Stalin's War of Extermination: 1941-1945, Planning, Realization and Documentation
By Joachim Hoffman (first published in German in 1999, English 2001)
022--As can be proven,
with certainty, that the German-Soviet war—considered by Hitler to be
inevitable following the fateful Molotov mission in November 1940 just barely
preempted a war of conquest that was planned and prepared under high-pressure
by Stalin, even more historical facts can be demonstrated today. This is
confirmed by ever more historical evidence today. Thus, it was not just Hitler,
as a certain school of contemporary historiography would continue to have us
believe, but Stalin, who, from the very outset, in his political and military
leadership of the Red Army, employed methods of outrageous brutality that
vastly surpassed anything that had ever previously occurred. A myth was widely
disseminated in Germany of the alleged possibility of waging "humane"
warfare, and that this possibility only vanished due to Hitler's alleged
refusal to consider humane methods of waging war. This myth is refuted by the
fact that practically in the first days of the war, the members of the Red Army
were systematically goaded toward violence and were, furthermore, incited to
feelings of infernal hatred against all soldiers of the invading enemy armies.
The collision between two dictatorially led socialist military powers obviously
left little room, from the very beginning of the war, for considerations of
humanity. Nor was there even respect for the laws and provisions of the
International Conventions—which were, moreover, recognized by the German Reich,
while the Soviet Union had strictly refused ratification.
The Germans also
committed crimes in the Soviet Union, responsibility for which rests chiefly
with the executive bodies lead by Reichsfuhrer SS Heinrich Himmler. These crimes have been
described repeatedly and thoroughly, and today the facts are known almost into
every detail. The crimes of the Soviets, on the other hand, are consciously and
methodically relegated to oblivion, since no "comparison" may be
permitted under any circumstances. Yet the drawing of historical
comparisons—the showing of connections, relations of cause and effect, and
parallels—nevertheless constitute the inescapable duties of truthful historical
research; to do otherwise is to pander, consciously and deliberately, to a
one-sided picture of historical events.
The present volume, based
largely on previously unknown documents and archive sources of German and
Soviet origin, therefore—uninfluenced by so-called "taboos and
intellectual prohibitions"—deals quite consciously with the methods of
waging war on the Soviet side of the Eastern Front. This description therefore
relates chiefly to Soviet crimes, but does not lose sight of, or ignore, crimes
committed by Germans in a misuse of the name of the German nation. Distinctions
must, however, be made in any case, and propaganda exaggerations must be
reduced to their actual kernel of truth. The present publication, taken as a
whole, therefore, must be conceded a greater value than that of a contemporary
school of historiography that fundamentally consists of ignoring Soviet methods
of waging war—either deliberately, or simply out of ignorance. That the
findings will not meet with universal approval is to be expected, and also
appears quite natural in view of the explosive nature of the contents. An
accurate appraisal, however, will be unable to deny that the author has,
nevertheless, striven for objectivity; it must also be conceded that it takes
courage to express uncomfortable historical truths in the Federal Republic of
Germany today. Above all, it will be impossible to doubt the author's feelings
of sympathy for the Russian people, a sympathy that totally pervades his other
books on the history of the German-Soviet conflict.
The point of departure of
the present description is, as stated above, the fact—which is now
indisputable—that Hitler, through the initiation of hostilities, just barely
preempted a war of aggression prepared by Stalin. This indisputable scholarly
fact is the rock upon which the hopes of our ideologues, in the truest sense of
the word, are wrecked. Their arguments are null and void, but their doctrinaire
blindness, nevertheless, remains. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to
all authors who have spoken out, regardless of persecution, and, in some cases,
vitriolic personal attacks, thus contributing to the final breakthrough of
historical truth. These authors include, among others, Dr. Heinz Magenheimer,
Lecturer at the National Defense Academy of Vienna; Professor Dr. Werner Maser
of Speyer; Viktor Suvorov of Bristol; Dr. Ernst Topitsch, Professor at Graz;
Professor Dr. Dr. phil. Alfred Maurice de Zayas at Chicago and Geneva; and,
finally, Profesor Dr. Dr. Gunther Gillessen who, in the
Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung,
has always
given evidence of a balanced appraisal, which is as proper as it is astute, of
this historical controversy, thus doing the cause a great service. A
far-reaching concurrence of opinion links me to the late, but well-known author
of relevant books, Dr. Alexandr Moiseevich Nekrich, who died in 1993; Dr.
Nekrich was a political officer in the Red Army during the war (one of the then
much-scorned "Jewish Bolshevist Commissars"), who, after his forced
emigration from the USSR, was active at Harvard University, not least of all in
regard to the "controversy of the preventive war." The present
publication originated during my thirty-five year tenure at the German Military
Historical Research Office (then Freiburg, today Potsdam), specializing in the
general topic of Stalin and the Red Army. I am indebted to the head official,
Brigadier General Dr. Gunter Roth, for the sympathetic liberties he permitted
me. In addition, I would like to thank my official colleague, Mrs. Karin Hepp,
who successfully carried out negotiations for me in Moscow, as well as Mrs.
Elke Selzer, who helped prepare the present manuscript, just as she did with my
work on the Caucasus, and completed both with great reliability. In contrast to
the spirit and letter of "freedom of research" as proclaimed under
the German Basic Law, it is, unfortunately, advisable today to have many
passages of a historiographical text revised for "criminal content"
prior to publication—an almost disgraceful situation. This awkward task was
undertaken, tactfully and amicably, by Court VicePresident Johann Birk of
Freiburg; heartfelt thanks in this regard are due to him at this point. Sincere
thanks are also due to the head archive director, Colonel Dr. Manfred Kehrig,
who kindly wrote the preface.
026--The imperialistic
power politics inherent in the Soviet political system from the very
beginning—but not given due attention by the public—also found striking
external expression in the governmental coat of arms
(gosudararstvennyj
gerb) of the USSR, which was
still current in 1991. The symbolism of this state coat of arms consists of a
hammer and sickle menacingly and crudely encircling the whole world, surrounded
by the following inflammatory words in several languages: "Proletarians of
all Countries, Unite!" What is so poignantly made evident here is the
goal, openly proclaimed by both Lenin and Stalin, of world domination by Soviet
Communist power, or, as they called it, the "victory of Socialism all over
the world." It was none other than Lenin who, on December 6, 1920, stated
in a speech that what was involved was to exploit the conflicts and
contradictions between the capitalist states. To "incite" the
capitalist states "against each other," and "of using the knives
of scoundrels, like the capitalist thieves, against each other," on the
grounds that "when two thieves fall out and fight, the honest man laughs
last. As soon as we are strong enough to overthrow capitalism completely, we
will immediately grab them by the throat." "Victory of the Communist
revolution in all countries is inevitable" he declared on March 6, 1920.
"Victory will be ensured in the not-too distant future."
Stalin was early devoted
to this principle of Bolshevism, which was proven by his well-known speech
before the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) in July 1925.
At that time, Stalin declared: "Should the war begin, we will not stand by
inactively; we will enter the war, but we will enter as the last belligerent. We
shall throw a weight on the scales that should be decisive." This
"Stalin Doctrine," as Alexandr Nekrich has shown with admirable
clarity, and regardless of statements to the contrary, was never abandoned .It
retained its force, and the effort to "incite fascist Germany and the West
against each other," as stated by author Viacheslav I. Dashichev, became a genuine idee fine with Stalin. In 1939, when the Red Army found
itself increasing in strength due to a rapidly growing gigantic armaments
program, Stalin believed that the time had come to intervene as a belligerent
in the crisis of "world capitalism." Both the British Ambassador, Sir
Stafford Cripps, and the American Ambassador, Laurence F. Steinhardt, warned
that Stalin wanted to bring about a war, not only in Europe, but in East Asia
as well, as early as 1939. Recently revealed documents of the People's
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindeo offer sufficiently clear information in this regard ."The conclusion
of our agreement with Germany," according to the Narkomindel
on July 1, 1940, to the Soviet
Ambassador in Japan, "was dictated by the desire for a war in
Europe." In regard to the Far East, a telegram from Moscow to the Soviet
Ambassadors in Japan and China on July 14, 1940, accordingly states: "We
would agree to any treaty that brought about a collision between Japan and the
United States." Undisguised in these diplomatic instructions is the
mention of a "Japanese-American war, which we would gladly like to
see." M. Nikitin transcribes Moscow's attitude with the following words:
"The Soviet Union, for its part, was interested in distracting British and
American attention from European problems, and in Japanese neutrality during
the period of the destruction of Germany and the 'liberation' of Europe from
capitalism."
On August 19, 1939, there
was a surprise secret meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee, which
included the participation of the members of the Russian section of the
Communist International. During the meeting Stalin announced, in a programmatic
speech, that the time had now come to apply the torch of war to the European
powder keg. Stalin declared flatly that "if we accept the German proposal
for the conclusion of a Non-Aggression pact with them," it was to be assumed
that "they would naturally attack Poland, and the intervention of France
and England in this war would be inevitable." The resulting "serious
unrest and disorder" would, as he remarked, lead to a destabilization of
Western Europe, without "us," i.e., without the Soviet Union, being
initially drawn into the conflict. For his closest comrades, he drew the
conclusion, already proclaimed in 1925, that, in this way, "we can hope
for an advantageous entry into the war." In Stalin's vision, a "broad
field of activity" now opened up for the development of the "world
revolution." In other words, for the achievement—which had never been
abandoned—of the Sovietization of Europe and Bolshevik domination. He concluded
with the call: "Comrades! In the interests of the USSR—the homeland of the
workers—get busy, and work so that war may break out between the Reich and the
capitalistic Anglo-French bloc!"
As the first stage for the
achievement of imperialist domination, Stalin designated the Bolshevization of
Germany and Western Europe. The Non-Aggression pact, with the momentous
additional secret protocol, was concluded between the representatives of the
Reich's government and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics four days after this secret speech, on August 23, 1939.
The speech by Stalin of
August 19, 1939, was obtained by the French Havas agency from Moscow by way of
Geneva from an "absolutely reliable source." It was published as
early as 1939 in volume 17 of the Revue
Du Droit International. Remarkably, the authenticity of the speech is
disputed with extraordinary zeal by Stalinist propagandists and their blind
adherents right up to the present day. However, in an interview under the
hypocritical headline "A Mendacious Report from the Havas Agency" in
the official party newspaper Pravda on
November 30, 1939, Stalin himself denied the speech. The mere fact that Stalin
felt personally and immediately compelled to publish an official denial reveals
the extent to which he felt he had tipped his hand. Only in extraordinary cases
did Stalin ever allow himself to consent to personal interviews.
Viktor Suvorov has proved
that the authorities of the Soviet Union, such as members of the Central
Committee, marshals, generals, professors, academicians, historians, and ideologists,
have wracked their brains, and, with truly ardent zeal, have attempted to prove
for fifty years that no meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee ever
took place on this particular August 19 at all. The whole tissue of lies
finally collapsed on January 16, 1993 in a single day, when Stalin's biographer
Professor Volkogonov confirmed in Izvestia
"that a meeting had indeed taken place on the date in question, and
that he himself had held the minutes in his hands."
The historian Ms. T. S. Bushueva,
during the course of a scholarly evaluation of Viktor Suvorov's books, which
had been distributed in editions of millions of copies, found the text of the
speech by Stalin. The speech, which had long been known, was discovered in the
secret depths of the former Special Archives of the USSR, apparently prepared
by a member of the Comintern. She made it available to the Russian public for
the first time in the periodical Novyi Mir in December 1994. This epoch-making
speech by Stalin is also contained in the published edition of the minutes of…
030--…summarizing his research results and said: "Analysis has shown that the text, regardless of any possible distortion, originates from Stalin, and must be considered one of the most important documents in the history of the Second World War." That Stalin, as will be ascertained, will be transformed into the principal warmonger must be conclusively acknowledged on the basis of all the following circumstances, and the whole chain of subsequent events." According to Viktor Suvorov, August 19, 1939, was the date upon which Stalin started the Second World War (since this was the day Stalin ordered a surprise attack against the Japanese 6th Army at Khalkhin Gol). Professor Lev Kopelev made a similar statement on December 24, 1994; his phraseology is different, but no less clear: "In 1939, the World War was continued by the Hitlerite and Stalinist realms... on a new and monstrous scale."
Russian historians today
have long seen an immediate connection between August 23, 1939, and June 22,
1941. The August 23, 1939, Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler enabled Stalin to
achieve his initial goal. Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union, recalled that
Stalin was "convinced that the Pact would enable him to wrap Hitler around
his little finger." "We have tricked Hitler for the moment," was
Stalin's opinion, according to Nikita Khrushchev. The August 23, 1939,
Non-Aggression Pact encouraged Hitler to attack Poland and, as a result just as
Stalin expected—a European war broke out. The Soviet Union participated as an
aggressor, beginning on September 17, 1939, without, of course, incurring a
declaration of war from the Western powers. The leader responsible for Soviet
foreign policy, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov,
spoke before the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939. He said: "A single
blow against Poland, first by the Germans, and then by the Red Army, and
nothing remained of this misbegotten child of the Versailles Treaty, which owed
its existence to the repression of non-Polish nationalities." It was the
express wish of Stalin that nothing should remain of the national existence of
Poland.
Through the waging of
aggressive war against Poland and Finland; through the extortionate annexation
of the sovereign republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and through the
threat of war against Romania, the Soviet Union, as a result of its treaties
with Hitler, expanded its territory by 426,000 square kilometers. This
territory was approximately equivalent to the surface area of the German Reich
in 1919. In so doing, Stalin tore away the protective buffer states on his
Western border while significantly improving his base for deployment toward the
West. In Stalin's view, it was now time for the next step, and indeed the
conditions for it were favorable. Germany's political and strategic situation,
regardless of initial German military achievements, was considered in Moscow to
be critical. Decisive victory in the war with England was increasingly receding
into the distance. Standing behind Great Britain, with growing certainty, was
the United States of America. German forces were scattered all over Europe,
locked in a single front against Great Britain stretching from Norway to the
Pyrenees. On the other hand, Germany's inability to fight a protracted war in
terms of economics was very well-known in Moscow. The German Reich was becoming
exceedingly vulnerable in regard to the possibility of being cut off from vital
petroleum imports from Romania. Detailed studies of the German economic and
armaments situation in these circumstances gave rise to a belief in Moscow that
Germany was lapsing into a condition of hopeless military inferiority. That the
Soviet leadership was "afraid of Germany and its armed forces" has
been proven by M. Nikitin to be a fiction of Stalinist historiography. During
these circumstances in late 1940, while the strategic military situation for
Germany and its Axis partner, Italy, was becoming increasingly more difficult,
Stalin—through Molotov in Berlin on November 12-13, 1940—transmitted the
delivery of a demand. The demand boiled down to an expansion of the Soviet
"sphere of influence" that was to include Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary,
Yugoslavia, and Greece, i.e., all of southeastern Europe, and, in the north,
Finland—with which a peace treaty had only been solemnly concluded in March of
that year. A so-called "Swedish question" was also raised. The Soviet
Union, in other words, was now demanding a dominant position in all of Eastern
Europe and the Baltic. Furthermore, it demanded the creation of bases on the
outlets of the Black Sea as well as discretionary passage through the outlets
of the Baltic (Great Belt, Small Belt, Sund, Kattegat, and Skagerrack). The
Reich, engaged in a struggle for its existence, would be hemmed in
simultaneously from the north and south.
These demands, delivered
in the midst of an increasingly difficult military situation, were so
provocative that they left the Germans, as a practical matter, only one
alternative: to submit to subjugation or to fight. These demands amounted to a
deliberately calculated provocation in which the psychological motive is of
principal interest, because it reveals the extent to which Stalin must have
believed himself to be utterly safe in terms of his military superiority at
that time. If Stalin had really been afraid of Hitler, as he repeatedly allowed
the German Embassy in Moscow to believe, he would hardly have provoked the
Germans in a manner that, in the view of Ernst Topitsch, amounted to a "summons"—a
thinly disguised demand for subjugation. That Molotov, in the days of his
mission to Berlin, was in constant, intensive telegraphic contact with Stalin,
proves beyond a doubt that he was acting on Stalin's direct instructions.
035--Even assuming the
admitted order of magnitude, the Red Army, on June 22, 1941, possessed a five-
to six-fold superiority in tanks, a five- to six-fold superiority in aircraft,
and a five- to ten-fold, and perhaps even greater, superiority in artillery
pieces. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the mass production of
modern weapons was really just gearing up. A huge increase in production
figures was not only scheduled, but was actually achieved during the last six
months of 1941, despite huge losses in industrial capacity as a result of the
German conquest of Soviet territory.
On the tangible basis of
a huge and increasingly rapid development of military arms production, the Red
Army had unilaterally generated a bold doctrine based exclusively upon a theory
of military aggression. It was characteristic of this military doctrine
that the concept of a "war of aggression" as well as that of
"unjust war," became obsolete as soon as the Soviet Union entered
hostilities as a belligerent. Lenin stated that what counted was not who
attacked first or who fired the first shot, but rather, the causes of a war,
its aims, and the classes that waged it. To Lenin and Stalin, any attack by the
Soviet Union, against any country at all, was automatically a purely defensive
war from the very outset. In addition, it was also a just and moral war under
any circumstances. The distinction between preventive attack and counterattack
was, furthermore, abandoned.
037--After the outbreak of
the war, the Germans obtained a great deal of information about the extent to
which the members of the Red Army and Soviet Navy were indoctrinated with the
conviction of the invulnerability of the forces of the Soviet Union. Soviet
Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Andrushat (39th Infantry Corps) had
taken advantage of an opportunity to switch over to the German side and
described the massive propaganda efforts. These had already taken place on
April 25, 1941, and made a deep impression on the troops. Andrushat said:
"The political commissars continually stressed that the war would be
fought on foreign territory, never our own... the Soviet Union would always
win, because it has innumerable allies behind the front of any enemy... Because
of the statements of the political commissars, the Red Army believed itself the
best in the world. It could therefore never be defeated by anyone. The
prevalent mood was one of enormous over-estimation of our own
capacities."'
Again and again, other
Soviet officers made similar statements even after the outbreak of hostilities.
Major Filippov (29 Infantry Corps), for example, reported on June 26, 1941,
that the "prevalent opinion among the troops was that the Red Army could
not be beaten. Colonel Liubimov and
Major Mikhailov (both of the 49 Armored Division) made similar statements on
August 4, 1941, referring to the "universally prevalent belief' "that
the Red Army was the best armed and trained in the world, and was therefore
invincible. Major Ornushkov (11
Armored Division) was also "firmly convinced that the Russian Army could
not be beaten."
On August 6,
1941, Ornushkov stated: "According to the propaganda intended for the Red
Army, the Russian people could have complete faith in the Red Army. Military
periodicals, the press, movies, and radio all constantly stressed the huge
expansion of the Armored and Air Forces."
041--German experiences
were quite similar. In Posen on May 6, 1943, a lecture by the Foreign Armies
East Branch of the General Staff of the Army to the I c Service (The I c was
the designation for the third (hence "c") staff officer to the chief
of staff of a division, corps, army, or army group, and was in charge of
intelligence.) stressed that "interrogations of prisoners of war are the
most reliable, and often the sole, way to obtain information on a really solid
basis." Anyone who has ever done comparative research on prisoner of war
interrogation records is always astonished at the extraordinary testimonial
force that must be attributed to these documents.
044--Finally, Stalin's
biographer, Colonel General Professor Volkogonov, accurately reproduced the
speech given by Stalin culminating in "military threats against
Germany," accusing Bezymensky indirectly of mendacity. According to
Volkogonov, Stalin was "candid as seldom before, and spoke about a great
many things that represented state secrets." It was, however, not so much
candor as alcohol that had loosened his tongue, according to the Russian
proverb "what's on a drunkard's tongue when he's drunk, is what's in his
brain when he's sober." Since, as eyewitnesses report, he was already very
drunk at that "late hour." Volkogonov summarized the speech of May 5,
1941, as follows: "The Vozhd
(Leader) made it unmistakably clear: war is
inevitable in the future. One must be ready for the 'unconditional destruction
of German fascism."' "The war will be fought on enemy territory and
victory will be achieved with few casualties."
The speech of May 5, 1941,
in which Stalin revealed his aggressive intentions, was, however, only the
sequel to a speech by "Comrade Stalin" on January 13, 1941, before
high-ranking troop commanders and another speech on January 8, 1941 to
high-ranking Air Force commanders, both held in the Central Committee, during
which he had revealed quite similar thoughts. A few essential points may be
taken from the captured diary of Major Murat of the NKVD (with the rank of
Major General) of the staff of the 21st Army, who was killed at Lochvica. According to this, Stalin had spoken of
a "cultivated enemy," i.e., Germany, after the manner of speech in
use among the leadership of the Red Army at that time, and of "attack
operations," which could begin when one possessed double superiority.
"Two-fold superiority is a law—greater superiority is even better,"
said Stalin on January 13, 1941: "The game is approaching military
operations." "When 5,000 aircraft have destroyed everything, we can
attempt to traverse the Carpathians." The Balkans were the central object
of Soviet planning on several occasions in the spring of 1941. The approximate
manner in which these operations were imagined was soon revealed by the Soviet
plenipotentiary representative in Belgrad. "The USSR will only react at
the proper time," he stated in a lecture given by him in the spring of
1941: "The powers are scattering their forces more and more. The USSR is
therefore waiting to act unexpectedly against Germany,
in doing so, the USSR will cross the Carpathians,
which will act as the signal for the Revolution in Hungary. Soviet troops will
penetrate Yugoslavia from Hungary, advance to the Adriatic Sea, and cut Germany
off from the Balkans and the Middle East."
Stalin and the Soviet
leadership had received increasing numbers of reports on the
"unwillingness of the German people to wage war," desertion in the
German army, and "the defeatist mood in the Wehrmacht." "If
Germany gets involved in a war with the USSR," German soldiers were
alleged to be saying: "We will be defeated," and: "We don't want
to fight, we want to go home." With the "growing proletarian
movements in Germany," the "revolutionary crisis" appeared to be
ripening, which, the "newspapers were writing about, the radio was talking
about, and the theoreticians were discoursing upon," as Stalin's
biographer Volkogonov described the atmo…
049--It was on May 20,
1941, fifteen days after Stalin's war speech before the graduates of the
Military Academy of the Red Army, in which—and was obvious to everybody—Germany
was designated as the enemy, and it was five days after Stalin had approved the
plan, still to be further discussed, of the General Staff of the Red Army for
an aggressive war against the Reich, that Kalinin gave a secret speech before
the Party and Young Communist League (Komsomo) Officials of the Apparatus of
the Supreme Soviet. Kalinin was the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet and, therefore, Head of State of the USSR, one of Stalin's most
dedicated accomplices, who, incidentally, also signed the order to shoot 14,700
Polish officers and 11,000 prominent Polish civilians. In this compromising speech,
Kalinin revealed a few basic ideas of the policies and strategy of the Soviet
Union.
Of course, the concept of
the Stalin doctrine of 1925—which boiled down to entering the war with fresh
armed forces in the event of the mutual exhaustion of the capitalistic states
and, in the end, dictating his own conditions—was temporarily thwarted in 1940
due to the quick German victory in France. Kalinin directed the party cadres on
the new course of his lord and master, which was that Communists were not to concern
themselves with questions of ensuring peace, but should rather "concern
themselves, above all else, in studying the advantages that may arise for the
Communist party from events that only occur once in fifty years." Real
Marxists must understand, according to Kalinin, and these are his actual words:
"that the fundamental concept of the Marxist doctrine consists of deriving
the greatest possible benefits for the Communist party from the tremendous
conflicts within humanity."
Hence, communists,
according to Kalinin, should encourage conflicts "whenever there is a
chance of success"—whenever they promise special advantages and
opportunities. "The best way to strengthen Marxism," the speech
concluded, "consists of studying military matters; fighting with a weapon
in your hand is even better." "War is a very dangerous businesses,
bound up with sufferings," he then added, "but consideration should
be given to the possibility of war when it is possible to expand
Communism." Kalinin expressed satisfaction that the Soviet Union had
succeeded in expanding the zone of Communism to some extent, with relatively
few sacrifices. He also added that the expansion of the zone of Communism must
continue, "even if it demands great efforts." Kretov, the chief of his
Secretariat, summarized the main point of the speech by Kalinin, in thesis
form. 65
Thesis No. 10 ran as follows:
"The capitalist world, filled with great atrocities, can only be destroyed
by the red hot steel of a holy revolutionary war."
The whole meaning of this
speech by the head of state on May 20, 1941, was, according to Alexandr
Nekrich, not concerned with national defense, but rather, with conquest, at
"strengthening the power of Communism." As Kalinin expressed it,
"which will perhaps be decisive to the entire process of historical events
that follows." Could aggressive intentions have been any more clearly
expressed in the atmosphere of May 1941 than when Kalinin called out in
conclusion—"to the thunderous applause" of the auditorium—that
"the army must think: the sooner the struggle begins, the better!"?
On June 5, 1941, in a speech before students of the V I. Lenin Military
Political Academy he repeated "The war will start when it is possible to
expand Communism."
In addition to other
members of the Politburo, among them for example Shcherbakov, Zhdanov
repeatedly propagated Stalin's aggressive policy in May-June 1941. Thus, he
called out in a speech before cinema technicians on May 15, 1941: "The
people must be educated in the spirit of active, combative military
attacks. "When the circumstances
permit," he added openly, "we will further expand the front of
socialism." Expanding the "Front of Socialism" to the West, as
Nikitin remarked, would, however, only be possible when Germany was smashed. A
conference of the Chief Military Council of the Red Army of June 7, 1941, was
headed by Zhdanov and dedicated to a topic chosen by Stalin: "The Task of
the Political Propaganda of the Red
Army in the Near Future." Zhdanov once again announced, with complete frankness:
"We have become stronger. We can now set more active goals for ourselves.
The wars against Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already
entered the path of a policy of attack.
The proceedings of May 5,
1941, and, as will be shown, of May 15, 1941, as well, are inseparably related
to the speeches of Zhdanov and Kalinin. They bluntly reveal that Stalin had no
interest in the maintenance of peace and in the defense of the Soviet State, as
Stalinist propaganda and Stalinist apologists continue to allege, even today.
On the contrary, they show that he worked militarily, politically, and through
propaganda, with all his might, to begin a war of conquest.
057--Stalin, however,
took great care not to sign documents of fatefully grave content. Colonel
General Volkogonov has, however, left no doubt as to Stalin's knowledge of the
General Staff Plan of May 15, 1941, and on July 29, 1990, in the Military
History Research Office in Freiburg stated that Stalin "signed with his
monograph" (i.e., initialed) the plan. Alexandr Nekrich says: "Stalin
favored execution of the plan, but wanted to keep his own hands clean."
Stalin always acted this way in decisive matters. An extraordinary document has
also been found in the "Presidential Archives" (in the former archive
of the Politburo of the Central Committee) in Moscow. This is the text of an
interview prepared on August 20, 1965 by Marshal Vasilevsky, with a concurring
comment by Zhukov, stating that "Stalin fully approves the principal
theses of the 'considerations."' Timoshenko and Zhukov must have received
Stalin's approval, since they immediately commenced execution of the plan; in
which, according to Valeri Danilov as well, they drew up "extensive
preparations" for an offensive war against Germany.
060--The General Staff
plan of May 15, 1941, meant, in terms of one central point, a deviation from
previous doctrine: an enemy offensive was no longer to be answered with a
devastating blow. Rather, the Red Army was to preempt enemy attack, which was,
at this point, still purely hypothetical, since the armored shock forces of the
German Armies East were deployed on the eastern border for the first time only
on June 3, 1941. Since the great devastating blow was intended to introduce the
"military policy of attack operations" ordered by Stalin on May 5,
1941, and, as Kalinin revealed on May 20, 1941, this really involved a
political aim, i.e., of "expanding the zone of Communism," which
meant expanding the power of the Soviet Union, it was, therefore, a purely
offensive war, a war of conquest, not a preventive war that was being prepared,
similar to the manner in which Hitler—although for different reasons—planned an
offensive war of his own.
069--The admission of a crass underestimation of the Red Army is also found in Dr. Goebbels's diaries. Looking back, he noted on August 19, 1941: "We obviously quite underestimated the Soviet shock power and, above all, the equipment of the Soviet army. We had nowhere near any idea of what the Bolsheviks had available. This led to erroneous decision-making..."
The Reich Minister for Enlightening the People and Propaganda expanded upon how difficult it had been for Hitler to make the decision to attack the Soviet Union to start with, adding: "But if the worries of the Fuhrer due to our inaccurate estimate of Bolshevik potential were so great as it is... and caused him such nervous strain, it would have been far worse if we had had a clear picture of the real extent of the danger!"
Hitler, Goebbels added, was now very indignant: "that he had allowed himself to be so deceived by the reports from the Soviet Union over the potential of the Bolsheviks. Above all, his underestimation of the enemy armored and air forces caused us extraordinary problems in our military operations. He has suffered a great deal over this. It was a very serious crisis..."
Hitler made statements that fully confirm this testimony. In the Fuhrer main headquarters on April 12, 1942, Hitler frankly admitted that he had been deceived in regard to the strength of the Red Army, when he declared that the Soviets had: "surrounded everything relating to their army with enormous concealment.
086--The consciousness of
Soviet strength combined, at the same time, with a knowledge of the difficult
political-strategic situation in Germany, which could not, as was well-known,
fight a war on two fronts, led to the decision that has been called the
"kernel of Bolshevism" ever since the time of Lenin. Namely, that it
was important to exploit a unique historical opportunity and bring about a
so-called "revolutionary war of liberation," thus vastly expanding
the power of the Soviet State, as crudely illustrated by the symbolism of the
Soviet governmental coat of arms. Stalin and Kalinin, as well as other high officials
such as Zhdanov, openly propagated Soviet imperialism in several of their
speeches in the spring of 1941. In November 1940, the feeling of a growing
superiority had given Stalin the occasion to make demands in Berlin which, at
any rate, made one thing quite plain: he saw no danger in Germany at that time.
The Red Army had taken up offensive deployment on the Western border with
overwhelming forces which were not organized for defensive purposes even as it
became evident that, for its part, Germany was also preparing an attack.
It is today proven beyond a doubt that Stalin was very closely informed about the German offensive. As early as 1966, Soviet Defense Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko made it quite clear that perhaps some front-line troops may have been surprised by the German offensive, but not the Soviet government and Red Army leadership."' Remarkably, Khrushchev, in addition to other military officers, left no doubt in this regard when he declared: "No one who has the most minimal political understanding can believe that we were surprised by an unexpected and treacherous attack."' One cannot speak of a "German sneak attack," as Colonel Filippov recently put it. Stalin's feelings of superiority was, furthermore, so great that he thought himself capable of defeating "any surprise attack by Germany and its allies at all... and to destroy the attacker."' The President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kalinin, expressed this conviction in a lecture before the V I. Lenin Military Political Academy on June 5, 1941, openly assuring his listeners: "The Germans intend to attack us... We are waiting for it! The sooner they do that, the better, since we will then wring their necks once and for all time."
With such an attitude, neither Stalin nor the Politburo itself, on June 22, 1941, doubted even for a moment that they would be successful in dealing Hitler the defeat that he deserved. General Sudoplatov, Chief of the Reconnaissance Service, even spoke of the "Big Lie of a panic in the Kremlin." Stalin was not surprised on June 22, 1941, but, on the contrary, as Colonel General Volkogonov stresses, the shock set in only several days later, i.e., when the illusions evaporated and catastrophe was looming on the front line, a catastrophe in which it finally became clear that the Germans were, nevertheless, superior in combat."
If Stalin's arrogance
applied in the event of defense against enemy attack, then it applied equally
to his own general offensive plans. In 1990, Colonel Karpov said with reference
to the General Staff Plan of May 15, 1941: "In the early grayness of a May
or June morning, thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our cannons
would have dealt the blow against thickly concentrated German troops, whose location
was known to us right down to battalion level—a surprise even more
inconceivable than a German attack on us,"
Stalin, the General Staff,
and the GUPPKA, in any case, expected an easy victory by the Red Army. They
expected that the huge offensive they were planning would end with the complete
destruction of the enemy with only a few Soviet casualties. As for Hitler and
the Germans, they had only a very incomplete notion of what the Soviets were
preparing. When one considers the extent of these preparations, however, it
becomes clear that Hitler under high pressure only barely preempted an attack
planned by Stalin. June 22, 1941, was therefore pretty much the last date on
which it would have been possible to initiate a "preventive war."
Colonel Petrov, a candidate
in the historical sciences, expressed this in plain but accurate language on
the anniversary of the victory on May 8, 1991, in a leading article of the
official party organ Pravda: "As a result of the overestimation of
our own possibilities and the underestimation of enemy possibilities, we drew
up unrealistic plans of an offensive nature before the war. In keeping with
these plans, we began the deployment of the Soviet armed forces on the western
border. But the enemy preempted us."
Finally, the Russian historian M. Nikitin should be mentioned who made a detailed analysis of the objectives of the Soviet leadership during the decisive months of May and June 1941. He summarized his research findings in the following words: "We once again repeat that the fundamental objective of the USSR consisted of expanding the 'Front of Socialism' to the greatest possible territorial extent, ideally to include all of Europe. In Moscow's opinion, circumstances favored the realization of this scheme. The occupation of large parts of the continent by Germany, the protracted futile war, the increasing dissatisfaction of the population of the occupied countries, the dispersion of the forces of the Wehrmacht on various fronts, the prospects of a conflict between Japan and the United States—all these factors were thought to give the Soviet leadership a unique chance to smash Germany by surprise attack, and to 'liberate Europe' from 'rotting capitalism.'
A study of the guiding documents of the Central Committee of the VKP (b), in Nikitin's view, "together with the data on the immediate military offensive preparations of the Red Army... unequivocally proves the intention of the Soviet leadership to attack Germany in the summer of 1941."
090--Soviet historical
writing on the German-Soviet war is dominated by a propaganda claim that has
been maintained with iron consistency to the present day regardless of all
other considerations. This claim, that of so-called "Soviet
patriotism," was first publicly made by Stalin on the twenty-seventh
anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1944. Briefly, the claim
is that the peoples of the Soviet Union, filled with "fervent and
self-sacrificing Soviet patriotism", "ardent love of their Socialist
homeland", "limitless dedication to the cause of the Communist
Party", and "limitless faith in the ideals of Communism,"
"rallied around the Communist Party and the Soviet government," and
merged together in a "burning hatred for the conqueror.
The "moral-political unity of Soviet society,"
and the "unshakeable mutual friendship of the peoples of the
USSR"—according to the stereotypical formula that was to be unceasingly
repeated from that time onward—was alleged to have been "gloriously"
confirmed and vindicated during the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet
Union."
In regard to the Red
Army, Stalinist propagandists never tired of asserting that every soldier in
the Red Army was a "boundlessly devoted fighter for his Socialist
homeland," motivated by "feelings of the highest dedication... to the
task entrusted to him of defending the Socialist homeland." He was
inspired by "the highest morals, magnificent resistance, courage, and
heroism," in fulfillment of "the holy duty to defend the Socialist
homeland," "for Party and government, for Comrade Stalin," and,
therefore, prepared to fight to the last bullet and the last drop of blood
"for our Socialist homeland, for our honor and freedom, for the mighty
Stalin." As late as October 1991, regardless of all evidence to the
contrary, at a time when Comrade Stalin had long since been unmasked as a
criminal against humanity, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Deputy Chief of the Institute for Military History of the Defense Department in
Moscow, Major General Dr. Khor'kov, at an International Conference on
"Operation Barbarossa" organized by the Military Historical Research
Office of the Bundes-wehr in Freiburg, nevertheless, felt entitled to speak of
the "will to resistance of the Soviet people and Soviet army" on June
22, 1941, of the "mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers," of the
"mass heroism, courage and steadfastness" alleged to have been
exhibited by the Red Army from the very outbreak of hostilities, at all times,
everywhere, and without exception.' If such statements are accepted without
objection, and even applauded, by audiences with some claim to factual
knowledge and professional acumen, what can be expected of the general public,
whose historical knowledge is largely based upon the superficial reports dished
out by an almost ignorant, but politically clearly committed journalism?
Anyone with any knowledge
of Russian military history is aware of the high quality of Russian military
spirit, the oft-proven bravery and steadfastness of Russian combatants during
attack and, most especially, in the defense of their native country. The
Germans in 1941 frequently underestimated the great degree of love of homeland
and country always felt by the Russian people and Russian soldiers. German
documents prepared after the outbreak of the war mention innumerable examples
of the fact that many Soviet soldiers, for whatever reasons, continued their
dedicated and self-sacrificing resistance in many localities until they were
killed. Such examples are, however, deceptively and unreliably generalized by
Soviet propagandists while consciously and deliberately ignoring everything not
in accordance with the propaganda image of Soviet heroism. The question,
nevertheless, arises: why would Russian soldiers—not to mention other soldiers
conscripted from the oppressed peoples of the USSR—fight "to the last
bullet and the last drop of blood" for the same terroristic regime that
had inflicted the most atrocious sufferings and privations upon its own
citizens and peoples?
Stalin himself was
initially blinded by illusory misconceptions as to the strength and
cohesiveness of the Red Army. Days after the invasion, he was paralyzed by
shock but had no illusions in this regard. He accurately attributed the
collapse of the front, not only to a failure of leadership, but above all, to a
disinclination to fight on the part of the troops of the Red Army. To Stalin,
there was only one way to inspire Soviet soldiers with "Soviet
patriotism" and to generate the frame of mind that is still referred to,
even today, as "mass heroism." This was the same method that had
hitherto always proven effective and upon which Stalin's entire system was
based: the infliction of the greatest possible
compulsion and terror, combined with an endless propaganda campaign intended to
ensure political sway. On July 3, 1941, Stalin dared for the first time after
the German attack to make a radio address to the peoples of the Soviet Union.
In manifold repetitions, he skillfully revealed the conclusion at which he had
just arrived: "There must be no place in our ranks for grumblers and
cowards, panic mongers and deserters. "4 In this speech, his first of the war, Stalin said: "We must wage a
relentless struggle against all forms of subversion behind the front, against
deserters, panic mongers, and rumor mongers; we must annihilate all spies,
subversives, and enemy paratroopers. All those that harm the national defense
through panic mongering and cowardice must be handed over to courts martial
without regard to persons... The Red Army, Red Navy, and all Soviet citizens,
must defend every inch of our Soviet territory. We must fight to the last drop
of blood for our cities and villages."
The leadership apparatus
of the Red Army immediately transposed these desiderata of a general nature
into orders intended to give Soviet soldiers only one choice: to fight or die.
The Main Administration
for Political Propaganda of the Red Army (GUPPKA), under Army Commissar First
Rank Mekhlis, pulled out all the stops to hammer into every "individual
soldier" "the speech of the Leader of the Peoples, the President of
the State Defense Committee, Comrade Stalin, as well as an awareness of the
tasks that lie ahead of us." The corresponding watchwords were issued in a
series of directives and orders, such as Order No. 20 of July 14 ,Order No. 081
of July 15, 1941, and other fundamental orders. All these orders complied with
the slogan of defending "every foot of the Soviet homeland," as
expressed in the familiar formula, "to the last drop of blood" and "the
last breath." Unauthorized "withdrawal from positions,"
"leaving the battlefield," and "permitting oneself to be
captured," were declared "crimes against your people, against the
Soviet homeland and government." "Subversives, panic mongers,
cowards, deserters, and the spreaders of provocative rumors" among the
"soldiers, commanders (officers), and political fellow-workers" were
henceforth to be opposed with a "ruthless struggle," the "most
brutal and severest countermeasures," and "merciless"
persecution.
Just what this was to
mean in practice was soon revealed on June 26, 1941, when a soldier in the 131
"Mechanized Division of the Red Army was bayoneted to death before the assembled troops for his failure to carry
out an insignificant order. "May all traitors to the homeland receive
similar treatment," stated the writ, prepared in the form of an order. The
command authorities, emulating the Main Administration for Political
Propaganda, naturally hastened to announce similar cases. They specified names
for the purpose of general deterrence and selected those from the plethora of
executions that now became everyday occurrences. Order No. 1 to the troops of
the Southwest Front on July 6, 1941, announced the executions of Red Army
soldiers Ignatovsky, Vergun, Koliba, and Adamov. The Commander-in-Chief,
Colonel General Kirponos, Member of the Military Council Mikhailov, and Deputy
Chief of Staff General Trutko, in a joint proclamation, stated menacingly:
"At times such as these, deserters who betray their comrades, who forget
their service oath, deserve only one sentence: the death sentence, accompanied
by contempt and expulsion from our ranks."
The West Front was also
purged upon (the former People's Commissar for Defense) Marshal of the Soviet
Union Timoshenko's assumption of the position of the arrested
Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Pavlov at the end of June. On July 6,
1941, order No. 01, jointly signed by Timoshenko and Member of the Military
Council, Army Commissar Mekhlis, was announced to the troops of the Western Front,
and was intended to serve as a warning to the entire leadership corps,
including all officers down to the rank of platoon leaders." It was
announced that Captain Sbirannik, Military Doctor 2nd Rank Ovchinnikov,
Military Doctor 2nd Rank Behavsky, Major Dykmann, Battalion Commissar Krol, and
an adjutant to a departmental chief of the Front Staff, Berkovich, had been
handed over to a court martial "for conspicuous cowardice" and
"treason."
Prikaz (Order) 02, issued
to the troops of the West Front on the following day, July 7, 1941, and,
likewise, signed by Timoshenko and Mekhlis, continued the intimidation of the
military leadership." On this occasion, it was announced that the
Inspector of Engineers of the Red Army, Major Umanets, had been handed over to
a court martial "for failure to obey a combat order, and for
treason." Umanets' crime consisted of a failure to blow up the bridges
over the Berezina near Borisov in time to prevent them falling into German
hands. This order was brought to the attention of all
officers of the West Front down to the rank of
platoon leaders, as well as to all officers on the endangered Southwest Front
and the troops of the NKVD. On July 8, 1941, Timoshenko, whose Military Council
now included the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
White Russia, Ponomarenko, in addition to Mekhlis, issued Order No. 03, which
was intended as a cautionary warning for the troops of the West Front. This
deterrent order announced the sentences handed down by courts martial against
the Commander of the 188h Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Colonel Galinsky, and
Battalion Commander Cerkovnikov. The "crime" of these two officers
simply was that the Germans had succeeded in capturing part of the military
equipment of the anti-aircraft regiment near Minsk during a surprise attack on
July 26, 1941.
This ruthless intervention
by the former People's Commissar for Defense (Timoshenko) was intended to set
an example and was soon emulated by command agencies on all levels, such as,
for example, the 20 'Army, under Lieutenant General Kurochkin, who announced to
all units, by Order No. 04 of July 16, 1941, that he had ordered the Commander
of the 34th Armored Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Liapin, the Battalion
Commander of the 33r Armored Regiment, First Lieutenant Piatin, and the Deputy
Commander of the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 17th Armored Division, Captain
Churakov, handed over to a court martial "for cowardice and for
engendering a mood of panic." This was equivalent to a death sentence.
Marshals of the Soviet Union Voroshilov and Budenny were, of course, no less
zealous than their colleague Timoshenko. The same was true of General of the
Army Zhukov, who was feared in the Red Army for his brutality. In his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the West Front, Zhukov gave an order on October 13,
1941, that all "cowards and panic mongers" were to be shot on the
spot.
Soviet military tribunals were
there simply to ensure that the sentences were carried out. Order No. 0 179 of
November 19, 1941, of the Commander-in-Chief of the 43rd Army, Major General
Golubev, threatened that all "cowards" would be "killed like
dogs."
As early as July 10, 1941,
Stalin demanded that the "treacherous" commanders of the Northwest
Front who had withdrawn before the enemy would be held to account. Holding the
entire Front Staff of the Army
Corps
and Divisions responsible for this "ignominy," he issued orders that
all "cowards and traitors" were to be dealt with on the spot.
Voroshilov, assigned by Stalin as new Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest
Front, as well as Member of the Military Council, Zhdanov, one of Stalin's
closest confidants in the Politburo, transformed this order into action. Order
No. 3 of July 14, 1941, demanded that all "commanders (officers) and soldiers"
who withdrew from the front line were to be hauled before a court martial and
sentenced to death, or simply "annihilated on the spot." Continuing
in this line of reasoning but further enriched with insults was Order No. 5 of
July 16, 1941, issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Front, Marshal
of the Soviet Union Budenny. On July 13, 1941, the President of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kalinin, placed the lawful sanction for the
execution of death sentences passed by courts martial upon a broader basis.
Executions of officers, political workers, and soldiers in the Red Army, in
large numbers—both with and without a legal verdict—had long been an everyday
occurrence, but Stalin once again intervened to spread the terror even further.
Stalin decided to make an
example of the demoted and arrested Commander-in-Chief of the West Front,
General of the Army Pavlov and his staff, thus sending a shock through the
entire Red Army and distracting attention from Stalin's own responsibility for
the collapse of the West Front. He ordered death sentences against General of
the Army Pavlov as well as against the Chief of Staff of the West Front, Major
General Klimovskikh, the Chief of Signal Communications of the Front Staff,
Major General Grigoriev, and the Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Army, Major
General Korobkov. The judgment, signed by the President of the Military Board
of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the blood-stained army jurist Ul'rikh, was
correspondingly drawn up upon Stalin's instructions, presented to Stalin, and
approved without any formal court proceedings.
Such was the usual practice of Soviet justice as dispensed by Soviet
courts martial.
On July 16, 1941, on his
own responsibility as President of the State Defense Committee, Stalin issued
Order No. 00381 announcing the forthcoming sentencing of the above mentioned
generals to the Red Army, as well as the sentencing of the Commander of the
41st Infantry Corps, Major General Kosobutsky, the Commander of the 60 Mountain
Infantry Division, Major General Shalikhov, the Regimental Commissar,
Kurochkin, the Commander of the 30th
Infantry Division, Major General Galaktionov, and the Regimental Commissar,
Eliseev. The defendants were accused of "cowardice, failure to supervise,
incompetence, lack of organization, abandonment of weapons to the enemy, and
unauthorized withdrawal from a position." That these accusations were not
entirely without justification is clear from Order No. 001919 of the
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, apparently signed on September 12,
1941, by Stalin and the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Shaposhnikov, that contains a revealing passage: "There are numerous
elements on all fronts who desert to the enemy, throwing away their weapons
upon the first contact with the enemy and taking others with them... at the
same time, the number of decent commanders and commissars is not very
great."
Stalin would hardly have
made such an admission if it were not true. The institution of the military
commissars and politruks, reintroduced on the same date, July 16, 1941, for the
supervision of the troop leaders of all ranks, is additional proof of just how
unreliable the political attitude and morale of the Red Army were in fact
believed to be. That the NKVD troops made no exceptions is revealed by the
example of the 23 Motorized Infantry Division of the Operational NKVD troops.
On July 12, 1941, the Political Deputy (Zampolit) of the Divisional Commander
and Chief of the Department for Political Propaganda of the 23rd Motorized
Infantry Division of the NKVD, Regimental Commissar Vodiakha, by Order No. 02/
0084, drew the attention of all subordinate formations and units to examples of
"failure to understand the nature of the Patriotic War of the Peoples of
the Soviet Union against the German fascists. Regardless of the military
program for the "activity of the Soviet peoples and its glorious Red
Army," set forth on radio on July 3, 1941, by the "Leader of the
Peoples," Comrade Stalin, there were, in Vodiakha's words, "persons
among the ranks of our fighters, and even in the leadership, who voice doubt as
to our victory, expressing defeatist opinions, praising the alleged power of
the German fascist army, repeating fairy tales about the excellent provisions
in the German Army, and even expressing doubt as to the veracity of our
press." Such talk constituted a "hostile, extremely harmful
influence, aiding and encouraging the enemy."
098--Three generals were
once again used to set a deterrent example: the Commander-in-Chief of the 28
Army, Lieutenant General Kachalov (who had, in reality, been killed on August
4, 1941, by a direct hit with an artillery shell near Starinka, and whose
soldierly death was exploited for purposes of intimidation); the Commander-in-Chief
of the 12 Army, Major General Ponedelin (who had been captured while severely
wounded); and the Commander of the 13' Infantry Corps, Major General Kirillov.
These three generals were accused of having permitted themselves to be captured
by the German fascists "in a cowardly manner," thus committing the
crimes of desertion and violating their service oath. This accusation was in
fact directed, not at these generals alone, but at all members of the army
military councils, all commanders, political officials, members of special
operations groups, regimental and battalion commanders, and practically every
soldier in the Red Army who failed to allow himself to be killed for
"Comrade Stalin" on the foremost front line. "All cowards and
deserters must be annihilated," Stalin repeated. He now ordered that all
"commanders and political leaders,... who flee from the enemy, or allow
themselves to be captured,... are to be considered evil deserters, as violators
of their service oath, and traitors to their country," and "must be
annihilated on the spot." On August 25, 1950, following five years of
investigation after their release from German captivity, the Generals Ponedelin
and Kirillov ought to be sentenced to death by the Military Board of the
Supreme Court of the USSR and subsequently
shot. All "superiors and Red Army officers" who allowed themselves to
be captured instead of fighting to the death would be annihilated by all
"means, both terrestrial and aerial." Overcrowded German prisoner of
war camps such as Orel and Novgorod-Severkij were thus attacked and bombed by
the Soviet Air Force. That the Soviet government recognized no Soviet prisoners
of war, but rather, only traitors to the Soviet homeland, had become general
knowledge during the Finnish Winter War at the very latest. Every Soviet
citizen was familiar with the reprehensible extension of liability to all
members of a family for the crimes of one member. All members of the Red Army
were once again expressly warned that the families of all officers and
political workers who surrendered would be arrested, while the families of all
Red Army soldiers who surrendered would lose "all State support or
assistance." The practical application was far worse in most cases.
It was typical of Stalin,
and characteristic of conditions in the Red Army, that the dissemination of
fear and terror, rather than appeals to much-famed "Soviet
patriotism," was now considered the most suitable manner in which to
induce members of the Red Army to fight for their "Socialist
homeland." This was made even clearer during the crisis of 1942, when
Soviet soldiers of all ranks were once again directly addressed in menacing
language by Stalin, regardless of the system of terror that had been perfected
in the meantime. Following the occurrence of a potential breakthrough by German
assault troops into the interior of the country in July 1942, German documents
spoke of "panicky" and "uncontrolled retreat" on the part
of Soviet troops. On July 28, 1942, Stalin, in his capacity of People's
Commissar for Defense, issued Order No. 227, amounting, in practice, to a
cruder version of Order No. 270 of August 16, 1941. Order 227 unequivocally
recalled that "panic mongers and cowards" were to be liquidated on
the spot or handed over to military tribunals for sentencing. In the "Red
Army of Workers and Farmers"—which was, nevertheless, simultaneously
supposed to be inspired by "ardent Soviet patriotism" and "mass
heroism"—the lower ranking officers, such as platoon leaders and company
chiefs, in addition to all battalion and regimental commanders, and especially
all generals, divisional and corps commanders, army commanders-in-chief and
their military councils, military commissars and political leaders, not to
mention the broad mass of soldiers, were suspected of being capable of
"treason to the homeland" and threatened with the severest
punishment.
101--Post-Soviet
historical literature, which had no choice, so to speak, but to sacrifice
Stalin—calling many of his criminal measures by their proper name—continues to
racks its brain in support of certain Stalinist historical propaganda
allegations. Among those that may not be questioned are: the myth of the
"cowardly, treacherous, fascist surprise attack upon the unsuspecting,
peaceful Soviet Union"; the formula of the "great Patriotic War of
the Soviet Union," which did not exist in that usage; not to mention the
unquestioning "Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism" of the
soldiers of the Red Army. Stalin's terrorization orders, such as, for example,
Order nos. 270 and 227, are invariably described as a continuation of the
unjustified repression of the 1930s, once again directed against the innocent.
These orders are alleged to have resulted in unjustified damage to the Soviet
war effort, just as if there had never been any large-scale "treason to
the homeland" at all.
An analysis of the
relevant documents, however, leads to a different conclusion. Stalin was
concerned, not only with finding scapegoats for the disasters at the front—for
which he himself was, after all, responsible—but also with compelling Soviet
soldiers to fight under the threat of ruthless terror. Only through the
dissemination of fear and terror did Stalin believe it possible to stabilize
the front at a time when all the reports described a collapse in morale among
the troops of the Red Army, although examples to the contrary should, of
course, also be cited over and over again. A personal directive by Stalin on
September 12, 1941 stated that the "infantry divisions of all fronts"
contained "numerous panic mongers and regular hostile elements who throw
away their rifles upon the first contact with the enemy, screaming 'we are
surrounded!"' "The result of this... is that the division takes
flight, and that our equipment is abandoned on the spot." Stalin,
furthermore, admitted that "the number of consistent and steadfast
commanders and commissars is not very great." This was an accurate
description of the situation as revealed by the documents of high command
authorities from the summer and the fall of 1941.
103--The "ignominious
phenomena of desertions and treason to the homeland" repeatedly admitted
in Soviet documents must be evaluated against the underlying fact that members
of the Red Army could not be prevented from deserting en mass to the Germans,
regardless of any threat of punishment. One and a half million Soviet soldiers
of all ranks were in German captivity by the middle of August 1941, over 3
million by the middle of October 1941, and 3.8 million by the end of 1941. A
total of 5.25 million Soviet soldiers and officers were captured during the
course of the war. During the initial phase of hostilities, the German command
authorities reported "that large sections of the enemy no longer exhibit
any strong will to fight," however, soon afterward they observed, that
"the enemy units are now offering stiffer or more embittered
resistance."
Nevertheless, the
latent tendency of Soviet soldiers to allow themselves to be captured or to run
away never entirely vanished at any time during the war.
106--The Soviet Union is
the only state in the world ever to have declared the captivity of its soldiers
to be a serious crime. The military oath, the article 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code and other regulations, such as the Interior Service Regulation) and the "Infantry Combat Provisions of the
Red Army" left no doubt that allowing oneself to be taken prisoner
would inevitably be punished by death as
"desertion to the enemy," "flight to a foreign country,"
"treason," and "desertion." "Captivity is treason to
the homeland. There is no more reprehensible and more treacherous act,"
the regulation stated: "But the highest penalty—shooting—awaits the
traitor to the homeland." Stalin, Molotov, and other leading officials,
such as Madame Kolontay, repeatedly and publicly declared that the Soviet Union
only recognized the existence of deserters, traitors to the homeland, and
enemies of the people. This attitude
toward prisoners of war should be borne in mind if one wishes to understand a
tactical maneuver engaged in by Moscow starting in July 1941, which has caused
fundamental confusion right down to the present day.
109--The second method
consisted of detailed descriptions of the horrible pangs of torture or of the
"horrible deaths by torture" inevitably suffered by Red Army soldiers
in capitalist captivity. Drastic examples were set forth, in particular, from
the struggles against the "White Finnish bands," the "Finnish
cut-throats," the "White Finnish scum of humanity." The Finns
were said to have directed all their efforts to "practicing unprecedented
torments upon prisoners of war and the wounded, burning the wounded alive, as
on the Island of Lassisaari, burning out their eyes, cutting open their
stomachs,
110--The Political Administration had another and, this time, truly convincing argument ready for anyone who failed in their eagerness to believe the official presentation of proof. "A disgraceful fate awaits anyone who surrenders out of fear, thereby betraying the homeland," the authorities stated menacingly: "Hate, contempt, curses from family, friends, and the people as a whole, followed by a shameful death." The text of the agitation manual describes the example of two Red Army men who, upon returning from Finnish captivity, were said to deserve and to have received "just retribution" for their "treason" and "violation of their service oath" "before the Soviet people." A court martial was alleged to have sentenced the two soldiers to death by shooting for "treason to the homeland," as "monsters," and "loathsome souls," on the grounds that a "traitor to the Socialist homeland has no right to live on Soviet soil." The circumstances, in reality, were somewhat different. Repatriated Soviet prisoners of war were never individually indicted following the conclusion of peace with Finland on March 12, 1940. Rather, they were indiscriminately and summarily arrested by the NKVD, solely on the grounds of their military captivity, and were never heard from again, having been shot to the last man.
112--Propaganda intended
to make Red Army soldiers believe that they would inevitably be killed in
German captivity 15 began with the
outbreak of the war and may be observed as early as June 23, 1941. The central
task of the political apparatus was to stimulate and intensify the fears of
captivity and was continued onward with iron consistency throughout the war.
The emphasis was not upon mere shooting, but rather, continued the propaganda
line of the Finnish Winter War. German soldiers were accused of "bestial
tortures," "horrible mutilations," "torturing prisoners to
death," "cutting off their fingers, ears, and noses, putting out
their eyes, and ripping out their spinal columns before shooting their
prisoners." Scattered throughout the documents are references to alleged
atrocities that no political tract or lecture, no "meeting," no "obrascenie" of political workers, no frontline newspapers could
fail to feature in 1943. For purposes of enhanced credibility, gross
falsification was resorted to. Thus, as early as July 1941, photographs of
Poles and Ukrainians shot by the NKVD by the thousands in the prisons of
Lemberg were produced as alleged "proof' of atrocities committed against
prisoners of war by German soldiers. There were other methods. German prisoners
of war were shot and left lying on back roads to provoke reprisals against
Soviet prisoners of war, that, in turn, it was hoped, would detract from the
"inclination of soldiers in the Red Army to desert." 18 Some German command posts showed signs of falling
for such a trap. The High Command of the Wehrmacht, however, put an early stop
to this, and prohibited reprisals on the grounds that "it would only
unnecessarily increase the bitterness of the struggle."
Members of the Red Army
were constantly reminded of the alleged fate of Soviet prisoners of war in
German captivity with such penetrating force that such propaganda could not
remain entirely without effect. Thus, the German command authorities repeatedly
reported that, as a result of systematic repetition by their "officers and
commissars," the belief became widespread among soldiers in the Red Army
that the Germans "killed all prisoners," that "we shot all
Russian prisoners of war, even torturing them beforehand." It was discovered
that, for one part, the "simple souls" among Soviet soldiers expected
to be shot.
113--It is widely known
today that, under the terms of Hitler's notorious "Commissar Order",
political officers of the Red Army were shot as alleged non-combatants by the
German Security Police and SD and, at least to some extent, by German
troops—although in relatively small numbers, and in the face of increasing
reluctance. It, nevertheless, appears necessary to remark in this connection
that similar actions were also committed by the Soviets: members of the
Wehrmacht known to be members of the NSDAP, particularly officers, were
immediately shot. Colonel Gaevsky of the Soviet 29th Armored Division, on
August 6, 1941, even testified to the existence of an order from the Superior
Army (4 or 10'), commanding that "lower-ranking officers should be shot
because these officers must be assumed to be dedicated follows of Hitler."
German captivity was
naturally characterized by differing methods of treatment, as may be shown by a
brief survey. For example, the German army, by decree of the Quartermaster
General, Major General Wagner, on July 25, 1941, even released Soviet prisoners
of war of Ukrainian nationality and, soon afterward, of White Russian
nationality as well, in their homelands in the occupied territories. According
to Russian data, 292,702 prisoners were released in the zone of the High
Command of the German Army before the action was stopped on November 13, 1941,
while 26,068 prisoners were released in the zone of the High Command of the
Wehrmacht. At a time when the Panzer Group 3, for example, released the
200,000th prisoner of war, Driuk, home with praise, and other units were acting
similarly, the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD were engaged in
the physical liquidation of "intolerable elements," particularly,
politically and "racially" undesirable persons. Even some members of
the peoples of Turkestan and the Caucasus, very often the most irreconcilable
enemies of the Soviet regime, fell victim to these liquidations, singled out only
for their exotic appearance as the prototypes of an erroneously conceived
"Asiatic" or "Mongol" Bolshevism. Tragically, just these
same minority groups were considered worthy by the High Command of the German
Army since winter of 1941/42 to join the newly formed national legions of
Turkestanis, Azerbaijanis, North Caucasians, Volga Tatars, Georgians,
Armenians, or Kalmuck Cavalry Corps as fellow combatants and soldiers of equal
rights, wearing the German emblem of sovereignty—the swastika in the talons of
the eagle—on field gray uniforms.
That the fate of Soviet
prisoners of war in German captivity in the winter of 1941/2 was indeed
terrible is generally well-known. Hundreds of thousands of them perished from
hunger and epidemics during those winter months in what has been justifiably
been called a "tragedy of huge proportions." There were, however,
many different reasons for this mass mortality. A lack of familiarity with the
peoples of the East, human indifference, or even ill will engendered by political
resentments, particularly on subordinate levels, may have all played a part. In
a greater sense, however, it was not so much ill will as the logistical
inability to provide food and housing for millions of often totally exhausted
prisoners of war under the harsh conditions of the eastern winter of 1941/2.
The German field army, engaged in a life and death defensive struggle, was
suffering from severe deficiencies following the near total collapse of the
transportation system. Comparatively speaking, it may be said that the
mortality rate among Soviet prisoners of war in Finnish captivity amounted to
almost one third of the total of men captured .It is simply contrary to
historical truth to blame the competent Quartermaster General of the German
Army General Staff for the conditions of the prisoners of war or to attempt to
relate any losses to Hitler's so-called "policy of extermination" in
the East. It was the Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the German
Army that, by the decrees of August 6, October 21, and December 2, 1941, to the
Wehrmacht Military District Commanders, established food rations in quantities
sufficient to maintain the life and health of all prisoners of war in the
occupied territories, including the regions of the Ukraine and the Eastern
territories, as well as Norway and
Romania.
As early as June 24, 1941,
prisoners stated that the reason for their stubborn resistance was that the
following was "drummed" into them: "l . If Soviet troops
evacuated a position and withdrew, political commissars immediately shot them.
2. If they deserted, the Germans would immediately shoot them. 3. If they were
not shot by the Germans, they would be immediately shot as soon as the Red Army
retook the position, in which case, their property would be confiscated and
their relatives also shot." These statements reveal the hopeless situation
in which Soviet soldiers found themselves entrapped.
117--Concerning what
happened to the guilty, the reports agree in their particulars: picking up and
reading German leaflets was punished by death .Red Army soldiers were shot for
this, everywhere, without judgment by court martial, and, if possible, in front
of the assembled troops. "Possession of a German leaflet by a Soviet
soldier is punished by court martial, in most cases by shooting," the
Commander of the 27 Infantry Corps, Major General Artemenko, bluntly admitted
in September 1941.
119--The "strictest
countermeasures" were now threatened. "The arrest of all persons
coming from areas occupied by German troops, detailed interrogations with the
objective of obtaining a confession, and handing the guilty parry over to court
martial"—which was the equivalent to shooting him. High-ranking officers
in the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies, including Lieutenant General Muzychenko,
Lieutenant General Sokolov, Major General Tonkonogov, Major General Ogurtsev (6
Army), Major General Ponedelin, Major General Snegov, Major General Abranidze,
and Major General Proshkin (12 Army), testified on August 16, 1941, that
"soldiers having escaped from German captivity were immediately
shot." According to the testimony of the Commander of the 196 Infantry
Division, Major General Kulikov, returning officers only received a minimum of
ten years imprisonment in a labor camp for "residence on the territory of
the enemy. In addition, all Soviet
soldiers who escaped the collapse of the fronts and the encirclement battles
and broke through to their own troops were subjected to severe persecution.
According to Major General Grigorenko, encircled troops
were greeted with orders of execution:
"Soldiers and officers, members of supply units, infantrymen, fliers...
tank crews... artillerymen... were all shot; the next day, those who had shot
them could themselves be encircled by the enemy and might well suffer the same
fate as those shot by them yesterday."
Only the absence of a
continuous front and the collapse of uniform leadership are believed to have
saved literally "hundreds of thousands" of soldiers from a senseless
policy of extermination.
The Soviets also used
another—psychological—means to prevent flight forward by Red Army soldiers: the
principle, well-known to every resident of the Soviet Socialist Republics, of
revenge and reprisals against family members. German interrogation records unanimously
reveal the anxiety with which captured Soviet soldiers contemplated this type
of "revenge by their Soviet rulers," i.e., that their family members
"would be banned to Siberia or shot." What is more, the "group
of relatives subject to the severest reprisals," according to the
testimony of a captured First Lieutenant, was "interpreted very broadly."
First
Lieutenant Filipenko, First Ordinance Officer of the Staff of the 87th Infantry
Division, on June 27, 1941, testified to the existence of a Soviet law
"according to which the relatives of captured or deserting soldiers would
be held responsible, i.e., would be shot." A summary report on prisoner of
war interrogations in the German XXIII Army Corps of July 30, 1941, states:
"The officers live in constant fear that their relatives will be shot by
the GPU if they are captured." This was also the impression of aircraft
crewmembers Lieutenant Anoshkin, Second Lieutenant Nikiforov and Sergeant
Smirnov: "If it is discovered that a flier has been captured by the
Germans, his family will answer for it, either through banishment or through
the shooting of individual members of the family. This fear of reprisals is
what prevents most desertions."
124--It should be clear by
now that the Red Army rested upon two pillars: the military leadership
apparatus, and the independent political apparatus. The latter had its own
official channels and was subordinate to the Chief of the Main Administration
for Political Propaganda (GUPPKA; after July 1941, the Main Political
Directorate of the Red Army) under the notorious Commissar First Rank Mekhlis.
Another institution, working in secrecy, was all the more dangerous: the NKVD
terror apparatus, which had nothing to do with the Red Army in terms of
organization, but took its orders from the People's Commissariat of Internal
Affairs under Beria. The ruling system of the Soviet Union was based on the
simple principle that anyone who failed to believe Soviet propaganda soon
experienced Soviet terror. In the Red Army, terror was institutionally
extremely well provided for.
128--…of the war, relating
to the working methods of this criminal organization, is in order at this
point. The Chief of the Counter Intelligence Department of the High Command of
the Wehrmacht, Admiral Canaris, presented a report in July 1941 concerning an
inspection of the Soviet Embassy building in Paris, i.e., an extra-territorial
diplomatic installation. According to the report, it was discovered that a GPU
headquarters had been installed in a side wing of the Paris Embassy, with
facilities for "torture, executions, and for the destruction of
corpses," something quite unique in the diplomatic history of civilized
states. The report assumes that "the bodies of several white Russian
generals who mysteriously disappeared in Paris a few years ago were destroyed
here."
132--Generally, it is true
to say that the inhumane treatment of the Soviet soldiers differed from the
treatment meted out to the Soviet civilian population in the combat zone only
in its perfection. Stalin had given the watchword on July 3, 1941, when he
demanded that "not one kilo of wheat, not one liter of gasoline"
should be left to the enemy, and that "all valuable property... that
cannot be transported" should be destroyed, "without exception."
This was further intensified in regard to the civilian population by Soviet
radio on July 7, 1941. All rolling stock, all stocks of raw materials, all
stocks of fuel, every kilo of wheat, every head of livestock, were to be
destroyed. Implementation of the newly proclaimed principle of destruction
meant deliberate, unquestioning destruction of the basic necessities of life
for the civilian population. It also meant that the population would be exposed
to the foreseeable consequences of the partisan war, which was begun at this
same time, and which was illegal under international law—i.e., the danger of
severe reprisals by the Germans and German-allied troops.
As early as June 29, 1941,
the Council of the People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the VKP (b)
gave instructions that all forces of the "Soviet" population were to
be mobilized in the struggle against the Germans, and that an extensive
people's war was to be organized in the enemy hinterland .The face of this
"people's war" is representatively revealed, in addition to many
similar worded proclamations, 22
by a directive of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party (b) of White Russia of July 1, 1941, communicating the
following data relating to the incipient "partisan movement:"
"Every link to the enemy hinterland must be destroyed, bridges and streets
must be blown up or damaged, fuel and food warehouses, vehicles and aircraft
must be burned, railway catastrophes must be arranged, all enemies must be
exterminated: they must receive no rest either day or night; they must be
exterminated everywhere, wherever they are surprised, they must be killed by
any means that comes to hand: axes, scythes, crowbars, hay forks, knives...,
you must not shrink from using any means in the extermination of the enemy:
strangle them, hack them to death, burn and poison the fascist scum."
According to the testimony
of the captured partisan Kozlov on October 1, 1941, the member of the Central
Committee of the Party, Kazalapov from Khol'm, also demanded that German
soldiers and wounded be "further tortured by mutilation prior to
shooting."
It was not only the
partisan units and partisan groups, some of them recruited by force from among
the male population under the threat of being shot, that now began an illegal
guerrilla war in crass violation of the letter and spirit of the Hague
Convention on Land Warfare. The entire civilian population was irresponsibly
drawn in, as revealed by a proclamation directed at all residents of
"enemy-occupied territory" by the Commander-in-Chief of the West
Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, and with him, Member of the
Military Council, Bulganin, on August 6, 1941. The "workers, farmers, and
all Soviet citizens" were ordered to "attack and destroy German rear
connections, transports, and columns, burn and destroy bridges, tear down
telegraph and telephone lines, set fire to houses and forests." "Beat
the enemy, torture him to death with hunger, burn him with fire, destroy him
with bullets and hand grenades... to carry out the destruction of bridges in
the rear of the enemy, use mostly local means, use expedients involving
explosives... burn warehouses, destroy the fascists like mad dogs." All
very easily said by persons who knew that they were in safety; the people would
suffer the consequences. No army in the whole world would have tolerated such
actions without the severest reprisals.
The inhumane attitude of
both Stalin and his regime toward their own population was revealed perfectly
when the German troops began to withdraw in 1943, with Soviet troops gradually
regaining the previously occupied territories. The Red Army troops were
everywhere followed by border troops and NKVD troops to secure the hinterland;
these were responsible for taking "Chekist measures" to purge
"all territories liberated from the occupant," particularly cities
and inhabited areas, "from enemy elements and their lackeys," from
"enemy agents and other hostile elements," to "normalize"
and "restore" the situation and create a "revolutionary
order" behind the front line.
What
this meant in practice is revealed with sufficient clarity by the actions of
the Soviet security corps: the shooting of all inhabitants and residents,
without regard to age or sex, having maintained at least bearable relations with
the German occupation authorities or German soldiers. Hundreds of thousands now
fell victim to NKVD purges, an order of magnitude that compares, and may even
exceed, the victims of the Einsatzgruppen of the German Security Police and SD.
A terrible fate awaited
the Caucasian peoples of Kalmucks, Karachays, Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, parts
of the Karbardinian people, as well as the Tatars of the Crimea for their
collaboration with the German occupation authorities. Following the initial,
far-reaching waves of bloody purges, these people, on the order of Stalin, the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP (b), and the State Defense
Committee (GKO) of 1943/1944, were torn from their ancestral residences and
deported to concentration camps in the barren regions of Siberia, and to north
of the Polar circle, or to central Asia. They were dispersed, stripped of all
national identity, and treated, immediately and practically, like convicts.
Tens of thousands fell victim to this "mass crime"—so-called by Khrushchev
in 1956, although he was personally involved. This crime was carried out using
methods that were as treacherous as they were cruel, with the usual
accompanying phenomena of executions and the systematic dispersion of families.
These actions clearly constituted the crime of genocide according to the 1948
Genocide Convention, ratified by the USSR (Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).
Anyone prepared to act as
mercilessly against his own civilian population would naturally show no mercy
to one's own soldiers. This is revealed by many characteristics. A common crime
in the Red Army, for example, was the self-infliction of wounds by soldiers
just prior to serious attacks in order to avoid combat. As a rule, the self-mutilators,
who were found in all sections of the army, were shot. This may be seen from
the records in all cases, either with or without judgment by a court martial,
which was irrelevant under Soviet conditions. The number of sentences handed
down for self-mutilation, already considerable as early as June 1941, increased
rapidly in 1942, almost doubling on the Kalinin Front, the Southwest Front, and
the North Front between January and May 1942, and increased by the factor of
nine on the Northwest Front over the same time period. It was not the fact that
there were "sometimes hundreds of self-mutilators" in the
"etappe," i.e., the field hospitals and military hospitals to
the rear, but rather the fact that few such cases were being reported on the
furthermost front line, in the first-aid stations (PPM) and medical battalions
(MSB), that motivated the intervention by the Military Public Prosecutor's
Office of the Red Army under Corps Jurist Nossov, on July 18, 1942. Nossov's
Order No. 0110 instructed the military public prosecutors of the Fronts and
Armies not just to take action afterward, as had been done previously, but
rather to hand over a few self-mutilators, sentence them to death and shoot
them immediately, during the attack preparations or just after the attack
began, "in front of all assembled personnel," to achieve the maximum
degree of deterrence .In this instance as well, the "mass heroism"
and "Soviet patriotism" of the Red Army was the result of
intimidation. In contrast to conditions in the German Wehrmacht, where soldiers
were only suspected of so-called self-mutilation in exceptional cases, the
broad mass of soldiers in the Red Army was suspected of self-mutilation from
the very outset .
According to Order of the People's Commissar of
Defense No. 111 of April 12, 1942, signed by Lieutenant General Khrulev, even
wounded or sick soldiers lying in medical installations were to be indicted and
prosecuted as self-mutilators.
The slaveholder mentality
and the system of contempt for human life peculiar to the Soviet Union is
clearly demonstrated by the methods of attack commonly practiced by the Red
Army, i.e., the tactic of the "human steam roller," guided, according
to Major General Grigorenko, by the "inhumane slogan" of "Spare
No Human Life." Colonel General Volkogonov has combed thousands of
operational documents of the Supreme Commander Stalin; not a single one of them
contains any hint that saving lives, achieving the established objective at
minimum cost, or avoiding unprepared frontal attacks was of any importance at
all. Quite the contrary: Stalin demanded successful assaults "at any price
in casualties"; for
example, in one order, he compelled "even Colonel General Yeremenko and
Lieutenant General Gordov to spare no manpower, and to shrink from no
casualties." "Casualties, casualties en masse," were indifferent
to Stalin, and simply didn't matter if only the desired success could be
achieved." According to Volkogonov, Stalin led his armed forces to victory
"at the price of horrendous losses." Why is it, asks Volkogonov,
"that our losses were up to three times as high as those of the enemy?
This was an underestimate, since, according to Finnish experiences during the
Winter War, Soviet losses exceeded Finnish casualties—at a "conservative
estimate"—by the factor of five: "Soviet infantry was driven en masse
against Finnish positions without any regard for losses." Authors from the
Soviet era, then drawing to a close, confirmed this assertion by stating, very
much to the displeasure of the Stalinist Voenno-istoriceski zhurnal (4/1991),
"that our army suffered losses in the past war
that were five times higher, and even more, than those suffered by the army of
the Hitlerites."
The whole system of Soviet
contempt for human life also found expression in the manner in which the
personnel was treated, which was compulsorily conscripted from the recaptured
territories starting in 1943. It must be recalled in this regard that the
population of the Caucasus, the Cossack regions at Terek, Kuban, and the Don, as
well as in the southern Ukraine, had generally maintained good relationships
with the Germans 6ofrom the Soviet
point of view this was an attitude of treason and hostility. The compulsory
conscription of all men of military age immediately after the recapture of this
region therefore formed part of a mass punishment campaign, undertaken
collectively against the population, as well as an act of revenge. As revealed
by Order No. 052 from the 3r Guards Army of February 23, 1943, as well as by
the statements of Major Genshtaba Zhilov of the staff of the 58 Army, the
mobilization of the male population after the first uncontrolled recruitments
was left to the front-line units of the corps and divisional commanders, who
were thus given an easy opportunity to make up for the heavy losses suffered by
their units. In practice, local commanders were assigned to summon the local
male population under threat of severe punishment. They then systematically
began to comb the cities and localities with the help of the Special
Departments of the NKVD and other NKVD agencies for "military age"
male personnel. All persons caught were ruthlessly drafted "the same
night." All males up to the age of fifty, and in some cases, sixty, were
considered able-bodied and liable for military service. Basically, all youths born as late as 1927, and in
some cases, 1928, i.e., sixteen year olds, and, in some cases, fifteen year
olds, were drafted, in various divisions by falsification of their birth dates.
In accordance with the Stalinist principle that no one was unfit for military
service, only the "obviously sick and cripples" were rejected; the
handicapped were, nevertheless, drafted as "fit for service" in many
cases. Depending upon their classification, the young people were immediately assigned
to the front units or to punishment units, so that, according to one source,
"the punishment companies consist mostly of young people, and the youngest
age groups."
Usually poorly trained, or
not trained at all, sometimes still wearing civilian clothing, poorly armed and
insufficiently provisioned, these men were immediately thrown into the struggle
at the foremost front lines and driven into German machine gun fire. The German
command posts repeatedly described the manner in which the Soviets—for example,
on the Taman peninsula and elsewhere—drove their units forward against fully
fortified and defended German positions, without reconnaissance or preparation,
wave after wave, with "extraordinarily high losses." An unnamed
Soviet political officer with the rank of captain also very accurately remarked
in his diary on March 4, 1943: "In the region... the young people... are
mobilized and immediately sent into combat as cannon fodder." In the
unanimous opinion of Soviet deserters and prisoners of war: "The extremely
high losses naturally suffered by these untrained replacement troops who had no
interest in fighting for the Soviet Union, and were trapped between the front
line and the blocking commandos, were deliberately accepted, since the Soviet
Union had no desire to keep these fascist-contaminated elements that therefore
constituted a danger to the morale of the Red Army."
The German troops took
account of this inhumane and illegal method, at least, insofar as armed
civilians were treated as prisoners of war rather than guerrillas if they were
captured in fighting formation next to regular soldiers of the Red Army.
In reply to Churchill's
well-known "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College in Fulton,
Missouri, on March 5, 1946, Stalin, in a foreign interview published in the
party newspaper Pravda on March 14, 1946, stated that the Soviet Union,
"in the struggle against the Germans, and, additionally, as a result of
the German occupation and the conscription of the Soviet population for forced
labor, irretrievably lost approximately (okolo) seven million people,"
i.e., both military and civilian personne1. The seven million figure was later
further inflated for propaganda purposes—several times during the following
time period. Thus, Member of the Politburo and Stalin Party doctrinaire Suslov,
in 1965, increased the figure to 20 million, ° a figure that was obligatory
throughout the Brezhnev era, while the total number of military and civilian
deaths in the USSR was increased to 27 million by Soviet State President
Gorbachev on May 9, 1990. Of these, 8,668,000 were members of the armed forces,
including members of the Interior Troops, the Border Troops, and Security
Agencies (gosbezopasnosti)." One year later, on the evening before the
anniversary celebrations, on June 21, 1991, a Soviet historian, Professor Dr.
Kozlov, ventured to assert: "The USSR suffered 54 million war dead.
A
comparison of obviously speculative casualty figures will hardly produce
reliable results. Furthermore, as the Austrian military historian, University
Lecturer Dr. Magenheimer, accurately stated: "The suspicion arises that
many of the civilian losses must be attributed to the reprisals, liquidations,
and deportations of the Stalinist system, not least of all to the compulsory
repatriations during and after the end of the war in 1945, all of which took
place at the express will of Stalin."
It was Stalin who—at the
end of the war, by order to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the
1S and 2n
White Russian Fronts, the 1St,
2nd 3,and 4Ukrainian Fronts, as well as to
"Comrade Beria, Comrade Merkulov, Comrade Abakumov, Comrade Golikov,
Comrade Khrulev, Comrade Golubev"—personally demanded the creation of
gigantic NKVD camps with a capacity of one million persons for "former
prisoners of war and repatriated Soviet citizens." Regarding the number of
military dead in particular, it should be recalled that the Soviet Union was at
war with, or had attacked, not only the German Reich between 1939 and 1945, but
the following states as well: Poland, Finland, Italy, Romania, Hungary,
Slovakia, Croatia, Iran, Bulgaria, and Japan. Although Colonel General
Volkogonov estimates Soviet losses at two or three times higher than those of
the enemy, these same losses, "at a conservative estimate," were in
fact five times higher than those of the enemy during the Winter War with
Finland alone. If the ratio rose even higher between 1941 and 1945, then the
reasons for it must be ascribed primarily to the Soviets.
The Soviet Union did not
recognize the Hague Convention, and never ratified the Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention, in order to prevent Soviet soldiers from saving their lives by
permitting themselves to be captured. Prisoners of war were fundamentally
considered "traitors" and "deserters," and were to be
annihilated by all means, both aerial and terrestrial; they were therefore
deliberately subjected to bombing attacks by the Soviet Air Force against
German prisoner of war camps. In terms of cause and effect, therefore, the
Soviet Union was itself responsible for the casualties among prisoners of war;
this is, furthermore, the opinion of the International Committee of the Red
Cross. Of course, this only exculpates the Germans insofar as German treatment
of prisoners of war did not result from indifference or ill will, but was
rather dictated by the force of circumstances. The individual and mass
executions, which were common in the Red Army throughout the war, also caused
heavy losses among Soviet soldiers. The numbers are difficult to determine, but
generally they must have been enormous. Finally, the barbarism of Soviet
methods of attack cost huge numbers of human lives. These massacres, coldly
calculated by the Soviet leadership, set the Red Army apart from all other
armies in the world, including the German army. One need only recall, for
example, the seriousness with which theories relating to the most economical
methods of infantry attack in terms of human life were discussed in the German
army, even before the First World War, and that blind frontal assaults against
enemy positions prepared for defense were considered to be almost prohibited at
that time.
Regardless of all
countermeasures, over 3.8 million Soviet soldiers surrendered to the Germans by
the end of 1941, and a total of 5,245,000 during the entire war. According to
the official Soviet definition, all these men were "traitors," and
"deserters." Two million of them perished primarily during the first
winter of the war from hunger and epidemics. Large numbers were also shot by
totally deluded German Security Police and the SD .A million Soviet soldiers,
nevertheless, did volunteer for military service on the German side, permitting
themselves to be armed for combat against the Soviet regime by the Germans.
Under the circumstances, the question arises: how can one possibly speak
seriously of a "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union"?
Furthermore, what is the justification for the stereotypical allegations of
"mass heroism" and "Soviet patriotism" of the Red Army when
the most reprehensible methods of compulsion were required to drive Soviet
soldiers into combat? "I repeat that the military defeat was the result of
the unwillingness of the Red Army to fight," wrote former Lieutenant Oleg
Krasovsky of the 16th "Kikvidze" Infantry Division in regard to the
events of 1941. Krasovsky was later
adjutant to Major General of the ROA, Blagoveshchensky, and until his death in
1993, he was Editor in Chief of the almanac Veche, published by the Russian National Association.
According to Lieutenant General Professor Pavlenko, the basic questions of the
German-Soviet war continue to be "unscrupulously falsified" by Soviet
historiography. It appears that these falsifications include, first and
foremost, the propaganda myth of "Soviet patriotism" that continues to
be a feature of historical literature on the German-Soviet war to this very
day.
149--Following the
"settlement"—naturally assumed to be "final"—of the
"Polish question" from the Soviet point of view, the Soviet regime,
in Stalin's words, had wished to proceed with a solution of the
"problem" of the Baltic States, by way of the agreement of August 23,
1939. That is, it began to put massive pressure upon the sovereign republics of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, regardless of any existing treaties, to throttle
their independence through the relentless application of political terror and
threats of military force.
According to the
German-Soviet Treaty of August 23, 1939, Finland was also deemed to lie within
the Soviet "sphere of interest," doubtlessly destined for a fate
similar to that of Poland and the Baltic States. However, the unprovoked Soviet
attack upon Finland, in violation of international law, had taken an unexpected
turn as a result of stubborn Finnish resistance. The Soviet government, to avoid
the threat of involvement by the Western powers, had abandoned its objectives
in regard to Finland and had been temporarily-satisfied with the annexation of
large chunks of territory in the Karelian peninsula. On the basis of the
German-Soviet agreement of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union had adopted a
similarly hostile attitude to Romania in the spring of 1940. The High Command
of the Soviet 12 Army, which was concentrated on the Soviet-Romania border, and
the Mechanized Cavalry Group under Lieutenant General Cherevichenko had been
ordered to initiate a surprise attack against Romania on July 26, 1940. Upon
the urgent advice of Germany, the Bukarest government submitted to the Soviet
ultimatum demanding the relinquishment of the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia
and Northern Bucovina to the Soviet Union, thus avoiding the outbreak of
military conflict.
The immediate result of
Stalin's agreement with Hitler, therefore, had been that the Soviet Union had
waged aggressive wars against Poland and Finland; that, in partnership with
Germany, the Soviet Union had destroyed the sovereignty and independence of the
Polish nation; that Romania had been forced to relinquish enormous territories
under threat of war; and that the Soviet Union had destroyed the independence
of the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania under the direct or
indirect use of force, and had incorporated these nations into the Soviet
empire. Poland had been described by the Soviet government as a matter of
exclusive concern to the Soviet Union and Germany, fundamentally rejecting the
right of the Western powers and Great Britain to intervene in Polish affairs.
According to Moscow, Britain and France had been alleged to enjoy
"undivided rule over hundreds of millions colonial slaves," thus
forfeiting the moral right to speak of the "freedom of peoples." The
traditional justification for the declaration of war upon Germany by the
Western powers, therefore, had been merely a pretext intended to conceal true
motives and objectives. The latter, in turn, had consisted of nothing more than
the mere desire to maintain the antiquated balance of power in Europe, created
at Versailles and of advantage to the Western powers alone, the elimination of
which had been the true intent of the German-Soviet treaty—according to Stalin.
The only concern of the Western powers had been to eliminate Germany as the
most dangerous competitor on international markets.
Britain and France had
been branded by the Soviet Union as the instigators of an imperialistic war,
and had been alleged to be responsible for its continuation and expansion.
Molotov, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, had called
the alleged motive of the Western powers for continuing the war against Germany
(the struggle against "fascism," which was by all possible means also
actively engaged in by the Soviet Union until 1939, then stopped, and then
suddenly recommenced in 1941) a meaningless and criminal piece of stupidity and
cruelty. According to Pravda on September 30, 1939, it was "a crime against
the peoples, committed by provocateurs and politicians without honor."
Stalin, summarizing the official opinion, had told Pravda in an interview on
November 29, 1939: "l. It was not Germany that attacked France and
Britain; rather, it was France and Britain that attacked Germany, therefore
assuming the responsibility for the present war; 2. Following the outbreak of
hostilities, Germany made peace proposals to France and Britain; the Soviet
Union publicly supported the German peace proposals, because it believed, and
still believes, that a rapid end to the war would radically alleviate the
situation of all countries and peoples; 3. The ruling classes in France and
Britain insultingly rejected Germany's peace proposals and all Soviet efforts
for a rapid end to the war. These are the facts."
The partnership and
complicity between Hitler and Stalin had been revealed, not only by the fact
that the Soviet Union had acted as an active partner in the violent
transformation of territorial conditions in Eastern Europe, but by the
provision of Soviet political, economic, and military support to the German
Reich in its struggle against the Western powers. Soviet maritime assistance to
the German naval war effort against Britain; the sabotaging of the French war
effort by the French Communist Party at the bidding of Moscow; uninhibited
Soviet efforts to sanction the situation created in Europe by the German
success at arms under the terms of international law; and, finally, huge Soviet
strategic economic deliveries to the German Reich—all of this is sufficiently
well-known so that it doesn't require repetition. A few remarks are,
nonetheless, called for at this point simply to typify the attitude of the
Soviet regime.
From the Soviet point of view,
the Western powers alone had desired a continuation of the war. The occupation
of Denmark and Norway by German troops in the spring of 1940 had therefore been
considered a justified countermeasure against the expansion of the war into
northern Europe desired by Great Britain and France. On April 9, 1940, Molotov
had formally advised the Reich Government of the Soviet understanding of what
Molotov called the "defensive measures... forced upon Germany,"
simultaneously wishing the Germans "complete success." The official
Communist Party publication and largest-circulation newspaper in the USSR, Pravda, as well as the government
newspaper Izvestia, and the trade
union newspaper Trud, had commented upon German actions in Scandinavia by
stating that Britain and France had "invaded" the neutral waters of
the Scandinavian countries to undermine Germany's military position. In view of
the fact that the Western powers were said to be "violating the
sovereignty of the Scandinavian countries," and were expanding "the
war to Scandinavia," any discussion of the legality of the actions forced
upon Germany was said to be "laughable."
155--The most important of
these men, however, was Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg (Erenburg), the principal
war propagandist of the Soviet Union. Ehrenburg
cannot simply be dismissed as a man of "great criminal energy," an
"instigator of homicide," or even a "psychopath," or as a
man of pathological talent. Criminal or psychopathic tendencies in no way
exclude literary and journalistic talent. These gifts, linked with a deficient
love of truth and a lack of all moral scruples, in any event, permitted him to
become the most important instrument of anti-German hate propaganda. The
political agitation and opportunistic refinement with which, for many years, he
skillfully adapted to changing circumstances while concealing the past,
including his own past actions, after the death of his lord and master Stalin,
as revealed in his novel The Thaw and his memoirs Goda, Lyudi, Zhizn (Years, People, Life), have gained him a degree of
credit that is not to be underestimated, and that has endured down to the
present day in the nations of the West. The Federal Republic of Germany is no
exception to this rule. It is disturbing to witness the degree to which Western
intellectuals misjudged the world of the Soviets—or, perhaps, how little they
wished to understand it—apart from the frivolity with which they abandoned all
standards of decency and morals.
For example, the publisher
of the West German edition of Ehrenburg's memoirs, Kindler, undertook it upon
himself to suggest, in regard to the publication of certain passages, that
Ehrenburg's hate propaganda was simply a repetition of the
"Goebbels-Lie." Similarly, as late as 1991, for example, the CDU (Christian
Democratic Union) Faction of the District Representative Assembly in
Berlin-Schoneberg filed an application to pay respects to Ehrenburg's
"creativity," cultivating the memory of the great writer and
journalist within the scope of an exhibition on "Russians in
Schoneberg." On the occasion of Ehrenburg's one hundredth birthday in
1991, leading German newspapers never tired of commemorating his honor,
stressing his effervescent literary spirit, describing him as a master of
satire, a "seeker for the origins of evil," while admiring his
"grandiose, panoramic depictions." One searches in vain for a single
word relating to Ehrenburg's criminal effectiveness during the war, an
effectiveness that had such terrifying consequences for countless German men,
women, and children. Walter, the author of a commemorative article in the arts
section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, glossed over this aspect of Ehrenburg's activity in
a single, dry sentence, asserting that Ehrenburg was "one of the most
active" and—somewhat deceptively—"most remarkable war
propagandists," a trivialization that drew a sharp rebuke in the same
newspaper by a noted expert, Heinz Nawratil, author of the work Vertreibungsverbrechen
an Deutschen (Expulsion Crimes
against Germans). Who Was Ehrenburg?
Born in Kiev in 1891 as
the son of a Jewish beer brewer, Ehrenburg acknowledged his Jewish origins all
his life and, as he himself wrote: "I am a Jew and proud of it.,,
17 Averse to regular training,
he dedicated himself, even as a schoolboy, not so much to his homework
assignments of his humanities oriented secondary school, but rather, to roaming
around in the political underworld of his native Russia. As a so-called
"sixteen-year-old Bolshevik revolutionary," he emigrated to Paris to
lead the unsteady existence of a homeless, rootless intellectual from that time
onward. He was a man with a profound and lifelong aversion for all men with an
honorable calling and an ordered bourgeois existence. As a cafe literary hack
in Paris until 1917, he was a regular guest of the Closerie des Lilas, where he "sat and wrote, all day, every
day." Attracted by the Russian revolution, he traveled to Moscow in 1917,
where he fell out with the new Soviet rulers, and once again attempted to
settle down in Paris. Expelled by the French police, he took up lodgings in the
disordered atmosphere of Berlin until 1924, where, having entered Soviet
service in 1921, he apparently earned his living as an employee of the Soviet
press and, in particular, as an informer and agent for the notorious GPU (Gosudarstvennoye
Politicheskoye Upravleniye;
State
Political Administration), the Soviet secret police. Returning to Moscow and
then again returning to Paris, he was assigned to Spain during the Spanish
Civil War as a correspondent and agitator from 1936-1939. He stayed once again
in Paris in 1939-1940, then, after the German invasion of France, he traveled
to Berlin, where the nature of his assignment remains unclear, and finally took
up residence in Moscow.
Ehrenburg first attracted
international attention through various publications in the 1920s, including
the political novel Neobychajnye pochozhdena Khulio Khurenito i ego
uchennikov (The Unusual Adventure
of Julio Juarenito and his Pupils), dealing with the defeat of the bourgeoisie
by revolution during the First World War. The book contains an axiom of
Bolshevik wisdom, summed up in the sentence: "Murders must be committed
for the well-being of mankind." In his work Padenie Parizha (The Fall of Paris), published in 1941, Ehrenburg
once again gave free rein to his lifelong "hatred for the well-tempered
French bourgeoisie," describing, under the impression of his experiences
in Spain, the causes for the defeat of France in 1940, from the point of view
of the Soviet class conflict. As the well-deserved reward for this welcome
propaganda hack job, Ehrenburg was granted the highest literary distinction
that the Soviet Union had to offer: the Stalin Prize First Class. Hardly
inferior to the last-named production in its "effectiveness upon the
masses in terms of contemporary history" was the political novel Burja
(The Storm), published in 1946, also honored with
the Stalin prize. Ehrenburg's talents, his unscrupulousness, his knowledge of
foreign countries, and not least his proven compliance, predestined him, as no
other, to handle the principal propaganda challenges facing Stalin in 1941.
With the outbreak of the
German-Soviet war, Soviet propaganda, in a sense, was caught in its own trap.
It was not very difficult to awaken feelings of hostility against
"fascists"—anti-fascist agitation had never really stopped since
1939, and was being carried on covertly. In addition, there was the outdated
doctrine that "German workers and farmers" were the natural enemies
of "fascism," which had, moreover, only succeeded in seizing power in
Germany "with the help of the magnates of the Ruhr and the social
traitors." According to this theory, Hitlerite Germany confronted
"yet another Germany." According to this theory, the "workers
and farmers" in the Wehrmacht would refuse to fight against the
"homeland of the Workers," the Soviet Union, as soon as they
"learned the truth." This explains the crudity of Soviet propaganda
on the front line during the opening phase of the war—propaganda that was
absolutely not understood by German soldiers, filled as it was with phrases
resembling those of the first Soviet leaflets: "German soldiers! Who
profits from the war against the Soviet Union? The capitalists and the lords of
the manor!"
This produced no effect at all.
"True hatred of the
Wehrmacht" as Ehrenburg admitted, was "unknown" in the Red Army
"at the beginning" of the war. Clear-cut conditions needed to
be created if "criminal fraternization" on the battlefield was to be
avoided or, even worse, Red Army soldiers were to be prevented from
surrendering to the Germans en masse. What Stalin wanted was "hate, hate,
and more hate"—not only against "fascism," but against
everything German, according to Lieutenant General Vlassov, who was present when
Stalin directed a request in this sense to Beria in the Kremlin after the
battle of Kiev. The propagandistic preconditions for such hatred had long since
been created. One need only recall inflammatory productions such as the 1938
Moscow film production of Alexander
Nevsky, with the screenplay written by Pyotr Pavlenko, directed by Sergei
Eisenstein, and music by Sergei Prokofiev. The challenge, however, was much
broader than this.
During the opening days of
the war, Ehrenburg was informed by Deputy Foreign Commissar Losovsky of the
decisive significance accorded by Stalin to foreign propaganda in Great Britain
and the USA. The member of the Politburo responsible for these matters,
Shcherbakov, now gave him the major official assignment of writing for the
Western Allies "on a daily basis." Guided by Stalin's definitive
instructions as much as by the hate feelings emanating from his depraved mind
and warped psychology, Ehrenburg began an activity that, as he said himself, no
longer had anything to do with literature, even in the Socialist interpretation
of the term. In fact, from now on, he wrote one or more, and often up to five
articles per day, every day, for the government newspaper Izvestia, the parry newspaper Pravda,
and, in particular, the Army newspaper Krasnaya
zvezda, but also wrote for other Soviet newspapers, and—under various
guises—pro-Soviet newspapers in foreign countries. Krasnaya zvezda formed the principal active basis for the excessive
degree of political propaganda required for the Red Army. Articles from this
newspaper were hammered into the heads of Soviet soldiers with stifling
monotony: "We went to bed with Ehrenburg's articles at night, and woke up
with them in the morning." Ehrenburg's name, as stated on September 21,
1944, was known to every Red Army soldier: "The Soviet people regard him
as one of their best writers and their greatest patriot."
The Soviet troops, often
before attacks, to enhance their fighting spirit were given, not liquor right
away, but "Ehrenburg's articles were read to them before the start of
battle." These articles repeated the same basic theme in innumerable
variants, i.e., the Germans were not human beings and needed to be pitilessly
exterminated. The generalization of this stereotype, though naturally
corresponding to the desires of the Soviet government, apparently raised doubts
on several occasions, even in the Soviet Union. Ehrenburg was sometimes asked
how he could constantly write about one and the same thing, the non-humanity of
the Germans. "Can they really be such butchers?" asked the people of
Moscow in the summer of 1944. The novelist Grossman, himself a committed
spokesman of Soviet war propaganda, reproached Ehrenburg, to say the least, for
failure to distinguish between Germans, "fascists," and "Hitlerites."
Objections were also raised in Western countries. When, for example, the
pro-Soviet Swedish newspaper Goteborgs Handelstidingen began to print Ehrenburg's articles in 1942, not
only did the German government intervene, but other Swedish newspapers, such as
Stockholms
Tidningen, Goteborgs Morgonpost and
Aftonbladet,
protested as well. Dagposten
wrote: "Ehrenburg beats all records for
intellectual sadism. Why should we refute these filthy lies and prove that
Ehrenburg accuses the Germans of things that are everyday occurrences in the
Red Army?"
It is not true that
Ehrenburg's articles, some of which were translated into the English language,
were received with approval everywhere in Great Britain and the USA. In 1945,
for example, a well-known New York magazine called for a protest against the
"cruelty of Soviet writers such as Alexei Tolstoy and Ilya
Ehrenburg." On October 26 and November 23, 1944, Ehrenburg was publicly
compelled to reply to a Lady Gibb, of Great Britain, who had written to him as
follows: "You call forth a very, very old evil in the hearts of the
Russian people, i.e., the desire for revenge after the victory has been won.
This old, old, evil ... brings the victors no blessings... We are very anxious
to see you place your great talents in the service of Russia on behalf of a
just and lasting peace, which can never be based on self-righteousness and the
lust for revenge."
Soviet propaganda, which
at this time was already quite busy defending enormous Soviet territorial
acquisitions, began to put massive pressure upon Lady Gibb, in an attempt to
nip any impulse of justice and humanity in the bud. Ehrenburg answered in the
hate-filled tones of an "un-human," quoting from the alleged letter
of a Lieutenant Zinchenko, who was said to have written in shock: "My
mother is religious too, and in the name of religion she asks, 'kill the
Germans with my blessings."' "One must not pity a wild beast,"
said Ehrenburg, "rather, one must destroy it... that is the opinion of our
people, dear Lady."
Ehrenburg could be quite
assured of his job in any case. Even the alleged reprimand from an ideologue in
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Alexandrov,
published in a leading article entitled "Comrade Ehrenburg Is
Oversimplifying," in the party newspaper Pravda on April 14, 1945, shortly
before the end of the war, was nothing but a tactical subterfuge undertaken
upon Stalin's direct instructions, and not directly against Ehrenburg
personally, as he was immediately given to understand, but rather, simply to
take propagandistic account of the changing political situation. Enjoying the
unrestricted trust of Stalin—with a short hiatus in 1949—Ehrenburg was assigned
to the countries of East and Central Eastern Europe as a sort of traveling
salesman after the end of the war, with the important assignment of preparing
for and solidifying a Communist takeover through agitation. The high value
placed upon Ehrenburg's services by Stalin personally at this time, was
revealed when the American Secretary of State, Byrnes, threatened to publish
American correspondence reports relating to Soviet acts of violence and
encroachment in Romania in 1945. Stalin is said to have dismissed these threats
"with a contemptuous wave of the hand, 'Then I will send Ilya Ehrenburg to
Romania and have him report what he sees. His word will carry more weight than
the word of your man.'"
As the
Deputy—i.e., in reality the President, in the secret Soviet Communist ranking
system—of the worldwide Soviet "World Peace Council," Ehrenburg was
engaged in intensive international subversion in the following years. His many
personal acquaintances and connections now revealed the extent to which
left-wing intellectuals, and well-known personalities in the intellectual and
political life of many countries, were prepared to degrade themselves,
deliberately or foolishly, as lackeys of the Soviet regime. Even the former
left-wing Center Party politician and German Chancellor Dr. Wirth did not
disdain to have amicable dealings with Ehrenburg in Switzerland. Where Stalin
prize winner Dr. Wirth is concerned, this comes as no surprise, since a
"voluminous" CIA file entitled "The Background of Joseph
Wirth" has traced his activities as a Soviet agent all the way back to the
early 1920s.
To Ehrenburg, who was
always a prolific writer, his output during the "Great Patriotic War of
the Soviet Union," in his own words, had nothing to do with literature,
even as the word is interpreted in the Soviet Union; rather, it consisted of
political agitation, i.e., incitement. Nearly three thousand of his leading
articles and proclamations were collected in a three-volume anthology called
Vojna (The War) between 1942 and 1944. Ehrenburg,
however, did not appear to wish to be reminded of these writings at a later
time. His memoirs, Goda, Lyudi, Zhizn, partly intended to conceal the past, discourse
verbosely upon the personal legacy of those fateful years. Of his wartime
articles, he said briefly: "What remains to me of those years? Thousands
of articles of the same type, which, at best, may be of interest to a
conscientious historian." The reasons for this modesty will soon be
obvious to anyone who actually penetrates this material with the spirit of
"a conscientious historian."
An analysis of this tidal
flood of articles is also likely to awaken memories of another writer of
somewhat similar articles, Julius Streicher, the Gauleiter of Franconia
deprived of his offices for personal failings in 1940, and publisher of the
inflammatory anti-Semitic newspaper Der Sturmer, which was, one might add, broadly rejected even within the NSDAP for its
low cultural level. Indicted by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg in 1945-1946, Streicher was convicted and sentenced to death because,
as stated in the grounds for the judgment: "Week after week, month after
month, he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism and incited
the German people to active persecution." "A leading article in
September 1938 was typical of his teachings, which termed the Jew a germ and a
pest, not a human being, but 'a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a
disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of
mankind."' Streicher was alleged to have unmistakably called for an
extermination of the Jews.
If Streicher was sentenced
to death by hanging under Article 4 of the indictment (crimes against humanity)
at Nuremberg—what can one say of Ehrenburg, who polluted the minds of the
peoples of the Soviet Union (and the Western countries as well) with the poison
of anti-Germanism, inciting people to active persecution and extermination of
Germans—for years, "week after week, month after month," even day
after day—not just in a remote local rag, but in the leading newspapers of the
Soviet Union, under the highest official orders? If Streicher was "Jew
Baiter No. I," then it seems not only justified, but even necessary, to
call Ehrenburg "German Baiter No. l." "Stretcher was responsible
for the deaths of millions of Jews," wrote Ehrenburg in the capacity of
trial observer at Nuremberg on December 13, 1945. As will be seen, and in more
detail, Ehrenburg was in no way inferior to Streicher, but perhaps in many
occasions even exceeded him in evil.
On June 22, 1941, the
Soviet Union, without lifting a finger, was suddenly freed from the camp of the
aggressors, and was now numbered among the attacked, making her propaganda
machinery available in order to cause former Soviet complicity with National
Socialist Germany to be forgotten. This enabled the Soviet Union to be depicted
as the defender of the "peace-loving peoples." The above mentioned
Soviet complicity had included the following: on September 17, 1939, by prior
agreement with the German Government, the Soviets attacked Poland;
"bombarded," the regions east of Lemberg during the night;
"dealt with" or "annihilated" "Polish troops";
"annihilated" "Polish infantry divisions and cavalry
brigades"; "shot down" Polish planes; "captured" or
"destroyed" war material and artillery; captured prisoners; took
cities; "purged" or "mopped up" the battlefields, forests,
terrain, and countryside "of the Polish army"; and
"solemnly" accepted the transfer of the fortresses of Osowiec and
Brest, as well as the city of Bialystok and other localities, from German
troops. At Lemberg, 8,500 Polish soldiers, including 100 officers, fled toward
the Germans to avoid capture by the Soviets—a wise decision—since they were
treated according to the principles of the Geneva Convention instead of being
shot in the back of the neck. The 15,000 Polish officers who fell into the
hands of the Soviets and, in addition to these professional soldiers, thousands
of "university professors, doctors, scientists, artists, secondary school
teachers," "the flower of Polish society," "doing their
duty as reservists," were shot by the NKVD near Katyn, at Kharkov, and
other places on the orders, as is well-known, of Stalin, Kalinin, and other
Soviet leaders. Of 250,000 Polish prisoners of war, 148,000 perished in the
Soviet Union; of 1.6 to 1.8 million Polish civilian deportees, 600,000 perished
in the Soviet Union; of 600,000 Polish Jews deported into the Soviet Union,
450,000 disappeared without a trace.
The Soviet government had
accused the Western powers of starting an imperialistic war under the pretext
of defending Poland; then accused them of expanding the war to Scandinavia,
Belgium, and the Netherlands. The Soviets had provided propagandistic,
diplomatic and, at least to some extent, military support to the German
military campaigns, ostentatiously taking account of the changing facts of the
situation to lull the Reich into security. As early as 1939, Moscow had severed
relations with Czechoslovakia despite treaty obligations requiring Soviet
assistance, then recognized the independence of the secessionist Republic of
Slovakia. In May 1941, Moscow had withdrawn recognition from the exile
governments of Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, on the grounds that they
no longer exercised sovereignty over their countries. Shortly afterward came
the break with Greece, and then—in a manner that must have amazed "even
the most experienced and callused observer of Soviet methods"—the break
with Yugoslavia, whose integrity and independence had been recognized by Moscow
hardly a month before, "even before the Germans had had a chance to open
their mouths." Now, from one day to the next, this was all to be
forgotten. Stalin, wrote Ehrenburg on February 8, 1942, "had no intention
of attacking other countries... We built cities, we worked and studied... We
educated human beings... while the Germans were building tanks"—this
despite the six or eight-fold superiority in tanks enjoyed by the Red Army on
June 22, 1941.
On January 4, 1945,
Ehrenburg, Stalin's propaganda mouthpiece, wrote in regard to the policies of
the Western powers of that time (but not, of course, the Soviet Union):
"Europe and the world now recognize the lessons of this immoral policy in
the ruins of Warsaw, the sufferings of Paris, and the wounds of London."
During the Polish campaign, the Soviets had provided German aircraft with their
positions in order to enable them to reach their objectives. Now the Germans
were the sole "arsonists." "They dropped bombs on Warsaw and
laughed themselves sick." The Soviet Union had treacherously attacked
Poland from the rear on September 17, 1939. "We greet our Sister
Poland," wrote Ehrenburg hypocritically on November 7, 1941, and on
December 14, 1941: "The spirit of Chopin still lives in the cities of
tortured Poland... The Poles say one to another: 'Beauty still lives. Poland
still lives.'" "We want freedom for ourselves and for all
nations," wrote Ehrenburg on January 1, 1942. "We do not want Poland
to be a land of German galley slaves." In 1939-40, Moscow
instructed the Communist party of France to
sabotage the French war effort. After the capitulation of Compiegne, the Soviet
government had congratulated the Reich Government and hastened to extend
diplomatic recognition to the "French State of Vichy." Now, at a
single stroke, Marshal Petain was called a paid traitor, the Judas of France.
Ehrenburg now insulted Premier Paul Reynaud
and Generals Weygand, Georges, and Gamelin as "capitulationists,"
referring to the Popular Front and the (treasonous) French communists, in
particular, as the only true patriots. "The victories of Rostov and Kalmin
were a death sentence to those who signed the cease-fire at Compiegne,"
wrote Ehrenburg on March 21, 1942.
German troops in France,
as is well-known, were subject to the strictest discipline, as Andre Malraux
admitted by his own accord. Malraux, a member of the French Communist Party
until 1939, later a member of the Resistance, writer, and Minister under de
Gaulle, stated that he had had "only good experiences with the German
army, and only bad experiences with the Gestapo." Ehrenburg, nevertheless,
wrote on July 14, 1941: "The Nazi murderers and gangsters marched on the
boulevards" to plunder and rob the nation of France, murdering children
and starving the population to death with rations of only fifty grams (two
ounces) of bread per day. Soviet revenge was threatened for a trivial instance
of property damage: "For the four spoiled jackets, you will exterminate
4,000 Germans who have trampled France." Ehrenburg summed up his attitude
toward the Germans—whose Border Treaty and Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet
Union had been valid until that very same date—in the following words, on June
22, 1941: "They plundered happy peace-loving France. They enslaved our
brother nations, the highly cultivated Czechs, the valiant Yugoslavs, and
talented Poles. They raped the Norwegians, Danes, and Belgians."
"German troops
stagger like drunkards all over Europe: from Boulogne to Odessa, from Poland to
Belgium, from Norway to Bulgaria," he wrote, turning up the heat, on May
2, 1942. And, just a few days later, on March 5: "They entered Russia
drunk on the blood of the Poles, French, and Serbs, the blood of old people,
maidens, and small children."
Ehrenburg was assigned to
give propaganda effect to Stalin's war speech of July 3, 1941, and to proclaim
the new program.' "We have millions and millions of faithful allies,"
he wrote on July 4, 1941: "All those who have lost their freedom and their
country stand by our side: Czechs, Norwegians, French, Dutch, Poles and
Serbs... Stalin's words will reach the city of trampled freedom, the subjected,
but irreconcilable Paris. They will reach the farmers of Yugoslavia, the
students of Oxford, the fishermen of Norway, and the workers of Pilsen. They
will call forth new hope in the hearts of all peoples suffering under fascist barbarism.
Stalin's speech will be heard by the people of London, who have experienced
hundreds of barbaric air raids, by the miners of Wales and the weavers of
Manchester... our Patriotic War will be a war for the liberation of Europe from
Hitler's yoke."
At the cost of few
propaganda phrases, the Soviet Union—which had been expelled from the League of
Nations for attacking Finland, and had come close to a collision with the
Western powers—now placed itself at the head of the countries drawn into the
war, making herself their spokesperson. "All democratic countries"
(naturally including the Soviet Union) "stand by us, all of progressive
humanity is with us," stated a proclamation of August 10-11, 1941, issued
at an "All-Slavic Meeting" of
so-called intellectual workers, held in Moscow. "All of humanity is now fighting Germany," echoed Ehrenburg on
August 24, 1941, without a side glance at the German military allies at war
with the Soviet Union—Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia.
"We want freedom for us and for all nations," he claimed on January
1, 1945. And to ensure that his protector and employer would not be forgotten
among the flood of phrases, he added the following: "Long live the Soviet
Union! May thy peoples live, thy gardens, thy children, thy Stalin!"
On November 6, 1941, the
anniversary of the "victory of the Great Socialistic October
Revolution" Ehrenburg took it upon himself to instruct the Allies in the
style of Communist Party agitators, calling upon them to join the common struggle
. "The defenders of Moscow contemplate with pride the firm fortress of
London. Fame for Britain! ... We greet you, pioneers of freedom, the invincible
people of France, we greet the Czechs... We greet the people of warriors, the
Serbs... We greet the brave Greeks... We greet the untiring Norwegians... we
greet the patient Dutch... we greet the hard-working Belgians... We greet our
sister Poland... We greet the
arsenal
of freedom—America." To avoid all possible doubt that these peoples and
countries were now to be indebted to the Soviets from that time on, he added:
"Moscow is fighting... for you, distant friends, for humanity, for the
entire world."
In 1930, no less a
personage than Winston Churchill had written of the "plague bacillus"
Lenin, compared to whom " ... no Asiatic conqueror, no Tamerlane or
Ghenghis Khan" could be a match "in the destruction of men and women.
To Churchill, the victories of Bolshevism had shifted "the borders of Asia
for the conditions of the dark ages... from the Urals to the Pripet
swamps." Russia was said to be frozen "in an endless winter of
inhuman doctrines and inhuman barbarity." On January 29, 1941, Ehrenburg
informed the peoples of the world that the "reprehensible scandal of
Bolshevism"—in Churchill's words—had now raised a torch: "We have
raised the torch to the sky... the torch of our culture, and the culture that
we rightly believe to be the possession of all of humanity. It is the torch of
ancient Greece, the Renaissance, the Eighteenth Century [i.e., the Enlightenment]—all
that in humanity that has opposed slavery, stagnation, and atavism. Our
struggle against Germany is guided by an illuminating moral principle... the
principle of reason, spiritual purity, freedom, and dignity."
Such phraseology should be
judged in light of the fact that, at the head of the Soviet Union, stood
Stalin, "the greatest criminal of all peoples and times." Stalin with
the help of creatures placed in power by him: Yagoda, Ezhov, Beria, Kruglov,
Abakumov, Kobulov, Serov, Dekanozov, Merkulov, Canava and others—had erected a
system of tyranny that could decide the "fate of any citizen in the
country, without exception, at Stalin's own bloody whim."
Since July 3, 1941, at the
latest, the Soviet Union claimed for propaganda purposes that it had been
unprepared for the German attack, of which it had had no inkling. It was,
therefore, waging a purely defensive war, pursuing no expansionist goals. The
historical legend of the "treacherous fascist surprise attack on the
unsuspecting, peace-loving Soviet Union" is demonstrably untrue, and has
no basis in fact. Of the many Ehrenburg propaganda lies, only a few need be
cited by way of example. November 23, 1944: "We do not need any 'living
space."' November 30, 1944: "The world looks upon the Red Army as a
liberator... [the Soviet Union] does not force its ideas on anyone."
January 11, 1945: "We do not want to force our ideas or customs on
anyone." May 24, 1945, after the victory: "We won the war because we
hate wars of conquest."
As the end of the war
approached, and the Red Army penetrated deep into the heart of Europe, the
purely defensive protestations came to be increasingly admixed with offensive
overtones. The Soviets, conscious of their enormous power, began to make
political demands in the form of the propaganda phrase, drummed into the ears
of the world, of the Red Army's great "Mission of Liberation.
The first
vaguely expansionist passages appeared in Ehrenburg's writings in October 1944,
as Soviet troops crossed the German border into East Prussia. On October 12,
1944, Ehrenburg wrote: "We rescued European culture... our people is
positively concerned with the fate of European culture. The Soviet land
produces no isolationists." On April 12, 1945, Ehrenburg was even more overt:
"It is time to say that the victories of the Red Army are victories of the
Soviet system. We draw attention to the fact that it was our people which
rescued Europe and the world from fascism." Or on May 17, 1945, he stated
rather inartfully: "We rescued human culture, the ancient stones of
Europe, its cradle, its working people, its museums and books. If Britain is
destined to produce a new Shakespeare, if new Encyclopaedists appear in
France... if the dream of a Golden Age is ever to become a reality, then this will
happen because the soldiers of freedom marched thousands of miles to plant the
banner of freedom, fraternity, and light. That is why Stalin's name is linked
to the end of the night and the first dawn of happiness, not only in our
country, but all over the world."
And on July 12, 1945,
continuing in the same vein: "The Soviet Union rescued the peoples of
Europe. Stalin shook everyone's conscience awake... we love Stalin."
According to Ehrenburg on
January 10, 1946, the Soviet Union—which was even said to have decided the fate
of Prague, Paris, and Rome—was "no longer a geographical and political
concept, but rather, a moral concept" in the mind of the nations
.
In other
words, therefore, it had become an ideal for all nations by virtue of its
military victories, automatically deriving the right to intervene in the
affairs of other countries as well. Stalin had no thought of "attacking
other countries"; instead, he thought about "creating a new
world," as Ehrenburg alleged on February 8, 1942.
Now that victory had been
achieved, Stalin could begin to realize his dreams of a "new world,"
"a new Europe," a Europe—as Ehrenburg immediately claimed—in which
"all the microbes of fascism" would be eliminated. Who, now, were the
"microbes of fascism"? Henceforth, the "fascists" were no
longer to be understood as merely German, the disciples of Hitler, but rather,
all those who opposed Soviet designs for conquest and Bolshevization on any
grounds whatever. This included all those whose understanding of the concepts of
"government, reform, and progress" differed from that of the
Communists—in particular, the hated bourgeoisie of all nations, the advocates
of a State of Law according to Western traditions, the whole "spiritual
underground of apparently normal people." Stalin had revealed the
political objective; Ehrenburg and his ilk set to work to propagate it in their
usual way.
On May 17, 1945, a few
days after the unconditional German surrender, Ermashev wrote: "The
collapse of the Hitler Reich does not automatically liberate mankind from all
the dangers with which the dark powers of fascism and reaction are still
capable of threatening the world"
Ominous words as far as
the future was concerned. Thus was announced a principal inclination of the
Soviet regime: the urgent desire to see the "fascist criminals,"
"the war criminals," punished as severely as possible. An
international show trial, organized on the tried and true Soviet model with the
leading participation of the Soviet Union, was to exert a deterrent effect on
all powers of "reaction," i.e., the potential opponents of Stalinist
claims to domination, all of whom were described as "followers of Hitler
and Mussolini."
In defiant language,
speaking on February 8, 1945, Professor Tarle, the above mentioned Soviet
historian, justified Stalin's claim to the right to shape "the future of
the peace-loving and freedom-loving nations" on the grounds of alleged
past experiences, stating: "But the great role of the Soviet people is not
yet over, even if it has freed humanity from the deadly German nightmare. The
fifth column, although temporarily relegated to the shadows, is still alive in
the world. Nazis and Nazi sympathizers still exist and are preparing to resume
the task in which they were engaged for so long and, furthermore, so
successfully in Europe. The European democracies—and not only the European
democracies—will face a highly extraordinary struggle in the coming years,
because fascism has not the slightest
intention of abdicating... it will, however, once again face the same
invincible obstacle: the Soviet Union, the Soviet people. The victory of the
Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War has created a firm basis for the
triumph of the world democracy. The immortal service of Stalin's strategy and
of the fighters of the Russian army is that they have rescued world
civilization. Those who understand that the struggle for freedom and democracy
must continue, pending the complete moral and political defeat of fascism, even
after the defeat of the Hitlerite war machine, look upon the USSR with profound
confidence."
Stalin's expansionist
intentions need hardly be expressed more clearly. This implied a continuation
of the pattern of aggression that had begun with the pact of August 23, 1939,
and that was now taking on a new shape—for the third time. Stephane Courtois,
editor of the Black Book of Communism, has stated with unequivocal clarity: "As
appears from numerous statements by Stalin, it was Stalin's firm determination
and intention to thrust forward to the Atlantic Ocean. As early as 1947, Stalin
told Maurice Thorez, at that time the General Secretary of the French Communist
Party, that he would have preferred to see the Red Army in Paris than
Berlin."
Thus he brilliantly
confirmed the conclusion drawn by Professor Ernst Topitsch in his book
Stalins
Krieg, published in 1985.
Thrusting through to the Atlantic, however, implied the imposition of
Leninist-Stalinist domination as well. "Anyone who occupies a territory
imposes his own social system as well," Stalin told Tito, a close
confidant, and Dilas, a partisan leader, in 1945. "Everyone introduces his
own system as far as his armies get. It cannot be otherwise." The invasion
of the Anglo-American expedition forces temporarily put a stop to Stalin's ambitions
in 1944. The following motto, considered valid until very recent times by
"socialist" activists and the spiritual accomplices of
"socialism" must be understood as implying a propagandistic
preparation for an expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence that had never
been abandoned: struggle against "fascism" as understood by the
Soviets. According to this
definition, anyone who opposes the aggressive designs of Soviet imperialism, is
ipso facto a "fascist" or "Nazi," to be destroyed by any
means possible, no matter how reprehensible. The Stalinist concept of
"fascism" has even survived the Soviet Union
itself, it is now generally used, for example, in the Federal Republic of
Germany, as a defamatory smear word applied to political dissenters. Anyone attempting to use the Bolshevik
"anti-fascist" fighting word in any way differing from the concepts
of the Stalinists and their apologists and heirs in Germany, no longer need
wonder at the repression that inevitably follows.
In reality, of course,
Soviet propaganda began as early as spring 1945 to produce its effects far
beyond the territories occupied by the Red Army. Hardly anyone saw this more
clearly than Winston Churchill, who in his famous "Iron Curtain"
speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 warned that "far from the
Russian frontier ... Communist Fifth Columns are established" representing
a "growing peril" to peace and to "Christian civilization"
as a whole.
172--A major element of
Soviet war propaganda consists of the atrocities actually or allegedly committed
by the Germans. Endlessly increasing numbers of accusations have been made,
both with and without justification. If an accurate sense of proportion is to
be maintained, these accusations must be considered in the context of extensive
Soviet crimes against humanity. An effort must be made to separate the wheat
from the chaff in any examination of the possible grounds for the Soviet
accusations selected from among the multiplicity of examples cited, while
simultaneously examining the political motivations that lie concealed behind
the propaganda. The fact is that the Bolsheviks had themselves already killed
many millions of innocent people long before the Germans ever had a chance to
commit any crimes in the Soviet Union or German-annexed territories. Terror was
a constant feature of the Soviet system, and was established immediately after
the October Revolution. A terror intended to accomplish, not only the social,
but often, the physical liquidation of entire classes: the extermination of the
nobility, priests, and bourgeoisie, as well as the followers of non-Bolshevik
socialist parties, such as the Menshevik and Social Revolutionaries, and the
followers of the bourgeois parties such as, for example, the much-libeled
Constitutional Democrats ("Cadets"). "Workers!" the party
newspaper Pravda proclaimed on August
31, 1918: "The time has come to destroy the bourgeoisie!"' The slogan
was duly put into effect: the People's Commissar for the Interior, Petrovsky,
quoted by the governmental newspaper Izvestia on September 4, 1918, called for "mass executions... at the
slightest resistance... No weakness or hesitation may be tolerated in the
introduction of mass terror. On
November l, 1918, Latsis, deputy head of the Cheka, gave orders to his
organization for the elimination of "the bourgeoisie as a class." As
stressed by Nicolas Werth in the Black Book of Communism, the merciless class warfare against whole sections
of the population
and entire
professions acquired the features of true genocide. Both the extermination of
the Cossacks—or "de-cossackization"—which began in 1920, and the
extermination of the peasantry—or "de-kulakization" which began
later, met the definition of genocide in terms of both objectives and
implementation.
In a letter addressed to
and intended only for the members of the politburo, years after the revolution,
on March 19, 1922, Lenin remarked to Molotov: "The more representatives of
the reactionary clergy and reactionary bourgeoisie we can shoot in this regard,
the better." Winston Churchill's book Nach dem Kriege (After the War), published in 1930, quotes a
statistical study by Professor Sarolea showing that the Bolshevik dictators had
already murdered the following number of persons by 1924: "28 bishops,
1,219 priests, 6,000 professors and teachers, 9,000 doctors, 12,950 landowners,
54,000 officers, 70,000 policemen, 193,290 workers, 260,000 soldiers, 355,250
intellectuals and tradesmen, and 815,000 farmers."
Churchill continued:
"These figures have been confirmed by Mr. Hearnshaw, of King's College,
London, in his brilliant introduction to A Survey of Socialism.
They do not, of course include the monstrous losses
of human life among the Russian population having perished from
starvation."
If this were possible even
under Lenin—who was described by Churchill as a "plague
bacillus"—then what was it like under Stalin, described by his biographer,
Colonel General Professor Volkogonov, as a "monster" without equal in
world history? Only a few of the principal phases of the Stalinist reign of
terror need be recalled at this point. According to unanimously accepted
opinions and demographic studies, between seven and ten million people died
during the forced collectivization of agriculture that began in 1929 and the
related, carefully planned and implemented "Holocaust by Hunger," or
genocide of the Ukrainian people, which took place in silence between 1932 and
1933. The mass executions of so-called "Enemies of the People," which
began in the very early 1930s, culminated in the delirium of the "Great
Purge" of 1937-1939, with another five to seven million deaths either from
execution by shooting or following deportation to GULags.
174--Nor should one forget
the heavy losses in human life as a result of the deportations of the Volga
Germans and the other ethnic Germans from the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the
Caucasus organized by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP (b) and
the Council of the People's Commissars in 1941. These deportations were carried
out under inhumane conditions and constituted the international crime of
genocide just as much as the deportations of the peoples of the Kalmucks,
Karachayers, Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, certain segments of the Karbardinian
people, as well as the Tatars of the Crimea, all of which occurred in 1943-44.
Mention has already been made of the executive instruments of the Border Troops
and Special Troops of the NKVD—comparable to the German Einsatzgruppen of the
Security Police and SD—which followed in the footsteps of the regular troops of
the Red Army, carrying out "mass purges" of the populations in the
reincorporated territories. As stated above, hundreds of thousands of people
were shot by the NKVD in the wake of the reprisals and purges that then
began." According to detailed German investigations, no fewer than four
thousand people, without regard to age or sex, were shot in the city of Kharkov
in March 1943 alone, following the brief Soviet capture of the city.
177--The
Black Book
of Communism is of inestimable
value in the intellectual situation of the year 1997: not that it provides
fundamentally new information, or arrives at estimated numbers of victims
equaling the estimates of earlier researchers. The estimate of "at least
twenty five million victims" of Leninism-Stalinism, calculated by editor
Stephane Courtois in his masterly introduction and accompanying comments, is
only equal to the lower limits of past estimates. But the Black Book
of Communism is a true compendium
of Communist crimes against humanity, casting light on the spiritual darkness
of the twentieth century. In this regard, it is comparable to the Gulag
Archipelago by Alexandr
Solzhenitsyn, and, like the latter work, has achieved an unexpectedly
widespread distribution in a short time.
The findings of Stephane Courtois, like those of Alexandr
Solzhenitsyn in past years, are in accordance with the basic theme of the
present book, which may be summarized as follows:
1. Soviet domination was only made possible by mass
crimes. Any analysis of the Soviet system must consider mass crimes—methodical
mass murder and other crimes against humanity—to have been a central feature of
the Soviet system.
2. Both Lenin and Stalin were guilty of the social and
physical elimination of all persons thought to represent open or covert opposition
to Leninist-Stalinist rule.
3. Lenin and Stalin were guilty of creating the
concentration camp system.
4. Lenin and Stalin were guilty of the deaths of at least
25 million people. In practice, mass murder was a constituent element of
Bolshevik rule.
5. Hitler started the world war, but proof of Stalin's
responsibility is overwhelming.
6. Stalin was an even greater criminal than Hitler, and
was, in fact, the greatest criminal of the century.
The Black Book of Communism therefore strikes at the very heart of the
Leninists-Stalinists. The physical extinction of a total of 100 million
people—25 million by the socialist Soviet power structure alone—cannot simply
be palliated on the pretext that Communism, in theory, consisted of an
"ideology of liberation." The merest knowledge of the revolutionary
figures who usurped absolute power in Russia by an act of violence in October
1917, simply to reduce their subjugated peoples to the condition of rightless
helots, reveals the infamy of those who parrot the "anti-fascist"
propaganda phrase still current today—that "Communism was initially based
on a love of the people." One reason why the findings of the Black Book of Communism weigh so heavily
is because the authors were personally sympathetic with Communism to some
degree in the past, and perhaps still are today, and because editor Stephane
Courtois is a "proven expert on Communism and a serious historian"
who cannot be refuted with the usual hair-splitting and deceptive dialectics;
he can only be personally defamed.
How humiliating it must be
for the ideologues and demagogues—the so-called "anti-fascists," who
presume to determine what free citizens shall or shall not be allowed to
think—to see Courtois drawing historical parallels, making comparisons, and
drawing up estimated calculations relating to both Communism and National
Socialism, i.e., performing the natural duty of a historian without regard to
"anti-fascist" taboos and distortions. Like Alexandr Solzhenitsyn,
Ernst Nolte, and Frangois Furet before him," Stephane Courtois holds the
opinion that the presumed prohibition against "historical comparison"
no longer applies: after all, to compare is to think. Not only is the
comparison legitimate, but Courtois considers it the elementary precondition to
historical understanding, in a manner similar to Albert Camus' postulation of
the comparability of Communism and National Socialism in 1954. The pretexts offered by the
"anti-fascist" opponents of all comparison between "racial
genocide" and "class genocide," a comparison rightly undertaken
by Courtois, have, in fact, always been truly disgraceful. This last taboo,
this last desperate argument, is rendered obsolete by the proof that Lenin and
Stalin not only committed gigantic acts of class murder, but also of racial
mass murder—falling under the definition of "genocide" according to
the "United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948." Even the
left-wing ideological German weekly newspaper Die Zeit could not help featuring
its several-page discussion of the Black
Book of Communism under the devastating headline: "The Red Holocaust."
Courtois believes that the concept of "uniqueness" and
"singularity" doesn't apply, on the grounds that the Bolsheviks, in
his view, committed the same, or very similar crimes as the "fascists"—almost
the only ones whose crimes, in the absence of justification, continue to be
harped upon today. The "fascist" method of procedure may have been
different, but, as stressed by Courtois, there is no specificity for genocide. The Black Book of Communism makes it unmistakably
clear that the crimes against humanity committed by Lenin and Stalin not
only preceded those of Hitler by decades in terms of time, but exceeded them
many times over in terms of scope, and, to some extent, in horror of execution.
"The facts regarding Leninist and Stalinist Russia," writes Courtois,
"make one's blood run cold."
As for the total number of
victims of Soviet domination, the concurrence of opinion is that there was a
true hecatomb, even if the data varies considerably and the real number of
victims can perhaps never be determined. The Russian historian Medvedev, a
former dissident of Jewish origin who drew closer to the Communists again in
1992, attempted, in 1989, to establish a total of 40 million victims of repression,
nevertheless, arrived at a number of fifteen million victims based on his own
research. The American historian Robert Conquest, after detailed analysis,
suggested a total of 20 million victims under the Stalinist terror alone, but
considers 10 million additional deaths to be probable. In Courtois's view, as
stated above, Lenin and Stalin were the murderers of 25 million people. Soviet
historian Professor I. A. Kurganov, in number 7 of the Moscow periodical
Novyj Mir in 1994, on the other hand, proposed a total number
of 66 million victims of Lenin-Stalin between 1917 and 1947, including "20
million deaths during the Second World War," a research finding confirmed
in issue 63 of the Petersburg periodical Nashe Otechestvo in 1996 and mentioned by the historian V V Isaev.
Nobel Prize winner Alexandr Solzhenitsyn speaks of 40 million victims of
"the constant interior war of the Soviet government against its own
people." The number
of 40 million people killed by the socialism of the Soviet Socialist Republics,
has been mentioned several times, for example, in the Welt-Nachrichtendienst on June 30,
1993: "According to careful estimates, approximately 40 million victims
fell victim to the dictator J. V Stalin";
this naturally
leaves open the question of the total number of murder victims falling under
Lenin's responsibility.
186--This controversy is
being conducted less in the "official" literature than in rather
remote publications, and is not a little influenced by official prohibitions
against certain forms of thought and speech, suspiciously watched over by a
system of political denunciation. The related prevention of free discussion of
an important problem of contemporary history, no matter how unfortunate it may
be today, will, of course, be ineffective in the long run. Experience shows
that free historical research can only be temporarily hindered by criminal law
as it exists in many European countries. Historical truths usually continue to
exert their effects behind the scenes, only to emerge triumphantly at a later
time. In regard to the problem of Auschwitz, moreover, it is not a question of
"obvious" facts relating to the cruel persecution and extermination
of members of the Jewish people, which is beyond discussion; rather, it is
solely and merely the question of the killing mechanism utilized and the
question of how many people fell victim to persecution. Major discoveries are
emerging in this regard, to such an extent that many current preconceptions
must inevitably be corrected.
194--If the Germans did
not even know of the cruel events occurring behind their backs, events of which
they would never have approved, then they cannot be held responsible. The main
thing is that even if citizens of the Greater German Reich were involved in
these crimes, it is no proof to the contrary; the Russian people, by the same
logic, would have to bear responsibility for the mass murder of millions of
people under the Soviets; the Georgian people could also be held responsible on
the grounds that, in addition to Dzhugashvili (Stalin)—a Georgian—Beria,
Dekanozov, Canava, Goglidze, Rukhadze, Karanadze, and other Georgians headed
the murder apparatus as leading NKVD officials. To stretch the analogy a bit further,
the Jewish
people could also be held responsible because—as Sonja Margolina, an author of
Jewish origin from the Soviet Union, stressed in her book Das Ende der Lugen (The End of Lies)—Jews in Bolshevism appeared,
not only as victims, but as criminals, for the first time in history. That
Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Yoffe, Krestinsky, Radek and innumerable other
leading Bolshevik officials were Jews, is very well-known. The Central
Committee that met in Smol'nyj in 1918 was popularly known as the "Jewish
Central Committee"; according to Sonja Margolina, Bolshevik rule in the
1920s actually bore "certain Jewish features." "The fact that a
significant proportion of the known Bolshevik party leaders were Jews..."
as Nicolas Werth writes in the Black Book
of Communism, "justified the equation of Jew = Bolshevik in the eyes
of the masses." After all, Wolfgang Strauss, a Slavist and political
journalist, refers to the ethnic breakdown of the principal Communist Party
leaders during the period from 1918-19, in the appendix to the new edition of
the well-known work by Robert Wilton, The
Last Days of the Romanovs, first published in New York in 1920, which shows
the following: "17 Russians, two Ukrainians, eleven Armenians, 35 Letts
[Latvians], 15 Germans, one Hungarian, ten Georgians, three Poles, three Finns,
one Czech, one Karaim, and 457 Jews."
Less well-known is the relatively high proportion of Jews
in the unleashing and organization of the Bolshevik terror (Cheka, GPU, NKVD).
As stressed by Nicolas Werth in the Black
Book of Communism, Trotsky, the People's Commissar for Military Affairs
[and de facto head of the Red Army], speaking before the Delegates of the
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets as early as December 1, 1917, (new
calendar: December 13) announced: "In less than one month, the terror will
acquire extremely violent forms, just as it did during the great French
Revolution."' Nicolas Werth also quotes Grigori Zinoviev, "one of the
most important Bolshevik party leaders," who on September 19, 1918,
writing in the newspaper Sevenaja
Kommuna, demanded that, of the one hundred million residents of Soviet
Russia, ten million "must be annihilated" through "our own
socialist terror."
196--Although Stalin
gradually restricted the influence of the Jews, and subjected many of them to
severe persecution as "Trotskyites," or, later, as
"cosmopolitans," they were still to be found in leading positions
everywhere during the Second World War. An important propaganda role in regard
to the United States, for example, was played by the "Jewish Anti-Fascist
Committee," which was expressly founded for this purpose, but liquidated
in 1948 by Stalin. One of Stalin's
closest collaborators, to the end of his life, was Lazar Moisseevich
Kaganovich, chiefly responsible, in addition to other persons, for "an
unprecedented act of genocide"—the carefully planned murder of seven to nine million Ukrainian
farmers during the 1932-33 famine.
Kaganovich was "responsible for the death of an entire generation of
intellectuals," and personally signed execution orders for 36,000 people. According to Medvedev, a historian of
Jewish origins, Kaganovich had "his hand in the murder of millions,"
and had more crimes on his conscience "than the men hanged at Nuremberg in
1946." The order to shoot the
15,000 Polish officers at Katyn and elsewhere—a crime that, in itself, would
have sufficed for the imposition of a death sentence according to Nuremberg
standards—was signed by Voroshilov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kalinin and Lazar
Kaganovich, in addition to Stalin.
Genrikh Grigorevich
Yagoda—a "scoundrel and common criminal," according to Colonel
General Volkogonov—was for years the head of the Bolshevik mass terror
apparatus and was responsible for the murder of millions as the head of the
GULag Archipelago and People's Commissar of the Interior.
The terror in the Red Army
was organized by the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army,
Army Commissar First Rank Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis. NKVD Colonel General
Abakumov, who surrounded himself with a whole group of Jewish collaborators,
was a close confidant of Beria. Beria, who was in turn called a "Jew from
birth" by NKVD General Sudoplatov, was one of the chief persons
responsible for the monstrous crimes under the authority of the NKVD-MVD. NKVD
General Raikhmann, head of the regional administration of the NKVD in Kharkov,
which was praised by Ezhov for its particular brutality during the
1930s,
played a decisive role in the shooting of the
Polish prisoners of war at Katyn in 1940. General of the Army Chernyakhovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd
White Russian Front, was responsible for atrocities
against the civilian population and against prisoners of war in East Prussia.
The list could be extended indefinitely.
Even if, in Margolina's
opinion, the active cooperation of many Jews in the Soviet terror organizations
truly requires a chapter of its own, responsibility for crimes committed by the
Bolsheviks can never be attributed to the Jewish people as a whole. It was not
peoples as a whole—Germans, Russians, Georgians, Latvians, or even Jews and others—who
were responsible for the atrocities, but rather, individual persons in all
cases. As for Germans in particular, no one can say that the persecution and
murder of peaceful populations form any part of the traditions of the German
people.
205--In execution of an
Order of Stalin to prevent the capture of Soviet political prisoners by the
Germans, approximately 4,000 Ukrainian and Polish political prisoners and other
civilians of all ages and both sexes, as well as a number of German prisoners
of war, were systematically shot by the NKVD in the prisons of Lemberg, such as
Brigidki Prison, Zamarstynow Prison, and the NKVD prison in the days preceding
June 30, 1941. In some cases, the prisoners were horribly mutilated and showed
signs of severe torture. This atrocity was exploited by Einsatzgruppe C of the
Security Police and SD as providing a suitable opportunity for the shooting of
up to 7,000 residents of Jewish origin, who had taken no part in the crimes at
Lemberg or the surrounding regions, in a so-called "reprisal for the
inhumane atrocities" before July 17. The fact, nevertheless, remains that
it was the Soviets who left behind the 4,000 corpses of murdered civilians,
some of them mutilated, a fact immediately seized upon by the Germans.
German press reports on
Soviet atrocities in Lemberg were confirmed by Polish reports reaching Great
Britain through unofficial pathways and not doubted by official circles in
London. The British Foreign Office, immediately convinced of Soviet guilt as in
the later Katyn case, sent the Moscow Foreign Commissariat a note requesting
clarification, to which Molotov hastily issued a categorical Soviet official
denial on July 12, 1941. Soviet propaganda immediately busied itself with
concealing the Soviet crimes at Lemberg by blaming the prison massacres on the
Germans. Lemberg thus set the precedent for the Soviet propaganda tactic of
covering up Soviet crimes by attributing them to the Germans.
218--The monument was
erected on NKVD terrain at Bykovnia (KOU NKVD), which is also in the vicinity
of other extensive mass graves from the Stalin era—such as the mass graves at
Darnica and Bielhorodka, in the region of Kiev. The deceptive inscription was,
nevertheless, removed under the mounting pressure of publicity in March 1989.
On March 17, 1989, the Soviet news agency TASS reported that, according to the
findings of a "State Commission"—the fourth of its kind—mass graves
containing the remains of 200,000-300,000 so-called "enemies of the
people" murdered during the Stalin era had been discovered at Bykovnia, as
well as in the Darnica Forest. At the same time, the journal of the Soviet
Writer's Association, Literaturnaja Gazeta, in April 1989, considered it proper to stress that
the massacres had been committed, not by "the Germans," but the
Stalinists—"our own people." Frightful details of these mass murders
committed by the NKVD, which began in 1937 and continued until immediately
prior to the occupation of the city by German troops in September 1941, were
provided by Carynnyk in an article entitled "The Killing Fields of
Kiev," in the October 1990 edition of the magazine Commentary,
published in New York by the
American Jewish Committee.
In Germany, of course,
such findings were only grudgingly acknowledged, if at all. In Germany, the
Soviet propaganda figure of 100,000 victims in the Ravine of Babi Yar, which
was not even accepted at Nuremberg, has penetrated deeply into the public mind,
as was proven by related newspaper articles from the commemorative year, 1991.
On September 14, 1991, a certain Wolfram Vogel, in a memorial article published
the regional newspaper Sudkurier, succeeded in outdoing the claims of Stalinist war propaganda by alleging
that "the mass grave of Babi Yar on the edge of Kiev" must have been
capable of "concealing the bodies of 200,000 people murdered during the
occupation. The female President of the German Bundestag,
Submuth, turned a memorial speech on the Ravine of the Old Woman on October 5,
1991, into an occasion for an unjustified attack upon the entire German people,
which had nothing to do with the executions of 33,771 Jews, or perhaps only
half that number—which would have been bad enough—by Special Action Squad 4a of
the Security Police and the SD. Executions that were committed without the knowledge
or approval of the German people, and for which the German people cannot
therefore be held responsible.
222--From the very
outbreak of the conflict, neither Hitler nor Stalin considered the
German-Soviet conflict an "ordinary European war" waged between two
armies in the ordinary way, but rather, as a war of annihilation between two
totalitarian systems that could only end with the destruction of one or the
other. Although Stalin's radio speech of July 3, 1941, depicted the war as the
Soviet Union's struggle, in alliance with the German people, to defeat
"fascism," Soviet propagandists lost no time in raising the specter
of a distinctly new and mortal enemy: not merely "fascism"—National
Socialism—but the German nation as such. The German nation was in effect
described as criminal almost from the first day of the war, along with the
German Wehrmacht, all German military personnel, and, ultimately, the entire
German people. Ehrenburg, in particular, was responsible for whipping up Soviet
soldiers and workers to blind, raging fanaticism against everything German,
through constant incitement to anti-German racial and national hatred.
An exact examination must
now be made of the image of the German nation and people, as depicted by Soviet
propagandists like Ehrenburg, Tolstoy, Simonov, and Zaslavsky, to mention only
a few, as well as by historians and military men like Tarle, Bruevich,
Velichka, and countless others. Ehrenburg, the principal spokesman for Soviet
propaganda, never described the Germans as having advanced beyond
"barbarism." "They clothe themselves in the skins of wild beasts
and offer bloody sacrifices to their god Wotan." Even during the
brilliance of the early Middle Ages, when the German Realm was governed by the
Ottonian and Hohenstaufen Emperors, the Germans—according to Ehrenburg—still
"roamed the forests, covered in the skins of wild beasts." Apart from
the well-known historical fact that Russia and Poland derived enormous benefits
from the heritage of their powerful expansions to the East, it was precisely
the German colonization of the East during the Middle Ages—the "glorious
traditions of the Teutonic Knights" as even Ehrenburg admitted—which was
now vilified by Soviet propagandists in the context of the German-Soviet war
through a series of misconceptions. "We are familiar with these
traditions," wrote Ehrenburg on February 20, 1942: "The Germans were
robbers, and robbers they have remained. They used to be bandits with spears
and swords. Now they are bandits with machine pistols." Ehrenburg saw no
difference between the various German tribes, past and present. To him, the
Germans were always the "same." "There is something frightful
about the Germans themselves," he wrote on January 14, 1942. "The
Teutonic hordes plundered Rome," and in the ancient Hanseatic city of
Novgorod, the German peddlers attempted "to swindle the Russians."
"Cunning and intrigue are the German style"—allegedly a Russian
proverb, according to Ehrenburg.
Ehrenburg's particular
hatred was directed at the historical development of Brandenburg-Prussia,
regardless of Prussia's ancient, and very close, dynastic and political links
with Czarist Russia, to which Soviet propagandists drew all too frequent
attention when it suited their purposes. In this distorted view, Brandenburg
was a "cancerous growth," a "robbers' cave," from which the
bandits sallied forth to terrorize "the Slavic and Lithuanian tribes in
Pomerania and Prussia," whose lord and protector, in 1945, was now the
Soviet Union headed by Stalin—in truth, of course, the largest slave state in
the history of the world. In Ehrenburg's view, the sole purpose of the royal
city of residence, Berlin, consisted of "the slaughter of human
beings." Berlin, this "evil growth," had become "a deadly
danger" "to all of Europe, and all civilized humanity"
(naturally including the Soviet Union). "It is lucky for the world,"
Ehrenburg added that "Stalin is cauterizing this growth with fire and
sword." "Stalin is saving the world by trampling to pieces the cradle
in which the cruel Prussian monster was born 250 years ago." Proof of
Prussia's alleged monstrousness included its "piratical attacks" upon
Denmark in 1864, the Prussian-Austrian federal execution in the matter of
Schleswig-Holstein, Austria in 1866, i.e., the Prussian-Austrian battle for the
dominant position in Germany, and France in 1870-1871, although Prussia-Germany
was, at that time, well assured of Russian benevolent neutrality, and despite
the fact that both Marx and Engels referred to the Franco-Prussian war as a
justifiable war of Prussian-German national defense against the imperialistic
ambitions of Napoleon III's France.
225--Alluding to Soviet
atrocities in the suburb of Metgethen, as described below, he added menacingly:
"Konigsberg has looked the Red Army in the face and sees its fate written
in the features of the Red Army... The city is moaning and stumbling
about." Thus were the soldiers of the Red Army prepared for the
forthcoming capture of the city of Konigsberg. The aftermath of the city's capture
was in accordance with the propaganda build-up. Murder, rape, robbery,
persecution, and utter anarchy raged throughout the ruined city. Entire rows of
houses were deliberately burned down, sometimes with the residents still inside
.The Soviet occupation authority, as stated, permitted 90,000 of the surviving
120,000 residents to simply starve to death in the months following the city's
capture.
That the Soviet Union had
very different objectives at this point was revealed by a brief but informative
announcement of June 21, 1945, relating to the appointment of the Soviet
Military Administration in Germany. By Order No. I of that authority, Colonel
General Serov of the NKGB—in Colonel General Professor Volkogonov's opinion,
"one of the wickedest members of Beria's entourage"—was now appointed
Deputy of the General Director of the Soviet Military Administration (SMA)
Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation
Troops in Germany. Serov, was also simultaneously the plenary Deputy of the
NKGB of the USSR within the group of Soviet Occupation Troops in Germany. Serov
had, since the outbreak of the war, acted as Stalin's chief tool in the
practical implementation of mass deportations and other acts of violence, all
falling under the legal definition of genocide and crimes against humanity. It
was Serov who deported 1-2 million Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Jews
from the annexed Polish territory in 1939-1940 to the barren regions of the
Soviet Union, followed by tens of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians from the annexed Baltic republics in 1940-1941. Usually the family
units were torn apart, and the head of the family was often liquidated, as in the case of the Baltic
States. Tens of thousands of residents of the annexed Romanian national
territories of Bucovina and Bessarabia suffered the same fate. Serov then
implemented the deportation of 1,209,400 Russian ethnic Germans under inhumane
conditions to Central Asia and Siberia, as ordered by decree of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet on August 28, 1940. In 1943-1944, it was again Colonel
General Serov of the NKGB who carried out the mass deportation and destruction
of the Kalmuck, Chechen, Ingush, Kabardinian, and Karachay peoples, and,
finally, the Crimean Tatars, upon the decision and order of Stalin, the
Politburo of the Central Committee, and the State Defense Committee. Based on
Order No. 00315 of People's Commissar Beria of April 18, 1945, Serov now made
immediate mass arrests among the civilian population in the occupied parts of
Germany, through the operational group of the NKVD/ NKGB, which he commanded.
The arrested persons, including women and young people (according to recent
Russian data, a maximum of 260,000 people), were transferred to ten captured or
newly built concentration camps, where tens of thousands of them perished from
inhumane living conditions. Serov's appointment to the politically decisive
position of head of the Soviet occupation zone and the immediately implemented,
brutal elimination of all persons in any way considered hostile, in any event
left no doubt as to the type of future policy the Soviet Union intended to
apply in Germany.
If the German-Soviet
conflict, as a collision between two opposing socialist systems, could end only
with the complete annihilation of one of the two systems, then the methods of
waging war employed were entirely in accordance, in their pitilessness, with
the totalitarian nature of both ideologies. "The Soviet-German war was an
exceptionally cruel war on both sides," Yakushevsky remarked in the
periodical Novoe Vremja in 1993:
"Both totalitarian systems waged war using similar methods."
Interpretations of history intended to give the
impression in Germany that the German-Soviet conflict could have been conducted
in a more humane manner had Hitler and the leadership of the Wehrmacht not
unscrupulously abrogated the usual rules and customs of war, even in the
planning of "Operation Barbarossa," ignore the central reality of the
situation, since these interpreters fail to consider corresponding realities on
the Soviet side. This does not, of course, imply that unnecessary German
severity could not have been avoided. Hitler's cardinal error was certainly his
failure to respect Russian honor and patriotism, as well as Russian bravery,
thus squandering a unique opportunity to gain the sympathy of the Russian
people—an act of blindness that made loss of the war inevitable.
The principle established
by Hitler in his address to the military leaders on March 30, 1941, passed on
by the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, General Halder, and
repeated by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal
Keitel, in his letter to Admiral Canaris of September 15, 1941, was: "We
must deviate from the principle of soldierly comradeship. A Communist is no
comrade to start with, and no comrade later on. This is a war of
annihilation." This was an exact mirror image of Stalin's views from the
very outset. To quote Stalin's key radio speech of July 3, 1941, yet again,
Stalin made it immediately clear that "the war against fascist Germany...
must not be viewed as an ordinary war"; "it is not a war between two
armies." "This is no ordinary war," Ehrenburg, his interpreter,
immediately echoed, "and it is no ordinary army that is fighting against
us"—a statement that was, of course, just as true of the Red Army itself.
250--The horrible details
of the massacre of over 4,000 Ukrainian and Polish prisoners in the city of
Lemberg (such as Brigidki Prison, Zamarstynow Prison, and the NKVD prison) have
already been the object of detailed military court and forensic medical studies
and post-war international investigations and require no further comment here.
The forensic medical officer, Medical Captain
Dr. Schneider, a professor of medicine, stated in an official letter to Medical
Major General Dr. Zimmer on July 21, 1941: "It has become clear to me that
the atrocities against Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and, unfortunately,
against captured members of the Wehrmacht as well, committed by the GPU in
Russia shortly before the evacuation of the cities, far exceeds everything
previously... known in terms of atrociousness and cruelty... My assistant, who
spent two days in Lemberg, told me that these events could neither be described
nor even intimated. The murder victims were without any doubt sadistically
tortured before death, in torture chambers installed for the purpose."
276--The reaction of the
German Wehrmacht to the uninterrupted series of murders of German soldiers must
now be examined. It has already been mentioned that the High Command of the
Wehrmacht prohibited all reprisals as early as July 1941 on the grounds that
"reprisals would fail because of the mentality of the Russians, thus
unnecessarily contributing to the bitterness of the war." The
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, was also of the
opinion that reprisals would be ineffective in regard to the Soviet Union in
contrast to the Western powers, and would, furthermore, have a negative
influence upon the abstractly favorable prospects for German front-line
propaganda where the Red Army was concerned. An order to this effect was issued
to all divisions of the German Army of the East, without regard to
"serious violations of international law by the Russians." At the
same time, on July l, 1941, a decision of the "Fuhrer and Supreme
Commander" was issued to treat the wives of all "officers and
commissars," and all Soviet women, "carrying weapons in accordance
with orders as prisoners of war when found in uniform." Whereas, if
captured in civilian clothing, they were to lose all protection under
international law and be treated as partisans.
On July 5, 1941, the
Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, Field Marshal von Reichenau, ordered Red
Army Major Turta of the 781S Infantry Regiment of the 124 Infantry Division
summarily shot because, as stated in the execution order, the division had
since June 22, 1941, "deliberately mistreated, tortured, mutilated, and
murdered German soldiers of all ranks following capture, whether wounded or
not, in a manner so cruel and bestial as to be hitherto inconceivable."
These bestialities were done "under the very eyes of, and with the
toleration of, officers fully and entirely responsible for the crimes of their
subordinates. Although von Reichenau continued to grant Soviet soldiers
ordinary treatment according to the customs relating to the treatment of
prisoners of war, he believed himself obligated to administer a "hard and
justified atonement" to the officers of the Red Army's 124 Infantry
Division on behalf of his "murdered comrades."
This was, after all,
simply an isolated case of reprisal, the victim of which may perhaps have been
the person responsible.
Generally, the German
command authorities do not appear to have deviated from the provisions of
international law in regard to prisoners, even on the eastern front. For
example, on July 10, 1941, the battalion doctor of the II Battalion of the 53rd
(Motorized) Infantry Regiment reported to the divisional doctor of the 14th
Motorized Infantry Division that one officer, eight non-commissioned officers,
and sixty-five soldiers of his regiment, some of them wounded, had been
captured by the Soviets, and that, as proven by an investigation, all had been
murdered "deliberately and according to order" by shooting them in
the back of the neck, stabbing them with bayonets, or beating them with rifle
butts, at the bridgehead at Dzisna on July 8, 1941. A number of the wounded men
showed signs of the "cruelest forms of mutilations." When the shocked
head physician asked his professional superiors for instructions on the proper
future treatment of wounded Russians, on the grounds, as he wrote, that
"it was difficult for me to continue to act as I would have previously
considered it my duty to do, after learning of this criminal attitude on the
part of the enemy in relation to our wounded," he received an order that
was characteristic. The Chief of the General Staff of the 3rd Panzer Group,
Major General von Hunersdorff, reported, through the battalion doctor on July
13, 1941, that "on the grounds of fundamental considerations, there could
be no question of a change in attitude on the part of German soldiers toward
enemy wounded."
He simply ordered
that there should be no reduction in the quality of care for the fellow German
wounded as a result.
When it was proposed to
the High Command of the 17 Army that high-ranking officers of the Soviet 6th
and 12th Army be shot in reprisal for the murder and mutilation of nineteen
German wounded soldiers and two medics in a Red Cross vehicle in August 1941,
the army commander, Lieutenant General von Stulpnagel, rejected this idea as
well, with quite analogous justification. When German soldiers became
enormously embittered after the massacre of Grishino-Krasnoarmejskoe, the
Commanding General of the XXXX German Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Henrici,
issued an order of the day on his own initiative on March 3, 1943, warning the
troops against permitting themselves to become carried away to the point of
engaging in acts of revenge as a result of these occurrences. The order read in
part: "We, nevertheless, wish to
adhere closely to the soldierly principle that an enemy who has been captured
in uniform, who is no longer capable of fighting and is unarmed, belongs in a
prisoner of war camp."
At Nuremberg on March 22,
1946, the President of the International Military Tribunal, Judge Lawrence,
rejected an application by defense lawyer Dr. Stahmer for admission into
evidence of the White Book of the German Reich Government on "Bolshevik
Crimes against the Laws of Humanity and the Laws and Customs of War,"
first series, 1941, as evidentiary material for the defense. Lawrence concurred
with the application of Soviet Chief Prosecutor General Rudenko, who permitted
himself to portray the legal investigation documents collated in the White Book
as "inventions" and "forged documents" characteristic of
"fascist propaganda," purely and simply intended to "hide the
crimes which were perpetrated by the fascists." Since the victims of the
crimes investigated and analyzed in the White Book consisted solely of German
and German-allied soldiers, the International Military Tribunal considered such
material "irrelevant" in full accordance with the London Agreement.
It is precisely this fact that justifies the presentation of a few of the
innumerable documented cases of mistreatment of German prisoners of war who are
otherwise consciously and methodically relegated to forgetfulness by the
journalistic profession in relation to the German-Soviet war.
282--The number of
prisoners of war murdered in the German eastern provinces alone will never be
known. Concerning the number of civilian victims, the investigations of the
German Federal Ministry for Victims of Expulsion and the German Federal
Archives, based on resident population statistics, provide at least an
approximate idea, although their estimates are very conservative and only
include the victims of immediate acts of violence. According to these estimates,
120,000 men, women and children were murdered, most of them by Soviet soldiers,
while 100,000-200,000 more perished in various prisons and camps. More than
250,000 others died during the deportations—which began on February 3, 1945—and
in Soviet work camps as "reparations deportees." Many more died from
the inhumane living conditions under the Soviet military administration of the
following occupation period—90,000 in Konigsberg alone. There was also an
extremely high proportion of persons who put an end to their own lives out of
desperation. This does not include the tremendous losses in human life caused
by immediate acts of violence in the prisons, concentration camps, and
extermination camps of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, such as the
43,000 civilians—at a minimum—who died of hunger or epidemics in the
concentration camps of the Soviet occupation troops.
As for conditions in
Bohemia and Moravia in particular, one need only quote the proclamation
broadcast over British radio on November 3, 1944, by the commander of the Czech
armed forces in exile, General Ingr: "When our day comes, the entire
nation will follow the old war cry of the Hussites: Strike them, kill them,
leave no one alive! Everyone should start looking for the best possible weapon
with which to hit the Germans as hard as possible, right now. If there are no
firearms available, some other weapon should be prepared and hidden—one that
cuts, stabs, or hits."
In the spirit of this and
other, similar proclamations, to cite just one example, the Commander of the
3rd Infantry Brigade of the lst Czechoslovakian
Army Corps in the Soviet Union, General Klapalek, who left London to join with
the Soviets, was jointly responsible for the mass murder of 763 German
civilians at Postelberg (Postoloprty) in June 1945. Czech military personnel
were also involved in the massacre at Aussig (Usti nad Labem) on July 31, 1945,
where up to 2,000 German civilians were murdered following a provocative explosion incited by the
Benesh government, under circumstances of horror that exceed the normal powers
of imagination. A total of up to
270,000 defenseless Germans were murdered in Czechoslovakia (CSR) beginning in
May 1945, some in an animalistic manner. In general, an estimated total number
of 2.2 million "unsolved cases" were reported in the so-called
"Expulsion areas," most of which, upon broader interpretation of the
term, must be viewed as "crime victims," i.e., the victims of
anti-German genocide.
The present exposition is
primarily concerned with the zone of responsibility of the Red Army, which had
already committed serious crimes against the civilian population in Yugoslavia
in 1944. It will be seen that Stalin, the Politburo, the Members of the State
Defense Committee, the political and military leadership of the Red Army, the
subordinate army and unit leaders, and their subordinate officers of all ranks,
bear immediate responsibility for everything that occurred. The commanders and
other officers are especially responsible, since they not only failed to
restrain their troops from committing acts that were criminal under
international law, but, on the contrary, incited them to commit such crimes,
tolerated and encouraged such acts of violence, and, to a great extent, even
participating in them. Particular responsibility falls upon the
Commander-in-Chief of the Y White Russian Front, General of the Army
Chernyakhovsky, and of the 1st White Russian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Zhukov, and their Military Councils, the full texts or extracts of whose
criminal orders have been found. Similar orders issued by the
Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd White Russian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Rokossovsky, and the Commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of
the Soviet Union Konev, have apparently not been found, but the conditions in
their zones of responsibility were in no way different.
Fundamentally, the above
mentioned men were, like Chernyakhovsky and Zhukov, as well as the
Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union
Malinovsky, responsible in each case for the deportation of peaceful residents
for slave labor in the Soviet Union, a crime under international law similar to
that for which Alfred Rosenberg and Fritz Sauckel were sentenced to death, and
Albert Speer to twenty years imprisonment, by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg. The deportation of all able-bodied ethnic Germans in
Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia to compulsory labor
in the Soviet Union had been ordered by Directive No. 7161 of the State Defense
Committee (Goko), signed by Stalin as early as December 16, 1944. According to
the implementation order issued (on the basis of the above directive) by
Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky, all able-bodied ethnic German men aged
17-45, and all able-bodied ethnic German women aged 18-30, on the territory of
Hungary and Romania (Transsylvania), were ordered arrested for this sole
purpose. On February 3, 1945, the State Defense Committee, by Directive No.
7467, also ordered the mass deportation of German men and women from the
territory of the Reich itself. In addition, all able-bodied Reich Germans aged
17-50 were now to be arrested, organized in labor battalions, and deported to
the Soviet Union for slave labor. The document, signed by Stalin in
collaboration with Colonel General of the NKVD Serov and the Deputy of the
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Beria, instructed the
Commander-in-Chief of the 1st
White
Russian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, and his Military Council,
"to take consistent measures" in this regard.
Professor Semiryaga who
held a position of responsibility in the Soviet Military Administration in
Germany (SMAD) for five years, wrote: "For two and a half months,
transport trains traveled eastward, loaded with tens of thousands of German
women and old people (since the entire population of young males was at the
front)."
In reality, minors, and
even children aged 12-13, were also deported under terrible conditions
resulting in innumerable fatalities, often during transport. Professor
Semiryaga does not conceal his awareness of the fact that "Soviet military
authorities in all the countries liberated by the Russian Army" had
undertaken the "illegal deportation" of peaceful German civilians.
Through their collaboration with Stalin's order, which was "in fact,
criminal," the leadership of the Red Army had become guilty of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, including those in the sense of the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
As far as military discipline was concerned, the Red Army was in fact
experiencing an increasingly rapid degeneration into savagery even in 1944.
During the reincorporation of former Soviet territories, such as the Ukraine,
but also in Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and
Yugoslavia, excesses and acts of violence against the local population reached
such proportions that the Soviet Command authorities were compelled to take
severe measures. Colonel General Petrov, Army Commander of the 4th Ukrainian
Front, in Order No. 074 of June 8, 1944, denounced the "disgraceful
excesses" by members of the Army of his Front in the Soviet Territory of
the Crimea, excesses "that even included the armed robbery and murder of local
residents."' He referred to the guilty soldiers, including high-ranking
officers, as "bandits," "rogues," and "armed
criminals" who, exploiting "the helplessness of the population,"
had tarnished the honor of the Red Army. Directive No. 0017 from the Chief of
the Political Administration of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Shatilov, of April 6,
1944, which is quite similar, mentions "plundering,"
"murders," "terrorist attacks," "marauders having
grown bold," and "criminals" from "many units and
agencies," and other crimes committed against the populations of the
western regions of the Ukraine, i.e., eastern Poland, very often with the
tolerance of political officials .The tenseness of the situation in Poland is
revealed by the diary of an officer in the 2nd Guards Artillery Division of the
5th Artillery Corps of the 1st Baltic Front, Yuri
Uspensky, who was later killed. "Amongst ourselves, we speak of the Poles
with great hostility," this highly meditative officer writes in regard to
the conditions in Vilna: "The soldiers even say that the Poles must all be
hanged, adding the following cultural platitude: "The Polish people,
historically, are totally unfit to live."
Of course, a single
occurrence, such as the "Violation of International Law" reported on
November 1, 1944, by the Chief of Staff of the German 16 Army, cannot be
generalized in regard to the non-German region; but it, nevertheless,
illustrates the crimes of which some Soviet soldiers had already become quite
capable. On September 20, 1944, behind the Soviet lines, in a small forest
belonging to the farm-hand Araji in the municipality of Grfnhof, not far from
Mitau (Latvia), at about 10 o'clock in the morning, three Latvian soldiers in
the German army became aware of "inhuman screaming, moaning, and
death-rattles." They observed the following from a hiding place: "The
screams came from a woman, apparently twenty to thirty years old, completely
naked, fastened to a wooden support, apparently in a kind of crucifixion, her
back upward, her face turned downward toward the undersupport, which was
leaning up against a tree at an angle of 45 degrees. The body of the woman was inclined diagonally to the
right, on top of this wooden support, the arms stretched outward sideways and
apparently fastened, the palms of the hands turned upward, the legs together,
reaching to the ground. I consider it possible that the body was held in place
by the nails driven through the plank-like under-support, and may perhaps even
have been held up by them. Two to four Soviet soldiers, recognizable from a
distance only as uniformed soldiers of unknown rank, went walking around from
time to time, without stopping, but, nevertheless, apparently gloating at the
woman's suffering, the real cause of which could not be discerned. They walked
around mostly in groups of two, at a distance of 20 meters from the woman,
walking around her, as far as I could tell, but otherwise making no other
movement, which led me to assume that tortures of this kind are not at all
unusual amongst them. We all three heard the cries for about two hours. The
cries continued for the most part without interruption and grew mute toward the
end of this time, apparently due to exhaustion on the part of the woman. The
cries were so inhuman, that one of us, whose family had been unable to flee
from the Soviets, lost control over his nerves for a while, although we were
all three old veterans of the former Latvian army. We conclude that the woman's
sufferings must have been quite inhuman."
It proved impossible to provide any assistance. In the non-German countries, the Soviet command authorities, though often in vain, continued to intervene occasionally against excesses and plundering by members of the Red Army. Upon entering the territory of the German Reich, however, all inhibition was lost. Thus the Corps Commander of the 43 Infantry Corps, Major General Andreev, threatened his soldiers in Poland with court martial in January of 1945 in the event of excesses, then simultaneously continued: "But as soon as we get to Germany, I will not waste one word over such things." The basic attitude of the Red Army soldiers after crossing the Reich border was characterized by the hate propaganda of I. Ehrenburg, A.N. Tolstoy, E.V Tarle, M.A. Sholokhov, K.M. Simonov, A.A. Fadeev and many others who deserve to be mentioned here. On August 24, 1944, Ehrenburg, who was the spokesman for the inciters, wrote: "On the German borders let us once again repeat the holy oath to forget nothing ... we say this with the calm of a long ripening and invincible hatred, we say this at the border of the enemy: 'Woe to thee, Germany!'"
[For Genocides]
306--The political
administrations and command agencies of the Red Army appealed to the hate
feelings and thirst for revenge of Soviet soldiers in order to achieve the
highest degree of combat readiness and performance. This procedure, as
discreditable as it was risky, was resorted to for the purpose of generating
heroism; yet the inevitable results of unleashing base human instincts soon
made themselves apparent. An "unrestrained instinctual behavior, unworthy
of human beings," set in among Soviet soldiers with the rapidity of the
wind, leading to a degree of demoralization and descent into savagery of such
proportions that "control over the troops was lost in many units and formations."
Order no. 006 of the Council of War of the 2nd White Russian Front, issued on
22 January 1945, discussed in more detail below, lamented that the discovery of
large quantities of alcohol had led to "excessive indulgence" among Soviet
troops, in addition to "robbery, plundering, arson"—the murders were
hushed up—and "mass booze-ups" in all sections of the front, even
with the participation "of the officers," to the chagrin of the
superior command authorities. The case of the 290 Infantry Division, assigned
to the front line, in which the soldiers and officers drank so much that
"they no longer even looked like warriors of the Red Army," was cited
as one example. It was stated that wine barrels had been placed upon the
chassis of tanks of the 5th Tank Army and that munitions vehicles had been so
heavily laden with "all possible kinds of household goods, looted food and
civilian clothing, etc." that "they became a burden to the
troops," "reducing troop mobility" to the detriment of "the
breakthrough capacity of the tank units."
Individual examples in
Soviet orders must be immediately generalized, here as everywhere else. Soviet
soldiers began to wear "civilian hats instead of the regulation
headgear," or, as noted by Yuri Uspensky in his diary, to wear
"Napoleon caps" and to carry "walking sticks, umbrellas, rubber
raincoats," immediately acquiring the outward appearance of robbers and
marauders. Failure to obey orders also became quite prevalent. As observed by
the Council of War of the 2nd White Russian Front, "these failings on the
part of the rear units show no signs of abating; on the contrary, they are even
increasing." The needless destruction of "the dwellings required to
quarter troops and staff, and to store military materiel"—i.e., the
burning of existing German buildings—was very detrimental and referred to as a
"shameful phenomenon" against which Soviet commanding officers not
only failed to intervene, but, quite the contrary, even encouraged through
their refusal to act. In this connection, the only mention made was of
shortcomings having a detrimental effect upon the combat readiness of the Red
Army. There was no mention of excesses and crimes committed against the German
population, offences which, in comparison, were far more serious. Nevertheless,
the need to restore some kind of military discipline, in addition, last but not
least, to a concern on the part of Soviet leadership for the possible negative
propaganda effect upon their Western Allies of the actions of Soviet
troops—skillfully exploited by the Germans while Soviet troops continued their
rapid advance into Central Europe—caused the leadership of the Red Army to take
severe measures after only ten days.
The Commander-in-Chief of
the 2nd White Russian Front, Marshall of the Soviet Union Rokossovsky, was the
first to intervene. Order no. 006, issued as early as 22 January 1945, signed
by Rokossovsky himself as well as by Member of the Council of War, General
Subbotin, and the Chief of Staff, General Bogomolov, and referred to above,
was, remarkably enough, to be made known to all ranks, even down to platoon
leaders. In the severest language, Marshall Rokossovsky ordered the
Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, all corps and divisional commanders, and all
commanders of all independent units of his front, "to extirpate these
occurrences, which bring shame upon the Red Army," "with red-hot
steel," in all units, squads, and divisions; to bring those responsible
for plundering and drunkenness to account; and to "punish such behavior
with the severest penalties, including shooting." The political
administration of the Front, the military state prosecutor's office, military
tribunals, and SMERSH—an NKVD organization—were assigned to take all necessary
measures to implement this order.
Marshall Rokossovsky now
demanded that the entire officer staff establish "exemplary order and iron
discipline" in all units. The widespread reality of the murders of
prisoners of war received further confirmation in this regard as well, though
only peripherally: Rokossovsky saw fit to remind his officers and soldiers that
enemy soldiers were to be killed in combat, but taken prisoner when they
surrendered. There was particular
concern for the situation in the rear zones. The Chief of the Political
Administration of the Rear Front Zone was called upon to establish the
immediate order necessary in the units of his zone as well. But the principal
matter of concern was simply the preservation of material values. The Chief of
the Rear Zone and the Superintendent of the Front received a special order to
"take all measures to ensure the seizure and confiscation of all
loot," and to prohibit "the misappropriation and black-market
sale" of the same. The Commander-in-Chief of the 1st
White
Russian Front, Marshall of the Soviet Union Zhukov—who had incited his troops
to the commission of acts of revenge and "inhuman acts of violence"
in unmistakable language on 12 January 1945—now performed a perfect 180-degree
turn, just as had done once before, in the winter of 1941-42, by suddenly
announcing that his subordinates would be held personally responsible for
"actions in violation of international law."
Contrary to many reports
in the relevant literature, Marshall Rokossovsky, the most nearly moderate
among the four Commanders-in-Chief at the front as far as we know, never wasted
one official word relating to the violations of international law committed by
his troops against the German population, even though such violations were
quite well known to him. The problem was nevertheless openly discussed in at
least a few implementation orders. On 23 January 1945, and with reference to
the demands of the Councils of War of the Front and the 48th Army,
the Military Prosecutor of the same army, Lieutenant Colonel of Justice
Malyarov, issued an order to all military prosecutors of the subordinate units,
such as, for example, those of the 190 Infantry Division (the 0134th, 0135th,
and 0137th). This order was chiefly concerned with the preservation of material
values .The principle that "all
material values in East Prussia, from the moment upon which they come into the
possession of the troops of the Red Army, are to be transferred to the
ownership of the Soviet Union, subject to seizure and transport into the
USSR"—a principle in violation of international law—was now bluntly
proclaimed. No distinction was made between private property and public or
governmental German property. If the Soviet military authorities now complained
of the "enormous material damage" caused "by wantonness and
hooliganism" in the cities and
villages, this was due solely to a preoccupation with a possible reduction in
the harvest of loot which it was hoped could be collected from the Germans.
Simultaneously, however,
the order of the military prosecutor of the 48th Army denounced the crimes
against the civilian population and prisoners of war for the first time.
Malyarov pointed out that there had indeed been "cases" of the use of
firearms by military persons "against the German population, particularly,
against women and old women." It was also stated that "numerous cases
of shootings of prisoners of war" under unjustifiable circumstances of
pure "maliciousness" had been established. The military prosecutors
were ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Malyarov to inform the members of the army,
in cooperation with the political apparatus, that the destruction of captured
property and the "burning of buildings and entire villages"
constituted subversive action. Additionally, it was stated that "reprisals
against the population are not customary in the Red Army, the use of weapons
against women and old people is contrary to law, and those guilty of such
actions will be severely punished." It was furthermore added that it was
in the interests of the Soviets to take German prisoners. The military
prosecutors' offices were ordered to organize an immediate "show
trial" against "arsonists
and other louts," to notify the troops of the sentences imposed, to
exercise strict control and, furthermore, in any case, to arrest the culprits
immediately.
The fact—unequivocally
admitted in the order of the military state prosecutor of the
48th Army,
as well as in the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd White
Russian Front—that an increasing demoralization and descent into savagery was
now prevalent among the ranks of the Red Army, was, however, immediately hushed
up by the subordinate troop leadership and political apparatus. This fact is
illustrated by the manner in which shameful incidents of wanton destruction and
drunkenness were interpreted for the benefit of subordinates. One example is
order no. 026, issued on 25
January 1945 by the Chief of Staff of
the 174 Infantry Division, Colonel Romanenko, to the troop commanders, in this
case, the 508 Infantry Regiment. In this order, the arsonists are
no longer described as marauding Soviet soldiers, but rather, as enemy agents
and provocateurs—i.e., Germans, who, "dressed in the uniforms of
the Red Army," were alleged to be seeking to prevent the advance of Soviet
troops by "burning settlements and individual buildings."
The official explanation
for the widespread alcoholism among the members of the Red Army, accompanied by
"mass booze-ups"—as Rokossovsky called them—with the participation of
Soviet officers and with devastating consequences, was very similar. The
Political Administration, which was
best acquainted with the attitude of the Council of War of the 3rd White
Russian Front, in an instruction leaflet addressed to the "Comrade
combatants, sergeants and officers" even attempted to place responsibility
for unrestrained Soviet drunkenness upon the Germans—the "reprehensible,
treacherous enemy"—who was said to be deliberately poisoning the supplies
of alcohol and food "in an attempt to cause casualties among our soldiers
and officers and to harm the Red Army. For
example, if members of a Red Army unit commanded by First Lieutenant Klimets,
or some other Soviet commander, drank huge quantities of methyl alcohol, or if
a group of Soviet soldiers under the command of the officer Nikiforov quaffed
"a barrel containing a fluid which smelled like alcohol," and died
horribly, the deceased were, of course, simply the victims of the
"treacherous enemy": an enemy which, in his efforts to harm the
Soviet Army, never shrank from the "basest, most reprehensible, and
horrible means of fighting." The question now arises: how were excesses
against the civilian population to be prevented if the impulsive lack of
restraint of the Red Army soldiers was mendaciously attributed, as described
above, to German treachery, countered with the mere proclamation that the
"fascist beasts" and "German monsters",
were to be punished for these "treacherous
methods" with "renewed, devastating blows"?
The orders issued by the
Soviet command authorities, were, therefore, far from unanimous. Many prisoners
of war informed the Germans that they had received knowledge of the new rules
of conduct in February 1945. For example, Major of the Guards of the
Superintendent Service Kostikov of the 277 Guards Infantry Regiment of the 91st
Guards Infantry Division (39th Army, 3rd White Russian Front), on 17 February
1945, reported that "strict orders have been issued that the German
civilian population is to be left alone, nothing is to be stolen, and German
women are not to be molested." According to the testimony of one Red Army
soldier, Shevchuk, the "shooting of civilians and German prisoners of
war," which had been customary in the Red Army until that time, was now
"strictly prohibited" in the 44th Motorized Infantry Brigade as of
6-7 February 1945. Similar, quite comparable, prohibitions were also issued
with regards to other units. When Soviet soldiers wantonly set fire to the city
of Gleiwitz, the burning of localities was "strictly forbidden" in
that section of the front
as well. The
commander of the 1042nd Infantry Regiment of the 295th Infantry Division,
Lieutenant Colonel Chaiko, informed his units that violations of the existing
prohibition against plundering would be "severely punished."
Generally, the Soviet command authorities were not stingy about threats of
punishment; the military tribunals appear to have intervened occasionally. But
these were exceptions. Members of the Red Army unanimously maintained that the
authorities only intervened in rare cases; in practice, everything continued as
before.
German civilians and
prisoners of war continued to be murdered as before, often upon the inducement
of superior officers, usually the "battalion and regimental commanders
involved," although a few prisoners of war testified that there were units
in "which such crimes were not tolerated." German women and girls
continued to be raped as before by "officers and younger soldiers of the
Red Army," despite of existing prohibitions, and were very often murdered
afterwards. Arson and pillaging with the participation of officers continued
just as before. That the numerous orders to the contrary remained a dead letter
is illustrated by the fact that anti-German hate propaganda was not amended or
modified in the slightest respect. A captured second lieutenant from the 266th
Infantry Regiment of the 88th Guards Infantry Division testified that posters
with inflammatory slogans were to be seen on the streets everywhere, even in
February 1945, such as: "Strike the Fascist Beasts Dead! Take Revenge on the
Fascists! Remember the Women and Children Murdered by the Fascists and Take
Revenge for Them!" The watchword of agitation upon the 27th anniversary of
the Red Army on 23 February 1945 was as follows: "Let's wreak vengeance on
the German-fascist monsters for plundering and destroying our cities and
villages, for raping our women and children, for murdering and deporting Soviet
citizens to German slavery! Vengeance and death to the fascist fiends!"
Since the powerful
political apparatus employed an entirely distinct language from the command
authorities of the Red Army, which had only intervened half-heartedly so far,
it is no wonder that violations of international law against German civilians
and prisoners of war continued to be committed on a horrendous scale throughout
February and March 1945.
The manner in which the
orders of the Soviet leadership were put into practice is illustrated by the
multitude of reports received by the Germans on atrocities by Red Army soldiers
against prisoners of war and the civilian population even in February
1945. The
available official material is naturally incomplete; some of it, furthermore,
can only be mentioned briefly here, for purposes of example. Similar reports
continued to be received from all parts of the regions of the provinces of
Silesia, the Brandenburg district, Pomerania, and East Prussia, all of which
were only partially occupied by the enemy. These reports unanimously described
the same criminal acts, murder, rape, robbery, plundering, and arson, and provide,
on the whole, a truthful picture of these frightful events. The selected cases
are typical of innumerable similar atrocities committed in all parts of the
four eastern provinces even in February 1945.
Silesia
Near the borders of the
Reich, west of Welun, Soviet soldiers from the 1st Ukrainian Front doused the wagons in a fleeing line
of refugees with gasoline and burnt them, together with the passengers.
Innumerable corpses of German men, women, and children, some of them mutilated,
with their throats cut, their tongues cut out, their stomachs slit open,
littered the roads. Also west of Welun, 25 members (Front workers) of
the Organization Todt were shot by tank crews of the 3rd Tank
Army of the Guards. In Heinersdorf, as well, the men were all shot, and the
women raped, by Soviet soldiers. At Kunzendorf, 25-30 members of the Volksturm
were shot in the back of the neck. At Glausche, near Namslau, 18 persons,
"including members of the Volksturm and female nurses" were murdered
by members of the 59th Army. At Beatenhof, near Ohlau, after the recapture
of the village by German troops, all the men were found shot in the back of the
neck, 14 murdered by members of the
Soviet 5th Army of the Guards. In Grunberg, eight families
were murdered by members of the 9th Tank Army of the Guards. The Tannenfeld manor near
Grottkau was the scene of a cruel orgy of crime: Soviet soldiers from the 229th Infantry
Division raped two girls and then murdered them after various acts of
mistreatment. The eyes of one man were gouged out and his tongue cut out. A 43
year-old
Polish woman received the same treatment and was then tortured to death.
At Alt-Grottkau, members
of the same division murdered 14 prisoners of war, cutting off their heads,
gouging out their eyes, and crushing them with tanks. Soviet soldiers from the
same division were responsible for crimes committed in Schwarzengrund, near
Grottkau: they raped the women, including the members of a nunnery, shot the
farmer Kahlert, slit his wife's abdomen open, hacked off her hands, shot the
farmer Christoph and his son, as well as a young girl. On
Eisdorf manor near Marzdorf, Soviet soldiers from the 5th Army
of the Guards gouged out the eyes of an elderly man and woman, apparently a
married couple, and cut off their noses and fingers. Eleven bodies of wounded
members of the Luftwaffe who had been horribly murdered were found in the near
vicinity. Twenty-one prisoners of war murdered by Soviet members of the 4th
Tank Army were also found at Giitersstadt near Glogau. In the village of
Haslicht, near Striegau, all the women were raped by Soviet soldiers from the
9th Mechanized Corps, "each one participating in turn."
Maria
Hainke discovered her husband, showing almost imperceptible signs of life, and
dying in a Soviet guardroom. A medical examination revealed that his eyes had
been put out, his tongue cut out, an arm fractured in several places, and the
top of his skull crushed.
At Ossig, near Streigau,
members of the 7th Tank Guards Corps raped the women, murdered six or seven young
girls, shot 12 farmers, and also committed similar serious crimes at
Hertwisswaldau near Jauer. At Liegnitz, the bodies of numerous civilians shot
by Soviet soldiers of the 6th
Army of the Guards were found. In the small city of
Kostenblut, near Neumarkt, occupied by units of the 7th Tank Guards Corps, all
the women and girls were raped, including an advanced pregnant mother of eight
children. Her brother was shot for attempting to protect her. All foreign
prisoners of war were shot, as well as six men and three women. Nor did the
nurses in a Catholic hospital escape mass rape. At Pilgramsdorf, near Goldberg,
numerous murders, rapes, and cases of arson were committed by members of the
23rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade. At Beralsdorf, a suburb of Lauban, 39 of the
still remaining women were violated "under the cruelest conditions"
by Soviet soldiers of the 7th Tank Guards Corps. During the rapes, one woman
received a gunshot wound to the lower jaw, was locked in a cellar, and, days
later, was "gang raped at gunpoint in the most brutal manner" by
three Soviet soldiers even though she was running a high fever.
Province Mark Brandenburg
(primarily Neumark and the Sternberger region)
A report from the Russian
agents Danilov and Chirshin assigned to the area by the 103rd Front
Reconnaissance Unit between 24 February and 1 March 1945 provides a general
idea of the treatment meted out to the population. According to the report, all
the Germans aged 12 or upwards were ruthlessly put to work building
fortifications, while all members of the population not assigned to such work
were deported to the east; the old were simply left to starve. At Sorau,
Danilov and Chirshin saw "piles of bodies of murdered women and men
(butchered), shot (in the back of the neck or in the heart)..., lying on the
roads, farms, and in the houses." According to the statements of one
Soviet officer, personally shocked at the extent of the terror, "all the
women and girls, regardless of age, were ruthlessly raped." Soviet soldiers
from the 33rd Army also indulged in a "cruel and bloody campaign of
terror" at Skampe near Zullichau. "Strangled bodies of women,
children, and old people" were found in almost all the houses. The bodies
of a man and woman were found a short distance from Skampe, on the road to
Rentschen: the woman's abdomen was slit open, her embryo torn out, and the
aperture in the abdomen stuffed with straw and garbage. Three members of the
Volksturm were found hanged nearby.
At Kay, near Zullichau,
members of the same army murdered wounded members of a transport, including all
the women and children, by shooting them in the back of the neck. The city of
Neu-Bentschen was plundered and wantonly burned by members of the Red Army. On
the Schwiebus-Frankfurt road, Soviet soldiers from the 69th Army shot so many
civilians, including women and children, that the bodies lay "underneath
and on top of each other." At Alt-Drewitz, on the road to Calenzig,
members of the 1st Tank Army of the
Guards shot a medical major, a major and several medics, while simultaneously
opening fire on American prisoners of war being retransferred from Stalag
Alt-Drewitz; 20-30 of the prisoners were wounded and an unknown number
killed. On the road to
GroB-Blumberg/Oder, the bodies of approximately 40 German soldiers were found
in groups of five to ten bodies each, murdered by gunshot wounds to the back of
the head or neck, and then robbed. In Reppen, all the men in a passing line of
refugees were shot by Soviet soldiers from the 19th Army and the women raped. At Gassen, near Sommerfeld,
civilians were indiscriminately shot at by tanks from the 6th Mechanized Guards
Corps. At Massin, near Landsberg, members of the 5th Assault Army shot an
unknown number of residents, raped the women and young girls, and carried away
looted objects. In an unknown location near Landsberg, members of the 331th
Infantry Division shot eight male civilians, after robbing them.
When units of the Soviet
11th Tank Corps or the 4th Infantry Corps unexpectedly invaded the city of
Lebus west of the Oder, they immediately began to rob the residents, shooting a
number of civilians. Soviet soldiers raped the women and girls, two of whom
were beaten to death with rifle butts. The sudden breakthrough of Soviet troops
as far as the Oder and, in some localities, even across the Oder, had fearful
consequences for innumerable residents and German soldiers. At
GroB-Neuendorf/Oder, ten German prisoners of war were locked in a barn and
machine gunned, apparently by Soviet soldiers from the lst Tank Army of the
Guards. In Reitwein and Trettin, all German soldiers, police officials, and
other "fascists," as well as entire families in whose houses members
of the Wehrmacht had found lodgings, were shot by Soviet soldiers, apparently
from the 8th Army of the Guards. In Wiesenau, near Frankfurt, two women aged 65
and 55 were found dying after being raped for several hours. At Zehden, a
uniformed Soviet woman officer, of unknown rank, from the 5th Tank Guards
Corps, shot a sales representative and his wife. At Genschmar, Soviet soldiers
murdered a manor owner, the manor manager, and three workers.
An assault group from the
Vlassov Army under Colonel of the ROA Sakharov retook the villages of New-Lewin
and Kerstenbruch, in the Oderbruch, on 9 February 1945 with German support. The
population in both villages, according to a German report of 15 March 1945, had
been "mistreated in the cruelest manner" and were still suffering
from the "frightful effects of Soviet terror." At Neu-Lewin, the
mayor was found shot, as well as a member of the Wehrmacht on furlough. In a
barn lay the bodies of three women who had been raped and beaten to death, two
of them with their feet tied. A German woman lay shot in front of the door to
her own house. An elderly married couple were strangled to death. The 9th Tank
Guards Corps was found to have been responsible, both here and in the village
of Neu-Barnim, not far away. At Neu-Barnim, 19 residents were found dead. The
body of the inn keeper, a woman, was found mutilated, her feet tied together
with wire. Here, as in the other localities, the women and girls were raped; at
Kerstenbruch, the rape victims included a 71 year-old woman with one leg
amputated. Pillaging and wanton destruction also formed part of the pattern of
violent crime committed by Soviet troops in these villages of the Oderbruch, as
well as everywhere else in the German regions of the East.
Pomerania
Only relatively few
reports are available for Pomerania during the month of February 1945, since
the real breakthrough battles only began towards the end of the month. A report
by the Georgian Lieutenant Berakashvili, who was commandeered from the Georgian
Liaison Staff to the German officer cadet school at Posen, where he
participated in the German defense of the Posen fortress with other officers
from volunteer units and then managed to get through to Stettin, provides a few
impressions relating to the region south east of Stettin. Persons wearing the
uniforms of any German civil service—not only Party members and members of the
Hitler Youth, but also railway employees, etc.—were shot everywhere. Soldiers
and civilians killed by shots to the back of the neck often lined the roads;
the bodies were "always half naked, and in all cases without boots."
At Schwarzenburg, Lieutenant Berakashvili witnessed the brutal rape of a
farmer's wife in the presence of her crying children, and saw signs of
pillaging and destruction everywhere. The city of Bahn was "cruelly
destroyed, and many civilian bodies" lay piled up in the streets, killed
"in reprisal," as Soviet soldiers explained.
The conditions in the
villages around Pyritz completely confirm these observations. At Billerbeck,
the manor owners, as well as the old and sick, were shot. All women and girls,
down to the age of ten, were raped, the dwellings plundered, and all surviving
residents deported. On Brederlow manor, Soviet soldiers raped the women and
girls, one of whom, as well as the wife of a German soldier on furlough who
succeeded in escaping, were then shot. At Koselitz, the principal official, a
farmer, and a lieutenant on furlough were murdered. At Eichelshagen, the Local
Group Leader and a six-member family were murdered. The perpetrators in all
cases were members of the 61st Army. A series of similar events took place in the
villages around Greifenhagen south of Stettin. At Jadersdorf, ten evacuated
women and a 15 year-old boy were shot, the surviving victims killed with
bayonets and pistol shots, and entire families with small children
"slaughtered" by members of the 2nd Guards Tank Army. At Rohrsdorf,
Soviet soldiers shot numerous residents, including a wounded soldier on
furlough. Women and girls were raped and frequently murdered afterwards. At
GroB-Silber, near Kallies, Soviet soldiers from the 7th Cavalry Guards Corps raped
a young woman with a broomstick, cut off her left breast, and crushed her
skull. In PreuBisch Friedland, Soviet soldiers from the 52nd Guards Infantry
Division shot eight men and two women and raped 34 women and girls. A cruel
crime was reported by the Commander of a German tank engineer battalion of the
7th Tank Division.
In late February 1945,
Soviet officers from the 1st or 160th Infantry Division used several
children aged 10 to 12 north of Konitz to clear a minefield. German soldiers
heard the "horrible screaming" of the children, severely injured by
exploding mines, "bleeding to death helplessly after being blown to
bits."
East Prussia
In East Prussia, the scene
of heavy fighting, atrocities in February 1945 continued uninterruptedly
despite any official Soviet prohibition. German soldiers and civilians were
murdered on the road near Landsbergstabbed with bayonets, beaten to death with
blunt objects, or shot at pointblank range, and some of them severely
mutilated—by members of the Soviet 1st Tank Army of the Guards. At Landsberg,
Soviet soldiers from the 331rd Infantry Division drove the surprised
population, including women and children, into the cellars, set fire to the
houses, and shot at all those fleeing in panic. Many people were burned alive.
In a village on the Landsberg-Heilsberg road, 37 women and girls were locked in
a cellar for six days and nights by members of the same Infantry Division; many
of them were chained together and raped several times a day with the
participation of the Soviet officers. Two of the Soviet officers cut two
women's tongues out "with a curved knife" in front of everyone
because of their horrible screaming. Two other women had their hands placed on
top of each other and were pinned to the floor with a bayonet. A very few of
the unfortunate victims were finally liberated by German tank soldiers; 20
women died of their injuries. At Hanshagen near PreuBisch Eylau, Soviet
soldiers from the 331st Infantry Division shot two mothers for resisting the
rape of their daughters, as well as a father whose daughter was dragged out of
the kitchen at the same time, and raped by a Soviet officer. A married couple,
teachers with three children, as well as an unidentified young female refugee,
an innkeeper, and a farmer, whose daughter was raped, were also murdered. At
Petershagen near Eylau, members of the same division murdered two men and a boy
aged 16 named Richard von Hoffmann during the continuing rape of the women and
girls.
Soviet troops made a
surprise breakthrough into the western part of the Samland in early February
1945, with the result that a large number of localities fell into their
possession. The Germans succeeded in defeating and to some extent forcing a
withdrawal of the invading forces after a few days, and in restoring the broken
land and sea link with Konigsberg by means of a bold, large-scale counterattack
on 19-20 February 1945. The High Command of the German Army Section Samland and
the German Army Group North conducted investigations on the fate of the population
in the recaptured regions with the help of the police, the results of which are
of course only available for a few localities. Members of the 271st Special
Motorized Battalion (motorcyclist) of the 39th Army murdered four civilians in
Georgenwalde and threw the bodies into a burning house. Women and girls,
including some no older than children, were cruelly raped by officers and
Soviet soldiers. At Kragau, two young women were raped and strangled by members
of the 91st Infantry Division; at Medenau, at least eleven persons were
murdered by members of the 358th Infantry Division: the bodies of two murdered
women, a small child, and an infant were found in front of a house. Two elderly
men and a 14 year-old boy were beaten to death, as well as two women and two
small girls after being raped. The completely nude body of a woman,
approximately 30 years of age, was found with stab wounds in the breast, her
skull split open, and the body riddled with bullets. At GroB-Ladtkeim, members
of the 91st Guards Infantry Division shot two German prisoners of war and four
civilians, including the mayor and his wife. There was no trace of their 18
year-old daughter. However, the body of a young girl was found with her breasts
cut off, her eyes gouged out, and showing obvious signs of rape.
The Soviet 91st Guards
Infantry Division penetrated the Krattlau-Germau region by way of Thierenberg
and was then encircled and, to some extent, defeated on 7 February 1945 after
heavy fighting. Serious violations of international law were established in the
localities occupied by the same division. For example, at Thierenberg, 21 German soldiers were dragged out of a
home for disabled war veterans near Sorgenau, taken to Thierenberg, and
murdered. Elisabeth Homfeld was raped and killed with her father-in-law by
pistol shots to the head, along with Minna Kottke, who had attempted to protect
herself from rape, and the son of the tenant of the parsonage, Ernst Trunz.
Three women and a man were shut inside a shed and killed by the explosion of a
hand grenade thrown inside, several other persons being seriously injured.
Soviet officers and soldiers later admitted in German captivity to having gang-raped women and even minor girls without
interruption and in a "bestial manner." In Krattlau, members of the
275th Guards Infantry Regiment of the 91st Guards Infantry Division murdered
six men and two German soldiers by bayonet wounds or shooting in the head. All
the women and girls, including thirteen-year olds, were raped without
interruption, many women being "sexually violated 5 to 8 times a day by 6
to 8 soldiers at a time." Three to four of the youngest women were
reserved for the officers, who handed them over to their subordinates when they
were finished with their rape. At Annental, the German liberators found the
bodies of two women who had been raped and then strangled, one of them on a
dungheap.
It was possible to begin
detailed investigations in Germau, which had been occupied by the Staff of the
Soviet 91st Guards Infantry Division and the Staff with sections of the 275th
Infantry Guards Regiment. The bodies of 21 murdered men, women, and children
were found at Germau. Eleven persons were unable to withstand the horrible
tortures and committed suicide. Fifteen German wounded soldiers were murdered
by crushing their skulls, one of them with a harmonica crammed violently in his
mouth. According to investigations carried out by medical captain Dr. Tolzien,
one female corpse exhibited the following injuries: bullet wound to the head;
crushing of lower left tibia; gaping, open cuts on the interior of the left
lower leg, gaping, open cuts on the upper part of the left thigh, all inflicted
by means of knives. Another woman, as well as a young girl found nude, died
from crushing fractures to the back of the head. A married couple named
Retkowski, as well as another married couple named Sprengel, with their three
children, a young woman with two children and an unidentified Pole, were all
found murdered. The bodies of an unknown female refugee, as well as a German
woman named Rosa Thiel (maiden name Witte), and a 21year-old Polish girl, were
all found in a common grave, the girls cruelly murdered after being raped; the
bodies of two master handicraftsmen of the village were also found, one of
whom, the miller Maguhn, had been shot for attempting to protect his young
daughter from rape. Two small girls were found on the Germau-Palmnicken road,
at kilometer stone 5, having been shot in the head at close range; one of them
had her eyes gouged out. The female population of Germau, approximately 400
women and girls, were confined in the church on the order of the commander of
the 91st Guards Infantry Division,
Colonel Koshanov, allegedly to protect them from excesses, according to Major
Kostikov, a prisoner of war. But Soviet officers and soldiers stormed the
church and committed "mass rapes" in the choir loft. The women in the
surrounding houses were raped uninterruptedly during the following days, mostly
by officers. Young girls were raped up to twenty-two times a night. Thirteen-year-old Eva Link was raped eight times before the
eyes of her despairing mother in the bell-loft of the church by an officer and
several Soviet soldiers. The mother apparently suffered the same fate.
The events in the city
suburb of Metgethen, west of Konigsberg, which was occupied by units of the
Soviet 39 Army (192nd, 292nd, and 338th Infantry Regiments) during the night of
30-31 January 1945, and liberated on 19 February after bloody fighting by
sections of the German 1st Infantry Division, the 561th Volksgrenadier
Division and the 5th Tank Division, have been described in detail many times in
the literature, including, recently, in a publication of the Russian periodical
Novoe
Vremija under the headline
"Crimes of the Red Army Soldiers." The American expert on international law, Alfred M. de Zayas made a
particular study of the atrocities committed at Metgethen; his work deserves
mention here. German soldiers found horrible evidence of atrocities at
Metgethen and the near vicinity. According to the former 3rd General Staff
Officer (Ic) in the Staff of the Commander of the fortress of Konigsberg, Major
in the reserves Professor Dr. G. Ipsen, the survivors were "in a condition
bordering on madness."
The bodies of several
hundred German soldiers, some of them mutilated beyond recognition, lay in the
access roads, while men, women, and children, beaten to death, lay in almost
all the houses and gardens, the women exhibiting obvious signs of rape, often
with the breasts cut off. In one location, according to the former ordinance
officer on the Staff of the 561st
Volksgrenadier Division, K. A. Knorr, the bodies of
two girls approximately 20 years old, were found torn apart by vehicles. At the
railway station stood at least one refugee train from Konigsberg. Each carriage
contained the bodies of "brutally murdered refugees of all ages and both
sexes." German prisoners of war and civilians had been driven together on
the tennis court in Metgethen and then killed by explosives. Parts of human
bodies were found even 200 meters from the gigantic crater. As late as February
27, 1945, a Captain on the Staff of the Fortress Commander, Sommer,
accidentally discovered the bodies of 12 completely nude women and children in
"a jumbled heap," lying on top of each other in a gravel pit behind a
house on the intersection of the road and railway lines near Metgethen. All had
been cut to pieces by bayonet and knife wounds.
In addition to individual
corpses scattered all over the entire residential suburb and numbering several
hundred, large earth mounts were discovered, containing, as was later
established, 3,000 corpses, according to Captain Sommer and Prof Dr. Ipsen. The
investigations of the commission of investigation created by the Commander of
the Fortress, Infantry General Lasch, proved very difficult: the Soviets had
poured gasoline over the bodies and attempted to burn them. It nevertheless
proved possible to establish that most of the victims had not been shot.
Instead, they were cruelly murdered, often with the use of blunt objects and
cutting weapons. A great proportion of the dead, moreover, were not even
German. They were Ukrainian refugees, approximately 25,000 of whom had been
stranded at Metgethen, or members of the so-called Ukrainian "labor
service," recruited for compulsory labor service (and poorly treated by
the Germans); like many of their compatriots in another location, these then
fell victim to Soviet acts of revenge.
According to Captain Sommer, west of Metgethen, on the road to Powayen, the bodies of murdered civilians lay everywhere, killed by bullet wounds in the back of the neck, or "completely naked, raped, brutally stabbed to death with bayonets, or bludgeoned." On the intersection before Powayen lay the bodies of four nude women, dragged to death behind a Soviet tank. A truly symbolic crime committed by Soviet soldiers in the church at GroB-Heydekrug is testified to by Captain Sommer, as well as by Major Ipsen, a professor of law: a young girl had been crucified between two German soldiers, who were hanged next to her on either side. All this took place before the very gates of the provincial capital of Konigsberg. The indescribable orgy of cruelty and crime committed by inflamed Soviet soldiers after the fall of the city of Konigsberg on 7-9 April 1945 is impossible to describe, and is mentioned in the diaries of the doctors Deichelmann and Count von Lehndorff only by way of suggestion.
The violations of
international law committed on German soil placed large parts of the Red Army
outside the tradition of ordinary military virtues. Criminal acts against the
defenseless such as the above, which are described only by way of example and
committed with the incitement and participation of the military leadership,
were unknown in the armies of other European countries, even during the Second
World War; they would never have been tolerated by the command authorities of
any other country. The German Wehrmacht was no exception to this rule. Robbery
and plundering, not to mention murder and rape, were punishable by severe
penalties under the compulsory
provisions of the German military criminal code. To maintain military
discipline, German military tribunals, as a rule, even in the Soviet
territories, punished criminal acts by members of the Wehrmacht against
civilians with severe penalties, including the death penalty, often inflicted
without hesitation .The question of responsibility for the war crimes committed
in the German eastern provinces must now be raised. According to the ancient military
principle that the superior is responsible in each case for the actions of his
subordinates, the majority of the commanders and troop leaders assigned to
these zones, as well as many members of the middle and lower-ranking
leadership, would be "war criminals" under the terms of the Nuremberg
statutes. Due to its expert knowledge, the Foreign Armies East Branch of the
General Staff of the German Army was decisively involved in the
"identification of enemy war criminals." According to the "lists
of war criminals" drawn up, and like, for example, the High Command of the
German Army Group Center, the Foreign Armies East Branch was inclined from the
outset to find Soviet commanders and unit leaders responsible for the crimes of
their subordinates. The concept should, however, be more narrowly defined in
the present connection. When we refer to a number of Soviet officers by name in
the following paragraphs as bearing responsibility based upon documentation
which is furthermore only available as a result of pure chance, this occurs
solely where the existence of aggravating circumstances or joint responsibility
in violations of international law has been proven on the basis of documentary
evidence, or insofar as compelling grounds exist for suspicion to this effect.
The following officers
have already been referred to as bearing responsibility for violations of
international law committed in the German eastern provinces: the
Commander-in-Chief of the 1st White Russian Front, Marshall of the Soviet Union
Zhukov and leading officers of his front staff, such as Member of the Council
of War, Lieutenant General Telegin; Colonel General of Artillery Kazakov;
Colonel General of Aviation Rudenko; Chief of the Front Staff, Colonel General
Malinin, and, even more clearly, the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd White
Russian Front, Army General Chernyakhovsky; Member of the Council of War,
Lieutenant General Khokhlov; and, finally, the Chief of the Political
Administration of the Front Staff, Major General Razbitsev. Among the many
persons implicated, the following officers bear particular responsibility: the
Commander-in-Chief of the 31st Army, Colonel General Glagolev; the Members of
the Council of War
of the 31st Army,
Major General Karpenkov, Major General Lakhtarin, and the Chief of the
Political Administration of the Army, Major General Riapasov; the Commander of
the 43 Infantry Corps, Major General Andreev; the Commander of the 72 Infantry
Division, Major General Yastrebov; the Commander of the 87th Infantry Guards
Division, Major General Tymchik; the Commander of the 88 Infantry Division,
Colonel Kovtunov; the Commander of the 153rd Infantry Division, Colonel
Eliseev; the Commander of the 2nd Artillery Guards Division, Colonel Kobtsev;
the Chief of the 7th Department of the Political Administration of the 50th
Army, Lieutenant Colonel Sabashtansky, whose subordinates included two German
collaborators, Major Bechler and Lieutenant Graf von Einsiedel, so-called
"Front Delegate" members of the NKFD; the Commander of the 611th
Infantry Regiment of the 88th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Sotkovsky;
the Commander of the 14th Infantry Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division,
Lieutenant Colonel Korolev; the Commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 14th
Infantry Regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division, First Lieutenant Vasil'ev;
and, finally, Adjutant of the 2nd Section of the 919th Artillery Regiment,
First Lieutenant Pugachev.
The following Soviet
officers, identified on the basis of documents available solely as the result
of chance, are responsible for the commission, advocacy, or deliberate
toleration of war crimes on German soil: Lieutenant General Okorokov, Chief of
the Political Administration of the 2nd White Russian Front, personally
participated in "extensive plundering" and other serious crimes
committed in his sector of the front. At
Petershagen near Pr. Eylau on 2 February 1945, Major General Berestov, the
Commander of the 331rd Infantry Division, accompanied by one of his officers,
raped the daughter of a farmer's wife, after personally being served food and
drink by her; he also raped a Polish girl. He is also fully responsible for the
many war crimes committed by his division at Pr. Eylau and Landsberg,
"only a very small proportion of which could be investigated." Major
General Papchenko, the Commander of the 124th Infantry Division, and Major
General Zaretsky, the Commander of the 358th Infantry Division, bear
responsibility for the crimes committed at Medenau between 15-21 February 1945,
as well as for the crimes committed at Kragau and GroB-Ladtkeim on 4 February
1945 by the Commander of the 91st Guards Infantry Division, Colonel of the
Guards Koshanov. The latter is moreover responsible for "the murders and rapes committed by his soldiers at
Thierenberg." Lieutenant Colonel Muratov, the Commander of the 1324th
Infantry Regiment of the 413th Infantry Division, bears responsibility for
inciting Soviet soldiers, through his political representative (Zampolit), to
commit acts of vengeance against the Germans: "You may now revenge
yourselves. Combat troops may do whatever they want with German prisoners...
"
Lieutenant Colonel
Bondarets, Zampolit of the 510 Infantry Regiment of the 154 Infantry Division
of the 2nd Army of the Guards of the 3rd White Russian Front, informed Soviet
soldiers in East Prussia that "of course, they could rape German
women," but that they ought not to shoot them.. Lieutenant Colonel
Tolstukhin, the Commander of the 85 Guards Infantry Regiment of the 32nd
Infantry Guards Division, a well-known "German hater," caused
"most of the German prisoners of war" in East Prussia "to be
shot". Lieutenant Colonel Rosentsvaig, Zampolit of the
72nd Guards Infantry Regiment, informed the soldiers of the Red Army through
their unit leaders that they "had full freedom to plunder".
Lieutenant Colonel Sashenko, the Commander of the 275 Infantry Regiment of the
91st Guards Infantry Division, is fully responsible for the "war crimes
committed by his soldiers between 2 and 8 February 1945 in Germau and Krattlau."
Major Beliaev, Chief of the "Anti-Fascist School" of the 2nd White
Russian Front, shot a helpless old woman at Neidenberg, and three wounded
soldiers at another location, in addition to other crimes. Major Sadykov, the
Commander of the 870th Infantry Regiment, personally committed rapes in Upper
Silesia and "had many prisoners of war shot" purely on the grounds of
personal hatred . Major Kobuliansky, the Commander of the 271st
Special Motorized Battalion of the 39th Army, and several of his officers,
including company leader Alt-Metveden and platoon leader Zinoviev personally
participated in aggravated rapes in the Ostsee bathing resort of Georgenwalde
between 3 and 5 February, and are responsible for a number of murders in the
immediate vicinity. A few of the immense numbers of Soviet top-ranking officers
who committed crimes or morals offences in the German eastern provinces include
the following: Captain Sobolev; Adjutant of the 2nd Battalion of the 691st
Infantry Regiment of the 383rd Infantry Division, First Lieutenant Sherebsov;
Chief of Staff of a
section of the
788th Artillery Regiment of the 262nd Infantry Division, First Lieutenant
Sliusarev; Chief of Staff of the lst Battalion of the 72nd Guards Infantry
Regiment of the 24th Guards Infantry Division, Lieutenant Shilkov of the same
battalion; and Lieutenant Kalinin, Political Representative of the 2nd
Battalion, who expressly incited Soviet soldiers to the commission of crimes,
stating that "they should spare no one and nothing." These are just a
few of the names which could be listed here. But they make it sufficiently
clear that officers of all ranks, from Marshall of the Soviet Union down to the
ranks of lieutenant, general, staff officer, as well as top-ranking officers in
the Red Army, were equally guilty of the commission of war crimes against the
civilian population and against defenseless prisoners.
Was the Red Army, taken as
a whole, guilty of participation in violations of international law? The
constant and enduring campaign of inflammatory propaganda conducted by the
Political Main Administration and its subordinate political organizations,
coupled with the fact that the sudden countermanding orders, issued by the
troop leadership, were in total contradiction to the initial proclamations,
that they were not emphasized and were furthermore only enforced in exceptional
cases, hardly encouraged humanitarian intervention. Not a few Soviet officers
and soldiers took offense at the horrible crimes and excesses of their own
comrades. The Soviet agents active on the German side, Danilov and Chirshin,
for example, spontaneously reported the case of an unidentified officer who
voiced disgust at the extent of the terror. In view of the atmosphere of incitement and hatred prevalent in the Red
Army, however, criticism of the barbaric treatment of the civilian population
and prisoners of war, which "made a mockery of all human decency,"
was rendered difficult and dangerous by the immediate possibility of
intervention by the political supervisory bodies.
Soviet prisoners of war
"unanimously" confirmed that it was "strictly prohibited to
express one's moral outrage to the leadership, since there was the danger of
being called a Hitlerite and being treated accordingly." For example, when
Captain Beliakov, referred to once again below, reported to his superiors
relating to the brutal rape of a 17 year-old girl in the presence of her mother
by eight Red Army soldiers, he was reprimanded by his Zampolit, Lieutenant
Colonel Bondarets, with the rhetorical question of whether he "wished to
defend the civilians?" If not, he should get out, and go back to his
battalion. Other critics were treated more harshly. Captain Efremov, Battalion
Commander in a regiment of the 4th
Guards
Tank Corps, who had raped a woman in Lindenhagen near Cosel on 2 February 1945,
shot out of hand a Red Army soldier who condemned this act. At another
location, as testified to by a captured Second Lieutenant of the 287th Infantry
Division, several Soviet officers were shot by inflamed Red Army soldiers for
"trying to intervene on behalf of the civilian population and to prevent
the excesses."
There are reports of tank
crews who warned the residents of the cruelty of the following units, and there
were always Soviet officers and soldiers who helped women and children or
distributed bread to them. Shining examples of humanity were set by Captain
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Major Lev Kopelev, who paid for their intervention on
behalf of the mistreated civilian populations of East Prussia with years of deportation
to the concentration camps of the GULag, having been accused and convicted of
"bourgeois humanitarian propaganda, sympathizing with the enemy
population, and slandering the Soviet military leadership." This series of
cruel occurrences was described in prosaic form for posterity by the later
Nobel Prize winner Alexandr Solzhenitsyn in his publication "East Prussian
Nights."
Soviet officers
occasionally succeeded in intervening against the uniformed criminals, in some
cases because they had superiors who felt the same, since a great deal always
depended upon the "attitude of the particular commander." Attitudes
were not unanimous, even in the "Duchachina" 91st Guards Infantry
Division. Horrible atrocities were committed at Germau and the surrounding vicinity
by the 275th Guards Infantry Regiment, including the divisional staff, although
no murders or rapes at all were reported in localities like Willkau, occupied
by other units of the same division. When one newly assigned commanding officer
was informed of the many crimes committed in Germau, he issued orders,
including to sentries surrounding the church, that mistreatment of women would
no longer be permitted: "otherwise it will be necessary for you to fire on
your own men." Conditions in the 72nd Infantry Division, commanded by war
criminal Major General Yastrebov, were quite different. For example, the 3rd
Battalion of the 14th Infantry Regiment committed serious atrocities, while
Soviet soldiers in the 3rd Battalion of the 187th Infantry Regiment were warned
against the commission of any criminal acts against civilians. But all things
considered, these appear to have been exceptional cases. The Chief of the
Foreign Armies East Branch of the General Staff of the German Army, Major
General Gehlen, whose agencies gathered all relevant reports, reported the
"correct behavior" of Soviet officers and soldiers in individual
cases, but felt simultaneously compelled to add that "a large proportion
of the officers tacitly tolerated excesses, and very often even committed them
personally". Captain Beliakov, the Commander of the
lst Battalion
of the 510th Infantry Regiment of the 154th Infantry Division of the 2nd Army
of the Guards of the 3rd White Russian Front, mentioned above, deserted to
German troops on 10 February 1945 at Dulzen near Pr. Eylau because, as he
explained: "I could no longer stand by and watch the way Soviet soldiers
treated the German civilian populations in the areas we conquered."
Captain
Beliakov, who had already shot a sergeant of his battalion and another Soviet
soldier caught in the act of brutally raping a totally deranged minor girl in a
remote barn, believed that he could only escape forthcoming arrest by the
military counter intelligence SMERSH (under Colonel General of State Security Abakumov)
by deserting to the Germans.
330--The German-Soviet war
was inevitable. The only open question was which of the two competing powers
would strike first to preempt its adversary. The rapidly increasing superiority
and strength of Soviet armaments, especially in tanks, aircraft, and artillery,
over the troops of the Wehrmacht, dispersed over all parts of Europe, led the
Germans to view June 1941 as the last possible opportunity for German
initiation of preventive war. Further delay would have eroded the only factor
favoring the Germans, which was their level of training. The most recent
discoveries in Soviet archives illustrate the extent to which Soviet military
preparation and deployment had in fact already been completed. To all
appearances, Stalin moved the attack date forward from 1942 to the months of
July-September 1941. This would offer a plausible explanation of Stalin's
desire to postpone the initiation of hostilities "even if only for... a
month, a week, or a few days," to complete his own military
preparations—without the slightest fear of German attack. Soviet research has
also arrived at the conclusion that the "military struggle against Germany
might have begun in July 1941."
The actual strength of the
Soviet army remained unknown to the Germans, although they obviously recognized
that preparations for an attack were taking place on their eastern border. The
German command authorities were nevertheless surprised by the enemy potential
encountered in the East after 22 June 1941. Statements alleged to have been
made by Hitler, and confirmed by Goebbels in his diaries, indicate that the
decision to attack would have been much more difficult to make had Hitler been
aware of the full strength of the Red Army. The results for Germany, and the rest
of Europe, if Hitler had not given the order to attack on 22 June 1941—if
Stalin, on the contrary, had been permitted to initiate his planned war of
extermination in Europe—are best left to the imagination. This does not, of
course, constitute a justification of the politically and morally detrimental
methods employed by Hitler in Russia (and Poland). Hitler planned a war of
conquest, too. The National Socialist war on the Soviet Union was conducted in the spirit of a statement once made by
Benjamin Disraeli, the Earl of Beaconsfield: "The racial question is the
key to world history." It should be borne in mind, in this regard, that,
by the very nature of things, no conflict between the National Socialist German
Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, could possibly resemble an
"ordinary" war; the war was inevitably fated to acquire extraordinary
features from the very outset. Militarily speaking, the great initial successes
of the troops of the Wehrmacht and their rapid penetration of Soviet territory
resulted in an underestimation of Soviet strength and powers of resistance
which ultimately proved fatal.
Stalin's intent was to
destroy the forces of the Wehrmacht concentrated on his western border in
several heavy blows constituting one huge attack operation; he was not even
swayed from this concept by Hitler's preventive attack. Stalin and the Soviet
leadership, in full awareness of the enormous superiority of the Soviet Union,
and quite well-informed as to the many weaknesses of the Wehrmacht, fighting on
two fronts, retained an absolute confidence in the certainty of victory, even
after 22 June 1941. These illusions only evaporated after the unexpectedly
successful German attack. After a brief phase of lethargy, however, the
Bolshevik regime (Stalin, the Politburo, and the newly-founded State Defense
Committee) proclaimed a "patriotic war," the radicalism of which made
the so-called "total war" proclaimed in Germany only after the defeat
at "Stalingrad" appear a mere figure of speech.
Stalin's initial concern,
and that of the STAVKA was, essentially, to restore the stability of the
wavering front. This was achieved through the ruthless application of the
tried-and-true Stalinist methods: first, utterly shameless propaganda, and,
secondly, the most brutal terror. The system was as simple as it was effective:
anyone who did not believe the propaganda, experienced the terror. Of course,
the Soviet leadership was perfectly well aware that any attempt to inspire
Soviet soldiers with "ardent and self-sacrificing Soviet patriotism,"
with "limitless dedication to the cause of the Communist Party," with
enthusiasm and "endless love for the Party and government, for Great
Comrade Stalin," and whatever other words might come to mind, would be
doomed to failure. The solution was believed to lie in a far deeper, more
wide-ranging, appeal to the baser instincts. It was considered necessary to
generate feelings of hatred and thirst for vengeance against the foreign
invader, against the "fascists"—the German occupier and German
allies. In this respect, Soviet propaganda, with decisive assistance from Ilja
Ehrenburg, was to descend to a level of primitive baseness and degeneracy which
could hardly be surpassed.
The primary necessity was
to generate an atmosphere of fear and terror in the Red Army and Navy by
creating conditions which would leave Soviet soldiers and sailors no choice but
to fight and die—"to the last bullet," "to the last drop of
blood"—for the "Soviet homeland" (whatever that might mean),
"for the Party and government," "for our beloved Stalin."
Contrary to the allegations of certain German historians, the possibility of
escape through surrender to the Germans, or German-allied armies, never for a
moment existed where members of the Red Army were concerned. In this regard,
Stalin, Molotov, and other leading Soviet officials, including Soviet woman
Ambassador Kolontay, never left the slightest doubt in anyone's mind. The
Soviet Union was the only country in the world to denounce the Fourth Hague Convention
of 1907, and had refused to ratify the 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention.
In the Soviet Union, the concept of "prisoner of war" was simply
unknown. The provisions of Soviet military law only recognized the terms
deserter and traitor, flight to class-enemy occupied territory and anti-Soviet
collaboration with the enemy. The Soviet Air Force is known to have carried out
deliberate bombing attacks against columns of Soviet prisoners of war. The
principle of brutal retaliation against the families and relatives of Soviet
prisoners of war, including shootings, was also standard practice.
The measures taken to
prohibit flight into captivity were also accompanied by other measures intended
to prevent flight to the rear. A system of spying and surveillance by the
political apparatus, by the NKVD organizations of the Special Departments and
their spies operating in secrecy, by terrorist activities of blocking units, by
military tribunals as well as by the measures announced in Stalin Orders nos.
270 and 227 was intended to leave Soviet soldiers no alternative. All this is
inconceivable in the armed forces of any other state. But this—plus the mass
shootings of soldiers and even members of the command authorities, including
many generals up to the rank of Commander-in-Chief of the Front—generated the
state of mind which continues to be praised as the "mass heroism" and
"Soviet patriotism" of the "Great Patriotic War." Generally
speaking, bravery and contempt for death are common characteristics of Russian
soldiers in any case. But true heroism is not generated by terror. The
casualties resulting from driving Soviet soldiers forward into enemy machine
gun fire, like cattle, were horrendous, amounting, during the Soviet-Finnish
Winter War of 1939-40, to at least
five times the casualty rate inflicted upon the Finns. "Human life must
not be spared": such was the Stalinist motto upon which the Soviet
military strategy was based, even where Soviet soldiers and civilians were
concerned.
In describing the
Stalinist war of extermination, it proved inevitable, no matter how delicate
the entire topic may be, to make a brief comparison between the mass killings
perpetrated by the Stalinist regime on the grounds, oversimplifying somewhat,
of class struggle, and those of the Hitler regime, committed on the grounds of
racial struggle. These politically ideologically motivated crimes, which have
no equal in the history of the world, were committed, in part, as a result of
the propaganda war conducted parallel to the military conflict between the
Soviet Union and Germany. It must, of course, be borne in mind, if a proper
sense of proportion is to be maintained, that, in the unanimous opinion of all
persons having studied the matter, the Soviet authorities killed at least 40 million
people even before the murder squads of the Reichsfuhrer SS ever even could go
into action. Kolyma, with its three million deaths, was only one of the central
concentration camps in the system of the GULag, preceding Auschwitz in time. In
accordance with Stalin's orders, the shootings of real or imagined political
adversaries began in all parts of the country—in Eastern Poland, in the Baltic
States, in White Russia, the Ukraine, in Greater Russia, and finally in the
Caucasus—immediately following the beginning of the German-Soviet War. The
Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and SD, which began to shoot the totally
innocent Jewish population in so-called retaliation for the Soviet massacres
already committed in Lemberg and leaving a trail of blood throughout the
country, simply followed in the footsteps of the NKVD. Hugo von Hofmannsthal
has stressed that the Austrians and Germans of the occupation regiments of the
Commander-in-Chief for the East during the First World War acted in a spirit of
justice for all, including the Jewish populations—which were very pro-German.
The events now taking place in the occupied eastern territories would have been
quite inconceivable under the ancien
regime of the Kaiser, and were the expression of a new age of barbarism. In
any case, these actions had no precedent in German tradition, and they were
carried out without the knowledge or even approval of the German population.
A series of murder
locations have acquired particular significance in the war of German-Soviet propaganda.
Lemberg, Kiev, Khar'kov, Minsk, are symbolic of the crimes of the two
belligerents, although in differing respects. Beria was responsible for Katyn
and Vinica, while Himmler was responsible for Majdanek and Auschwitz, their
superiors being Stalin and Hitler respectively. The concentration camps of the
system of the GULag
nevertheless lay
outside the eastern theatre of war, and were therefore not taken into
consideration in this context. The Soviet Union, initially on the defensive
both military and politically, appears to have been increasingly successful in
regaining ground, politically, when the anti-Jewish excesses of the
Einsatzgruppen came to light during the German withdrawal. An
"Extraordinary State Commission" was created to serve as the suitable
instrument for the concealment of Bolshevik crimes and for the propaganda
exploitation of fascist crimes. Katyn and Vinica were mendaciously represented
to the normally well informed Allied Governments as "fascist" crimes.
The endless mass graves of Bykovnia, Darnica, and Bielhorodka, with their
hundreds of thousands of victims, in the vicinity of Kiev, disappeared behind
the propaganda smokescreen of Babij jar—the Ravine of the Old Woman—which
nevertheless continues to cast up certain unsolved riddles. The massacre of the
NKVD and its Chekist predecessors at Khar'kov, Minsk, and Lemberg were also
concealed by the Soviet propaganda roaring about the "fascist crimes"
also committed there.
Soviet propaganda gained
the upper hand after the further advance of Soviet troops into the
concentration camps of the General Government of Poland, particularly,
Auschwitz and Majdanek, in late 1944/early 1945. The locations of horror in the
extermination camps of Poland, immediately exploited with self-satisfaction by
the "Extraordinary State Commission," appeared to confirm all
previous Soviet allegations and made a devastating impression, particularly in
the Allied countries. That the numbers of victims were exaggerated in this
context was irrelevant within the dispute and is still considered irrelevant.
Today, it is considered almost a criminal offence "to speak of Jewish
losses as having been horrendously exaggerated."
Historians
are particularly disturbed by this situation, since it means that they are
caught between a system of political justice and spying and informants on the
one hand, and their professional duty to the truth on the other hand, i.e.,
their duty to determine the number of victims with the greatest possible
accuracy: Hans Delbruck, for good reason, stressed
the demand for strict critical analysis of figures; even Friedrich Engels once
called the statesman Adolphe Thiers a "big swindler" because of the
alleged incorrectness of all of his numerical statements.
With regards to the losses
in life caused by the Anglo-American air raids on the open city of Dresden in
February 1945, mentioned purely for purposes of example, the minimum figure of
35,000, dictated by the Soviet occupation authorities on political grounds in
early 1945, continues to be quoted to this day, even though the municipal
administration of the regional capital of Dresden, in a letter dated 31 July
1992, described a figure of 250,000-300,000 deaths, mostly women and children,
as "realistic," based on "proven data." With regards to the
losses in human life occurring in Auschwitz extermination camp, however, the
maximum figure of four million deaths continues to be considered valid,
although the figure can be proven to originate from the Soviet NKVD. The number
of victims at Auschwitz was, however, seriously reduced in 1990, and now
amounts to 631,000 to 711,000 according to the latest reports; this is, of
course, just as frightful, but appears to be approaching a realistic order of
magnitude. That the figure of 74,000 supported by the documents, only relates
to a part of the actual total, cannot be doubted. Generally, however, the mere
fact that it can be proven to have been none other than the perpetrator of
crimes against humanity, Ilja Ehrenburg, who first mentioned the figure of Six
Million Jewish victims of National Socialism on 22 December 1944, and then
introduced that figure into Soviet propaganda, must nevertheless give rise to
caution. How, one must ask, did he arrive at this figure? Auschwitz
concentration camp with its four to five million deaths—or so we were told—was
only captured by Soviet troops on 27 January 1945! This question remains
unanswered.
Stalin's war of
extermination, by contrast, began with the mass murders at Lemberg in June
1941, although he only used the term personally on the 24th anniversary of the
"Great Socialist Revolution" for the first time on November 6, 1941.
The murders of German prisoners of war, which began spontaneously on 22 June
1941 along the entire front, were not, as often alleged, in reprisal for the Commissar guidelines, which were unknown to
the Soviets at the outset, and were furthermore rescinded in May 1942 as a
result of protests within the German army. The murders of helpless German
prisoners of war, and prisoners from the German-allied armies, were frequently
ordered, or at least tolerated, by Soviet officers, often of higher rank,
although many command agencies repeatedly, and in vain, attempted to prohibit
the arbitrary shooting of prisoners, if only on the grounds of the need to
capture Germans for reconnaissance purposes. But what could one expect of the
mass of Soviet soldiers if they were incited to "kill all German
invaders," "just destroy them," "fulfilling this
humanitarian mission," in continuation of "the work of Pasteur,"
"the work of all those scientists" having "discovered the means
of destroying all deadly microbes"—to "put the Germans
underground," or, quite simply, "wipe them off the face of the
earth"—all in the space of just a few days, by the front propaganda led by
someone like Ilja Ehrenburg? In view of the genocidal attitude generated in the
Red Army—an attitude which was not directed against "fascists" at
all, but rather, against all Germans—it was very difficult (and very often
quite dangerous) for the moderate segments of the Soviet command agencies to
attempt to stop the unrestrained activities.
Following the breakthrough
of Soviet troops into the territory of the German Reich in October 1944, the
victims of inflamed soldateska, often incited by their officers, were no longer
limited to defenseless German prisoners of war, but rather included German
civilians, men, women, and children. At least 120,000 German civilians were
killed outright, and at least 100-200,000 others perished in Soviet prisons and
camps. More than 250,000 civilians died during or after deportation to the
Soviet Union for slave labor, while innumerable others simply starved to death:
90,000 in Konigsberg alone. A total of 2.2 million "unexplained"
fatalities are estimated to have occurred in the subsequent "deportation
regions," fatalities which must, for the most part, upon a closer
examination, be viewed as "victims of terrorism," i.e., anti-German
genocide. The internationally known expert, Professor Dr. de Zayas, furthermore,
considers that the actual number of victims may have been lower—"while it
may also have been higher"—than the official figure of 2,379,000
"'deaths testified to by eyewitnesses', plus unexplained fatalities."
The Soviet Commanders-in-Chief at the Front, who had themselves personally
called for acts of revenge, soon found themselves compelled to intervene
against the descent into savagery and sadism on the part of considerable
numbers of their troops. All such efforts nevertheless remained without effect
in view of the anti-German hate propaganda, which, under the Ehrenburg's
leadership, continued unabated until shortly before the end of the war,
culminating in the demand to "put an end to Germany," as well as in a
demand, which Ehrenburg considered "modest and honorable," to
"reduce the German population," in which case the only decision that
remained to be made was whether it was preferable to "kill the Germans
with axes or clubs."
Stalin personally was
fully aware of all these monstrous measures and procedures; it was he who
personally ordered them; it was he who bore immediate responsibility for them.
This is clear from an order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander,
signed by Stalin and the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Antonov, on
20 April 1945, which speaks of the "cruel measures" of the Soviet
armed forces—not on humanitarian grounds, or out of any concern for
international law, but purely and simply on the basis of political
considerations. As explained by Professor Semiryaga, this order from the
STAVKA, signed by Stalin, constitutes an admission that Stalin personally
considered the acts of the Red Army to be cruel, "both against prisoners
of war and the civilian population."
The German-Soviet
conflict, conducted by both powers as a war of extermination, each in its own
way, would have represented an absolute low in German-Russian relations had
there not, despite everything, been an aspect of hope. During the initial phase
of the war, the friendship with which a large proportion of the Soviet population
greeted the German troops is quite obvious—if not in the large industrial
centers, then at least in the cities and villages of the steppes and plains
generally. This was true of the Baltic States and Eastern Poland, of White
Russia and the Ukraine, of Greater Russia as far as Smolensk and beyond, of the
Crimea in 1942, and even of the Caucasus. "The further east we go,"
reported the Supreme Command of the Army on 12 July 1941, "the friendlier
the attitude of the civilian population towards the German Wehrmacht seem to
be, particularly in the countryside." In many localities, the Germans were
actually welcomed as liberators. But even where this was not directly true,
even where the population merely greeted the Germans with amicable reserve or
expectant curiosity, the situation was still in absolute contradiction to
official Soviet doctrine. Unjustified requisitions and, in certain cases,
plundering and other excesses by German soldiers, against which the German
command authorities naturally intervened, led to disillusionment in certain
areas without, however, seriously disturbing the reciprocal relationship. A
sudden change in the attitude of the population set in with further
developments. This change in attitude resulted from the absence of any constructive
German occupation program, combined with many repressive measures and
irresponsible actions in reprisal for the actions of partisans in guerrilla
warfare. This partisans warfare was, of course, illegal under international law
and was initiated by the Soviets in a spirit of cold calculation. The
persecution of the Jews may also have made a greater impression on many
segments of the Russian population than the Germans were aware. It should,
however, be noted that the areas controlled by the German Army and Wehrmacht,
despite many injustices, often contrasted very favorably with other zones under
German civilian administration. Army Group A, for example, assigned to the
Caucasus, was granted full political authority: the result was that relations
with the minority nationalities living in the region, the Cossacks as well as
Russians, were extremely positive. In the Caucasus, the foundations of
preliminary forms of independent states for these nationalities, including a
Cossack state, were even laid with German assistance.
When it is furthermore
recalled that, regardless of all the Soviet deterrent terror and horror
propaganda, a total of no less than 3.8 million Soviet soldiers, from enlisted
men up to the rank of generals, surrendered to the Germans in 1941 alone—a
total of 5.3 during the entire war—it becomes clear how favorable the prospects
for a political and military cooperation between the "Russians" and
the "Germans" actually were. The unconditional precondition for such
cooperation, would, however, have been the recognition of Russia as a
German-allied state. The essential preconditions for Russian cooperation with
the Germans against the Stalinist regime were stated, from the very beginning
of the war and throughout the years that followed, by Soviet officers of all
ranks in German captivity, including a considerable number of Army
Commanders-in-Chief, corps and divisional commanders. These conditions were:
the formation of a "Russian national government and Russian army of
liberation under entirely Russian leadership," the "actual
recognition of a Russian national government," and their "own
national liberation army." Soviet officers and commanders stating these
requirements included the Commanders-in-Chief of the 22 (20) Army, Lieutenant
General Ershakov; of the 5th Army, Major General Potapov; of the 12 Army, Major
General Ponedelin; of the 19th Army, Lieutenant General Lukin; of the 3rd Army
of the Guards, Major General Krupennikov, and other military leaders, of whom
the following deserve particular mention: Generals Abranidze, Alaverdov,
Besonov, Egorov, Kirillov, Kirpichnikov, Kulikov, Ogurtsev, Sibin, Snegov,
Tkachenko.
It was Hitler who
destroyed the attractive possibilities of a German-Russian alliance,
substituting "racial-ideological" principles for realistic
negotiation, as a result of which his policy of conquest, oppression, and
exploitation was doomed to failure. And yet, although they never received the
slightest concession, a small group of Soviet generals as well as hundreds of thousands
of Soviet soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers, trusting in an
ultimate, inevitable change in German attitude, decided to take up the struggle
on the side of Germany. These generals included the Representative
Commander-in-Chief of the Volkhov front, Lieutenant General Vlassov; Army
Commissar and temporary leader of the 32nd Army Zhilenkov; and Major Generals
Artsezo (Assberg), Blagoveshchensky, Bogdanov, Malyshkin, Shapovalov,
Sevastianov, Trukhin, and Zakutny.
The resulting military cooperation,
arising from the most insignificant beginnings in 1941 and contrary to Hitler's
original intentions, was also, politically speaking, perhaps the most positive
phenomenon of the German-Soviet war. Although political considerations may have
been less decisive than military considerations on the German side, at least
initially, the deployment of these volunteer units, consisting of members of
all nationalities of the Soviet Union, was the only way in which Hitler's
efforts in the East, doomed to failure, could successfully be countered. Hitler
declared on 8 June 1943 that he will never build a Russian army, since that
would mean abandoning "complete control over the war aims from the very
outset." The creation of volunteer units, however, conducted with the
support of nearly all Commanders-in-Chief and commanding officers of the Army
of the East and Central Army Agencies with the de facto cooperation of
the responsible Group Leader II in the Organizational Division of the General
Staff of the Army, Major on the General Staff Count von Stauffenberg, could no
longer be countermanded, and now acquired, on the contrary, new momentum.
National armies of liberation were now created, recruited from the peoples of
Turkestan and the Caucasus, of the eastern legions of non-Russian minority
nationalities of Turkestan, the North Caucasus, Azerbajdzian, Georgia, Armenia,
and Volga Tatars. Units of Crimean Tatars, of Kalmuck and Cossack cavalry
corps, now arose to liberate the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban, Terek, and
Siberia, parallel with a Ukrainian liberation army in divisional strength.
All soldiers of Russian
nationality within the structure of the German army after 1943 could consider
themselves members of a Russian Liberation Army, although it existed in name only.
But with the creation of the Committee for the Liberation of the Russian
Peoples (KONR) in Prague on November 1944, a Russian Liberation Army (ROA)
actually came into being, with its own Supreme Command and all arms of the
service, including a small air force, referred to as the Armed Forces of the
Committee for the Liberation of the Russian Peoples (VS KONR). General Vlassov,
as Chairman of the Committee—equivalent to a government-in-exile—also became
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of a Russian national army which was
entirely independent, both de jure and de facto,
and simply allied
with the German Reich. Thus was Hitler's stated principle turned upside-down.
If, as Alexandr Solzhenitsyn writes, hundreds of thousands, but in reality, as
we know, one million Soviet soldiers of all ranks took up the struggle against
their own government on the side of the enemy, in a war described as a
"great patriotic struggle," the reason for it lay, not in any variety
of treason, no matter how that word may be defined, but rather, in an
elementary political phenomenon which never before existed on such a scale at
any time in history. This unique historical phenomenon would, in itself,
suffice to refute the mindless catchword of the unlimited validity of a so-called
"Soviet patriotism" and "mass heroism."
The war between the German
Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was conducted with methods
reflecting their ideology on both sides. After the battle of Kiev in 1941,
Stalin personally ordered Beria in the Kremlin to spare no means in the
generation of "hate, hate, and more hate." On 6 November 1941, he
expressly proclaimed a war of extermination against the German Reich.
Ultimately, however, it was the soldiers on both sides who bridged this gap of
hatred for the first time. "In the years of the common struggle,"
General Vlassov announced to his troops upon assuming Supreme Command on the
Munsingen drill ground on 10 February 1945," "a friendship arose
between the Russian and German peoples. The errors committed on both sides, as
well as their means of rectification, prove the existence of common interests.
The main thing is the trust, the mutual trust, in the task of both sides. I
wish to thank all German and Russian officers having participated in the
deployment of this unit." These were expressions hardly ever before heard
in this war of extermination. Vlassov closed his speech, which was joyfully
received, with the following appeal: "Long live the friendship between the
Russian and German peoples! Long live the soldiers and officers of the Russian
Army!" Hitler and Stalin were never even mentioned with as much as a
single word. The Russian liberation movement, which also pursued the objective
of a renewed Germany, naturally failed, as a result of the unfavorable turn of
events in 1945, but it was not in vain; nor were the failed attempts at
liberation in the history of other peoples, bequeathing a particularly
brilliant power of example to the annals of history.