AIR ATTACK [CAPT. McGonagle:] After general quarters was over from the drill, I lingered on the bridge for a few minutes. As I recall, the following officers were present on the bridge: LCDR ARMSTRONG, LT ENNIS, LT O'CONNOR, who is normally officer of the deck during general quarters, LT TOTH, the Operations and Navigator, also Intelligence Officer. LTJG PAINTER came onto the bridge after general quarters to assume the watch as the officer of the deck. As he assumed the officer of the deck watch, he indicated that he was having difficulty in obtaining an accurate ship's fix. At that time, and the time was approximately 1400. I personally sighted the Minaret at El Arish to be on a bearing of 142 from the ship and the range as I recall from the radar was approximately 25.5 miles. [CAPT. McGonagle:] At this point in the preparation of my statement, I referred to the quartermaster's notebook. 12-1600 watch. Thursday, 8 June 1967. I referred to this log for the purpose of refreshing my memory as to the initial moments of the unexpected attack. The log shows that at 1355, LTJG PAINTER relieved LT O'CONNER as officer of the deck. The log also shows that at 1355, ENS O'MALLEY, as junior officer of the deck under instruction assumed the con. The 12-1600 watch on Thursday, 8 June 1967 has no entry from the time frame 1356 until 1446. I shall relate in my own words and to the best of my knowledge and belief all events of which I have personal knowledge which occurred during that time frame. [CAPT. McGonagle:] The time gap in the Quartermasters notebook resulted from the fact that there were insufficient number of people in the bridge area to maintain an accurate record of events as they occurred and execute the orders of the Commanding Officer simultaneously. With communications to various stations limited various personnel, as they were noted on the bridge, were used as messengers. At one time during this time frame, the only individuals seen on the bridge were Quartermaster BROWN, who was on the helm, Ensign LUCAS, and Myself. Ensign LUCAS was busy relaying my instructions to the various battle stations. The smooth log will be a reconstruction of events as recalled by the Commanding Officer, who was present on the bridge throughout the entire incident and maintained his faculties at all times during the incident. [50] 1351 [LOG:] 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR 32,000 YARDS BEARING 082T - REJUHED TO BRIDGE AS 3 SURFACE CONTACT 1353 [LOG:] RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER SURFACE CONTACTS. 1358 [LOG:] SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM 135 DEG RELATIVE 5 - 6 MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE APPROXIMATELY 7000 FT. A/C PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP 1403 [LOG:] LOUD EXPLOSION - PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS 1405 [LOG:] SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM - LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF FRAME 85, 01 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED. 1405 [LOG:] ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLED BY ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH. 1405 - 1410 [LOG:] SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR MORE A/C MAKING COORDINATED STAFING, ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS OVER SHIP. THREE MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF SHIP WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED DURING THE AIR A ATTACK, ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 51, ONE KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE 01 LEVEL PORT SIDE. APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER, THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE AREA FROM SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS. [129-130] [CAPT. McGonagle:] About 1400 the lookouts, who were stationed on the 04 level, immediately above the bridge, reported that jet aircraft were sighted in the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars and there observed one aircraft of similar characteristics, if not identical to the two aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which a sighting report had been submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was about 135. Its position angle about 45 to 50 degrees. Its elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on a parallel course traveling in the same direction an the ship. While I observed this aircraft, I did not see it approach the ship directly in a hostile attitude. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from the port side of the ship. I immediately ordered the general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed on the 01 level, portside amidships, were burning furiously. It was evident that it would not be possible to reach the quick release lever by proceeding down the outside port ladders of the ship. I ordered the Executive Officer to go to the starboard side of the ship and proceed down to the 01 level, cross over to the port side, and there release the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'CONNOR was still on the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top of the ladder to proceed down the ship received an apparent bomb hit in the vicinity of the whaleboat stowed on the 02 level starboard side, immediately aft of the bridge. Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. O'CONNOR and others in the bridge area were thrown back into the bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were blown from their feet. [CAPT. McGonagle:] At this time I ordered a person, who I believe to have been LT BENNETT, to report to CNO via the highcom that LIBERTY was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate assistance was required. I do not recall whether I ordered any course changes to have the ship zig-zag or not. One helmsman was seriously injured in the starboard bridge bomb blast, and he was replaced by Quartermaster Third BROWN. I do not recall who had the helm at the time of the initial attack. [CAPT. McGonagle:] The response of the crew to general quarters was very expeditious. I do not recall whether all of the bridge personnel ever arrived on station or not, but the public address system, the 21MC, and most sound powered phone circuits were severed or destroyed during the initial first or second of the total number of six to eight strafing attacks that occurred. [CAPT. McGonagle:] It seemed to me that the attacks were made in a crisscross fashion over the ship, with each attack coming at approximately forty-five second to one minute intervals. After the starboard bridge bomb hit, I ordered personnel to be organized for a fire fighting party to put out the fire in the vicinity of the whaleboat. The whaleboat was burning furiously. [CAPT. McGonagle:] It is estimated that the total air attack was completed in approximately five to six minutes. [CAPT. McGonagle:] About midway during the attack, Ensign LUCAS was noted on the bridge and at that time he became my assistant and assisted me in every way possible. Runners were used to relay my orders to the repair parties, to main control and other vital stations. [CAPT. McGonagle:] Sometime after the starboard bridge bomb hit while on the starboard side of the Pilothouse, another attack from the starboard quarter proceeding forward was made and I was hit with flying shrapnel. I was not knocked off my feet, I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence. I noticed slight burns on my starboard forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my trousers right leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries. [CAPT. McGonagle:] Shortly after this I opened the bridge safe and took out a camera which was maintained on the bridge to take pictures of foreign ships and aircraft. I immediately took the camera to the port wing of the bridge and there was able to take several pictures of the planes as they had passed over the ship after their attack. In an effort to obtain documentary evidence to establish the identify of the aircraft, I retained this camera in my possession throughout the reminder of the attack. Later I took pictures of the torpedo boats before and after the torpedo attack, also the helicopters which approached the ship after the attack was over. This film has been turned over to the USS AMERICA for development and further disposition. [CAPT. McGonagle:] On what appeared to be the last air attack on the ship, I observed a cylindrical object dropped from one of the aircraft as it was passing from port to starboard ahead of the ship. This object landed in the water an estimated 75 to 100 yards directly ahead of the ship. There was no explosion from this object, but it shattered into several pieces. It appeared to me that it might have been an empty wing tank but I am not certain of this. 141? [LOG:] BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS. 1424 [LOG:] 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD 1BEAM DISTANCE 4 -5 MILES [CAPT. McGonagle:] In the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 at a distance of about 15 miles. The ship at the time was still on course 283 true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots. At no time did the ship stop during the air attack. It is believed that the time of initial sighting of the torpedo boats, the time was about 1420. The boats appeared to be in a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about 27 to 30 knots. They appeared to be about 150 to 200 yards apart. [LT. Golden:] After completing general quarters, I came from the engineering and went to the port side of the ship, the motor whaleboat started smoking instantly, and walked into the wardroom to have a quick cup of coffee before going to my office. I sat down in the forward part of the wardroom, and I had no more had set down when the word was passed to stand clear of the motor whaleboat while testing. Immediately, there was a bang, and the first thought came to my head that the whaleboat had been dropped into the water. I jumped to the porthole, looked out, and there was black smoke coming up from the side of the ship. I immediately ran to the door to the wardroom to go outside. The second I hit the door, I heard the word passed, "General Quarters, all hands man your battle stations." And then the alarm went off. [LT. Golden:] Before I had gotten clear of the door, the word was also passed over the PA system, which sounded like the Commanding Officer's voice, telling radio central to notify high command that we were under air attack. [LT. Golden:] When I hit the deck plate in the engineroom main control in front of the throttle board at 1405, I knew it was this time because the tachometers were ringing up at the same time flank speed. I had informed over the 1MC the Captain it would take me a couple of minutes to bring the other boiler on the line, as we had just secured it to repair a gasket. The Commanding Officer told me to get it on as soon as possible and give him all the turns possible. [LT. Golden:] Within a few minutes we were doing 86 rpms, until there was a hit and I lost electrical power. We went dead in the water. Counsel for the Court: Would you please read pertinent extracts from these logs? [LT. Golden:] Aye, sir. In the engineering smooth log on the 12 to 1600 watch on 8 June 1967 - The log is signed by R. J. BROOKS, Machinist Mate Chief, 1405 [ENG. LOG:] general quarters under attack. 1406 [ENG. LOG:] granted permission to fire room to light fires in number two boiler. 1406 [ENG. LOG:] informed throttleman to maneuver at various speeds, to draw steam no less than 400 pounds. 1407 [ENG. LOG:] reported condition Zebra set. 1408 [ENG. LOG:] secured number one and number two distilling units in order to have more steam or speed. [Chief Lamkin:] Yes, sir, I was secured from GQ drill shortly before the attack and at the time of the attack I was in the disbursing office, I noticed the initial shock and immediately headed for my GQ station which is repair three. As I was going to my GQ station the word was passed that we were being attacked by aircraft. Upon arriving to my GQ station I immediately started dispensing the gear, settling the men down. Q. Your GQ station is where? [Chief Lamkin:] Repair Three. After there we got together. We had the men lay low on the deck, you could hear the strafing. At this time the word was passed that they had a fire in shaft alley and I took approximately four men and went down to shaft alley. The fire in shaft alley was under control in a matter of minutes. When I came back up they were calling for stretcher bearers and the men were dispensed for that. At this time they said they had a fire on the bridge in the motor whale boat and they were calling for assistance. I took repair three alpha plus some other men that were there and headed for the motor whale boat. As I was up an deck, portside by the U boat I was knocked down by some sort of explosion. I got up and went up and the men were already fighting the fire in the whale boat. It was pretty well destroyed at the time. As I was standing there we were strafed again and one of the men to my left fell. I don't remember his identity, he was picked up and drug inside. I turned to run forward when I came across the body of Mr. Toth who was pretty well messed up. I remember getting kind of sick at my stomach for a second or so. At this time I remember they had the fire pretty well under control. I went back down to my GQ which is repair three. I don't remember any of the time lapse during that time but I do remember them announcing to prepare for a torpedo attack starboard side. [Ensign Lucas:] Yes Sir. We had a general quarters drill which secured shortly prior to 1400. After securing from the drill I came to the wardroom and was in the presence of Lieutenant Golden and Ensign Scott. Ensign Scott left the wardroom and we heard the word passed over the 1MC to stand clear of the motor whaleboat while testing engines. Very shortly after that word was passed we heard what sounded like a very loud thump or crash. Mr. Golden and I half jumped from our seats, we looked at each other, and both thought that the motor whaleboat had fallen from its davit onto the deck. We went to the closest porthole, pulled the curtains, and did see some dust and black smoke rising. [Ensign Lucas:] It was at this time that the general quarters alarm was sounded, and we knew that we had been attacked. I went into the passageway outside the wardroom via athwartships passageway to the starboard side of the main deck and from there used the ladder to go to the bridge, the 03 level. Upon arriving on the bridge I got my battle helmet and my life jacket from the starboard gear locker and was just getting ready to go to my general quarters station which is on the 04 level, the flying bridge. We were hit by what I assume to be the second pass of aircraft. Another man was next to me. I think he was a signalman. We both hit the deck just outside the starboard hatch leading to the pilothouse. Three or four shells hit in our area. After that shelling had ceased, I went into the pilothouse, didn't figure it was too safe to go to the 04 level at that time. Another pass was made and everyone in the pilothouse hit the deck. When I did enter the pilothouse, the officer of the deck for general quarters, LT. O'CONNER, had already been injured and had been carried into CIC, which is just aft of the pilothouse. The junior officer of the deck at general quarters, LT ENNES, was lying in the after portion of the pilothouse and appears to have [deleted]. I can't recall what other personnel were on the bridge at that time. It consisted of several phone talkers and a third class quartermaster, BROWN, was at the helm, which was his general quarters station. [Ensign Lucas:] I left the pilothouse, came to the wardroom to learn the condition of LT. O'CONNER and LT Ennis. Came down the ladder in the superstructure. When I got to the 02 level, the men were carrying the Executive Officer LCDR ARMSTRONG, down to the wardroom for medical aid. At the time I saw him, he appeared to be in shock, was very pale, and was not saying anything. Mr. ENNES had gotten partially down - they were having difficulty carrying him down and he was in the passageway outside his stateroom, waiting for attention to his leg. I came into the wardroom and there were at least half a dozen casualties in there being treated. Several of the enlisted men had been in the spaces forward of the superstructure, and the IC shop and the emergency diesel room. These areas had been shelled very heavily on one of the first passes. I found out the emergency diesel did not work and that the gyro was not functioning either. [Ensign Lucas:] I left the wardroom area. Somehow we received word that there was a fire burning on the 01 level, port side. It was in the vicinity where two 55 gallon drums of P-250 fuel was stored. Some enlisted men in the passageways got a hose and were putting out the fire. The fire had spread aft of the P-250 cans and the four life rafts were burning on the 01 level. I can't remember the exact amount of time that I did spend in the superstructure area. When I was in the passageways, I hear we did receive some more shelling. [Ensign Lucas:] I returned to the bridge. To the best of my knowledge, when I did return to the bridge, the only people present were the Commanding Officer, one phone talker, who was lying on the deck in the chart room, quartermaster BROWN on the helm and myself. Before I went back to the bridge, we had received word over the phones that were working, we had very little communication as such, the 1MC was hit and not functioning. The only communications we had were via sound-powered phones. We had received the word "standby for a torpedo attack". [Ensign Lucas:] The Commanding Officer had been injured in his right leg on what must have been the first aircraft pass. He was bleeding profusely. The Captain had been administered first aid and he had a belt tourniquet around his leg. He insisted on being everywhere that he could. He was on both wings, in and out of the pilothouse, taking pictures. I believe at the time I was giving orders to after steering the bleeding had started again on the Captains leg wound. I'm just theorizing that the shell fragment that was lodged in the leg had been discharged by his movement. We called the corpsman, and the Captain was stretched out on the port wing, being administered first aid. He was still calling orders in to me to relay on to after steering. Bleeding did stop and the Commanding Officer once again was, well, this time he was placed in his chair on the port wing. He gave orders there for quite awhile. Q. Backtracking to a point during the heat of combat, did you observe the Captain when he was initially wounded. [Ensign Lucas:] Yes, I did. Q. And he continued on in this condition without stopping for assistance by medical? [Ensign Lucas:] That is correct. It was quite awhile before he did slow down enough to have the belt tourniquet put on the leg. I assisted with that. I used my belt, and after that a corpsman came up just long enough to adjust the tourniquet and take a look at the Commanding Officer. He did not want any further medical attention and he did not receive any more until the bleeding started a second time, when I think the shell fragment was worked loose. Q. In the first portion of your testimony, you mention shelling, what did you intend to convey by the word "shelling"? [Ensign Lucas:] The first hit, the first noise that LT GOLDEN and I heard when we were in the wardroom was obviously a heavy hit. I assumed this was aircraft and it sounded to us as if It hit on the starboard side. Like I said, we thought it was the motor whaleboat falling from its davit onto the deck. I mentioned shelling again just as soon as I had put on my battle helmet and life jacket on the bridge. This again, I would say was aircraft cause there was a whistling sound several seconds before the actual burst and noise itself came. After I had gone inside the pilothouse and was on the deck, there was another series of whistling sounds preceding the hits. Here again, I assume it was aircraft. When I had come down to the wardroom, was lending a hand to getting the hose to fight the fire on the port side, there were more easily discernible whistling sounds, even in the passageways, that were aircraft hits. The two men who were handling the hose were keeping an eye out for aircraft. They would put out the fire until another plane came over and then they ducked back inside. Q. Do you have any idea how many aircraft were involved? [Ensign Lucas:] I did not actually see any of the aircraft. Q. During the time that you were on the bridge, did you receive any lookout reports via sound-powered telephones? [Ensign Lucas:] During the attack? Q. During the attack. [Ensign Lucas:] When I got up to the bridge, as I said I did not get to the 04 level which was my general quarters station. During general quarters, the two air lookouts were on the 04 level, but they had not made it up there either. I cannot recall seeing a surface lookout on either side of the bridge when I got there. The shelling from the aircraft had either injured them, or they had taken cover inside the pilothouse. [Ensign Lucas:] On the forward mounts, I said we had no communications up there. My third class gunner's mate, THOMPSON, according to several witnesses, and to the members of repair two, which is located directly beneath mount 51, said that petty officer THOMPSON went to mount 51 when GQ sounded. He was below decks. His station is with me on the 04 level. Guess he figured he didn't have time to get up there. He went to the closest gun and from the account given by the people in repair two, it sounded as if he got off half a box of ammo at the aircraft. They somehow missed him on the first strafing attack. Several witnesses said that he had the aircraft under fire while it was circling for the second pass and it was during the second pass that he was cut in half by a rocket, but he had the aircraft under fire and got off at least half a box of 50 caliber ammo. Q. When did you receive your injuries? [Ensign Lucas:] As soon as I had gotten to the bridge and put on the battle helmet, I mentioned what I assumed were rockets from the aircraft hit in the immediate vicinity. I hit the deck and picked up several pieces of [deleted] One of them was bleeding enough that I took out my handkerchief and wrapped it around [deleted]. [Ensign Lucas:] The piece of fragment that hit me in the [deleted] occurred much later, after I had been to the wardroom, returned to the bridge, and after the quartermaster had been killed on the helm. The commanding Officer came from the port wing into the pilothouse, and he said "standby for another attack". I don't recall if it was surface, air, or torpedo. He said "take cover". I heard some firing, some ricocheting off the starboard side. I assumed it was from the patrol craft. I was in the rear portion of the pilothouse and tried to crawl behind the water fountain as best I could, and I got most of me back when I felt something hit me just to the right of [deleted] it started bleeding rapidly. I tore off the [deleted] over the wound and just continued on from there. President:. Q. A question if you please - would you be kind enough to expand on the performance of duty of a young man mentioned earlier in your testimony, named LARKINS? [Ensign Lucas:] Seaman LARKINS helps man mount 54, 03 level, port side, as his general quarters station. He was on that mount, and stayed on that mount, until the fire coming from the 01 level chased him away. He did recall seeing a plane approaching from the port side and lobbing a cylinder that was attached under the wing. A cylinder five to six feet long, approximately ten inches in diameter. This cylinder approached the 01 level port side in an end over end fashion. After it hit, and the fire started, he climbed over the skylight to mount 53 and helped the gun crew there until the fire from the motor whaleboat drove all people away from that mount. I later personally saw him helping to extinguish the fire on the port side and still later, he, by himself, manned mount 51 and fired one shot before he received a cease fire from the Commanding Officer. Some place between 1335 and 1350 I again assumed con from Mr. ENNIS. [Ensign O'Mallery:] At about 1402, 03, or 04, something like that, I was looking at the radar screen, and trying to get a fix. I noticed three contacts coming off the shore and I said, "Lloyd, I think I have three contacts here." He said, "I think I'll talk to the gun mounts on the phone circuits." He tried to talk to them, and before I knew it, just as he was about to say "gun mounts 51 and 52" a jet opened up. It was just, "boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom," and all of a sudden I found myself down on one knee. Someone yelled general quarters, I yelled general quarters, and I left the bridge, and as I went passed, I noticed that the general alarm was sounding. I went into CIC. To return to what had elapsed, well, by the time I took over the con it was 12 o'clock, and the time I was relieved it was approximately 1345. [LTJG. Painter:] Yes sir. I was at this time, the officer of the deck. I had the 12 to 1600 watch that afternoon, and we had had a practice general quarters drill at 1300 and secured from that at approximately 1345, 1350. And during general quarters I left the bridge and went to my general quarters station, which is repair three, located on the mess docks. After this drill was over, I went back up to the bridge to relieve the watch, and when I came up to the bridge, I was Q. What time was that? [LTJG. Painter:] Sir, I think it was 1350, thereabouts. I came back up to the bridge and relieved Mr. O'CONNOR who was the general quarters OOD, and assumed the watch. The first thing I was concerned with was getting a fix, and I remember distinctly checking the radar, and the nearest point of land on the radar at approximately 1355 was 17.5 miles. And I remember distinctly asking the Captain if I could come back to our base course, which I believe was set at about 14 and a half miles. We were about three miles outside of base course. About this time, it was around 1400, the Captain was on the starboard wing. He was watching some jet aircraft. The Captain was on the starboard wing, and he was looking up in the air at a couple of jet aircraft. He called me out there and said, "you'd better call the forward gun mounts." He said "I think they're going to attack," or words to that effect. So, I ran into the bridge area and tried to call the port and starboard gun mounts forward. I couldn't get them; I called them about three times, and about the third time I said, "bridge, gun mounts 51 and 52." They were hit. I can't testify exactly which one was hit first, port or starboard; they were both hit so fast. I believe the starboard one was hit first. At this time, I still had the phone in my hand, I was looking through the porthole at the gun mounts. I was looking through the porthole when I was trying to contact these two kids, and I saw them both; well, I didn't exactly see them as such. They were blown apart, but I saw the whole area go up in smoke and scattered metal. And, at about the same time the aircraft strafed the bridge area itself. The quartermaster, Quartermaster third class POLLARD was standing right next to me, and he was hit, evidently with flying glass from the porthole. I don't know why I came out without a scratch. I was standing, as I said, right next to him. Finally, about this time they started strafing and we both hit the deck, as well as Mr. O'MALLEY, who was my JOOD at the time. As soon as the first strafing raid had been made, we sounded general quarters alarm. The Captain was on the bridge, He was in the pilot house at this time. I don't know whether he was hit then or not, I can't remember. It was so smokey. [LTJG. Painter:] I took off for my general quarters station, which, as I said before, was repair three on the mess decks. On the way down I was running as fast as I could. By the time I got to the Chief's Lounge, the entrance through the lounge to the mess docks, I saw SPICER, our postal clerk, lying there cut in half with strafing and the hospital corpsman was applying mouth to mouth resuscitation. This I later found out failed. He died right there. [LTJG. Painter:] Well, anyway, I got down to the mess decks and all my men were assembling there as fast as possible. They went to full battle dress, and so did I. I can't recall exactly how long we were waiting for the strafing raids to be over, but I believe it was approximately 20 minutes. [LTJG. Painter:] At this time someone, I believe it was one of the quartermasters, came down and called me to the bridge. He said, "the Captain's hurt and the operations officer was dead, and the executive officer was mortally wounded." I ran up to the bridge. And when I got up there, the Captain was laying on the stretcher up there while trying to get underway. He thought for a while I think, I'm not sure, that he would pass out, and he wanted somebody up there to take over. He wanted somebody up there in case he did. I'm not sure, but I think that is why he had called me up there. I don't know whether he called me up there, or the quartermaster just took it on his own to get me up there. I never found out. [LTJG. Painter:] So, I was up there for a few minutes and it looked like the strafing raids were over, and some of the people were coming out and looking around and my repair chief had come out to assess some of the damage. When I saw him an the 01 level aft, I told him to take over Repair Three as I would be on the bridge. Well, by this times, the Captain had regained consciousness and told me that I would best be needed in Repair Three. Q. Was that the Captain? [LTJG. Painter:] Yes sir. So I left and went back to Repair Three, and, I don't know how long, time was slipping by so fast at this time, after that we had our first torpedo attack. [LT. Pfeiffer:] Well, we had secured from the General Quarters drill. I was standing in the passageway outside the pantry, which is on the main deck. Suddenly, we heard a sound as a jet plane flying low and the steward to whom I was talking and myself thought that something had happened to one of the steam lines. Immediately after that, we heard an explosion, and we sounded general quarters. [LT. Pfeiffer:] My general quarters station is on the main deck aft, the main battle dressing station. I went across the main deck, and at that point I saw another plane passing over the ship and letting loose its supply of rockets on the ship. It was passing from the starboard bow to the port side and aft. [LT. Pfeiffer:] I went into the main dressing station as quickly as possible and awaited the flow of casualties that would come in. We sent the third class corpsman to the forward battle dressing station which was in the wardroom. In the main dressing station was the first class corpsman and myself. When I was in the main battle dressing station, we were relatively sealed off and we didn't hear very much of what was happening outside. At that point I would have thought it was a single or two planes that had strafed the ship once or twice. I didn't have an idea exactly how much had been done. And when they brought in the first aid patient who was a seaman with a collapsed lung, we thought he would be one of the few casualties that we got, and immediately took care of him, which involved an incision in his chest and packing of a pretty good sized chest cavity to remove the blood and air to make it possible for him to breathe again. [LT. Pfeiffer:] We then found Mr. Watson, who had the combination to our narcotics safe in the medical storeroom. I sent the corpsman to get Mr. Watson to got me a supply of morphine and we started administering to the men. The time at this time was about a quarter to two, and it would be before the torpedo had struck. [LT. Pfeiffer:] Someone told me that they wanted me on the bridge, and to get there I went through the mess decks which had a number of casualties there already, I passed the wardroom and found the forward battle dressing station was somewhat flooded by casualties, and went to the bridge where at that point, the Captain was the only person who was still functioning and the Captain had helm. Again, the Captain had not been injured at that time. I took a look outside the bridge and saw two decks below the remains of our Navigator, Mr. Toth. The helmsman had died where he stood at the helm, and at that time there wasn't anything I could do for any of the men on the bridge except administer morphine to those who were injured and yet living and get men up with stretchers to evacuate them. It so happened the fire in the starboard side, the men had under control, and I returned to the wardroom where again we started caring for the casualties as best we could. We took care of the men in the wardroom and in the passageway on the main deck there were men wounded sitting shoulder to shoulder the full ???? ?????? of the passageway. On the port side in a stretcher was the executive officer who had compound fractures of three bones on one leg and two bones on the other leg, the senior research officer, Mr. Lewis, who had semi--flash burns of his face and had been temporarily blinded, and all the men that had been injured. [LT. Pfeiffer:] I found our third class corpsman, Shulman, with our mail clerk, Spicer, who had suffered [deleted] and was [deleted] Shulman was performing, or had finished performing [deleted] him breathe. President: Shulman's a third class? [LT. Pfeiffer:] Yes sir. And, one of the other men had his arm in a sling and was operating the foot-powered suction pump enabling him to activate the man's trachean lungs to get the secretions from there. President: Doctor, is this the foot-powered trachean pump which supports the microphone into which you are speaking? [LT. Pfeiffer:] Yes sir. Sir, in the chief's mess, we found another man, this was Payon, who was also having difficutly breathing. He had a [deleted] that time we did not have the facilities on board to care for a second [deleted] so the only thing I could do at that point was [deleted]. There was another man with a broken leg who we were just able to splint. As it turns out the last thing that we bought before we left Norfolk was a supply of air splints that were just coming in and being used as many as we had, and we could have used more. Then I returned to the main dressing station. At this time again I was going through the mess decks and there were more people there. I got to the main dressing station and found people on the floor, people in the beds, in the isolation room, and the clean room. One of the men in the bed was Blanchard, a man who had sustained [deleted] The first class corpsman and I had examined him and we realized that we might have to operate on him. At that point we had also agreed though, unless it was an absolute matter of being certain he would die otherwise, we would not do anything to him. Then someone told me in a moment that the wardroom had been hit, and that the Captain had been hit. We went by the wardroom and found fortunately that the hit had been away from where the people were being taken care of. [Ensign Scott:] After we secured from general quarters, I came in to the wardroom and I just left when I heard the first hit. With that, I took off running to DC central. I did not come topside again until about 0500 the following day. Presidents: Tell us a little bit about your damage control measures when the ship was hit from starboard. [Ensign Scott:] Yes sir. When we were first hit, the first orders we got were, "two fires, one port side in the vicinity of the gas drums, one starboard side vicinity of the motor whaleboat." I ordered fire fighting parties out. Next we were ordered to pick up the wounded. We had a number of calls, repeated calls to pick up the wounded. I called back and said that every available stretcher was in use. They were using blankets and mattresses to haul the people back. After the fires were out, they burned for quite awhile before we got them under control. [Chief Smith:] Yes sir. On that date at approximately 1400 local time, we had heard a loud blast. I was in radio central at the time with my second class who was on watch at the time. We immediately set Zulu and closed the porthole covers, and as soon as we had gotten them closed, the second blast sounded and the word was passed on the 1MC to pass over hicom that we were being attacked, to any station. I immediately picked up the hicom transmitter which was on UIC 32, auxiliary radio. We started to transmit with it. No station heard us, and five minutes or so later the transmitter was reported to have blown out. I immediately switched to a work two transmitter in the transmitter room, and we couldn't get out on that either, so, in between attacks by this time, I had went down to transmitter room and I found or discovered that somebody had accidentally knocked the frequency dial one KC off. I corrected this and ran back to the radio shack and we got hold of stations schematics on which we passed the attack message. We did authenticate, and he authenticated correctly because he got a roger for it, my second class. Immediately after that, after we passed the word on the bridge that the message had got out, we had a power failure. After the power failure, I discovered that my control lines, remote lines were disconnected or in some way inoperable, so we passed control on the transmitter direct, but we still maintained a receiver on hicom. From that time on we passed all our traffic from the transmitter room and at 1227 they took control. Counsel for the Court: Did you have occasion to see the national colors flying? [Chief Smith:] Yes sir. At the time I ran out of the radio central space to the transmitter room. Q. What time was this? [Chief Smith:] I would say about 1225, this was about two minutes either way. And this was Zulu time because I'm basing it on the log here. I had occasion to look at it because I was under the impression we were being attacked by UAR, and I wanted to see, and by the time that report came down to us from the bridge that they were Israelis, I wanted to check myself personally to see if our flag was flying because I couldn't understand it. For some reason I saw the flag flying at that time. If this was the original flag or not, I do not know sir. Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have with you today in your custody the radio log for the 8th of June 1967 for the USS LIBERTY? [Chief Smith:] Yes sir, I do. I have the original log from 1227Z on, and I have the smooth log covering the total time at 1158Z. At this time, from 1158Z to 1227Z, it is a reconstruction and we did not keep a log in radio central. Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the original radio log exhibit number 23, and the smooth log exhibit number 24. I now request that they be admitted into evidence and request you read the pertinent times to the Court. [Chief Smith:] In our log 0430Z was the last entry, on hicom log. At 1158Z is when we started to call any station, this is ROCK STAR. We passed a Zulu precedence to this message. At 1200Z ROCK STAR was called by schematic saying "you are garbled". "Say again". We repeated three times to them that we were under attack. At 1204Z we had to switch transmitters. We called at 1208Z schematic and repeated three times that we were under attack. Immediately after 1208Z, still in the same minute, they rogered for the message. At 1209Z we repeated again we are under attack and this time we added "we need immediate assistance". At this time schematic asked ROCK STAR for authentication, at which time we gave them the correct authentication. At 1214Z they rogered that. About 1217Z we called schematic again saying "be advised that we have been hit by torpedo, listing about 9 degrees, request immediate assistance". At 122OZ this message was received and rogered for. At 1224Z three unidentified aircraft approached the ship. We told this to schematic. At 1227Z they rogered for that message and that's when we had our power failure. We immediately shifted to the transmitter room. Assistant Counsel for the Court: Which hicom? A. E4.4. Q. You're sure chief - the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net - E4.4? [Chief Smith:] Yes sir. E4.4 At 1233Z we had placed the emergency destruction bill in effect and I took it upon myself, not having any communications with the bridge, to hold emergency destruction. I only started emergency destruction on phase 1 and phase 2, which does not include unclassified matter. It only included RPS material that I had on hand. Well, we started to burn, and then the word came down from the bridge, finally, that there was never any order given to do this, so I had them halt and replaced all the ashes and the foreign material in the weighted bags. Q. Did you throw anything over the side? [Chief Smith:] No sir. Nothing was thrown over the side. I have everything that we had up there. From 1233Z until 1323Z no signals were sent or received via hicom. All the traffic that we wanted to get out was out by the time the attack was over. At 1355 power was restored, passed down from radio central that the phone was inoperable and we shifted the control to transmitter room complete. By this I mean we had the receiver earlier. We gave them the receiver too. Q. Did you note any Jamming on the hicom circuit? [Chief Smith:] Yes sir. We did have jamming in my estimation. I was unable to determine this exactly, but every time it seems when an attack was made on us, or a strafing run, it was preceded by, anywhere from 25 to 30 seconds, carrier on our hicom circuit, and I had ascertained to check this by calling the transmitter room and they said that they had not keyed the transmitter. This prevailed during the attack and quite a bit after the attack, intermittently. Assistant Counsel for the Court: Chief, can you tell me ordinarily what circuits are you normally up on? [Chief Smith:] We're normally up on hicom, and we carry 500KCS receive only for distress and our 243.0 and 121.5 distress. On this occasion we had 339.4 set up, which, I'm not sure what frequency it is but it's a COMSIXTHFLT frequency. Q. This is is addition to the hicom? [Chief Smith:] This is in addition to the hicom, yes. And we did have 277.8 fleet common up at the time. Q. You said that at the time 1204, I understood you said that prior to that time you had transmitted an attack report to schematic? [Chief Smith:] Yes sir. Q. Did they acknowledge? [Chief Smith:] I am not able to say right now. Q. And you said that you did not authenticate under initial transmission? [Chief Smith:] No Sir, we did not. Q. Authentication took place at time 1214? [Chief Smith:] That's when they rogered for it, yes sir. We authenticated at 1209. Q. Were you challenged? [Chief Smith:] Yes sir, we were challenged by schematic. Q. And at 1214 they rogered for your authentication? [Chief Smith:] Yes sir. The first rogered transmission was at time 1208 and the first rogered authenticated transmission was at time 1214 on the CINCUSNAVEUR hicom net between LIBERTY and schematic --CTU 60.2.9. [Chief Thompson:] We had just secured from general quarters drill and I had gone on main deck with petty officer HAROLD to discuss training and some of the attitudes toward training, when I heard a rocket come past and hit. At this time, I wasn't sure it was a rocket. I thought it was a shore battery, and I was either knocked down or I ducked quick. Then I got up and started running across the deck to repair two locker which is inside the forecastle. I was knocked down again, but made it inside to start breaking out the damage control equipment, getting stretcher bearers on deck, and taking stock of the situation. The attack appeared to last, I would say about 20 minutes to half an hour. Time is difficult to recall. [LTJG. Watson:] Well, we had a practice GQ approximately 1310. My GQ station was the fire room down in the engine room. When we had secured from the practice GQ, I had come up. [LTJG. Watson:] I was standing by the wardroom pantry when the attack came. I ran back down the officer's ladder and went down to my station in the fire room. [LTJG. Watson:] And shortly I was called up to sick bay. I'm narcotics custodian, and I had to open the narcotics locker. I came up from the fire room, went through the mess decks, up to sick bay. I got the key from the first class corpsman, and a seaman KERNER went with me back down to the mess decks, forward along the passageway, into the engineering berthing compartment, down the hatch, into the narcotics locker. I opened the locker, removed morphine, gave half of it to KERNER and told him to go on back up and I took the other half and left the safe unlocked but closed. I locked the door behind me, I came back up. As I passed by DC Central, I stopped in there and told them I had opened xray fittings to get down to the narcotics locker and had reclosed it. [LTJG. Watson:] At this time, DC Central is just forward of the diagnostic room, under which the torpedo hit. And at this time the torpedo had not hit the ship cause I would have known it because of the way the passageway was torn up. I went back up into sick bay with the morphine that I had, and gave the key back to the first class corpsman and told him what I had done and that I had left the locker open. There was a seaman laying on the operating table, and they didn't have too many people helping in sick bay at the time, so I helped them move the seaman off the operating table, and I helped move third class gunners mate EASON onto the operating table. The Doctor told me where to get two bottles that he wanted. I thought we were done. And I helped him prepare things for operation, and by that time more people had just come into the sick bay to help out. So I said, "If you don't need me, I need to go back to my GQ station." And he said at the time, "go ahead". FINDINGS: 19. Aircraft attack on LIBERTY Attack initiated by single aircraft, making a run similar to previous overflights. First warning that this aircraft had attacked ship was a rocket explosion abaft the bridge, port side. In five of six attacks, from various angles, two or more jet aircraft at a time conducted strafing, rocket and incendiary attacks. 24. From the time of first air attack onward, attackers were well coordinated, accurate and determined. Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows, both beams, and quarters effectively chewed up entire topside including ship control and internal communications (sound powered) network. Well directed initial air attacks had wiped out the ability of the four 50 cal. machine guns to be effective. 45. The degrees of coordination and accuracy of the air and surface attacks combined first to wipe out defense and shipboard control capabilities, followed by the crippling blow of a torpedo.