PETER CHIARELLI, EXECUTIVE PRODUCER
Peter Chiarelli earned a Masters degree from the Peter Stark Producing program at USC, where he met Rawson Thurber and Jason Mercer. When he graduated he began his film career at DreamWorks. During that time, Chiarelli produced the short film "Terry Tate Office Linebacker", which was developed into one of the most popular Super Bowl commercials of all time. In 2001, he became an executive at Red Wagon Entertainment, where he worked on the films "Memoirs of a Geisha", "Win a Date with Ted Hamilton" and "RV". He later moved to MGM to work as a Director of Development where he supervised production of "The Pink Panther" and "The Amityville Horror". In 2005, he moved to the Dreamworks lot to head up Kurtzman/Orci Productions. As well as producing he has written a feature screenplay entitled "The Proposal", which was bought by Disney.

Speakers included Ron Prehogan, chair of the Jewish Federation of Ottawa, Bernie Farber, CEO of Canadian Jewish Congress, Ronen-Gil-Or, deputy head of mission at the Israeli embassy, French Ambassador Daniel Jouanneau, and Andy Kusi-Appiah, senior policy adviser to Ottawa Mayor Bob Chiarelli.

Prehogan said the torture and murder of Halimi was an attack on all Jews.

“The Jewish community of Ottawa, in solidarity with our Jewish brothers and sisters the world over, pledges to continue to be front and centre in the fight against anti-Semitism, intolerance and hatred of all kinds, to sensitize the authorities and media whenever we can, to never be silent, to never stop doing everything we can to bring the perpetrators of hate crimes to justice,” he said.

Holding the vigil shows the Halimi family and the Jews of France that they’re not alone, Farber said.

Lieutenant General PETER W. CHIARELLI

Casey
commander in Iraq must devise a five-star pullout plan
Originally published October 28, 2006

The clamour for an honourable exit strategy is making General George Casey's unenviable job even tougher, writes Joshua Kucera

Before 2004, General George Casey had never been in combat and had only scant experience with the Middle East. But President George W. Bush nominated him anyway to one of the hardest jobs in the world: command of the US military effort in Iraq.

Two years later, he is still in command, and while the shift in strategy that General Casey has overseen has generally been praised, the violence in Iraq continues to spiral out of control.

US strategy in Iraq is created and implemented by a huge cast of characters including the White House, the Defence Department, the State Department, the army, the marine corps and Central Command. But General Casey has become the public face of the US occupation for the past two years, and has played a vital role in both its successes and failures.

After an easy invasion in 2003 and a relatively quiet occupation for several months, by 2004 the situation in Iraq had spiralled out of control. In the spring, Sunni extremists in Fallujah ambushed four American private security guards, killed them, strung the bodies from a bridge, then took them down and burned them. The attack was filmed and the footage shocked Americans. The US military attempted to root insurgents out of the city, but failed.

Shortly thereafter, it emerged that US military prison guards had been humiliating Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, creating a public relations catastrophe for the military.

In Washington, the administration had begun to lose faith in Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez, then commander of American forces in Iraq, and thought that General John Abizaid, a highly regarded Lebanese-American in charge of the US military across the Middle East, was spending too much of his energy on Iraq.

'Sanchez was a miserable failure and Abizaid had failed to do anything about the man and the mess he created,' said retired colonel Douglas MacGregor, a prominent commentator on army affairs.

Mr Bush decided to replace the three-star General Sanchez with the four-star General Casey, who was then serving as the army's vice-chief of staff. Sending a higher-ranking officer was a sign that the administration knew it needed higher firepower in Baghdad.

'When I asked 'Why is General Casey being sent over there?' I was told by someone very highly placed in the army that it was to make the trains run on time,' said Mr MacGregor.

General Casey, the son of a two-star general who died in a helicopter crash in Vietnam, joined the army after studying international relations at college. He did not intend to make a career of the army, but moved up the ranks through mainly planning and policy jobs.

As he rose higher, he became well known around Washington, having done Pentagon tours on the army and Joint Staff.

 He was confirmed easily by the Senate despite his lack of combat experience.

'I've learned how to think competitively and how to operate against a thinking enemy, and that has great carry-over into combat operations,' General Casey told The Washington Post shortly after he was confirmed.

He was also loyal to the administration, Mr MacGregor said.

'He's a 'can do, yes sir, let's get it done' personality who's willing to do whatever it takes to make the secretary of defence happy,' said the retired colonel.

General Casey had proved his loyalty to the administration during the run-up to the Iraq war, according to respected military writer Thomas Ricks in his new book, Fiasco.

As planning for the Iraq war progressed in late 2002, some army officers quietly started to rebel, arguing that Iraq had nothing to do with the 'global war on terror' they thought they were fighting. General Casey, then the chief of strategic plans at the Joint Staff, laid down the law, wrote Ricks, citing an unnamed aide.

'Look, this is part of the 'war on terror',' General Casey said. 'Iraq is one of those state supporters, and it is a state that has used weapons of mass destruction.'

During his Senate confirmation, General Casey admitted that he did not know the answers to many of the hard questions facing the US in Iraq then - how many troops did the US need there? Was the strategy the US was employing a good one? - but said he would learn on the job.

And in the first year of his command he largely hewed to General Sanchez's strategy, which was to focus on killing and capturing insurgents. That experience led him to suggest that despite many calls in the US for an increase in the number of American troops to try to quell the violence, this was not the answer.

'What you saw for the next 12 months [after he took over] was large-scale raids - battalion and brigade-sized operations that just create more enemies. So by the fall of 2005 ... he said, 'More soldiers are not the answer',' Mr MacGregor said.

But as the violence increased, General Casey and his advisers began to look more seriously at their strategy and how to fight an insurgency. The last insurgency the US had fought was the Vietnam war, and it had been a painful experience.

The lesson the army took from Vietnam was to never fight a popular insurgency again. Throughout the 1970s, '80s and '90s counter-insurgency doctrine was ignored, and the army focused on what it was best at: fighting against other large armies like that of the Soviet Union.

But a small group of army intellectuals began to challenge that myopia as the war in Iraq worsened. General Casey brought in advisers like Kalev Sepp, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School who studied past insurgencies and how they were fought. He came up with a series of rules for fighting insurgencies - almost all of which the US Army was breaking in Iraq.

The rules included living among the population, focusing on intelligence-gathering rather than on attack, and placing the best officers as advisers to indigenous forces.

Towards the end of last year, General Casey established a training centre for counter-insurgency - known as the Coin Academy - north of Baghdad and required every commander in Iraq to attend a five-day course there.

Under General Casey, the US also focused more attention on development of the Iraqi army and police.

Some commanders in Iraq, following the principles taught at the Coin Academy, have succeeded in driving insurgents out of their areas and developing good relations with the Iraqi population. But the army is a tradition-bound institution, and change comes very slowly.

In any case it is probably too late for the US, Mr MacGregor said.

'[General Casey's] focus for the last 12 months has been on the Iraqi military and the government ... I also think that's a losing proposition and there's no chance of success,' he said.

On Tuesday, General Casey held a press conference in which he acknowledged that the US may need to send additional troops to bolster the approximately 144,000 there now.

Mr MacGregor believes the move is not in fact a precursor of a longer war, but the opposite. The unstated strategy, he said, is to increase troop strength on the ground and then launch a new offensive as a last-ditch effort to achieve success.

'The generals have been lying to themselves and the country for years and how do they get out of those lies? They have to do something spectacular in an effort to reverse the situation,' he said.

'That will fail, more people will be killed, more damage will be done and nothing will be achieved ... and there's nowhere to go but home.'



Top US commander in Iraq decides to extend mission


NY TIMES NEWS SERVICE, WASHINGTON
Monday, Jan 16, 2006, Page 7
Defying expectations: General George Casey has extended his Baghdad mission despite a common opinion he would be transferred, leaving intact the current military-diplomatic team into 2007.

General George Casey is extending his assignment as the top allied commander in Iraq to a third year, senior Pentagon officials said on Friday, ensuring that the current US military-diplomatic team there remains in place well into next year.

After serving in one of the military's most arduous jobs since July 2004, Casey had widely been expected to transfer to a new assignment this summer as part of the Army's regular rotation of senior officers.
Fortified headquarters

But at the request of President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Casey has agreed to stay for another year at his fortified headquarters in Baghdad, the officials said. He will continue to oversee the US military's role in assisting the formation of Iraq's newly-elected government and in training Iraqi soldiers and police to take greater responsibility for securing their country.

Senior Pentagon and White House officials said that Casey had mastered the nuances of Iraqi tribal and regional politics during in his tenure, and had developed an exceptional working relationship with Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador to Iraq. These officials said they wanted to take advantage of that personal chemistry during the critical post-election period.

It has not always been the case that the top US general and civilian official in Iraq have seen eye to eye. The relationship between Casey's predecessor, Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez, and the former top US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, was badly strained during their year together, according to officials who worked for both men during that time.

Casey also enjoys good working relations with General John Abizaid, the overall US commander in the Middle East, and with Lieutenant-General Martin Dempsey, who last summer became the top US trainer in Iraq.

Nearly two years ago, Casey was toiling in relative obscurity at the Pentagon as the Army's vice chief of staff. Pentagon officials had initially settled on a different commander for Iraq, but the political fallout from the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal scuttled that plan, and Casey soon found himself on a plane to Baghdad.
 

No combat experience

Casey had served in a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, but had no combat experience before Iraq.

As the four-star commander in Iraq, Casey has overall responsibility for the military's role in political and reconstruction issues, working closely with Khalilzad. A three-star officer, Lieutenant-General John Vines, oversees daily military operations in Iraq, consulting frequently with Casey. This month, Lieutenant-General Peter Chiarelli will succeed Vines, who is ending his year-long tour in Iraq.

Casey, a career infantryman and a former commander of the 1st Armored Division, will be overseeing an anticipated reduction in US troops in Iraq.
 

The Iraqi government, with a complete security cabinet, is now standing on its own. The seating of a government based on national unity was a critical precursor for future success. In cooperation with the Iraqi government, we now have an opportunity to capitalize on recent successes afforded by the seating of the new government and the death of al-Qaida in Iraq's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, laying the foundation for future prosperity in Iraq.

This month about 2,500 Iraqis are being released throughout Iraq as a visible symbol of national unity and reconciliation. Baghdad security is steadily improving as a result of operation Amaliya Ma'am Ila al-Amam, Together Forward, which started in mid-June. And provincial Iraqi control of Muthanna is set for this July. All of these demonstrate a real and tangible beginning to a new phase in Iraq's history.

Violence is not widespread in Iraq. Fourteen of the 18 provinces, which have 63 percent of the population, experience less than nine attacks per day. Violence is centered in a 30-mile radius around Baghdad. Eleven of those 14 provinces have less than one attack per day. While violence is still at unacceptable levels, it is declining when compared to the week following the Samarra mosque bombing.

However, violence and troop reductions alone are not an accurate measure of success in Iraq. We have achieved great progress with the Iraqi security forces and have 265,000 military and police. This translates to three divisions, 18 brigades and 69 battalions in the fight now. By the end of this summer, 75 percent of the Iraqi Army brigades will be in the lead. Ninety percent of the divisions will be in the lead by the end of the year.

Another positive sign of progress is the upcoming transfer of the Muthanna province to Iraqi control. Muthanna will be the first of the 18 provinces to assume full security responsibility. Achieving this is an involved process that shows Iraqi success in developing the government and security forces. As always, the Coalition stands by to assist, but the first line of defense for emergencies in the province will be the Iraqi security forces.

Al-Qaida in Iraq forces are significantly hurt, and the elected Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is making a strong stand and representing the Iraqi people - not sectarian agendas. Operation Amaliya Ma'am Ila al-Amam is succeeding in making Baghdad safer. Iraqis are increasingly taking control of their country as evidenced by the upcoming transfer of the Muthanna province. We are well postured to make 2006 a decisive year in Iraq.

 

General George W. Casey, Jr.  casey career

General Casey became the 30th Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, on October 17, 2003.
General Casey was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1970. Throughout his career, he has served in operational assignments in Germany, Italy, Egypt and the United States. He has commanded at every level from platoon to Division. His most recent assignment was as the Director, Joint Staff.

His principal staff assignments have been as a Congressional Liaison Officer; Special Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Operations Officer and Chief of Staff, V (US/GE) Corps, Heidelberg, Germany; Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff, J5; Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/J7, US Joint Forces Command and Director, J5, Joint Staff. He has also served as a UN Military Observer in Cairo, Egypt with the UN Truce Supervision Organization.

He commanded a mechanized infantry battalion, 1st Battalion 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; a mechanized infantry brigade, 3d "Grey Wolf" Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; served as Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver and Support in the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia and Germany; and commanded the 1st Armored Division in Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

General Casey holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from Denver University and has served as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
 

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
Armed Forces Staff College
Senior Service College Fellowship - The Atlantic Council

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES
Georgetown University - BS - International Relations
University of Denver - MA - International Relations

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

PROMOTIONS DATES OF APPOINTMENT

2LT 21 Oct 70
1LT 21 Oct 71
CPT 21 Oct 74
MAJ 6 Sep 80
LTC 1 Aug 85
COL 1 May 91
BG 1 Jul 96
MG 1 Sep 99
LTG 31 Oct 01
GEN 1 Dec 03

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

FROM TO ASSIGNMENT

Apr 71 Sep 72 Mortar Platoon Leader, later Liaison Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 509th Infantry (Airborne), 8th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe, Germany
Sep 72 Jun 73 Platoon Leader, A Company, 2d Battalion 509th Infantry (Airborne), 8th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe, Germany
Jun 73 Oct 74 Mortar Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, A Company, 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry (Airborne), United States Army Southern European Task Force, Italy
Oct 74 Dec 75 Student, Ranger School and Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Dec 75 Apr 77 Assistant S-4 (Logistics), later S-4, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Apr 77 Apr 78 Commander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado,
Apr 78 Dec 78 Commander, Combat Support Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Dec 78 May 80 Student, International Studies, University of Denver, Denver Colorado
Jun 80 Jan 81 Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia
Feb 81 Feb 82 Department of Defense Military Observer, United States Military Observer Group, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Jerusalem
Feb 82 Feb 84 S-3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Feb 84 May 85 Secretary of the General Staff, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Jul 85 Jul 87 Commander, 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado
Aug 87 Jul 88 Student, United States Army Senior Service College Fellowship, The Atlantic Council, Washington, DC
Jul 88 Dec 89 Congressional Program Coordinator, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, Washington, DC
Dec 89 Jun 91 Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC
Aug 91 May 93 Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
May 93 Mar 95 Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Mar 95 Oct 95 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), V Corps, United States Army, Europe
Oct 95 Jul 96 Chief of Staff, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 96 Aug 97 Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), later Assistant Division Command (Support), 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 97 Jun 99 Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Jul 99 Jul 01 Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 01 Oct 01 Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/Director, Joint Training, J-7, United States Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia
Oct 01 Jan 03 Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Jan 03 Oct 03 Director, Joint Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Oct 03 Jul 04 Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Washington D.C.
SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS Dates Grade

Department of Defense Military Observer, United States Feb 81 - Feb 82 Major
Military Observer Group, United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization, Jerusalem

Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs Aug 97 - Jun 99 Brigadier General
J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/Director Jul 01 - Oct 01 Major General
Joint Training, J-7, United States Joint Forces
Command, Suffolk, Virginia (No joint credit)

Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5 Oct 01 - Jan 03 Lieutenant General
The Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Director, Joint Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC Jan 03 - Oct 03 Lieutenant General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

 

Operation New Market Commences in Haditha

Operation New Market has commenced in the city of Haditha. The city is strategically located on the Euphrates River; it sits at the midpoint between Baghdad and Qaim on the Syrian border, as well as at the crossroads to a major highway to Mosul in the north. Wretchard’s prediction and explanation of The River War still holds true to this day.

American Marines currently garrison the Haditha Dam, but do not maintain a presence in the city itself. Over 1,000 Marines are involved in New Market, and while the force size is similar to that of Operation Matador, initial reports indicate New Market is not similar in scope. It appears New Market is a designed as cordon-and-search operation, where a region the city is surrounded and methodically searched for enemy fighters, weapons and support structures.

In Haditha, helicopters swept down near palm tree groves dropping off Marines who blocked off one side of the town, while other troops on foot and in armored vehicles established checkpoints and moved toward the center of this city, 140 miles northwest of Baghdad. U.S. warplanes circled overhead.

No significant arrests or casualties have been reported. Iraqi security force participation is minimal, as “a small reconnaissance unit of Iraqi soldiers is participating in the attack.” A good estimate for the size of the Iraqi unit would be a platoon or company. The Chicago Sun-Times states “Haditha has no functioning police force, and U.S. military officials acknowledge that their presence has been light in the city but say Iraqi troops are expected to arrive soon.”

Haditha is more closely situated to the American and Iraqi concentration of forces in the Sunni Triangle, and the real question will be is if this a a “search and destroy” or a “clear and hold” mission. The question will be answered if Iraqi security forces do indeed arrive and garrison the city.

K-2 Airbase, Bayji

K-2 Airbase is located in Northern Iraq. The airfield is served by one runway 9,870 feet long. The airbase is named after the K-2 oil pipeline pumping station. Among the targets struck during the 1991 Gulf War was the critical K2 pipeline junction near Bayji [Beiji] that connects northern oil fields, an export pipeline to Turkey and a reversible north-south pipeline inside Iraq. Camp Lancer In late April 2003 the 404th ASB (Aviation Support Battalion) located at a captured Iraqi air base near Bayji. The big news at for TF3-66AR at Camp Lancer, in Bayji, Iraq, the first week of September 2003 was the graduation of the first class of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. The infantry company, Bravo Company, 1-22 Infantry had been training the initial force for the past few weeks. The Lancers finished a weeklong mission in the town of Ash Sharqat, an hour's drive north of the base camp

This K-2 Airbase should not be confused with K-2 Airbase in Uzbekistan or K-2 Airbase at Taegu, Korea.

. Ash Sharqat is a town friendly towards the United States and US soldiers enjoy helping the locals to improve their living conditions. The civil affairs team has been active helping to repair and restore schools and clinics both there and in Bayji. Progress continued on the containerized housing units, and TF3-66AR hoped to move in soon. Living conditions improved daily.

In November 2003, during Ivy Cyclone II, a series of strategic operations conducted across Task Force Ironhorse, and throughout other operations, many soldiers assume traditional infantry roles. For the members of 3rd Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, conducting convoy security, raids and patrols are everyone's responsibility. Ever since 4th Infantry Division entered theater as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, soldiers from every job field have been called on to perform frontline duties in places where there are no frontlines. Filling in as security on convoys and missions has just become another part of regular duties for the computer technicians.

By late 2003 a number of contractors have started moving in. These include Washington Group, Bechtel and KBR (the company Dick Cheney is associated with). When KBR moves in, you know that's the place to be. They make sure their employees are living as well as can be. Parsons has been in contact with KBR for sharing Dinning facilities, well water for showers and the Rec Center (gym, movie theater, game room, etc.). By the end of January 2004 it will almost be like a mini city. Each one of these companies bring with them about 100 employees a piece. They each have different missions. The CEA (Captured Enemy Ammunition) project provides Bomb Disposal. The Washington Group is working on a project that involves the Tigris River. There are so many contract companies in Iraq, you never hear of them in the news. All doing various missions; restoring oil, water, electric, phones, destruction of unexploded ordnance. You name it and there most likely is a company here restoring it.

Haditha strike