"THE HERITAGE FRONT AFFAIR":
OUR VIEW

A JOINT DISSENTING OPINION AGREED TO BY THE BLOC QUEBECOIS AND THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA

INTRODUCTION

1. In August and September, 1994, there were a number of public reports of allegations about the activities of an alleged CSIS source within the Heritage Front. It was reported that this source helped set up and finance the organization with the use of public funds and the support of a government agency. More specifically, this person was alleged to have spied on the CBC, used the Heritage Front to infiltrate the Reform Party of Canada, attempted to obtain personal information about members of the Jewish community, engaged in illegal activities with "white supremacists", improperly obtained police information, and spied a postal workers union, among other activities. If true, these allegations would bring into serious question the legitimacy of an operation undertaken by CSIS and the security intelligence scheme put in place by Parliament in 1984.

2. When the first allegations became public, both SIRC and the Subcommittee began their respective reviews. While SIRC was conducting its investigation, the Subcommittee deferred its review so as to avoid duplication of effort. In the meantime, we carried out our consideration of documents and personnel security matters arising from the unauthorized release by an employee of classified material from the office of a former Solicitor General. SIRC reported to the Solicitor General on December 9, 1994, and its Report was made public a week later.

3. The opposition members of the Subcommittee principally based their review of these events on a detailed, critical consideration of the SIRC Report. We did not attempt to repeat the exhaustive investigation undertaken by SIRC because we wanted to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and because we did not have the resources to do so. We have, however, considered SIRC's findings and conclusions, and, based upon them and our own inquiries, set out our own views and opinions in this Report.

4. The events dealt with in this report represent an important test of the security intelligence scheme put in place by Parliament when it adopted the CSIS Act, including the roles of the Solicitor General, the Deputy Solicitor General, SIRC, the Inspector General, and the Director of CSIS. In the "Heritage Front Affair", we have the use of one of the most intrusive investigation techniques possible, the placement by a security intelligence agency of a human source within a leadership core before, during and after the founding of a "white supremacist" group. This happened at a time of vigorous activity and confrontation between groups and individuals holding radically opposed points of view. Was this appropriate? Was it properly controlled and reviewed? These are some of the broad policy questions the opposition members of the Subcommittee will address in this Report.

BACKGROUND TO SUBCOMMITTEE REVIEW

5. At the earliest opportunity, the Subcommittee began its consideration of the public allegations. On September 13, 1994, SIRC, which had already begun its review of events, appeared before us in a public meeting. At that meeting, the Subcommittee released to SIRC and to the public the questions it expected SIRC to fully investigate and answer in its Report on the allegations.

SIRC was also pressed by the Subcommittee to describe the investigative methodology it intended to follow and to prepare its Report in such a way as to ensure that as much of it as possible could be publicly released by the Solicitor General.

6. While SIRC was carrying out its investigation, the Subcommittee heard evidence in public session from the Honourable Doug Lewis, former Solicitor General, his former Chief of Staff, Michael Dearden, and his former Executive Assistant (who had responsibility in his office for CSIS matters), Blair Dickerson. These witnesses were heard from to determine what light they could throw from their perspectives on the allegations, and to pursue issues related to the unauthorized release of classified documents from the office of the former Solicitor General.

7. Once the SIRC Report was made public on December 15, 1994, the Subcommittee heard Review Committee members in public session the next day. Because the Subcommittee concluded that public hearings were too unwieldy for a detailed consideration of the SIRC Report, it held five in camera meetings with the Review Committee and its staff. During these meetings, its Report was examined in detail and SIRC was closely questioned on its findings. On occasion, SIRC members were unable to answer queries put to them by members of the Subcommittee, and written answers to some of these questions were provided at a later time. SIRC members refused to answer other questions because of their interpretation of the law. The Subcommittee agreed to disagree with them.

8. Once the process was completed, the Subcommittee heard from Elisse Hategan, a former member of the Heritage Front, her counsel, Paul Copeland, and Martin Theriault of the Canadian Centre on Racism and Prejudice. Finally, it heard from SIRC in June 1995 at a wrap-up public session.

9. The opposition members of the Subcommittee have determined, in the absence of credible evidence to the contrary, that Grant Bristow and the person referred to in the SIRC Report as the Source are the same person. Therefore in the balance of this Report, the human source will be referred to inter-changeably as either "Bristow" or "the Source". Before proceeding with the opposition members of the Subcommittee's finding and conclusions, it is important to put them into context by setting out some elements of the Heritage Front's development and what it is.

THE HERITAGE FRONT

10. Racist activity in Canada is not new. There have been several waves of it in the past. It has its modern roots in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Ku Klux Klan and different fascist groups were active in various parts of Canada. The second wave occurred between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, when US-inspired neo-nazi and anti-Semitic activity surfaced. The third wave began in the early 1980s, and is with us still in various forms of "white supremacy". The Heritage Front has been at the centre of this wave.

11. Wolfgang Droege is at the core of, and is the main force behind, the Heritage Front. A long-time activist in right-wing extremist organizations, he in 1989 had the idea to establish an organization which would act as a kind of umbrella group. After attending, with the Source, Grant Bristow and others, a conference in Libya organized by the government of that country, he and a small group, including Bristow, formed the Heritage Front in September 1989.

12. The Toronto-based Heritage Front draws its membership from racists, neo-nazis, skinheads, and "white supremacists". There is no reliable way of knowing the size of its membership. It has no offices or meeting rooms of its own, nor any formal organizational structure. Its membership fluctuates, with participants in its activities moving from one organization to another. Many of its activities are ad hoc in nature. Its main activities in the past have been to: set up telephone racist message lines; publish a periodical called Up Front; organize meetings at which racist and Holocaust denial lecturers speak; and organize skinhead dances where violent confrontations have at times occurred. It has also had branches in other parts of Ontario and contacts in Quebec, as well as relations with similar groups on other parts of Canada, the US, and elsewhere.

AN APPROPRIATE TARGET

13. When considering the public allegations dealt with in this Report, the opposition members of the Subcommittee posed several questions to the Subcommittee itself. Was it appropriate for CSIS to re-focus an existing investigation of the "extreme right wing" so as to target its leadership? That is, was the Heritage Front, once formed, through its leadership a possible threat to the security of Canada under section 2 of the CSIS Act and hence a legitimate target of investigation under section 12? Once the Heritage Front was formed, was it appropriate for CSIS to continue targeting its leadership through the placement beyond an initial period of a human source? This section of the Report and the following one will deal with these interrelated questions.

14. Section 2 of the CSIS Act defines 'threats to the security of Canada' to include espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, politically motivated violence, and subversion. Section 12 of the Act sets out the Service's security intelligence mandate. It allows to collect, analyze, and retain, to the extent that is strictly necessary, information and intelligence about activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of being threats to the security of Canada.

15. The legislative threshold for beginning the investigation of a target is a low one - indeed, it is much lower than the requirements in the criminal law context where there have to be reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal offence is being or has been committed.

16. In this case, the Heritage Front per se was not targeted by CSIS. (SIRC Report, Chapter II, para. 2.1) However, Wolfgang Droege was approved as a Level 2 target by CSIS' International Target and Review Committee (TARC) on October 4, 1989 and the Source was explicitly tasked against him. (SIRC Report, Chapter III, p. 12 and 15)

17. Droege was investigated by CSIS because of his involvement in politically motivated violence and criminal activity prior to the October 1989 targeting decision. He spent a good part of the 1980s in US prisons. In May, 1983, he was released after serving a portion of a three year prison sentence under the US Neutrality Act for his part in attempting to organize an invasion of Dominica. In 1985, he was convicted in the US of weapons and drug trafficking offences for which he as sentenced to 13 years imprisonment-he returned to Canada in April, 1989 after having served only part of his sentence. Droege was targeted after having returned to Canada and having attended the Libyan-sponsored conference (with the Source, Bristow and others) that led to the founding of the Heritage Front on September 25, 1989 by him, Bristow, and others. At the beginning of 1990, CSIS targeted the Source against Droege because of his increasing leadership role in extreme right wing activity. CSIS believed Droege trusted the Source and wanted him to be part of the core group setting up the Heritage Front. The Service was concerned that if Droege became a leading personality, his organization would be harder to penetrate because of his past experience and security consciousness. To quote SIRC, "If this scenario were to materialize, they would be fortunate to have a source in on the ground floor". (SIRC Report, chapter III, P. 15, para 3.3.6)

18. According to SIRC, the leadership of the "extreme right" was at first targeted in 1990-91 under both paragraphs (b) (foreign-influenced activities) and (c) (politically motivated violence) of the section 2 CSIS Act definition of threats to the security of Canada. This was later (after 1991-92) changed to a paragraph (c) targeted threat only.

19. In the 1990-91 submission to TARC, it was concluded that after investigating the extreme right wing movement since 1985, CSIS found petty criminal activity, but nothing that could be construed as threats to the security of Canada. CSIS then continued its TARC-approved investigation by refocusing its efforts on the leadership of the extreme right wing. (SIRC Report, Chapter II, p.2, para.2)

20. In the view of the opposition members of the Subcommittee, the leadership of the extreme right and its most prominent emerging organization, the Heritage Front, were appropriately targeted in the initial stages of the refocussed investigation. As stated earlier, the observation was made in 1990 by CSIS that the extreme right wing movement was not a threat to the security of Canada. The 1992-93 submission to TARC requested the continuation of the targeting authority because, among other things, there was increased coordination among racist groups in Canada and elsewhere, and the groups made greater use of modern technology to monitor those who threatened their ideology. It also asserted that these groups had become more proactive in furthering their political objectives. Similar comments were made in the 1993 submission to TARC. These later submissions to TARC may reflect the impact of the presence of the Source within the Heritage Front leadership, with his knowledge of electronic and security matters. Had the Source not been part of the Heritage Front leadership grouped, its activities might only have been petty criminal in nature and the investigation would have been terminated at an early time rather than refocussed.

PLACEMENT OF A SOURCE

21. Effective investigations may be carried out through the use of a number of techniques. Some are more intrusive and more effective than others. Among these different techniques are: "environmental scanning"; monitoring of open sources; physical surveillance; electronic surveillance; recruitment of informants; and placement of human sources. The recruitment and placement of human sources is one of the most intrusive techniques available, as well as one of the most effective in terms of potential results. The placement of human sources brings with it a degree of uncertainty. The control and reliability of sources is fraught with difficulty. Their impact on individuals and groups is often unknown. Ensuring that they play a passive, intelligence-gathering role, rather than an active, provocative, counteracting role, is a true challenge.

22. Because of these challenges, the Solicitor General of the day in October, 1989 issued a Ministerial Direction dealing with human sources, under section 6 of the CSIS Act, to the Director of CSIS (it was modified in August, 1993 by the Minister then in office). It sets out comprehensive instructions on the recruitment, authorization, use, behaviour, remuneration, treatment, and control of confidential human sources. It enunciates six general principles on the use and management of confidential sources by CSIS. They are the following:

1. Human sources are to be used only when and to the extent reasonable and necessary.

2. The need for a human source must be measured against its impact on rights and freedoms.

3. The use of human sources is to be centrally directed and controlled within CSIS because of the intrusive nature of this technique.

4. Human sources are not to engage in illegal activities or to do things that will bring discredit on the Service or the Government of Canada.

5. Human sources are to be managed in such a way as to protect both the security of CSIS operations and the personal safety of the source.

6. Human sources are to be treated by the Service ethically and fairly in terms of handling and compensation.

23. The Ministerial Direction also deals specifically with what it calls the "most sensitive institution of our society". It instructs the Director of CSIS or a designate to personally approve the use of a human source in relation to any academic, political, religious, media or trade union institution. They are to be used in relation to such institutions with caution and with the greatest respect for rights and freedoms.

24. CSIS has also established a Target Approval and Review Committee, chaired by the Director of CSIS, to approve and manage human sources, as well as other approved investigative techniques against designated targets. There is also provision both at Headquarters and in Regional Offices for the recruitment, control and remuneration of human sources. Finally, the CSIS Operational Manual provides detailed guidance to CSIS employees on many of these matters.

25. There are two issues to be addressed in this part of the Report. The first of these is whether it was appropriate for CSIS to place a source within the leadership group of the Heritage Front. The second question to be dealt with is whether this Source should have been initially placed, then left in place and allowed to participate in its activities in light of events as they unfolded.

26. The placement of a source inside an organization such as the Heritage Front cannot help but have an effect on it and what it does. In this instance, CSIS directed a source to the leadership of the Heritage Front as it was being conceived and during the early days of its formation. The Service had already been investigating the activity of extremist right wing groups for a number of years before it authorized the placement of the Source near Wolfgang Droege in October 1989. The infiltration of a Source was an effective means of obtaining information about a nascent right wing extremist organization being set up as an umbrella group by an individual with a long history of right wing extremist activity.

27. However, there came a time, as indicated in the preceding section of this Report, when it was concluded in a 1990-91 submission to TARC that extreme right organizations and their related activities were petty criminal in nature and did not constitute a threat to the security of Canada. It is not clear to the opposition members of the Subcommittee why the Service did not simply refer these matters to law enforcement agencies, rather than redirecting the investigation and the Source for more than an initial period to the leadership of the extreme right wing. The key question is what was the justification for the continued targeting and the presence of the Source after 1990. SIRC did not clearly address this issue in either its Report on the Heritage Front Affair or in its 1994-95 Annual Report, released in October, 1995.

28. Having concluded that the placement of a human source was acceptable, although for a shorter time than this Source was actually in place, the opposition members of the Subcommittee then asked themselves whether the service should have recruited and put in place this particular Source?

29. Recruiting and controlling sources is not easy. Because of the conflicting roles they play, as both trusted participants in the activities being monitored and provider of information about these activities, they are not always the most reliable people. There must not only be confidence that the information provided will be accurate and useful, but that the human source will be trustworthy and discrete as to the dual roles being played. This is especially important when a human source is being developed. Human source operations can fail because of unreliability, character weaknesses or detection by the target.

30. The Source was not unknown to the Service when he was initially "directed" to the extreme right wing movement and later to its leadership. He first came into contact with the Service in early 1986 in relation to a foreign country's intelligence activities in Canada. The foreign country cut off its connection with him when he learned he had been providing some assistance to the Service. In February, 1987, CSIS Headquarters was becoming a little concerned about the overzealousness of the Source. In June of that same year, the police source told CSIS that it had been advised by the Source that he was involved in a long-term Service operation. Consequently, contact by CSIS with the Source ceased at that point.

31. In November, 1988, the Source was back in touch with CSIS with respect to right wing extremist group activity. The Service decided to once again make use of him to get the needed information on these activities. Once more, what SIRC called "the old problem" recurred. On December 12, 1988 a police source advised CSIS that the Source was claiming to have Service contacts.

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