Off The Hook - 2003-11-12

[00:00.000 --> 00:05.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: His main concern is that the school district and bus company are trying to place the blame on the children.
[00:05.560 --> 00:10.540]  [SPEAKER_00]: We are very concerned because you're talking about children safety in jeopardy here.
[00:10.740 --> 00:18.580]  [SPEAKER_00]: And you're having a school board and a bus company trying to create some kind of diversion away from who should be held responsible.
[00:18.920 --> 00:22.280]  [SPEAKER_00]: So at this point, we are really looking into legal litigation.
[00:22.280 --> 00:27.060]  [SPEAKER_00]: We are discussing some issues with some attorneys to see what's the best code of action to take.
[00:27.060 --> 00:35.300]  [SPEAKER_12]: According to the investigator at the State Attorney General's Office Civil Rights Division, their office is investigating the matter as a serious one.
[00:35.580 --> 00:38.400]  [SPEAKER_12]: For Free Speech Radio News, I'm Randy Zimmerman.
[00:40.980 --> 00:46.940]  [SPEAKER_01]: Free Speech Radio News is produced at Pacifica Station's WBAI in New York and KPFA in Berkeley.
[00:47.520 --> 00:49.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: And that's all you're going to say tonight because we're late.
[00:49.640 --> 00:50.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's 7.02.
[00:50.880 --> 00:51.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: Time for Off the Hook.
[01:24.780 --> 01:25.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: And a good evening to everybody.
[01:26.000 --> 01:26.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: The program is Off the Hook.
[01:26.900 --> 01:29.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Emmanuel Goldstein here with you for the next hour or so.
[01:29.500 --> 01:31.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, we're on this week, but we're not on next week.
[01:31.460 --> 01:34.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: So we have a lot of material to try and cram into this hour.
[01:35.240 --> 01:35.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: Jeff, welcome back.
[01:36.220 --> 01:36.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Thank you.
[01:36.580 --> 01:37.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: You were on assignment.
[01:37.700 --> 01:38.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[01:38.100 --> 01:38.620]  [SPEAKER_15]: How did it go?
[01:38.920 --> 01:39.880]  [SPEAKER_15]: It went wonderfully.
[01:40.280 --> 01:42.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, well, we sent Jeff out actually on assignment to cover the eclipse.
[01:43.020 --> 01:49.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: But it turned out that this is the first time that the radio station didn't have live coverage of the eclipse, of the lunar eclipse.
[01:50.260 --> 01:51.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: My phone was ready.
[01:51.360 --> 01:52.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: I was waiting for the call.
[01:52.360 --> 01:53.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, apparently it's a programming change.
[01:54.160 --> 01:57.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: We used to always cover those things, the solar eclipses, of course, and the lunar...
[01:57.740 --> 01:59.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, you know, I don't know.
[01:59.640 --> 02:00.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: They just don't happen anymore.
[02:01.220 --> 02:01.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: How about that?
[02:01.880 --> 02:02.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: My phone turned itself back on.
[02:05.860 --> 02:06.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: Very nice.
[02:07.500 --> 02:08.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: This is what Rebel does.
[02:08.640 --> 02:11.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: He always likes to make the phone ring.
[02:11.160 --> 02:12.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's all the noise you're going to get on the air tonight, Rebel.
[02:13.400 --> 02:16.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, it's another Wednesday night.
[02:16.940 --> 02:17.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie S.
[02:17.320 --> 02:18.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: joins us from Philadelphia.
[02:18.420 --> 02:18.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie, are you there?
[02:19.420 --> 02:22.640]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes, I'm tooling around in a taxi cab with a bad transmission.
[02:22.920 --> 02:25.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: You've hired a cab to get you through the hour tonight.
[02:25.620 --> 02:27.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's awfully classy.
[02:29.400 --> 02:32.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: We have all kinds of letters that we've gotten from last week's show.
[02:32.840 --> 02:39.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, of course, we invite people to write in OTH at 2600.com if they have any feedback, information, things that we should know about.
[02:39.820 --> 02:46.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: One listener actually sent in an answer to a question that we raised last week, which I guess nobody else has really talked about.
[02:46.580 --> 02:48.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: It might seem kind of trivial, but it's interesting.
[02:49.220 --> 02:51.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Why is the Empire State Building on all night long?
[02:51.640 --> 02:52.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Why is the light on?
[02:52.620 --> 02:53.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: Have you noticed that?
[02:53.360 --> 02:54.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: Jim, that's the kind of thing you'd notice.
[02:54.580 --> 02:55.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: I have noticed that.
[02:55.700 --> 02:57.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: Wait, I didn't notice where your microphone... there it is.
[02:57.420 --> 02:58.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay, set it again.
[02:58.380 --> 02:59.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: I have noticed that.
[02:59.720 --> 03:00.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: But you don't know why, do you?
[03:00.940 --> 03:08.140]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, yeah, but I did notice that it had been on a while, and I did notice that it was not all white, even though you insisted that it was by...
[03:08.140 --> 03:08.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: I still do.
[03:08.700 --> 03:11.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: I haven't seen it any other color than white in the last couple of months.
[03:12.220 --> 03:12.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[03:12.740 --> 03:18.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: And the rumor was starting to spread was that the guy in charge of that had died, and he took the keys with him, and no one knew how to turn the lights off.
[03:18.680 --> 03:19.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's why I didn't correct it.
[03:19.840 --> 03:22.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: I figured it was an excellent urban legend to start.
[03:22.360 --> 03:22.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh-huh.
[03:22.740 --> 03:27.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, we're going to dash that urban legend tonight, because... well, at least, if this listener is correct...
[03:27.920 --> 03:29.020]  [SPEAKER_15]: It's a new urban legend.
[03:29.280 --> 03:29.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, yeah.
[03:30.160 --> 03:31.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: One that didn't last very long, though.
[03:31.960 --> 03:35.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: This person actually called the Empire State Building Public Relations Department.
[03:35.400 --> 03:35.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Did you know they had one?
[03:36.120 --> 03:36.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yes, I did.
[03:36.680 --> 03:49.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, uh, the reason that the lights are on, the tower lights have been on after midnight, in fact, until dawn, because of the major project involving reinforcement of the broadcast tower to accommodate broadcasters who have relocated here after September 11th.
[03:49.680 --> 03:53.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, and you also know from time to time they will be white instead of a previously scheduled color.
[03:53.960 --> 03:55.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's what they say over there.
[03:55.420 --> 03:56.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: So they're using it as a work light.
[03:56.740 --> 04:00.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and in fact, you know, I've listened on this radio station, uh, there's all kinds of maintenance going on.
[04:00.340 --> 04:04.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: We occasionally lose the signal after midnight because of the maintenance they're doing over there.
[04:04.120 --> 04:07.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Because I guess you have to turn a transmitter off if somebody is walking in front of it.
[04:07.640 --> 04:09.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: I, uh, I don't have cable.
[04:09.560 --> 04:12.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: I have, uh, over-the-air, uh, reception.
[04:12.620 --> 04:19.260]  [SPEAKER_17]: And I notice quite a lot of, uh, 10-second, 30-second, uh, losses in transmission.
[04:19.480 --> 04:22.700]  [SPEAKER_17]: And they tend to be all broadcast channel-wide.
[04:22.920 --> 04:26.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: In other words, it's not just channel 2 or channel 7 in New York that goes out.
[04:26.920 --> 04:27.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: It's everything.
[04:27.800 --> 04:29.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: All 7 or 9 channels.
[04:30.360 --> 04:31.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, I think Bernie's paying us fare.
[04:32.440 --> 04:32.780]  [SPEAKER_02]: Yes.
[04:33.060 --> 04:34.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, give the guy a good tip.
[04:34.900 --> 04:35.280]  [SPEAKER_02]: I did.
[04:35.380 --> 04:36.860]  [SPEAKER_02]: He's going to need it to pay for the transmission.
[04:37.000 --> 04:38.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: You don't have to cover the whole transmission.
[04:38.240 --> 04:39.360]  [SPEAKER_02]: I thought we got rear-ended.
[04:39.440 --> 04:40.260]  [SPEAKER_02]: He was just switching gears.
[04:42.100 --> 04:44.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, um, we have, uh, news items as well.
[04:45.480 --> 04:47.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, anything anyone want to bring up?
[04:47.420 --> 04:49.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: Any adventures, stories, things like that that happen to people?
[04:49.660 --> 04:50.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: Mike, you're leaning forward.
[04:51.680 --> 04:52.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: I have news.
[04:52.700 --> 04:52.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: You have news.
[04:52.960 --> 04:53.280]  [SPEAKER_09]: What's the news?
[04:53.360 --> 04:53.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: Go ahead.
[04:53.820 --> 04:57.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, there was a vote in, in Boone County, uh, near Indianapolis.
[04:57.760 --> 04:57.960]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[04:59.940 --> 05:04.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: They were running the, uh, they had a computer displaying onto the wall the number of votes.
[05:04.460 --> 05:11.120]  [SPEAKER_09]: And it said 144,000 votes forecast, which is odd, because in this county there's only 19,000 registered voters.
[05:11.780 --> 05:12.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: Wow.
[05:12.400 --> 05:14.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: So people were pretty enthusiastic about what they were voting for.
[05:14.580 --> 05:16.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: They voted, uh, 10 times, it looks like.
[05:16.520 --> 05:16.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: Yeah.
[05:16.760 --> 05:20.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: This was the, uh, the micro-vote software that made the mistake.
[05:20.700 --> 05:24.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: So even if you don't use Diebold, as we were discussing last week, you can still get errors.
[05:24.980 --> 05:28.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: So there are other companies involved in, uh, electronic voting.
[05:28.160 --> 05:29.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, and where was this again?
[05:29.680 --> 05:30.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: This was Indiana?
[05:30.660 --> 05:31.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: Indiana, yeah.
[05:31.440 --> 05:31.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay.
[05:32.040 --> 05:32.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, Boone County.
[05:32.980 --> 05:34.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: Lebanon is the name of the town.
[05:34.360 --> 05:37.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: What, uh, what exactly, uh, did they do in the end?
[05:37.900 --> 05:47.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, it says there was a lengthy collaboration between the county's information technology director and the advisors from the micro-vote software producer, and they fixed the problem.
[05:47.860 --> 05:48.260]  [SPEAKER_09]: So...
[05:48.260 --> 05:49.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: They fixed the election, too?
[05:49.640 --> 05:50.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: Well, that I don't know.
[05:51.660 --> 05:52.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: How hard is it?
[05:52.740 --> 05:54.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, all they're doing is counting.
[05:54.020 --> 05:55.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's actually very hard.
[05:55.660 --> 05:56.880]  [SPEAKER_09]: Okay, tell me why it's hard.
[05:56.980 --> 06:05.700]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's hard to get all the security features right, so that you, when you come up with 144,000, you actually can find out the correct number, which in this case was 5,300.
[06:06.900 --> 06:07.200]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh-huh.
[06:07.460 --> 06:10.680]  [SPEAKER_09]: Um, but it's not, you know, it's not that hard.
[06:10.800 --> 06:11.900]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's hard, but it's not that hard.
[06:12.080 --> 06:13.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, someone from Germany wrote into the other program.
[06:13.780 --> 06:16.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: I was talking about elections because, uh, that was, that was broadcast on election day.
[06:16.960 --> 06:21.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, and, uh, he asked, why don't you guys simply, uh, you know, have them on, on paper?
[06:22.060 --> 06:26.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, you just write down yes, no, whatever, and, and they can be counted very quickly afterwards.
[06:26.340 --> 06:30.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: And also, why don't you have your election day on the weekend when people can vote probably more easily?
[06:30.520 --> 06:35.180]  [SPEAKER_15]: I thought that was the, the best suggestion there, to be able to, to do it on a day when people are available.
[06:35.420 --> 06:37.340]  [SPEAKER_15]: They don't have to worry about getting out of work and running home.
[06:37.460 --> 06:39.680]  [SPEAKER_15]: And getting back to the, their, their local area.
[06:39.840 --> 06:41.120]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can combine the two.
[06:41.300 --> 06:45.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Have the paper ballot, which is very hard to, uh, go astray with.
[06:45.620 --> 06:50.620]  [SPEAKER_17]: And you would have volunteers that would be free on the weekends to assist with the paper ballots.
[06:50.860 --> 06:53.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: You have, you know, a number of each party.
[06:53.300 --> 06:57.100]  [SPEAKER_17]: So there would be no, uh, uh, collusion or at least less.
[06:57.100 --> 07:04.200]  [SPEAKER_17]: If you have a Republican, a Democrat, and some sort of third-party, a guy watching every paper ballot, which is blatantly marked.
[07:04.680 --> 07:04.980]  [SPEAKER_15]: Mm-hmm.
[07:05.080 --> 07:13.180]  [SPEAKER_15]: But, you know, every time I vote, I, I, I have to use the machine, and I still have to sign my name twice, on, once in a book, another time on a piece of paper.
[07:13.300 --> 07:13.520]  [SPEAKER_15]: Really?
[07:13.520 --> 07:13.960]  [SPEAKER_15]: Oh, yeah.
[07:14.040 --> 07:14.460]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yes, yes.
[07:14.520 --> 07:15.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: Only once for me.
[07:15.560 --> 07:16.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: I've got to do it twice in New Jersey.
[07:16.840 --> 07:18.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, I do it, you know, the second time I vote.
[07:18.440 --> 07:23.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, uh, you know, the first time, the first time, it's just, you know, you sign it, your signature's already there.
[07:23.660 --> 07:25.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Somehow they've gotten your signature, and you sign next to it.
[07:25.700 --> 07:27.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: And you do a pretty good job, you know, imitating it.
[07:27.780 --> 07:27.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Mm-hmm.
[07:27.880 --> 07:31.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, uh, and then you're, uh, you know, you, you go into the little booth and play with the levers.
[07:31.900 --> 07:32.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: How do you do a write-in vote?
[07:33.060 --> 07:33.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: I've never done that.
[07:33.920 --> 07:36.160]  [SPEAKER_17]: Oh, in a, in a, uh, in a machine?
[07:36.280 --> 07:36.440]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah.
[07:46.000 --> 07:51.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, and, uh, actually, they tell you to, uh, uh, call the attendant over.
[07:52.180 --> 07:53.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, so they know you're doing a write-in vote, then?
[07:54.140 --> 07:54.560]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, yeah.
[07:55.740 --> 07:56.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: They can all point at you.
[07:57.000 --> 07:57.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: Mm-hmm.
[07:57.300 --> 07:58.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: So much for anonymity.
[07:58.460 --> 08:01.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and, and also, the other thing I'd like to know is, how do you get the full results?
[08:02.060 --> 08:06.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: The full results of everybody who has, uh, you know, been voted for, and what parties?
[08:06.980 --> 08:08.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's an interesting question.
[08:08.300 --> 08:12.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, the Board of Elections actually makes that data available on their website, at least in New York City.
[08:12.660 --> 08:19.580]  [SPEAKER_09]: Uh, if you want it, uh, at a, so if, it will give you the, the results by Assembly District on their website.
[08:19.900 --> 08:20.020]  [SPEAKER_09]: Mm-hmm.
[08:20.020 --> 08:27.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: If you want it, a finer grain detail by Election District, that's by each machine, you have to pay for that, some copying fee.
[08:28.420 --> 08:28.820]  [SPEAKER_09]: Interesting.
[08:29.020 --> 08:33.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, those are some of the, uh, little facts about elections that, uh, most people don't talk about.
[08:33.560 --> 08:40.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: But if you know of a, uh, electronic system that actually works, or maybe one that works as badly as the one in Indiana, please, uh, let us know about it.
[08:40.400 --> 08:44.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, or if you know where the software is residing this week, uh, we'd certainly like to take a look at that as well.
[08:45.140 --> 08:50.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: I happen to think that, uh, uh, open-source is the only way to go for something as important as, uh, as an election.
[08:50.640 --> 08:52.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: And there must be other countries experimenting with this, too.
[08:52.700 --> 08:54.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, countries that maybe are getting it right.
[08:55.140 --> 08:57.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: Although, that's probably, countries that are getting it wrong, too.
[08:57.740 --> 08:59.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Brazil, I hear, has electronic voting.
[09:00.360 --> 09:00.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Do they?
[09:01.260 --> 09:01.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Brazil, yeah.
[09:01.940 --> 09:02.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: They have voting.
[09:02.740 --> 09:03.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: They have voting.
[09:03.220 --> 09:04.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, that's good, too.
[09:04.580 --> 09:06.240]  [SPEAKER_09]: I don't know how many candidates they have.
[09:06.380 --> 09:06.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh-huh.
[09:07.320 --> 09:13.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's funny, you know, one of the elections that, uh, that I was voting in, uh, the same candidate was running for every, every party.
[09:13.460 --> 09:17.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: Democrat, Republican, right to life, anti-right to life, you know, everything.
[09:17.120 --> 09:17.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: A judgeship, huh?
[09:18.260 --> 09:20.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, usually that's the case.
[09:20.200 --> 09:20.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: I didn't vote for him.
[09:20.280 --> 09:21.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: I just didn't vote for him as spite.
[09:21.460 --> 09:25.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: There was no way I could figure out how to make this person lose, which is what I, you know, really wanted to do in the, in the end.
[09:26.120 --> 09:27.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Leo, you're, you're motioning.
[09:27.080 --> 09:27.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes.
[09:27.780 --> 09:30.580]  [SPEAKER_11]: I just, I just want to say that, uh, is the mic on?
[09:30.980 --> 09:32.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, Leo, the mic's on.
[09:32.220 --> 09:32.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: Come on.
[09:32.420 --> 09:45.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: Uh, I just want to say that, uh, there's, uh, a way to make electronic voting safe, which is basically have, like, a button that's electronic that automatically counts to vote on the computer that also punches a hole or something in a paper.
[09:45.500 --> 09:48.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: So you get an electronic vote and a paper vote.
[09:48.360 --> 09:49.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, but how do you know they're the same?
[09:50.500 --> 09:52.000]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, you could just test it.
[09:52.040 --> 09:57.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: In other words, the software's not going to be in charge of, uh, of keeping track of all the individual votes.
[09:57.780 --> 10:03.180]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's only averages out the, uh, in other words, why not have both paper and electronic?
[10:03.480 --> 10:10.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, you could have, you know, three or four different systems, but again, you know, knowing that they're the same, that's, uh, that's, you know, the real test.
[10:10.720 --> 10:12.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, of course, you can't really, you can't print out a receipt.
[10:13.100 --> 10:15.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: I know people are thinking of printing out a receipt for electronic voting.
[10:15.520 --> 10:15.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Why, Jim?
[10:16.080 --> 10:17.960]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, I, I've got a solution.
[10:18.500 --> 10:28.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: Uh, do it so that at home or at, like, uh, an Internet cafe or something, you, you have a ballot and you, you have all the candidates and you can sit there and type out what you want.
[10:28.320 --> 10:28.680]  [SPEAKER_17]: Okay.
[10:29.460 --> 10:33.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: And it gives you, uh, a, a, two copies.
[10:33.800 --> 10:34.300]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[10:34.460 --> 10:36.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: And what it is, it's like a barcode, say.
[10:36.620 --> 10:36.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: All right.
[10:37.000 --> 10:37.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: There are ways to do this.
[10:38.080 --> 10:40.020]  [SPEAKER_17]: And then you go to the polling place.
[10:40.200 --> 10:41.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: You've decided on your candidates.
[10:41.680 --> 10:45.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: You stick that in the machine and it eats one of those copies.
[10:45.340 --> 10:47.420]  [SPEAKER_17]: You've got the other one to take home to prove you voted.
[10:47.580 --> 10:49.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: And also to prove to the person paying you off how you voted.
[10:50.000 --> 10:50.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, that too.
[10:50.580 --> 10:51.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's why it doesn't work.
[10:51.680 --> 10:52.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right.
[10:52.380 --> 10:52.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Red Hat.
[10:53.220 --> 11:09.160]  [SPEAKER_10]: Uh, well, one thing with, in terms of also having it, uh, you know, have the paper or punch, like Leith said, I think what he was saying was when you actually physically push the button, not only would it register with the electronic system, it would actually have something behind it that would go through,
[11:09.500 --> 11:11.800]  [SPEAKER_10]: say, a punch card or something to register the vote.
[11:12.000 --> 11:13.920]  [SPEAKER_10]: That way is sort of a redundancy.
[11:14.140 --> 11:21.220]  [SPEAKER_10]: And I guess then the only, you know, electro mechanical part of it would be to feed the, keep feeding the punch cards versus having it punch the same one.
[11:21.220 --> 11:23.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: For every system, I'm sure we can figure out a way to defeat it.
[11:23.340 --> 11:25.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: And I think we have the obligation to figure out how to defeat it.
[11:25.640 --> 11:26.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: I really do.
[11:26.020 --> 11:31.560]  [SPEAKER_09]: My point is that, you know, none of us in this room are smart enough to like right now on the spot, come up with a voting system that works.
[11:31.820 --> 11:34.040]  [SPEAKER_09]: However, there are people that are smart enough to do that.
[11:34.180 --> 11:36.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: And they seem not to work for Diebold, which is kind of strange.
[11:36.840 --> 11:37.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: And who are those people?
[11:37.660 --> 11:40.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know, there's people in the security community and elsewhere.
[11:41.680 --> 11:51.440]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know, if you put enough of them together to like punch holes in each other's arguments, not their punch cards, but their arguments, you know, then eventually you'll come up with something.
[11:52.080 --> 11:58.300]  [SPEAKER_09]: But the way it's being done now where they just people like come up with some ideas that are almost as bad as the ones that we're coming up with here.
[11:59.220 --> 12:02.400]  [SPEAKER_09]: And then they implement them because they work for Diebold.
[12:02.520 --> 12:02.980]  [SPEAKER_09]: And we don't.
[12:03.520 --> 12:04.800]  [SPEAKER_09]: That's where you get the problems.
[12:06.180 --> 12:09.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, well, moving on to what's going on in other countries.
[12:09.700 --> 12:11.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Some rather nasty things are happening.
[12:11.960 --> 12:15.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, there's plans in the UK for ID cards, mandatory ID cards.
[12:16.340 --> 12:20.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: All UK citizens could be forced to have some form of identity card by 2013.
[12:20.600 --> 12:22.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: Sounds kind of far away, but it really isn't.
[12:22.560 --> 12:23.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's 10 years from now.
[12:24.000 --> 12:31.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Up until 2007, 2008, all new passports and driving licenses will include details such as eye recognition, fingerprints, things like that.
[12:31.900 --> 12:37.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Most people will have one of the voluntary documents by 2013, and then it could be made compulsory.
[12:37.300 --> 12:38.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's how it works.
[12:38.560 --> 12:46.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: The scheme, according to this guy named David Blunkett, I got this from BBC, but they don't say who David Blunkett is.
[12:46.240 --> 12:48.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: I guess if you're in the UK, you know who David Blunkett is.
[12:48.600 --> 12:49.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: I certainly would.
[12:49.620 --> 12:55.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: But Mr. Blunkett says the scheme is vital for fighting benefit fraud, immigration abuse, and terrorism.
[12:56.760 --> 13:05.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: New Tory Home Affairs spokesman David Davis said the timescale for the introduction of the cards was a 10-year deferral forced by cabinet splits over the issue.
[13:05.400 --> 13:08.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: He also raised fears about the way personal information could be used by government.
[13:08.980 --> 13:14.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Under the plans, people wanting to use the NHS, claim benefits, or get a job would have to produce a valid card.
[13:16.160 --> 13:21.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Prime Minister Tony Blair, you've heard of him, said the public understood the need to contemplate such schemes.
[13:21.100 --> 13:24.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: He told reporters, it is important to realize that we live in a quite different world today.
[13:24.660 --> 13:26.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: there is a real security threat.
[13:26.520 --> 13:33.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: What I'd like to know is, how does having an ID card prevent someone from blowing themselves up in a bus, or, you know, anything else that they want?
[13:33.100 --> 13:33.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: It doesn't.
[13:33.940 --> 13:37.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: They always seem to know who they are anyway, so, you know...
[13:37.500 --> 13:37.860]  [SPEAKER_17]: Exactly.
[13:37.860 --> 13:51.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: I mean, you go up to the door where security checks ID, you hand them the ID that says, hi, I'm Saddam Hussein, and you walk in, and then you detonate the explosives that are around your chest and down your pants and whatever, and you kill 30, 40 people or more.
[13:51.360 --> 13:53.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and you don't do it anonymously.
[13:53.340 --> 13:53.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: No, exactly.
[13:56.160 --> 14:00.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: Anyway, basically, Mr. Blunkett goes on to say, an ID card is not a luxury or a whim, it is a necessity.
[14:00.820 --> 14:04.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: I know some people believe there is a sinister motive behind the cards.
[14:04.320 --> 14:05.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: Hey, you must listen to our show.
[14:06.420 --> 14:07.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, it's true, Bernie.
[14:07.340 --> 14:09.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: They will... that they will be part of a Big Brother state.
[14:10.660 --> 14:11.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: This is... this is wrong.
[14:12.000 --> 14:12.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: This is wrong.
[14:12.560 --> 14:18.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: Only basic information will be held on the ID card database, such as your name, address, birthday, and sex.
[14:18.300 --> 14:21.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: How do you like, you know, the government knowing your address at all times?
[14:21.360 --> 14:22.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: If you move, you have to tell them.
[14:22.940 --> 14:24.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's how it is in a bunch of countries.
[14:24.780 --> 14:26.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Gee, wouldn't that have been useful in Nazi Germany?
[14:26.800 --> 14:27.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: It will not, very much so.
[14:28.000 --> 14:32.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: It will not have details of religion, political beliefs, marital status, or your health records.
[14:32.480 --> 14:35.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: That will be on the health card, and your political beliefs, that will already be in their computers.
[14:36.820 --> 14:37.740]  [SPEAKER_09]: I have a question.
[14:38.520 --> 14:41.520]  [SPEAKER_09]: Are you allowed to smile on the picture for your ID card?
[14:41.520 --> 14:43.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, yes, the Canadian passport.
[14:43.480 --> 14:44.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: You're not allowed to smile on...
[14:44.520 --> 14:46.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't think you're allowed to smile on American ones, either.
[14:46.280 --> 14:54.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: If anyone out there is planning on getting a passport, give them a big, toothy grin and see if they say something, because I'd like to know if they raise the same objections.
[14:55.220 --> 14:57.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, for some reason, you're supposed to have a neutral expression on these ID cards.
[14:58.260 --> 14:59.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: I smile on my passport.
[15:00.040 --> 15:00.280]  [SPEAKER_10]: It's not...
[15:00.860 --> 15:01.680]  [SPEAKER_10]: Do you have it with you?
[15:01.820 --> 15:02.440]  [SPEAKER_10]: No, not...
[15:02.440 --> 15:04.820]  [SPEAKER_10]: Well, no, actually, I should, but I don't.
[15:04.940 --> 15:07.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: I had a slight grin on my face, but I don't think you could have, like, a big...
[15:07.620 --> 15:09.560]  [SPEAKER_10]: No, I have a big, toothy grin on mine.
[15:09.740 --> 15:10.020]  [SPEAKER_10]: Really?
[15:10.160 --> 15:12.500]  [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, you take the picture and you attach it to the application.
[15:12.500 --> 15:15.580]  [SPEAKER_10]: They're not going to send it back and say, I'm sorry, you're smiling.
[15:15.940 --> 15:17.440]  [SPEAKER_10]: Well, they do in Canada, apparently.
[15:18.240 --> 15:19.660]  [SPEAKER_03]: I have a smirk on mine.
[15:19.860 --> 15:21.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, yeah, I think you can get away with it.
[15:21.340 --> 15:22.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: It matches your natural expression.
[15:22.920 --> 15:29.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: Anyway, Mr. Blunkett goes on to say that independent research showed eight out of ten members of the public backed ID cards.
[15:30.020 --> 15:31.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's right, eight out of ten.
[15:31.240 --> 15:46.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: But his Lib Dem, they have newspeak over in England already, that means Liberal Democrat, opposite number, Mark Oten, suggested that 5,000 unfavorable consultation responses had not been counted as they had been submitted through an anti-ID card website.
[15:46.860 --> 15:49.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, they've got the election thing down over there, too, don't they?
[15:50.320 --> 15:53.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: The money earmarked for the ID card scheme would be better spent on more police.
[15:53.840 --> 15:54.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's great, you know.
[15:55.260 --> 15:58.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: One thing or another, they're just going to throw money at this.
[15:59.820 --> 16:01.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: So that's a pretty scary thing.
[16:01.760 --> 16:06.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: Some countries already have ID cards, among them Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal.
[16:06.220 --> 16:10.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: However, I believe in the Netherlands and France, they're voluntary.
[16:10.980 --> 16:11.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Germany, they're mandatory.
[16:12.040 --> 16:13.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: I know Spain, they have them, too, and they're mandatory.
[16:15.220 --> 16:20.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: But it's something that I think the whole EU could probably wind up doing if people close their eyes for a little bit.
[16:21.120 --> 16:23.500]  [SPEAKER_10]: Our whole driver's license system is linked.
[16:23.640 --> 16:27.280]  [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, each one has a barcode, and most states have ways to scan.
[16:27.280 --> 16:30.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: But you're not required to have a driver's license, unless you're driving a car.
[16:31.280 --> 16:36.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: But it's a pretty easy thing to simply extend that, to have the non-driver ID be required.
[16:36.680 --> 16:39.720]  [SPEAKER_10]: You are required to have it if you want to do many things, though.
[16:39.860 --> 16:47.160]  [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, it's pretty much the only form of identification that most places will accept to identify you.
[16:47.360 --> 16:53.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: But the thing is, when you're stopped on the street by a policeman and you don't have an ID, you're not breaking the law.
[16:53.280 --> 16:55.220]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, it depends on what you're stopped by.
[16:55.640 --> 16:56.340]  [SPEAKER_17]: Stopped for, rather.
[16:56.460 --> 16:57.800]  [SPEAKER_17]: Well, if you're stopped for driving a car, yeah.
[16:58.240 --> 17:01.600]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, no, if you're stopped for cause, in other words...
[17:01.600 --> 17:01.840]  [SPEAKER_17]: You can be vagrant.
[17:02.300 --> 17:02.940]  [SPEAKER_17]: No, no, no.
[17:03.040 --> 17:04.360]  [SPEAKER_17]: Vagrancy laws were thrown out.
[17:04.580 --> 17:15.740]  [SPEAKER_17]: But if you're stopped for cause, say you exactly or very closely match a suspect's description, all right, and you don't have ID, yeah, you'll be hauled down, booked, printed...
[17:15.740 --> 17:17.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: But you won't be charged with not having ID.
[17:17.900 --> 17:18.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: No.
[17:18.180 --> 17:23.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: You'll be suspected of something and maybe questioned and interrogated, but you won't be charged with a crime for not having the ID.
[17:24.120 --> 17:26.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: And that's a scary thing, when that becomes mandatory.
[17:26.600 --> 17:28.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: And then they can start asking questions.
[17:28.340 --> 17:31.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: I had somebody... I forget which of the countries I was in.
[17:31.980 --> 17:33.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: It was Russia, yeah, Russia.
[17:33.220 --> 17:36.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: A friend of mine in Moscow said that they have ID there.
[17:36.600 --> 17:37.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: In fact, that's required.
[17:37.640 --> 17:38.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: They didn't mention that in the article.
[17:39.060 --> 17:40.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: Everybody carries a passport.
[17:40.300 --> 17:43.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: And the passport is really a nice-looking sort of book thing that everybody has.
[17:43.460 --> 17:44.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: They take very good care of it.
[17:45.280 --> 17:46.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's actually an internal passport.
[17:46.840 --> 17:51.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: You need a passport to get around inside the country as well as another one to get outside the country.
[17:52.040 --> 17:59.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: But if, say, you were in St. Petersburg and you lived in Moscow, the police, when they look at your ID, will ask, why are you in St. Petersburg?
[17:59.340 --> 18:02.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: And actually give you a hard time for not having an address in St. Petersburg.
[18:02.960 --> 18:07.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: And there's all kinds of things that can be opened up as a result of that knowledge that they have about you.
[18:08.140 --> 18:08.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes, Leo.
[18:08.680 --> 18:15.540]  [SPEAKER_11]: Well, when I was in Moscow last year, I believe there's only one passport because I have a dual citizenship.
[18:16.000 --> 18:25.940]  [SPEAKER_11]: And when they stopped my brother and other people because my brother was sleepy and they stop anybody who looks drunk, they only ask for your normal passport.
[18:26.200 --> 18:28.320]  [SPEAKER_11]: There's no actual booklet or anything.
[18:28.480 --> 18:31.560]  [SPEAKER_11]: It's just your normal passport that you'd use to travel outside of the country.
[18:31.940 --> 18:39.860]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, I could be wrong because I was only there for about a week or two and only got stopped once, but they only asked for the main passport.
[18:40.180 --> 18:43.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, well, keep in mind that in Russia, you have to present the passport for everything.
[18:43.680 --> 18:45.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: You buy a train ticket to go someplace, they want your passport.
[18:46.280 --> 18:48.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, you're cashing a check or something, they want passports.
[18:49.280 --> 18:53.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: So maybe our Russian listeners can write in to us, tell us if they've mixed that into one.
[18:53.940 --> 18:56.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: I was told, though, there are two different ones, so who knows?
[18:56.960 --> 18:58.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: There might be an old system and a new system.
[18:58.800 --> 19:07.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, over to the more cheerful country of Singapore, Singapore, they've passed strict new legislation to protect the country's computer systems from attack.
[19:07.900 --> 19:12.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: The government has said the legislation was necessary because of the damage that computer hacking can cause.
[19:12.940 --> 19:20.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: The laws allow the monitoring of all computer activity and preemptive action, though an official said they would be used sparingly.
[19:20.660 --> 19:25.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Some members of parliament said the measures could be open to abuse with threats to individual liberty.
[19:25.780 --> 19:33.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: Singapore's senior member of state for law and home affairs, Ho Peng Ki, said the law aimed to fight cyberterrorism.
[19:33.620 --> 19:39.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: He said it would be used mainly against threats to national security and essential services like banking and finance.
[19:39.920 --> 19:41.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Instead... and listen, that's a great quote here.
[19:41.660 --> 19:53.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: Instead of a backpack of explosives, a terrorist can create just as much devastation by sending a carefully engineered packet of data into the computer systems which control the network for essential services, for example, the power stations.
[19:54.000 --> 20:05.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sorry, but somebody blowing up things, that's got to be different than somebody corrupting data, because you can always back up the data, you can always fix the computer system, you can't restore the lives that are lost from explosives.
[20:05.560 --> 20:22.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: It sounds suspiciously like the argument that prosecutors used in Kevin Mitnick's case to deny him his discovery evidence, which was data on his hard drive, provided to him in the encrypted format that he had, because they said it would be just like smuggling a gun into the prison.
[20:22.700 --> 20:30.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, when you get into people's heads that it's just like that, and it's just as bad, of course people are going to respond as if it were just as bad, and it's nothing like that.
[20:32.120 --> 20:34.280]  [SPEAKER_17]: How do you use a stream of data to kill somebody?
[20:34.360 --> 20:35.060]  [SPEAKER_17]: But anyway...
[20:35.060 --> 20:40.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, you can, if the people are stupid enough to have it hooked up to life support systems or something like that.
[20:40.120 --> 20:40.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Wait, wait, wait.
[20:40.520 --> 20:41.800]  [SPEAKER_00]: You kill them bit by bit.
[20:42.260 --> 20:42.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: Oh!
[20:43.120 --> 20:44.100]  [SPEAKER_09]: Very good, very good.
[20:44.180 --> 20:44.480]  [SPEAKER_09]: The U.S.
[20:44.780 --> 20:46.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: military kills people with streams of data all the time.
[20:46.620 --> 20:49.860]  [SPEAKER_09]: They hook the streams of data up to missiles and launch them, and so on.
[20:49.860 --> 20:50.620]  [SPEAKER_03]: What I mean is...
[20:50.620 --> 20:51.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: Minority weapons.
[20:51.480 --> 20:51.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: You haven't heard of it?
[20:51.740 --> 20:52.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: In a prison.
[20:52.900 --> 20:53.160]  [SPEAKER_09]: Mm-hmm.
[20:54.560 --> 21:02.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, I mean, I guess if hackers broke into a missile system and started launching missiles, I could see them being charged with, you know, terrorist acts or something like that.
[21:02.640 --> 21:05.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, but that's not the same thing as...
[21:05.000 --> 21:11.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, even if somebody causes a blackout, which is a real pain in the ass, it's not the same thing as blowing things up.
[21:11.240 --> 21:12.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, no, lives can be lost.
[21:12.500 --> 21:13.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm not defending that action.
[21:13.620 --> 21:14.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: No, no, no, no, but...
[21:14.340 --> 21:15.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Lives can be lost, that's true, but...
[21:15.540 --> 21:23.120]  [SPEAKER_15]: Sure, you could have accidents occur from traffic lights and all kinds of things where, you know, if one person dies, it's...
[21:23.120 --> 21:38.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: No, I'm not in any way negating the seriousness of the situation, but I'm saying if somebody goes in with the intention of killing people using, you know, a missile system or some other murderous weapon, I think it's very different than someone just stumbling into a system that really shouldn't even be accessible in the first place,
[21:38.980 --> 21:39.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: you know?
[21:39.240 --> 21:44.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: And that kind of thing will happen if the systems aren't kept secure or isolated from the whole rest of the net.
[21:44.420 --> 21:45.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: I think that's the real problem here.
[21:45.900 --> 21:51.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can have all of these preemptive actions that you want, but I don't think it's going to change that.
[21:51.400 --> 21:54.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's going to create this aura of fear.
[21:54.300 --> 22:03.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: But anyway, the new law allows police to take preemptive action to protect computer networks from unauthorized entry by hackers, only hackers, those found guilty of hacking or defacing a website.
[22:03.920 --> 22:05.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: See how they just slip these things in there?
[22:05.640 --> 22:11.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: How is defacing a website in any way a terrorist act, you know, or a life-threatening act?
[22:11.160 --> 22:11.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Defacing a website?
[22:12.140 --> 22:12.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: Good God.
[22:12.560 --> 22:16.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, it doesn't matter if it's your own website or Yahoo or CNN.
[22:16.940 --> 22:20.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's still a website that can be easily fixed and easily secured.
[22:20.860 --> 22:21.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know?
[22:21.740 --> 22:22.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: A website.
[22:22.380 --> 22:23.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm right here, right?
[22:23.340 --> 22:25.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, it's not something that's...
[22:25.440 --> 22:29.500]  [SPEAKER_15]: I've seen some websites that people own that they've defaced themselves, that are criminal.
[22:30.100 --> 22:41.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, anyway, those found guilty of hacking or defacing a website, which really could be anybody when you define what hacking is, could get up to three years in jail or be fined up to $5,800.
[22:42.160 --> 22:45.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: Seems like not the same thing as three years in jail, but...
[22:45.320 --> 22:46.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'll take the $5,000.
[22:46.560 --> 22:46.740]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[22:47.920 --> 22:52.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: The government has said the measures are necessary because of rising cases of successful hacking.
[22:52.800 --> 22:56.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: There were just 10 in 2000, but that had risen to 41 last year.
[22:57.040 --> 22:57.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: Of course, that's Singapore.
[22:58.680 --> 22:59.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's Singapore.
[22:59.580 --> 22:59.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: 41.
[23:00.320 --> 23:00.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: And they're complaining.
[23:00.800 --> 23:02.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: You mean gum is illegal there, too, I think.
[23:02.260 --> 23:03.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's true, and it's also a form of hacking.
[23:04.520 --> 23:12.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, Singapore has, uh, been tightening security since last year's Bali bomb attacks in neighboring Indonesia, as if that has anything to do with computer hacking.
[23:12.700 --> 23:17.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, some MPs said the new law is just another aspect of the city-state's authoritarian side.
[23:18.180 --> 23:25.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Chin Ted Young, chairman of the Government Parliamentary Committee for Home Affairs and Law, said it could become an instrument of oppression itself.
[23:25.240 --> 23:26.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: He was then summarily executed.
[23:26.960 --> 23:27.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, probably.
[23:28.740 --> 23:31.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, so that's, uh, that's a kind of a scary development.
[23:31.600 --> 23:35.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't know if we have any, uh, Singapore listeners, but, uh, maybe they could give us some updates on that.
[23:36.340 --> 23:37.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: These stretches of logic.
[23:37.840 --> 23:47.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, I'm amazed that more people aren't more incredulous about these, just, just huge strides in leaping logical barriers.
[23:47.600 --> 23:49.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: These things have nothing to do with each other.
[23:49.580 --> 23:51.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, it was, it was funny when it was on Geraldo, you know?
[23:51.700 --> 23:56.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: It was funny when it was, uh, you know, just part of the, the, the media's failure to get it right.
[23:56.840 --> 24:00.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: But now it's governments, powerful governments, that are implementing these things.
[24:00.320 --> 24:01.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: They can lock people up and kill them.
[24:02.240 --> 24:03.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, absolutely.
[24:03.900 --> 24:10.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: Authoritarian regimes could certainly say this is, uh, you know, a, a, a, a punishment worthy of the death sentence.
[24:10.780 --> 24:10.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Definitely.
[24:12.120 --> 24:14.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, let's go on to some, uh, listener mail.
[24:14.400 --> 24:15.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: We'll take some listener phone calls.
[24:15.500 --> 24:16.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: 2-1-2-2-0-9-2-9-2-9-0.
[24:17.300 --> 24:22.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, this person writes in, could you post the pictures of the national security truck that you were discussing on the October 1st show?
[24:22.140 --> 24:23.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, we have posted those pictures.
[24:23.920 --> 24:25.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: In fact, they are, uh, online right now.
[24:26.280 --> 24:31.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, Bernie, this, this, this, uh, uh, Homeland Security truck, uh, you want to quickly describe it?
[24:31.120 --> 24:31.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: It was in Philadelphia.
[24:32.000 --> 24:42.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, it's an amazing, uh, truck that, uh, we saw outside of a, uh, that, uh, both Safe Shifter and I saw, uh, a few months ago, parked outside the Philadelphia Convention, or Pennsylvania Convention Center in Philadelphia.
[24:43.260 --> 24:46.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: And, uh, it's, uh, about the size of, uh, half an 18-wheeler.
[24:47.220 --> 24:51.280]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it's got all manner of amazing communications equipment inside.
[24:51.900 --> 24:52.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: Uh, and outside.
[24:53.060 --> 25:01.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: Satellite dishes, uh, portable, uh, it's got a, uh, basically a, a portable cellular telephone system all in the, in the truck.
[25:01.400 --> 25:07.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: They can just hand out cell phones and pull this truck up to any place where there's no cell phone service and people can talk to each other.
[25:07.260 --> 25:14.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: They can make two-way radio systems from incompatible, uh, law enforcement agencies that, uh, all interoperate.
[25:14.740 --> 25:17.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: Um, all kinds of, uh, surveillance gear on them.
[25:17.940 --> 25:18.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's a pretty amazing thing.
[25:18.920 --> 25:22.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, uh, Safe Shifter took some good pictures both inside and outside of the vehicle.
[25:22.800 --> 25:26.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they're up on, uh, 2600.com.
[25:26.460 --> 25:29.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Just go to where the October 1st show is and you'll see a link, uh, right next to that.
[25:29.840 --> 25:30.800]  [SPEAKER_03]: Right, go to the old show archives.
[25:31.160 --> 25:34.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and they're, they're, uh, they're in both, uh, Photoshop format and, uh, JPEG format.
[25:35.020 --> 25:36.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Thanks very much to Jeff for, for doing that.
[25:36.520 --> 25:36.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: Good pictures.
[25:36.920 --> 25:37.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: My pleasure.
[25:38.040 --> 25:42.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right, uh, and, yeah, there, there are good pictures, uh, both of the inside and the outside of the van.
[25:42.480 --> 25:44.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, or truck, whatever you might want to call it.
[25:44.920 --> 25:46.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: You don't want to mess with this, uh, vehicle, whatever it is.
[25:47.580 --> 25:50.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: Um, here's an interesting story comes out of Australia.
[25:50.580 --> 25:59.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: Australian fisheries investigators wrapped up an illegal poaching operation after inserting microchips into fish then tracking them to the culprit's freezers.
[25:59.440 --> 26:01.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: This is sort of what we were talking about the last few weeks about RFID.
[26:02.480 --> 26:11.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: Victoria State Fisheries Minister Bob Cameron said the high-tech sting began when officers in his department found an illegal fishing net in a creek in the state's northwest.
[26:11.040 --> 26:18.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: The officers inserted microchips under the skin of the golden perch and Murray Cod caught in the net then returned them and waited for the poachers to turn up.
[26:18.840 --> 26:24.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh, the fish had disappeared a day later and when officers stopped the poachers' vehicles they could find no trace of the animals.
[26:24.240 --> 26:34.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: However, a subsequent search of their home uncovered fillets in the freezer complete with microchips still emitting signals to the fisheries' officers' tracking devices.
[26:34.080 --> 26:39.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, my question is, okay, they stopped these guys, they knew who they were, how come they couldn't find the fish then?
[26:40.480 --> 26:42.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: They didn't have the fish with them.
[26:42.520 --> 26:43.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's how they know those were the guys.
[26:44.840 --> 26:45.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: After the fact they knew?
[26:46.480 --> 26:48.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: They knew before they went to their houses that these were the guys.
[26:48.940 --> 26:50.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's not clear from the article.
[26:50.200 --> 26:50.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, then why did they go to their houses?
[26:50.940 --> 26:58.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: There's a stretch from, there's a gap somewhere in this article where how they got to search their houses without finding, without sending evidence of the fish first.
[26:58.100 --> 27:00.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: So I don't know, but maybe the Australian laws are different.
[27:00.340 --> 27:03.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: But the next sentence in there is pretty funny.
[27:03.280 --> 27:08.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: The officers involved in the operation have shown how effective the use of modern technology can be in the war against people who steal fish.
[27:11.040 --> 27:12.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, yeah, that may be so.
[27:12.600 --> 27:17.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, you know, it's also kind of worrying to me that, you know, this kind of technology can be used this way.
[27:17.040 --> 27:22.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: They could also go through your house and see who's bought a bong recently and say, well, maybe you're a drug user.
[27:22.420 --> 27:23.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Or any number of things.
[27:23.580 --> 27:25.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: Use your imagination how this could be abused.
[27:25.440 --> 27:27.400]  [SPEAKER_15]: There's another interesting point about this article.
[27:27.400 --> 27:32.160]  [SPEAKER_15]: If you're going to eat fish with the chips, I understand that the red sauce is better than the white sauce.
[27:32.300 --> 27:33.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: And that's another thing.
[27:33.180 --> 27:34.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, no, no, let's not go there.
[27:34.480 --> 27:36.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: You have the chips then inside you.
[27:36.640 --> 27:36.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yes, yes.
[27:36.980 --> 27:38.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: And then you can be tracked all over the place.
[27:38.800 --> 27:38.980]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yep.
[27:39.600 --> 27:40.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: Fish and chips.
[27:41.300 --> 27:42.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's good, yeah.
[27:43.320 --> 27:45.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'd like to know of any more stories like this.
[27:45.200 --> 27:49.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: But there's all kinds of ways, all kinds of ways I'm sure we can come up with where this would not be a good idea.
[27:49.740 --> 27:51.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, Bernie, you think this is good, what they did?
[27:51.820 --> 27:58.200]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, people seem to think these RFID things can be read from a satellite or from long distances.
[27:58.200 --> 28:00.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: They only work like a few feet away.
[28:00.900 --> 28:02.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're not long-range devices.
[28:02.680 --> 28:05.880]  [SPEAKER_03]: They can't work any reasonable distance.
[28:06.200 --> 28:20.440]  [SPEAKER_03]: So if they were outside of somebody's house, especially if they were inside a refrigerator, it's inconceivable to me that they could have detected the fish inside this house, the chips inside these fish, inside the house, from outside of the house.
[28:20.440 --> 28:21.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, fine, fine.
[28:21.480 --> 28:24.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: And these guys undoubtedly are guilty, you know, of stealing fish.
[28:25.000 --> 28:27.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: So they got what they deserved, I guess.
[28:27.620 --> 28:32.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: But let's look at this, you know, in a more imaginative light.
[28:32.220 --> 28:35.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: Like, let's say one of us one day were to smoke marijuana, okay?
[28:35.900 --> 28:38.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's a bit of a reach, I know, but let's say we did that.
[28:38.420 --> 28:45.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: And let's say somehow they managed to get these chips into that, you know, and you somehow were able to ingest these, you know, these chips into you.
[28:45.760 --> 28:49.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: And then you walk by, say, an airport security thing.
[28:49.600 --> 28:52.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, you have to go through this, you know, check your bags and all that kind of thing.
[28:52.760 --> 28:55.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, they also have a little sensor there that detects those particular chips.
[28:56.020 --> 29:04.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: And then you get pulled aside and questioned and interrogated and analyzed as if you're, you know, a drug smuggler of some sort because they have evidence that you have ingested marijuana.
[29:04.740 --> 29:05.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: You see how this thing can be abused?
[29:07.920 --> 29:08.860]  [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, is it on?
[29:09.000 --> 29:10.100]  [SPEAKER_10]: Oh, sorry, the headphones.
[29:10.200 --> 29:11.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: The microphones are all on.
[29:11.440 --> 29:11.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[29:11.640 --> 29:12.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: People don't worry about that.
[29:12.480 --> 29:12.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Go ahead.
[29:12.960 --> 29:19.700]  [SPEAKER_10]: Well, I mean, the thing is, to do that, the government or whoever is doing this would have to have access to said plant in the first place.
[29:19.880 --> 29:20.580]  [SPEAKER_10]: And if they had access to it...
[29:20.580 --> 29:21.320]  [SPEAKER_10]: And you think they don't?
[29:21.400 --> 29:21.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: They probably...
[29:22.440 --> 29:24.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, it's, yeah.
[29:24.480 --> 29:26.400]  [SPEAKER_10]: The idea is they're supposed to stop it at the source.
[29:26.460 --> 29:29.640]  [SPEAKER_10]: So if it's gotten to you, then they probably haven't had access to it along the way.
[29:29.860 --> 29:34.380]  [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, it could be used as some sort of high-tech sting of all marijuana users.
[29:34.380 --> 29:38.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: All they have to do is just, you know, do it to a small supply, you know?
[29:39.540 --> 29:39.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's true.
[29:39.960 --> 29:45.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: They can spray it like they sprayed Paraquat in the 70s, you know, which hurt a lot of people.
[29:45.440 --> 29:50.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, you know, I just see that as a way that it can really be abused and people's privacy can be...
[29:50.500 --> 29:53.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sure we can come up with a lot more scenarios, a lot more imaginative scenarios.
[29:53.760 --> 29:55.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: And if you have one, please email it to us.
[29:55.340 --> 29:56.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: We'd like to hear about it.
[29:57.800 --> 29:58.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: Let's see.
[29:58.300 --> 29:58.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: What else?
[29:59.320 --> 30:02.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Bernie, you sent us something about AT&T and the Do Not Call list.
[30:04.260 --> 30:05.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Apparently, they're being fined?
[30:06.760 --> 30:07.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, yeah.
[30:07.400 --> 30:09.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: This was a couple, three weeks ago, I think.
[30:10.240 --> 30:11.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: Was it...
[30:11.080 --> 30:14.480]  [SPEAKER_03]: How many millions of dollars the FCC has announced they're going to...
[30:14.480 --> 30:16.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, they're going to try to fine AT&T.
[30:16.620 --> 30:18.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: $780,000, actually.
[30:18.300 --> 30:20.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, which they make in about two seconds anyway.
[30:20.580 --> 30:23.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: So, apparently...
[30:23.380 --> 30:30.780]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it's really ironic because AT&T was awarded the contract by the FCC to administer the Do Not Call list.
[30:30.780 --> 30:44.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I remember saying on the show when we were discussing this weeks ago that it was ironic that AT&T, one of the biggest abusers of telemarketing, was administering the Do Not Call list.
[30:44.520 --> 30:49.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: And sure enough, here they are abusing callers who asked not to be called, according to the FCC.
[30:50.460 --> 30:55.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: Now, of course, AT&T is going to fight this in court, and who knows how many years it'll drag out.
[30:55.180 --> 31:00.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: But it just goes to show what you were saying, Emmanuel, that this list will get out, and it will be abused.
[31:00.920 --> 31:06.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it's a ready-made list of live people who are good targets for telemarketing.
[31:07.440 --> 31:08.140]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's odd.
[31:09.500 --> 31:13.220]  [SPEAKER_15]: How would they be a good target if you don't want to get the call?
[31:14.400 --> 31:16.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: Because you know they're live people.
[31:16.920 --> 31:18.980]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, I understand that part of it.
[31:19.060 --> 31:25.400]  [SPEAKER_15]: But if you already know that these people went through the trouble to register because they don't want to be bothered, I know myself.
[31:25.560 --> 31:26.760]  [SPEAKER_15]: I mean, I have a bad thing.
[31:26.840 --> 31:30.120]  [SPEAKER_15]: If you're going to call me on the phone with an offer, it's obviously not a good thing.
[31:31.100 --> 31:46.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: But the normal way these lists are gotten, there's a high failure rate, and there's a lot of errors in mailing lists and the methods that are used to call people with sequential dialing or whatever methods that are used.
[31:46.460 --> 31:49.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: So there's a high failure rate in reaching actual live people.
[31:49.740 --> 31:52.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: But this is not just a list of phone numbers.
[31:52.620 --> 32:02.160]  [SPEAKER_03]: This is a list of people's names, their email address, if you register online, and the phone number all linked together in one database.
[32:02.200 --> 32:04.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's a goldmine for telemarketers.
[32:04.720 --> 32:06.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, but the telemarketers don't get that.
[32:06.120 --> 32:10.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: What the telemarketers get, I know because I got this, is just a list of the phone numbers.
[32:10.660 --> 32:12.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: And in fact, you don't even have to be a telemarketer to do this.
[32:12.820 --> 32:20.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: Go to the telemarketing section of the doonightcall.gov site, and you can just download those numbers.
[32:20.540 --> 32:26.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: You have to pay a fee if it's over a certain amount, but you don't have to pay a fee if it's under a certain amount, and it's pretty easy to get.
[32:26.520 --> 32:27.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: That was the wad of paper you hit me with.
[32:27.780 --> 32:29.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: That was the wad of paper I smacked you with a few weeks ago.
[32:29.720 --> 32:31.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and I couldn't believe it.
[32:31.160 --> 32:32.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't know if it's still as easy.
[32:32.380 --> 32:33.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: Maybe people can let us know.
[32:34.480 --> 32:38.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: But yeah, I mean, a list of people that don't want to be called, that's a good list to have.
[32:38.080 --> 32:39.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: You don't have their names, you don't have their email addresses.
[32:39.480 --> 32:40.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's in there somewhere.
[32:40.380 --> 32:45.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: I guess the people running doonightcall.gov have that, but still having that list of numbers.
[32:45.400 --> 32:48.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: I mean, imagine if that got out, and it doesn't seem like it's too difficult.
[32:48.860 --> 32:55.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: We have listener mail concerning this, concerning telemarketing, because there's always a way around this kind of thing.
[32:55.120 --> 33:01.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can have the call emanate from Canada or even overseas, and they're not covered by that.
[33:02.080 --> 33:04.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: How can you prosecute somebody in another country?
[33:04.200 --> 33:08.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: And it will show up as unavailable on your caller ID, so you won't know where they're calling from.
[33:08.780 --> 33:13.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: This person said, I recently received a call from a telemarketer, and my caller ID reported the number as all zeros.
[33:14.380 --> 33:18.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: I know it was a telemarketer because the call was a recorded message that my voicemail picked up.
[33:18.400 --> 33:20.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: My voicemail also logged the number as zeros.
[33:21.180 --> 33:25.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: I've seen private or unknown many times if the caller ID isn't available, but never zeros.
[33:25.920 --> 33:26.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Have you guys ever heard of this?
[33:26.900 --> 33:28.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: If so, do you know how they do it?
[33:28.660 --> 33:31.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: If zeros can be spoofed, then it seems like the same could be done with any number.
[33:32.420 --> 33:32.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: Signs, Scott.
[33:33.100 --> 33:33.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, Scott, yes.
[33:33.900 --> 33:39.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: In fact, we had a panel at last year's conference, H2K2, where we demonstrated spoofing caller ID.
[33:39.620 --> 33:41.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's very easy to do.
[33:41.140 --> 33:46.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: It really is, especially if you own your own PBX, your own phone system in a small business.
[33:46.540 --> 33:47.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can program that.
[33:47.920 --> 33:51.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can even do it on an ISDN line to send whatever number you want.
[33:51.840 --> 33:53.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's really a trivial thing.
[33:53.840 --> 33:58.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: I've gotten all kinds of wacky calls from people that are playing around with these things with all kinds of different nonsensical numbers.
[33:58.960 --> 34:01.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: So that's one way to certainly get around it.
[34:01.440 --> 34:08.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: But I guess probably the best way to catch these people, since they want you to buy something, is say that you're interested in buying it and find out who they are.
[34:08.640 --> 34:09.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: Then you got them, you know?
[34:10.020 --> 34:10.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Then you...
[34:10.500 --> 34:11.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: It doesn't matter if they send a fake number.
[34:11.920 --> 34:16.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: If you're interested in what they're selling, you can probably figure out who they are from that.
[34:16.620 --> 34:19.820]  [SPEAKER_03]: Once you express an interest in doing business with them, they're allowed to contact you.
[34:19.920 --> 34:21.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: But they already have contacted you.
[34:21.360 --> 34:23.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: You see, the offense occurred before that.
[34:23.220 --> 34:25.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: So it's a chicken or the egg situation.
[34:25.500 --> 34:26.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Sort of, yeah.
[34:26.620 --> 34:27.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: So it's...
[34:27.140 --> 34:28.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: I just ask them to hold on.
[34:28.420 --> 34:29.820]  [SPEAKER_03]: You could wind up with egg on your face.
[34:30.620 --> 34:31.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right, enough of that, that.
[34:32.520 --> 34:33.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, and this person writes in.
[34:33.900 --> 34:34.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: We'll take some phone calls now.
[34:34.660 --> 34:35.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: 212-209-2900.
[34:36.860 --> 34:39.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Off the hook, I don't know if you've seen any recent broadcast of War Games.
[34:40.400 --> 34:41.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Try to see it every time I can.
[34:42.020 --> 34:43.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: But about a month ago, I saw it on UPN.
[34:43.880 --> 34:45.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: You probably saw it on a local channel.
[34:45.140 --> 34:46.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't think the whole UPN network broadcast it.
[34:46.640 --> 34:47.520]  [SPEAKER_10]: It was on UPN.
[34:47.620 --> 34:49.300]  [SPEAKER_10]: I did happen to flip through that.
[34:49.380 --> 34:51.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, it was on Channel 9, but I don't think the whole UPN...
[34:51.700 --> 34:53.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't think UPN even has a movie of the week or something like that.
[34:54.180 --> 34:57.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: Anyway, they deleted the scene where he freaks the payphone with a pop-top.
[34:57.700 --> 34:58.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Pretty weird, don't you think?
[34:58.780 --> 35:00.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, can you verify that?
[35:00.400 --> 35:01.100]  [SPEAKER_10]: I didn't watch it.
[35:01.180 --> 35:02.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: I just passed by it.
[35:02.500 --> 35:05.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, that's why I don't watch things on commercial TV, because they're always editing and cutting things.
[35:06.320 --> 35:10.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: So I don't think they cut that scene for any reason other than to sell more commercials.
[35:11.440 --> 35:15.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm not sure if that's a particularly controversial thing these days, especially since you can't even do it anymore.
[35:15.560 --> 35:19.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: That particular method worked on phones where you didn't get a dial tone before you picked it up.
[35:19.420 --> 35:20.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, payphone.
[35:20.080 --> 35:27.800]  [SPEAKER_03]: But the person who does the chopping of the tape or video probably wasn't aware that you can't do that anymore.
[35:27.980 --> 35:32.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: And maybe they were afraid that, oh, we can't let this knowledge into the hands of kids everywhere.
[35:32.520 --> 35:33.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, that might be true.
[35:33.880 --> 35:34.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: That might be true.
[35:35.040 --> 35:35.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: That'd be my vote.
[35:36.160 --> 35:41.200]  [SPEAKER_03]: I mean, actually, it was a pretty good scene depicting how that could be done back in the day.
[35:41.740 --> 35:42.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: It was an accurate scene.
[35:42.880 --> 35:43.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: It was refreshing to see that.
[35:44.020 --> 35:51.160]  [SPEAKER_03]: I remember when the movie first came out, as soon as a kid approached the phone booth, I had an idea, or he was looking on the ground for something, I knew what he was going to do.
[35:51.420 --> 35:55.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, but you know, that particular action that he did, as far as from the most controversial thing he did in the film...
[35:55.920 --> 35:56.680]  [SPEAKER_03]: Oh, hardly, yeah.
[35:56.840 --> 35:59.240]  [SPEAKER_03]: But, I mean, it's just sometimes refreshing.
[35:59.500 --> 36:07.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's so rare to see an actual technologically accurate representation of hacking or freaking in a major motion picture that it was refreshing.
[36:07.920 --> 36:08.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[36:08.260 --> 36:08.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, I know...
[36:08.840 --> 36:09.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: I can tell you one thing.
[36:09.640 --> 36:10.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: I can tell you one thing.
[36:10.280 --> 36:17.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: From the movie Hackers, which I was a consultant on, they were going to use real red box tones during the closing credits.
[36:17.560 --> 36:19.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: That was one of the things I was pushing for.
[36:19.460 --> 36:21.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: And somebody in the studio killed that.
[36:21.680 --> 36:24.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: Someone killed that idea that they wouldn't use real red box tones.
[36:24.820 --> 36:26.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: Because, you know, it was a simple thing.
[36:26.300 --> 36:28.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Play these tones, and it's like a quarter.
[36:28.240 --> 36:29.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: They just have to hear those tones in the payphone.
[36:30.080 --> 36:33.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: It was that simple, that stupid a system that they operated back then.
[36:33.340 --> 36:37.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: And that didn't make it past whatever sensors are...
[36:37.520 --> 36:39.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: I remember they replaced them with Touch-Tones.
[36:39.460 --> 36:41.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, something really stupid that, of course, wouldn't work.
[36:41.820 --> 36:43.680]  [SPEAKER_10]: There was actually some... a bit of...
[36:43.680 --> 36:51.340]  [SPEAKER_10]: It wasn't really an accurate movie, but in The Matrix Revolutions, Nmap did appear while they were attempting to shut down the power grid.
[36:51.700 --> 36:52.640]  [SPEAKER_10]: It shows up.
[36:52.880 --> 36:55.960]  [SPEAKER_10]: They used Secure Shell and Nmap in that scene, if you look carefully.
[36:57.160 --> 36:58.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, I amazed how many people...
[36:58.560 --> 36:59.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: That was the second film, right?
[36:59.760 --> 37:00.100]  [SPEAKER_10]: Yeah.
[37:00.240 --> 37:01.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: The third film was terrible.
[37:01.720 --> 37:03.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, I haven't seen it yet, so don't...
[37:03.140 --> 37:03.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Don't ruin it for me.
[37:03.940 --> 37:06.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: But so many people caught that SSH exploit.
[37:07.080 --> 37:08.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: How long was it on the screen for?
[37:08.920 --> 37:09.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, they take...
[37:09.980 --> 37:10.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: Not very long.
[37:10.960 --> 37:11.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: But people caught it.
[37:11.780 --> 37:12.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's amazing.
[37:13.260 --> 37:14.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: What else?
[37:14.480 --> 37:16.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: You hear about the phone where you can...
[37:16.300 --> 37:19.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can put your forefinger in your ear.
[37:19.280 --> 37:19.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, yes.
[37:19.740 --> 37:20.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's interesting.
[37:21.200 --> 37:29.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Japan's largest mobile telecom company, NTT Docomo, is developing a wearable mobile phone that uses the human body to make calls.
[37:30.100 --> 37:31.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's called Finger Whisper.
[37:31.880 --> 37:33.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: The device is built...
[37:33.840 --> 37:34.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm not making this up.
[37:34.580 --> 37:38.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: The device is built into a narrow strap worn on the wrist like a watch.
[37:38.640 --> 37:39.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: To answer a ringing...
[37:39.640 --> 37:40.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: It sounds obscene.
[37:40.460 --> 37:50.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, to answer a ringing Finger Whisper phone or to initiate and end phone calls, the user simply touches their forefinger to their thumb and then puts their forefinger into their ear.
[37:52.140 --> 37:54.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: So if you've seen people walking around like that...
[37:55.740 --> 37:58.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, that's an interesting symbol there.
[37:59.580 --> 38:08.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: Electronics in the wristband convert sound waves into vibrations which are carried through the bones of the hand to the ear so that the Finger Whisper user can hear the other caller.
[38:09.060 --> 38:19.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: With bones transmitting sound vibrations better than air, the sound quality is expected to surpass a conventional cell phone and should easily drown out noisy surroundings.
[38:19.640 --> 38:21.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: Do you think this is going to be outlawed in cars?
[38:22.700 --> 38:24.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: You must use a detachable hand to...
[38:24.780 --> 38:26.660]  [SPEAKER_15]: I just... I worry about, you know...
[38:26.660 --> 38:27.660]  [SPEAKER_15]: Here, they want to talk to you.
[38:28.740 --> 38:29.540]  [SPEAKER_15]: Oh my goodness.
[38:29.680 --> 38:30.440]  [SPEAKER_15]: How is that going to look?
[38:31.080 --> 38:32.080]  [SPEAKER_11]: How do you talk?
[38:32.240 --> 38:32.860]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's for you.
[38:33.220 --> 38:33.740]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, yeah.
[38:34.360 --> 38:35.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you put your finger in your ear...
[38:35.540 --> 38:37.280]  [SPEAKER_03]: It could probably be in other parts of the body as well.
[38:37.480 --> 38:44.340]  [SPEAKER_10]: If you put your finger in your ear, your wrist is somewhat near your mouth so that you could theoretically speak into your wrist where the...
[38:44.340 --> 38:46.780]  [SPEAKER_11]: But that would destroy all the extra sound quality.
[38:46.920 --> 38:48.760]  [SPEAKER_11]: I mean, all the background noise.
[38:48.800 --> 38:51.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, one of us is going to have to go over to Japan and play with these things.
[38:51.620 --> 38:52.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: It sounds pretty interesting.
[38:53.020 --> 38:55.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: You have to hold your finger in the ear the whole time.
[38:55.980 --> 38:57.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: I imagine so, if you want to hear the person.
[38:58.160 --> 38:58.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: Otherwise, how else?
[38:59.200 --> 39:02.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: So people are going to be walking around Japan with their finger in their ear.
[39:02.100 --> 39:04.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, they already are, except they have phones attached to them.
[39:05.180 --> 39:07.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Every other person around here is doing that now.
[39:08.180 --> 39:10.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, Bernie, when does...
[39:10.080 --> 39:12.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: When is the cutover for portability for cell phones?
[39:12.500 --> 39:13.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's coming up pretty soon, isn't it?
[39:13.540 --> 39:13.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: 24th.
[39:13.900 --> 39:14.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: November 24th.
[39:15.080 --> 39:33.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: And this week, the FCC announced that wired carriers, like your local exchange carrier, like Verizon or whoever where you are, must now provide portability of their numbers to wireless carriers, if you decide.
[39:33.280 --> 39:45.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: So if you have a home phone line, that number can be transferred to your mobile phone after November 24th, unless the local exchange carrier can make a good case to the FCC that it's not technically feasible.
[39:45.200 --> 39:47.300]  [SPEAKER_03]: So that's going to be interesting to see how they play that game.
[39:47.420 --> 39:51.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: So this means that the next show we do, which will be in two weeks, that will be after number portability.
[39:52.780 --> 40:02.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: And it's going to be interesting to see how that actually plays out because a lot of people, when they switch their carriers, they want to keep their phone numbers, their cellular phone numbers, and change carriers.
[40:02.700 --> 40:04.780]  [SPEAKER_14]: And now it can be extended to home phones as well.
[40:05.420 --> 40:10.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: But a lot of times, people who are already using cell phones We want people to use those same cell phones anymore.
[40:10.440 --> 40:16.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: And I've actually seen concern expressed over what's going to happen in the landfills when all these phones start to show up in them.
[40:16.360 --> 40:20.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Useless phones that have equipment inside them that they don't want to wind up in landfills.
[40:22.040 --> 40:23.200]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like exploding batteries.
[40:23.420 --> 40:24.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Things like that, you know.
[40:24.580 --> 40:26.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: There's all kinds of hazardous things that are inside your phone.
[40:26.600 --> 40:26.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: Like landmines.
[40:27.300 --> 40:27.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: Watch where you step.
[40:28.140 --> 40:28.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[40:28.580 --> 40:30.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: So I'm wondering, maybe we should start collecting all these phones.
[40:30.760 --> 40:34.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: Maybe people can send them to us instead and we can, you know, hand them out.
[40:34.080 --> 40:34.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: Don't walk with them, exactly.
[40:34.780 --> 40:37.160]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, hand them out to the indigent or something.
[40:37.160 --> 40:38.660]  [SPEAKER_09]: So that they can throw them in the landfill?
[40:38.840 --> 40:39.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't know.
[40:39.680 --> 40:41.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm sure there's a useful...
[40:41.180 --> 40:55.100]  [SPEAKER_03]: People forget, the FCC has required, and they haven't lifted this requiring yet, that all wireless carriers must switch 911 calls, or carry 911 calls, even if the phone has not been activated.
[40:55.760 --> 40:58.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: So everybody can have a phone on them that can call 911?
[40:58.920 --> 40:59.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: Exactly.
[40:59.920 --> 41:00.380]  [SPEAKER_03]: That would be kind of nice.
[41:00.380 --> 41:03.600]  [SPEAKER_09]: Doesn't everyone who wants this service already got a phone that can do anything that can call 911?
[41:03.600 --> 41:08.220]  [SPEAKER_03]: You can get one of these used phones, not register it with any, with the carrier.
[41:08.400 --> 41:12.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: You don't have to pay a dime, and you can call 911 whenever you feel like it.
[41:12.640 --> 41:13.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, it could be a problem.
[41:14.040 --> 41:16.760]  [SPEAKER_03]: But a lot of people keep phones only for emergencies.
[41:17.100 --> 41:18.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, why pay anybody?
[41:18.880 --> 41:19.560]  [SPEAKER_03]: Just have a...
[41:19.560 --> 41:24.140]  [SPEAKER_03]: So you can use like a 10-year-old bag phone, you know, and call 911.
[41:24.160 --> 41:29.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: In fact, they're better because they're 3 watts, and they have far more range on the analog system than any of these digital phones.
[41:29.020 --> 41:34.960]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I know several people, I've told them, hey, just keep a big phone in your car, and for emergencies, you can still call 911.
[41:35.360 --> 41:36.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: And they do it, and it works.
[41:38.300 --> 41:50.080]  [SPEAKER_15]: There are organizations, I know the Battered Women's Services, are accepting these phones and getting the charges and things, and giving them to women that are in situations where they might need to call 911.
[41:50.240 --> 41:50.400]  [SPEAKER_15]: Okay.
[41:50.400 --> 41:52.060]  [SPEAKER_15]: So they do have a purpose and a use.
[41:52.180 --> 41:53.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: So don't throw out that old cell phone there.
[41:53.700 --> 41:53.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's right.
[41:53.880 --> 41:55.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: There's probably somebody who needs it.
[41:56.360 --> 41:56.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: Donate it.
[41:56.760 --> 41:58.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: I wonder how many people are thinking of changing.
[41:58.400 --> 42:01.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: I know I'm thinking of changing, but I have to wait until my contract runs out with Sprint.
[42:02.220 --> 42:05.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: And believe me, the day it does, the day it does, I'm out of there, and I'm over to someplace else.
[42:05.860 --> 42:08.720]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, you can get out of it if you pay a $150 penalty.
[42:08.940 --> 42:09.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Which I'm not going to do.
[42:10.180 --> 42:10.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: No.
[42:10.520 --> 42:11.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm not going to do that.
[42:11.580 --> 42:14.740]  [SPEAKER_03]: Although it may even be worth paying $150 to get rid of Sprint PCS.
[42:15.300 --> 42:15.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: I don't know.
[42:16.020 --> 42:17.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's a real quandary there.
[42:17.500 --> 42:18.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: A lot of...
[42:18.280 --> 42:27.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: Sprint and a lot of other carriers are doing their darndest to lock people into long-term contracts now as number portability approaches.
[42:27.360 --> 42:27.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Mm-hmm.
[42:27.680 --> 42:31.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, so be very careful of that because, you know, Sprint is one of the companies...
[42:31.500 --> 42:33.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can't even change a phone without them charging you a fee.
[42:33.640 --> 42:34.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's one of the reasons I'm leaving them.
[42:35.160 --> 42:36.140]  [SPEAKER_03]: Ah, I get around that.
[42:36.320 --> 42:37.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: How do you get around that?
[42:37.500 --> 42:41.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: If you pay their $4 a month insurance fee.
[42:41.360 --> 42:42.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, yeah.
[42:42.220 --> 42:43.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: They told me about that.
[42:43.120 --> 42:44.140]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, I know it's a rip-off, but...
[42:44.140 --> 42:44.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's extortion.
[42:44.700 --> 42:45.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's what it is.
[42:45.680 --> 42:46.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: It is extortion.
[42:46.360 --> 42:48.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: However, I frequently change my ESNs.
[42:48.740 --> 42:54.180]  [SPEAKER_03]: I have several phones, and from time to time, I switch to different phones on my same account.
[42:54.680 --> 42:57.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: And I can do that without ever being charged because I pay $4 a month.
[42:58.020 --> 42:59.040]  [SPEAKER_03]: So I actually come out of here...
[42:59.040 --> 43:00.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's a protection racket.
[43:00.160 --> 43:03.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: They sell you phones that are guaranteed to break down in a short amount of time.
[43:04.280 --> 43:10.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: And if you don't pay them their $4 a month, you have to not only pay for a new phone, but pay them a fee to connect that new phone.
[43:10.580 --> 43:12.580]  [SPEAKER_03]: Their activation fee is $36.
[43:13.140 --> 43:14.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, it went up $1.
[43:14.520 --> 43:14.800]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[43:15.000 --> 43:16.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: $35 when I did the last.
[43:16.200 --> 43:16.920]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah, that was $36.
[43:17.020 --> 43:17.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: I didn't pay that fee.
[43:18.380 --> 43:19.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: You didn't pay the fee?
[43:19.280 --> 43:19.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: How did you get around it?
[43:20.300 --> 43:21.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: I didn't pay it.
[43:21.180 --> 43:22.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: They didn't ask me for it.
[43:22.640 --> 43:23.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, I don't know.
[43:23.020 --> 43:24.300]  [SPEAKER_15]: You have ways of slipping through the cracks.
[43:24.320 --> 43:24.680]  [SPEAKER_15]: I don't know.
[43:25.420 --> 43:32.460]  [SPEAKER_15]: I was with Bernie one night when we were driving, I think, out to Ohio or something, and he was actually on the phone telling them, yeah, I'm going to switch this.
[43:32.460 --> 43:35.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: And it was fun to watch.
[43:35.280 --> 43:38.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: You see, I still prefer the GSM system where you just take your little, you know...
[43:38.940 --> 43:39.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: Chip out.
[43:39.480 --> 43:43.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: Your little, yeah, card, and you just put it in another phone and it works.
[43:43.900 --> 43:44.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know?
[43:44.440 --> 43:45.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: They don't have to know what phone you're using.
[43:47.000 --> 43:47.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: So, I don't know.
[43:48.140 --> 43:49.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'd like to hear feedback from people on that.
[43:49.740 --> 43:51.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: 212-209-2900 is our phone number.
[43:51.860 --> 43:53.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: Let's see who's out there.
[43:54.660 --> 43:55.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: Want to pick a number, Jeff?
[43:56.380 --> 43:57.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, sure, here.
[43:57.220 --> 43:57.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right, go ahead.
[43:58.660 --> 43:59.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: And good evening.
[43:59.300 --> 43:59.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: You're on the air.
[44:00.260 --> 44:01.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: It wasn't a very good choice, was it?
[44:02.240 --> 44:03.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right, you want to try it one more time?
[44:03.440 --> 44:03.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right.
[44:04.980 --> 44:05.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: And good evening, you're on the air.
[44:06.280 --> 44:08.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: Cindy, at the Reservation Center.
[44:08.240 --> 44:09.120]  [SPEAKER_03]: That wasn't a very good day.
[44:09.260 --> 44:11.600]  [SPEAKER_03]: Congratulations, you've been invited to receive a holiday promotion.
[44:13.720 --> 44:14.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: I'm batting a thousand.
[44:15.100 --> 44:16.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: Good evening, you're on the air.
[44:16.380 --> 44:17.040]  [SPEAKER_19]: Hi, good evening.
[44:17.960 --> 44:20.820]  [SPEAKER_19]: I'm Emmanuel, Danny, Dave's brother from PC.
[44:21.160 --> 44:22.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: Hey, PC show, which comes on afterwards.
[44:23.100 --> 44:23.460]  [SPEAKER_19]: You got it.
[44:23.580 --> 44:24.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: The personal computer show.
[44:24.680 --> 44:42.060]  [SPEAKER_19]: Anyway, that bit about cell phones and 911, mostly correct, and of course it's a good idea, but one minor issue, or maybe not so minor, while the phone will make 911 calls, it has to be on a network that, or physically, can work with the phone.
[44:42.260 --> 44:56.860]  [SPEAKER_19]: So, for example, if you have a 1900 megahertz GSM phone, and you're in, I don't know, East Cupcakeville that has Nextel and has Sprint and a few other things, your phone will physically not work.
[44:56.860 --> 44:57.560]  [SPEAKER_19]: True.
[44:57.860 --> 45:00.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: If you're in the subway, of course, it's not going to work either, but...
[45:00.140 --> 45:00.900]  [SPEAKER_19]: Well, we're working on that.
[45:01.000 --> 45:03.100]  [SPEAKER_19]: We hope to have that going soon.
[45:03.300 --> 45:06.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Is there actually plans to have the phones work inside the subway?
[45:06.120 --> 45:11.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: Because in Berlin, you can travel everywhere in the subway and have a five-wire signal all the time.
[45:11.260 --> 45:21.840]  [SPEAKER_19]: They're looking at doing a partial setup in that some of the stations will be lit, which will give you coverage in the station itself and, you know, some amount into the tunnel.
[45:22.260 --> 45:27.420]  [SPEAKER_19]: But the full tunnel length, it'll come after the next presidential election.
[45:28.340 --> 45:33.620]  [SPEAKER_09]: I'm actually kind of glad that I don't have to be on the subway with people, like, yammering into their cell phone.
[45:33.780 --> 45:34.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[45:34.100 --> 45:37.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, the way people talk on cellular phones in this country is very different from in other countries.
[45:37.820 --> 45:41.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: In Germany, when I was on the subway and people were on their phones, they were talking quietly.
[45:41.440 --> 45:42.900]  [SPEAKER_14]: Of course, the trains are quiet there, too.
[45:43.020 --> 45:44.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: But you couldn't tell they were on the cell phone.
[45:44.880 --> 45:46.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Here, you can hear people a block away on their cell phones.
[45:51.840 --> 45:54.640]  [SPEAKER_19]: Where the metro is rubber-tired and so is quieter.
[45:55.420 --> 45:59.120]  [SPEAKER_19]: And also, they do have more cellular service inside of it.
[45:59.400 --> 46:01.180]  [SPEAKER_19]: Just, you know, take a look.
[46:01.340 --> 46:03.200]  [SPEAKER_19]: Or Quebec, Montreal.
[46:03.720 --> 46:04.080]  [SPEAKER_19]: Okay.
[46:04.160 --> 46:05.460]  [SPEAKER_19]: It might be interesting to see what's going on there.
[46:05.700 --> 46:06.440]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, we'll check into it.
[46:06.480 --> 46:06.600]  [SPEAKER_15]: All right.
[46:06.680 --> 46:06.920]  [SPEAKER_15]: Take care.
[46:07.100 --> 46:07.300]  [SPEAKER_15]: Thanks.
[46:08.020 --> 46:13.020]  [SPEAKER_15]: There's another thing that, as you travel into the tunnel, they tell you, Verizon, that they're wired in there.
[46:13.160 --> 46:14.800]  [SPEAKER_15]: My calls drop out every time.
[46:15.000 --> 46:15.860]  [SPEAKER_15]: I'm on Verizon.
[46:15.900 --> 46:17.320]  [SPEAKER_15]: I can't keep a call in the tunnel.
[46:17.700 --> 46:18.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Really?
[46:18.240 --> 46:18.380]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah.
[46:18.440 --> 46:19.340]  [SPEAKER_14]: You must be doing something wrong.
[46:19.680 --> 46:20.660]  [SPEAKER_15]: Yeah, I'm using the phone.
[46:21.500 --> 46:22.640]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, you want to pick another one?
[46:22.700 --> 46:27.340]  [SPEAKER_03]: The first tunnel I saw with cellular service is the Lehigh Tunnel on the Pennsylvania Turnpike.
[46:27.540 --> 46:32.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: Because for Allentown, when you go under that mountain, this was back in the 80s.
[46:32.220 --> 46:36.940]  [SPEAKER_03]: You could actually use your analog amps cell phone in that tunnel.
[46:37.060 --> 46:39.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: It was one of the first tunnels I know of that actually implemented that.
[46:40.000 --> 46:41.080]  [SPEAKER_03]: And it worked pretty well.
[46:41.080 --> 46:43.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: I went clear through the Midtown Tunnel once on my sprint phone.
[46:43.640 --> 46:49.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: And it wasn't until I got halfway to Suffolk County that I realized that, hey, I didn't get disconnected when I was talking to somebody in the tunnel there.
[46:49.940 --> 46:50.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: That only happened once.
[46:51.000 --> 46:51.580]  [SPEAKER_05]: It's called micro-cells.
[46:51.720 --> 46:51.980]  [SPEAKER_14]: Uh-huh.
[46:52.080 --> 46:55.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: But it's not there anymore because it used to work, but it didn't work after that.
[46:55.920 --> 47:03.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: One thing that does work in the tunnels, though, is the FM and AM spectrum, where you can get every radio station all the way through the tunnels.
[47:03.360 --> 47:07.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: But not the stations that aren't, I guess, registered somewhere.
[47:07.820 --> 47:11.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: Because there was a pirate station I was listening to, I think at 91.9.
[47:11.240 --> 47:14.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: And they faded right away as soon as I got into the tunnel.
[47:14.720 --> 47:17.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: And they were just as powerful as any other signal that was out there.
[47:17.340 --> 47:21.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: But something prevented them from being carried into the tunnel as well.
[47:21.240 --> 47:23.540]  [SPEAKER_10]: Perhaps there are repeaters in the tunnel to repeat the...
[47:23.540 --> 47:26.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: Which means they have to have a repeater for every signal.
[47:26.500 --> 47:28.260]  [SPEAKER_03]: It's a leaky coax system.
[47:28.400 --> 47:38.400]  [SPEAKER_03]: They have a coaxial hard line cable running through the tunnel that basically picks up the FM spectrum outside and retransmits it inside the tunnel.
[47:39.040 --> 47:40.840]  [SPEAKER_03]: So my guess is that the pirate station...
[47:40.840 --> 47:42.900]  [SPEAKER_03]: Were you listening to the pirate station just outside the tunnel?
[47:42.940 --> 47:44.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: And then when you went in the tunnel, you couldn't pick it up?
[47:44.660 --> 47:46.520]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and when I got out of the tunnel, it was back.
[47:46.780 --> 47:50.640]  [SPEAKER_03]: It could be wherever they had the receiver that feeds the leaky...
[47:50.640 --> 47:52.540]  [SPEAKER_03]: The amplifier and the leaky coax.
[47:52.760 --> 47:55.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: Wherever they had the receiver may not have been picking up the pirate station.
[47:55.460 --> 48:00.520]  [SPEAKER_03]: But I doubt very much that they actually register certain radio stations and only transit.
[48:00.620 --> 48:03.060]  [SPEAKER_03]: That would actually be a pretty difficult system to manage.
[48:03.260 --> 48:07.260]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, considering that it's New York City doing it, they probably would pick the most difficult system to manage.
[48:07.500 --> 48:08.000]  [SPEAKER_03]: Could be.
[48:08.200 --> 48:09.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: If someone knows about that, please let us know.
[48:09.960 --> 48:13.280]  [SPEAKER_14]: We've got to answer the Empire State Building question, so someone out there must have the answer to this.
[48:13.380 --> 48:14.700]  [SPEAKER_03]: Port Authority would probably know.
[48:14.840 --> 48:15.820]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah, and we know they listen.
[48:15.960 --> 48:17.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: OTH at 2600.com.
[48:18.040 --> 48:18.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: Jeff, you want to pick another one?
[48:19.160 --> 48:19.420]  [SPEAKER_03]: Yeah.
[48:20.220 --> 48:20.860]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, go ahead.
[48:20.920 --> 48:21.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: You're on the air.
[48:22.760 --> 48:23.600]  [SPEAKER_08]: Good evening, gentlemen.
[48:24.000 --> 48:24.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: Hello, how are you?
[48:24.960 --> 48:25.320]  [SPEAKER_08]: Good.
[48:26.060 --> 48:27.340]  [SPEAKER_08]: I have a computer question.
[48:29.120 --> 48:34.700]  [SPEAKER_08]: I recently loaded down at work the Morpheus program.
[48:35.900 --> 48:41.760]  [SPEAKER_08]: And I'm getting something that says the exec file is not a valid Win32 application.
[48:41.860 --> 48:43.380]  [SPEAKER_08]: I have no idea what that means.
[48:43.520 --> 48:44.420]  [SPEAKER_08]: I mean, it worked.
[48:44.660 --> 48:47.760]  [SPEAKER_14]: It sounds to me like this is more a question for the personal computer show.
[48:47.940 --> 48:48.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh.
[48:48.240 --> 48:49.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: It comes on after us.
[48:49.180 --> 48:49.800]  [SPEAKER_08]: Oh, I'm sorry.
[48:50.080 --> 48:50.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, it's okay.
[48:50.560 --> 48:52.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: No, it's a good question.
[48:52.440 --> 48:53.920]  [SPEAKER_08]: I don't want to take up your time, then.
[48:54.100 --> 48:56.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right, but they're on after 8 o'clock, so give them a call.
[48:56.640 --> 48:57.000]  [SPEAKER_08]: All right.
[48:57.000 --> 48:57.560]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[48:58.080 --> 48:58.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: Go ahead, John.
[48:58.920 --> 49:13.320]  [SPEAKER_03]: On that subject, there's a lot of ISPs are now announcing they're going to charge much higher rates for people who are using programs like Morpheus and Kazaa, peer-to-peer programs, because of all the extra bandwidth that those users are using.
[49:13.320 --> 49:18.020]  [SPEAKER_03]: So look pretty soon for you're having a tiered broadband rate.
[49:18.300 --> 49:22.440]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, Bernie, are they charging people for using those programs or for using more bandwidth, which is...
[49:22.440 --> 49:26.980]  [SPEAKER_03]: Well, the articles I've read say they're charging people for using those programs, but there's no way to really check that.
[49:27.120 --> 49:29.360]  [SPEAKER_03]: They're probably going to meter the bandwidth somehow.
[49:29.760 --> 49:34.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's amazing how they give the impression that they can keep track of everything you're doing.
[49:34.300 --> 49:37.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: And in some cases, they are able to keep track of things they really shouldn't be able to keep track of.
[49:38.500 --> 49:40.320]  [SPEAKER_10]: It's not that difficult to keep track of.
[49:40.320 --> 49:45.660]  [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, you can tell what services and what things are running on someone's machine.
[49:45.720 --> 49:47.000]  [SPEAKER_14]: But you can also hide those things.
[49:48.020 --> 49:49.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can try to anyway.
[49:49.180 --> 49:55.940]  [SPEAKER_10]: If you're going to be uploading, if you're going to be on one of these file sharing networks, generally it's going to be pretty obvious that you're doing so.
[49:56.200 --> 50:00.540]  [SPEAKER_10]: I mean, because you have to provide some means for the other systems to connect to you.
[50:01.480 --> 50:03.940]  [SPEAKER_10]: The whole problem is with uploading, really.
[50:04.060 --> 50:05.140]  [SPEAKER_10]: That's what kills the bandwidth.
[50:05.160 --> 50:15.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, the thing I saw last week, which was really kind of funny, was all the media had this story of how most people are deleting all the music on their computer systems.
[50:15.320 --> 50:19.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, how would they know that people are deleting music on their computer systems?
[50:19.320 --> 50:20.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: They didn't talk about shared music.
[50:20.620 --> 50:25.120]  [SPEAKER_14]: They were talking about people who store music, you know, that they copy legally or illegally.
[50:25.940 --> 50:27.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: Most people are deleting it.
[50:27.340 --> 50:30.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: And, you know, they had no scientific evidence to back this up at all.
[50:30.260 --> 50:31.220]  [SPEAKER_14]: But people believe it.
[50:31.520 --> 50:32.680]  [SPEAKER_15]: But it's funny.
[50:32.680 --> 50:34.440]  [SPEAKER_15]: I talk to students about this all the time.
[50:34.440 --> 50:37.640]  [SPEAKER_15]: And the kids are saying, well, I've deleted all the files.
[50:37.640 --> 50:41.160]  [SPEAKER_15]: I burn them to CDs and they're not on my computer anymore, so I'm not going to get a letter, right?
[50:41.280 --> 50:44.280]  [SPEAKER_15]: And I said, well, guys, it doesn't quite work that way.
[50:44.500 --> 50:48.500]  [SPEAKER_15]: It has to do with the logs and the files that you were downloading.
[50:48.680 --> 50:52.940]  [SPEAKER_14]: But it brings up another important issue, and I think this is something that the recording industry of America has to address.
[50:53.420 --> 51:12.200]  [SPEAKER_14]: There are a lot of people out there... I'm sorry, I have to talk about this, because this is something that has been bothering me, and I think it should be something that's, you know, revealed, and we all know it's true, but there are people out there who are copying music from CDs that they buy and then making copies for their friends and handing them to them,
[51:12.240 --> 51:13.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: like, on the street.
[51:13.360 --> 51:13.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: No.
[51:13.760 --> 51:13.920]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[51:14.420 --> 51:14.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: No.
[51:14.700 --> 51:22.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, I don't quite know how we can stop this, how the recording industry can monitor these kinds of transactions, but they are going on quite frequently.
[51:23.980 --> 51:35.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, maybe if we have some of those tracking devices on the CDs, you know, we can know who has what music, and, you know, if the serial numbers don't match as they walk by the monitoring posts, they can be, you know, interrogated further.
[51:36.400 --> 51:39.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: But, you know, you don't need the Internet to trade digital music.
[51:39.100 --> 51:40.880]  [SPEAKER_14]: You can trade it in all kinds of different ways.
[51:41.060 --> 51:45.140]  [SPEAKER_15]: And when you have the CD, you just put it on your MP3 player and no more chip.
[51:45.320 --> 51:45.600]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[51:45.940 --> 51:46.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: I know.
[51:46.740 --> 51:47.420]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's scary.
[51:47.580 --> 51:48.040]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's scary.
[51:48.180 --> 51:49.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: It's taking money from the artist's mouth.
[51:49.720 --> 51:54.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: What we need to do is create a chip that, when you copy the CD, the chip gets copied, too.
[51:55.300 --> 51:55.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[51:56.000 --> 51:59.700]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, there's all kinds of technical things that we can probably think of to help out the industry.
[52:00.360 --> 52:02.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: But I just thought I'd bring that to people's attention, because it's...
[52:02.840 --> 52:06.920]  [SPEAKER_03]: How about an RFID chip that you can stick in your ear and play music?
[52:08.140 --> 52:08.460]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yeah.
[52:09.820 --> 52:11.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: You know, we need to bring one of these chips in.
[52:11.440 --> 52:12.060]  [SPEAKER_14]: I want to see one.
[52:12.960 --> 52:13.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: I really do.
[52:14.160 --> 52:15.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: Need a microscope, too.
[52:15.440 --> 52:15.740]  [SPEAKER_14]: Good evening.
[52:15.780 --> 52:16.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: You're on the air.
[52:17.200 --> 52:17.680]  [SPEAKER_18]: Oh, great.
[52:18.260 --> 52:19.020]  [SPEAKER_18]: Write-in votes.
[52:19.300 --> 52:22.900]  [SPEAKER_18]: And basically, in New York City, the machines, there's...
[52:22.900 --> 52:24.620]  [SPEAKER_18]: The button is in the upper left-hand corner.
[52:24.960 --> 52:27.800]  [SPEAKER_18]: And if you want to do write-in vote, you have to write-in all the candidates.
[52:28.100 --> 52:30.840]  [SPEAKER_18]: You know, you can't do some with the lever and some with the write-in.
[52:30.900 --> 52:31.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: Oh, really?
[52:32.940 --> 52:42.380]  [SPEAKER_18]: So if you want to do a write-in, you know, and you want to write-in someone who is an actual candidate, you know, if you want to vote for someone who's an actual candidate, you have to do them via write-in also.
[52:43.080 --> 52:44.160]  [SPEAKER_18]: So just so you'll know.
[52:44.280 --> 52:45.500]  [SPEAKER_14]: And then also with the AT&T...
[52:45.500 --> 52:46.180]  [SPEAKER_14]: Wait, one question.
[52:46.240 --> 52:46.480]  [SPEAKER_14]: One question.
[52:46.560 --> 52:47.360]  [SPEAKER_14]: Do they provide the pencil?
[52:48.080 --> 52:48.400]  [SPEAKER_18]: Yes.
[52:48.780 --> 52:50.560]  [SPEAKER_18]: It's in the voting booth right there.
[52:50.840 --> 52:51.760]  [SPEAKER_17]: Wait, Jim has something there.
[52:51.780 --> 52:55.180]  [SPEAKER_17]: Yeah, are you sure you're not talking about what's known as an affidavit ballot?
[52:55.340 --> 52:56.020]  [SPEAKER_18]: No, no, no, no.
[52:56.020 --> 52:57.460]  [SPEAKER_18]: No, I'm talking about in the voting machine.
[52:58.040 --> 53:01.060]  [SPEAKER_18]: You go in, there's a button in the upper left-hand corner.
[53:01.240 --> 53:06.520]  [SPEAKER_18]: If you want to vote for a write-in candidate, you push the button and you open the window.
[53:06.520 --> 53:09.040]  [SPEAKER_18]: There's like a little metal slide thing and you write in the vote.
[53:09.040 --> 53:15.260]  [SPEAKER_18]: But once you press that button, you can't start flipping levers for the remaining candidate.
[53:15.800 --> 53:19.960]  [SPEAKER_18]: And if you start voting for a candidate via the levers, you're not allowed to push the button.
[53:20.440 --> 53:21.820]  [SPEAKER_18]: It's like mutually exclusive.
[53:21.960 --> 53:25.620]  [SPEAKER_14]: You mean once you throw the lever, even though you can put the lever back, you've already set it so you can't do the writing?
[53:25.680 --> 53:27.500]  [SPEAKER_18]: No, you can flip the lever back and then push the button.
[53:27.560 --> 53:28.140]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay, I see.
[53:28.540 --> 53:29.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Now, what's your second point?
[53:29.880 --> 53:32.300]  [SPEAKER_18]: Oh, the second point was the AT&T do not call list thing.
[53:32.760 --> 53:36.680]  [SPEAKER_18]: Now, what is in play here is not the do not call registry.
[53:36.680 --> 53:40.660]  [SPEAKER_18]: This is for customers or people who got a solicitation call.
[53:40.800 --> 53:46.880]  [SPEAKER_18]: And when someone calls you, you can say to them at that time, you can say, please do not call me again.
[53:47.140 --> 53:48.420]  [SPEAKER_18]: Put me on your do not call list.
[53:48.580 --> 53:48.700]  [SPEAKER_18]: Right.
[53:49.140 --> 53:50.300]  [SPEAKER_18]: That's what is in play here.
[53:50.560 --> 53:51.620]  [SPEAKER_18]: This is not the do not call registry.
[53:51.620 --> 53:53.240]  [SPEAKER_18]: It wasn't the federal do not call list.
[53:53.380 --> 53:54.680]  [SPEAKER_18]: There are two separate things.
[53:54.920 --> 53:59.220]  [SPEAKER_18]: And AT&T violated the individual saying, do not call me again.
[53:59.280 --> 53:59.580]  [SPEAKER_14]: I see.
[54:00.320 --> 54:00.660]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[54:00.820 --> 54:02.100]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, thanks for that clarification.
[54:02.320 --> 54:02.400]  [SPEAKER_14]: Yep.
[54:02.980 --> 54:03.300]  [SPEAKER_14]: All right.
[54:03.360 --> 54:06.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: And that's pretty much going to do it for us as far as that kind of thing goes.
[54:06.540 --> 54:12.680]  [SPEAKER_14]: One thing I would like to do, I'd like to inspect these voting machines and figure out where do they keep them when they're not having elections because they take up a lot of space.
[54:13.040 --> 54:17.080]  [SPEAKER_09]: There's a warehouse on the west side in like the 20s.
[54:17.160 --> 54:17.760]  [SPEAKER_09]: How do you know this?
[54:18.300 --> 54:21.500]  [SPEAKER_09]: You know, as a party hack, I know these things.
[54:21.660 --> 54:23.720]  [SPEAKER_09]: It's scary the kind of information you can get at this place.
[54:23.740 --> 54:24.380]  [SPEAKER_09]: I bought one.
[54:25.160 --> 54:26.200]  [SPEAKER_15]: You bought a voting machine?
[54:26.500 --> 54:27.340]  [SPEAKER_15]: Not the machine.
[54:27.340 --> 54:32.520]  [SPEAKER_15]: I have the voting booth from Florida with the Chad ballots, everything.
[54:32.800 --> 54:33.520]  [SPEAKER_15]: How about that?
[54:33.520 --> 54:34.080]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[54:34.280 --> 54:35.720]  [SPEAKER_14]: Well, that's a good souvenir to have, I guess.
[54:36.160 --> 54:36.320]  [SPEAKER_14]: Okay.
[54:36.360 --> 54:36.840]  [SPEAKER_14]: That's it for us.
[54:36.840 --> 54:37.540]  [SPEAKER_14]: Off the hook this week.
[54:37.620 --> 54:37.960]  [SPEAKER_14]: Right to us.
[54:38.060 --> 54:39.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: OTH at 2600.com.
[54:39.380 --> 54:42.240]  [SPEAKER_14]: We won't be here next week, but we will be here in two weeks.
[54:42.680 --> 54:45.020]  [SPEAKER_14]: Have yourselves a good couple of weeks.
[54:45.200 --> 54:45.380]  [SPEAKER_14]: Good night.
[55:30.640 --> 55:32.960]  [SPEAKER_06]: We'll be right back.
[56:15.630 --> 56:16.250]  Hey,
[56:21.160 --> 56:22.080]  [SPEAKER_07]: hey, you guys.
[56:22.960 --> 56:24.060]  [SPEAKER_07]: Come on.
[56:24.760 --> 56:25.380]  [SPEAKER_07]: Jonesy.
[56:25.640 --> 56:26.280]  [SPEAKER_07]: Yeah, what?
[56:26.500 --> 56:26.960]  [SPEAKER_07]: Hey, listen.
[56:27.280 --> 56:31.400]  [SPEAKER_07]: I've been thinking we'll never get on the radio like this.
[56:31.700 --> 56:32.720]  [SPEAKER_07]: You know that?
[56:33.940 --> 56:39.000]  [SPEAKER_07]: Now, I've been studying the charts, using my mind and my imagination.
[56:39.380 --> 56:41.120]  [SPEAKER_07]: And I can see it all now.
[56:42.280 --> 56:45.860]  [SPEAKER_07]: The drummer's in the box office and he's counting all the money.
[57:40.460 --> 57:42.260]  [SPEAKER_13]: I love that kind of music.
[57:42.460 --> 57:43.600]  [SPEAKER_13]: That is real music.
[57:43.740 --> 57:45.480]  [SPEAKER_13]: Rock and roll at its finest.
[57:46.000 --> 57:46.680]  [SPEAKER_13]: Kicking it.
[57:47.120 --> 57:49.580]  [SPEAKER_13]: That's what I like about one thing I like about that show.
[57:49.780 --> 57:52.880]  [SPEAKER_13]: But stay tuned to The Personal Computer Show.
[57:53.100 --> 57:56.440]  [SPEAKER_13]: That's going to be coming on right after this special message.
[57:56.440 --> 58:00.080]  [SPEAKER_13]: Is there
[58:03.490 --> 58:04.090]  [SPEAKER_16]: still time?
[58:04.250 --> 58:06.150]  [SPEAKER_16]: You have until November 21st.
[58:06.170 --> 58:07.030]  [SPEAKER_16]: Then there is still time.
[58:07.130 --> 58:08.310]  [SPEAKER_16]: There still is time.
[58:08.410 --> 58:09.630]  [SPEAKER_16]: Till November 21st.
[58:09.630 --> 58:12.070]  [SPEAKER_16]: Time for you to become a member of WBAI.
[58:12.150 --> 58:13.150]  [SPEAKER_16]: And get to vote.
[58:13.270 --> 58:13.770]  [SPEAKER_16]: That's right.
[58:13.950 --> 58:18.210]  [SPEAKER_16]: For as little as $25, you get to vote for members of the local station board.
[58:18.330 --> 58:21.810]  [SPEAKER_16]: You can give memberships to friends and relatives and they will be able to vote.
[58:21.950 --> 58:24.110]  [SPEAKER_16]: I can be a candidate and they can vote for me.
[58:24.230 --> 58:26.250]  [SPEAKER_16]: If you gave me a membership, I could vote for you.
[58:26.350 --> 58:27.550]  [SPEAKER_16]: What about your twin sister?
[58:27.550 --> 58:29.430]  [SPEAKER_16]: If I had one, you could buy her vote, too.
[58:29.610 --> 58:30.890]  [SPEAKER_16]: This is a wonderful country.
[58:30.990 --> 58:32.550]  [SPEAKER_16]: This is a wonderful radio station.
[58:32.870 --> 58:32.990]  [SPEAKER_16]: Yeah.
[58:33.230 --> 58:34.450]  [SPEAKER_16]: How do I get this accomplished?
[58:34.570 --> 58:35.830]  [SPEAKER_16]: You make a phone call now.
[58:35.970 --> 58:36.770]  [SPEAKER_16]: I like the Internet.
[58:36.930 --> 58:38.670]  [SPEAKER_16]: Go to WBAI.org.
[58:38.770 --> 58:39.650]  [SPEAKER_16]: Or maybe I'll call.
[58:39.870 --> 58:42.690]  [SPEAKER_16]: Telephone 212-209-2800.
[58:42.910 --> 58:43.680]  [SPEAKER_16]: I love democracy.
[58:44.270 --> 58:44.490]  [SPEAKER_16]: Good.
[58:44.610 --> 58:48.670]  [SPEAKER_16]: And if you want to vote or run for the local station board, there's still time.
[58:48.850 --> 58:50.930]  [SPEAKER_16]: Become a member of WBAI.