KGB spares no expense on eavesdropping in U.S.

Editor's Note: This story is based on an exclusive three-hour interview given the Bulletin by the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat ever to defect to the U.S.

By WILLIAM F. PARHAM
Bulletin Staff Writer
GLEN COVE, LONG ISLAND — In the late 1950s nobody in this sleepy little town had any idea there was anything unusual going on in the attic of the Soviet U.N. delegation's big mansion tucked away on a hilltop off quiet, tree-lined Dosoris Lane.

At that time, Soviet interception of U.S. East Coast phone calls from the attic was just a shoot-the-breeze operation.

In 1958, 23-year-old Soviet diplomat Arkady Nikolayevich Shevchenko happened to spend three months living at the mansion in connection with his participation in disarmament negotiations at the U.N.

He and others associated with the Soviet Mission to the U.N. shared the sprawling three-story mansion and spacious grounds and gardens with a couple of technicians who never said anything about what they were doing.

Upstairs to nowhere
Shevchenko was curious about why the technicians were so taciturn, and why every day they would disappear up the stairs into the off-limits part of the attic penthouse.

"Already at that time there were a few people whom we immediately spotted, all of us," Shevchenko says.

"They didn't belong actually either to the mission or to the security officers who follow you or guard the mission or to any kind of management concerning the building or anything like that," he said.

"We even shared the same big kitchens when we cooked in there, and these people, they wouldn't talk.

"There were at that time two or three, and they were just technicians, radio technicians, electronics.

A KGB operation
"Of course later I found out that every-thing had been under the KGB, closely supervised by them," he said.

Shevchenko, a scholar whom the KGB had unsuccessfully tried to recruit when he was a student at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations, rose quickly in the Soviet Foreign Ministry hierarchy and became the youngest man ever to reach its highest diplomatic rank.

For five years beginning in 1973, Shevchenko was again living at the Glen Cove mansion, this time as Under Secretary General of the U.N.

He could see — and his contact with high Politburo and KGB officials confirmed what he saw — that by 1978, the KGB's mini-eavesdropping station had grown to massive proportions.

Didn't live in a vacuum
"By that time I had a lot of information about the KGB activities. I never had been KGB, but we did not live and work in a vacuum.

"They discussed with me a number of things. I was aware, I knew their personnel.

"There were more than a dozen people, professionals of the department of the KGB that is in charge of technical spying."

In April 1978, Shevchenko left his quarters here, broke with the Soviet government, quit as Under Secretary General of the U.N., and defected to the U.S.

By the time he left, the off-limits area in the mansion had been expanded to the entire attic, and outside to a huge locked greenhouse.

20 years of progress
Between 1958 and 1978, tons of electronic equipment had been flown to New York from Moscow and then trucked to Glen Cove, and the radio/electronic technician force that regularly disappeared up the attic stairs had added another dozen people to cope with the increased activity.

In the intervening 20 years, U.S. phone companies increasingly elected to bypass construction of expensive new land-line phone connections and to beam more and more of their inter-city phone conversations and computer data transmissions by microwave.
Microwaves are high-frequency radio waves beamed on a line of sight from transmitters to a series of relay towers spaced every 25 miles or so.

Microwave beams relay most U.S. intercity phone traffic plus many calls within cities, particularly when local land-line systems are tied up with heavy traffic.

Medals in the Rose Garden

During the latter 1970s many critics of the FBI were outraged because the U.S. domestic counterintelligence bureau was allowed to maintain 40 wiretaps in the U.S., a former FBI counterintelligence official recalled recently.

But aside from a few national security experts and such people as Sen. Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), nobody was paying much attention as the KGB routinely intercepted and recorded millions of U.S. phone calls a year and shipped tons of the recordings back to Moscow for analysis.

"We are standing around in the Rose Garden pinning medals on one another for having discovered that the FBI is tapping somebody's telephone," Moynihan said several years ago, while no one is doing anything about Soviet eavesdropping.

The pouch gets heavier

There were indications that the KGB's "take" was growing.

By 1978, the Soviet U.N. Mission's periodic "diplomatic pouch" -- escorted from the mission to Moscow every two weeks or so by Soviet diplomatic courier and free from any interference from U.S. authorities -- included perhaps two or three 100-pound bags of genuine U.N. mission business.

But the total number of diplomatic pouches leaving the mission with the diplomatic courier often ranged from as few as seven or eight to as many as 23 or 24.

According to Shevchenko, the extra bags contained KGB intelligence gleanings, much of which consisted of tapes of U.S. phone conversations being sent back to Moscow for detailed analysis.

If half the material in the KGB bags were phone intercept tapes, that could amount to perhaps seven to 10 tons per year of tape of Connecticut-New York-New Jersey corridor phone messages -- both conversations and data transmissions -- from the Soviet U.N. Mission in New York alone.

Instant processing

This doesn't count those particularly interesting phone conversations between Americans that the KGB considered important enough to process on the spot in Glen Cove, Shevchenko said.

Nor does it count the KGB's phone intercepts in the Washington and San Francisco areas, which may equal or exceed the New York "take."

And in the four years since 1978, experts say, the volume of such interceptions has increased.

Shevchenko says the recent restrictions on Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, have not cut the flow of tapes of phone conversations being shipped to Moscow for analysis.

"I think now they have more trouble because there is no direct line, no Soviet Aeroflot plane now in this country," he says. "But it's only a small nuisance, because they just take the train to Montreal and that's it."

Telephone company spokesmen discourage reports of phone circuit interceptions, and have said that such interceptions are unlikely because they would be impracticable and too expensive.

They say the complexity of phone company switching apparatus makes the routes a particular call might take totally unpredictable -- thus safe from intercept.

But Shevchenko said that private U.S. phone companies with limited budgets really don't appreciate that "the KGB has no limitations whatsoever on how much money they spend."

"They can spend money even at the expense of the Soviets who have no bread," he said. "They don't care."

"There is no other organization in the Soviet Union that has such absolutely tremendous funds, which are not checked by anyone except the Politburo."

Known major concentrations of Soviet electronic interception equipment are the East Coast from Connecticut-New York-New Jersey through Washington to Norfolk, Va., and the San Francisco "Silicon Valley" high technology mecca.

New York offers prime financial, U.N.-related, technical intelligence, as well as microwave relays for phone links between Boston's aerospace subcontractors or New York's submarine-related contractors and subcontractors and the Pentagon in Washington.

The Frisco goldmine

San Francisco's Silicon Valley area offers fast-developing aerospace and other computerized military technology.

The Soviet Consulate on Green Street in San Francisco perches high on a hill near the juncture of three key microwave phone relay paths and the high-technology "Silicon Valley."

In choosing a site from which to try to intercept microwave transmissions, height is an advantage.

Silicon Valley south of San Francisco is perhaps the most highly concentrated area of modern technology and research in the U.S., providing such vital military components as microcomputers, silicon chips, and fiber optics.

"In San Francisco when they got the consulate, it was an important thing for them," Shevchenko says. "That's why they were so interested in it."

For all practical purposes, says the former Soviet diplomat, the consulate is a front the KGB uses to collect such electronic intelligence.

Eastern Shore treasure

Norfolk, Va., the hub of U.S. Atlantic Fleet activity, offers particularly valuable ship deployment and weapons capabilities data.

In the mid-1970s, Shevchenko says, the Soviets were ecstatic when they were allowed to purchase a beautiful remote estate with several buildings on Pioneer Point on the Chester River on Maryland's Eastern Shore south of Washington.

"It was not accidental that they looked where to get that," Shevchenko says. "The Eastern Shore property happens to be in the main microwave transmission corridor between Norfolk, Va., hub of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet operations and the Air Force's major base at Langley Field, and Washington.

Several microwave relay links between Washington and Norfolk pass directly over the Soviet antennas.

"I'm not privy to the details," Shevchenko says, "but I remember how happy they were when they bought this estate."

At first the antennas went up slowly.

Later, a Navy source says, more and more antennas grew.

DC's antenna mountain

Washington offers unparalleled opportunities to pick up military, technical, economic, and especially political intelligence.

Since 1933 the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been in a Victorian stone mansion on 18th Street, a stone's throw from the White House. Numerous antennas sprout from the roof. The Soviets maintain they are innocuous.

A new Soviet embassy on one of the highest locations in Washington at Mount Alto at Belmont and Wisconsin avenues -- is nearing completion.

The residential apartments are finished -- complete with an array of antennas already on the roof.

The property is close to a microwave relay between Arlington, Va., and Gambrills, Md., that serves the primary telephone trunk group for the eastern seaboard.

A Department of Defense digitalized voice circuit relay link passes almost directly over the site from the Pentagon to Western Union's Tenley Tower on Wisconsin Avenue.

This new Soviet electronic facility and embassy complex is high enough to have very long lines of sight -- nearly to National Airport and Crystal City.

From a phone intercept point of view, it's a nearly perfect location.

"In Washington they will have everything," Shevchenko says. "They can listen to all the conversations from nonservice phones -- to the White House, to the departments, or to the Pentagon."

Tomorrow: Part II -- Trailing off Montauk Point for "pluckables."
There isn't much KGB eavesdroppers can't hear

Editor's note: This second story in a three-part series on Soviet eavesdropping on U.S. phone calls is based on a series of interviews with U.S. counterintelligence experts and with former UN Under Secretary General Arkady Shevchenko.

By WILLIAM F. PARHAM
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GROTON — Red labels on most Navy phones here warn users that calls from the phone may not be safe from eavesdropping.

"This is a nonsecure telephone subject to communications security monitoring," say the labels.

"Use of this phone constitutes consent to monitoring." The same warning might as well be attached to every phone used for long distance calls from Connecticut to Norfolk, Va., according to former Soviet diplomat Arkady Shevchenko.

Two groups do the monitoring. Occasionally the Navy itself has been known to listen to calls Navy personnel make on Navy-owned telephones to see how much vital data may be leaking over nonsecure lines.

The other group, the Soviet KGB intelligence service, listens in full time, tapes many of the calls, and every year ships tons of the tapes to Moscow for detailed analysis.

From the attic of the Soviet UN Ambassador's mansion in Glen Cove, Long Island and from other locations, the KGB monitors many of the nonsecure long-distance calls from southeastern Connecticut to Washington or Norfolk, according to Shevchenko.

Thousands of defense-related calls routinely pass through this corridor every month from the Navy's Sub Base in Groton, the Naval Underwater Systems Center in New London, Electric Boat submarine shipbuilders and other technical contractors in southeastern Connecticut.

Some calls go on secure circuits, on which cryptographic encoders and decoders complicate the task of interception. Many other calls from the same places go over open circuits, experts say.

Calls monitored from the Glen Cove attic are those which are relayed via microwave — high frequency radio signals relayed between phone company towers at intervals of perhaps 25 miles.

Most long distance calls in the U.S. are relayed by microwave. When local land line circuits are tied up, even some local calls go microwave. In southeastern Connecticut 12 percent of the local circuits, for example, are served by microwave.

Not only does Soviet intelligence use the Glen Cove attic for monitoring open intercity phone calls relayed by microwave along the Connecticut-New York-New Jersey corridor, but it also can pick up Navy radio messages to and from Navy ships including submarines homeported at the submarine base here, Shevchenko says.

Trawlers fish for "pluckables.

During periods of special interest, the KGB monitoring from Glen Cove can be supplemented by Soviet Navy AGI intelligence collection ships patrolling off the eastern end of Long Island Sound.

Last summer during sea trials of the first U.S. Trident missile submarine, SSBN726 Ohio, three different Soviet Navy AGI intelligence collection ships patrolled near the east tip of Long Island Sound.

At the time it was reported that these ships were interested in recording Ohio's sound and other signatures for reference by the Soviet Navy's growing antisubmarine warfare forces.

Navy sources said the AGI ships probably didn't have a lot of success in this effort. They may have had greater success, however, in another endeavor.

It is certain that these Soviet intelligence ships were also interested in listening to phone calls associated with the sea trials, a Navy expert has said — including those calls at the end of the trials that may have enthusiastically described Ohio's various successes in surpassing various design specifications including speed and quietness.

A Navy source has recently said that these Soviet AGI trawlers frequently spend long periods of time moored offshore near important U.S. missile submarine ports, listening to various "pluckable" radio frequencies ashore — including microwave phone-relay frequencies.

Until the Reagan Administration's recent ban, even Soviet merchant ships were pressed into eavesdropping service off U.S. shores.

These ships have very sophisticated arrays of radio intercept antennas, and their merchant seamen crews are known to include electronics experts.

Until recently, such ships were allowed to call at 40 U.S. ports, including New London harbor as long as the ships gave a two-week advance notice.

The range of microwave and other radio signals is known to be much greater over water than over land. Such signals do follow the earth's curvature somewhat over water.

The U.S. Navy doesn't know, however, what the Soviets learned about the Ohio sea trials.

CONTINUED
Guidelines promulgated during the Carter Administration prevented the Navy from listening in to the frequencies that Soviet spy ships lock onto if they turn out to be U.S. phone communications.

No piggybacking allowed

U.S. counterintelligence officials were prevented by Carter Administration guidelines in the late 1970s from determining how much the Soviets were listening to U.S. phone calls anywhere in the U.S.

U.S. officials were prohibited from "piggybacking" or listening in on any Soviet transmissions of data they intercepted from U.S. phone calls.

Soviet telephone interception computers can be programmed to listen for key words, depending on KGB priorities of the moment. Cryptography expert David Kahn said this capability is at the edge of technology and can probably be used by the Soviets to pick up perhaps 10 words or so, but probably not several hundred words yet.

Soviet Mission rules

Soviet electronic intercept capabilities exercised here in the U.S. can be read from the rules the Soviets impose on their own employees at the Soviet U.N. Mission in Manhattan, Shevchenko says.

Soviets in Soviet diplomatic outposts in the U.S. are prohibited from tapping secret material on typewriters or teletypes in outer rooms of the diplomatic buildings. Because of the interceptable sounds made by individual keys on the keyboards, the Soviet employees are allowed to type secret material only in inner, sound-insulated "referentura" sanctuaries deep in the center of Soviet embassies, missions, and residences in the U.S.

"They understand well the technique of monitoring everything," Shevchenko says.

They prohibit you to type -- not only can you not dictate a code cable, draft code cable, but you are not allowed even to type it on the coding machine.

"Because by the sounds you can get it. You have to write it, it should be handwritten."

Soviet KGB officials in the U.S. -- whose real missions are known to other Soviets here -- still go to extreme lengths to keep their own phone numbers in the U.N. mission secret even from their own countrymen.

Soviet intercepts of U.S. phone traffic are accurate, Shevchenko says, and the KGB is adept at sifting the important conversations from the several million calls intercepted every month.

"I know just from the conversations with them (KGB)," Shevchenko says, "it is important to know the telephone number from which they are calling, because there are millions of telephones.

"Sometimes it is very hard for them to know the telephone number. But if they know your private telephone number, they can do it.

Vibrating window panes

Soviet intelligence agents do not hold conversations on sensitive matters indoors in rooms with windows because listening equipment can be focused on those windows from distant line-of-sight locations.

Shutters are kept closed tight on all the windows of the Soviet 16th Street embassy in Washington, where every Soviet-bloc military attaché in Washington (all are military intelligence officers) gather for monthly meetings to discuss plans and projects.

In all these cases, Soviet practice is based on the perception that since they themselves have the electronic capability to monitor and record talk or keyboard typing from the outside, then the U.S. must also have -- and use similar capabilities.

To prevent long-range interception of conversations that vibrate window panes, some windows of official U.S. rooms in Washington in which high-security conversations take place are faced with window-pane shakers producing high-frequency window-pane vibrations to neutralize those caused by the sounds of the conversations inside the room.

This is designed to prevent interceptions by the Soviets, who are known to have laser equipment that can be trained from a considerable distance at any window in sight to pick up window pane vibrations from conversations inside.

Urgent information gleaned from the KGB's electronic intercepts can be in Moscow nearly as soon as it is intercepted.

Soviet diplomatic outposts in the U.S. are apparently equipped with burst transmitters and receivers which can compress hours of conversation into coded, split-second satellite-relayed transmissions.

Satellite relay footprints

In recent years many large U.S. companies, including General Dynamics and other defense contractors, have established satellite relay communications for an increasing part of their data message traffic between subsidiaries. These transmissions from one large steerable earthbound dish to one of seven satellites -- 22,300 miles high and back down to another dish -- perhaps thousands of miles away are also the target of Soviet monitoring.

The "footprint," or area covered by the beam on its return to earth from the satellite, is larger than the continental U.S.

In 1977 the Soviet Union spent several million rubles to install large (perhaps 30-meters in diameter) steerable dishes at various antenna fields outside Havana, Cuba, to intercept phone calls, telegrams, and computer data relayed to and from U.S. points by satellites 22,500 miles up.

TransAtlantic cables

Concerned about possible Soviet intercept of radioed transAtlantic phone communications, the National Security Agency persuaded the FCC in 1976 to require the construction of a 7th $300-million transAtlantic cable to be begun in 1983.

A year later, cryptography expert David Kahn wrote in the journal Foreign Affairs, "There have never been any reports of Soviet attempts to tap transAtlantic phone cables by induction because demultiplexing (sorting out) the various interleaved conversations would require considerable and complicated equipment, probably too bulky for a submarine to carry."

Since then, the Soviets have made significant progress in miniaturizing their computer capabilities.

Also, the Soviet Navy has begun adding two very large new classes of nuclear submarines to its undersea fleet.

The new 13,000-ton Oscar-class cruise missile submarines are nearly three times larger than previous Soviet cruise missile submarines.

If the Oscars aren't large enough for the task, perhaps the new 25,000-ton Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines -- twice as large as previous Soviet SSBNs -- would be.

Tomorrow: How much can they really hear?
How much can the KGB hear?

Editor's note: This final story in a series on Soviet eavesdropping on U.S. phone calls is based on an exclusive three-hour interview with the highest ranking Soviet diplomat to ever defect to the U.S.

By WILLIAM F. PARHAM
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UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. — Every once in a while the Soviet KGB intelligence service tips off the Soviet U.N. Ambassador ahead of time as to how Washington has instructed the American delegation to vote in a crucial Security Council debate.

The U.N. deliberations and the strategies of Soviet U.N. Ambassador Oleg Troyanovskiy and before him, Yakov Malik, aren't really the KGB's primary concern.

But the KGB likes to remind top Soviet diplomats at the KGB's growing ability to intercept simultaneously thousands of U.S. phone calls and instantly select those with immediately useful data.

Carelessness over open phone lines by employees of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. is vital to the KGB tips, says former U.N. Under Secretary General Arkady Shevchenko.

"Some of the people in the American mission talk either with Washington, directly with the State Department, or even inside the delegation in New York, they call from the U.N. building to the U.S. mission and talk, according to Shevchenko.

He says that despite U.S. government warnings, Americans continue to be extremely careless about chatting on the phone about classified matters. "You know, everybody is talking to anybody about everything."

He also says the tips show the KGB is able to monitor simultaneously thousands of phone calls in the Connecticut-New York-New Jersey area.

"There's no doubt about it," says Shevchenko. "Otherwise, I can tell you, if they were not able to do this simultaneously, they would not tell Ambassador Troyanovskiy or Malik before him a damn thing.

"I mean they don't pay much attention to that. The KGB would do their own job first, and GRU military intelligence would use more of the conversations of the American military.

"And the last thing they are interested in is what's going on in the U.N., and to help the Soviet Ambassador with something.

"From their point of view it would be much more interesting to get something more solid, rather than this petty business in the U.N. Security Council."

The '72 grain heist

The Bulletin has confirmed from another source that in 1972 the Soviet Embassy on 16th Street in Washington picked up inside information by eavesdropping on conversations between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Midwest grain dealers.

As a result, the Soviets outmaneuvered U.S. negotiators and signed a long-term contract for a record tonnage of grain — at bargain prices.

Presumably other political and economic negotiations important to the Soviets, including arms negotiations, receive equally attentive consideration from the Soviet electronic eavesdroppers.

Khrushchev's kudos

After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, reports former CIA officer Harry Rositke, Nikita Khrushchev complimented Soviet military intelligence for giving him crucial information from phone intercepts in Washington that helped him reach an agreement with President Kennedy that Khrushchev felt benefited the Soviet Union.

And during the Vietnam War, the KGB could and did monitor Defense Department message circuits used by the Pentagon to give instructions to Saigon and other overseas commands.

No safe phones in Washington

Shevchenko says he has been told by experts that there are no "safe" nonsecure telephones in Washington, period.

Even the White House, normally thought of as a highly secure area, has been vulnerable when outside callers have called in on nonsecure lines.

Washington is potentially an extremely fertile field for the hard-nosed use of juicy tidbits gleaned from unguarded phone conversations.

"Anyone listening in to a senator's telephone conversations for two weeks would own him," a Senate aide once cracked.

Originating phones

Experts have disagreed as to whether the Soviets are able to register originating phone numbers as well as the dialed, or destination, numbers.

"I think they can do both," Shevchenko says. "They are extremely sophisticated. Their ability should not be underestimated."

"I know just from the conversations with them (KGB), that it is important to know the telephone number from which they are calling, because there are millions of telephones."

Shevchenko says the KGB from the Glen Cove facility alone can computer-scan thousands of phone calls simultaneously, perhaps a million over a period of several days — by originating as well as by dialed phones.

This has been corroborated by a U.S. official who said that Soviet computers can indeed be programmed to pick up "pairs" of phones which most often yield interesting conversations.
"They've developed a real-time capability that can alert them instantly that a call has been dialed between two individuals who often talk of things interesting to the Soviets," this source said.

"Meanwhile, other lower priority calls are still being recorded and sent back to Moscow for routine analysis.

"If they tried to monitor all military or State Department calls, they'd go wild, but they can quickly target certain phones and pairs, such as calls between the Under Secretary of State X and Senator Y."

Interceptor proliferation

Soviet intercept facilities are not necessarily limited to official Soviet diplomatic, residential or commercial properties in the U.S.

Numerous senior Soviet intelligence officials live outside the official residence quarters in Washington and nearby areas — often on the top floors of their apartment building, where height is an advantage for microwave intercept.

One senior Soviet military intelligence officer has had an apartment near the top floor of a strategically located Arlington, Va., apartment house.

Phone interception equipment can be as mobile as a large portable television set.

"All it takes is a little black box in an apartment near a microwave relay," says one U.S. expert.

Not only can interceptors make use of such innocent-looking structures as apartments, houses, sheds or barns, experts say, but even specially outfitted vans can be equipped to do the interceptions — particularly if the vans can get close to the microwave tower or beam.

Military experts say the Soviets have for some time used U.S. phone intercepts for:

— Military weapons data and technical secrets to improve their own military technical capabilities and counter improvements in U.S. military technology;

— Military deployment (such as ship deployments) and operational practices data useful for developing effective and unexpected plans of attack;

— Political and economic data to aid various Soviet political and economic bargaining against the U.S.

A military officer said that one way the Soviets can use phone intercepts is to confirm, correct or elaborate on data on U.S. military plans and programs that may leak into print, such as Aviation Week and Space Technology — which the Soviets fly immediately to Moscow for minute analysis.

U.S. government technical people with first-hand knowledge of such programs are known to chat with colleagues on unprotected phone lines as to how close to the mark such news reports may come.

"Early attempts to cure

In the mid-1970s, the National Security Council considered a plan to abandon the widely used microwave telecommunications relay towers in favor of the more expensive underground cables.

After long discussion the Ford Administration decided to leave the decision to the Carter Administration, which decided against the move.

The Carter Administration did decide to encourage many defense contractors to spend millions of dollars on scrambler equipment to encrypt message transmissions that if intercepted might weaken the U.S. against the Soviets.

The Carter Administration also decided to begin to put underground all government phone calls in the Washington, New York, and San Francisco areas where the Soviets were known to have primary interception capabilities.

Some officials have believed publicity about Soviet intercepts would threaten similar U.S. capabilities in the Soviet Union, and thus would be harmful.

Others however have maintained that the U.S. is more vulnerable to damage from such practices, even if the U.S. maintained a similar level of surveillance of Soviet phone messages in the Soviet Union — and such capabilities reportedly do exist.

Leverage in a trusting society

It has been argued that since the Soviet Union is a closed society, U.S. intercepts of Soviet phone conversations yield more valuable information than Soviet intercepts of U.S. conversations.

On that count this seems doubtful.

First, the U.S. government has laged the U.S. in many crucial areas of defense technology — but is catching up now, apparently with a big boost from U.S. phone intercepts.

Second, the U.S. would normally be much less able to use information overheard in the Soviet Union to influence Soviet policy through "leaks" of material gained through the intercepts (see accompanying story).

The Politburo controls the news media in the Soviet Union.

And the Soviet media, in turn, is not the slightest bit receptive to walk-in "leaks" of material harmful to Soviet government policies — in sharp contrast to accepted media practices in the U.S. and other Western democracies.

A retired FBI counterintelligence expert says that Americans "only know the tip of the iceberg" of Soviet intercepts of U.S. phone and radio transmissions.

Speaking of Soviet facilities to select and record U.S. phone and phone-channel data transmission messages, this former official said:

"It's the most lucrative source of information the Soviets have."
WASHINGTON — Perhaps a quarter of the famous news leaks in the nation's capital over the past 10 years may have been leaked by the Soviet KGB — leading heavily on its interceptions of U.S. phone calls.


Shevchenko knew personally many top Soviet intelligence, military, diplomatic and Politburo leaders including Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev, KGB Chief Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and International Information Department Head Leonid Zamyatin.

On the basis of his long-time inside knowledge of Soviet policies, Shevchenko feels the growing KGB phone interception operation here reaps extremely useful information from unwary conversations between loyal but talkative Americans.

Shevchenko says the phone intercept information is used, among other things, for Soviet "disinformation" efforts, to leak something.

"That activity has become quite important," he says.

Speaking of the leaks in Washington over the past 10 years, Shevchenko stressed that most were the result of Americans at odds with their own government.

"But I would say that roughly speaking I would not be surprised if a quarter of them were due to some extent either to the KGB directly, or to the people linked in one way or another with the Soviets or the KGB," he said during a discussion of Soviet interception capabilities.

He said the Soviets clearly have an interest in anonymously leaking to major U.S. media some material gained through phone intercepts in Washington.

He referred to recent leaks of alleged U.S. plans to destabilize Nicaragua and leaks of Secretary of State Haig's private notes on world leaders as examples of the type of material whose publication could help accomplish Soviet aims.

If the Soviets can get hold of such valuable information, he said, "they'll use it against the United States.

Since the Soviets clearly have the technical capability to overhear considerable inside information in Washington and leak it anonymously to the media, he said, "of course it would be done."

Potentially embarrassing information can be either "doctored" or used "as is" and leaked anonymously to the press in the U.S. or abroad.

Such Soviet-facilitated disinformation campaigns, if successful, could have a shattering impact on U.S. public and Congressional opinion and could thus help change U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic policies in ways favorable to Soviet interests.

"There is a special disinformation department in the KGB," he said. "What do you think they are doing?"

"You can imagine how much attention they are now focusing on the matter of propaganda and disinformation, which is part of all the propaganda in which the Soviets are so sophisticated.

"They have now the big and very important department of the Central Committee, which is the Department of International Information headed by Leonid Zamyatin, who is quite an experienced man in managing propaganda. He was director general of Tass."

Zamyatin's department includes many top-flight, very experienced people, Shevchenko says, including first deputy Valentin Falin, former Soviet Ambassador to Bonn and one of the top Soviet experts on Germany.

"They're also using basically the communist parties, the so-called front organizations like the World Peace Council and sympathizers, who are not aware exactly how they can be used," Shevchenko says.

"Of course the journalists for them are very good," he said. "The journalists are sensational."

But performing the most sensitive role in the disinformation operation is the KGB, he says.

"They find the people who are in trouble financially or otherwise, or just against the government for many reasons.

"Or the people who would just like to help the Soviets."