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Sunday, June 3, 2001

For sale: Revered piece of Yugoslav past; downed U.S. jets are source of pride

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Peter Jaeger / Stars and Stripes

Anti-aricraft missiles similar to these Russan-made SA-3s were used by Yugoslavian 250th Rocket Brigade near Belgrade to bring down a U.S. F-117A Night Hawk during the NATO airstrikes in 1999.

JAKOVO, Yugoslavia — A few months ago, a Japanese businessman visiting Belgrade went souvenir shopping.

His search came to an odd climax when he learned of a most unusual trinket at the Yugoslav Aeronautical Museum gift shop.

The knickknack: small chips of the U.S. Air Force stealth fighter jet shot down near Belgrade on the evening of March 27, 1999.

“So the man buys 50 parts,” museum guide Petar Nedeljkovic said, shaking his head in amusement. “They cost 10 [German] marks [about $5] apiece.”

No word on what customs officials thought of his haul, but Yugoslav military officials still revel over what the 250th Rocket Brigade managed to pull off two years ago.

On a cloudy night, the Yugoslav air defense unit knocked a F-117A Nighthawk from the sky. A month later, the same unit shot down a U.S. Air Force F-16.

U.S. forces rescued both pilots, but the downings gave the Yugoslav people something to gloat about during the 78-day NATO bombing campaign, launched to abridge alleged atrocities in Kosovo.

“People are proud we shot down a stealth [fighter],” Nedeljkovic said.

So how did they do it? How did the Yugoslav military hit an aircraft viewed by many as not only invisible, but invincible?

On a recent visit to Yugoslavia, military leaders spoke of the downing, but in generalities.

The U.S. Air Force hasn’t gone into great detail either, though for different reasons.

Nick Cook, an aerospace consultant for Jane’s Defence Weekly, said there are three theories.

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Peter Jaeger / Stars and Stripes

Cmdr. Col.  Dragan Stankovic, left, and Lt. Col. Bosko Dotzic.

One raises the pall of espionage, while another attributes the downing to just plain luck. The last theory, which Cook views as most plausible, has the Yugoslavs using multiple radar systems to paint a faint, but decent enough profile for a skilled anti-aircraft crew to work with.

“Those are tactical and technical details,” Yugoslav air force Col. Radovan Rakovic said with a broad grin.

Rakovic oversees morale, and ranks at the top of the command structure.

“There is no aircraft that is completely invisible, nor do we have enough missiles to shoot blindly,” Rakovic said through an interpreter in his office at the Yugoslav air force headquarters in Belgrade.

Of the 476 Yugoslav troops killed in the conflict, 41 were air force personnel. A large plaque commemorating those who died is located outside the main building along a busy pedestrian walkway.

The highest-ranking officer killed was Colonel-General Ljubisa Velickovic, the second in command. He died in a bombing raid while visiting an anti-aircraft unit.

“All our airports on the ground suffered great damage,” Rakovic said.

The Yugoslav air force, he said, lost about 30 percent of its combat equipment and 40 percent of its combat systems.

“We were aware that NATO possesses all the contemporary armament systems and that, in all aspects, they were superior to us, with the equipment that we had available to us,” Rakovic said.

But knocking two U.S. warplanes out of the sky, he added, “is proof of the high readiness and high training of our members, and it’s [further] proof that, even with older equipment, you can counter newer equipment.”

One of Yugoslavia’s most heralded units was the 250th Rocket Brigade, which last year received the Order of the National Hero medal.

The brigade is on a Yugoslav military base near the town of Jakovo, about 20 miles west of the Yugoslav capital.

The commander of the unit then and now is Col. Dragan Stankovic.

During the campaign, nine members of the brigade were killed, and 13 were injured, according to Stankovic, who spoke through an interpreter. The commander said he had known one of the deceased soldiers for 20 years.

“We were protecting our country, our people, our families,” Stankovic said as he sat with members of his staff in a base training classroom. “And so that is why we were prepared to sacrifice ourselves to the last one.”

The unit succeeded, he said, because it recognized its weaknesses and tried to offset those with diligence and ingenuity. Each six-member crew worked in shifts and many were constantly on the move to avoid detection. Stankovic figures the crews collectively logged about 600,000 miles during the 78-day conflict.

By his count, the brigade hit 14 North Atlantic Treaty Organization aircraft and shot down 10 cruise missiles.

“I didn’t have time for hatred,” Stankovic said when asked how he felt about the U.S.-led NATO campaign, dubbed Operation Allied Force. “I spent my time finding adequate solutions to their aircraft.”

The unit typically uses Russian-made SA-3 systems, one of which was on display for Stankovic's guests. The colonel and his staff stood by as a surface-to-air missile crew activated a launcher located near a cluster of black cherry and plum trees.

During the conflict, Yugoslav anti-aircraft crews often gave their missiles female names before launching them, said Lt. Col. Bosko Dotlic, a battalion commander. The one that downed the stealth was nicknamed Natalie.

Asked how they managed to shoot down the F-117, Stankovic mulled over the question and its inquisitor before giving a measured response.

“I feel it is too early to discuss professional experiences from the war,” the 46-year-old commander replied.

Cook, the Jane’s Defence Weekly consultant, said the Yugoslavs may have used a detection method called “bi-static.” Basically, it entails positioning radar units at multiple locations, sweeping a particular area and melding the data to get a more comprehensive picture.

Bouncing radar off the F-117 from several locations can give an accomplished anti-aircraft crew something to work with, Cook said. Over time, basic flight paths and tendencies could be reasonably predicted, making the “invisible” aircraft more susceptible.

Cook said another possible method relies on a similar configuration of assets, but monitors electro-magnetic noise.

At least for now, one can only speculate on how this Yugoslav air defense unit managed to shoot down one of the U.S. Air Force’s prized planes.

“Getting inside the Serbs’ heads has been difficult” over the last couple of years, Cook said.

Back at the aeronautical museum, bits of the doomed F-117 fighter are on display. One section includes yellow detailing that features a pilot’s name: Capt. Ken “Wiz” Dwelle.

“It’s more like a trophy, isn’t it?” a man with an Irish accent said as he looked at the remains. “I’m surprised they put it on public display.”

He would have been even more surprised — and, perhaps, disappointed — if he had known that parts of it were for sale.


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