The subscriber you have dialed is not in service.
If you feel you've received this message in error, please hang up and try your call again later.
Message MD-0256.
But if they could, they would.
Bum Diddley Bum for the best, expect the worst.
I hope that's understood.
Bum Diddley Bum!
Bum Diddley Bum.
Bum Diddley Bum.
Bum Diddley Bum.
And a very good evening to our right program is Off the Hook.
Emmanuel Goldstein here with you on this Wednesday evening.
Joined tonight by Kyle.
Hi.
Out in Signal Land, we have Rob T. Firefly.
Good evening.
We have Gila.
Good evening.
And we have Alex.
Good morning.
I'm ensconced in Thursday over here.
Yeah, it's Thursday where you are already.
Okay.
I have to say, you have a much better connection than you do here in New York.
So wherever you are, that might be your new permanent place because I don't think you've ever sounded better.
Is that right?
That's amazing.
Yeah, maybe it's the acoustics of this lovely hotel room.
I'm actually in Taipei right now in Taiwan.
So pretty far away.
I don't think anyone on the show has ever been there before.
So this is a first.
Wow.
You know, March 2026.
Off the Hook is broadcast from Taipei, Taiwan.
And note there's no latency.
You're right there.
There's no satellite delay.
None of that stuff.
It all seems to be quite local.
Yeah, the internet infrastructure here, I have to say, is pretty amazing.
I mean, just the general infrastructure of Taipei is pretty excellent.
I mean, I've been spending a lot of time on the subways over the last couple of days.
But, you know, I'm here for work, of course.
So my days are taken up.
But pretty extraordinary place.
Have you guys ever been?
I've never been there.
I've been to Beijing, which is in China.
And I know there are all kinds of comparisons that people make between the two.
For instance, okay, you mentioned you're on the subway.
When the subway pulls in, does everybody try to get on first before all the people get off?
No.
No, absolutely not.
Okay, because in Beijing and in Shanghai, they do that.
Oh, no.
You know, it's quite interesting.
When you get on the subway here, I find this so fascinating.
Everybody is extremely courteous, number one.
So the train will pull in.
And the first time I got on the subway the other night, I started to think to myself,
what is this really beautiful music that's all of a sudden playing?
And as the train is about to approach, the station will play some really sonorous music,
you know, announcing the arrival of the train.
It's really nice.
It's uplifting.
The train is here.
And then at every place where the train stops, there are three different arrows.
And in the middle is an arrow pointing away from the train.
And on the two sides of this rectangle are arrows pointing in.
And so the people getting out leave through the middle and the people coming in go along
the sides.
It's pretty, pretty simple.
Why don't they just wait for the people to get off the train?
Well, I guess it's this way.
You can have traffic going in and out at exactly the same time.
People know where it's going.
It sounds to me like they have the same problem as Beijing had, except they're dealing with
it by painting arrows.
So people pass each other instead of waiting for each other.
So that's interesting.
Well, yeah, there's that.
And then there's also this other strange thing that happens in the subways where there are
these rectangular boxes that go out from the door for a few feet and then over at a right
angle.
And you line up in these rectangular boxes and wait for the train.
And then that's the order of entry for people boarding the train is by standing in these
rectangular boxes.
It's very orderly.
Wow.
I have to say I was very I was very impressed.
And how long are you there for?
Well, I'm actually flying back tonight.
So I've been I left on Saturday.
I was in I was in London last week.
It's hard to miss you guys.
And so I fly back tonight.
I leave this evening from Taipei and go kind of up and around Alaska, across the United
States, across the international date line, basically around the world.
I arrive in New York only three hours after I leave the time in Taipei because I cross the
international date line.
You may lose all of that time when you arrive due to the way airports.
Well, you know what?
I'll just let it be a surprise.
I've heard I've heard quite a bit that our friends from from ICE are doing, you know,
menial administrative tasks and whatnot over at it's unbelievable that I have to come back
to the United States and be greeted by, of all people, ICE.
And, you know, it's it's kind of remarkable that those bastards at ICE, you know, all due
respect, they get paid for doing the job of the TSA workers who aren't getting paid.
I mean, that is that is that just shows the injustice in this.
Yeah.
In this current.
The whole thing has become just extremely psychotropic to listen to from from from afar,
you know, over the last week and a half or so that I've been here.
It's just unbelievable what's happening.
Well, I hope you bring back lots of stories and you'll be in New York next week, I take
it.
I will indeed.
Yeah, a rarity.
Maybe we'll see you at the No Kings rally on Saturday because they're happening all over
the country.
Oh, is that right?
I was not aware of that.
That's something.
Yeah.
Well, maybe I'm probably going to be in Pennsylvania this Saturday.
I'm hoping they have them there, too.
I've heard I have heard they need them there probably more than most places.
I'm sure they'll be hard to avoid.
Yeah, well, we'll have it come to you.
All right.
Very good.
Make it as easy as possible.
Hey, I know a lot of people want to talk about hope.
We're going to talk about hope and the big announcement and all that.
Yeah, it's back in Manhattan.
But we're going to talk about that on overtime.
So overtime is on YouTube channel 2600 at eight o'clock.
And we're happy to take calls and have an extended conversation or whatnot.
We just have so much so much other material to get into.
And we're kind of sick about sick of talking about it the last few weeks in our personal
lives.
But there's so many stories going on.
And one of the most interesting ones has has to do with this this striker hack.
Have you heard about this?
And now the U.S. Department of Justice, they've seized four domains belonging to the pro-Iran
hacking group called Handala in the wake of an attack on the global medical giant known
as striker.
I don't know if that's their friendliest name for a medical medical giant striker.
It sounds violent.
But the hackers behind that cyber attack basically wound up losing websites.
In fact, the I have some of the sites listed.
Well, I had some of the sites listed.
Oh, yeah, here they are.
JusticeHomeland.org, Handala-Hack.to, KarmaBelow80.org, and Handala-RedWanted.to.
Does anyone know where .to is?
Is that .to?
I think it might be.
That's a common CCTLD for threat actors, though.
A lot of them love to use that country code top-level domain.
Tonga.
Tonga, there you go, yeah.
Okay, who can find Tonga on a map?
That's a good question.
Yeah, all right.
FBI Director Cash Patel, who cannot, by the way, was bullish regarding the success of the
current operations against Handala and any future efforts to stymie the Iran-backed group.
Iran thought they could hide behind fake websites and keyboard threats to terrorize Americans
and silence dissidents.
We took down four of their operations pillars, and we're not done.
The FBI will hunt down every actor behind these cowardly death threats and cyberattacks,
and we'll bring the full force of American law enforcement down on them, etc., etc., etc.
You know, all fine and good, except how?
You know, you know, the internet works globally.
I'm curious how they managed to take down a .to site.
Maybe it was hosted in the United States.
But correct me if I'm wrong.
The DOJ cannot just go out and shut down any website it wants.
It has to have some amount of control over it in the first place.
Alex, you know something about this.
Yeah.
I mean, it kind of depends on where the infrastructure is, whether you have a cooperating party on
the other side of whatever the DOJ or FBI is requesting.
With Tonga, they probably had some kind of coordination with the operator of the CCTLD,
the Country Code Top Level Domain for DOJ.
Every Country Code Top Level Domain has, you know, an operator, right?
And they're generally associated with the telecommunications infrastructure of the country
for that particular CCTLD.
So my guess is that they made some kind of multilateral assistance request over to Tonga,
and Tonga complied and said, okay, sure, we'll take down this infrastructure.
On the other hand, you could be absolutely right, Manuel, in that if you're using a .to
domain, that domain can be any, it can point to any type of name server or any host, and
it can be hosted by any company around the world.
You could have a .to domain that's hosted in Russia.
You could have a .to domain that's hosted in New Jersey.
It doesn't really matter.
That's how the Internet works.
But the other thing that I find just absolutely laughable, risable, as some would say, is that,
you know, they think that this is some kind of big win in taking down this threat actor
infrastructure.
It's a couple of domain names.
It's not like they can't just spin up a couple of new domains.
Well, guess what?
Guess what they did?
They spun up a few more domains, yes.
I didn't think more than a couple hours, I don't think.
But yeah, they restored all the websites.
In fact, I think they even have more now.
But here's my question, and maybe it's a stupid question, I'm sure it is.
Why didn't these so-called hackers just use .ir, the Iranian top-level domain?
Is it because their own government was shutting it down?
That's a good question, actually.
I think that the .ir cctld, that country code top-level domain, is probably not as connected
as it used to be.
I bet you there's a lot of the infrastructure that has been disconnected as part of the
Internet blackout.
So the service is probably sporadic.
And yeah, it's really just a matter of personal preference, too.
I mean, the .ir cctld operator certainly wouldn't cooperate with a multilateral assistance treaty
from the United States.
But domains, you know, are like weeds, right?
I mean, they just pop up wherever you don't want them.
It really doesn't matter whatever they want.
If they want consistent infrastructure, then maybe .ir or .ru or something like that would
have been better.
But also, .ir domains are probably a lot harder to access on the client side.
So if you want people to go to those domains, if you want publicity over towards them, they're
probably going to be blocked by a lot of firewall rules and various things that are blocking
cctlds like .ir.
So it also depends on what the point is of the threat actors.
Do they want to bring the public's attention to these particular sites?
Or do they just want to take up resources of the FBI by having them play whack-a-mole
and take down all these domains while they just pop up new infrastructure?
I'll tell you, I never heard of these domains until DOJ started talking about them.
Yeah.
Well, that makes perfect sense, too, right?
So now they're touting this as some massive win.
But yet what they're doing is just bringing publicity to the messages that they're sending
on these domains.
They get so few wins, Alex.
Let them have this.
I mean, it's the Streisand effect, I guess, in the form of a domain takedown.
Well, here's something a little bit more understandable, at least to me.
There are 45,000 malicious IP addresses and servers out there.
And there was a sweeping international cybercrime operation that dismantled them, coordinated
by Interpol, the operation known as Operation Synergia 3.
I guess there were two other ones.
I'm not quite sure how to pronounce Synergia either, but hopefully I'm doing it right.
It brought together law enforcement agencies from 72 countries in a months-long effort to
disrupt cybercriminal networks operating across continents.
That's how you do it.
That's how you cooperate.
You bring people together.
You bring countries together.
72 countries, law enforcement, agents.
You imagine the stories they traded.
You know, that is, you combine your forces.
You work together for a common goal.
That makes more sense to me than a single country going out and saying,
hey, look, we took down four websites for these nasty people.
Um, and, um, yeah, they got more websites, but, uh, that's not what we're talking about
today.
Yeah.
I mean, uh, that it is, I mean, these, these coordinated efforts are really kind of interesting
and they're, you know, taking down massive botnets and things require a lot of, you know,
multilateral coordination between these agencies, between Interpol and they're very effective,
but you really have to think about like, how are you going to squash this infrastructure?
How are you going to, to create a lot of friction for the threat actor when you take down the
infrastructure so that they don't just spin up new domains and we're, we're point the
existing domains.
If you've, if you've decided to take them down to host level to different hosts, um, you
really have to be careful about what you say and, and tout as a victory, you know, while
the bad guys on the other end are, are, you know, making an end run around your place
already.
Well, operation, uh, center GF three ran between July 18th of 2025.
And January 31st of this year, combining intelligence sharing cross-border coordination and targeted
enforcement actions, uh, during this period, investigators identified key nodes within
cyber criminal ecosystems and dismantled the infrastructure, enabling large scale fraud and
hacking campaigns.
Um, beyond the technical takedown, the operation led to significant enforcement outcomes on the
ground.
Authorities confirmed 94 individuals were arrested, uh, further 110 suspects remain under
investigation.
And in addition, 212 electronic devices and servers were seized during raids across multiple
countries.
It doesn't sound like very many, uh, when, uh, when, uh, you look at the scale of the story,
uh, I, I know people who have been raided who had more electronic devices than, than 212.
Uh, but the, uh, coordinated actions were made possible by transforming large volumes of cyber
threat data into actionable intelligence, allowing national police forces to identify and target
key actors within criminal networks.
Uh, they carried out raids on identified locations, disrupting operations ranging from phishing hubs,
that's with a pH, uh, to fraud rings and malware distribution systems.
So, uh, yeah, I don't think anybody can really, uh, say that's a bad idea.
Go ahead, Rob.
Yeah.
And, uh, Stryker, for those that are familiar, is, um, a manufacturer of medical equipment,
uh, things used in all sorts of medicine and also things used inside people, medical devices.
And they've been, uh, quick to announce that this hack didn't compromise anything relating
to the medical devices that their, that their customers and, uh, patients are using.
So, uh, that seems good.
This seems just, uh, just to have affected Stryker's own system.
Um, but now Stryker itself is being, uh, sued, uh, four of their employees are suing Stryker
for, um, fearing, for fear that their own employee PII personal identifying information
was, uh, leaked to ne'er-do-wells in this hack.
So, uh, they're looking to make that a class action suit and it'll be interesting to see
how that goes.
Yeah.
And it's about time too, that, uh, these companies that, uh, don't have sufficient
security take responsibility for that.
So having their own employees sue them because they were compromised, uh, you know, usually
we don't hear about that.
We don't hear about the victims and how their lives have been disrupted because of sloppiness.
So it's good to see them finally, um, uh, saying something about it.
Go ahead, Alex.
Yeah.
This is a common thing nowadays when, when there's a data breach, there's always some
kind of a plaintiff's firm out there ready to file a lawsuit on behalf of the employees.
And I'm, I'm not trying to, to undermine the validity of these claims.
I think they are valid.
And in fact, that I, I bring this up to my class because you guys know, I, I, one of the
reasons why I'm often over in London is because I, I teach over at King's college in the
law faculty there and I teach through the lens of the great hacks.
And I talk about different hacks and teach the law after we talk about how these hacks
have happened.
It's, it's, it's a really, it's a fun course, but the first one that we do is about the
Sony hack back in 2014.
And that was, you know, a massive data breach that affected so much internal information
that was leaked, you know, by North Korean threat actors.
And then there's some questions about whether it was North Korea for whether it was several
threat actors running rampant through Sony systems at the time.
There's still a lot of questions about that attribution.
So I'll acknowledge that for a moment.
But one of the things that I bring up in my lecture is that there was a woman who was an
employee at Sony.
And once the data was leaked back in 2014, the end of 2014 into 2015, there was a disciplinary
report about her that had claimed that she had stolen some company property when she was
leaving the company and that there was this report.
And then, so anytime that she went and looked for a job after Sony, people would Google her
name.
That's just common practice.
You Google your employee, your prospective employees' names.
And this report would show up on the internet claiming that she was accused of theft.
And it turns out that this report related to something like a $4 mouse that the company
alleged she didn't return when she left Sony.
And this report was basically preventing her from getting a job because everybody believed
that she was some kind of kleptomaniac, you know, inside a company.
She couldn't get a job because of it.
So these things, I think it just goes to really undermine that these claims are valid, that there
are real people that are affected by this.
Once the data is out there on the internet, accurate or not, it can be misleading.
Wait, did you say it was because of a mouse?
A mouse.
One mouse.
One mouse.
One mouse.
There was a report inside Sony about this particular woman having stolen, I think it was a $4 or $6
mouse.
It might've been $6.
So what kind of companies would not give her a job because somebody else accused her of taking
a $4 mouse?
Well, it wasn't clear from the information on the report that was available online that
it actually related to a $4 or $6 mouse.
It just was a report of theft from a company property.
I see.
Okay.
All right.
Wow.
They're pretty petty over there at Sony.
Yeah, you would think so.
Right?
Unbelievable.
I mean, just think about the amount of time and effort you would have to spend to submit
that report.
Way over $6 worth of your time.
Somebody had an issue of one sort or another and really wanted to get even.
Okay.
I think so.
All right.
Getting back to the United States versus the whole rest of the world.
Now we have banned new foreign-made consumer internet routers.
Yeah, this is almost unbelievable.
And an update Monday to a list of equipment seen as not secure enough for use.
The Federal Communications Commission, run by that, well, I'm not going to say that word
on the air, but run by Brendan Carr, let's put it that way, added all consumer grade routers
made outside the U.S. are forbidden now.
Wow.
Now, routers, which are widely used in homes and businesses to connect computers, phones,
TVs, and other devices to the internet, are basically now on a par with foreign-made
drones, which were banned at the end of last year.
I guess your router could maybe turn into a drone and attack you.
You don't know.
Who knows what these people are doing?
Malicious actors have exploited security gaps in foreign-made routers to attack American
households, disrupt networks, enable espionage, and facilitate intellectual property theft,
said the FCC.
While people will still be able to use foreign-made routers that they already own, in case anybody
was panicking about that, the ban applies to all new device models.
It stems from growing concern over the last year that routers were a point of easy access
for malicious actors.
Look, I don't want to get too patriotic here, but I believe that any router built in the United
States is just as capable of being compromised as something from a different country, all right?
We can design things that will be accessed by all sorts of malicious actors.
We don't need to buy foreign for that.
So I don't know what's being proven here.
I really don't.
USA.
Don't do that.
Don't do that.
God, I hate that chant.
I hate that chant so much.
Quiet.
I think this really begs the question, what about all of the current routers?
Because I, as a broadband consumer, just like anybody else, in a lot of households, these
things are sitting there for a really long time.
This isn't something that you generally want to pay for.
I mean, sometimes they lease them to people.
There's different schemes depending on your provider.
But in my mind, it's the kind of thing that, you know, if this is such a big threat, what
on earth is being done now for all of the devices that are deployed?
Yeah.
I mean, I could go on and on, but I'll just leave it at that.
Do you have a foreign router in your house right now?
Is it watching you?
Is it attacking you?
Okay, everybody.
Just because you can, they're letting us.
Oh, goodness.
I don't feel better.
I'm looking at all of you now.
Point to a router.
Can you do it?
Okay, good, good.
All right, Alex, what's wrong with you?
You don't have a router?
Yeah, I mean, I'm in the hotel room.
You're in a foreign country.
You're in a foreign country.
This is where the problem is, the foreign routers.
And you could actually attack one of them before they get to us.
I could technically.
I'm in the Republic of China, right?
And you claim you don't know where the router is.
I have no idea where the router is in this hotel, but I've been looking for it for days.
Just to say hello.
Very convenient.
Yeah.
All right, Rob.
How do you wake up?
What's clear is that, you know, even American electronics companies manufacture their equipment overseas.
The vast majority of them do.
One notable exception to this, one company that's manufacturing their routers in the United States is Starlink, owned by SpaceX, owned by Elon Musk.
So, yeah, they're fantastic products.
Maybe the only things we're allowed to get hold of anymore.
Wow.
Okay.
Interesting.
Well, of course, they say that Starlink routers are made in Texas.
What do you say to that?
Well, I don't know.
Yeah.
I mean, I guess perhaps.
But where does this end naturally, right?
I mean, we're talking about routers.
I mean, routers are important.
It's important to update your router.
You know, people have, you know, routers that have firmware on them that hasn't been updated since, you know, 2005 that they're still using in most cases.
Rob, as I think you had indicated, most people's routers in their homes are generally given to them by their broadband provider, right?
So, you know, whether it's Spectrum or Blue Ridge Cable or whoever it is, right?
Right.
So where are those routers manufactured?
Those probably are not manufactured in the United States.
I would imagine this will affect them.
But all the routers, to Kyle's point, that are still in people's homes are not going to be recalled.
I mean, and these are very likely routers that have very old firmware that hasn't been patched.
So this whole national security framing of the issue, to my mind, is really kind of crazy, right?
Because if the routers are trustworthy, or rather, I'm sorry, if they're untrustworthy, then what's the evidence of this, right?
Like, other than what we've already known.
My router has an account name and a password.
Yeah, they're both the same, I know, but, you know, good luck guessing it.
Well, I think that this is an excellent point, that the thing you're given isn't necessarily something you're updating and taking care of.
And that these things, I think, my reaction is that a lot of them are managed and updated, if they do any of that at all, but mostly by the carrier.
And they're aware of their supply chain.
They're aware of where they're made, possibly other countries like Malaysia or wherever.
You know, there's a lot of other places that things are assembled for exactly these reasons, and not just routers.
I do think it is a valid problem.
And it is funny that, you know, Texas is the American entity, although there's a lot of long history of semiconductors and electronics there.
So, I guess it's not surprising, and they're going to use their own in-house supply chains for that particular product.
So, yeah, we should have more, and we should be aware of this stuff.
But I'm so behind Alex's point about where the stuff is made, essentially, and giving us more information about, like, disclosing what the actual vulnerability is, because that's a huge gap in this.
Like, we don't get actual concrete information about what exact routers.
I mean, okay, I just said, yeah, a lot of the carriers probably manage this and have a well-thought-out device that they're giving people.
But what percentage of this, are these routers that people buy off the shelf independently of a carrier, kind of like an unlocked phone?
We need more information about what the actual vulnerabilities are.
And I think this is something that is criminal.
Like, we got to have more info about this stuff.
This whole, like, coy, cagey vagueness or, like, just, oh, let's all follow this edict from the FCC, that's not enough.
Like, I get that they want to distance themselves from details and maybe obfuscate a little bit about the actual incidences that we're asking for as evidence.
Because we really want to know, like, okay, name and, not shame necessarily, but name the manufacturers.
Where are the problems?
How are these things?
Which ones are being exploited?
What controllers?
What hardware is at effect?
Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
It's easier to say just all the foreign routers are the problem.
Totally.
I mean, we tested it out on the people.
Now we're testing it out on the routers.
Well, I mean, without evidence, as Alex said, there's the case, we're only left to our imaginations about, like, what the motive is.
Evidence takes so much time, and we just don't have the patience.
Alex, go ahead.
Yeah.
I mean, I don't want to belabor the point, but they should have this technical evidence, and it should be published, or there should be some kind of independent audit.
And it would be very easy for them to set some kind of security baseline for all vendors, foreign or domestic, that are manufacturing communications equipment that are used in Americans' homes across the United States.
And those are baselines that everybody should meet.
Just because something is American doesn't mean it's any less vulnerable than a Chinese router or a South Korean router or an Asus or a TP-Link or something like that.
And also, if they're concerned about this, maybe we should be making sure that the communications providers push out automatic firmware updates across these routers.
That's something that would solve a lot of these things being compromised, because these routers are devices that have historically been compromised and then co-opted by massive botnets like we were just talking about earlier in the show.
And then what's the – yeah.
Go ahead, Kyle.
Absolutely, I'll just add that, yeah, make the product capable enough to be maintained for longer periods as they do sit in people's homes and take responsibility, because leaving it to the consumer, you're giving them this device and going for the lowest kind of design quality that isn't really well-maintainable in the field.
Then, yeah, you're setting us up for failure and then leaving citizens and people that are, depending on your service, totally vulnerable.
And that's not fair.
You're setting people up, in my view.
Yeah.
And taking a broader view of this, what's scary about this, what should be scary for our listeners, is this whole idea that the government can decide, without publishing evidence or any kind of independent audits, about what types of boxes and electronics you're allowed to plug into your own damn wall.
Well, what's that – what's to stop them from deciding next step for an IP-enabled IoT devices like a refrigerator is not allowed in your particular home or apartment or something like that?
Those can be compromised just as easily as a router and turned into some kind of packet-sniffing device, depending upon how they're configured, the hardware, and the software.
Yeah, I just – and I would just add that, like, I think it's not really about, you know, that our systems are necessarily better or that we're preferring it.
But if we're going to say they are, let's, like, come up with a criteria that we agree on and then, like, stick to it.
We should know that, like, yeah, these have met certain criteria that people can count on, just like any other consumer product.
All right, moving on, we have some listener mail, and you can write to us and become listener mail yourself by simply emailing OTH at 2600.com, OTH at 2600.com.
On the March 18th edition of Off the Hook, you were talking about returning to the good old days of interoperability, being able to read and post to the social media side of your choice and have it cross-post to everywhere else, complete with working replies.
Hear, hear. The reason we lost interoperability is that Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act makes it a felony to tamper with a digital lock, punishable by a five-year prison sentence and a $500,000 fine.
Most of the social media sites sit behind those locks.
This is a big part of Cory Doctorow's outstanding 2025 book, whose title I can't say on the air, but I'll just call it Encrapification, Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It.
The minute we get more reasonable representatives in Congress, we need to join with the EFF to start lobbying hard to repeal the DMCA, especially Part 1201, and not give up until we can all start making interoperability work again.
Think of it as right to repair for software.
That's a big way to chip away at the oligarchy.
Great show. Good to hear your voices. Keep up the good work. Much love to you all.
Thank you very much for that wonderful letter.
Speaking of not being able to say a title on the air, anybody catch SNL UK, the UK edition of the Saturday Night Live that debuted this past Saturday?
They can use cuss words there.
I mean, it took them 51 years to rip us off.
We ripped them off a lot quicker.
But they instantly said, yeah, we're not going to have these regulations.
And it worked.
It really works when you're not, you know, muzzled so much.
Yeah, the broadcast rules in the UK, as I understand it, are basically it depends on what time you're on.
If it's late in the evening, the kids are in bed.
You can speak like a grownup to other grownups.
And so you don't get in trouble for the sorts of dirty words that get stations like WBAI in trouble sometimes.
And here in this country, we are being told to watch what we say to be more patriotic, thanks to Brendan Carr over at the FCC.
It's not being met well.
It's not being met very well at all.
And the fight will continue.
Here is another letter.
Well, you people have announced that you're going to announce something.
I just wanted to announce to you upon your announcement, I'm here and ready to help you both spread the announcement and be part of whatever you announce.
Good luck, folks, signed Old Guy.
You know, I know who that is.
I'm not going to say the name because he didn't say the name or she didn't say the name.
It says Guy, though.
But this probably has something to do with our Hope News, which, as I said, that's at 8 o'clock on Overtime on YouTube, channel 2600.
But thank you.
Thank you for the support and look forward to hanging out and doing all kinds of fun things.
Here's a letter from Maine.
I've been a longtime listener and subscriber, and I'm writing because I've noticed the recent feedback regarding the show's heavy focus on politics.
I'd like to offer a middle ground, topics that align with current events but remain firmly rooted in the hacker world.
We live in heavy times, and for years off the hook has been my one-hour escape while mowing the lawn or commuting.
I've never listened to anything while mowing the lawn, but that must be, that must, how do you hear people screaming?
You know, if you're going somewhere you're not supposed to go.
I don't know.
I just, I'm very cautious with headphones.
Recently, it feels less like an escape and more like an extension of the daily grind.
I'd love to see a return to the technical roots that make the show unique.
Are you politically neutral?
You know what?
I challenge that statement.
I doubt you're politically neutral because to be politically neutral in this day and age means you're not paying any attention.
You don't know what's going on, and you don't care.
I have a feeling you care.
You just, and I get this, you don't want it to become a part of everything.
You don't want the political, you know, issues to come up in every conversation.
And, you know, I don't think we do that.
At least we try not to do that, but let's continue.
I simply want to hear about hacking, cybersecurity, and the how-to of tech.
Here are a few topics that could bridge that gap.
All right, let's listen.
Anti-surveillance.
Using high-output infrared LEDs or CV-dazzle clothing to confuse facial recognition.
Well, slight problem there.
The government really likes surveillance.
They really want that to work.
They really want to know what you're doing.
And by pushing anti-surveillance, you're kind of taking a political stand against them that they're not going to appreciate.
I'm not saying I'm against this.
I'm all for it.
I'm just letting you know that you might get some pushback from some very powerful people and entities.
All right, next point.
Off-grid comms.
A deep dive into LoRa and MeshTastic for encrypted, decentralized communication.
Ooh, getting off the grid.
Yeah, you know, that could be seen as anti-patriotic, anti-government as well.
Not saying that's the case here.
But when you start experimenting with different kinds of technology, you know, like let's look at blue boxes and red boxes of the past.
You know, we try to explain to the authorities it's not just for making fraudulent phone calls.
There's all kinds of other uses and also the joy of simply building it.
They never got it.
They never got that.
And a lot of people never got that as well.
They said, of course, why else would you want to build something like that unless you are up to something?
You know, if you've got nothing to hide, then you should have no problem being out in the clear.
We get this all the time.
So, yeah, problem with that as well.
Operational security.
Practical mobile security like managing SD cards or encrypted volumes when crossing borders.
Ooh, okay.
Who wants to take this one?
Crossing borders, hiding data, not giving up everything to border control.
They want your laptop.
They want your passwords.
They want your social media access.
And if you're not going to give that to them, you become an enemy of the state.
You know, you become a threat.
And there aren't very many enemies of the state that are considered apolitical.
You know, the thing is, I'm into all these things.
I really am.
Hardware projects, using the ESP32 for Wi-Fi source monitoring, steganography techniques or DIY GPS units.
Okay, so we're talking about hiding messages in images.
You know, that's like James Bond stuff there.
No, I'm all for it.
I'm into it.
But it can be seen as a threat, can be seen as something very dangerous to the status quo.
Continuing with the letter, and I'm sorry for nitpicking every single one of your points.
You can still give people hope and address the state of the world by teaching us how to build the tools to navigate it.
I'd much rather hear about the latest in Wi-Fi security than the latest headlines.
Hope you all have a great day.
Name withheld upon request.
And I agree.
I agree with everything said here.
And, you know, when we talk about issues, I think we always relate it to something in the hacker world or in the technological world.
It may not always be as apparent as we'd like it to be.
We might also get into debates every now and then.
You know, you have to defend yourself sometimes when somebody says something, you know, outrageous, which happens occasionally.
Um, but, um, for the most part, we, we, we, we keep that link to technology.
There's always a link to technology because technology in itself is political, you know, access, uh, how much data, uh, you're, you're able to, um, hold on to yourself, privacy, encryption, all of that.
It's, it's, it's, you know, something we're passionate about, but there are people, there are entities that are against it because they want more control.
And then there are people who say, if we talk about that, that's too political.
So it's, it's a question of degree, you know, how much politicization are you willing to endure?
And, um, you know, we try to make it as minimal as possible, but your, your points are heard and valued.
So thank you for writing, Rob.
Yeah, I, I am entertained by the irony of the, uh, final line in this person's email.
I'd much rather hear about the latest in wifi security than the latest headlines.
Um, and of course we were talking earlier in the show about a major headline story that's directly about wifi security, but, uh, yeah, I can see where they're coming from.
And at the other, you know, on the other hand, I am also going to push back on anyone claiming to be politically neutral.
Um, no one is politically neutral.
Well, being politically neutral, I think right now means I'm not going to make trouble because I'm okay with how things are and I can't classify myself, uh, as that.
I think also at this point, political neutrality is almost willful ignorance, not almost it is, it is willful ignorance.
And it's hard to really talk about anything at all without relating it both to the hacker world, the hacker mindset technology and the world we're living in right now.
Like, no, sorry, words are gone, but political neutrality is willful ignorance right now.
And we would be, um, remiss, I think, to have this radio hour and be willfully ignorant out loud for an hour.
Yeah, I, I, I hear you.
Uh, we're not calling anybody ignorant.
We're not saying that, uh, this is something that people aspire to.
I think it's something we all want.
We all want to be, um, not having to think about what's going on all the time because it's so depressing.
It's so outrageous.
But, you know, if we go down that road and we don't, um, react and we don't have an opinion, it's kind of what they want.
They want you not to be any trouble whatsoever.
So we're here to be a cog in the wheel, you know, uh, we're, we're here to, uh, uh, make trouble, good trouble, Alex.
Yeah, the, the things that we're talking about, I, I, I think we always have some kind of link in some way or another to, to the, the tech focus or the tech aspect of this.
I mean, this is a show that's been on the air for so many years now, and it, it builds itself as talking about the societal ramifications of technology.
And you can't talk about those societal ramifications without talking about the political sphere.
And if you think about the political sphere itself, these are, these are systems that are exploited.
These are systems that have loopholes.
These are systems that are abused, just like technical systems.
And, and we have to talk about those particular vulnerabilities as well.
These types of systems are really just code, but they're for human beings and they're affecting human beings.
And just like any other kind of vulnerability that we find or any kind of abuse, we should shout about it.
And I think we, we don't, you know, we're not talking about amendments to the civil procedure and things like that, things that have no rational relationship whatsoever to technology.
Everything's got it, but it's, it's very difficult to divorce those issues.
And, um, you know, I've, I've oftentimes agreed with the people that write in and criticize us and, and I appreciate the time and effort that they take to criticize us.
And I think they're the right to do it sometimes, but there's always the, these implications.
And I would, I would challenge our listeners as well to take a wider view of these particular issues while they're asking us to constrain our views at the same time.
So, Kyle, we're really thoughtful about all of this.
So, um, I take the listeners point and I'm so thankful for their, um, what, what we are to them and that they've, that for their listenership, that they've been around.
Um, and we want to talk about all those things too.
Like we're excited.
And, um, for the, for us, a lot of this is an escape, um, from the day to day.
And we, we're happy to hear it is for you as well.
And, and we do our part.
Um, it also is, um, something that, uh, we're typically trying to keep a lot of what we're saying approachable.
So, um, when we get chided, I think for being, not being, you know, wildly technical, sometimes that can make it, um, so it isn't as approachable to people.
And we're here on a wonderful, uh, radio station that has so many different people and their level of understanding of technology probably is, is wide ranging.
So, so we like to keep a careful balance in, um, the topic of conversation.
But all of that said, I think that, um, we do our best with, with the, the time we have.
And I think the urgency, if, if there wasn't such an urgency, I think we would be more focused on, um, escaping or maybe projects and things that, uh, didn't seem to have as much consequence.
But I think because of that, we feel a little bit of a responsibility, um, and, and, uh, owe it and owe it to the dynamic of, of this medium that it is just a conversation and it goes in so many different directions all the time.
And we like to draw connections.
We like to make it approachable, draw those connections and keep it moving, keep the conversation, something that is integral, exciting, uh, relevant to people's daily lives, but also interesting and, um, can be applied.
And I think in the point that the, the, uh, uh, writer is making here, um, my counterpoise, I, the way I would come at that is just to say it's, you're missing.
And I think your reading of it was, was, was, was making this point, but you're, um, wanting us to, uh, talk about things to prepare you for a hellscape when what we're talking about is ways to avoid arriving at a world that is that very hellscape.
Yeah. And we've been talking about that for decades before, before now, we kind of warn people about, uh, societies like the one that's forming around us, what, how technology can be used and abused, you know, same thing in 2600, same thing at Hope, basically the same thing throughout the hacker world.
Uh, people have been warning about the very things that we're seeing now, you know, we, there was a story, I don't know why this story was so popular, but the, the stupid dancing robot that went out of control and started smashing dishes in California somewhere.
Yeah. Yeah. Why was that on every channel? Of course that's going to happen. If you have a robot in a restaurant and you expect it to not go crazy at some point, uh, you're, you're, you're woefully misled. That's, uh, it's inevitable. It really is. Um, what are you pointing at, Gila?
I'm trying to get Rob to the right tab.
Oh, I see. Okay. I didn't know what that was. Uh, we have this, uh, final letter here from, uh, Kirk over in the UK, uh, and who says this may be noteworthy for listeners. I, I backed this, um, uh, this project on Kickstarter a long time ago. We're talking about the joy bubbles movie, which is premiering on May 2nd at the Bartos screening room at the museum of the moving image in Astoria.
That's in Queens. Um, and basically, um, uh, it was, um, it's a 79 minute documentary, uh, about Joe and Grecia known as joy bubbles. Uh, he discovered that at a very young age, by whistling a specific tone into the telephone, he could manipulate the entire system. He was born blind in 1949. Uh, and, uh, Joe legally changed his name to joy bubbles in 1991. He was a whiz kid with an IQ of 172.
Uh, he, um, uh, rejected the idea of adulthood, preferred to think of himself as an eternal five-year-old. I'm sure this will be a fascinating film, uh, for phone freaks and, and pretty much anyone who is, uh, interested in technology and also, um, this person who was a very interesting, um, uh, human being. Uh, so again, that's happening May 2nd at the, at the Saturday at the Museum of the Moving Image in Astoria. Rob.
Yeah. Yeah. I was also a Kickstarter backer of this documentary and I am so excited to see this. Um, it's been a very long time in the making. Um, but, uh, joy bubbles was a fascinating figure in hacker and freak history and technical history.
Um, just as, um, as, um, as a person, just as himself is fascinating person to look into. Um, I had the pleasure of speaking with him, um, only once on a conference call many, many years ago that, uh, someone had, uh, looped him into and he was just very, very nice. And I, I look forward to learning more about him, uh, through this movie.
All right. Maybe we'll all see that film then. Uh, we are out of time. Uh, again, please write to us. OTH at 2600.com. We're going to continue the conversation over on YouTube at eight o'clock and, uh, you can get the address there. Well, the address is channel 2600 on YouTube, or just, uh, go to the link on top of 2600.com webpage. We will see you here on WBAI next week. Oh, and by the way, next week will be a call-in show for WBAI.
So, uh, mark that on your calendars.
of the day
Ho, ho, ho
A gift of guidance
from above
And ho, ho, ho
Pairs the heart
in mother's blood
No plans could be conceived
No ships could bear the seas
If there would be no courage
Were it not for love
Now the path before it slides
Before our blurry eyes
Don't you see?
And it leads up to the gateway
To lead you through
Don't you see?
Then come and take my hand
Raise up your hand
And dry your eyes
For up ahead I see
Oh, oh, oh, oh, yeah
A way of peace
A shining on me
So let us feel hope
And feel the sunrise in our minds
To give hope
Is to enlighten all mankind
All but lose hope
And life seems black as blind
When faith gives way to fear
When motivation disappears
All is lost
If one abandons her
All is lost
If one abandons her
Oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh