Writing viruses is a sure way to learn not only the intricacies of linkers and loaders, but also techniques to covertly add additional code to an existing executable. Using such clever techniques to wreak havoc is not very neighborly, so here's a way to have some fun, by injecting additional code to tighten the security of an ELF executable.

Since there's no need for us to hide the payload, the injection technique used here is pretty rudimentary. We find some empty space in a text segment, divert the entry point to that space, run a bit of code, then execute the program as usual. Our payload will not delete files, scan the network for vulnerabilities, self-replicate, or anything nefarious; rather, it will use seccomp-bpf to limit the system calls a process can invoke.

Caveats

By design, seccomp-bpf is unable to read memory; this means that string arguments, such as in the open() syscall, cannot be verified. It would otherwise be a race condition, as memory could be modified after the filter had approved the system call dispatch, thwarting the mechanism.

It's not always easy to determine which system calls a program will invoke. One could run it under strace(1), but that would require a rather high test coverage to be accurate. It's also likely that the standard library might change the set of system calls, even as the program's local code is unchanged. Grouping system calls by functionality sets might be a practical way to build the white list.

Which system calls a process invokes might change depending on program state. For instance, during initialization, it is acceptable for a program to open and read files; it might not be so after the initialization is complete.

Also, seccomp-bpf filters are limited in size. This makes it more difficult to provide fine-grained filters, although eBPF maps\(^{31}\) could be used to shrink this PoC so slightly better filters could be created.

Scripting like a kid

Filters for seccomp-bpf are installed using the prctl(2) system call. In order for the filter to be effective, two calls are necessary. The first call will forbid changes to the filter during execution, while the second will actually install it.

The first call is simple enough, as it only has numeric arguments. The second call, which contains the BPF program itself, is slightly trickier. It’s not possible to know, beforehand, where the BPF program will land in memory. This is not such a big issue, though; the common trick is to read the stack, knowing that the call instruction on x86 will store the return address on the stack. If the BPF program is right after the call instruction, it’s easy to obtain its address from the stack.
The BPF virtual machine has its own instruction set. Since the shell code is written in assembly, it’s easier to just define some macros for each BPF bytecode instruction and use them.

```
bpf_ld    equ 0x00
bpf_w     equ 0x00
bpf_abs   equ 0x20
bpf_jmp   equ 0x05
bpf_jeq   equ 0x10
bpf_k     equ 0x00
bpf_ret   equ 0x06
seccomp_ret_allow equ 0x7ff0000
seccomp_ret_trap equ 0x00030000
audit_arch_x86_64 equ 0xc000003e

%macro bpf_stmt 2 ; BPF statement
  dw (%1)
  db (0)
  dd (0)
  dw (%2)
%endmacro

%macro bpf_jump 4 ; BPF jump
  dw (%1)
  db (%2)
  db (%3)
  dd (%4)
%endmacro

%macro sc_allow 1 ; Allow syscall
  bpf_jump {bpf_jmp+bpf_jeq+bpf_k}, 0, 1, %1
  bpf_stmt {bpf_ret+bpf_k}, seccomp_ret_allow
%endmacro
```

Information is displayed on tube screens ranging from 3” to 21” in diameter. Many of these tubes used in the SAGE system achieved 20,000 hours or more of reliable performance.

Heart of the CHARACTRON Tube is a stencil-like matrix, a tiny disc with alphanumeric and symbolic characters etched through it. The matrix is placed within tube neck, in front of an electron gun.

The electron stream is extruded through a selected character in the matrix, forming the beam into the desired character shape. When the beam impinges on the phosphor-coated tube face, the character is reproduced. In compact tubes the entire matrix is flooded with electrons, generating a complete array of characters. Only the desired character is allowed to pass through a masking aperture. By actually forming the character or symbol from the electron beam, the tube provides the highest available definition of character generation and overall display quality.
**SPEED UP & STREAMLINE CALCULATIONS!**

**USE ADDIMAX**

the one and only pocket adding machine with a CREDIT BALANCE!

---

**Position of the C. O. F.**

\[
A_1 = 1170 \quad A_2 = 375 \quad A_3 = 4400 \\
A_4 = 1450 \quad A_5 = 55 \quad A_6 = 8000 \\
\frac{\Sigma A}{2} = 2620 \quad \Sigma A_1 = 12400 \\
\frac{y_0}{2} = \frac{12400}{2620} = 4.74
\]

**Credit balance shown here**

\[
(12.85 - 20.00 = -7.15)
\]

only $4.95

genuine leather case incl.

---

**Only ADDIMAX has two rows of answer windows. Look for them in a machine you buy!**
By listing all the available system calls from\nsyscall.h\n it's trivial to write a BPF filter that will deny the execution of all system calls, except for a chosen few.

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    if (argc < 2) {
        printf("no socket created\n") ;
    } else {
        int fd=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 6) ;
        printf("created socket , fd = %d\n" , fd) ;
    }
}
```

A Makefile takes care of assembling the payload, formatting it in a way that it can be included in the C source, building a simple guinea pig program twice, then infecting one of the executables. Complete source code is available.

```
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) = 0
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, {len=30, filter=0x400824}) = 0
socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 4
−−− SIGSYS {si_signo=SIGSYS, si_code=SYS_SECCOMP, si_call_addr=0x7f2d01aa19e7 ,
      si_syscall=__NR_socket, si_arch= Audrey_ARCH_X86_64} −−−
+++ killed by SIGSYS (core dumped) +++
```

Testing & Conclusion

The output in Figure 22 is an excerpt of a system call trace, from the moment that the seccomp-bpf filter is installed, to the moment the process is killed by the kernel with a SIGSYS signal.

```
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) = 0
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, {len=30, filter=0x400824}) = 0
socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 41
−−− SIGSYS {si_signo=SIGSYS, si_code=SYS_SECCOMP, si_call_addr=0x7f2d01aa19e7 ,
      si_syscall=__NR_socket, si_arch= AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64} −−−
+++ killed by SIGSYS (core dumped) +++
```

Figure 22. Excerpt of `strace(1)` output when running `hello.c`.
Dearest neighbor,

Our scruffy little gang started this самиздат journal a few years back because we didn’t much like the academic ones, but also because we wanted to learn new tricks for reverse engineering. We wanted to publish the methods that make exploits and polyglots possible, so that folks could learn from each other. Over the years, we’ve been blessed with the privilege of editing these tricks, of seeing them early, and of seeing them through to print.

Now it’s your turn to share what you know, that nifty little truth that other folks might not yet know. It could be simple, or a bit advanced. Whatever your nifty tricks, if they are clever, we would like to publish them.

Do this: write an email in 7-bit ASCII telling our editors how to reproduce ONE clever, technical trick from your research. If you are uncertain of your English, we’ll happily translate from French, Russian, Southern Appalachian, and German.

Like an email, keep it short. Like an email, you should assume that we already know more than a bit about hacking, and that we’ll be insulted or—WORSE!—that we’ll be bored if you include a long tutorial where a quick explanation would do.

Teach me how to falsify a freshman physics experiment by abusing floating-point edge cases. Show me how to enumerate the behavior of all illegal instructions in a particular implementation of 6502, or how to quickly blacklist any byte from amd64 shellcode. Explain to me how shellcode in Wine or ReactOS might be simpler than in real Windows.

Don’t tell us that it’s possible; rather, teach us how to do it ourselves with the absolute minimum of formality and bullshit.

Like an email, we expect informal language and hand-sketched diagrams. Write it in a single sitting, and leave any editing for your poor preacherman to do over a bottle of fine scotch. Send this to pastor@phrack.org and hope that the neighborly Phrack folks—praise be to them!—aren’t man-in-the-middling our submission process.

Yours in PoC and Pwnage,
Pastor Manul Laphroaig, TéGâ SâBâ