"The number one security challenge in the United Stutes now and probably for years ahead is to prevent these ueapons of mass destruction, whether chemical, biolog ical or nuclear - and the scientific knowl edge of how to make them-from going all over the world, to rogue groups, to terrorist groups, to rogue nations." - Sam Nunn, ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, speaking on "Face the Nation," Oct. 15, 1995.
For the first time in more than 25 years, the U.S. may be waking up to the seriousness of chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Several interrelated events have caused this awakening.
Five Russian defectors have reported on a massive 25-year effort to create qualitatively new families of CBW agents using the most advanced biotechnology. Arms control treaties were disregarded by both the Soviets and Russians. The Soviet program, code named Biopreparat, is roughly 10 times larger than U.S. CBW intelligence specialists had estimated prior to the Soviet breakup. Denial, Evasion & Stonewalling
Diplomatic efforts were initiated to convince the Soviets to cease and desist. These pressures were expanded as more information became available and as the leadership changed. Their response has been denial, evasion and repeated stonewalling. By mid-1994. U.S. authorities began to recognize that the Russian leadership either would not, or could not, stop the programs, whose total magnitude is still unknown.
The Gulf War exposed serious deficiencies in protective gear, gas masks, troop training and supplies of antidotes. Had Iraq unleashed its capability against the arriving U.S. deployments, the results could have been disastrous. To heighten concerns, this summer we learned that U.S. intelligence had seriously underestimated Iraq's CBW capabilities and that Iraq had a large stockpile of bombs and other munitions containing Clostridium botulinum, Bacillus anthracis and mixtures of fungal toxins similar to the "Yellow rain" of Southeast Asia and Afghanistan fame. Prudence would suggest that estimates apropos China, North Korea, Cuba, Syria, Egypt, Israel, Libya and Iran are also too low. In the wake of the Soviet breakup, a varied assortment of individuals emergedhawking military weapons and know-how. While nuclear proiferation and missile and submarine sales have received the most attention, by far the worst problem is CBW proliferation. To gauge its seriousness, recognize that the Soviet Biopreparat program involved more than 30,000 scientists, engineers and techniciansÑthe top scientific talent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They have been working since 1970 to create CBW agents that were different from (and more sophisticated than) nerve agents. The most recent event to raise consciousness is one Sen. Nunn highlighted: the release of a sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo commuter train by the Aum cult earlier this year. Reports in the open press have credited this cult with more than 10,000 members in Japan, 30,000 members in Russia and ties to North Korea; sufficient chemicals to manufacture six tons of nerve agents; the ingredients to produce botulinum toxin; attempts to obtain the Ebola virus: testing sarin on sheep in Australia; planning a coup in Japan; a war chest between $300 million and $1 billion; a Russian helicopter and two unmanned drones, ideal CBW delivery systems; setting up companies in America to obtain CBW supplies; preaching global Armageddon; and planning a CBW party for the upcoming Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in honor of visiting officials, including President Clinton.
This high-level awakening is long overdue and reflected in a sudden increase in CBW sensor development research and counterproliferation programs. Unfortunately, most of these efforts will accomplish little without corresponding changes in perceptions, policy, intelligence and organization.
Since 1969, the "conventional wisdom" has been that neither chemical nor biological weapons had any strategic value. Chemical weapons posed only a "battlefield" problem and biological weapons would be used only as an adjunct to general nuclear war, which was not worth worrying about. This perception blithely disregards 25 years of revolutionary advances in the biological and chemical sciences and the potential products of the Russian program. There is no allowance for "nonmilitary" CBW applications. Yet the most troublesome developments in the Russian CBW program are agents designed for covert use against diplomats, politicians and business executives. Also absent is serious attention to terrorist motivations and options.
U.S. CBW policy has put its full faith and credit in arms control. While laudable. arms control has serious limitations; it did not stop the Soviets, who used it to their advantage. When modern technology is considered, arms control becomes unmanageable. CBW agents designed for intelligence, political or commercial applications never make the agenda. Finally, arms control hardly applies to non-nation state players, such as the Aum cult.
This problem is exacerbated because so little thinking in the U.S. has been directed to examining what can be done in CBW with modern biotechnology. U.S. CBW thinking can be fairly said to lag that of the Russian's by a decade or more.
While an awakening has begun, actions suggest that the interest is still more superficial than real. There is no indication that any of the steps required to bring about meaningful change are under way or even under consideration. About the only visible action is the typical U.S. money and technology response. However, much more is needed than merely throwing money at the problem. A sea change in thinking is required.
The battlefield problem is serious but minor when compared with the rest of the problem. There is a panoply of new agents for military use whose target is not the battlefield. There are more agents designed for nonmilitary application - arguably the main thrust of Russian R&D. No U.S. agency now addresses these developments. CBW agents designed to put populated regions to sleep rarely appear in U.S. studies. Terrorism, and the techniques a rogue nation or disgruntled cult might employ, are not high-priority subjects. What consequences might have emerged had the Aum cult not been so open and technically careless in its operations?
On the defense side, a major overhaul of the procurement system is needed. Because the field has been so neglected for so long, it is, in general, not what one would describe as imaginative, inspired or energetic. Rather, with a few notable exceptions, programs are the product of mismanaged momentum. There is no effective advocacy group, no high-level political representation and extremely limited technical competence.
Stopping proliferation is critical. An effective counterproliferation program has to start with serious intelligence collection directed against the former Soviet Union. Mounting such an effort when the top brass still views such action as being politically incorrect, and when mid-level officials sabotage new collection initiatives, will be difficult. But it must be done.
The Next Step
It seems imperative to create a capability that is prepared to respond to events in real timeÑa CBW counterpart to the Nuclear Emergency Search Team organized many years ago to deal with a nuclear accident or weapons theft. Such a group would have the mission and mech anisms to examine the problem in all its lurid detail and set meaningful requirements for intelligence and technology. To work, however, it would have to be composed of people not part of the institutional CBW mind set.
Where we are headed is anyone's guess. Our top leadership now understands that the terrorist threat is serious. The next logical step is for them to expand their horizons and consider also the fruits of modern technology, the full range of Russian CBW, and sophisticated nonmilitary CBW uses.
Mr. Douglass is co-author of "CBW: The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb" (Institute for Foreign Policy Analyses, 1984) and "America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare" (Lexington Books, 1987)
Source: THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, NOVEMBER 2, 1995
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