Dissenting Opinion by the Official Opposition
Presented by
Francois Langlois, M.P.
The Official Opposition and the Reform Party, who together make up a
majority of the members of Parliament who heard evidence on the Heritage
Front Affair, have already submitted a joint opinion which stated that
we were fundamentally in agreement with drafty number 4 of the report tabled
on December 1, 1995, including the following paragraph:
"The Subcommittee has determined, in the absence of credible evidence
to the contrary, that Grant Bristow and the person referred to in the SIRC
report as "the source" are the same person. Therefore in the
balance of this Report, the human source will sometimes be referred to
as "the source"."
A more detailed document has been tabled by the Official Opposition and
the Reform Party of Canada on this issue. (Appendix "A")
In addition to this joint opinion, I would like to present three other
conclusions at which I have arrived, as follows:
GRANT BRISTOW AND THE REFORM PARTY OF CANADA
Since I have concluded that Grant Bristow and the source referred to in
the joint report are the same person, I must also conclude that CSIS was
aware of Grant Bristow's proximity to Reform Leader Preston Manning and
that CSIS was regularly informed about Grant Bristow's activities in connection
with the Reform Party. As Mr. Bristow carried out these activities over
a number of months, I am also of the view that Grant Bristow was acting
on instructions from CSIS, which plainly overstepped its authority in this
matter.
The role of (former) Solicitor General Doug Lewis is more difficult to
determine.
Mr. Lewis appeared before the Subcommittee without the assistance of an
attorney on an issue of vital importance to his own personal integrity.
He provided his testimony with an easy-going, some might say careless,
attitude.
Mr. Lewis does not seem to realize that at the time of the Heritage Front
Affair, he was the federal minister responsible for the activities of CSIS.
Even though the Solicitor General is not involved in day-to-day CSIS operations,
it is his responsibility to inform himself about or to be kept informed
about major operations being carried out by the Service.
According to the principle of ministerial accountability, Mr. Lewis must
share with CSIS the blame for the Heritage Front Affair.
Mr. Lewis's testimony before the Subcommittee revealed that he did not
make a clear distinction between the interests of Canada and the interests
of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, of which he was an executive
member. It is always disquieting to see a politician who has become a member
of the Privy Council who cannot distinguish between the public responsibilities
and his partisan interests.
In my view, Mr. Lewis perceived the Reform Party of Canada as a threat
to his own Party and at the very least condoned CSIS's targeting of the
Reform Party as a threat to Canada's security.
It must be clearly stated that the Reform Party of Canada has suffered
political damage because of the Heritage Front Affair, and that this operation
was viewed sympathetically, if not authorized, by the very highest levels.
There is nothing in the evidence heard that leads to the conclusion that
the Reform Party of Canada was trying to do anything other than come to
power in accordance with the rules.
It is unfortunate that, at the time these lines were written, the Reform
Party of Canada and the Liberal Party of Canada were attempting to resolve
the issues surrounding the communique of the Member for Charlesbourg on
the basis of criteria that are incompatible with the liberties guaranteed
in a free and democratic society. I personally do not intend to defend
fundamental rights by reducing them to mere partisan issues.
THE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE (SIRC)
The attitude of the members of SIRC when they appeared before the Subcommittee
was quite simply contemptuous. The members of the Subcommittee cannot take
personal offence, but the parliamentary institution from which the Subcommittee
derives its authority cannot tolerate such behaviour. SIRC members consistently
refused to co-operate with the Subcommittee. Through their answers to some
questions, by their refusal to answer others, and by the mental evasion
that characterized their evidence, the SIRC members have demonstrated contempt
of Parliament and should therefore be relieved of their duties.
This comment does not apply to Ms. Paule Gauthier.
It is equally disturbing to note that the Ministry of the Solicitor General
and even the Privy Council Office appear to have lost control of the Service.
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
In light of my experience with the Subcommittee, I am of the view that
the following conditions must be met if the Subcommittee is to perform
its full role:
(i) The Subcommittee must become a standing committee whose members are
appointed for the duration of the Parliament.
(ii) The Subcommittee must have the authority to call any witness whose
testimony is considered necessary and to order production of any document
regardless of its confidentiality. Moreover, the Subcommittee must also
have access to any data, information or intelligence, even if it has been
given the highest security classification.
Finally, the Subcommittee's powers of enquiry, oversight and investigation
must cover not only CSIS and SIRC but also the Communications Security
Establishment (CSE), federal ministers and the Privy Council, in order
to monitor how they deal with issues of national security.
The Subcommittee must be given the staff it needs for its enquiries, investigations
and reports, as well as the necessary clerical staff.
Ottawa, June 13, 1996