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China Raids NSA Jewels

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interview with a
CIA SPYCATCHER

J.F.K.... Oswald... and the spy who got away?



MI6 hunt for spies - not fantasists



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
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
Daring Chinese Spies Target NSA "Crown Jewels"



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China's spies create front company to penetrate and acquire intelligence and attract agents from top secret NSA facility in Hawaii

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


Tennent H. Bagley, former head of the CIA's Soviet Counterintelligence Desk, talks exclusively to Eye Spy about his work and why he believes the KGB 'planted' an agent inside the world's most powerful intel agency

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
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During the making of a Russian documentary on the case of MI6 frogman 'Buster' Crabb, a former Soviet diver offered journalists a new theory - he killed him

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Eye Spy continues its journey into the intelligence tradecraft of disguise - and discusses various points with an intelligence expert trained in this fascinating art


EYE SPY

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Demystifying Britain's Secret
Intelligence Service...
it's no

FANTASY ISLAND



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EYE SPY EDITORIAL

WHEN SECURITY AFFORDS NO PROTECTION

As Scotland Yard's finest arrived in Pakistan to help in the investigation into the appalling murder of Benazir Bhutto, the incident is a reminder that a determined terrorist is a dangerous adversary. There have been claims that the security surrounding Ms Bhutto was lax, and that specialist "electronic bomb jammers" requested by her bodyguards, were never supplied. The truth is, her assassin was prepared to die (as he probably did in the resultant blast).

I'm not a specialist in this area, but one only has to see the nervous looks of those charged with protecting an official or dignitary at public meetings; it's a precarious occupation, and history has shown us, that there are times when even presidents can't be assured they will not encounter a lunatic. However, the Bhutto assassin was far from that - he was cold, organised and utterly calculated in his action. He was a deadly predator.

The question many people are asking, is that could it happen elsewhere... in London or Washington, for example. The short answer is "yes". It's one reason why the intelligence and security world rely so heavily on the "sixth sense". Establishing secure cordons, placing spotters on rooftops and providing toughened vehicles is of course a must, but it won't help if a bomber manages to get close enough. Utilising the sixth sense to pick-out an adversary before they strike, is something that can only be learned by experience and training. Next time you watch these officers at work - the Secret Service, for example, take a close look at their eyes and mannerisms - they are engaged in a world few people would want to enter...





COURTESY A. KIRCH
BfV headquarters Cologne

FSB SPY NUMBERS HIGH



"One in three Russian diplomats in Germany is a spy" - Heinz Fromm

Heinz Fromm, President of Germany's domestic intelligence agency Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV - Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), said one in every three Russian diplomats accredited in Germany, is involved in "clandestine intelligence gathering". While MI5 sources believe Russia is operating about 30 spies in Britain, the BfV say four

times that many are engaged in espionage in Germany. All are believed to be in the employ of Russia's foreign SVR secret service, the federal FSB counter-intelligence agency and the military GRU service.

Like MI5, the BfV said Russia is also targeting scientists, military officials, business managers and regional as well as federal politicians in Germany. Other

TOO HOT TO HANDLE

Leaks, Customs, Nuclear Bombs, MI6, CIA and the Khan Network

According to various reports on both sides of the Atlantic, on 5 December 2007, police searched the home and car of Atif Amin, a senior UK Customs investigator who headed *Operation Akin* - the secret British investigation that probed links between UK companies and Abdul

Qadeer Khan and his underground nuclear network. It is understood, warrants citing the Official Secrets Act were presented. Amin probed Khan's network as early as 2000, but the "rogue trader" was not closed down until 2003.


The police investigation seems related to a new US book called *America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise* (October 2007). It has been suggested by some journalists that Akin told the book's authors, David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, that MI6 and CIA "interfered in his attempts to halt an international nuclear smuggling ring." They further say that after Akin had found evidence in Dubai that Khan had helped Libya's nuclear programme, UK and US intelligence "ordered" him to "drop his inquiries" and "return home." The book says that between 2000 and 2003, Khan still traded. Some reasons are provided for this, but Eye Spy analysts believe it may have had something to do with the

fact that MI6 and the CIA were both "hot on the heels" of Libya's nuclear intelligence anyway. The services wanted to "bring together" major evidence and the "senior figures" in the Khan network.

Armstrong and Trento quote a "frustrated Amin" who told colleagues: "They knew exactly what was going on all the time."

The authors say: "If they'd wanted to [UK and USA intelligence], they could have blown the whistle on this long ago. It's a story Washington and London do not want out. If Amin can be discredited, it would distract the public from the fact that the US and Britain prevented the most dangerous nuclear smuggling operation in history from being shut down when the opportunity [first] existed."


The reasons behind the police search are not totally clear, but intelligence watchers believe that some of the book's content is of



A.Q. Khan




Joseph Trento



"interest" and may have been sourced from "customs reports from *Operation Akin* to the authors."

Armstrong and Trento said: "The British authorities are conducting a witch hunt on the assumption Amin was not the subject of our book but our source. The investigation of Amin is a deliberate distraction."

N GERMANY



agents have been accused of massive economic and political espionage in Germany. NATO also remains a significant target.

A senior German intelligence official said: "Russia's secret service apparatus was still placing the highest priority on all facets of political espionage." The BfV has accused some suspected Russian intelligence officers of targeting German lawmakers and members of their bureaus as well as political parties and foundations.

FALLING DOWN



Alleged former CIA aircraft crashes

MEXICO: A number of Spanish and English speaking websites have reported that a Florida based Gulfstream II jet aircraft crash landed on 24 September 2007, apparently after running out of fuel over Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula.

According to unconfirmed reports authorities recovered four tons of cocaine. It's also been alleged that this particular aircraft was involved in three "extraordinary renditions flights", though it has changed hands at least twice over recent months. The 1975-built aircraft, reportedly carried the number N987 SA

Read all About it...



AL-QAIDA THEOLOGIAN ATTACKS BIN-LADEN

CAIRO: SAYYED IMAM AL-SHARIF, one of al-Qaida's most senior theologians, has called on followers of the terror group to end their jihad. Speaking from his prison cell in Cairo, al-Sharif said 9/11 was a "catastrophe for all Muslims," and Osama bin-Laden had betrayed Taliban leader Mullah Omar in Afghanistan. In a serialised manifesto, the lapsed jihadist even called for the formation of a special Islamic court to try bin Laden and his old comrade Ayman al-Zawahri.


BENAZIR BHUTTO KILLED IN ATTACK

RAWALPINDI: Former Pakistan Prime Minister BENAZIR BHUTTO was assassinated in a suicide attack on 26 December. Ms Bhutto had just spoken at an election rally in Rawalpindi when suspected al-Qaida gunmen shot her in the neck and then set off a bomb. At least 20 other people died in the attack and several more were injured. The leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was set to win January's election. Several al-Qaida web sites were quick to admit responsibility. According to one, the assassination was ordered by Ayman Al-Zawahri, al-Qaida's deputy leader. The message proclaimed: "We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat [the] mujahadeen." The pro-Western Bhutto had vowed to rid her country of extremists and was regarded as a major threat to Osama bin-Laden's terror group. One intelligence source said Ms Bhutto's vehicle was shot at by two gunmen using armour-piercing bullets.



HOOVER'S 1950 "MAST ARREST" PLAN

WASHINGTON: FBI chief J. EDGAR HOOVER considered arresting thousands of American citizens just 12 days after the start of the Korean war in 1950. The plan "to apprehend and detain persons who are potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country", was submitted to Admiral Sidney Sours, President Harry Truman's special consultant for military and foreign affairs. Sours had been the first director of the nascent CIA in 1946. The revelations were discovered in recently released intelligence files.



NORTH KOREA ARRESTS "SPIES" IN ITS INTEL BUREAU

PYONGYANG: Intelligence sources in North Korea reported that 10 suspects from the Seventh Bureau of the Defense Security Command in Chongjin, part of the intelligence service of the (North) Korean People's Army, were under investigation for espionage. A source said: "An internal inspection team found a camcorder in the home of Han Chol Beom, the treasurer of the Seventh Bureau in Chongjin. The vice president of the Seventh Bureau, who had close relations with Mr. Han, was also implicated in this espionage case."

GUANTANAMO BAY TERROR SUSPECT FREE

CANBERRA: Convicted terror supporter and former Guantanamo inmate, David Hicks has walked free from an Australian prison. Hicks was the first person convicted at a US war-crimes trial since World War II after he pleaded guilty in March to providing material support to al-Qaida.



RUSSIAN SPY REPORTS


Annual Spy Report from Moscow

Nikolai Patrushev, head of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), released what's becoming something of an annual spy report. Patrushev told his country's primary news agencies, RIA-Novosti, ITAR-Tass and Interfax, that the FSB had foiled espionage and disruption attempts by nearly 100 foreign spies in 2007. He explained that most of the "spies" were intent on seeking intelligence on Russia's political system, economic interests and foreign policy moves. However, he did mention the case of a former Russian military Staff General dismissed for passing on secrets. Two years ago Major General Yevgeny Veselov was dismissed for using Russian troops to build his home. This it seems, was not the only reason, according to the report.



Nikolai Patrushev

More serious was his suggestion that the West is using Baltic states for espionage. "Foreign intelligence services, primarily in the Baltic nations, intensified their activities against Russia in 2007," said Patrushev. He notes that this is not surprising since Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are now members of the European Union and NATO. The FSB believe these three nations are "active conduits" of MI6 and the CIA.



Iraq link to failed 2007 UK attacks

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE is believed to have uncovered information that suggests the al-Qaida attacks in Glasgow and London last summer, could be linked to a major al-Qaida group operating in Mesopotamia, Iraq. If this is proven, it would be the first time an attack has been coordinated on the British mainland from the Middle East. The intelligence seems to have been acquired from a number of cell phones that were recovered in a vehicle outside the London target - the Tiger Tiger nightclub, and a vehicle parked nearby that was intended to cause even greater carnage to fleeing nightclubbers. It has been reported that working with CIA and MI6, anti-terrorist police and MI5 managed to track down several stored numbers and matched them to known members of the Mesopotamia cell.

Bilal Abdulla, a British-born doctor of Iraqi descent, and Kafeel Ahmed, an Indian aeronautical engineer, parked two vehicles laden with gas canisters and explosives near the popular nightclub in central London at the end of June. However, when the men dialled the phones, the circuit did not stimulate other apparatus and the charge was insufficient to cause an explosion. The terrorists left a plethora of vital clues.




AN IRANIAN MYSTERY

Search still on for missing retired FBI agent

Christine Levinson, the wife of retired FBI agent Robert Levinson who went missing in Iran last March, has travelled to Tehran in an effort to find out what happened to him. He was involved in a private security business and on his way to Kish Island in Iran when he suddenly vanished. It is understood he was investigating a cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting operation. Mrs Levinson said: "I'm just a wife looking for my husband and the father of my children. I just want to make it better and bring Bob home."

Robert Levinson, a father of seven, was last seen on 8 March 2007, after checking in to a local hotel on the resort island. "He just told me that he was going to be travelling and he wouldn't be able to get in touch with me for the next 24 hours, and he would call me as soon as he returned to the hotel in Dubai," Mrs Levinson said.

The Iranian Government via the United States Protecting Power in




Iran, the Swiss Embassy, said the authorities have conducted an investigation but do not know what happened to Mr Levinson.

State Department Deputy Spokesman Tom Casey said in a written statement: "Despite numerous requests to the Iranians, we have not received any details on the results of the Iranian investigation."

The family has launched a web site, HelpBobLevinson.com to bring his disappearance to light.


OFFICERS CLEARED

No charges for senior Scotland Yard officers cleared in de Menezes case



CIA's Brain Drain Programme

Langley lures Iran's nuclear specialists



Intelligence sources say the White House authorised a secret CIA programme in 2005, designed solely to diminish Iran's nuclear weapons project by persuading senior scientists to defect. Dubbed the 'Brain Drain', the programme was part of a wider intelligence effort to gather more information on just how far Iran had succeeded towards its nuclear goal. Though little is known of the CIA programme, it is believed several key scientists and nuclear advisors decided to move to the United States. It is believed some intelligence gleaned from key officials was partly used to produce America's controversial National Intelligence Estimate - a US report released in late 2007 that concluded Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 (see page 32).

ESPIONAGE FEARS IF "RELATIONS FIXED"

TEHRAN: Iran's "supreme leader" Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in January, that his country "was willing to improve relations with the USA, but that it is not the right time." Khamenei also said such a move would provide the CIA with lots of opportunities for spying. "Agents would come and go, and conduct espionage," he said.

2,250 US Spy Flights

NORTH KOREA has accused the United States and South Korea of performing no fewer than 2,250 "aerial espionage missions" over its territory in 2007. According to Pyongyang, US and South Korean spy planes flew nearly 200 sorties in December alone.

Officials said the aerial reconnaissance peaked when US and South Korean troops launched "military exercises for aggression" in August.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) said the espionage proves that the United States and South Korea remain hostile entities.



Deputy Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick (below), who held the post of Gold Command at the time of the shooting of a 21/7 London bomb suspect, was cleared of any personal wrong-doing. Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead by counterterrorism officers on a train in Stockwell, London, after being mistaken for one of the failed bombers.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) said that the mistakes made by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick and three other senior Scotland Yard officers on the fateful day "did not amount to personal misconduct." Mr de Menezes's family said the decision was "a scandal."

The IPCC did not believe Ms Dick personally culpable, nor three other officers described only as Silver, Trojan 84 and Trojan 80. Silver was second-in-command in the control room. Both 'Trojans' were heads of the firearms team that shot Mr De Menezes.

The IPCC did, however, note 16 points of "concern" relating to the shooting. All police forces were asked to address these issues, and the authority is aware that "significant progress" is being made to correct errors that culminated in the death of Mr de Menezes.

Another officer, Andy Hayman, who recently stepped down from his post as Assistant Commissioner at Scotland Yard, will not be disciplined over allegations that he gave misleading information about the incident.




Andy Hayman

SADDAM'S US SPY

18 months for Iraqi intel agent

A Michigan man who spied for former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein has received an 18 months prison sentence. Ghazi Al-Awadi, 78, had already pleaded guilty in July 2007, to illegally acting as a foreign agent, and admitted he spied on Dearborn-area opponents of the former Iraqi dictator. Al-Awadi reported on Iraqi nationals who had fled to the United States, reportedly receiving block payments of \$1,000 from the Iraqi intelligence service for information.



Ghazi Al-Awadi

"I am sorry for what happened," said Al-Awadi, who moved to the United States in the early 1970s and became a US citizen in 1981. It's believed he was coerced by Iraqi officials when he travelled to the country to arrange marriages for his children. In 1990 he was jailed in the US for stabbing his son-in-law to death on a Detroit street.

Al-Awadi, who has prostate cancer, will have an operation to remove a cyst from his kidney before his prison term begins.

Another accused Iraqi spy charged at the same time as Al-Awadi, Najib Shemami, 59, of Sterling Heights, is awaiting trial.

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
ETA mission ends in tragedy

High-ranking members of an ETA terrorist cell shot dead two unarmed surveillance operatives from the Spanish Guardia Civil (SGC) in the French resort of Capbreton, some 12 miles from the southern city of Biarritz, France on 1 December (40 miles from the border). It was the first deadly attack since the Basque separatist group abandoned its ceasefire.

An attack on Madrid Airport in December 2006 - which left two persons dead - was a sign ETA was still very active. The SGC officers were shot dead at point-blank range after reportedly being recognised or overheard discussing the surveillance at a cafe. The case once again illustrates the dangers of such work...

Eye Spy looks at how events unfolded....

When surveillance goes wrong



THE CAPBRETON

The undercover officers were part of a joint Spanish-French surveillance team monitoring the activities of several leading ETA members. Counterintelligence teams had been in Capbreton for a few weeks installing covert cameras targeting an ETA safe house. On 1 December, at around 8.30am, after finishing a coffee at a local restaurant, the officers returned to their vehicle. ETA gunmen pounced. First they opened the car's boot and found surveillance gear. As the officers sat motionless, the gunmen fired several shots at point-blank range. Raul Centeno, 24, died immediately, Fernando Traperó, 23, succumbed to his wounds three days later at La Côte Basque Hospital in Bayonne. Two men and a woman then fled the scene and hijacked a car.

Some 1,500 police officers from France and Spain were assigned to the resultant manhunt. Train stations, airports, roads and ports were monitored.

Sources say both officers were unarmed and appear to have been noticed, recognised or overheard by those they were supposed to be surveilling. Interior Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said there had been a "chance encounter" in the cafe between the suspects and the surveillance officers. Witnesses told police that one of the gunmen shouted "Txakurras... Sois txakurras" ("sons of a whore").

Spanish Interior Minister Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba said: "Since ETA broke the ceasefire, they continue to kill. They achieved that... but only prison awaits them. They will be relentlessly pursued using all available means." French Interior Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said ETA was using France as a refuge and a base to prepare attacks.

Rubalcaba's wishes seem to have been granted when two armed suspects, Asier Bengoa, and Saioa Sánchez (female) were arrested in the remote southern French village of Châteauneuf-de-Randon, near Toulouse on 5 December. Two days earlier a surveillance



unit had spotted the suspects in the southern city of Rodez, and followed them as they went by taxi northwest to Mende, some 65 miles away. The couple stayed overnight in a hotel before heading, again by taxi, to Châteauneuf.

During the night, police set up a nearby road block. After checking out of the hotel, the suspects were detained at the police check point. They were found to be in possession of a large amount of money. Both suspects were transferred to the headquarters of the French Police Anti-Terrorist Division (SDAT) in Paris.

**Raul Centeno**

However, there is some confusion over their exact role. Some police sources say Asier Bengoa, and Saioa Sánchez may not have participated in the actual incident, while others say Sánchez fired some of the shots that killed the officers. It now seems that Bengoa met up with Sánchez on the Sunday after the executions at a pre-arranged rendezvous near Bordeaux. Neither of the two weapons seized when the two suspects were arrested - a 9mm

**Fernando Trapero**

Hernández, though this was never officially confirmed. It has been suggested both people were carrying false identity papers.

Intelligence officials say forensic evidence indicates the third member of the gang was Aitzol Iriondo alias 'Gurbitz'. He is believed to be the head of ETA's logistical operation and has been on the run since 2003. Iriondo is alleged to be a bodyguard to ETA's military

Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna - ETA



EUSKADI TA AZKATASUNA - ETA, which began in the late 1950s basically as a student resistance movement, stands for "Basque Homeland and Freedom". The Basque lands covers seven areas in northern Spain and southern France and is home to about 2 million people. ETA regard this region as their own country. Early followers of the group were violently engaged in actions against General Franco's military dictatorship, but this soon turned to assassinations and a bloody bombing campaign against the authorities - especially in Spain.

When Franco died in 1975, there was a gradual transition to democracy, and although the Basque region enjoys more autonomy than elsewhere in Spain, its hardline supporters want total independence. Since its formation, ETA has been accredited with 842 deaths, kidnappings, extortion, explosions, blackmail and drug-running. Counterterrorism officials believe hundreds of other killings can be attributed to the group. Its primary targets are usually officials, judges, politicians, police and anyone opposed to its separatist demands.

Though its exact strength is unknown, it is believed the group have a few dozen active members and relies on an intricate support network that straddles the Basque Country. ETA is regarded as a terrorist organisation but even most Basques object to its operations.

INCIDENT

**Aitzol Iriondo and Saioa Sánchez**

parabellum and a 357 Magnum - were the guns used to murder the two officers.

French intelligence say Saioa Sánchez - codename 'Hintza', is near the top of the list of most wanted ETA suspects, and an alleged member of the 'Larrano' ETA terror cell.

An earlier report identified the two arrested suspects as Asier Bengoa López de Armentia and his "girlfriend", Agurtzane Izarza

commander, Garikoitz Aspiazu, alias "Txeroki". Iriondo is now suspected of opening the police officers boot and firing some of the shots that killed Centeno and Trapero. A fourth person has now been implicated in the escape from Capbreton of the gang, though not in the actual shooting.

Two weeks after the incident, ETA released a statement, subsequently published in the Basque newspaper *Gara*, and claimed responsibility for the attack in Capbreton. The statement claimed the attack was in response for the 'incessant pressure' placed on Basque



militants by the Spanish armed forces, and that such attacks would continue wherever it was necessary.

ETA has waged a four-decade-long bloody campaign for an independent Basque state, spanning parts of northern Spain and southwestern France. Police data shows the terror group are responsible for over 800 deaths in this time.

- Since the incident, Spain and France have agreed that a special anti-terrorism unit dedicated solely to combating ETA be formed.

As MI5 and MI6 recruitment programmes continue apace, more doors are being opened that allows ordinary mortals a glimpse of what it's really like to work for a secret service. But for some job seekers expecting to engage in a "fantasy island" type operation, the reality is somewhat of a let down.



In November, staff from both MI5 and MI6 were allowed to discuss some of their work with the BBC. Undoubtedly the move was aimed at youngsters, thus it came as no surprise 'officers' were dubbed 'agents' and the language sometimes bordered bizarre. Nevertheless, it was a useful exercise in demystifying the work of both services, and a recruiting platform to get more people from Britain's ethnic population interested in joining the intelligence world.

BBC radio journalist Andy West was given permission to interview two MI6 officers at the



Service's Vauxhall headquarters in London. This in itself would not have happened just a few years ago. More remarkably, he was even allowed access to the *supposed* head of MI6 recruitment. The officers quickly denied any parallels to the world of 007 and the popular series *Spooks* or *MI-5* as it is known in the United States. The recruiter quickly bounced away the James Bond perception: "This is the biggest myth at the service. We do not have a licence to kill, we do not carry Berrettas. That's simply not true," he said. "And for the record, there is not, no never was a licence to kill." West didn't press the point, though in

reality, some officers are trained to use firearms. He also said the imaginary Bond is hampering MI6 recruitment in that too many potential thrill seekers and fantasists are applying for work: "I think sometimes we're hampered by it - I think it gives people a false impression of what working for the organisation is actually like." Undoubtedly listeners were being persuaded that Ian Fleming's creations, while of use in illuminating the Service, were more than a nuisance when trying to explain the true role of many MI6 employees.

Welcome to the Real MI6....




Demystifying Britain's Secret Intelligence FANTASY IS



Ian Fleming - the man behind the movie icon was himself a brilliant MI6 officer



listeners were being persuaded that Ian Fleming's creations, while of use in illuminating the Service, were more than a nuisance when trying to explain the true role of many MI6 employees



FAR FROM IMAGINARY US Navy SEALs conduct a training exercise. MI6 has complained that too many persons seeking employment believe a lifestyle like this awaits.

e Service... it's no LAND

The recruiter, referred to as "Mark" continued: "We need people to deploy into a range of situations around the world and people who have a different ethnicity can often go places and do things and meet people that those from a white background can't. There are some places that white males can't go." He's absolutely correct of course, and despite a burgeoning staff, people from the ethnic minority population make up just 7 per cent of MI6's total field strength.

As West journeyed deeper into the building dubbed 'Legoland' by many employees, it was apparent his route had been specially pre-planned to keep him well away from the real heart of MI6's "intel machine". There was plenty of carpeted hallways and a photograph of the Queen, but this was about as much as the *Newsbeat* reporter was allowed to see.

An MI6 female Muslim officer called "Yasmin" also spoke about her work: "My job is to identify, target and recruit people who will provide us with secret intelligence. ➤

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
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
They include things like counterterrorism, the international drugs trade... and can also include promoting British economic interests abroad... making sure Britain isn't being ripped off.

"We absolutely never threaten or blackmail or coerce people to work with us. That is the most counter-productive tactic you can ever use. Their lives and their safety is my responsibility... we will do everything in our power to make sure our agents are safe."

Just across the River Thames at MI5's Thames House headquarters, Anna Cunningham of the BBC's *Asian Network* interviewed two British Asian intelligence officers called "Jayshree" and "Shazad". Explaining that the 7/7 London terrorist operation was one of the "biggest jobs" she had ever been involved in, Jay said: "This is a country that has welcomed my family. I've been born, raised here. This is my country. I just want to work as hard as I can to ensure it's safe for my... I'd like to say community but by that I mean my whole country."

"Jayshree", who analyses intelligence from domestic and overseas sources, described her double life as an exercise in discretion. She said: "When out with friends or relations I tend to be quite vague about my work - I don't want the unnecessary attention."

Both "Jayshree" and "Shazad" distanced themselves from the BBC drama *Spooks*.





The documentary, called *'Britain's Most Wanted'*, suggested that prime suspect and former KGB man Andrei Lugovoi, could have been used by forces in Moscow to get to Litvinenko, without him knowing he was about to deliver a "fatal blow". The new theory, according to Franchetti's sources, is that Lugovoi was sent to Britain on a fact-finding mission about Litvinenko's liaisons with suspected Chechen terrorists. Lugovoi was reportedly "selected" because he could get close to Litvinenko.

Before Lugovoi set off for London and his encounter with Litvinenko, he was given a substance that he believed was a "truth serum" or "debilitating drug". This was to be slipped into Litvinenko's tea as they chatted about various topics. The agent, therefore, would have had no idea he was actually



Aleksander Litvinenko

The 'Involuntary




A recent BBC documentary based on the research of Sunday Times correspondent, Mark Franchetti, has thrown up a new scenario in the assassination of Aleksander Litvinenko in November 2006....



A 180-degree panoramic view of Oxford Circus, London. It was in this part of London that Litvinenko met with many of his contacts

NEW SERIES

Strange But True



A Suitable Press

When America joined Britain to tackle the Nazis in WWII, military officials sought every possible means at their disposal to gather intelligence, including locating ex-patriots living abroad who were prepared to help. Embedded in foreign lands, these citizens were seen as ideal candidates to use as spies, especially if they had remained loyal to the land of their origin. The agency given this challenge was the legendary Office of Strategic Services (OSS).



The OSS set about delving into foreign resident papers and scouring Europe for agents, but few would have imagined they would approach a 72-year-old woman married to a wealthy Frenchman. The couple had met just after WWI, and friends, neighbours and officials living near their chateau had forgotten or had no idea she was an American.



The CIA has a permanent memorial at Langley honouring the agents of the OSS

After an OSS agent made contact, he explained that if she accepted the job, she would need to use cunning and discretion. Naturally, it would be demanding and dangerous, if caught she would face certain death. Nevertheless, despite her advancing years, she agreed to become a courier in the Paris area, transmitting and carrying secret messages to and from agents in the field. Her real name was never used - the OSS simply called her the "Madame".

She had a few close shaves with German officers and officials as she went about her business. Carrying instructions in code on her person was a task laced with danger, and at any point she could have been stopped and challenged. Good fortune therefore that she was not in possession of a secret message when she was stopped and searched on a train. However, a strange set of circumstances conspired that turned out to be equally dangerous.


During one journey on a train in summer, the woman found herself in need of using the toilet. It was a red-hot day and each carriage was crammed with passengers who were naturally sweltering. Predictably, as was the case in WWII France, the passenger train's toilet was absolutely filthy, and so the agent used her morning newspaper to wrap around the seat. Within minutes of returning to her seat, the train stopped at a small station. German troops boarded and ordered everyone off and into a large room. Men and women were separated and asked to strip naked. When two Nazi female officials started to examine "Madame", one shouted excitedly and departed - quickly returning with a mirror. They used the mirror to try and read a "secret coded message" that had been invertedly printed on her bare bottom. They truly believed



SOE and OSS female agent Virginia Hall and OSS creator William Donovan. Hall performed numerous acts of bravery - just like "Madame"!

they had discovered a new Allied method for sending top secret instructions.

After an hour carefully deciphering the text, the Germans realised they were in fact reading the morning news. The warmth of the day and sweat and moisture on the toilet seat, had interacted with the ink, and her heavy weight had provided for a suitable and ample press to "lift" the text from the paper. "Madame" was ordered to dress and return to her carriage. The OSS agent carried on spying throughout the war until France was liberated.



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depositing fatal Polonium-210. Litvinenko would not die immediately, allowing Lugovoi time to fly back to Russia oblivious to the fact he had delivered a poison. According to Franchetti's research, the security official and now Russian MP, may have become an "involuntary executor" of the murder.

Franchetti, who is highly regarded by fellow journalists and has immaculate intelligence sources, put his research to former KGB general and now Russian politician Alexei Kondaurov, 58. He said killing anyone abroad was a difficult task - without getting caught. He noted, however, that Polonium is difficult to detect and that by the time it starts to have an

affect, it would be "easy to get an agent out of the country." To perform such an operation, Kondaurov believes it would be better to provide "few details" to the "executor" - the agent charged with delivering the blow. He mentioned that some agents after conducting operations, have no idea their actions had led to the death of a victim. Kondaurov says if the scenario is authentic, Lugovoi was chosen because he, like Litvinenko was a former KGB man, and it would have been possible to make contact and meet.

Lugovoi, who went willingly to the British Embassy in Moscow after learning of his "connection" with the death of Litvinenko,




A young Andrei Lugovoi in his KGB days

called this scenario absurd, saying it suits British intelligence. He was "bewildered" when his name was linked to events in London. In an interview with Franchetti, Lugovoi explained his KGB role, his burgeoning security business,

Executioner'?

Wanted for murder - Andrei Lugovoi the former FSB officer now faces arrest if he travels to any European Union country





Andrei Lugovoi is said to have attended a football match between Arsenal and CSKA Moscow on 1 November - the same day he met Litvinenko at the Millennium Hotel in Grosvenor Square, Mayfair. Traces of the deadly Polonium-210 were found at the Emirates stadium

VITAL WITNESS?

COURTESY: LITVINENKO JUSTICE FOUNDATION



GENESIS FOR PLOT BEGIN IN 2001

One man who could help throw light on the affair is Mikhail Trepashkin, a former Russian security officer who was freed from prison in December 2006. Litvinenko's wife, Marina, believes if he is allowed to leave Russia it could help her case which she has taken to the European Court of Human Rights. Scotland Yard want to question Trepashkin, who was jailed in 2004 for disclosing classified information, because he has already said that in August 2002, the FSB wanted him to join a team that was planning to assassinate Litvinenko and Berezovsky. "If this happens," Marina told Reuters, "it will be immediately clear that the operation was planned a long time ago." Trepashkin has applied for a passport and is currently waiting for Moscow's decision.



Mark Franchetti's research has created many new talking points


his family and his alleged involvement in Litvinenko's death. He said he did not have a motive, nor would

he perform such an act for money or revenge. Franchetti notes, however, that over the past few months Lugovoi has become "increasingly bullish and self-confident."

Lugovoi insists he was framed, or at the very least used as a pawn in a rather murky intelligence-underworld plot. There have been suggestions in Moscow that Litvinenko was linked to a nuclear black market plot, that his former employer Boris Berezovsky was somehow involved, that the murdered former FSB man was in "the employ of MI6" - hardly any of it convincing to Scotland Yard who want to bring Lugovoi back to London.

In November 2007, Lugovoi and his business colleague Dmitry Kovtun (both men had met with Litvinenko in London in November 2006) held an RIA Novosti press conference in Moscow and discussed the allegations. Kovtun said the incident in London could even

have been the result of an "unfortunate accident." He elaborated: "It's perfectly possible that his death was just an unfortunate accident - and Britain's MI6 intelligence service found itself in a ridiculous situation."



President Putin pictured with former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at the Kremlin. Mr Putin rejects allegations that the FSB or any government agency was behind the killing of Litvinenko



Sidelnikov talked about the case of murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya with Litvinenko in London just two days before he was poisoned

Kovtun, a former KGB officer who knew Litvinenko fairly well, even suggested Litvinenko was killed by MI6 or with its "connivance." Lugovoi agreed and backed his friend: "This is a serious possibility that needs checking. What if Litvinenko grew careless with polonium? How was his former boss [in MI6] supposed to explain his death?" The theory and claims have been dismissed by Litvinenko's family, friends and supporters.

As for the suggestion that a shadowy outfit in Moscow "hired him" as an involuntary executioner, Lugovoi said: "I'm not a small and naive boy, and reasonably professional, including [in] the area of security, to not allow someone to use me blindly."



COURTESY KREMLIN

850 Cases of Radioactive Smuggling Averted by Russian Customs in 2007



INTERFAX NEWS said Russia's Federal Customs Service foiled 850 attempts to move illegal radioactive materials through Russia's borders. Nikolay Kravchenko, the deputy chief of the agency's main directorate for information technology, said 85 per cent of the incidents involved materials coming into Russia.

"In 2007, the equipment that spots excessive radiation in luggage at customs borders went off more than 65,000 times. In 850 cases, customs officials found that goods with a high level of ionizing radiation were being illegally transported across the border of the Russian Federation," said Kravchenko.

The Customs representative spoke at length about legal shipments of radioactive materials, such as Polonium-210, which is used in industrial applications. Kravchenko said that

Russia was "far from the only country to export substances of this kind," although he did acknowledge the Polonium-210 used to kill Litvinenko was traced to a Russian state facility.

The official also dismissed international concerns that Russia does not adequately track its radioactive materials. "One hears very often that Russia does not monitor the movement of radioactive isotopes sufficiently well. And yet this is not the case. In reality, Russia is the only country in the world where declared radioactive goods are searched and checked with special equipment, so our equipment makes it possible to spot any mismatch between the actual contents of the container and what is declared on paper in the case of legal transportation of radioactive materials."

The customs agency plans to furnish each of its inspection stations with advanced detection equipment by 2010.

In December an international arrest warrant was issued for Lugovoi. This means he will be arrested if he enters any European country. However, because Lugovoi recently won election as a politician to Russia's parliament, it means there is virtually no chance he can be extradited to the UK to face trial.

SCOTLAND YARD

Andrei Sidelnikov, a Russian dissident who met Litvinenko just two days before he was poisoned, has spoken to Scotland Yard detectives about the meeting. Sidelnikov said the two men had discussed the case of murdered journalist Anna Politkovskaya at a cafe in Oxford Circus. Litvinenko told Sidelnikov he was expecting some documents from Moscow that might prove his suspicion that the FSB was involved in her killing.

Sidelnikov had flown to the UK shortly before Christmas from the Ukrainian capital Kiev. He had initially planned to fly from Moscow but was refused permission. Thereafter friends



Dmitry Kovtun believes MI6 was behind the assassination of Litvinenko



Mark Franchetti discusses the Litvinenko affair with Andrei Lugovoi in the BBC documentary - 'Britain's Most Wanted'

helped him reach the Ukraine via Belarus. Sidelnikov heads a group called 'Pora', an opposition youth movement which advocates an Orange-style revolution to overthrow the government of Vladimir Putin. He explained to journalists in London that he "feared for his life" if he remained in Moscow. "I am very afraid about my life in Russia. When I saw the letter [refusing permission to travel to the UK] from the FSB, I thought that it was the end of my story in Russia." He went on to say he is seeking asylum in the UK.

Sidelnikov's activists took the name Pora ("It's Time") from a Ukrainian student pro-democracy group 'Pora' who supported that country's opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, now president. In 2006, Sidelnikov said: "We are living through a new era of street politics. Our young people are becoming more and more active. They might explode when they can't take it any longer."



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
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The head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Hayden, has acknowledged that two tapes containing tough interrogation techniques used on al-Qaida suspects, including Abu Zubaydah, one of the terror

group's leading operatives, were destroyed at the end of 2005. The tapes were reportedly melted to protect the identity of the agency's senior interrogation officers, and because it was thought there was little worth in keeping them. Critics of the decision note that the timing of the tapes destruction coincided with major pressure being exerted on the CIA over its "extraordinary rendition" programme.

According to intelligence sources close to the affair, the "melt decision" was taken by Jose Rodriguez Jr, then director of the CIA's clandestine operations.

One of the tapes was made in 2002, just as US forces were squeezing al-Qaida out of Afghanistan. It has been alleged that the controversial technique of "waterboarding", whereby a person feels they are drowning, was used on one suspect. Hayden banned the use of the procedure in 2006.



CIA Films of Rend


After the story was leaked to the press, and fearful of a political backlash, Michael Hayden decided it was better to explain to employees the decision to destroy the data in an internal memo. His statement was also posted in full on the CIA website:

DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT ON THE TAPING OF EARLY DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS

"If past public commentary on the Agency's detention programme is any guide, we may


see misinterpretations of the facts in the days ahead. With that in mind, I want you to have some background now.

"CIA's terrorist detention and interrogation programme began after the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002. Zubaydah, who had extensive knowledge of al-Qaida personnel and operations, had been seriously wounded in a firefight. When President Bush officially acknowledged in September 2006 the existence of CIA's counter-terror initiative, he talked about Zubaydah, noting that this terrorist survived solely because of medical treatment arranged by CIA. Under normal questioning, Zubaydah became defiant and evasive. It was clear, in the President's words, that "Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking.




Jose Rodriguez Jr.

"That made imperative the use of other means to obtain the information - means that were lawful, safe, and effective. To meet that need, CIA designed specific, appropriate interrogation procedures. Before they were used, they were reviewed and approved by the Department of Justice and by other elements of the Executive Branch. Even with the great care taken and detailed preparations made, the fact remains that this effort was new, and the agency was determined that it proceed in



Guantanamo Bay detention centre Cuba



Ramzi Binalshibh

they would permit identification of your CIA colleagues who had served in the programme, exposing them and their families to retaliation from al-Qaida and its sympathizers."

DCI Hayden said the CIA only ever taped the first two captured al-Qaida suspects, one of whom was Abu Zubaydah. Zubaydah, did provide intelligence on his 9/11 accomplice Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh was captured thereafter, and with information provided from himself and Zubaydah, this led to the arrest of the 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 2003.

tion Interrogation Melted

accord with established legal and policy guidelines. So, on its own, CIA began to videotape interrogations.

"The tapes were meant chiefly as an additional, internal check on the program in its early stages. At one point, it was thought the tapes could serve as a backstop to guarantee that other methods of documenting the interroga-



Abu Zubaydah

tions - and the crucial information they produced - were accurate and complete. The Agency soon determined that its documentary reporting was full



and exacting, removing any need for tapes. Indeed, videotaping stopped in 2002.

"As part of the rigorous review that has defined the detention program, the Office of General Counsel examined the tapes and determined that they showed lawful methods of questioning. The Office of Inspector General also examined the tapes in 2003 as part of its look at the agency's detention and interrogation practices. Beyond their lack of intelligence value - as the interrogation sessions had already been exhaustively detailed in written channels - and the absence of any legal or internal reason to keep them, the tapes posed a serious security risk. Were they ever to leak,

Left: KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED - one of the main terrorists behind the attacks on America in 2001. Since his capture in 2003, Khalid has been a vital source of intelligence for the CIA

The CIA's destruction of the tapes provoked much anger from civil liberty groups who believe the agency took an executive decision that effectively insulates and protects individuals who may have crossed the line.

- On 3 January 2008, solicitor General Michael B. Mukasey announced that the Justice Department had elevated its inquiry into the destruction of the videotapes to a formal criminal investigation. The decision indicates lawmakers believe CIA officers and other officials may have committed criminal acts.



DCI Michael Hayden

COURTESY CIA

On 30 August 2007, the National Security Agency/Central Security Service announced the expansion of its operations facility on the Pacific island of Hawaii (Field Station Kunia, Wahiawa). The move was to “evolve a global cryptologic enterprise that is resilient, agile, and effective in prosecuting a dynamic threat environment”, according to a press release. The new operations upgrade was hailed as a significant chapter in the evolution of the world’s most secret agency. Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, USA, Director, NSA/Chief, CSS, said, “What will rise

from this site, is NSA’s commitment to continue to provide our national and tactical decision-makers with the best cryptologic support possible. This building, its design, its infrastructure, its capabilities, and its location will support and protect an unparalleled intellectual combine.”

BACKGROUND

The enormous 400 million square foot building, officially called a “Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility” (SCIF), also incorporates a detached 600 square foot shredder facility and a new “Antenna Farm

Building”. Confirmation of Kunia’s upgrade is the culmination of a major research effort that reveals once again, US intelligence considers China a major threat in the espionage game.

US government analysts said of the base in 2003: “Existing NSA/CSS HAWAII facilities have numerous and significant continuity of



**NSA Director
Keith B. Alexander**

Daring Chinese Spies Ta

China’s spies create front company to penetrate and acquire intelligence from top secret NSA facility in Hawaii

RED SKIES

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

operations vulnerabilities and physical plant deficiencies, including force protection inadequacies, safety issues, infrastructure deficiencies, and a lack of usable operational space."

It's not too difficult to understand why the new operations centre was required. NSA/CSS HAWAII is housed in an underground facility built between 1942 and 1944. It was originally intended as an aircraft assembly plant. The building was not designed or constructed to be an intelligence centre and has already exceeded its practical life. Though portions of the interior have been renovated over the



Kunia is a vital part of NSA's ECHELON system. It is fed signals from air, space, sea and land. Pictured here the hog-nosed RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, with its extensive antennae array

get NSA "Crown Jewels"



The existing entrance to Field Station Kunia. The vast majority of this huge complex, built during the war, is underground

PHOTO BY CTMC KARL F. SITLER, USN


years, the overall structure and supporting utilities plant/equipment are antiquated. Until recently, much of the original equipment was still in operation.

SPY GAMES

Just days before Christmas 2007, senior intelligence officials revealed that the facility, 15 miles west of the city of Honolulu and ten miles south of the world famous North Shore of Oahu, had been the target of a complex and most cunning plan by China's foreign intelligence agency to steal its secrets, and recruit spies. US officials, for security purposes, did not reveal when the operation started or how it was defeated, but said investigators from the Naval Criminal Investi-

gative Service (NCIS) carried out a major counterintelligence operation, that exposed an "extensive Chinese spy programme".

Eye Spy is convinced that in 2003, China, learning of US intentions to develop Kunia, and recognising that such a move would mean hiring more translators because of an increase in signals intercepted, seized upon the opportunity and began planning a careful spy operation. China's Ministry of State Security spy directorate (2 PLA), first created a "legitimate" American-based translation company on Hawaii - essentially a "front company". This led to contracts being won from US Naval intelligence and the NSA to translate thousands of intercepted Chinese



This eavesdropping centre is one of NSA's most important field stations and collects and processes signals from China and other Asian countries. Once the front company understood how Kunia was collecting the signals, what it was processing and from where, experts believe it would have been possible for China's spy agency to block the intercepts, and even "export disinformation".

In 2005, US officials reportedly learned that a naval "cryptographic technician" attached to Kunia, accepted a "no charge" visit to China that was paid for by Beijing. Investigators also discovered employees nearing the end of their career were offered some sort of deal by representatives of the front company. Chinese intelligence officers embedded in the company then sought to identify Kunia employees with



and Far East signals from satellites, field stations (listening posts), ships and aircraft. China is one nation that is a major operator of front companies and it is known that hugely important US defence secrets have been acquired via this method. The Chinese effort on Hawaii was not just to learn about the type of signals NSA were intercepting, but they made great efforts to recruit intelligence staff (military and civilian) with access to the spy base and break US codes. This proved a mistake.

The front company reportedly handled contracted files out of the NSA base at Kunia.

links to China (relatives) and they too were offered free visits. Once abroad, they would have been approached in the hope they could be turned.

The new NSA operations centre expansion cost \$350 million (£175m) and Kunia is regarded as one of the agency's "crown jewels". Little wonder then 2 PLA and other Chinese spy services targeted the facility in an elaborate spy operation.

The scale of the undercover NCIS investigation remains secret, but it is already being hailed as a major US counterintelligence victory.

US intelligence antenna array farm

COMPL

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
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

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SPY WARS

The Nosenko Case - one of the great unsolved mysteries of the Cold War




A brief overview by Tennent Bagley

In December 1961, at a time of great tension in the Cold War with Khrushchev rattling sabers over Berlin, a KGB officer named Anatoly Golitsyn defected to CIA and gave startling indications of KGB successes in recruiting Western officials. Only a few months afterwards, there arrived on temporary mission in the West yet another KGB officer, Yuri Nosenko, volunteering his services to CIA in Geneva.


Coming from inside the KGB's directorate that worked against foreign intelligence inside the USSR, Nosenko brought quite different, and more comforting versions of certain operations that Golitsyn had partially exposed. Nosenko was unwilling to defect or to meet CIA inside the USSR, but agreed to make contact whenever he travelled to the West.

A year and a half later Nosenko came out again, this time having changed his mind and defecting outright. This was just weeks after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald, who had earlier defected to and spent three years in the Soviet Union. Nosenko claimed astonishing direct knowledge of Oswald's sojourn there, and could report with

© PHOTO HULL UNIVERSITY VIA CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES



Tennent Bagley, former head of the CIA's Soviet Counterintelligence Desk, and author of the controversial book - *Spy Wars* - talks exclusively to Eye Spy about his work and why he believes the KGB 'planted' an agent inside the CIA and broke American secret codes





Yuri Nosenko - the KGB defector who Bagley maintains was a plant to deflect CIA attention away from other more important matters - including the assassination of John F. Kennedy

telligence matters, and to discredit me and others who had distrusted him. Nosenko continues to live in the United States to this day, enjoying the trust of the American intelligence community.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, during the brief window of opportunity that opened in the 1990s (and has since closed), I established contact with former KGB adversaries (who were fully aware of my long work against them) and in friendly conversations got confirmation that Nosenko had been planted by the KGB to hide the facts 1) that moles in CIA had permitted the KGB to detect CIA's great spies Popov and Penkovsky, and 2) that the KGB had recruited American code clerks who had permitted the Soviet Union to break American ciphers - gaining a war-winning capability.

So I decided to write *Spy Wars*, in the hope of 1) persuading American authorities to look into these findings, 2) correcting history, and 3), exposing the dangerous treason of still-undiscovered moles.

INTERVIEW

authority that the KGB had taken no interest in Oswald, much less had it had any hand in his later act. (While the KGB doubtless had more contact with Oswald than Nosenko reported, there is no reason to suspect the truth of his basic message - that the KGB had nothing to do with the assassination. The Soviet leadership is known to have been anxious to convey this message to the United States because a direr conclusion might even be a cause for war.)

I was Nosenko's initial contact in Geneva and later, in Langley as head of CIA's worldwide operations against Soviet intelligence, supervised all contact with him until early 1967. We detected strange circumstances around Nosenko, and his reports seemed to be intentionally hiding the existence of KGB moles in CIA and among American code clerks, so I took a position against my own apparently important agent. In a long interrogation my views gained confirmation - though no confession. But after my departure on assignment abroad, CIA found it expedient to whitewash Nosenko of all doubts, take him into its fold as a counsellor on counterin-

EYE SPY: The extensive details you provide on the Yuri Nosenko defection case show that CIA leadership and some officers in the Soviet Branch were likely wrong in clearing him, yet your book, *Spy Wars*, was cleared for publication. Do you think that this is an indication that opinions have changed at CIA regarding Nosenko?

THB: It's not criticism that CIA tries to avoid when clearing its veterans' writings for publication. They're looking - and rightly - for any inadvertent disclosure of their sources or methods or personnel. When the Agency cleared my manuscript they did find a few, so of course I deleted them. But that didn't significantly reduce or dilute what I had to say. But to answer the other part of your question, no, there's no sign that opinions have changed there. Nosenko evidently continues to enjoy CIA's full confidence.

EYE SPY: *Spy Wars* makes clear that there were two factions at CIA: those who believed that Nosenko was a bona-fide asset, and others,

like yourself, who strongly believed that Nosenko and other KGB personnel who "defected" during this same period were plants and part of a large deception plan.

THB: Those who believed Nosenko was genuine were those who knew least about how the case unfolded on the scene, and that includes people who had studied the files. It still astonishes me to see them defending Nosenko's good faith while entirely ignoring - or distorting - the truly significant facts. I've listed some of those facts in the form of "Twenty Questions" - matters like Nosenko's false claim to have held the KGB job where he got the most important information he gave CIA about Soviet spies. Or why he failed to tell us that his closest associates happened to be KGB specialists in deception. My publisher, Yale University Press, put those twenty questions onto its web site: <http://yalepress.yale.edu:yupbooks>.) Not one of these questions has ever been addressed, much less answered, by any defender of Nosenko.





Lee Harvey Oswald - in what appears to be a "doctored" photograph

EYE SPY: What role did senior executives at CIA play in deciding who was bona-fide and who was not? Why would upper level managers ignore so many strong indications of false defections? You stated that some of them wanted Nosenko cleared. What were their reasons?

THB: Upper level managers had little time or inclination to delve into the details of the cases - and they wanted Nosenko cleared. That's easy to understand. If they were to conclude that the KGB had planted Nosenko on them, they'd have had to ask why. They'd have to deal with what Nosenko was hiding - that the KGB had broken American ciphers and had moles inside CIA. That would bring troubles down on their


heads. Remember when they discovered a later mole, Aldrich Ames, in their midst; that didn't win them any praise but instead waves of public outrage and ridicule. That sort of unpleasantness could be avoided if Nosenko were judged to be bona fide. So upper level managers were understandably receptive to any explanations - even faulty and distorted ones - that might clear Nosenko and rid them of what CIA Director Richard Helms called this "incubus," this "bone in the throat." I understand why CIA might whitewash Nosenko as a political expedient, but I cannot understand how it could then adopt, as truth and doctrine, the inevitably flimsy and corrupt analysis it took to whitewash someone so obviously lying. This foreclosed any further attempt to dig

out the moles that the KGB was hiding behind Nosenko's stories.

EYE SPY: What was Nosenko's true mission? Discredit Golitsyn? Cover for another penetration? You (and Anatoly Golitsyn) have shown, in convincing detail that the KGB had a large, well organised deception plan aimed at the CIA and FBI during the 1960s and 1970s. What were the broad objectives of this deception plan? (Aside from absorbing CI assets, sowing confusion and lending credibility to Nosenko's defection).

THB: Let's not mix up two separate things, as others have done. On the one hand there was the KGB's broad programme of misleading and manipulating Western policy; on the other, there were the counterintelligence deception operations in which the KGB sent Nosenko and other false sources into CIA's hands. Nosenko's defenders, by playing the trick of amalgamating these two quite separate things, tried to deride the whole case against Nosenko as a paranoid delusion by a few nuts with visions of some all-knowing, octopus-like KGB manipulating the world in a "monster plot." In fact, as my book makes clear, we were simply assessing concrete facts that faced us - and dealing with the kind of operations the KGB had been conducting for two generations.


Those two different sorts of operations stemmed from different elements of the KGB. Its foreign-operations directorate was conducting that broad deception programme you referred to, influencing and misleading Western governments in the interests of Soviet policy objectives. A quite different element, the KGB's Second Chief Directorate (SCD), worked inside the USSR. Today, in fact, the two are housed in different Russian agencies: foreign operations in the SVR, internal counterintelligence and security in the FSB. It was the SCD (today's FSB) that launched the Nosenko deception. It did so on its own and for reasons not directly relevant to the KGB's foreign operations. It was protecting some of its most treasured secrets that had suddenly become threatened with exposure. A few months earlier, KGB officer Anatoly Golitsyn had genuinely defected to CIA knowing things that could expose the SCD's recruitment in



Tennent Bagley and Eye Spy editor Mark Birdsall

Moscow of American personnel who had enabled the KGB to break American ciphers and to uncover CIA's great spies in the Soviet military establishment, Pyotr Popov and Oleg Penkovsky. Nosenko's mission in 1962: was to plug this leak. The SCD's operational-deception unit sent him to tell CIA some things that would throw Western counterintelligence off the track of those important SCD recruits.

EYE SPY: There is a great deal of information about Lee Harvey Oswald contained in *Spy Wars*. He fled to the Soviet Union in 1959 and may have flirted with Soviet Intelligence. Just two months before Kennedy was shot on 22 November 1963, Oswald turned up at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. It has been



Aldrich Ames



Oleg Penkovsky after receiving his death sentence for spying on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency

suggested that one of Nosenko's primary missions was to remove any possible suspicions that the KGB was involved in Kennedy's assassination. Is this a sub plot? What do you believe? Did Nosenko ever discuss the KGB mindset when Kennedy was assassinated? Nosenko seemed to know a great deal about Oswald. He was keen to downplay any possible link between the former US marine and the KGB. How so?

THB: When Oswald assassinated President Kennedy the Soviet leadership feared that the Americans might conclude that they had commanded the act - a potential cause of war. Thus it is no coincidence that just then, only six weeks after the assassination, Nosenko emerged in the West again - this time defecting outright - to tell us that he had had no fewer than four points of direct contact with the Oswald case


in the USSR. Nosenko said he had personally reviewed the KGB file on Oswald on the order of the Soviet leader Khrushchev himself. With this extraordinary authority he could assure us (as his KGB boss could assure Khrushchev) that the KGB had had no contact whatsoever with Oswald in the USSR; it was not even interested in him, much less had it commanded his act. Yes, this was indeed a "sub-plot" - in fact, a basic change - in the Nosenko operation. It was surely not the KGB's original purpose to put him into our hands as a defector. In 1962 he had told us in no uncertain terms that he would never defect and would meet us only when he came to the West on occasional official trips. That way, we would only be able to meet him when and for as long as he (meaning the KGB) permitted, and we would never get the opportunity to debrief him systematically and detect the flaws in his (shaky) legend. Now

however, after Oswald murdered the President, the Soviet leadership needed some way to reassure the Americans about Oswald, to testify publicly with convincing authority - and there was Nosenko, already in touch with CIA and apparently trusted by them. But for this he would have to defect - a risky business, but the stakes were high. As a result Nosenko had to submit, like any defector, to our detailed debriefing and as I show in the book, he was ill prepared to do so. (I

think if we had not locked him up for serious questioning, Nosenko would have "redefected" before we had a chance to do it, as did a later defector, Vitaly Yurchenko). So Nosenko's mission in 1962 was different from that of 1964 - the KGB was compelled to change it because of the Kennedy assassination.

EYE SPY: You provide extensive detail to show that Nosenko lied repeatedly to you and others after his defection and during his interrogation sessions. There were many inconsistencies in the answers Nosenko provided to his CIA interrogators. Why was this ignored or not fully taken into consideration as a factor in his being cleared? Did this not spark alarm bells?

all history - is a subject that deserves attention. Some within CIA failed to understand counterintelligence and resented the mystery with which Angleton surrounded his activities (some, in fact, bore him a personal grudge), so they made him the scapegoat in their attempts to discredit, as paranoia, our suspicions of Nosenko. While it would be enlightening to know exactly who was behind this, and why, it is not directly pertinent to the way CIA handled the Nosenko-related cases. Angleton did not play a deciding role in this and had nothing to do with CIA's incarceration of Nosenko. But to answer your question, yes, Angleton remained firmly convinced to the day of his death that the KGB had planted Nosenko.



President John F. Kennedy


THB: Alarm bells were clanging in my mind and some others, as I describe in my book. How could CIA ignore all the causes of that alarm, and muffle those alarm bells, without resolving the doubts I describe in my book? I'd like to know, but I don't.

EYE SPY: You make clear that former CI Staff chief James Angleton had minimal involvement in the Nosenko case, yet he has been blamed repeatedly in books and articles for the - mistreatment and imprisonment of Nosenko." To what do you attribute so much anti-Angleton feeling even years after he departed the scene? Did James Angleton suspect the KGB had planted Nosenko?

THB: The vilification of James Angleton - the unjust pasting of the adjective "paranoid" to his name for

EYE SPY: Regarding the handling (or mishandling) of another defector, N.F. Artamonov, a Soviet naval officer whom the KGB kidnapped in Vienna and killed. You state that his handlers, Bruce Solie from CIA's Office of Security and Elbert Turner of the FBI, allowed him to meet with the KGB in Vienna despite warnings from Angleton's CI Staff to never let him meet with the KGB outside the United States. Was anyone held responsible/asked to answer for this incident?

THB: These events transpired after I had left the job overseeing counterintelligence operations. I am not aware of anyone having been held accountable for this clumsy, naïve, and ultimately fatal mishandling.



A photo found by the FBI of Lee Harvey Oswald pictured in a US military uniform. Oswald was a qualified sharpshooter

"...This guaranteed that MI5 surveillance of Vassall would confirm his contact with the KGB - and make Nosenko look good in Western eyes..."

EYE SPY: The CIA's best secret sources inside the USSR were Lt. Col. Pyotr Popov and Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, both of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence). Both were exposed and executed. The Soviets claimed that both moles had been unearthed by routine surveillance of Western diplomats in Moscow. But you believe this was not the case. How so?

THB: I explain in my book the compelling reasons to disbelieve the story that Nosenko (among others) conveyed to us to mislead us about when and how the KGB really detected Popov and Penkovsky. I cite circumstances that leave little doubt that both were betrayed by one or more KGB moles in CIA. By looking behind a couple of Nosenko's tales we were able to identify the CIA man who apparently betrayed Popov. It was the man CIA had sent to Moscow to support the Popov case there. After the Cold War the KGB admitted they had recruited him - but by then he was dead, without ever being confronted with his treason. As for Penkovsky, we looked behind other tales Nosenko told us and were shocked to see that the KGB must have really learned about Penkovsky's contact with us immediately after it began, many months before any surveillance in Moscow. To hide the mole or moles who betrayed Penkovsky, the KGB let Penkovsky spy on for more than a year until they could establish that "surveillance" legend that Nosenko foisted on us. And the mole has never been uncovered. I hope someone will follow up.

EYE SPY: Your book shows that the KGB repeatedly duped the CIA and the FBI during the 1960s and 1970s. It is difficult, even for the average reader, to believe that these organisations so readily accepted the same approach, the same general stories - essentially the same tradecraft. Is it possible that someday we will read that these organisations were not really taken in by the KGB, that these operations were being played back at the Soviets in some masterful, super-secret fashion?

THB: It would be nice to think that, but it just isn't so. The KGB can thank many different factors for their

success - including our incurable tendency to believe what we want to believe, and reject what we don't.

EYE SPY: In December 1961 KGB officer Golitsyn changed sides to the CIA. He soon began providing intelligence about dozens of Soviet agents operating in the West, including an unnamed traitor,



John Vassall

perhaps two, working in the UK's Admiralty. One of those was John Vassall. Nosenko later confirmed Vassall was a Soviet spy, but it has been suggested he "gave up" Vassall to help conceal the second and even more important asset in the Admiralty. Is this possible?

THB: Certainly. I gather that British counterintelligence had indications of another KGB source in the Admiralty, though I don't know how their investigations turned out. As for Vassall, Golitsyn gave precise descriptions of secret Admiralty documents that some unknown spy had given the KGB. This enabled MI5 to narrow down the list of candidate suspects to about three, of whom one was Vassall. So Vassall would have been caught without the extra detail that Nosenko later added that pinpointed him. By the way, here's a fascinating insight into KGB trickery, showing that the KGB did, indeed, sacrifice Vassall - at least to build up Nosenko in our eyes and perhaps also, as you suggest, to hide yet another source in the Admiralty. Our secret source inside Polish State Security, Michal Goleniewski, had

uncovered an important KGB spy in the Admiralty, Harry Houghton. When Goleniewski defected to the West at the end of 1960, the KGB, realising that he had known about Houghton, saw that the British would now investigate in the Admiralty - and possibly stumble upon other mole or moles there. To protect Vassall the KGB took the standard precaution of suspending contact with him. They put the case temporarily "on ice" as the expression goes. Then, in late 1961 Anatoly Golitsyn defected. The KGB knew he was aware of Vassall's reporting to the KGB - but chose this unimaginable moment to reverse its normal practice and restored its suspended London contact with Vassall. Then they sent out Nosenko with information that pinpointed Vassall. This guaranteed that MI5 surveillance of Vassall would confirm his contact with the KGB - and make Nosenko look good in Western eyes. Vassall was not, by a long shot, the only spy the KGB sacrificed to build up Nosenko's reputation. Another Nosenko tip, in 1964, uncovered US Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson as a KGB spy. By that time Johnson had lost his access to the highly secret information he had been passing to the KGB, and his wife was denouncing him as a Soviet spy, so the case was of no further value for the KGB. So they had Nosenko uncover him to CIA, sacrificing their loyal collaborator in order to build up Nosenko in our eyes. In fact, this became a blood sacrifice when Johnson, in prison because of Nosenko's tip to CIA, was stabbed to death by his own son visiting him.

EYE SPY: During the height of the Cold War, you believed (and still do) that three American code clerks at



DCI Angleton



Anatoly Golitsyn





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the US Embassy in Moscow, were in fact spying for the KGB. You also maintain you would still like to find these traitors. Just how much information do you think these three individuals imparted, and could there have been more?

THB: Here you touch the very core of the KGB's purpose in launching the Nosenko deception operation. Nothing is more valuable for an intelligence service - and worth more protection if you have it - than the ability to read the enemy's communications. (Remember the "Ultra" secret of World War Two - a "war-winning capability.") One hides the fact of any successful cipher break behind the most rigid security barriers and perhaps even launches deception operations to make the enemy feel safe. Nosenko claimed to have supervised KGB operations against American code clerks in Moscow. With this authority he told us that up to that time in the Cold War, the Soviets had never succeeded in recruiting any. At the same time, he said other things that were evidently designed to conceal no fewer than three real successes that we might have tumbled to with information from Golitsyn. After the Cold War, in informal contact with old KGB adversaries, I was able to get the KGB side of one of those operations that Nosenko was hiding. At the end of the 1940s, one of these code-clerk traitors had betrayed information that permitted the KGB to reconstruct the then-active American cipher machine and to intercept secret American communications, with historic consequences. (What I learned - both the spy and the fact of the cipher break - had been known to only seven people in the whole KGB.) The other two code clerks were apparently recruited by the KGB at the beginning of the 1960s and may have given equally important advantages to the Soviet Union. You ask if there could have been more. Yes indeed. Almost any spy case can be the root from which others grow. We can't afford to overlook these old traitors simply because the passage of time has made their old betrayals obsolete.

EYE SPY: If Yuri Nosenko was successfully planted by the KGB, was there ever an occasion when you suspected further contact between him and Moscow? It seems implausible that Nosenko was not used again, or perhaps his usefulness had been exhausted?



CIA Director Richard Helms called breaches in security his "incubus," and "bone in the throat."

THB: During my years on the case Nosenko had no chance to make direct contact with Moscow or its representatives (although of course from their side the KGB could have sent messages to him through, say, coded advertisements in a Washington or New York or Russian-language newspaper). However, after CIA put its trust in him I presume he did manage contact with the KGB. I say this because CIA spokesmen have referred to things he later reported that he did not know during the first years of his contact with CIA. CIA has said publicly only that Nosenko gave "valuable information," exposed "new cases," and assisted CIA operations. I can only speculate that all this somehow benefited the KGB. It would be interesting to know.

EYE SPY: Has anyone done a broad, detailed analysis of the information that was provided by the numerous false KGB defectors?

THB: We certainly did this during my time. From our comparison of what different false sources had reported to CIA, we detected a common directing hand and common KGB objectives behind several different cases. But we did not have access to everything the FBI, for example, got from its own false sources. (They

had concluded that their spy in the KGB in New York, Aleksey Kulak, had been working against the FBI as a KGB plant for many years.) But I doubt that anyone ever pulled together everything that all the suspect sources had reported.

Continued on page 70



EYE SPY BEST-SELLERS

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Eye Spy Intelligence Magazine rear-vision surveillance sunglasses have a black-metal designer frame, rubber-backed ear drop-over (for comfort) and superb glass lenses. They also come in a tough smart black carry case. Don't confuse these glasses with other cheap models that are easily spotted, or others that carry the Eye Spy name. The reflective mirror in our glasses is actually embedded into the lens and impossible to detect.

COURTESY USAF



IRAN'S

A controversial assessment made by 16 US intelligence agencies that states Iran stopped its nuclear weapons programme in 2003, is still causing confusion. According to senior intelligence officials, the programme remains on hold, and appears to contradict an earlier assessment made two years ago that Tehran was working inexorably toward building a bomb. The NIE is at odds with intelligence gleaned by Israel's Mossad.



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CIA and Mossad fail in their case to convince wider US intelligence community over Iran's nuclear weapons programme

NUCLEAR CON-FUSION

It is understood notes recovered from an Iranian engineer contained on a laptop in 2004, led to a major intelligence operation launched by the CIA and NSA. Intercepted conversations between "furious" Iranian military officials who complained Iran should not stop its weapons programme, also complemented the material. The CIA thought long and hard about the possibility that the Iranians were trying to dupe Langley with a distraction operation, but in the end analysts decided Iran's nuclear weapons programme had stalled.

THE "GREAT DISCOVERY"


The information on the laptop provided the CIA with a plethora of intelligence on Iran's covert bomb project - proving beyond doubt that it existed. President Bush, when questioned about the "reversal", said a "great discovery" led to the NIE. This is probably what was found on the laptop computer. How the computer "fell" into the hands of the CIA is not known.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE DETAILS

A two-page summary of a 130 page National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) represents the consensus of America's premier intelligence services, though it's far from clear if the report has not been "laced" with caveats. Some intelligence watchers believe it could also be a huge clever ploy to draw a reaction from Iran. That reaction came in the form of Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, declaring "victory" and announcing his country would continue to enrich uranium.


The NIE suggests international pressure caused Iran to stop its weapons research, but other analysts believe it was the removal of al-Qaida and the defeat of the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan that caused Tehran to react.

Though each of America's premier intelligence services had input into the NIE, there is still uncertainty over its accuracy, primarily because



President Ahmadinejad claimed the NIE was a "great victory" for Iran

so little HUMINT is available on Iran's weapons programme. More alarming has been the suggestion that some of its content has been "politically guided" by opponents of President Bush. Either way, the intelligence used to



Analysts from various agencies produced the controversial NIE

The strange NIE produced in Washington is either a birthday present for Iran or a stunningly clever deception plan that few people can explain...

produce the summary is top secret, save the material found on the laptop and through eavesdropping; intelligence watchers can only hazard a guess at other key elements used by analysts to reach their conclusions.

Only a few months ago information leaks from Washington suggested moves were afoot to prepare for an attack on several key Iranian nuclear sites. Then followed news that Israel had conducted at least two "simulated" attacks on Iran's sites. Officials from both Mossad and some US intelligence agencies issued concerns that Iran was just two or three years away from having a nuclear weapon. The conclusions of the new assessment are also likely to be major factor in the tense international negotiations aimed at getting Iran to halt its nuclear energy programme.

The assessment notes that Tehran's decisions are guided by a "cost-benefit approach" rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs. "Some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways might - if perceived by Iran's leaders as credible - prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons programme," the estimate states.

NIE's are what guides US policy, and this surprising release comes exactly five years after a controversial NIE concluded Iraq "possessed chemical and biological weapons programmes and was determined to restart its nuclear programme." The report formed the basis that

led to Washington authorising a military invasion of Iraq. That NIE was wrong, and it seems those analysts judging Iran's "nuclear ambitions", are not willing to sanction a report that could provoke a strike on Iran.




Donald M. Kerr

The new report also concludes that if Iran decided to engage again in its weapons programme, it would be 2010 before Tehran would have enough highly enriched uranium to produce a nuclear bomb. The NIE suggests it is still "very unlikely" Iran could produce enough of the material by then. More realistically, the NIE says Iran "could have a bomb" by 2013-15 "because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems."

Previous analysis and estimates that claimed Iran was determined to obtain a nuclear bomb, appear to have been

US Admiral Michael Mullen Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held key meetings with intelligence officials



Though the NIE says Iran stopped its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 - US monitoring agencies continue to surveil Tehran's activities

COURTESY DOD

literally "thrown out". But the smart money is on the notion that the US simply does not know how far Iran has taken its nuclear weapons programme and after the Iraq debacle, caution has become a byword. One crucial line that the media seems to have totally ignored, is that the NIE does say that Iran's ultimate goal is still to develop nuclear weapons.

In a separate statement accompanying the NIE, Deputy Director of National Intelligence Donald M. Kerr said that given the new conclusions, it was important to release the report publicly "to ensure that an accurate presentation is available."

President George Bush said the report would not change Washington's position: "Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous," he said. "And, Iran will be dangerous if they have the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon."

MOSSAD INTELLIGENCE

Just one week after the release of the NIE, US Admiral Michael Mullen met with Israel Defence Force Chief of General Staff, Lt.-General Gabi Ashkenazi and Defence Minister Ehud Barak. Mullen reportedly belongs to a group within US intelligence that opposes any "war talk" with Iran. Other colleagues allegedly include US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and US Admiral William Fallon, Commander of US Central Command. Eye Spy understands that during Mr Mullen's 24-hour stay in Tel Aviv, he was briefed by senior Mossad officials who presented intelligence that proves that far from Tehran stopping its race towards the nuclear bomb, it has actually hastened its efforts. How the Mossad acquired this intelligence is impossible to say, but some intelligence watchers believe it was not fully used in the manufacture of the US NIE. It is also understood, Mullen, a former Commander of the US Navy, was briefed on Israel's operation to destroy a suspected nuclear weapons research facility in Syria in September 2007.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran's huge and powerful intelligence services have used every crafty trick in the book to gain more time to help conclude its weapons programme.

The strange NIE produced in Washington is either a birthday present for Iran or a stunningly clever deception plan that few people can explain.

Editor's Note: Readers can download the NIE on Iran's nuclear weapons programme by visiting www.eyespyimg.com - go to the Reading Room and click on the section: - 'Government Releases'



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


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DISGUISE TECHNIQUE

Cloaking tricks, deceptions and

Eye Spy continues its journey into the intelligence tradecraft of disguise - and discusses various points with an intelligence expert trained in this fascinating art

Antonio J. Mendez, was a brilliant CIA master of disguise, who often drew upon the expertise of Hollywood to create various disguises. He's been described as the man who helped CIA officers disappear into the world's back alleys, but even he admits: "It's not just the makeup... disguise is not just the face you present. It's the 6,000-year-old secrets, the capability to create illusions. The essence is illusion and deception." Few would argue with this overview.



ANTONIO J. MENDEZ

A disguise can be any one of the following and more: physical, illusionary, prop-assisted, psychological, technical (new identity etc.). They are all essentially "cloaking tricks" "deceptions" and "illusions" that differ depending

on the type of operation they are intended for.

Certain materials, substances, objects and clothing can be used to augment a disguise. Some of these are known as 'one-time props' and have a "sell-by date" dependent on user requirement: a walking stick, false tattoo, a specific coat, handbag, spectacles etc. Serving behind a shop counter in a uniform, being seen in a certain area and even making a purchase with a credit card can confuse an adversary and may fall into the 'one-time

prop' category. It's important to remember that circumstances and tasks dictate what, if any disguise should be used, and of course, what form it should take. More often than not, several disguise techniques will be employed over the length of an operation. They can also be rethought and reconstructed.

Eye Spy recently discussed disguise tradecraft with "Pam", a specialist trainer for a leading foreign intelligence collection service. She advised that if at all possible, a heavy physical disguise, especially one that involves major facial preparation, should not be used. "There are operatives for all tasks and all seasons," she said. "If necessary we can create a new image... though identity, realism, mannerism and thought are equally powerful tools." She told of a classic case that involved an intelligence officer infiltrating a trade show. He was sent to represent an electronics company and make contact with other firms in an effort to acquire information - not just at the show, but to develop future relations. "It was pointless producing a physical disguise here," she said, "the illusion was in his knowledge of the business - he had to be technically capable of sharing a conversation and discussing the industry he was representing." At a hotel he met with other delegates and, over a drink or two, learned even more and relations were cemented.

This is a good example of three disguise factors coming together. The prop-assist and illusion was the trade show stand, and the operative was certainly capable of discussing high-end electronics. The deception was also assisted by the fact that there was "common ground". Once a conversation developed, the 'front company' was further supported by an

array of other officers. It was an elaborate effort - the beginning of a major intelligence coup. A disguise, therefore, can be big or small, but they are often risky. For example, during the Cold War a CIA operative based in Berlin posed as a West German businessman. This allowed him to travel to Russia quite freely and liaise with Soviet trade contacts. Unfortunately the ruse was discovered by the KGB, who managed to secure intelligence on various subjects from the contacts. They even used some of the businessmen - loyal to the state - to pass on disinformation.


ONE-TIME PROPS

Deception and illusion and inexorably linked to disguise and even the most subtle "alteration" in a "scene" can affect the overall picture or impression. Take for example the CIA's attempt to recruit two Soviet Military Intelligence officers in the early 1960s. The CIA was at the point of making contact with the men, but the KGB had prior knowledge of the



Part III

TECHNIQUES and illusions



Another bugged Soviet Embassy telephone line recorded a conversation with a Russian doctor also discussing the "accident". Of course it was all a ploy to get at least one of the men out of Germany before the CIA could pounce. To augment the illusion, the officer (it could well have been a double - with the real officer already under arrest) was put on a Moscow-bound aeroplane complete with a "very large visible cast". The Soviets knew a CIA surveillance team was following and reporting on the scene. The one-time prop in this case was the cast.

Other one-time props occasionally used to deflect or attract attention are white sticks signifying a blind or poor sighted person or someone wearing dark glasses. Crutches, walking sticks, plaster casts, wheel chair-bound persons and even walking a dog can lessen a persons 'threat level'. However, they can also make a person more visible - especially to an aware surveillance team. It's all about context. Using most of these props in a hospital environment would hardly attract a glance - not so in a busy shopping street where persons would be forced to move aside. It's because of this, some operatives are reluctant to use such tactics.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS AND USING DOUBLES

Similarly, many case or field intelligence officers do not like to use disguise techniques to conduct their business, but there are a multitude of reasons why it happens. Using doubles, for example, which often begins with "making an impression".

A counterintelligence service will seek background information on any person that it suspects of belonging to an foreign intelligence adversary, especially one assigned to an embassy or a permanent trade council or international company. Naturally, besides conventional enquiries involving residence, phone numbers and job occupation, routes taken to work, dress, habits, contacts and places visited are all noted.

Persons engaged in information collection, agent contact and very dangerous work, will often resort to making a "first impression" or "impact" (regardless of how subtle it is) - *it's what they will be remembered by and for*. This could take any one of a number of forms. Driving a specific car; taking the family to dinner on a certain day of the week and at a "favourite" restaurant; jogging in a park at a specific time; walking briskly; walking slowly; slouching; wearing the same coat; donning a black cap, combing a parting on one side of the head or even having a certain shaped



**Top - General Montgomery
and below his impersonator -
Clifton James**

moustache etc. It could also relate to how a person waves their hands in a conversation, hails down a taxi or generally conducts themselves. Such tactics are employed to help establish an image and provoke complacency - ultimately they can also be used to help create a disguise.

Example: A surveillance officer expects to see a person [target] jogging in the park at 9.30am on a Sunday morning, but is it really him? In many cases whereby contact with undercover operatives is essential or other tasks must be undertaken covertly, the role is played by a colleague - essentially a "double" allowing the case officer to exit an embassy, for example, and meet in another part of the city or countryside.

Switching persons or using doubles is still a problem area because skilled counterintelligence officers are trained to recognise certain body traits and details, even at a distance. Though the person may be dressed identically, is the same height, and just happens to be in the park at 9.30am, it might not fool a

plan because of a mole. The KGB, however, didn't want to alert Langley to their asset - something that surely would happen if they suddenly recalled the officers from Berlin. To thwart the operation and protect their source, Moscow used a variety of tradecraft. It had learned West Germany's BfV was tapping a number of specific Soviet telephones: thus was born a cunning plan. The KGB knew the BfV was working with the CIA on the phone taps, so "employed" a Russian woman to play the role of a wife of one of the CIA-targeted Russian officers. "Isn't it a shame that [...] broke his leg and has had to go home for treatment," the woman said to her friend.



Wearing a branded (logo) hat will create an impression (though don't use this one). It also helps conceal various features of the head - including the shape

professional. Perhaps the biggest danger in this case, is most people run and walk differently; so too the way in which we converse and conduct ourselves, and few people are rarely the same shape and size. There are always subtle differences. The key to the illusion here would be wearing an identical track suit and mimicking the run. If the person runs with an exaggerated arm movement it can be copied. But experienced counterintelligence officers will look for anything untoward or unusual. It's that "sixth



sense" again (see issue 51 and 52). Therefore anyone working as a double, whether it's to confuse an adversary, "throw" a surveillance team, create a diversion, or even meet a person, attention to detail is everything. If a target regularly picks up a copy of *The Times* at a train station, for example, it's important his colleague double does the same. Whenever such ruses are conducted, it's preferable that some concealment to the face area, if practical, is made. This takes us full circle to "first impressions", the intelligence officer

may have chosen to run wearing a distinctive tracksuit complete with logo and hood. He could wear glasses, a high-collared jacket and scarf. Any of these could augment at least partial face cover. Only identical lookalikes or twins can get away with a perfect "double act".

DANGERS

One often overlooked aspect of disguise, especially in the "double" or "switch" element of disguise tradecraft concerns the person being left or right-handed. A professional observer will strive to note if a person is left or right-handed by monitoring certain actions. Moments when such intelligence can be gleaned will always present themselves: the

Same person - same dress - but simply by walking differently or feigning a bad back and utilising the walking stick can provide a marked visual effect



Attention to detail is important if using a double as a counterplay - including remembering if the person is left or right handed



Purchasing a different newspaper could well be noticed

target could visit a cafe and hold his coffee cup; eat in a restaurant; write a cheque in a bank; present a credit card in a store; open a car door or put money in a parking meter etc. Similarly, they could carry a case or bag over a certain shoulder - if there are any major deviations with a double here, it could spell serious trouble. It's the tiny things that can often ruin a deception of this kind, and one reason why this obvious, yet crucial element,

if ignored, can make or break an operation. How many times do you sit in an office and note who holds a phone to their right ear, holds a pen or fork or opens or closes a drawer with their left hand? Rarely, but it's a counterintelligence essential.

THE DETRACTOR

An alternative and useful way to help perform the "double" ruse is using what's called a "detractor". It's another "first impression" that is unique to a particular person. This could take various forms - and is something that a surveillance team expects to see - from a facial mark to that tracksuit with a specific branded logo or a pair of running shoes. Similarly, using a dye to match a person's hair

can help "ease surveillance worries" - even if seen at a distance it will augment the deception.

Success depends on the quality of a disguise, its planning, the failings of an adversary and luck. But as we shall see, there are disguise experts who can create impressive alterations that are virtually impossible to detect - even from just a few inches away. One such technique was touched upon in issue 52. The




QUICK CHANGE DISGUISE

Carrying holdalls like these enables persons utilising disguises to conceal a second-change of clothes and other items. If required, the person could enter a washroom and exit in an entirely new costume. Leg shape and length are also concealed and a shoe exchange can alter height and gait





It's all too easy to overlook minute details - such as carrying a bag on the "correct" shoulder



'Beyond Hollywood' feature showed how professional undercover intelligence operatives use Potassium Permanganate to create utterly realistic bruises that will fade naturally. However, this useful substance can also be used to reproduce a "nicotine stain effect" simply by rubbing the watered-down crystals over the middle and forefinger - most used by smokers. It's a useful aide, especially if the person doesn't smoke but wants to give the impression they do. The results are convinc-

ing. And in the event the person is obliged to wash their hands (under observance) - even in bleach or detergent, the odourless stain will remain for several days. Similarly, getting this substance wet and behind the fingernails it creates the impression of an oil stain - it's impossible to remove and is useful if the operative is supposedly working in a an environment like a garage or heavy industry. But it is predominantly a "first impression" tool - most people will notice nicotine staining.

In other circumstances it has been used as a one-time prop to create a "birthmark" on the face, arm or body. The problem here is if the user tries to duplicate the effect again, it's almost impossible - unless the stain only covers a specific small area. Essential therefore that any changes or additions to a facial disguise, such as a

mark are photographed - just to make sure that they can be duplicated again with some degree of accuracy.

INTENTIONAL MARKINGS

Pam mentioned a couple of products (one purposely made - the other creative) when applying facial and hand marks that are intended to be noticed: "Collodion can be quickly applied to create a scar, or give the impression of a burn. It's used in the film trade and the effect is very good. Collodion works by pulling the skin together as it dries; if it's applied in layers - the tighter the pull. It's not advisable to put on very sensitive skin or where the skin is thin. Once it is dried it can be retouched with subtle colours. If it's an emergency... a glue like Copydex can be used." [Editor's note - Warning: Collodion is toxic and flammable]



In both cases the wearer either peels it off, or thinners can be used to quickly dissolve it.

There are a whole host of services and stores that support visual disguises: most are in film, television, theatre, advertising, publishing etc. From spirit gum adhesives used to apply beards and small prosthetics, to silicone based adhesives that are clear and will support prosthetics - even under strenuous conditions - it's a huge industry.

In certain circumstances, they are of course useful and it's an interesting field to research,



"Potassium Permanganate... can also be used to reproduce a "nicotine stain effect" simply by rubbing the watered-down crystals over the middle and forefinger - most used by smokers..."


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
These three British Army undercover agents who worked in Northern Ireland relied more on holding their nerve and their ability to be believable, rather than a physical disguise

Infiltrating a suspected terrorist cell will require a convincing cover story and, at the very least, some participation in "group mentality". It's not for the faint-hearted and the person must be psychologically tough and prepared. Worst of all, the person may be challenged - thus having an array of items that can augment operatives in this type of work is vital: from a credit card, local bus ticket, receipt, proper documentation, fake photographs of relatives or pictures of a visit to another country with a well known building or feature in the background. Disguise experts pay as much attention to "supporting products" as they do to facial features, clothing and training.

Continued on page 78



Incorrect documentation, poorly prepared support stories and hesitation are dangerous for anyone using a disguise




Touching face


do lean forward and appear intent and alert, if it's a casual meeting - relax, sit back and smile. Eye contact is also crucial. Look at the person you are talking to - and don't nervously glance from left to right. Breathing normally is also important. Under the cloak of a disguise some operatives feel nervous and dizzy: some people find it difficult to answer clearly because subconsciously their breathing patterns have altered.

DETAILS AND SUPPORTING PRODUCTS


Infiltration often relies heavily on creating a new image and identity for a person. This can be supported by documentation, dress, facial jewellery, and other attributes, including having language and behavioural skills, a disguise involves every aspect of an operative's life. British intelligence openly distances itself from some more shadowy aspects of undercover work, including using employees in honeytraps and other related topics. However, some of the most sensitive and controversial work is often conducted by agents, assets or contractors not directly in the employ of government offices. "Deniability" is a word that comes to mind. This area of disguise is hugely important and dangerous.



Arm folding




Waving hands



Infiltration is one reason for using a disguise - this peace protester would not find it too difficult to strike up a conversation with a related group

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The CIA's task is twofold: to coordinate the intelligence efforts of the U.S. government, and to collect, evaluate, analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence. Since its foundation, the CIA has provided and continues to provide the most accurate, comprehensive, and objective information available about national security matters.

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Central Intelligence Agency recruiting poster aimed specifically at university graduates. Even here the two characters carry a hint of a disguise

you don't want to do anything that might distinguish you from anyone else. This is another essential area for disguise experts, especially when preparing operatives for overseas assignments. Spending time researching local dress, languages, dialects, customs, writings and traditions is a vital disguise element. In some countries women

are not allowed to travel alone in vehicles - in others it's an offence to be in a car with a man who is not your husband. A piece of jewellery, long hair or a tattoo might betray a person. One false manoeuvre here could wreck any sort of operation. An oft-used intelligence phrase for changing appearance, dressing suitably and blending-in, is called "Going



First impressions last


Grey" (see Eye Spy 37). And it's not unusual for attractive operatives to "tone down" - in some cases going from blond to black hair.

SPEECH

Equally important is speech - any lapse here may prove dangerous. If an operative works overseas and poses as a national, one wrong phrase or a word spoken in English (or a foreign language) may invoke suspicion. "Playing the part" and "consistency" can only come with training. A counterintelligence officer could make a verbal challenge at any time - for example in the heart of Tehran - "good morning - nice weather" is not a phrase you expect to hear... especially not in English. *But it is* to the English operative who may answer "yes it is" - rather than look puzzled. Catching people off guard, by surprise or via traps, some simple - some complex - is an essential tool of the spycatcher.

BODY LANGUAGE

Body language is another important disguise element that can betray an operative even more than a physical disguise. Voice hesitation, leaning forward to convey or listen to an opinion too often, touching your mouth or face are key signs that you are uncomfortable. So too putting hands in front of the mouth, folding arms and constantly looking away. Conversation and mannerisms should "match the message". If what is being said is important,





British and US Special Forces meet with friendly locals in an Afghanistan village. In this case there was no attempt to hide their distinctive Western attire. However, during some intelligence-led operations against the Taliban and al-Qaida - undercover operatives will dress accordingly to blend-in with their surroundings

from making masks, prosthetics, and false teeth, to using alginates, plaster, foam latex and dental acrylics. However, in the security world, relying totally on a full facial disguise comes with a risk and is only practised by specialists. If the intention is for a certain person to be seen in a vehicle at a specific location, a carefully crafted full mask intended as a one-time prop can be manufactured. It will look convincing inside a car, or by a person walking in an unlit area, especially at night. Most senior disguise experts have the capability to "create" another person - though not even today's masks would last, nor would they fool everyone.

One physical impression that makes us all unique is our fingerprints. It's long been thought that creating convincing fingerprints was impossible - this is no longer the case. Mooted in the 1971 movie, *Diamonds Are Forever*, 'Q' makes latex fingerprints for Bond who successfully imposes himself as a villain's henchmen. So could it really work? Experts note the recent research of Japanese scientists. Using just common household materials, they reportedly manufactured fingerprints lifted from a gelatine mould that defeated advanced biometric security systems. In the past, criminals and people on the run have tried all sorts of methods to

change their fingerprints, from burning them away with heat, to scratching, slicing and cutting them off entirely. Perhaps they should have waited a little longer. However, as far as we are aware the replica fingerprints are not a permanent addition to the finger, but it should be of concern to security projects which already use and scan prints to open access doors and gain entry into some computers.

ANONYMITY


Anonymity is a brilliant disguise asset. "Being a normal person and one who doesn't stand out is a great asset," Pam said. "Two relatively important areas for foreign intelligence collection at the moment are Afghanistan and Iraq. Local dress often means operatives can be covered literally head-to-foot. This means attention [training] is focused more on language skills, knowledge of customs and behaviourism."

Two years ago two British Army surveillance officers wearing a traditional Iraqi dress were "outed" because they decided to keep their army boots on. "It was a bit of a mess," said Pam "the boots were noticed by a local militia."


Current operations in Afghanistan are equally as fraught. The local men wear Pakols (hats) and Lungies (turbans) and Chapans (coats). If an undercover operative deviates from traditional dress it could prove problematic. Dressing to suit is a vital disguise technique -




Japanese scientists have created fingerprints that can defeat some of the world's best scanners




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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CRABB MYSTERY SOLVED?



*Russian diver of
Commander Li*

It's a story Eye Spy has followed for a number of years - the strange death of an MI6 officer who died during a covert operation to spy on a visiting Soviet warship to Portsmouth in April 1956. Now a new "witness" has emerged.... his killer

Commander Lionel 'Buster' Crabb, who was 47 at the time, led an "unauthorised" Royal Navy mission to examine the advanced hull of a visiting Soviet warship in April 1956. The vessel was part of a goodwill flotilla carrying none other than Nikita Khrushchev and other Soviet ministers to the UK for meetings with Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden. Crabb disappeared and it sparked one of the most enduring spy mysteries of all time. There were rumours he had been captured, shot, drowned and even killed by his own side - all of which were unproven. A few months later and just down the coast, the headless body of a frogman

was found by local fishermen. Was it Crabb? Even this question was never satisfactorily answered. The man who formally identified Crabb has since retracted much of his testimony. In between, the British secret services did everything to conceal what had happened on that fateful day - even from the prime minister! Hotel registers where Crabb had stayed were removed and officers told to keep quiet. When Downing Street eventually learned of the operation, ministers were furious - but simply had no option but to keep quiet. Eden told Parliament: "It would not be in the public interest to disclose the circumstances in which Commander Crabb is presumed to have met his death. While it is the practice for ministers to accept responsibility, I think it is necessary in the special circumstances of this case to make it clear that what was done was done without the authority or knowledge of Her Majesty's

denying a television firm the right to produce a documentary. Some intelligence files have been released confirming a spy operation, but Crabb's death, due to a mazy and clever cover-up, has never been satisfactorily explained.

A NEW THEORY

Fifty years since the headless frogman was found - the Crabb affair still fascinates - even more so now that a new explanation has surfaced - this time coming from Britain's dwindling band of friends in Russia. A Russian television crew commissioned to make a documentary about the incident, have found a prime witness - "too good to be true" - according to many close to the case. He is retired Russian Navy diver Eduard Koltsov who wants to reveal what really happened before he dies.



Semper Occultus

MI5 Director-General Dick White replaced MI6 chief John Sinclair (inset) after the bungled operation



Soviet warship the Ordzhonikidze

Koltsov was 23-years-old at the time and served on the cruiser *Ordzhonikidze* as a member of a combat group known as *Barracuda*. In Portsmouth, he was asked to investigate "suspicious activity" under the ship. He soon spotted a diver who was attempting to fix an explosive charge to the hull. "I saw a silhouette of a diver in a light frogman's suit who was fiddling with something at the starboard," said Koltsov. He continued: "It was next to the *Ordzhonikidze*'s ammunition hold, so I swam closer and saw that he was fixing a mine." Koltsov swam behind the diver and cut his throat.




Nikita Khrushchev

...sims he killed MI6 man ...nel 'Buster' Crabb


ministers. Appropriate disciplinary steps are being taken." Eden forced MI6 chief Major-General John Sinclair, to resign. He was replaced by Sir Dick White, the head of MI5.

But journalists and a fascinated public could not be kept away, yet the truth remained tantalising out of reach, hidden behind a wall of silence.

Two decades later - government officials wrote a flurry of letters that focused on



Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden



'Buster' Crabb

hierarchy some time later for his "outstanding bravery".

But there is a major problem with Koltsov's story. Let's examine a perfect translation of what he said, for throughout the conversation, he strangely talks about himself in a "third person" manner. For example: "Naturally in such an emergency he [himself] had no means of communication with the ship. Getting down, he discovered a man in diving gear fixing an explosive device to our vessel's ammunition compartment. Our man didn't know if that diver was armed, so he decided to attack him from below. He dived deeper and went sharply up catching his opponent by the feet. He dragged him down and slashed his throat with a knife,

Koltsov "proudly" showed the film crew the dagger which he used to kill Crabb, and the 'Red Star' medal "secretly" awarded to him by the Soviet

also cutting his air supply. Then he just let the body float away with the tide."

The Times put the theory to Lomond Handley, 61, a relative of Commander Crabb, whose mother carried out many investigations about his death. "I find it astonishing and hard to believe... for any of Her Majesty's Navy to endanger a visiting ship would have been unthinkable," said Ms Handley. "Any explosion would have embarrassed our government and destroyed the relationship between the British and the Soviet Union which our government was trying to build up. It's possible that Crabb may have gone down to see whether there were mines and it would have been his duty to get rid of them.

"It's absolutely incredible and I find it hard to believe that any Soviet divers or sailors would


Former diving colleague Sydney Knowles believed Crabb was on the point of defecting after mixing with the likes of Anthony Blunt

EVIDENCE NOT SO CLEAR? The Strangest Theory

One of Crabb's former diving colleagues, Sydney Knowles, suggested he may have been murdered on the orders of British intelligence. Knowles, who identified the headless body found off Pilsley Island as Crabb, said he only did so under pressure: "Crabb had a specific scar on his leg - which he'd got diving near barbed wire. That body didn't have one."

He went on to say that Crabb was "mixing with a pro-Soviet group of people" - and they dragged him to parties attended by the likes of double agent Anthony Blunt. "It's either suicide or bloody Russia," Crabb once told Knowles, who, fearing he was about to defect, told MI5.

Knowles believes that on Crabb's final mission, he did not dive alone. "Our heroes were our heroes, and we couldn't have a war hero defecting," said Knowles, who believes his former partner was murdered.



have committed the murder of a British sailor in our waters. What he is admitting to, this gentleman, is committing an act of murder. I simply don't believe it."

In 1994, Nicholas Elliott, the MI6 man generally thought responsible for planning the operation, wrote in his memoirs that he believed Crabb died from "respiratory trouble" - noting the diver was a heavy smoker and that his equipment probably failed. He said: "Crabb did not die as a result of any incompetence. Nor did he lose his life as a result of any action by the Russians."

Koltsov's story beggars belief - Britain blowing up the *Ordzhonikidze* in Portsmouth Harbour? If there is any truth in the matter then it may be that Koltsov may have mistakenly believed equipment carried by Crabb to test the hull, was a bomb. Interestingly, the claim was made about the same time as Don Hale published his book - *The Final Dive*. Hale says that Crabb was a "decoy" for other UK intelligence divers who were placing listening devices on the ship. The book claims that Crabb and one other diver were killed.

Despite Koltsov's revelations and the fact that some British papers have been released, intelligence watchers note that other Crabb documentation, deemed so sensitive, can't be viewed until 2057.



The world realised when the country of Estonia recently experienced the first cyber war, we had entered a new age of conflict. The Estonia attack was unprecedented in size and scope and should alarm every nation around the world. Offensive cyber weapons have been developed by multiple countries that could create havoc and damage to our information infrastructure. 'Cyber Arms' have become easier to obtain, easier to use, and much more powerful. These weapons come at a fraction of the cost of traditional weapons such as tanks and missiles. Therefore, country or group sponsored attacks against information systems using computer viruses and other techniques should be considered an act of war. As such, governments must be proactive and establish parameters, definitions and regulations surrounding cyber war.

There has been some work that focuses on the area of cyber war, including that conducted by the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSSC). However, this work is quite limited in scope and does not go far enough. As a private sector information security consultant, I along with many of my colleagues, feel the current plan described in the NSSC does not ensure that companies will implement sound security practices.

The world is addicted to computers and the United States is no exception. It is estimated that the US Department of Defense uses more than five million computers on 100,000 networks at 1,500 sites in 65 countries worldwide. This does not include computers embedded in weapons

and weapons systems. While this is a significant amount of computers, it becomes minuscule when compared to those used by businesses or even those used by private citizens.

While most politicians shy away from discussions centred on applying additional regulatory requirements on the private sector, this is an area where government needs to become involved. Richard Clarke, former chairman of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (CIPB), warned that the United States critical infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to Info-centric




Richard Clarke

Operations (IO) attack because cyber attackers could possibly use the millions of home and business PCs that are poorly protected against malicious code, to launch and support a series of debilitating assaults. To-date we have not heeded his warning. We need to make several protective measures mandatory.

The following is a list of suggested regulatory requirements.

1. Registration of emergency cyber contact
2. Requirement of minimum protective measures
3. Reporting of cyber attacks and incidents
4. Reporting of software vulnerabilities
5. Regulating and controlling cyber arms internationally

These five areas must be incorporated into the organisational design of the agency or depart-



Intelligence analyst Kevin Coleman believes a world-wide organisation should be created to combat the growing threat of cyber attacks. A look at this formidable and invisible enemy

ment that will provide the defence of cyber space.

Technology will be critical for early identification and tracking of cyber attacks. As with most threat tracking and monitoring systems, time, location and metrics are critical. Cyber threats and attacks are no different. However, without legislation mandating timely reporting of cyber attacks on business, industry and government, the technology will be of little help. Location-based intelligence represented on a graphic information system display allows visual interpretation of the current status of cyber attacks. The following graphic represents one version of such a system. The system would provide the Cyber Space Defense Agency the ability to quickly and easily access detailed

A Department of Cyber Defense?

The Time Has Come

By Kevin Coleman



geospatial data about attacks and track/trace the attacks back to the point or points of origin. The graphic (left) was provided by DefComm1, a US-based company focused on offensive and defensive cyber war strategies, weapons and tactics.


The figure represents three points of attack: one on the west coast and a second on the east coast of the United States and the third in the United Kingdom. In addition the situation map shows the status of the attack on the west coast of the US and illustrates the three points of attacks and the two intermediaries being used. This is similar to the displays used at North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) at Peterson AFB in Colorado.

*One thing is for sure,
 success in future
 conflicts will depend
 less on Bombs and
 Bullets and more on
 Bits and Bytes...*

In addition to new systems and technology, the skill set of a cyber warrior is significantly different from traditional military training. David Webb of Spy-Ops said: "During analysis for our Certificate in Cyber Warfare training programme we assessed the skill differences. Cyber war has significantly different strategies, tactics, targets and weapons. Military leaders around the world have a challenge when it comes to recruiting and training the new type of soldier."

The advanced education and skills required in computer science coupled with the high demand for the same resources in the private sector makes this a huge issue. How will the new organisation attract the resources necessary to properly develop the offensive and defensive capabilities they need? If we do not have enough graduates in the sciences and engineering with security clearances, who will build the cyber weapons and systems?

Current college enrolment in the sciences and engineering is down substantially in the United States and that is only one part of the problem. Finding individuals who can get a security clearance is another. One senior US military official recently



stated: "We may have to make the current requirements for a security clearance less stringent to meet the current demands." There are an estimated 600,000 technology jobs that require a security clearances that are vacant. Clearly there is, and will be for the foreseeable future, a shortage of educated resources with security clearance needed to work in the area of cyber defences and weapons.

The Estonia attack was unprecedented in size and scope and should alarm governments around the world. The United States, like other nations, is at grave danger of a cyber attack that could devastate the national economy. Failure to take action now could have serious consequences in the not too distant future.

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace published in February 2003, states that the private sector now has a crucial role in protecting national security because it largely runs the nation's critical infrastructure. Tightly coupling business and industry into the Cyber War Defense strategy is arguably the most critical component and the one area that the government has the worst track record. In addition, if we are to protect nations, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace must contain language that requires by law, that business, government and industry adopt a set



Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo (left) expresses his views on the threat of cyber terrorism during his discussions with US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in the Pentagon on 28 November 2007

of minimal cyber security measures to protect our nation's information assets. Other countries would be well advised to do the same.

As the executive branch of the US Government contemplates creating a new department / agency to address the dire threats of a cyber attack, existing organisations continue to jockey for position for their share of responsibility and of course, major funding. One thing is

for sure, success in future conflicts will depend less on Bombs and Bullets and more on Bits and Bytes.

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
Editor's note: Kevin's full research paper can be downloaded at www.eyespyimag.com (Reading Room - Eye Spy Intelligence Papers)

REAL CYBER WAR GAMES

Team Works to Defend Digital Battlefield in Europe

In 1983, with the Cold War still going strong, a movie called *War Games* depicted an eccentric computer hacker named David Lightman, played by Matthew Broderick. With dogged determination to play a military-generated "game" - *Global Thermonuclear War* - David managed to hack into the North American Aerospace Defense Command computer system and almost caused an actual nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

The US Army's 5th Signal Command has now created a cyber-threat intelligence cell to detect, monitor



and combat malicious digital infiltrations on military computer networks. *War Games* represented the tensions and anxieties of the ever-looming nuclear threat during the Cold War nuclear arms race. The global war on terrorism has replaced many threats of the Cold War. Many believe that in today's "information age" there are real David Lightmans who pose a cyber threat to military networks that could cause the loss of innocent lives unless something is done about them. "We are taking a proactive approach to stop these 'hacktivists' from attacking our systems," said Robert Hembrook, deputy chief of intelligence for United States Army Europe's 5th Signal Command.

For the first time in the European military theatre, a cyber-threat intelligence cell has been created for the specific purpose of detecting, monitoring and combating malicious

digital infiltrations on military computer networks, Hembrook said.

Cyber defence is implemented at the Department of Defense level and already was under way in the halls of US European Command, in Stuttgart, but a fully developed and funded European theatre-level cyber cell now is active within 5th Signal Command, Hembrook said. The cell consists of three experienced intelligence and computer experts whose jobs are to observe potentially harmful data passing from the Internet into friendly networks, identify patterns of attacks, analyse data, and advise the operators of the network so that they can take preventative action to ensure the safety and security of all systems in the European footprint. "The fact is that there are people currently trying to break into our systems in an effort to obtain data or plant viruses that

put service members and their missions at risk," one of the cyber cell members said. The US military, along with most other organisations, relies more and more on the speed and capabilities of computer-based technology to give it an edge on the battlefield. This reliance also allows an extra avenue of attack for the enemy. "This cyber cell marks a change of approach in the intel world," a team member said. "We are already experts on predicting physical attacks from the enemy, but we never had a dedicated staff to predict and prevent virtual attacks at a theatre level."



Crest of the 5th SG




Letter from Fort Meade by David Hamer



...being an irregularly occasional, or an occasionally irregular, communication from the American cryptological community: particularly those things associated with the National Cryptologic Museum [NCM] and its parent, the National Security Agency [NSA]

"What did Horace say Winnie?"



Certainly a phrase unlikely to be familiar to today's BBC audiences but one that was heard often, spoken by comedian Harry Hemsley, during World War Two. The question might also have been posed during the war period by anyone attempting to eavesdrop on an encrypted conversation using the voice scrambling equipment [VOCODER] known as SIGSALY, developed by the Allies specifically for telephone communications between the other 'Winnie', Prime Minister Churchill, and President Roosevelt.

SIGSALY - a randomly chosen cover name and not an acronym - was a huge piece of equipment... so large in fact that at the UK end of the transatlantic link it could not be situated within the usual government enclave in Whitehall but was installed in the basement of *Selfridges's* department store on Oxford Street... with of course a secure land line link to the War Rooms. The American end of the line was housed in the newly completed Pentagon complex.

SIGSALY

LONDON AND WASHINGTON CALLING




© DAVID HAMER AND NCM

the WWII secure
telephone system



Original Sigsaly
handset donated to
the NSA Museum
by Thomas Thacher

© DAVID HAMER AND NCM



Today digital technology is at the core of communications, both clear and encrypted, and the transformation of audio information into digital form is now a routine process that is incorporated into our telephone, television and other information media systems. The beginnings of such digitisation began as far back as the early part of WWII in an attempt to provide secure voice communications. Prior to



President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

The Beginning of the Digital Revolution

Today, digital technology is the backbone of our entire information industry. The pioneering work for these digital capabilities was done early in World War II. The work provided secure voice communications for high-level government officials. The system that supported this unprecedented capability was known as SIGSALY.

Technical Features

The United States entered World War II without true voice security capability, but the technical groundwork for a solution was in place at the Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL). Even with this foundation, SIGSALY was a huge challenge, for it demanded many unique developments, not simply improvements.

Some of the most remarkable "firsts" of the system were:

- ★ realization of enciphered telephony
- ★ quantized speech transmission
- ★ transmission of speech by Pulse Code Modulation (PCM)
- ★ use of compressed PCM
- ★ multilevel Frequency Shift Keying (FSK)
- ★ speech bandwidth compression, and
- ★ use of Frequency Shift Keying-Frequency Division Multiplex (FSK-FDM) as a viable transmission method over a fading medium.

The BTL team was highly skilled and had access to many experts. For example, the now-famous Harry Nyquist and Claude Shannon made important contributions. In addition, British cryptographer Alan Turing was briefly involved in the development and approved the security aspects of the system for the British. The team acquired over 30 patents.

Key Generation and Distribution

The random keying materials were recorded on large phonograph records. Key distribution was accomplished by means of transporting and distributing the phonograph records. Every key-pair was distributed by courier from Arlington Hall Station in Virginia to the sending and receiving stations. Each recording provided only twelve minutes of key, and since the keys were changed for every conference and on a regular schedule, a very large number of recordings were made and distributed under strict controls. The key recordings were destroyed after use.

Operations

The system was formally put into use on 15 July 1943 in a conference between the Pentagon and London. Twelve terminals were eventually deployed under Army Signal Corps contract. Terminals were established in Washington, D.C., London, Paris, North Africa, Hawaii, Guam, Manila, and Australia, among others. Systems were also deployed after the war to other locations, including Berlin and Frankfurt, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan.

In London, the bulk of the SIGSALY equipment was housed in the basement of an annex to Selfridge's department store, while the actual instrument used by Churchill and his staff was about a mile away in the War Rooms near the prime minister's residence.

SIGSALY was removed from service in 1946, having supported over 3,000 official secret conferences. The existence of the capability to conduct secure voice communications during this time remained secret until 1976.

Support

It was clear from the start that SIGSALY required a specially trained operations and maintenance staff. The Army Signal Corps responded by establishing the 805th Signal Service Company. Special training was provided in a BTL school, and members of the 805th were sent to all SIGSALY locations. The 805th was a very unusual company, to say the least. It consisted of 81 officers and 275 enlisted men. Although technically not assigned to the 805th, members of the Women's Army Corps (WACs) and some civilian women performed a wide variety of duties related to SIGSALY, including creating stenographic records of many of the important conversations.

Success Beyond the Original Expectations

The ability to use truly secure voice communications at high organizational levels was a great advantage to the allies in the conduct of the war and in the critical activities that followed. SIGSALY was a highly successful secure voice system and it provided a springboard into the digital communications world. It encouraged the BTL staff and their government counterparts to think more about communications in digital terms rather than in the traditional analog terms.

the entry of the United States into the war in 1941, the Allies were using an analog voice privacy system designated 'A-3' that has been described as being capable of providing "... reasonable protection against the casual eavesdropper but... vulnerable to anyone with sophisticated unscrambling capability." Use of the system did however continue even though it was discovered that a German radio facility located in the Netherlands was able to 'read' the conversations. Not an ideal situation but neither of the two principal allies had an immediate solution to the problem.

The beginnings of that solution were already in place. In the United States, as far back as

1936, Bell Telephone Laboratories were exploring the conversion of analog voice signals into a digital format. Much research and development, spurred by the needs of war, produced a satisfactory, usable system. SIGSALY was first deployed in 1943 when, on 15 July of that year, a successfully encrypted conversation took place between officials in Washington DC and London.

As with any encryption system the most important single component is the key and the way in which that key is created and distributed [see Eye Spy 48 for a discussion of the 'one-time pad' and the importance of secure



keys]. In SIGSALY the randomised keys were electronically generated by using 'noise' from huge, mercury-vapour vacuum tubes [valves]. In those pre-miniaturisation days each tube was four inches in diameter and over fourteen inches high! After sampling and selection each key was recorded, in the manner of the era, on sixteen-inch diameter wax master discs using the audio technology of the day. Such master discs, which in the recording industry of that time would typically have been used to produce thousands of vinyl records for sale, were used only to produce three discs - two for distribution: one retained for emergencies. Distribution of the keys, always a problem in pre-public-key times was accomplished by the secure physical transportation and distribution of the discs. Later advances led to simultaneous recording of the keys onto acetate discs.

When in use each terminal of the encrypted voice circuit would carry its key on one of a pair of precision-driven turntables that were time-synchronised at each end of the link. Since each disc carried only about twelve



NCM has built a section of a SIGSALY terminal that includes a pair of the original turntables

© DAVID HAMER AND NCM

minutes of a given key two of the precision turntables were needed at each end of the conversational link. Timing and precision of the equipment was paramount as there was no time-synchronisation link between the two ends of the [typically] transatlantic connection.

As noted earlier each SIGSALY terminal was a huge system when installed, consisting of upwards of forty standard-size electronics racks and weighing in excess of fifty-five tons! As the conflict in Europe progressed use of SIGSALY expanded beyond the single London-Washington link. Included in this expansion were Paris, North Africa, Hawaii, Guam, Manila and Australia. Post war locations included Berlin, Frankfurt and Tokyo. Twelve terminals in all were deployed: each consumed so much electrical power that special cooling systems were designed to dissipate the heat generated. SIGSALY was withdrawn from use in 1946.

No complete SIGSALY is known to exist. This is not so much because of any considerations of

security such as those that led to the post-war destruction of Bletchley Park's Colossus but rather that the valuable components of the system were usable and needed for development in other areas of electronic research and development - SIGSALY had outlived its usefulness.

The NSA's National Cryptologic Museum has however re-created a display - a section of a SIGSALY terminal that includes a pair of the original turntables (above and below). SIGSALY, along with the rest of this museum's unique and interesting collection commemorating the history of Allied cryptology, is open to the general public; See <http://www.nsa.gov/museum/index>. A fuller, more detailed description of SIGSALY is given in an NSA publication: *The Start of the Digital Revolution: SIGSALY, Secure Voice Communications in WWII*, Center for Cryptologic History, NSA, 2000.

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
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BOOK RELEASES



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COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES: Successes and Failures of Six Nations Yonah Alexander Potomac Books


Despite the wake-up call of 11 September 2001, terrorism remains a dire threat to the security of all civilized nations, making it imperative for leaders to develop better national, regional, and global strategies to counter its many forms. *Counterterrorism Strategies* examines how six countries have combated terrorist groups from the 1970s to the present and draws lessons that are applicable to today's threats. Some of this important new book's case

studies are the USA pursuit of al-Qaida, Italy's efforts against the extreme left-wing Red Brigades and extreme right-wing New Order, Germany's battles with the Red Army Faction, France's struggles with separatist movements and international terrorist Carlos the Jackal, Egypt's experience with Islamist terrorism, and Sri Lanka's long confrontation with the Tamil Tigers.

Counterterrorism Strategies shows that there are no simple or complete solutions to the dangers posed by determined and elusive terrorists, but several of the countries detailed here have had significant successes. The contributors, analyses of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of strategies used by these six countries offer a counterterrorism road map for the twenty-first century. This book is essential reading for policymakers, for counterterrorism scholars and professionals, and for members of the general public who are concerned about



Publishers should send review copies or advisory notices to our UK or New York address featured on page 83



the direction of the international campaign against terrorism. Softback 256pp

Available from Eye Spy
Ref: ES/1262 £27.95 \$29.95

THE MIGHTY WURLITZER: How the CIA Played America Hugh Wilford Harvard UP

In 1967, the magazine *Ramparts* ran an expose revealing that the Central Intelligence Agency had been secretly funding and managing a wide range of citizen front groups intended to counter communist influence around the world. In addition to embarrassing prominent individuals caught up, wittingly or unwittingly, in the secret superpower struggle for hearts and minds, the revelations of 1967 were one of the worst operational disasters in the history of American intelligence and presaged a series of public scandals from which the CIA's reputation has arguably never recovered.



the mighty wurlitzer
HOW THE CIA PLAYED AMERICA
HUGH WILFORD

CIA official Frank Wisner called the operation his "mighty Wurlitzer", on which he could play any propaganda tune. In this illuminating book, Hugh Wilford provides the first comprehensive account of the clandestine relationship

between the CIA and its front organisations. Using an unprecedented wealth of sources, he traces the rise and fall of America's Cold War front network from its origins in the 1940s to its Third World expansion during the 1950s and ultimate collapse in the 1960s.



Frank Wisner

Covering the intelligence officers who masterminded the CIA's fronts as well as the involved citizen groups - emigres, labour, intellectuals, artists, students, women, Catholics, African Americans, and journalists - Wilford provides a surprising analysis of Cold War society that contains valuable lessons for our own age of global conflict. Hardback 400pp

Available from Eye Spy
Ref: ES/1263 £29.99 \$32.95

BERLIN TO BOND AND BEYOND: The Story of a Fleming Man Judith Lenart Athena Press Ltd

Judith Lenart always knew her stepfather had lived an exciting life - as a journalist from the end of WWII to the end of the Cold War, he met, investigated and exposed some of the greatest artists and con men international politics has ever known. Yet it wasn't until after his death in 1992 that she began to discover just how exciting his life really was. As Lenart began the process of sorting through his personal effects, she stumbled upon a bundle of documents she never expected to find: letters, telegrams and instructions from Ian Fleming (below), editor and coordinator of his own elite selection of journalist spies, and a direct link between the media and MI6. She asked herself "could her stepfather have really been a spy"?

Berlin to Bond and Beyond relates the true story of how Terry was recruited by Fleming and sent to many European countries using the cover of a *Sunday Times* foreign correspondent. Fleming ran an intelligence outfit known as Mercury which used journalists working for the *Sunday Times*' parent company *Kemsley*





Newspapers, for which he was foreign manager, as spies.

Former MI6 man Anthony Cavendish described the relationship in his book *Inside Intelligence*: "At the end of the war a number of MI6 agents were sent abroad under the cover of newspapermen. Indeed the Kemsley Press allowed many of their foreign correspondents to cooperate with MI6 and even took on MI6 operatives as foreign correspondents."

Judith Lenart told the *Kent on Sunday* newspaper: "I see Antony Terry more as the sort of person who was helping Bond, rather than Bond himself. "He would have been an authority who James Bond could rely on to know the scene and organise the right meetings in the right places. Like the journalist figure who helps Bond when he has his Japanese adventure in *You Only Live Twice*. That was Antony. Bond was much more Fleming himself."

"If you think of a spy as somebody on the payroll I don't think it would be fair to label him that, but if you think of a spy as someone who has connections to intelligence agencies and provides them with information and, on occasion, gets information in return then I'd say that's a pretty accurate description of Antony."

"He was a man who had little regard for his own personal safety. When he was in



Antony Terry

Budapest during the uprising in 1956 he would wander around in the street with Russian tanks just to see if a guy had a bazooka or not. When he got the Military Cross he had been running around in a German-occupied place with a handgun and had not been at all worried about his own safety."


Here Lenart brings together some of Antony Terry's finest investigative works, as well as never before seen excerpts from his notebooks and transcriptions. Interspersed with Lenart's own insights, this remarkable collection offers a rare opportunity to get to the heart of a man whose duty, in death, was to disappear. Paperback 252pp

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THE SPY'S BEDSIDE BOOK Graham Greene and Sir Hugh Greene Hutchinson

Republished classic compendium of espionage stories - fiction, memoir and autobiography - from the pens of some of the greatest writers and most famous spies.

On its first appearance in 1957, Hugh and Graham Greene's *The Spy's Bedside Book* provoked a storm of interest, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 100 copies were bought by East German Intelligence.



This classic anthology, with a new introduction by the former head of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington, includes stories by some of the great writers on spying and many practitioners, including Ian Fleming and John Buchan, Sir Robert Baden-Powell and Belle Boyd, Walter Schellenberg, Sir Paul Dukes and Vladimir Petrov, and from the golden age of mystery and suspense, William Le Queux and E. Phillips Oppenheim.

There are also some unexpected figures: William Blake, D.H. Lawrence and Thomas Mann, all suspected of spying in three great wars. How can you hide messages in a boiled egg? Why should you always put pepper in your vodka



Former MI5 Director-General Dame Stella Rimington

when in Russia? Answers to these questions and much more can be found in this thrilling collection, which will enthrall readers once again with its tales of espionage from a bygone era. Hardback 272pp


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THE REGIMENT: The Real Story of the SAS Michael Asher Viking

On 4 May 1980, seven terrorists holding twenty-one people captive in the Iranian Embassy in London's Prince's Gate, executed their first hostage. They threatened to kill another hostage every thirty minutes until their demands were met. Minutes later, armed men in black overalls and balaclavas shimmied down the roof on ropes and burst in through windows and doors. In seconds all but one of the terrorists had been shot dead, the other captured.

For most people, this was their first acquaintance with a unit that was soon to become the ideal of modern military excellence - the Special Air Service regiment. Few realised that the SAS had been in existence for almost forty years, playing a discreet, if not secret, role almost everywhere Britain had fought since World War II, and had been the prototype of all modern special forces units throughout the world.

In *The Regiment*, Michael Asher - a former soldier in 23 SAS Regiment -




examines the evolution of the special forces idea and investigates the real story behind the greatest military legend of the late twentieth century. Hardback 624pp

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Ref: ES/1266 £23.50 \$48.00

THE HUNT FOR NAZI SPIES: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France Simon Kitson Chicago University Press

From 1940 to 1942, French secret agents arrested more than two thousand spies working for the Germans and executed several dozen of them - all despite the Vichy government's declared collaboration with the Third Reich. A previously untold chapter in the history of World War II, this duplicitous activity is the gripping subject of *The Hunt for Nazi Spies*, a tautly narrated chronicle of the Vichy regime's attempts to maintain sovereignty while supporting its Nazi occupiers.

Simon Kitson informs this remarkable story with findings from his investigation - the first by any historian - of thousands of Vichy documents seized in turn by the Nazis and the Soviets and returned to France only in the 1990s. His pioneering detective work uncovers a puzzling paradox: a French government that was



hunting down left-wing activists and supporters of Charles de Gaulle's Free French forces was also working to undermine the influence of German spies who were pursuing the same Gaullists and resisters.


In light of this apparent contradiction, Kitson does not deny that Vichy France was committed to assisting the Nazi cause, but illuminates the complex agendas that characterised the collaboration and shows how it was possible to be both anti-German and anti-Gaullist.

Combining nuanced conclusions with dramatic accounts of the lives of spies on both sides, *The Hunt for Nazi Spies* adds an important new dimension to our understanding of the French predicament under German occupation and the shadowy world of World War II espionage. Hardback 208pp

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Ref: ES/1267 £28.99 \$28.99

RUSSIA AND POSTMODERN DETERRENCE:
Military Power and Its Challenges for Security
S. J. Cimbala and Peter Jacob Rainow
Potomac Books Inc

Russia is a post-communist country struggling to adapt to the modern world economically and politically. In the twenty-first century, Russia faces postmodern social, cultural, and political



problems with its old policy of deterrence. For Russia's political leaders and military planners, three scenarios define their postmodern setting: 1) the world's leading military and economic powers, with the exception of China, are market-based economies and political democracies; 2) the revolution in military affairs, based on advances in information, electronics, and communications, is driving both civil and military technology innovation; and 3) the Cold War's fundamental war-fighting premises, such as deterrence based on nuclear weapons and on conventional armed forces organised and trained for massive wars of attrition, have changed radically.

These points, implications for future Russian strategy are profound. Russia faces an increased presence of its former adversary, the United States, in adjacent territories; an increasingly assertive NATO, which includes many of Moscow's former allies; and continued fighting in Chechnya. Ominously, China aspires to overtake Russia as the world's second-ranked military power and establish its hegemony over the Pacific basin. In short, Russia confronts a radically new political and military world order that demands adapting to postmodern thinking about deterrence and defense. The danger is that Russia, realising that it lags behind in leveraging modern technology for military purposes and that it must scrap its dependence on conscription, now relies on nuclear weapons as its first line of deterrence against either nuclear or conventional attack. Softback 192pp

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WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN:
US Naval Intelligence and the Cold War Struggle for Germany
Robert K. Massie (Foreword), Marvin B. Durning
Potomac Books Inc

In 1955, after assignments at the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and on board a destroyer, Marvin Durning arrived at ONI's office in Munich, Germany. During this year, he participated in the final stages of transforming Germany from a defeated enemy into a respected democracy, reestablishing its sovereignty, and shepherding its membership in NATO, which also involved rearming America and Europe's erstwhile foe. At that time, Munich, like Berlin, was a nerve centre for the Cold War. It was crowded with US troops and German and Slav refugees. 'Radio Free Europe' called it home. The city was, Durning writes, "a jungle of competing secret intelligence organisations: British, French, American, Russian, West and East German, Czech, Polish, and others."


Beneath the calm surface of everyday life in Munich roamed agents and double

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


Turned Upside Down is Durning's account of such activities.

Durning served as the de facto executive officer of a small office of German intelligence specialists tasked with routine navy issues. But they were doing much more. Known only to his commander and himself, former admirals of the defunct German Kriegsmarine attended secret meetings at his office, where they worked to plan and create a future West German Navy. In addition, Durning served as a liaison officer to the Gehlen Organisation, the supersecret German intelligence and espionage agency, and he recounts their activities here. Hardback 208pp

agents who witnessed defections, kidnappings, interrogations that ended in death, and assassinations by bomb explosions and by poison dart. *World*

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
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
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


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features a 2 1/2 inch colour LCD screen and AC/DC operation. Includes cigarette lighter adapter and AC adapter.


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UK £315.00 USA \$600.00 ROW £350.00




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New Generation MATRIX

This powerful product allows you to receive a call covertly from any landline anywhere in the world... simply pop in a telephone socket and type-in a receiving number - it's that simple



1. Insert socket
2. Programme receiving number
3. Listen covertly

SUBSCRIBERS SAVE £100 (\$200)!

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EYE SPY SUBSCRIBER PRICE:

Order code: ESPL MATRIX/SUB UK £399.00 USA \$800.00 ROW: £500.00

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ECONOMY

HIGH-QUALITY COVERT CAMERA AND AUDIO
RECORDER PLUS COLOUR DISPLAY

Eye Spy's Covert Black Economy Set (see review in issue 47) proved an instant success with readers. Capture video and audio easily and safely without fear of compromise. View film on display, computer or television. All leads supplied for a variety of tasks. Powered internally (no leads or exterior battery).



Set comes in a smart polished metal and black case. High quality and easy to use.

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PRICE ALSO INCLUDES SHIPPING/POSTAGE AND PACKING TO ALL COUNTRIES

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
UHF KEY RING TRANSMITTER



Range upto 500 metres.
Requires just one 3V lithium battery (included) for power.

Order code: **LSSKR**
UK £180.00
USA \$330.00
ROW £190.00

MAINS-DOUBLE SOCKET TRANSMITTER



Fully working mains socket transmitter ideal for permanent applications - easy to install. Continuous 24-hour-operation. Range 850ft

Order code: **LS-TX-4** UK £195.00

UHF ROOM OR BODY WORN TRANSMITTER

High quality room or bodyworn transmitter with excellent pick-up. Powered by 9V battery. Easily concealed. Range 1000ft

Order code: **HL1** UK

£190.00
USA \$350.00
ROW £200.00

METAL-CASED ROOM TRANSMITTER

Order code: **L11MC** UK £190.00
USA \$350.00 ROW £200.00



Black painted high-quality UHF room bug used by operatives in the trade. Its small size and strong casing means it can be concealed in a multitude of locations. Device comes with an additional screw-in aerial for increased transmission. Powered by one internal AAA battery - easily replaced. Transmission range 1000ft

EYE SPY HIGH-QUALITY MINIATURE UHF RECEIVER

Eye Spy's new compact and remarkably small 150-channel UHF receiver. Pre-programmed to receive transmissions from any of the devices shown here. Unit comes with earphones, recording jack, screen display for switching channels and volume control. Receiver also has smart clip allowing for overt or covert placement on person. Note size in comparison to our 12-channel receiver. Battery powered - fantastic quality - superb value for money.



Order code: **ESH-REC**
UK £145.00 USA \$290.00
ROW £155.00

EYE SPY UHF 'CREDIT CARD' TRANSMITTER

3mm thick and can be slipped in the side of a wallet, file, folder or pocket. Voice activated transmission. Battery operated (included) New minimum range - 1000ft.

Order code: **LS-CCT**
UK £195.00 USA \$350.00 ROW £199.00




12-CHANNEL METAL UHF RECEIVER

Eye Spy's superb 12-channel UHF receiver can be used to pick up transmissions from any of the transmitters listed here. The unit will pick up transmissions from different UHF listening devices placed in several locations, simply by changing channels. Powered by a 9V battery, the unit has a range of 400 metres - comes with jack-plug so you can record transmissions and luxury earphones for privacy - all contained in a solid case.



Showing size comparison



12-channel UHF receiver

Order code: **L-SS-12CR**
UK £145.00 USA \$290.00
ROW £155.00

UHF CALCULATOR TRANSMITTER

Working desk calculator conceals a tiny UHF transmitter. The unit can be left in an office environment without raising suspicion. Range 850ft. Battery - 15 hours.

Order code: **LS-TX-6**
UK £195.00 USA \$350.00
ROW £205.00

calculator model may differ from photo




BALLPOINT PEN UHF TRANSMITTER

Innocent-looking working biro - complete with one of our most powerful UHF transmitters. Unit can be used in overt or covert fashion - and has a range of around 900ft.



Image light-blinded to show microphone

Order code: **ESU-PT**
UK £190.00 USA \$350.00
ROW £200.00



www.eyespy.com

UHF UMBRELLA TRANSMITTER

Ideal for leaving in a room, office, hotel etc. Powered by long-lasting battery (five days). Easily replaced.

Transmission range 850-1,000ft

Order code: **ESD-UM**
UK £250.00
USA \$490.00
ROW £275.00



Umbrella may be of different design but of equal quality

UK AND USA PORTABLE MAINS-DOUBLE PLUG ADAPTOR TRANSMITTER

A conventional fully mains-working double plug adaptor conceals UHF transmitter. 24-hour-a-day transmission. Minimum range 850ft. Sound pick-up - superb.

Order code: **LH-1**
UK £195.00
USA \$350.00
ROW £200.00



United States model

UK model



NEW GENERATION LOW, LOW PRICES KEYKATCHERS

**NOW
COMPATIBLE
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KEYKATCHER and EYE SPY are pleased to announce a new range of the world's most popular and best-selling key loggers. Unbeatable quality, highly versatile and undetectable...

Please use order form on page 82 or call Eye Spy direct



KEYCARBON CORPORATE SE

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Order code: ES-KC-FOR
UK £199.00 USA \$360.00
ROW £210.00

KEYCARBON HOME

Order code: ES-KC-HOM
UK £120.00 USA \$199.00
ROW £127.50

KEYCARBON USB 1.5MB CORPORATE SE

KEYCARBON USB CORPORATE SPECIAL EDITION: The ideal key logger for all your internet monitoring needs. CAN'T be detected by anti-virus or anti-spy software. This stealthy USB keylogger works on USB keyboards (including wireless) for PC and MAC computers. KeyCarbon records every keystroke typed on your computer (over 1 million keystrokes) including e-mail, chat, IM, internet addresses and more. The KeyCarbon USB key logger is the perfect solution for monitoring your employees' computer and online activities. A KeyCarbon keylogger is the easiest way to monitor your PC or MAC. Simply unplug your keyboard and plug the KeyCarbon into the USB port. Then plug the keyboard into the KeyCarbon and it's ready to record. There is no software to install. As keys are typed the data is stored inside the device. When you want to see what's been recorded simply open any word processor or text editor (Microsoft WordPad recommended) and type your password. The KeyCarbon keylogger will display a menu allowing you to view what's been recorded. **AVAILABLE IN BLACK OR WHITE.**

System Requirements: USB keyboard connector (works with both high & low speed USB).



KEYCARBON USB 2MB FORENSIC

KEYCARBON USB FORENSIC KEY LOGGER : NOW WITH TIME/DATE STAMPING: Functions and description like the above but records over 2 million keystrokes and comes with date and time stamping allowing accurate forensic investigation. Perfect for specialist investigative operations and long-term monitoring. Cross reference users with activity.

KEYCARBON USB 512K

KEYCARBON USB HOME KEY LOGGER: Functions and description like the above (no time/date stamping) with recording capacity of over 512,000 keystrokes. The perfect low-cost solution for monitoring your child's on-line activity.

KEYKATCHER HARDWARE KEYSTROKE RECORDERS FOR HIGH-USE FAMILY COMPUTER MONITORING

All keystroke loggers are literally an anti-virus software update away from becoming obsolete! KEYKATCHERS CANNOT be DETECTED or DEFEATED by anti-spy software programmes. Our 256K key logger stores over 162,000 keystrokes including e-mail, chat, IM, internet addresses and more. We recommend KeyKatcher key loggers for professional use, for homes with high levels of computer activity or for any application requiring infrequent checking. The new Magnum KeyKatcher has a fantastic 4MB capacity and also date and time stamping for forensic and specialist use. For our full range - visit www.eyespy.com (shop).

- Search capability
- Memory remains intact even when unplugged or during power loss
- No software to install
- Virtually undetectable
 - Will defeat all electronic and software bug hunters

System Requirements:
PC and MAC
compatible computer

Magnum KeyKatcher



KEYKATCHER MAGNUM 4MB

MORE UNIQUE FEATURES & HIGHEST MEMORY CAPACITY OF ANY PS/2 HARDWARE KEYLOGGER ON THE MARKET: 128-Bit Encryption, Time/ Date Stamping, Time of Use Charts, 4 Megabytes of Data Storage, TrueStampTM Technology makes it virtually impossible to falsify time/ date stamps. This extra level of security leaves no doubt about when activity occurs. Records Data at the Source - KEYKatcher keyloggers records keystrokes as they are typed for maximum accuracy and reliability. Software is vulnerable to detection and being deleted. Quick Erase - Erasing memory takes about 4 seconds - faster than other KEYKatcher products. Multiple Viewing Options and a customizable password allows you to change the password from the default to a password of your choice. Magnum's powerful search utility allows you to search the memory without downloading the data. Searches save time and allow you to quickly piece together activities.

KEYKATCHER MAGNUM 4MB

Order code: ES-KK-MAG

UK £92.50 USA \$160.00 ROW £99.00

**KEY KATCHERS Can't be detected or defeated by
anti-virus software. Also works on wireless keyboards!**

KEYKATCHER PRO - 256K HARDWARE KEYLOGGER

Records ~128 pages of typing; NETPatrol & Keyword, search facility
Order code: ES-KKPRO UK £55.00 USA \$100.00 ROW £65.00

KEYKATCHER FAMILY - 128K HARDWARE KEYLOGGERS

Records ~ 64 pages of typing - Internet monitoring no software
Order code: ES-KK5 UK £50.00 USA \$90.00 ROW £60.00

KEYKATCHER MINI - 64K HARDWARE KEYLOGGERS

Records ~ 32 pages of typing - Internet monitoring no software
Order code: ES-KK4 UK £46.00 USA \$60.00 ROW £55.00

KEYKATCHER USB ADAPTOR SET

The USB adaptor set allows KEYKatcher products to work with most USB keyboard set-ups. If your USB keyboard shipped with a PS/2 adapter, the adaptor set will work with your system. If your keyboard did not ship with an adapter, please check your documentation to see if your USB keyboard will work with a non-active PS/2 adapter.

Order code: ES-KKAS

UK £25.00

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ROW £30.00




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*The Nosenko Case - one of the
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
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Published by Yale University Press

EYE SPY SECRET HISTORY FILES

70 Years Ago - Spies Caught, Spies Lost, Lessons Learned

It was the FBI's first major international spy case: on 2 December 1938 - less than a year before World War II broke out in Europe - three Nazi spies were found guilty of espionage in the United States. The man who had exposed the spy ring, Guenther Rumrich, was eventually given a reduced prison term for his cooperation. Far from being hailed a great success, the FBI acknowledged it had made mistakes. Four times as many spies had escaped, including



Captured spy Guenther Rumrich exposed a Nazi espionage ring just prior to the start of World War II.


The FBI

most of the senior Nazi planners. The Bureau was "roundly criticised in the press," and for good reason. Senior officials today admit, "...we were simply unprepared at that point in history to investigate such cases of espionage."

It was a complex affair that began in February 1937, when the crafty Guenther Rumrich - a naturalized American citizen recruited by German intelligence - was arrested by the New York Police Department for the US Army and the State Department, following a tip-off by British intelligence. The charge: impersonating the Secretary of State in order to get blank US passports.

Rumrich was willing to talk, and confessed that he was acting on behalf of Nazi agents. He also said he would provide the name of 10 to 15 spies working for Germany.

Who would lead the investigation? The Department of State, the FBI, and what was then called the War Department debated the issue.



When the case surfaced, J Edgar Hoover thought his 'G' men were more suited to fighting organised crime than tackling an international spy ring... he also believed the case had been compromised. Hoover lost the argument and the FBI was ordered to investigate




s First Spy Case

Director J. Edgar Hoover didn't want to take it on, believing that the lack of coordination between agencies had already compromised the case. But the War Department insisted, and the case fell into the lap of the FBI.

An experienced criminal agent named Leon Turrou was placed in charge. Turrou debriefed Rumrich and other agent German agents and interviewed Dr. Ignatz Greibl, head of the US German intelligence ring. But after each interview, Turrou told the spies that they'd need to testify before a grand jury, and most fled the country to avoid prosecution. Turrou's background simply didn't prepare him for the nuances of an espionage case. Worse yet, he leaked information about the case to the New



One who got away and three who didn't: (left to right), Dr. Ignatz Greibl, who fled; and the three convicted spies, Otto Hermann Voss (six years), Johanna Hoffman (four years), and Erich Glaser (two years)



York press and even agreed to write a series of articles for one paper.

In June 1937, Turrou was fired for breaking the FBI oath. But his damage was far from done. When he took the stand at the trial of the few remaining suspects in October 1938, he was accused of being an overzealous government agent motivated by profit and fame, of tampering with witnesses, and even of taking a bribe from Dr. Greibl. Despite the convictions, the FBI looked unprofessional and unprepared to protect the United States from espionage.

Following the debacle, the FBI immediately started to reform its counterintelligence operations. The Bureau trained dedicated agents and prepared them to conduct espionage investigations. Procedures were put in place that made it more difficult for foreign agents to operate in the country. Since the Rumrich case was based solely on statements by the spies themselves, the FBI also began developing other tools and techniques to corroborate testimony.

That the FBI learned much from the way it handled the Rumrich case became clear in 1941. Undercover officers working with a "German spy" helped smash the Nazi Duquesne spy ring case. In this huge operation, officers took extensive surveillance footage of German agents in carefully staged



Though mistakes were made - the FBI inflicted serious damage to Hitler's foreign intelligence gathering potential



Special Agent Leon Turrou, whose bungling of the German spy case led to far-reaching changes in the FBI's counterintelligence operations

65-1219

November 19, 1940

WILLIAM SEBOLD received through the mail an envelope addressed to himself, postmarked at New York, which bore the printed heading "News Flash from Air Associates, Inc., Bendix, New Jersey", and contained a full-page newspaper entitled, "Air Associates Extra", Bendix Airport, October 15, 1940. On the first page is the hand-printed name, "JULIE".

November 20, 1940

Radio message #61 was received from Germany and read as follows:

"Tell Dunn not to give newspaper reports. Reports about the one five naught Brewster planes for Dutch appeared in newspaper of tenth November. You all must get busy getting new men and detailed news."

On the same day SEBOLD received, through the mail, an envelope postmarked New York, November 19, 1940, which contained a newspaper clipping from the NEW YORK JOURNAL AND AMERICAN of Monday, November 11, 1940, setting out the speech of JOSEPH P. KENNEDY.

On the same day SEBOLD, not having received an answer from DUQUESNE on the telegram which he sent on November 13, 1940, and mailed the following letter addressed to DUQUESNE at his office:

"Dear Sir:

I have your order for three hundred pairs ready. Must see you at once. Let me know where I can see you.

Yours truly,

Harry

November 21, 1940

Radio message #62 was received from Germany in part, as follows:

"First. For Dunn. Try to hire the following people said to be OK. Baroness RENEE BUCOVITCH, divorced

I therefor American opinion on Q...
Some time gave me \$30,000. I never him where I could get it.

Some time I had never seen his pre my friends and he mention GOSTZ had informed him a floating airplanes dock, practical, and that he was certain his name was my dock invention. We made agent for the sale of effect that he was to repre sale of the dock. He also p dock for some time, until a from the S. S. Saint Louis fr as a deposit, binding my agre even enter my house and just left.

Some time later, I times from Holland, in the am National Bank and one drawn on New York City. It was my undere paid \$5,000. in return for giving docks.

icals and magazines dealing with States, and they gave me the address and told me to send this material and address in my dictionary. information of this nature to this ad Government and also forwarded these

Shortly thereafter, I re that these patents were uninteresting that the initials "J.G." appeared from Brauerhaven, Germany.

A short time after this, I Germany, telling me not to use the add any longer, but to transmit my

settings. The case devastated the Nazi intelligence gathering capabilities in the United States even before it entered the war.


'Harry Sawyer' and the Duquesne Spy Ring

On 2 January 1942, 33 members of a Nazi spy ring headed by Frederick Joubert Duquesne were sentenced to serve a total of over 300 years in prison. They were brought to justice after a lengthy espionage investigation by the FBI. William Sebald, who had been recruited as a spy for Germany, was a major factor in the FBI's successful resolution of this case through his work as a double agent for the United States.

A native of Germany, William Sebald served in the German army during World War I. After leaving Germany in 1921, he worked in industrial and aircraft plants throughout the United States and South America. On 10 February 1936, he became a naturalized citizen of the United States.



The FBI made contact with an overseas German shortwave radio-transmitting station used by Nazi spies in New York. Hundreds of messages were received... and sent



The House on 92nd Street (1945)

The film is loosely based on the Duquesne Spy Ring headed by Frederick Joubert Duquesne and the work of real life double agent William G. Sebald. Interestingly, many of the "bit roles" in this film were played by real FBI agents... all approved by J. Edgar Hoover who just a few years earlier had reluctantly accepted to investigate this case.

Several letters to this address concerning
me, but I did not receive any money.
ADAM GORTZ returned to my home and
GORTZ was living, and when I asked
him, he told me to "skip it".
one [redacted] came to my house.
He told me that he knew me through
of ADAM GORTZ. He told me that
was working on my investigation concerning
in harbors or wherever else
interested in it. I am quite
gave [redacted] a wooden model of
ment. He wanted to be my Euro-
made an agreement to the
transactions concerning the
send me a down payment in return
it receive any money for the
to my house and said he was
and he gave me \$500, in cash
This man did not
door, gave me the money,
no bank drafts at different
each, one drawn on the First
urers Trust Company, both in
that I was to be
agency for the sale of my
me to obtain all period-
sters published in the United
is address. I wrote this
hereafter I began to send
to begin to obtain
the United States
China.
ter from Germany saying
er was signed and
words, and I recall
letter was postmarked
other letter from
ough the address of



SPY MAN

FREDERICK JOUBERT DUQUESNE

Born in Cape Colony, South Africa, on 21 September 1877, Frederick Joubert Duquesne emigrated from Hamilton, Bermuda, to the United States in 1902 and became a naturalized citizen on 4 December 1913. Duquesne was implicated in fraudulent insurance claims, including one that resulted from a fire aboard the British steamship *Tennyson* which caused the vessel to sink on 18 February 1916. When he was arrested on 17 November 1917, he had in his possession a large file of news clippings concerning bomb explosions on ships, as well as a letter from the Assistant German Vice Consul at Managua, Nicaragua. The letter indicated that "Captain Duquesne" was "one who has rendered considerable service to the German cause."

When Sebold returned to the United States in February 1940, Duquesne, code name 'Dunn', was operating a business known as the 'Air Terminals Company' in New York City. After establishing his first contact with Duquesne by letter, Sebold met with him in Duquesne's office. During their initial meeting, Duquesne, who was extremely

concerned about the possibility of electronic surveillance devices being present in his office, gave Sebold a note stating that they should talk elsewhere. After relocating to an Automat, the two men exchanged information about members of the German espionage system with whom they had been in contact.


Duquesne provided Sebold with information for transmittal to Germany during subsequent meetings, and the meetings which occurred in Sebold's office were filmed by FBI Agents. Duquesne, who was vehemently anti-British, submitted information dealing with national defense in America, the sailing of ships to British ports, and technology. He also regularly received money from Germany in payment for his services.

On one occasion, Duquesne provided Sebold with photographs and specifications of a new type of bomb being produced in the United States. He claimed that he secured that material by secretly entering the DuPont plant in Wilmington, Delaware. Duquesne also explained how fires could be started in industrial plants. Much of the



information Duquesne obtained was as a result of his correspondence with industrial concerns. Representing himself as a student, he requested data concerning their products and manufacturing conditions.

Duquesne was brought to trial and was convicted. He was sentenced to serve 18 years in prison on espionage charges, as well as a two-year concurrent sentence and payment of a \$2,000 fine for violation of the Registration Act.



Harry Sawyer

Continued from page 65



Sebold returned to Germany in February, 1939, to visit his mother in Mulheim. Upon his arrival in Hamburg, Germany, he was approached by a member of the Gestapo who said that Sebold would be contacted in the near future. Sebold proceeded to Mulheim where he found employment.

In September 1939, a Dr. Gassner visited Sebold in Mulheim and interrogated him regarding military aeroplanes and equipment in the United States. He also asked Sebold to return to the United States as an espionage agent for Germany. Subsequent visits by Dr. Gassner and a "Dr. Renken", later identified as Major Nickolaus Ritter of the German Secret Service, persuaded Sebold to cooperate with the Reich because he feared reprisals against family members still living in Germany.

Since Sebold's passport has been stolen shortly after his first visit from Dr. Gassner, Sebold went to the American Consulate in Cologne, Germany, to obtain a new one. While there, Sebold secretly told personnel of the American Consulate about his future role as a German agent and expressed his wish to cooperate with the FBI upon his return to America. Sebold reported to Hamburg, Germany, where he was instructed in such areas as preparing coded messages and microphotographs. Upon completion of training, he was given five microphotographs containing instructions for preparing a code and detailing the type of



Following the early war spy cases, the FBI enjoyed much success against Nazi spies. The breaking of the US spy rings was also a major wake-up call for the security services, military and the public - as evidenced in these wartime Department of State posters



COURTESY FBI

information he was to transmit to Germany from the United States. Sebold was told to retain two of the microphotographs and to deliver the other three to German operatives based in America. After receiving final instructions, including using the assumed name of "Harry Sawyer", he sailed from Genoa, Italy, and arrived in New York City on 8 February 1940.

The FBI previously had been advised of Sebold's expected arrival, his mission, and his intentions to assist them in identifying German agents in the United States. Under the guidance of Special Agents, Sebold established residence in New York City as Harry Sawyer. Also, an office was set up for him as


a consultant diesel engineer, to be used as a cover in establishing contacts with members of the German spy ring. In selecting the office for Sebold, FBI Agents ensured that they could observe any meetings taking place there.

In May 1940, a shortwave radio-transmitting station operated by the FBI on Long Island established contact with a German Shortwave station abroad. This radio station served as a main channel of communication between German spies in New York City and their superiors in Germany for 16 months. During this time, the FBI transmitted over 300 messages to Germany, and received 200 messages from Germany.


Sebold's success as a counterespionage agent against Nazi spies in the United States is demonstrated by the successful prosecution of the 33 German agents in New York (above). Of those arrested on the charge of espionage, 19 pleaded guilty. The 14 men who entered pleas of not guilty were brought to trial in Federal District Court, Brooklyn, New York, on 3 September 1941; and they were all found guilty by jury of 13 December 1941.

The Rumrich case, though seriously flawed, ultimately helped the FBI mature into an effective force for protecting national security.

Just as well, with a Cold War looming...




ISSUE 9 REF: ES/09
UK £3.50 USA/ROW \$7.00




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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SPY BACK ISSUES

NOSENKO

Continued from page 31



Certainly no sign of any such thing has ever reached public print - and if the intelligence community believes that Nosenko is bona fide, why would they do it?

EYE SPY: Could you or the agency have done more to expose Nosenko?

THB: Certainly. Our examination of Nosenko produced pointers to specific moles. Had Nosenko not been whitewashed and given full trust, those pointers could have been followed - and moles discovered. That would have gone a long way toward exposing Nosenko.

EYE SPY: Spy Wars has attracted criticism from some people in the

intelligence community. We understand planned lectures have been cancelled and skulduggery is afoot. A former FBI CI officer called Spy Wars "one of the most dangerous and disruptive books that could have been published in any time, particularly in 2007. In fact... radioactive poison." KGB defector Oleg Kalugin called the book "absurd... trash." We were surprised by this language - it seems to have touched a raw nerve. Are some former "players" embarrassed that they may, after all, have allowed a KGB officer to provide so much disinformation?

THB: Yes, my book touches sensitive nerves. It threatens the intelligence community's abiding faith in Nosenko's bona fides. You could feel that sensitivity in the surprising words that you mentioned. Three veterans, one each from the FBI, CIA and KGB, were venting their emotions when they called my

book "radioactive poison" and "trash" - they certainly weren't reviewing it, as they pretended, because not a single one of the three "reviewers" had even read it. The FBI veteran admitted to friends he hadn't read more than 40-odd pages of this "radioactive poison." KGB veteran Kalugin, who had long been assuring Westerners that Nosenko genuinely defected, trashed the book for what he called its lack of understanding of the KGB and Soviet system. If he had read it, he would have been aware of the input into it by KGB veterans, some of whom knew more than he did about these KGB operations. They were upset because their faith and teachings had been called into question. And "faith" is the right word. The intelligence community's view of Nosenko sounds like a Credo. Here are some of its words - all spoken or written by CIA directors, top leaders and insiders, some of them under oath at the time:

"At no time during his first six years of reporting to CIA - nor since then, as far as the outside world knows - did Nosenko ever uncover a single KGB spy who, at the time, was still in touch with the KGB, still had access to NATO-country secrets, and was previously unknown to Western intelligence."

"There is no reason to believe that Nosenko is other than what he has claimed to be... He defected of his own free will and has not sought to deceive us... Anything Nosenko has said has been said in good faith... If any contradiction appeared in his reporting, it is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch... If Nosenko inadvertently told any untruths, they were not at the behest of the KGB... Any claim we [in CIA] may have left to having served in an honourable and dignified profession dictates that we accept the Agency's judgment in this case - that Nosenko was always bona fide and our colleagues [who


nerves get raw in the face of evidence that they are wrong.

EYE SPY: On a scale of 1-10 (10 being the highest), how useful was the intelligence imparted by Nosenko?

THB: If you mean "positive" intelligence on the USSR - political, economic or military, for example - Nosenko gets a "0". That may be understandable from a CI/security man - but strangely, Nosenko's score is suspiciously low even in counterintelligence matters. At no time during his first six years of




DCI William Casey and President Ronald Reagan



Spy Wars has been described as "radioactive poison" and "trash" - though clearly it is not

In 1981, Bagley together with former KGB officer Peter Deriabin (right), submitted to DCI William Casey's representative a long report noting their concerns about Nosenko



COURTESY STEVEN SCHECTER



THB: I wrote it because I still hope that these betrayals of our country - and betrayals of the brave Soviet officers who secretly assisted us - will not go unrecognised. I hope that this old, buried Nosenko case might be reopened. I also wrote it to correct History. The official lies about Nosenko have been adopted by writers and historians. I had to do it before it was too late. I am the only person alive who remembers all the facts, and if I had failed to get the truth on the record, those facts would have remained buried forever. And fiction would have become History. I learned things from my conversations with KGB veterans after the Cold War that reinforced this need. But even before this I had made repeated efforts to reestablish the truth about this part of the Cold

reporting to CIA - nor since then, as far as the outside world knows - did Nosenko ever uncover a single KGB spy who, at the time, was still in touch with the KGB, still had access to NATO-country secrets, and was previously unknown to Western intelligence. In other words, he did not reveal anything so sensitive or important that the KGB could not readily sacrifice it to build up a plant in Western eyes. For the minor CI information Nosenko did give - unimportant tourists and others recruited by the KGB, names of a lot of KGB officers working inside the USSR, etc. - give him perhaps a "2" on your scale of 10. By the way, some CIA insiders spread the tale - and some writers passed it on to the public as fact - that Nosenko gave far more and better information than Golitsyn did. Since I know in detail what each of them reported, I can tell you this is grotesquely false. It is truth stood on its head.

EYE SPY: Why did you write *Spy Wars*? And why did you wait so long to bring out this information?


War. When I read CIA's whitewash of Nosenko in 1968 (its so-called "Solie report") after I had left the scene, I submitted a long rebuttal - but it was apparently ignored. In 1978 when I saw how CIA defended Nosenko - and distorted the whole case - before the congressional committee (HSCA) that was reviewing the assassination of President Kennedy, I went before the Committee and rebutted CIA's testimony. The Committee concluded that Nosenko had lied, but that apparently had no effect on CIA's rosy view of the man. Again in 1981, when William Casey took over as Director of Central Intelligence under the new President, Ronald Reagan, I submitted to Casey's representative a long report, along with the former KGB officer Peter Deriabin. Again, the effort was in vain. Then in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, I set out to try, now that the Cold War was over, to get KGB veterans to tell some of the truth behind this old operation. I succeeded beyond my wildest hopes. With this new confirmation, this fresh new input from former

enemies, I felt justified in finally bringing the story to public print. Hence my book, *Spy Wars*.

EYE SPY: A book came out about the same time as yours, and dismissed CIA as an incompetent failure in the Cold War - its title even labelling CIA's legacy as one of "ashes." Given your criticism of CIA's later handling of the Nosenko case, would you agree with this judgment?

THB: No, I would not. For example, the book you refer to dismisses CIA's operations against the Soviet Union as a failure simply because CIA did not succeed in recruiting Soviet officials by its own initiatives. But that was only one aspect of the picture. In fact, CIA was alert and prepared to accept those who volunteered - and throughout the Cold War the best spies for both sides had "walked in" as volunteers. CIA was able to handle them skilfully and productively (and securely, except when moles entered our ranks). That was no easy task in the face of KGB counterintelligence barriers. Our handling of GRU Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov, for example, kept him safe for five or six years and might have gone on indefinitely had a mole not betrayed him. Through him CIA produced intelligence that vastly improved America's military posture vis-à-vis its potential enemy - keeping the country safer in dangerous times. That was the work of a competent and effective service. I saw while inside CIA - as I still do from outside - devoted and able men and women giving their all to defend their country in near-impossible tasks. I'm proud

© EYE SPY



Tennent Bagley pictured with Professor Tom Kane of the Centre for Security Studies, Hull University. Mr Bagley recently delivered a fascinating lecture on Nosenko and many aspects of CIA tradecraft

to have served that Agency. The book you refer to calls itself a history of the Agency, but just in this "anti-Soviet" aspect of CIA's performance, it appears neither accurate nor balanced. Its treatment of the Nosenko case, for example, is a superficial, cut-and-paste repetition of the conventional wisdom - the distorted myth - without offering any fresh facts or insight.

EYE SPY: Nosenko is still living in the United States. If you could ask him one question, what would it be?


THB: Well, maybe something like this: "Why don't you write a book telling the truth about your life? Lay it all out. It would be a bombshell and a stunning contribution to counterintelligence history. And for a change, you would be serving well the country of which you have become a citizen and to which you presumably swore loyalty."

EYE SPY: Are you planning a sequel to *Spy Wars*?

THB: It's too soon to be considering that. Perhaps more facts will come to light that will call for a sequel.

Editor's note: We will continue to follow this fascinating case with more interviews and comments from the intelligence world.


See page 62 for details of how to purchase Tennent Bagley's enthralling book - *Spy Wars*



KGB headquarters, Lubyanka Square, Moscow

One of the great unsolved mysteries of aviation crime is being reinvestigated by the FBI. It involves an unidentified man aged about 40, who parachuted from a hijacked airliner somewhere between Seattle and Reno in November 1971.

Donning a trenchcoat and loafers, he jumped - making off with about \$200,000 in ransom cash - a fortune in those days. The case, codenamed NORJAK by the FBI, has featured in documentaries, books and magazines, and saw hundreds of would-be "investigators" wander under the aeroplane's flight path into remote wilderness seeking the money which has never been found.



FBI reopens case file of the suitcase bomb hijacker

Right: "Cooper's" J.C. Penney black tie which he left behind on the airliner. In 2001, DNA was acquired from the tie which helped the FBI rule out a number of "Walter Mitty" claiming to be the hijacker

THE NORJAK COLD

So who was he? Did he escape? Thirty-seven years later the FBI are still not sure if he even survived the leap. "It's a mystery, frankly," agency officials said in a December news release issued periodically to update old cases. And though the mystery man called himself "Dan" and sometimes "D.B. Cooper," detectives believe these are pseudonyms.

With new technologies not previously available, and with newfound attention from an agent on the west coast, the FBI has announced it is once again looking into the cold case.


Just as interesting, the FBI has released a number of artist's impressions of the hijacker and a photo of his black tie that he left on board Northwest Orient Airlines Flight 305 (Boeing 727). The Bureau hope these images may attract the attention of someone who knew "Cooper", or provide a new insight into

what happened to all that money. Some \$5,800 was found by a young boy on the bank of the Columbian River in 1980, its serial numbers matching the ransom money, but the rest has never turned up.

Since the incident, a number of people have claimed they were the parachuter, but since DNA testing came about, all have been dismissed as hoaxers (DNA was obtained from the tie in 2001).


"This case is 36 years old, it's beyond its expiration date, but I asked for the case because I was intrigued with it," said Larry Carr, a federal agent based in Seattle who usually investigates bank robberies, and who was just four-years-old when the hijacking occurred. "I remember as a child reading about it and wondering what had happened. It's surreal that after 36 years here I am, the only investigator left. I wanted to take a shot at solving it."

A few things to keep in mind, according to Special Agent Carr: "We originally thought Cooper was an experienced jumper, perhaps even a paratrooper. We concluded after a few years this was simply not true. No experienced parachutist would have jumped in the pitch-black night, in the rain, with a 200-mile-an-hour wind in his face, wearing loafers and a trench coat. It was simply too risky. He also missed that his reserve chute was only for



One of the parachutes left behind by Cooper and the canvas bag it came in

Illustration showing how "Cooper" left the airliner and became part of American aviation folklore

A side-view illustration of a Northwest Airlines jet, likely a Boeing 707, in flight. The aircraft is white with a dark blue stripe along the fuselage and a red tail fin. The word "NORTHWEST" is written in white on the dark blue stripe. A man, presumably "Cooper", is standing on the upper surface of the wing, looking out. The aircraft is shown from a low angle, emphasizing its size.

CASE

"The hijacker had no help on the ground either. To have utilised an accomplice, Cooper would've needed to coordinate closely with the flight crew so he could jump at just the right moment and hit the right drop zone." But said Carr, "Cooper simply said, 'Fly to Mexico,' and he had no idea where he was" 🗏



COURTESY FBI

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NO26

COOPER

VANCOUVER, WASH. (AP) -- AS WORDS OF REPORTERS AND A HERD OF COWS LOOKED ON, SCIENTISTS AND FBI AGENTS STIFLED THROUGH SAND ALONG THE COLUMBIA RIVER, SEARCHING FOR MORE OF THE BOAT THAT WAS BEING MISSED SINCE SUE PIRATE D.B. COOPER PARACHUTED FROM A PLANE NINE YEARS AGO. AGENTS TRENCHING THE RIVERSHORE WEDNESDAY FOUND A FEN MOOR SCRAPS OF THE \$200,000 RANSOM BUT NO SIGN OF THE FIRST MAN TO HIJACK AN AIRLINER FOR MONEY.

AND THE FBI AGENT WHO LED THE INVESTIGATION SINCE THE 1971 HIJACK SAYS THE DISCOVERY TENDS TO CONFIRM HIS SPECULATION THAT COOPER, WHO HAS BECOME SOMETHING OF A FOLK HERO, DIED THE NIGHT HE PARACHUTED INTO A STORM SOMEWHERE OVER SOUTHWESTERN WASHINGTON.

SOGGY AND BATTERED FRAGMENTS OF SEVERAL THOUSAND DOLLARS IN \$20 BILLS WERE DISCOVERED SUNDAY BY A 9-YEAR-OLD BOY DURING A FAMILY PICNIC. SERIAL NUMBER CONFIRMED THEY WERE PART OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FBI AGENT PAUL HUDSON SAID HE RULED OUT VANCOUVER.

MONEY WAS BURIED ALONG THE RIVER NEAR VANCOUVER.

"WHOMEVER THEY GOT THERE, THEY MUST HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED WITHIN A COUPLE OF YEARS AFTER THE HIJACKING," SAID AGENT WALSH HINKELSBACH, DUE TO RETIRE IN TWO WEEKS AFTER HEADING THE COOPER INVESTIGATION SINCE THE HIJACK. "RUBBER BANDS DETEIORATE RAPIDLY AND COULD NOT HAVE HELD THE BUNDLES IDENTIFIED A LAYER OF SAND AS HAVING BEEN THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS IDENTIFIED A LAYER OF SAND AS HAVING BEEN DEPOSITED WHEN THE 40-FOOT SHIP CHANNEL WAS DREDGED IN AUGUST 1974. AGENTS SPECULATED COOPER'S BODY WOULD HAVE CLOTTED THE DREDGE IF IT HAD BEEN IN THE CHANNEL THEN, BUT A SACHEL COULD HAVE GONE THROUGH. AGENTS ALSO SPECULATED THE BILLS COULD HAVE WRASPED INTO A TRIBUTARY IN THE AREA NEAR LACENTA, WASH., INTO COLUMBIA RIVER APPARENTLY PARACHUTED.

WHICH COOPER APPARENTLY PARACHUTED TO KEEP HIMSELF FROM BEING CAPTURED. OFFICIALS KOPED OFF THE RIVERBANK FOR MORE THAN 10 MILES AND ONLY SECTORS FROM THE AREA AS THEY DUG FOR MORE OF THE REMAINS. SHERMAN AND AGENTS ALLOWED IN WEDNESDAY WERE REPORTEDLY PHASED SHERMAN AND

DRAWY COWS.

"I'LL ADMIT TO A CERTAIN SENSE OF SATISFACTION," SAID HINKELSBACH. "THE CASE ISN'T SOLVED, BUT THIS IS CERTAINLY A MAJOR STEP."

AUG 06 1980

AP-W-1214

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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W089
DR
COPPER MONEY
VANCOUVER, WASH. (AP) -- THE CRUMBLING REMAINS OF \$20 BILLS
UNBURNED BY A VANCOUVER FAMILY MORE THAN TWO WEEKS AGO REPRESENT
ABOUT \$5,800 OF THE \$200,000 TAKEN BY SKYJACKER D.B. COOPER IN 1971,
THE FBI SAYS.

RAY MATTHEWS, SENIOR AGENT FROM THE BUREAU'S GENTILE OFFICE, SAID
WEDNESDAY THAT OFFICIALS COUNTED THE DECAYING GREENBACKS DURING FBI
LABORATORY TESTS IN WASHINGTON, D.C.


OTIS COX OF THE BUREAU'S WASHINGTON, D.C., OFFICE CONFIRMED THAT
THE COUNT WAS MADE, BUT SAID LITTLE ELSE HAS BEEN REVEALED ABOUT THE
MONEY. LAB TECHNICIANS CONTINUE TO STUDY THE LOOT, PARTICULARLY FOR
EVIDENCE OF WHERE IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BEFORE IT WASHED UP ON THE BANKS
OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER, OTIS SAID.

THOUGH LUMPY MASSES OF THE MONEY WERE FOUND BURIED BENEATH A SHALLOW
COVER OF SAND, COOPER, AMERICA'S FIRST SKYJACKER-FOR-MONEY, HAS NEVER
BEEN LOCATED. AUTHORITIES TEND TO BELIEVE HE IS DEAD, BUT ACKNOWLEDGE
"WE DON'T KNOW FOR SURE."

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FUGITIVE INDEX
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An FBI chart showing the flight path of the airliner





Making a jump like this from the back of an aeroplane is a difficult task - even for professionals. "Cooper's" descent into the blackness of night must have been even more difficult



Left: An interesting photograph of the original artist's impression - still in the FBI book

when he jumped. There was also no visibility of the ground due to cloud cover at 5,000 feet.

"We have a solid physical description of Cooper. The two flight attendants who spent the most time with him on the aeroplane were interviewed separately the same night in separate cities and gave nearly identical descriptions. They both said he was about

"Cooper" 1971



D.B. Cooper's FBI Profile

Race: White
Sex: Male
Age: Mid-40s
Height: 5'10" to 6'
Weight: 170 to 180
Build: Average to well built
Complexion: Olive, Latin appearance, medium smooth
Hair: Dark brown or black, normal style, parted on left, combed back, sideburns, low ear level
Eyes: Possibly brown. During latter part of flight put on dark wrap-around sunglasses with dark rims
Voice: Low, spoke intelligently; no particular accent, possibly from Midwest section of U.S.
Characteristics: Heavy smoker of Raleigh filter tip cigarettes
Wearing apparel: Black suit; white shirt; narrow black tie; black dress suit; black rain-type overcoat or dark top coat; dark briefcase or attache case; carried paper bag 4" x 12" x 14"; brown shoes



A BULLETIN FROM THE F.B.I.
 Following is an artist's conception of the hijacker who extorted \$200,000 from Northwest Airlines on November 24, 1971.



THIS MAN IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

Race: White
Sex: Male
Age: Mid 40's
Height: 5'10" to 6'
Weight: 170 to 180 pounds
Build: Average to well built
Complexion: Olive, Latin appearance, medium smooth
Hair: Dark brown or black, normal style, parted on left, combed back; sideburns, low ear level
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Characteristics: Heavy smoker of Raleigh filter tip cigarettes
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If you have any information which might lead to the identity of this individual, please contact the nearest FBI Office which would be found in the front of your telephone directory.



Photo showing livery of Northwest

5'10" to 6', 170 to 180 pounds, in his mid-40s, with brown eyes. People on the ground who came into contact with him also gave very similar descriptions."

Agent Carr was given the task of reopening the case in mid-2007. He decided to treat it as a bank robbery that took place on an aircraft. "The classic way we solve bank robberies is with the public," Carr said. "Everything we know - pictures, descriptions, m.o., everything. We put it all out there." The FBI are hoping someone will call saying "my uncle who disappeared in 1971 - he could have been Cooper. I just never thought about it until now."

Northwest Airlines 305 left Portland enroute to Seattle on 24 November 1971. "Cooper", described as a quite man and wearing a business suit, white shirt and black tie, ordered a bourbon and soda while still on the ground. At around 3.00pm, he gave flight attendant Ms. Schaffner a note, the shocked women read the letter. There was a bomb in his briefcase and he wanted four parachutes and \$200,000 in \$20 bills. "Cooper" opened up his case which exposed a mass of wires and red coloured sticks. When the aircraft touched down in Seattle, Cooper let the 36 passengers leave in exchange for the ransom.



"Cooper" 2007



The USAF tracked the airliner with two F-106s from McChord Air Base. And though they were in constant pursuit - being just five miles away - the pilots did not see "Cooper" make his jump

DEATH BED STORIES: And what of some of the names previously mentioned as Cooper? None turned out to be true. Duane Weber, who claimed to be Cooper on his deathbed, was ruled out by DNA testing (a DNA sample from Cooper's tie was taken in 2001). Kenneth Christiansen, named in a recent magazine article, didn't match the physical description and was a skilled paratrooper. Richard McCoy, who died in 1974, also didn't match the description and was at home on the day after the hijacking having Thanksgiving dinner with his family in Utah, an unlikely scenario unless he had help.



Some of the money recovered near a river - it matched the serial numbers from the ransom paid to "Cooper"

However, this goodwill gesture did not extend to all the crew. He then ordered the pilot into the skies again and told the captain he wanted him to fly to Mexico City.

At approximately 8.00pm that evening and, flying somewhere between Seattle and Reno, Nevada, "Cooper" incredibly jumped from the rear of the aircraft. He had donned two parachutes, but one of these was for instruction and was useless. The cord from a third parachute was used to help tie the money bag.

And though the FBI monitored the airliner's journey via two USAF fighters, and despite years investigating the case, "Cooper" simply

disappeared into the night - along with most of the money.

There were prime suspects, of course, but none of these proved to be "Cooper". "If he's alive today, he'd be about 85 years old," Carr said. "Maybe one day I'll be sitting at my desk and I'll get a call from an old man who says, 'You're not going to believe this story.'"

As many agents before him, Carr thinks it highly unlikely that Cooper survived the jump. "Diving into the wilderness without a plan, without the right equipment, in such terrible conditions, he probably never even got his chute open."

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


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

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


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
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


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DISGUISE TECHNIQUES


Cloaking tricks, deceptions and illusions

Continued from page 43

MASTERS OF DISGUISE

The Central Intelligence Agency has a deserved reputation in the art of physical disguise, and a number of its former officers have since taken their skills in to the public arena, but none more admirably so than Bob Barron. In high school he was encouraged by Irene Brock, his art teacher and was captivated by creating the illusion of reality. He would later become the CIA's Senior Disguise Specialist only retiring in 1993. He was the person who actually made the fake noses, chins, skin and ears to protect the identities of Central Intelligence Agency operatives in the Cold War. During his 30-year career he even altered faces to make doubles. Barron's attention to detail was astonishing - a living example of a true disguise expert - and far from being unrealistic, his creations were hailed by cosmetic experts as "incredible". Barron said: "I wouldn't issue [agents] a disguise if [it put] their life in jeopardy as the result of a less-than-perfect disguise."

Barron naturally rarely comments about his spy career, which began as a document forger, airbrushing photographs, counterfeiting identity cards. He then moved on to the Technical Services Directorate - and became a disguise expert. It was a job that enabled him to travel around the world on assignments - Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America and early in his career - two far east capitals in the 1970s. Here Barron had to be precise about changing the skin tone of Caucasian Field officers who had to meet their Asian agents under the watchful eyes of KGB counterintelligence. Barron said: "When I worked for the



COURTESY BOB BARRON

Former CIA disguise expert Bob Barron - his skills fostered during his time in the Agency are now being using to help and transform the lives of many unfortunate people...

CIA I put people in hiding, agents depended on the realism of their disguise to keep them alive, this was my responsibility." He acknowledges the CIA had craftsmen who were the world's best at creating false beards, moustaches, wigs, glasses, and even teeth. In 1983, searching for material to help his disguise work, Barron attended the annual symposium of the Association of Biomedical Sculptors. He believed prosthetics might be a "useful tool" to the CIA.

Today, he still works with advanced prosthetics, assisting members of the public with various facial deformities. His company, Custom Prosthetic Designs, has mastered a technique of making silicon look like skin. The genesis for the programme began during Barron's time at Langley.

In 2006, he helped seven-year-old Gage Chenard, who was born without a left ear. An impression was created from Chenard's existing ear, and then Barron "fine-tuned" the texture so the cast ear resembled skin. An adhesive glue was used to fit the ear in place on Gage. The family was delighted. Other corrections and additions, depending on the task, are completed using titanium screws embedded in bone or natural skeletal undercuts such as the ocular orbit.

"I wouldn't issue [agents] a disguise if [it put] their life in jeopardy as the result of a less-than-perfect disguise."

**Former CIA disguise expert
Bob Barron**



So just how good is Barron? Well, he was the man who made the incredibly intricate life-like silicone masks used by Tom Cruise in the Hollywood blockbuster 'Mission Impossible'. It was a remarkable mask that took just four hours to make and a couple of seconds to destroy when it was ripped off (a one-time prop that heavily relied on computer techniques to enhance the illusion). "It's very realistic - but this kind of disguise is for a short period of time," Barron said. Indeed, many of Hollywood's many film outfits offered Barron a job, but his attention was focused on medical matters and unfortunate people. He told the *Washington Post*: "I was researching materials in the commercial field to make, maybe, my products better... so I went undercover to the Association of Medical

DAY OF THE JACKAL II

Sculpture in New York, where they were doing a lot of prosthetic devices. I saw there so many people disfigured... I knew then I wanted to help those people... I knew at that time this will be my second career."


JACKALS STILL EXIST

It's ironic that we began this three part series on disguise techniques by venturing back almost 50 years - looking at the work of Frederick Forsyth and his magnificent book - *The Day Of The Jackal*. The imaginary assassin - Charles Calthrop showed how it was possible to use a whole host of disguise techniques to get close to President Charles de Gaulle. He began by searching through a graveyard looking for a dead child that would have been approximately his age had he lived. Once discovered, he sent off for a new birth certificate - a document that allowed him to obtain a false passport. And so, to our surprise, this loophole may not to have been totally sealed, for another interesting character - the disappearing "Canoe man" John Darwin - obtained a false passport by stealing the identity of a dead baby.

The "back from the dead" former prison guard caused a worldwide sensation when he suddenly turned up recently at a London police station five years after he was thought to have drowned in the North Sea. He said he was suffering from amnesia - but the police did not believe him - and for good reason.

In an almost identical plot to that devised by Forsyth, Darwin, who was heavily in debt with

Known as the "Canoe man" John Darwin faked his own death, and after insurance monies were paid, sought a way to bring himself back to life. He did this by finding the grave of a baby who died in the very year of his own birth - John Jones. With this data



he sent for a replacement birth certificate in the name of John Jones which then allowed him to obtain a new British passport.



Once he had "died" he changed his appearance by growing a beard. Foolishly, after trying to start a new life overseas, he and his wife - who assisted in the deception - allowed themselves to be photographed with an estate agent. This photo was uploaded on the company's web site and the ruse was up.

Amazingly the ploy was first revealed in Frederick Forsyth's book - *The Day Of The Jackal* - and thought unworkable today. Not so, it appears...

451	Twenty Seven March 1950 57 St. Patrick's Church U.D.	John	Boy	Alfred John JONES	Lily Agnes JONES family RANING	Labour River Commissioners of 27 Wear Street Sunderland U.D.
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THE 20th CENTURY SPYING GAME


These illustrations are taken from an early 20th century book on espionage.

Far left: The German sentry surprises the British spy who quickly pulls out a bottle of whisky (prop) and pretends to be a drunk (illusion).

The diagrams on the right show how changing clothes - even subtly can work in disguise. The overcoat is removed and held over the arm and the style of hat alters. Also note the tie has been changed. The trousers on the left are longer and drop over the shoes while the figure on the right is wearing a pinstripe suit - complete with turn-ups.

Equally as noticeable - note how the person on the left has pulled his shoulders up and is leaning slightly forward, while the figure on the right is much more upstanding and relaxed.





It is possible to fool all of the people some of the time, but that doesn't necessarily mean you have to go to extraordinary lengths to make a disguise work....

KNOW WHO YOU ARE




Fig. 1




Fig. 2





Fig. 3




Fig. 4

Every head shape falls into a particular category: round, square, long, triangular, square, heart, pear etc. Knowing a head shape allows disguise experts to carefully prepare hair cuts, beards, eyebrows etc. to change its shape - and thus appearance. For example, a round head can be made to look longer and thinner simply by growing a small beard and moustache (Figs 1 and 2). A long narrow square-chinned head can look very different if a thick beard and moustache are grown. The illusion is ever better if the person grows his hair thicker and allows part of it on to the forehead. The square chin also disappears and the head is now oval (Figs 3 and 4).




FOOLING NO ONE: The real subject in this montage of photographs is upper left. His hair has been dramatically altered in each of the subsequent pictures: study his face and the disguise becomes irrelevant


his wife at the time, is thought to have searched graveyards in the dead of night and newspaper records in an attempt to find a suitable candidate for a name change and new identity. Darwin found the grave of John Jones - a baby born on 27 March 1950 - but who died five weeks after birth from enteritis at Sunderland's Hospital for Infectious Diseases. Young John was buried on 3 May 1950 in the city's main cemetery. Darwin then reportedly used John Jones to obtain a birth certificate. Once acquired, he also decided to change his appearance by growing a long scruffy beard. A few weeks later he visited a photo booth, took a few pictures and sent these together with the birth certificate to the passport office on 8 October 2003 - eighteen months after his "death". Days later he reportedly received his new passport. As for his whereabouts for the last few years - he stayed at home and built a secret passage into an adjoining apartment - remaining out of sight.




A year or so later, and after a massive search operation, Darwin was declared dead at an inquest in 2003. Insurance payouts were made to his wife and all sorts of skulduggery took place. Darwin used the passport in 2005 to travel to Gibraltar and Spain with a view to purchasing a yacht - he even used the name John Jones on a receipt. In 2006 he visited Panama City and Costa Rica with his wife Anne, 55 where they made a mistake - they were photographed together with a smiling estate agent. Unfortunately for them the estate agent posted the photo on his web site and the Darwins luck ran out. For a couple so deceptive, it was an astonishing error.



If preparing a facial disguise or headgear to augment a deception - get it wrong and you may as well dress like these characters



First impressions last



Sometimes less is best

Photo credits L to R: LAW ENFORCEMENT PICTURE LIBRARY/STEVE MCMANUS; TALISMAN INTELLIGENCE LIBRARY; US GOVERNMENT

On the night he "disappeared", Darwin, a canoe enthusiast, changed shifts and paddled a way into the sea. After making a hole in the canoe and sinking it, he used the cover of darkness to slip back to shore. He also dropped a paddle in the sea - for effect. His deception worked.

Had baby John Jones survived, he would have been 57 - exactly the same age as John Darwin. Naturally John Jones' relatives are furious. Both Darwin and his wife are in custody charged with dishonestly obtaining £162,515.18 (\$330,000).

WIDER IMPLICATIONS

This case file may not be indicative of the numerous complex elements used by disguise experts, but disguise, as the Darwins now realise, often brings together so many different subjects. With each subject comes a problem, and if not properly planned, checked, maintained and supported, a disguise operation can end in disaster. But for a seconds madness, the couple may well have succeeded in fooling the world.

It is possible to fool all of the people some of the time, but that doesn't necessarily mean you have to go to extraordinary lengths to make a disguise work. A great deal of the actual "presentation" is dependent on why a disguise is needed, and even more so on how long it is in use. Maintaining a complex



physical disguise over a long period of time is extremely difficult and time consuming - people make mistakes. Thus it's more beneficial to keep it simple. For short stop-gap illusions, the disguise is limited only by a person's imagination and skill. In theory, it can be as complex and as cunning as those often seen in movie theatres. How a person "holds" the disguise together is vital. And regardless of what many disguise experts say - it is advantageous if a person is able to hold their nerve.

Props can be a terrific tool, but these must look realistic and be fully maintained. For government disguise experts the scope for creating a disguise is endless. From plastic surgery that will change appearance, to using drugs to increase the melanin count in the skin thus making the person darker, intelligence services, especially in the West, have units dedicated to this tradecraft. Disguise experts can also help a person change their personality through training. However, that element can be performed by anyone - as we have already seen. If you are brash, talk loudly and wear smart suits, be calm, quiet and casual. If you perform everyday actions in a hurry, slow down. It's often the little things that can generate comments like "that doesn't sound like him".

Civilian contract engineers checking an electrical point - or undercover surveillance officers?

Our real-life disguise expert Pam said that the psychology of invisibility depends greatly on the person using a disguise, and on how it is received by others. She also insisted that "first impressions matter", more often than can be imagined. "People get used to seeing you as you are - but everyone is different and so too are peoples perceptions. Changing a hair style doesn't necessarily mean it will be noticed - or that it will change your appearance... even though to you it does! There are so many factors that are involved with disguise, and each are unique in themselves."


DISGUISE DANGERS

However, there are certain counter measures, some of them not available just a few years ago, that threaten the use of many disguises - and they don't all rely on luck or the sixth sense.

FACIAL THERMOGRAMS are unique to the individual, and methods and systems for positive identification have been developed. Plastic surgery is no guard against some technologies in this area.

VOICE RECOGNITION technology is moving along at an incredible rate - and even masters of this craft might find it difficult in future years to fool people - especially in a face-to-face confrontation.

FINGERPRINTS. The ridge pattern on fingers uniquely identify people. Each fingerprint has at least one major feature and many "small features" (so-called minutiae). The earliest classification scheme was devised in the 1890s. But a 2006 Japanese study that tested 15 biometric systems found 11 of them failed to detect 'false' fingerprints that were being used in the form of a latex strip covering a person's fingers. In time, it's not too difficult to




Though Japanese scientists have discovered a latex fingerprint that can defeat some security technology, they may find it more difficult when it comes to Iris recognition and DNA sampling

see this area of forensics being scrutinised even further. However, no doubt countermeasures to combat false prints will be found, but some cases relying solely on a partial print may be vulnerable. And of course, there are always people seeking retribution, leaving a print acquired from an individual at a crime scene may no longer be science fiction. After all, millions of visitors to some countries are having their fingerprints stored on giant computer data bases. If this information falls into the wrong hands, then it could be disastrous.

BIOMETRICS is another area that is set to thwart many a villain and identity fraudster. The detail in an iris is far more unique and accurate than that of a fingerprint - in fact no two are identical. It's "non-invasive" and "hands free".

FACE BIOMETRICS is inexpensive but affected by pose, expression, hairstyle, make-up, lighting and glasses. It is generally not considered a reliable biometric measure.



Even more impossible to disguise is a person's **DNA**. If this is kept of file, then even the world's greatest disguise experts don't stand a chance! And this is the reason Britain's new national identity card will contain such information.

There will always be a need for disguise experts in the intelligence world. But what a change we have seen over the last 100 years... and what advances await this tradecraft?

Mark Birdsall

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