A Top Gun looks at Jay Cristol's account of what a jet pilot can see and how a jet pilot operates: By Bruce Charles 1) The Israeli/Jewish Air Force Day Fighter Forces were one of the best in the world at the time they attacked the effectively unarmed USS Liberty in international waters and killed 34 Americans. In terms of pilot quality, equipment and experience, the Israelis were probably second only to German, British and American Combat Air Forces. 2) In addition to Israel's Air Force quality, Israeli intelligence services were also considered among the best in the world. Individuals spying for Israel are so pervasive that as recently as the first Bush Administration, and probably so today, a CIA employee had to report any contact (party, pub, professional, accidental or incidental) with an Israeli, or Israeli representative in the United States. It is difficult to believe Liberty's identity, location, and purpose were unknown to Israel's intelligence/war machine. 3) The attack came on the 4th day of a war long-planned and initiated by Israel. No "first mission" jitters. Highly trained crew, excellent equipment and well into the execution of the planned Six Day War. 4) The attack on the USS Liberty took place in IDEAL CONDITIONS for proper identification with unlimited ceiling and visibility at mid-day (CAVU & sun "high"). Best possible conditions and time for an air attack against a low-threat unsuspecting target. (Much like a practice air-to-ground gunnery range mission.) 5) Because Israel had considered herself at war for many years and had initiated this attack upon the Arab states, it is highly unlikely that pilots had not received an enormous amount of very specific target study. Target study is a basic fact of life with Fighter Pilots. 6) Rarely, except in times of actual war or a "war preparedness exercise" (ORI), does a squadron level "line" fighter pilot fly more than one time each day, and more likely would be a frequency of three times each week -- briefing, flight, and debriefing usually take about four hours. Thus, in a 40-hour week, 12 hours would be used for the three flights, leaving 24 hours for other work. Fuel, maintenance and practice weapons cost too much to do more flying even in the United States Forces. Aircraft have a limited number of useful flight hours. Many fighter aircraft were initially designed for approximately one or two thousand flying-hour useful lives. 7) This leaves a lot of time to study targets that are likely to be hit in time of war. Since war was a planned certainty, it is absurd to assume that fighter pilots did not know each target of significance in a most likely and important adversary's inventory (Egypt). Ships are significant targets. As a fighter pilot serving during the same period in SEA, Japan and Korea, target study included ships of both the good and bad guys. The "Russian Trawler" was common knowledge. Silhouettes and actual photographs were standard. We even had silhouettes at various angles of the "good" and "bad" guys painted on the walls in the fighter pilots' bar. 8) The significance of target study and POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION of the target is to a Professional Fighter Pilot as running to the CORRECT GOAL is to a Super Bowl MVP aspirant -- there ain't no second chance. 9) Attacking a ship in international water is significant. Attacking a Russian ship in international water just might get you a chance to observe a significant atomic occurrence very close to your favorite bar. (EC121 REF… ask me.) 10) At the time of the attack on the Liberty, Israel had Air Supremacy in the area and had defeated all significant Arab forces that had attempted to repel her surprise attack. (Pearl Harbor to the Arabs.) 11) The attack upon the USS Liberty was way out at Sea …late in the war … in international water … in a no-shooting zone …with the Liberty the only item on the horizon ... the threat was essentially nil to the attacking Israeli pilots …Plenty of TIME to POSITIVELY IDENTIFY the target. 12) The Israelis had not been attacked by anything that could be described as Naval Forces. 13) Because of the above factors alone, little credence can be given to the assertion of "fog of war" or other accidental cause for the air attack upon any neutral or friendly ship. The actual attack profile was more like a leisurely trip to an extremely well marked air-to-ground practice gunnery range. 9) The "low-threat" attack profile for the fighters was both simple and standard tactical practice: A) Drive out at moderate altitude to the target area, B) Visually acquire the target (CAVU -- probably at the visual horizon or at least 10 miles from the target. Remember that the USS Liberty was one and one-half football fields long -- pretty easy to see on a flat ocean in clear weather conditions at mid-day.) C) Set up a parallel approach to positively identify the target -- drive by and look her over. (This is exactly what was reported by Liberty's crew.) D) POSITIVELY IDENTIFY the target. This was extremely easy in the USS Liberty's case due to the enormous "Moon-Bounce" antenna carried on a very tall platform rising from the deck of the Liberty. This single feature set her apart from any other type of ship. If Egypt had one of these Moon-Bounce Equipped Intelligence Ships it would have been a FIRST DAY priority target known to every fighter pilot in the Israeli Air Force. Thus, the negative was also clear -- Israeli fighter pilots knew this ship was not Egyptian. E) After the EYE CATCHING, clear and unique USS Liberty Moon-Bounce Antenna came many other obvious and unique AMERICAN features which made Liberty impossible to mistake for the "Egyptian horse carrier": a) The Name "Liberty" on the stern b) The unique "GTR 5" type/number painted on the bows. c) The many other significant antenna structures all over the ship: Big "whips" & ELINT enclosures. d) The big AMERICAN FLAG. e) Upon the Israeli fighter pilot's POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION of the pre-authorized target, they would then turn to the final attack heading and establish approach parameters for the weapons selected and release their weapons. (Again, exactly as reported by the Liberty's crew.) THESE ISRAELI FIGHTER PILOTS KNEW THEY WERE KILLING AMERICANS, AS DID THE officers and men of the MTBs THAT FOLLOWED. Again, the HUGE, unique, Moon-Bounce structure rising from the deck of the USS Liberty -- followed by all the other unique structures, markings and the FLAG. (Just think about driving down a street in an average neighborhood with sort-of similar houses, roof lines, and front yards -- except one house has an old-style 10 foot diameter satellite antenna on the roof just above the front door and all kinds of HAM radio towers and antennas in the yard. BINGO: even the half-stoned Valley Girl with the room temperature IQ is going to exclaim: WOW, what is that?) When you consider the above information from a Tactical Fighter Pilot's perspective, and then look at what Cristol has written in his dissertation, you may have a better understanding of why I find his writing without substance. Specifically, I believe his reference to the mechanics of the air attack described from page 226 to 241 (inclusive) to be totally without merit. Specifically: P.226 Cristol states: "The first and most easily identifiable marking of Liberty was her color. She was painted gray. Sometimes the color is referred to as battleship gray. The color clearly marked her as a warship and she was in a war zone." Charles' Answer: 1) You see shape before you see color -- especially when the color is a dull gray. 2) "Battleship Gray" has long been available as "surplus" at your friendly "ARMY-NAVY" store and more commercial fishing boats, tramp steamers, and assorted duck boats have been painted with this "surplus" color than have "Warships." 3) "Warships" are identified by Fighter Pilots by those really big sticky-outie cylindrical long pole-like things poking out sort-of horizontally from boxes on top of the boat. I think they are called "guns." Without big guns, I think they are called "non-combatants." 4) The USS LIBERTY had a really big stickie-outie thing going straight up with a really big saucer on top of the stickie-outie thing. I'm not sure what it is called, but it ain't something I have seen on a Arab ship before -- like in "target study." 5) Note the illogical path from "gray" color to guaranteed "warship." And the clear misstatement of the value of color over shape. (The author attempts to divert the reader's attention from shape which is what a fighter pilot would first use to POSITIVELY IDENTIFY his target.) P 227 "The first question one must ask is what could the pilots see?" Charles' Answer: Here the reader is led down another rosy path by the author. First the author "gives" the liberty the benefit of the doubt by allowing that the flag is held out by a breeze and thus in the best possible position to be recognized by the attacking Israeli pilots and MTBs. The author goes on and on with his argument providing totally irrelevant "facts" and argument to divert the reader's attention to the Flag as the most significant identification feature. He then attempts to destroy the Flag as a means of positive identification. The author totally ignores the huge growth from the center of the ship -- that enormous, unique, Moon-Bounce Antenna which is 100 times the size and 1000 times the significance from a fighter pilot's standpoint for a POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION compared to the FLAG. You could change the Flag, but that huge structure is not going to go away with a yank on a halyard. Also ignored are all the other identifying marks unique to Liberty. His concluding paragraph on p228 is both incorrect and diversionary. Page 230 shows an attack diagram that was not used. Again, an attempt by the author to mislead the reader. Remember, the Israeli's first flew by the ship, then having POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED their assigned target turned back to the attack from a very low altitude. Rocket hits on the forward gun tubs show a "level" trajectory and thus, a "level" attack which is what the crew described as the initial attack flight path the Israelis used. Very "up close and personal." NOT the fighter aircraft attack profile depicted by Cristol Page 231 is an irrelevant FAA diagram intended for bored and rather inattentive private pilots. If fighter pilots and their aircraft reacted as described in that chart, they would be little more than "used" targets. Page 230 is more nonsense -- assumes no target study, no flying over the Med, none of the pilots being former US pilots, etc. Again, the flag is a false path; shape is the critical factor. Pages 233-235 continues the smoke and mirrors. The author wants the reader to look at the flag, not the shape. The silly reference by Cristol on pages 234 and 235 to the Flag of Convenience of Liberia and the flag of Malaysia as similar to the American flag and somehow this was a contributing or primary cause of the attack on the Liberty clearly shows the bankruptcy of his position. Cristol's statement: "The Malaysian flag also has horizontal red and white stripes and a field of blue. No U. S. warship had made a port call in Israel since 1963, so the US Flag on a ship was not something with which Israeli Air Force Pilot's were familiar." Cristol wants the reader to believe that Jewish fighter pilots, unlike others, are so inept that they cannot recognize the most familiar Flag in the world on a ship because they have not seen the specific combination of ship and flag in one of their ports? BS! The Page 236 reference to the soviet ship during Vietnam -- if this is the ship attacked by F-105s as described in "Going Downtown" "My War Against Hanoi and Washington" then the attack was no mistake. A friend of mine flew the mission and the Soviet ship fired on the 105s first, and as my friend said, the 105s cleared the decks of the ship that fired upon them -- markings don't mean squat if somebody shoots at you when you are well armed. Page 236: Choppers shot down over Iraqi "no-fly" zone. First: Cristol states that this was in a "non-combat" zone. He's wrong, we are at "war" with Iraq. We have been killing Iraqis with warplanes, bombs and missiles for about 8 years. We continuously patrol the "no-fly" zone to shoot down airplanes and kill people. The ID was by Electronics -- not visual. No IFF, and the attack was directed by on scene "electronic" authority, the AWACS command aircraft, thus the kill. The trial was political. I spoke with a person very familiar with the incident. Irrelevant -- no big dish on the choppers. The poor bastards on the choppers did not have their IFFs operating in a "no-fly/free-fire zone." They were killed as long-planned and directed by the political/military decision-makers. In the case of the choppers, no close-up visual ID is possible/desireable because of the chopper anti-aircraft defensive missile systems. Unlike the Liberty, the choppers were in the most publicized and long-established "no-fly" zone in the world. The choppers were not in "international waters" and they were not in a "non-combat" zone, and were presumed to have armament capable of shooting down a fighter that came close enough to visually ID them. Operating IFF systems were necessary to avoid death. Remember, a fighter only "shoots" from the front of the aircraft and takes quite a while to turn around. A chopper can turn on a dime and thus has almost the equivalent of an all-aspect defense/offence capability. If a fighter "flies-by" within the "bad" choppers missile range, he becomes dead meat if the chopper is the bad guy. The "bad" chopper realizes that he (the chopper) will be dead if he lets the fighter gets away and turns back to bring his guns/missiles into the firing envelope. The Liberty did not have armament capable of endangering a JET Fighter Aircraft USS Stark: The Israeli attack was not a single fighter from a third rate air force, at night, using radar at long range, in a crowded sea, and launching a long range anti-ship missile at a blip on a radar scope such as the single shot attack on the Stark. It is ludicrous to equate the long range missile hit at night on the Stark and the up close and personal broad daylight fly-by and then low altitude, level, strafing attack on the Liberty. Page 237: I and other air-to-ground range personnel have used 7x50s many times to view very small practice bombs being released from dive bombing fighter aircraft at slant ranges of several thousand feet. I see no problem tracking and viewing a face in a 200 mph aircraft flying low and slow past my ship. You can clearly see the white helmet and oxygen mask of a fighter pilot going past at 400kts on an air-to-ground gunnery range -- occasionally even his "single finger salute" to the range officer. (400kts is a more likely speed of the attacking jet aircraft, not the 600kts used by Cristol -- 600kts on the deck is very, very fast -- "Q" at 600kts indicated is probably beyond the capability of rocket pods and napalm cans.) Page 241: Admiral Moorer is on target with the "shape" of the ship (ugliest ship). Bottom Line: From a fighter pilot's standpoint, there is no rational path to Cristol's concept of an Israeli mistake. Cristol is so far off base that I could go on and on. Bruce Charles Bixby, Oklahoma