob?
[48:24.960 --> 48:25.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yeah, they do.
[48:25.980 --> 48:26.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: They do.
[48:26.780 --> 48:28.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: And is there a solution?
[48:30.620 --> 48:32.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: Usually we have the same.
[48:32.220 --> 48:34.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's even more difficult here to give credit on your phone bill.
[48:34.880 --> 48:36.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: The phone company is even more arrogant.
[48:39.300 --> 48:40.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: But, yes, it does happen.
[48:40.760 --> 48:45.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: We have less of a problem in one sense, though, that all the lines here are underground.
[48:45.840 --> 48:46.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: We have nothing on poles.
[48:47.820 --> 48:51.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: And there's pretty good protection on the junction boxes.
[48:52.080 --> 48:53.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: There has been since 89.
[48:53.680 --> 48:56.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: I was part of showing the media.
[48:56.660 --> 48:59.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's one thing we do not have here, is protection of the junction boxes.
[48:59.720 --> 49:02.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's so easy to just tap in and get a line.
[49:02.820 --> 49:05.920]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, here are all the junction boxes in the whole country are alarmed.
[49:06.460 --> 49:12.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: If you step into one, or if you break one open, it actually sounds an alarm in the central office.
[49:14.420 --> 49:15.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Do we have Bernie S back?
[49:16.940 --> 49:17.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: Hello?
[49:17.660 --> 49:18.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: Good evening, you're on the air.
[49:18.860 --> 49:20.140]  [SPEAKER_08]: Hi, I have a question for you.
[49:20.220 --> 49:20.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[49:21.420 --> 49:28.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: I was reading in the newspaper recently in the New York Times and some local New Jersey newspapers about the new CDA bill that's going through the Supreme Court.
[49:28.640 --> 49:30.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right, it's being appealed by the government.
[49:30.980 --> 49:33.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: It was thrown out by a lesser court last year.
[49:34.280 --> 49:43.780]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I'm starting an internet provider with some friends of mine here locally in New Jersey, and we were wondering what implications this has for us, and if we're liable for any of this through the new law.
[49:44.060 --> 49:51.740]  [SPEAKER_02]: At the moment, you aren't, but if the CDA is held to be constitutional on the eyes of the Supreme Court, that could change radically.
[49:51.740 --> 50:04.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: You could be expected to shield young eyes from anything that might be considered not only obscene but indecent, and that could be anything from a picture that someone might see the wrong way to four-letter words.
[50:04.640 --> 50:04.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[50:04.880 --> 50:12.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, this is something you should definitely be monitoring and spreading the word about because, you know, a lot of people realize how absurd it is.
[50:12.740 --> 50:15.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: That doesn't necessarily mean it's not going to happen, you see.
[50:16.020 --> 50:19.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, yes, it would definitely affect you as an internet provider.
[50:19.580 --> 50:19.840]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[50:20.760 --> 50:23.300]  [SPEAKER_08]: So, does that mean books such as The Catcher in the Rye?
[50:23.600 --> 50:24.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[50:24.180 --> 50:24.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, sure.
[50:24.820 --> 50:25.360]  [SPEAKER_08]: I figured.
[50:25.580 --> 50:26.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: It could include that.
[50:26.580 --> 50:27.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: It could include anything.
[50:27.340 --> 50:31.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, it's based on quote-unquote community standards, whatever that means.
[50:31.440 --> 50:31.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[50:31.860 --> 50:35.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: You know, and on the internet, you know, the internet itself is the community.
[50:35.940 --> 50:41.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: So, it's very difficult to, you know, to stick Tennessee standards into something that goes to California or New York.
[50:42.020 --> 50:43.340]  [SPEAKER_02]: But people have done that.
[50:43.900 --> 50:44.100]  [SPEAKER_08]: Okay.
[50:44.440 --> 50:44.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right?
[50:44.880 --> 50:45.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: Thank you very much.
[50:45.600 --> 50:45.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[50:45.740 --> 50:46.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: Good luck.
[50:46.220 --> 50:46.300]  Yep.
[50:46.620 --> 50:48.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, it goes even further than that.
[50:50.500 --> 51:01.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: There's, back in the time when it looked like the Decency Act was going to pass without any trouble and then be held constitutional, it was like that for a few months.
[51:02.700 --> 51:16.320]  [SPEAKER_09]: internet providers here in Europe started making their customers sign contracts that they would abide by the American Communications Decency Act because otherwise these providers would have their transatlantic links cut.
[51:16.500 --> 51:18.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: That must have gone over real well in foreign countries.
[51:19.260 --> 51:19.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: Oh, yes.
[51:20.200 --> 51:27.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, but it was actually, it was getting to the point where the major providers were getting scared to have their MCI or Sprint Links cut.
[51:28.660 --> 51:31.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: So they were making their customers sign for liability.
[51:33.420 --> 51:33.960]  [SPEAKER_10]: Uh-huh.
[51:34.440 --> 51:35.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: Where does it stand today over there?
[51:37.780 --> 51:45.200]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, it looks like it looks now that the Decency Act is not going to be held constitutional, which it shouldn't be.
[51:45.440 --> 51:49.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, I think the Supreme Court will come back with the decision, I think, in June or July.
[51:49.540 --> 51:50.040]  [SPEAKER_02]: So we'll know then.
[51:50.300 --> 51:53.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: But this whole thing was going on, what was it, a year and a half ago?
[51:54.340 --> 51:55.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Two years ago?
[51:55.220 --> 51:56.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, a year and a half ago.
[51:56.240 --> 51:56.780]  [SPEAKER_09]: I think so, yeah.
[51:57.220 --> 52:03.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: Back then, the whole Internet was much more a star network from Washington and California than it is today.
[52:04.280 --> 52:04.540]  [SPEAKER_12]: Uh-huh.
[52:04.720 --> 52:07.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: So back then, it was really scary.
[52:07.500 --> 52:11.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: If you lost your connectivity to the States, you basically lost your connectivity to the Internet.
[52:12.200 --> 52:21.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: And right now, the Internet is developing into much more of a multinational thing where we don't have to go through the States to talk to any other country than our own anymore.
[52:21.920 --> 52:24.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: I think that's the best way it could possibly go.
[52:24.860 --> 52:25.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[52:25.640 --> 52:27.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right, let's see if we can take one more call.
[52:27.180 --> 52:27.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: Good evening.
[52:27.780 --> 52:28.240]  [SPEAKER_02]: You're on the air.
[52:28.500 --> 52:29.240]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right, how you doing?
[52:29.500 --> 52:29.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay.
[52:29.840 --> 52:35.480]  [SPEAKER_06]: I've got a quick question for you regarding the payphones NYNEX, the newer payphones, the people like all steel-encased or something.
[52:35.560 --> 52:36.520]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, you notice those things?
[52:36.660 --> 52:37.260]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah, aren't those wild?
[52:37.600 --> 52:38.680]  [SPEAKER_02]: They're kind of neat-looking.
[52:38.820 --> 52:41.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: They look like they've been spray-painted with silver paint.
[52:41.460 --> 52:45.320]  [SPEAKER_06]: You know, the problem is they won't let you dial longer than 16 digits, so God help you if you make a mistake.
[52:45.480 --> 52:48.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: And you certainly can't do the pound key to do repeat calls.
[52:48.940 --> 52:52.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right, this is what I suggest to everybody out there, because they got rid of the yellow phones.
[52:52.840 --> 52:54.080]  [SPEAKER_02]: We complained about the yellow phones.
[52:54.200 --> 52:54.760]  [SPEAKER_02]: They sucked.
[52:54.860 --> 52:55.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: They were awful.
[52:55.540 --> 52:58.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: They didn't allow all different things, different kinds of phone calls.
[52:58.620 --> 52:59.180]  [SPEAKER_02]: They got rid of them.
[52:59.500 --> 53:00.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Now they put these phones in.
[53:00.560 --> 53:03.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: Now we have to complain about the fact that they cut off dialing after a certain amount of digits.
[53:04.260 --> 53:06.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: You should be able to dial as many digits as you want.
[53:06.680 --> 53:07.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: Was there a reason for that?
[53:07.980 --> 53:08.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's just stupidity.
[53:09.060 --> 53:09.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's all it is.
[53:09.640 --> 53:16.840]  [SPEAKER_06]: Do they think that there were people that were taking advantage of it by constantly using touchstones, what is, I don't know, as lethal weapons or something?
[53:17.200 --> 53:21.940]  [SPEAKER_02]: Whenever there's an act of overt stupidity, it usually is traced back to the war on drugs, okay?
[53:22.220 --> 53:28.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: And they think somehow by cutting off touchstones that drug dealers won't be able to beat themselves and communicate in that way.
[53:28.600 --> 53:30.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: If anything, it just annoys the rest of us.
[53:30.720 --> 53:31.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's what it does.
[53:31.500 --> 53:36.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: It annoys the rest of us and it makes us all curse the name of NYNEX and if it becomes Bell Atlantic, we'll curse that name too.
[53:37.380 --> 53:42.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Now, you know, payphones should just allow you to dial however many digits you want after you connect to something.
[53:42.420 --> 53:43.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: It doesn't cost them.
[53:43.320 --> 53:50.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: They don't pay a maintenance fee every you can hit the digits as many times as you want and just leave it alone at that.
[53:50.860 --> 53:56.820]  [SPEAKER_06]: One of the things they tried to do was put a charge, a 75 cent charge for directory assistance.
[53:56.960 --> 54:00.360]  [SPEAKER_06]: I mean, if you're at the payphone, you're going to end up making the call.
[54:00.560 --> 54:00.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: Exactly.
[54:01.400 --> 54:01.860]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's so ridiculous.
[54:02.000 --> 54:04.040]  [SPEAKER_06]: Anyway, the last thing I wanted to say was the DVD technology.
[54:04.220 --> 54:05.780]  [SPEAKER_06]: So no one's really actually seen it, I guess.
[54:05.980 --> 54:06.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: It's too new.
[54:06.600 --> 54:07.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, I've seen it.
[54:07.240 --> 54:08.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: I've held a DVD in my hands.
[54:08.720 --> 54:10.020]  [SPEAKER_02]: I've touched the machine myself.
[54:10.320 --> 54:10.600]  [SPEAKER_06]: Wow.
[54:10.840 --> 54:12.120]  [SPEAKER_06]: Did you like wash your hand afterwards?
[54:12.400 --> 54:12.720]  [SPEAKER_02]: No.
[54:13.700 --> 54:15.120]  [SPEAKER_02]: Not until I have one of my own.
[54:16.180 --> 54:16.900]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's impressive.
[54:16.900 --> 54:17.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: It really is.
[54:17.860 --> 54:21.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: But unfortunately, there's only the demo disc out right now, so it's not that impressive.
[54:21.700 --> 54:23.940]  [SPEAKER_06]: But the picture actually doesn't look like...
[54:23.940 --> 54:29.220]  [SPEAKER_06]: You know, I've seen compressed video, like on the mini disc I think they had or the CD...
[54:29.220 --> 54:33.200]  [SPEAKER_06]: That new CDI thing that they had for like two seconds, you know, the Panasonic thing?
[54:33.380 --> 54:33.600]  [SPEAKER_06]: Yeah.
[54:33.720 --> 54:43.720]  [SPEAKER_06]: When they showed it, it was really bad because what it looked like was a really bad missed game because people who were moving in the foreground sort of moved, but in the background it was static.
[54:43.720 --> 54:51.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: This is good enough where I predict that when you go to see a film in a theater, they will stop using reels, they'll start using DVDs.
[54:51.760 --> 54:53.580]  [SPEAKER_06]: So the compression doesn't take a big toll?
[54:54.120 --> 54:54.880]  [SPEAKER_02]: I haven't...
[54:54.880 --> 54:59.800]  [SPEAKER_02]: I mean, maybe somebody who has better eyes can tell me I'm wrong, but I don't believe so at all.
[54:59.800 --> 55:00.340]  [SPEAKER_06]: All right.
[55:00.440 --> 55:01.100]  [SPEAKER_06]: Well, thank you very much.
[55:01.220 --> 55:01.440]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[55:02.480 --> 55:04.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, we're just about out of time, Rob.
[55:04.400 --> 55:11.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: Unfortunately, we lost Bernie S., and he didn't get back to us, so we'll have to thank him for calling us, I guess, some other time.
[55:12.200 --> 55:22.460]  [SPEAKER_02]: But why don't you give out information for the Dutch Hacker Conference, and we'll give out information for the American side of that, and we'll let you get back to your wedding night.
[55:23.140 --> 55:23.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[55:23.580 --> 55:27.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: The Dutch Hacker Conference is August 8th, 9th, and 10th of this year.
[55:27.680 --> 55:29.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's in the Netherlands.
[55:30.160 --> 55:33.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: People can come and set up tents as early as August 5th.
[55:34.200 --> 55:35.340]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's going to be a lot of fun.
[55:35.440 --> 55:40.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: There's going to be maybe even 2,000 people there, lots of hackers, lots of interesting people to talk to.
[55:40.940 --> 55:42.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: I really wish I could go to this thing.
[55:42.340 --> 55:43.420]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know how frustrating it is?
[55:43.860 --> 55:45.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah, I know, I know.
[55:45.180 --> 55:48.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: But it's going to be so much better if we can link the Hope event to this event.
[55:48.780 --> 55:49.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's true.
[55:49.400 --> 55:49.920]  [SPEAKER_02]: That's true.
[55:50.120 --> 55:53.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: For the people visiting, this is going to be the best thing ever.
[55:53.820 --> 55:57.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: There's really no purpose in ever organizing hacker events after this.
[55:57.680 --> 55:58.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, this is it.
[55:58.660 --> 55:59.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: You can't get any bigger than this.
[55:59.800 --> 56:00.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: This is it.
[56:00.300 --> 56:00.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: No, no.
[56:01.340 --> 56:03.300]  [SPEAKER_02]: This is the event that ends events.
[56:04.000 --> 56:06.620]  [SPEAKER_02]: Is this before or after the comet crashes into the Earth?
[56:07.420 --> 56:08.520]  [SPEAKER_02]: It's right before.
[56:08.700 --> 56:09.000]  [SPEAKER_02]: Right before.
[56:09.160 --> 56:09.420]  [SPEAKER_02]: Good.
[56:09.860 --> 56:11.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: Actually, I'll tell you something funny.
[56:11.780 --> 56:12.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: You don't have to pay the bills that way.
[56:12.820 --> 56:14.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: We have an observatory.
[56:14.700 --> 56:17.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: We have somebody that offered to bring an observatory to the field.
[56:18.120 --> 56:21.200]  [SPEAKER_09]: And that's, of course, now that you mention it, that's, of course, because of the comet.
[56:21.480 --> 56:21.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[56:21.940 --> 56:23.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: Stupid of me not to think of it.
[56:23.280 --> 56:23.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[56:24.540 --> 56:34.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: People can find out more information by looking at www.hiphip97, there's one word, .nl for Netherlands.
[56:34.980 --> 56:38.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: So that's www.hip97.nl.
[56:39.160 --> 56:45.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: And for us, for the HOPE conference, the address right now is www.2600.com.
[56:45.360 --> 56:48.700]  [SPEAKER_02]: Sooner will be www.hope.net, but I don't think it's working yet.
[56:48.700 --> 56:51.140]  [SPEAKER_02]: So continue to connect to the 2600 website.
[56:51.140 --> 56:57.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: That gives you all the information on the New York version of that, which will be happening downtown at the Puck Building, August 8th, 9th, and 10th.
[56:57.760 --> 56:59.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: And it's going to be pretty wild.
[56:59.320 --> 57:01.500]  [SPEAKER_02]: We've got some surprises in store for people.
[57:02.080 --> 57:03.980]  [SPEAKER_02]: And sure, we're going to get some surprises ourselves.
[57:04.460 --> 57:06.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: Rob, it's been great hearing from you.
[57:06.380 --> 57:09.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: Thanks for helping us dispel the Dutch hacker story a little bit.
[57:09.640 --> 57:13.580]  [SPEAKER_02]: And I guess we'll talk to you next time something like this happens, which will probably be in another couple of weeks.
[57:14.640 --> 57:18.400]  [SPEAKER_02]: Until then, I wish everybody over there well, and we'll talk to you soon.
[57:18.700 --> 57:20.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, I'm going to enjoy my wedding night now.
[57:20.760 --> 57:21.480]  [SPEAKER_02]: Okay, you do that.
[57:21.940 --> 57:22.220]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[57:22.500 --> 57:22.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: All right.
[57:23.640 --> 57:24.600]  [SPEAKER_02]: Oh, he's off.
[57:24.980 --> 57:25.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: There we go.
[57:25.960 --> 57:27.060]  [SPEAKER_02]: Rob from Amsterdam there.
[57:27.360 --> 57:28.560]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, we're out of time, too.
[57:28.820 --> 57:31.160]  [SPEAKER_02]: We'll be back again next week, next Tuesday night from 8 to 9.
[57:31.380 --> 57:37.220]  [SPEAKER_02]: And who knows what will happen between now and then, but whatever it is, we'll be right on top of it, and we'll tell you all about it.
[57:37.860 --> 57:42.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: Until then, it's Emmanuel Goldstein for Fiber Optic, who has taken ill someplace.
[57:43.260 --> 57:45.380]  [SPEAKER_02]: We'll hear from him hopefully next week as well.
[57:45.680 --> 57:47.200]  [SPEAKER_02]: Until then, have yourselves a good night.
[57:47.200 --> 57:49.320]  [SPEAKER_02]: Well, we'll see you next week on Off the Hook.