
SSHD(8)			    System Manager's Manual		       SSHD(8)

NAME
     sshd - secure shell daemon

SYNOPSIS
     sshd [-diqQ46] [-b bits] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time] [-h
	  host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-p port] [-u len] [-V
	  client_protocol_id]

DESCRIPTION
     sshd (Secure Shell Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1).  Together
     these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted com-
     munications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.	The
     programs are intended to be as easy to install and use as possible.

     sshd is the daemon that listens for connections from clients.  It is nor-
     mally started at boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incom-
     ing connection.  The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, au-
     thentication, command execution, and data exchange.  This implementation
     of sshd supports both SSH protocol version 1 and 2 simultaneously.	 sshd
     works as follows.

   SSH protocol version 1

     Each host has a host-specific RSA key (normally 1024 bits) used to iden-
     tify the host.  Additionally, when the daemon starts, it generates a
     server RSA key (normally 768 bits).  This key is normally regenerated ev-
     ery hour if it has been used, and is never stored on disk.

     Whenever a client connects the daemon responds with its public host and
     server keys.  The client compares the RSA host key against its own
     database to verify that it has not changed.  The client then generates a
     256 bit random number.  It encrypts this random number using both the
     host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the serv-
     er.  Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is
     used to encrypt all further communications in the session.	 The rest of
     the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish
     or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default.	The client selects the encryp-
     tion algorithm to use from those offered by the server.

     Next, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.  The
     client tries to authenticate itself using .rhosts authentication, .rhosts
     authentication combined with RSA host authentication, RSA challenge-re-
     sponse authentication, or password based authentication.

     Rhosts authentication is normally disabled because it is fundamentally
     insecure, but can be enabled in the server configuration file if desired.
     System security is not improved unless rshd(8),  rlogind(8),  rexecd(8),
     and rexd(8) are disabled (thus completely disabling rlogin(1) and rsh(1)
     into the machine).

   SSH protocol version 2

     Version 2 works similarly: Each host has a host-specific DSA key used to
     identify the host.	 However, when the daemon starts, it does not generate
     a server key.  Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
     agreement.	 This key agreement results in a shared session key.  The rest
     of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently Blowfish,
     3DES or CAST128 in CBC mode or Arcfour.  The client selects the encryp-
     tion algorithm to use from those offered by the server.  Additionally,
     session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentica-
     tion code (hmac-sha1 or hmac-md5).


     Protocol version 2 provides a public key based user authentication method
     (DSAAuthentication) and conventional password authentication.

   Command execution and data forwarding

     If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
     the session is entered.  At this time the client may request things like
     allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP/IP
     connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
     secure channel.

     Finally, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
     The sides then enter session mode.	 In this mode, either side may send
     data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command
     on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.

     When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connec-
     tions have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
     client, and both sides exit.

     sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration
     file.  Command-line options override values specified in the configura-
     tion file.

     sshd rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
     SIGHUP.

     The options are as follows:

     -b bits
	     Specifies the number of bits in the server key (default 768).

     -d	     Debug mode.  The server sends verbose debug output to the system
	     log, and does not put itself in the background.  The server also
	     will not fork and will only process one connection.  This option
	     is only intended for debugging for the server.  Multiple -d op-
	     tions increases the debugging level.  Maximum is 3.

     -f configuration_file
	     Specifies the name of the configuration file.  The default is
	     /usr/local/etc/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no
	     configuration file.

     -g login_grace_time
	     Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (de-
	     fault 300 seconds).  If the client fails to authenticate the user
	     within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.  A
	     value of zero indicates no limit.

     -h host_key_file
	     Specifies the file from which the RSA host key is read (default
	     /usr/local/etc/ssh_host_key). This option must be given if sshd
	     is not run as root (as the normal host file is normally not read-
	     able by anyone but root).

     -i	     Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd.  sshd is normally
	     not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key
	     before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of
	     seconds.  Clients would have to wait too long if the key was re-
	     generated every time.  However, with small key sizes (e.g., 512)
	     using sshd from inetd may be feasible.

     -k key_gen_time
	     Specifies how often the server key is regenerated (default 3600
	     seconds, or one hour).  The motivation for regenerating the key
	     fairly often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after
	     about an hour, it becomes impossible to recover the key for de-
	     crypting intercepted communications even if the machine is
	     cracked into or physically seized.	 A value of zero indicates
	     that the key will never be regenerated.

     -p port
	     Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
	     (default 22).

     -q	     Quiet mode.  Nothing is sent to the system log.  Normally the be-
	     ginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
	     logged.

     -u len  This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp
	     structure that holds the remote host name.	 If the resolved host
	     name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
	     instead.  This allows hosts with very long host names that over-
	     flow this field to still be uniquely identified.  Specifying -u0
	     indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into
	     the utmp file.

     -Q	     Do not print an error message if RSA support is missing.

     -V client_protocol_id
	     SSH-2 compatibility mode.	When this option is specified sshd as-
	     sumes the client has sent the supplied version string and skips
	     the Protocol Version Identification Exchange.  This option is not
	     intended to be called directly.

     -4	     Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only.

     -6	     Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only.

CONFIGURATION FILE
     sshd reads configuration data from /usr/local/etc/sshd_config (or the
     file specified with -f on the command line).  The file contains keyword-
     value pairs, one per line.	 Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are
     interpreted as comments.

     The following keywords are possible.

     AFSTokenPassing
	     Specifies whether an AFS token may be forwarded to the server.
	     Default is ``yes''.

     AllowGroups
	     This keyword can be followed by a number of group names, separat-
	     ed by spaces.  If specified, login is allowed only for users
	     whose primary group matches one of the patterns.  `*' and `?' can
	     be used as wildcards in the patterns.  Only group names are
	     valid; a numerical group ID isn't recognized.  By default login
	     is allowed regardless of the primary group.

     AllowTcpForwarding
	     Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.  The default is
	     ``yes''. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve se-
	     curity unless users are also denied shell access, as they can al-
	     ways install their own forwarders.

     AllowUsers
	     This keyword can be followed by a number of user names, separated
	     by spaces.	 If specified, login is allowed only for users names
	     that match one of the patterns.  `*' and `?' can be used as wild-
	     cards in the patterns.  Only user names are valid; a numerical
	     user ID isn't recognized.	By default login is allowed regardless
	     of the user name.

     Ciphers
	     Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.  Multiple
	     ciphers must be comma-separated.  The default is ``3des-
	     cbc,blowfish-cbc,arcfour,cast128-cbc''.

     CheckMail
	     Specifies whether sshd should check for new mail for interactive
	     logins.  The default is ``no''.

     DenyGroups
	     This keyword can be followed by a number of group names, separat-
	     ed by spaces.  Users whose primary group matches one of the pat-
	     terns aren't allowed to log in.  `*' and `?' can be used as wild-
	     cards in the patterns.  Only group names are valid; a numerical
	     group ID isn't recognized.	 By default login is allowed regard-
	     less of the primary group.

     DenyUsers
	     This keyword can be followed by a number of user names, separated
	     by spaces.	 Login is disallowed for user names that match one of
	     the patterns.  `*' and `?' can be used as wildcards in the pat-
	     terns.  Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID isn't rec-
	     ognized.  By default login is allowed regardless of the user
	     name.

     DSAAuthentication
	     Specifies whether DSA authentication is allowed.  The default is
	     ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 on-
	     ly.

     GatewayPorts
	     Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
	     forwarded for the client.	The argument must be ``yes'' or
	     ``no''. The default is ``no''.

     HostDSAKey
	     Specifies the file containing the private DSA host key (default
	     /etc/ssh_host_dsa_key) used by SSH protocol 2.0.  Note that sshd
	     disables protocol 2.0 if this file is group/world-accessible.

     HostKey
	     Specifies the file containing the private RSA host key (default
	     /usr/local/etc/ssh_host_key) used by SSH protocols 1.3 and 1.5.
	     Note that sshd disables protocols 1.3 and 1.5 if this file is
	     group/world-accessible.

     IgnoreRhosts
	     Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in au-
	     thentication.  /etc/hosts.equiv and /usr/local/etc/shosts.equiv
	     are still used.  The default is ``yes''.

     IgnoreUserKnownHosts
	     Specifies whether sshd should ignore the user's
	     $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts during RhostsRSAAuthentication. The de-
	     fault is ``no''.

     KeepAlive
	     Specifies whether the system should send keepalive messages to
	     the other side.  If they are sent, death of the connection or
	     crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed.  However,
	     this means that connections will die if the route is down tem-
	     porarily, and some people find it annoying.  On the other hand,
	     if keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the
	     server, leaving ``ghost'' users and consuming server resources.

	     The default is ``yes'' (to send keepalives), and the server will
	     notice if the network goes down or the client host reboots.  This
	     avoids infinitely hanging sessions.

	     To disable keepalives, the value should be set to ``no'' in both
	     the server and the client configuration files.

     KerberosAuthentication
	     Specifies whether Kerberos authentication is allowed.  This can
	     be in the form of a Kerberos ticket, or if PasswordAuthentication
	     is yes, the password provided by the user will be validated
	     through the Kerberos KDC.	To use this option, the server needs a
	     Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's iden-
	     tity.  Default is ``yes''.

     KerberosOrLocalPasswd
	     If set then if password authentication through Kerberos fails
	     then the password will be validated via any additional local
	     mechanism such as /etc/passwd. Default is ``yes''.

     KerberosTgtPassing
	     Specifies whether a Kerberos TGT may be forwarded to the server.
	     Default is ``no'', as this only works when the Kerberos KDC is
	     actually an AFS kaserver.

     KerberosTicketCleanup
	     Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket
	     cache file on logout.  Default is ``yes''.

     KeyRegenerationInterval
	     The server key is automatically regenerated after this many sec-
	     onds (if it has been used).  The purpose of regeneration is to
	     prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the
	     machine and stealing the keys.  The key is never stored anywhere.
	     If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated.  The default is
	     3600 (seconds).

     ListenAddress
	     Specifies what local address sshd should listen on.  The default
	     is to listen to all local addresses.  Multiple options of this
	     type are permitted.  Additionally, the Ports options must precede
	     this option.

     LoginGraceTime
	     The server disconnects after this time if the user has not suc-
	     cessfully logged in.  If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
	     The default is 600 (seconds).

     LogLevel
	     Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
	     sshd. The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE
	     and DEBUG.	 The default is INFO.  Logging with level DEBUG vio-
	     lates the privacy of users and is not recommended.

     MaxStartups
	     Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated con-
	     nections to the sshd daemon.  Additional connections will be
	     dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime ex-
	     pires for a connection.  The default is 10.

	     Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the
	     three colon separated values ``start:rate:full'' (e.g.,
	     "10:30:60").  sshd will refuse connection attempts with a proba-
	     billity of ``rate/100'' (30%) if there are currently ``start''
	     (10) unauthenticated connections.	The probabillity increases
	     linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of
	     unauthenticated connections reaches ``full'' (60).

     PasswordAuthentication
	     Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.  The de-
	     fault is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to both protocol
	     versions 1 and 2.

     PermitEmptyPasswords
	     When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
	     server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.  The
	     default is ``no''.

     PermitRootLogin
	     Specifies whether the root can log in using ssh(1).  The argument
	     must be ``yes'', ``without-password'' or ``no''. The default is
	     ``yes''. If this options is set to ``without-password'' only
	     password authentication is disabled for root.

	     Root login with RSA authentication when the command option has
	     been specified will be allowed regardless of the value of this
	     setting (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if
	     root login is normally not allowed).

     PidFile
	     Specifies the file that contains the process identifier of the
	     sshd daemon.  The default is /var/run/sshd.pid.

     Port    Specifies the port number that sshd listens on.  The default is
	     22.  Multiple options of this type are permitted.

     PrintMotd
	     Specifies whether sshd should print /etc/motd when a user logs in
	     interactively.  (On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
	     /etc/profile, or equivalent.)  The default is ``yes''.

     Protocol
	     Specifies the protocol versions sshd should support.  The possi-
	     ble values are ``1'' and ``2''. Multiple versions must be comma-
	     separated.	 The default is ``1''.

     RandomSeed
	     Obsolete.	Random number generation uses other techniques.

     RhostsAuthentication
	     Specifies whether authentication using rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv
	     files is sufficient.  Normally, this method should not be permit-
	     ted because it is insecure.  RhostsRSAAuthentication should be
	     used instead, because it performs RSA-based host authentication
	     in addition to normal rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication.
	     The default is ``no''.

     RhostsRSAAuthentication
	     Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication to-
	     gether with successful RSA host authentication is allowed.	 The
	     default is ``no''.

     RSAAuthentication
	     Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed.  The de-
	     fault is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol ver-
	     sion 1 only.

     ServerKeyBits
	     Defines the number of bits in the server key.  The minimum value


	     is 512, and the default is 768.

     SkeyAuthentication
	     Specifies whether skey(1) authentication is allowed.  The default
	     is ``yes''. Note that s/key authentication is enabled only if
	     PasswordAuthentication is allowed, too.

     StrictModes
	     Specifies whether sshd should check file modes and ownership of
	     the user's files and home directory before accepting login.  This
	     is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally
	     leave their directory or files world-writable.  The default is
	     ``yes''.

     Subsystem
	     Configures an external subsystem (e.g., file transfer daemon).
	     Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command to execute up-
	     on subsystem request.  The command sftp-server(8) implements the
	     ``sftp'' file transfer subsystem.	By default no subsystems are
	     defined.  Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 on-
	     ly.

     SyslogFacility
	     Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
	     sshd. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LO-
	     CAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The de-
	     fault is AUTH.

     UseLogin
	     Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login ses-
	     sions.  Note that login(1) is never used for remote command exe-
	     cution.  The default is ``no''.

     X11DisplayOffset
	     Specifies the first display number available for sshd's X11 for-
	     warding.  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
	     servers.  The default is 10.

     X11Forwarding
	     Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.  The default is
	     ``no''. Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not improve secu-
	     rity in any way, as users can always install their own for-
	     warders.

     XAuthLocation
	     Specifies the location of the xauth(1) program.  The default is
	     /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.

LOGIN PROCESS
     When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following:

	   1.	If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
		prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
		configuration file or by $HOME/.hushlogin; see the FILES sec-
		tion).

	   2.	If the login is on a tty, records login time.

	   3.	Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits
		(unless root).

	   4.	Changes to run with normal user privileges.

	   5.	Sets up basic environment.


	   6.	Reads $HOME/.ssh/environment if it exists.

	   7.	Changes to user's home directory.

	   8.	If $HOME/.ssh/rc exists, runs it; else if /etc/sshrc exists,
		runs it; otherwise runs xauth.	The ``rc'' files are given the
		X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.

	   9.	Runs user's shell or command.

AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
     The $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys file lists the RSA keys that are permitted
     for RSA authentication in SSH protocols 1.3 and 1.5 Similarly, the
     $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys2 file lists the DSA keys that are permitted
     for DSA authentication in SSH protocol 2.0.  Each line of the file con-
     tains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a `#' are ignored as
     comments).	 Each line consists of the following fields, separated by
     spaces: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment.	 The options field is
     optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a
     number or not (the option field never starts with a number).  The bits,
     exponent, modulus and comment fields give the RSA key; the comment field
     is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify
     the key).

     Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long (be-
     cause of the size of the RSA key modulus).	 You don't want to type them
     in; instead, copy the identity.pub file and edit it.

     The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifica-
     tions.  No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.  The fol-
     lowing option specifications are supported:

     from="pattern-list"
	     Specifies that in addition to RSA authentication, the canonical
	     name of the remote host must be present in the comma-separated
	     list of patterns (`*' and `?' serve as wildcards).	 The list may
	     also contain patterns negated by prefixing them with `!'; if the
	     canonical host name matches a negated pattern, the key is not ac-
	     cepted.  The purpose of this option is to optionally increase se-
	     curity: RSA authentication by itself does not trust the network
	     or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
	     somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in
	     from anywhere in the world.  This additional option makes using a
	     stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
	     to be compromised in addition to just the key).

     command="command"
	     Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
	     for authentication.  The command supplied by the user (if any) is
	     ignored.  The command is run on a pty if the connection requests
	     a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty.	A quote may be includ-
	     ed in the command by quoting it with a backslash.	This option
	     might be useful to restrict certain RSA keys to perform just a
	     specific operation.  An example might be a key that permits re-
	     mote backups but nothing else.  Note that the client may specify
	     TCP/IP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibit-
	     ed.

     environment="NAME=value"
	     Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
	     logging in using this key.	 Environment variables set this way
	     override other default environment values.	 Multiple options of
	     this type are permitted.

     no-port-forwarding
	     Forbids TCP/IP forwarding when this key is used for authentica-
	     tion.  Any port forward requests by the client will return an er-
	     ror.  This might be used, e.g., in connection with the command
	     option.

     no-X11-forwarding
	     Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
	     Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.

     no-agent-forwarding
	     Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
	     authentication.

     no-pty  Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).

   Examples
     1024 33 12121...312314325 ylo@foo.bar

     from="*.niksula.hut.fi,!pc.niksula.hut.fi" 1024 35 23...2334 ylo@niksula

     command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding 1024 33 23...2323 back-
     up.hut.fi

SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
     The /usr/local/etc/ssh_known_hosts, /usr/local/etc/ssh_known_hosts2,
     $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts, and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts2 files contain host
     public keys for all known hosts.  The global file should be prepared by
     the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained auto-
     matically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host its key is
     added to the per-user file.

     Each line in these files contains the following fields: hostnames, bits,
     exponent, modulus, comment.  The fields are separated by spaces.

     Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns ('*' and '?' act as wild-
     cards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name
     (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when
     authenticating a server).	A pattern may also be preceded by `!' to indi-
     cate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not ac-
     cepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line.

     Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key;
     they can be obtained, e.g., from /usr/local/etc/ssh_host_key.pub. The op-
     tional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.

     Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are ignored as comments.

     When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
     matching line has the proper key.	It is thus permissible (but not recom-
     mended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names.
     This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different
     domains are put in the file.  It is possible that the files contain con-
     flicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can
     be found from either file.

     Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
     long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
     Rather, generate them by a script or by taking
     /usr/local/etc/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front.

   Examples
     closenet,closenet.hut.fi,...,130.233.208.41 1024 37 159...93
     closenet.hut.fi

FILES



     /usr/local/etc/sshd_config
	     Contains configuration data for sshd. This file should be
	     writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not neces-
	     sary) that it be world-readable.

     /usr/local/etc/ssh_host_key
	     Contains the private part of the host key.	 This file should only
	     be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to
	     others.  Note that sshd does not start if this file is
	     group/world-accessible.

     /usr/local/etc/ssh_host_key.pub
	     Contains the public part of the host key.	This file should be
	     world-readable but writable only by root.	Its contents should
	     match the private part.  This file is not really used for any-
	     thing; it is only provided for the convenience of the user so its
	     contents can be copied to known hosts files.  These two files are
	     created using ssh-keygen(1).

     /var/run/sshd.pid
	     Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
	     there are several daemons running concurrently for different
	     ports, this contains the pid of the one started last).  The con-
	     tent of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.

     $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
	     Lists the RSA keys that can be used to log into the user's ac-
	     count.  This file must be readable by root (which may on some ma-
	     chines imply it being world-readable if the user's home directory
	     resides on an NFS volume).	 It is recommended that it not be ac-
	     cessible by others.  The format of this file is described above.
	     Users will place the contents of their identity.pub files into
	     this file, as described in ssh-keygen(1).

     $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys2
	     Lists the DSA keys that can be used to log into the user's ac-
	     count.  This file must be readable by root (which may on some ma-
	     chines imply it being world-readable if the user's home directory
	     resides on an NFS volume).	 It is recommended that it not be ac-
	     cessible by others.  The format of this file is described above.
	     Users will place the contents of their id_dsa.pub files into this
	     file, as described in ssh-keygen(1).

     /usr/local/etc/ssh_known_hosts and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts
	     These files are consulted when using rhosts with RSA host authen-
	     tication to check the public key of the host.  The key must be
	     listed in one of these files to be accepted.  The client uses the
	     same files to verify that the remote host is the one it intended
	     to connect.  These files should be writable only by root/the own-
	     er.  /usr/local/etc/ssh_known_hosts should be world-readable, and
	     $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts can but need not be world-readable.

     /etc/nologin
	     If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
	     in.  The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
	     log in, and non-root connections are refused.  The file should be
	     world-readable.

     /etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny
	     If compiled with LIBWRAP support, tcp-wrappers access controls
	     may be defined here as described in hosts_access(5).

     $HOME/.rhosts
	     This file contains host-username pairs, separated by a space, one
	     per line.	The given user on the corresponding host is permitted
	     to log in without password.  The same file is used by rlogind and
	     rshd.  The file must be writable only by the user; it is recom-
	     mended that it not be accessible by others.

	     If is also possible to use netgroups in the file.	Either host or
	     user name may be of the form +@groupname to specify all hosts or
	     all users in the group.

     $HOME/.shosts
	     For ssh, this file is exactly the same as for .rhosts. However,
	     this file is not used by rlogin and rshd, so using this permits
	     access using SSH only.

     /etc/hosts.equiv
	     This file is used during .rhosts authentication.  In the simplest
	     form, this file contains host names, one per line.	 Users on
	     those hosts are permitted to log in without a password, provided
	     they have the same user name on both machines.  The host name may
	     also be followed by a user name; such users are permitted to log
	     in as any user on this machine (except root).  Additionally, the
	     syntax ``+@group'' can be used to specify netgroups.  Negated en-
	     tries start with `-'.

	     If the client host/user is successfully matched in this file, lo-
	     gin is automatically permitted provided the client and server us-
	     er names are the same.  Additionally, successful RSA host authen-
	     tication is normally required.  This file must be writable only
	     by root; it is recommended that it be world-readable.

	     Warning: It is almost never a good idea to use user names in
	     hosts.equiv. Beware that it really means that the named user(s)
	     can log in as anybody, which includes bin, daemon, adm, and other
	     accounts that own critical binaries and directories.  Using a us-
	     er name practically grants the user root access.  The only valid
	     use for user names that I can think of is in negative entries.

	     Note that this warning also applies to rsh/rlogin.

     /usr/local/etc/shosts.equiv
	     This is processed exactly as /etc/hosts.equiv. However, this file
	     may be useful in environments that want to run both rsh/rlogin
	     and ssh.

     $HOME/.ssh/environment
	     This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
	     It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
	     `#'), and assignment lines of the form name=value.	 The file
	     should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by
	     anyone else.

     $HOME/.ssh/rc
	     If this file exists, it is run with /bin/sh after reading the en-
	     vironment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
	     If X11 spoofing is in use, this will receive the "proto cookie"
	     pair in standard input (and DISPLAY in environment).  This must
	     call xauth(1) in that case.

	     The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization
	     routines which may be needed before the user's home directory be-
	     comes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environ-
	     ment.

	     This file will probably contain some initialization code followed
	     by something similar to: "if read proto cookie; then echo add
	     $DISPLAY $proto $cookie | xauth -q -; fi".


	     If this file does not exist, /etc/sshrc is run, and if that does
	     not exist either, xauth is used to store the cookie.

	     This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
	     readable by anyone else.

     /etc/sshrc
	     Like $HOME/.ssh/rc. This can be used to specify machine-specific
	     login-time initializations globally.  This file should be
	     writable only by root, and should be world-readable.

AUTHOR
     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu
     Ylonen, but with bugs removed and newer features re-added.	 Rapidly after
     the 1.2.12 release, newer versions of the original ssh bore successively
     more restrictive licenses, and thus demand for a free version was born.

     This version of OpenSSH

     o	 has all components of a restrictive nature (i.e., patents, see
	 crypto(3))  directly removed from the source code; any licensed or
	 patented components are chosen from external libraries.

     o	 has been updated to support SSH protocol 1.5 and 2, making it compat-
	 ible with all other SSH clients and servers.

     o	 contains added support for kerberos(8) authentication and ticket
	 passing.

     o	 supports one-time password authentication with skey(1).

     OpenSSH has been created by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl,
     Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song.

     The support for SSH protocol 2 was written by Markus Friedl.

SEE ALSO
     scp(1),  sftp-server(8),  ssh(1),	ssh-add(1),  ssh-agent(1),  ssh-
     keygen(1),	 crypto(3),  rlogin(1),	 rsh(1)

BSD Experimental	      September 25, 1999			    12
