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The Enemy of Europe

...by Francis Parker Yockey

ORIGINS OF THE WAR

To understand the origins and the morphology of the Second World War, it is necessary to grasp the fact that England passed into the American sphere of influence not after, but before, the War. In 1942, a member of Parliament stated that it appeared to him as though England had the choice of becoming an eastern outpost of America or a Western outpost of Germany. His statement did not cover all the possibilities, and was imprecise, but it was at least based on the political fact that England's independence and sovereignty had ceased to exist.

English independence began to dwindle away from the moment in History when English policy sought to preserve rather than to enlarge the overseas Empire. Inwardly, this point was reached when England's Conservatism, which had formerly meant respect for the Past, shifted to hostility towards the Future. The establishment of American hegemony over the Island could be proved by citing documents, diplomatic agreements, overseas telephone conversations, and the like. But such things, indispensable as they are to the historian, the journalist, and the armchair politician, are all quite unimportant from a larger point of view. For the great, indisputable facts of politics themselves show sufficiently the underlying power-currents. Neither power nor its movements can be concealed. What are those facts?

The aim of Politics is to obtain power. As we have seen, an elderly organism aims expressly at maintaining the present circumference of its power, although the precondition for maintaining power is the acquisition of more power. From the actual nature of Politics (and accordingly one could also say, from the nature of superpersonal organisms and the human beings in their service), it is evident that a political unit must not recklessly enter upon a war that cannot increase its power. To the entire world it was obvious that England could not have increased its power through a war against Germany.

A war that a political unit is not capable of pushing through to victory on its own cannot increase the power of that unit. The term “political unit” is used here in the strict sense, of course, and means a unit that possesses true sovereignty and thus has the ability to decide on its own initiative the War-Peace question; therefore this term cannot be applied to areas like Brazil and Canada. If allies are indispensable-not merely practicable and useful-for bringing the war to a victorious conclusion, then these allies will be the real power-beneficiaries of a successful war. The term “allies” describes only other, real political, units which can make the War-Peace decision on their own initiative; and here, too, areas like Colombia and South Africa are excluded. Obviously, not even with the remnants of its Empire and with its dependencies, France and Poland, could England have defeated Germany. It must be assumed that what was known to the entire world was also known to official circles in London. Nevertheless, in September, 1939, England began a war against Germany.

After the American declaration of war in December, 1941, it was officially admitted in England that the primary goal of pre-war English diplomacy had consisted in winning American military aid. What was not admitted, but was just as notoriously certain at the time, was that England's war-declaration had been made, first, with complete and unlimited confidence in America's assistance in every form; second, to carry out a policy that had been set in Washington and that in no way meant the continuance of English national policy.

It does not matter who begot the miscarriage called “collective security”— a mixture of legalism, naïveté, stupidity, envy, and senility. The fact is certain that only two powers in the world benefited from this policy: Russia and America. The government in London did not willingly favour Russia, but it worked, with full awareness of what it was doing, under pressure from the Washington regime, exactly according to its instructions.

The salient point here is that this fact, although satisfactorily proved by war memoirs, confessions, documents, and such, is manifest in the great decisions themselves. By way of example: If a power enters a war that it cannot win militarily, and that would not cause any power to accrue to it even if it did win a military victory, it requires no searching through history books to know that “power” is not acting in its own interests. In other words, it is a protectorate. From the standpoint of the Washington regime, the remnants of the English State were useful as a means of entangling America in a war against Germany, according to the 1916 formula, and the English Island was valuable as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier”— in the words of the American General Staff,— likewise as a conduit for men and materiel.

In these events, the relationship of England to America did not differ essentially from that of, say, Poland or Serbia. The Washington regime had England just as much at its disposal as it did Poland and Serbia. Only the strong power in a coalition can be said to have allies; the others merely are allies. In 1948, the post-War French government officially appealed to America as the “ally of France.” This appeal requires no explanation. History consists of the ridiculous as well as the sublime.

A state that needs allies can never obtain them; it can become the ally of another, more powerful state, and fight for the increase of that power, but the state that needs to ally is the subordinate one. An alliance is never the sentimental grouping of a club, dripping with friendship, that the journalists are wont to make it out to be. On the contrary, every alliance has as its basis Protection and Obedience.¹ Taken strictly, Washington and Moscow had no alliance during the Second World War, since the relationship showed obedience, to be sure, on the part of the Washington regime without protection (which is a corollary of authority) on the part of Russia. In a Protection-Obedience relationship, the protectorate is within the sphere of influence of the Protector, and therefore must obey it. However, America's self-robbery on behalf of the Russian war-effort was thoroughly voluntary, even though it was in complete opposition to America's national interests.

Two degrees of political stupidity are to be found in diplomacy. The first is short-range: lack of political skill, inability to carry on any negotiations successfully and to recognise short-term advantages. The second is long-range: lack of political far-sightedness, ignorance of deeper power-currents and the Ponderables of the Becoming. These two kinds of political stupidity stand in the same relation to each other as the Military stands to the Political. The Military is the weapon and the servant of the Political. Only disaster can come of military thought dominating political thought. “Win the War!” can never be an expression of Politics, for Politics is concerned with identifying the power-currents, choosing the Enemy, and weighing in relation to the national interest all happenings, inner and outer, according to how the war develops. To elevate the slogan “Win the War!” to the rank of policy, as America did during the Second World War, is the equivalent of saying that there is nothing political about the war. Military thought is simply not political thought. The permanent ambition of all military thought is to win a military victory; the corresponding ambition of all political thought is to win more power. That may or may not be implicit in a policy that seems to desire military victory at whatever cost, for one can probably adduce just as many historical examples of political and military victory occurring separately as of both coinciding neutrally. Likewise, if short-range political thinking constantly prevails over the long-range in the policy decisions of a state, the only possible result is that state's political extinction. No matter how skillfully executed its political manoeuvres, if a state has ignored the larger power-currents in puzzling out its policy, it will suffer a political defeat.

All these explanations and definitions apply only to real political units, for the microscopic destinies of such dwarfish “states” as San Marino, Monaco, and Belgium are completely determined by the Destinies of the true political units, the Great Powers, as the diplomatic concert of the 19th century liked to call them.

The Polish officials of 1939 were politically stupid in the first sense. Their country encircled by two Great Powers that had just concluded a non-aggression pact, they nonetheless chose to enter upon a war that would mean for it direct, permanent political extinction in the least desirable form: occupation and partition. Actually, it is pure charity to call the political dealings of those officials stupidity instead of treason, for shortly after the beginning of the War, they disappeared, going abroad to live on the capital they were able to amass owing to their policy. Treason and political stupidity are closely related to each other. In The Proclamation of London it is stated: “Treason is nothing but incapacity when it becomes resolute.” As used here, the word “treason” refers to treasonous conduct on the part of individuals. An individual may be able to better his personal-economic circumstances through an act of treason, but no group, no class, no organic stratum within a country is ever able to better the power-position of the country through a large-scale act of treason. In this sense, all treason is political stupidity.

The English officials of 1939 were politically stupid in the second sense in that they completely failed to identify the larger power-currents and likewise totally lacked statesmanlike feeling for the Definition of Enemy: The Enemy is the state that one can defeat and thereby gain more power.² Thus military victory over an opponent whose defeat proves so costly that one must take in the bargain a greater loss of power elsewhere must be called political defeat.

These English officials approached diplomatic preparations for the Second World War according to the old tried and true methods. They attempted to isolate Germany, concluding wherever possible war-alliances with Germany's neighbours (the “Peace Front”). They counted on American aid, trusting in the Washington regime's assurances that it would be able to lead America to war-despite the geopolitical position of America, despite the unanimous opposition of the American people, despite the conflict between intervention and the national interests of America, and finally, despite the fundamental spiritual indifference of Americans towards even a victorious war against Europe.

The question they failed to ask was: What is the final political aim? Or in other words: How will England's power be increased through a victorious American war against Germany? Had they asked this question, it would have been obvious to them that, since England could not win this war alone, any extension of power derived from a defeat of Germany would be for the benefit of America, or some other power. The result of their failure to ask this question was England's total defeat.

The suicide-policy of the English regime in 1939— it was continued throughout the War— has various roots, and the ultimate explanation of it will keep scholars and archivists busy. The essential facts are already well-known. First, political stupidity alone is not to blame: Some members of the government consciously and deliberately pursued a policy that was not pro-English, only anti-German. Second, some members of this regime were not officially part of the government, indeed, not even part of the English organism. Third, and most importantly, with Joseph Chamberlain the rich political tradition of England had been laid to rest. The succeeding statesmen were of lesser calibre; class-warriors, like Lloyd George and MacDonald; pure egotists, capable of representing any alien interest, like Churchill and Eden; even obsessed psychopaths, like Duff Cooper. Thomas Hardy did well to introduce the Spirit of Irony into his Napoleonic drama, The Dynasts, in which the paradoxical and the ironic make up the favourite conversation of Clio. How ridiculous in retrospect now seem the efforts of those officials in London during the period from 1939 to 1941: They sought to drag America into the War! In reality, the War was from beginning to end a creation of the Washington regime. If it ended in victory, victory could mean only an increase in power for that regime, or some other political unit, but in no case for England. The English nation was impressed into the War as a vassal that had been made to believe it was acting independently, and it emerged from the War with every characteristic of a colony. Only the definitive, legalistic formulation was wanting. Those at the head of the London regime who were honest, if also stupid, schemed to use America for their purposes. And precisely because of their scheming, they were used to forward the ambitions of the Washington regime.

1: Cf. IMPERIUM, p. 194, ff.

2: Cf. IMPERIUM, p. 137, ff.

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