While compiling its report on the Heritage Front Affair, SIRC included
a chapter that had nothing to do with the Heritage Front. It was about
the Reform Party and a foreign government, subsequently identified as South
Africa. SIRC wanted us to believe that by including this chapter they could
allay any fears amongst Reformers that CSIS had investigated the party,
or the leadership. In the SIRC Report, the CSIS investigation is portrayed
as a by-the-book, straight-forward operation. Upon closer inspection this
investigation proved to be anything but straight-forward. Rather than allaying
any of our concerns about CSIS investigations, SIRC's willingness to lie
about the facts has made the Reform Party even more suspicious.
Through a Privacy Act request by Preston Manning, CSIS released its documents
on this investigation. Although they are heavily censored, the documents
show that SIRC withheld information and misrepresented the facts in their
report, so that they could demonstrate that CSIS conducted a proper investigation.
Any evidence that was contradictory to their conclusion was suppressed.
In the following pages, we will review the actual investigation, SIRC's
version of the investigation, and the bizarre fallout from this chapter
of their report. In exchanges of correspondence and testimony that occurred
after the tabling of the report, we learned that CSIS documents were altered
and misdated. We observed SIRC made admissions, and then subsequently retract
these admissions, completely contradicting their earlier statements and
testimony. The Director of CSIS also provided a version of events that
not only contradicted his earlier testimony, but also required him to admit
that almost everyone who touched this file made mistakes. In the final
analysis, the Reform Party is convinced that CSIS launched an insupportable
investigation of Preston Manning in 1989, and tried to cover it up five
months later. Both the current management at CSIS and SIRC have continued
that cover-up, frequently changing their story when confronted with facts
that did not fit their version of the events.
A dubious source sparks an investigation.
As SIRC reported, and the CSIS documents confirm, this investigation
began with a tip from a source who was described by the CSIS investigator
as "self-serving and very opportunistic, particularly if it benefited
himself." This dubious source informed CSIS about a conversation that
he had with a board member of an association that promoted links between
South Africa and Canada. This source then stated that the board member
said that his group was giving money to Preston Manning's campaign, as
Manning was running against External Affairs Minister Joe Clark. This information
by itself should not have been of interest to CSIS. In democracies, citizens
can financially support whoever they want in an election, for whatever
reason.
For CSIS to investigate they needed information that South Africa was actually
providing the money. During the first meeting between CSIS and this dubious
source, the source stated that he thought the board members meant that
the money was coming from South Africa. When the source realized that he
did not have the key piece of evidence that CSIS required, he miraculously
obtained it less than three weeks later. The source stated that he had
been talking to an unidentified, close associate of the board member, who
supposedly told him that the South Africans may have contributed as much
as $45,000 to Preston Manning and the Reform Party in trying to defeat
Joe Clark in his riding of Yellowhead.
This is the extent of CSIS' information about the Manning campaign receiving
money from a foreign government. Third-hand information from a source who
is not only of unknown reliability, but who had been identified by the
CSIS investigator as "self-serving and opportunistic", should
not be the basis of a CSIS investigation of any Canadian citizen, much
less the leader of a legitimate political party.
CSIS analyst stated, basis for investigation "difficult to support"!
We are not the only ones to question the validity of this investigation.
After the regional investigator sent two reports to CSIS Headquarters in
November 1988, a response from the HQ analyst on the South Africa desk
was sent to the region in January 1989. As the SIRC report acknowledged,
the analyst stated that in HQ's opinion, the source of the alleged funding
was most likely the group of Canadian businessmen who belonged to the association.
But when the analyst addressed the possibility of foreign funding, CSIS
did not accurately portray the analyst's comments. The analyst did state
that, "if it were shown that South Africa indeed contributed as much
as $45,000 to Manning's campaign, HQ could in time attempt to make the
argument that South Africa is unduly influencing Canadian politics."
However, SIRC chose not to include the following sentence by the analyst
in their report: "To say the least, this kind of argument would be
difficult to support."
Since the analyst had stated that there was no basis for a CSIS investigation,
contradicting SIRC's conclusion that it was a legitimate investigation,
SIRC chose to suppress this line. It is the only line in that section of
the report that SIRC did not include in the Heritage Front Affair report.
The HQ analyst concluded this January 10, 1989 message by requesting that
the region keep "HQ apprised of any forthcoming information which
you may obtain in light of the above." There was no further information
forwarded by the region. Rather, the next document that appears in Manning's
file is an authorization of a TARC level 1 investigation, dated October
17, 1989.
Lead up to the TARC Level 1 investigation - January 10, 1989 to October
17, 1989.
While there is a great deal of controversy over what happened between October
17, 1989 and March 30, 1990, we are equally perplexed about what happened
between January 10, 1989 and October 17, 1989. The Reform Party has never
received a logical answer to why an analyst on the South African desk in
CSIS HQ stated that there was no basis for an investigation into the alleged
contribution to Preston Manning on January 10, 1989, and yet without any
additional, or new, information, an analyst on the South African desk in
CSIS HQ submitted a request for a TARC Level 1 investigation on October
17, 1989?
SIRC attempted to provide the following as an answer: A reliable source
provided CSIS with information that a foreign country (read South Africa)
had transferred over a quarter of a million dollars to Canada, to try to
influence 24 members of Parliament from other political parties (read Progressive
Conservatives and Liberals). When asked, SIRC stated that CSIS did not
take any steps to investigate these M.P.s.
If the information about South Africa funding these 24 M.P.s did indeed
inspire the investigation, why was there no mention of this on the form
(REQUEST FOR AND APPROVAL OF COLLECTION LEVEL 1, 2, AND CATEGORY A aka
4002) authorizing the investigation? It is therefore unlikely that this
information played any role in the investigation.
SIRC would still have us believe that CSIS received information from a
reliable source that the South African Government was using over a quarter
of a million dollars to influence 24 Conservative and Liberal M.P.s, but
did not investigate them. Instead, CSIS proceeded to launch an investigation
of Preston Manning, who was neither an M.P. nor a Progressive Conservative
nor a Liberal. We find SIRC's logic to be less than satisfying.
The Actual Investigation: Who, What, When, Why?
From the moment the Solicitor General tabled the Heritage Front Affair
report, one particular passage has caused a great deal of grief for the
Sub-Committee, SIRC and CSIS. This passage resulted in a number of admissions,
explanations, contradictions, retractions and accusations. The Reform Party
believes that the best way to present this complex subject is in the following
chronological manner:
(Then follows the chronological manner dealing with such shady things as
an "altered file opening request, citing a document two weeks before
it existed, an altered filed # 4002, and two documents filled out by the
same individual. Since this information does not directly pertain to the
Zundel case, it is here omitted)
CONCLUSIONS
The Reform Party regrets having to present such a painstakingly, detailed
review of the Preston Manning investigation, but it was necessary to demonstrate
the extreme lengths that we have had to go in our attempts to find the
truth in this matter. The documents obtained by Mr. Manning through his
Privacy Act request afforded us the opportunity to challenge SIRC's version
of events directly. SIRC has demonstrated that their word cannot be accepted
at face value.
But what does this all mean in the final analysis?
Two issues need to be resolved. The first is what initiated the October
17, 1989 TARC Level 1 investigation. Since the South African desk in CSIS
HQ wrote off any investigation on January 10, 1989, what suddenly spawned
interest nine months later? One would think that it would be logical for
someone to have something in writing suggesting that an investigation be
opened. But that didn't happen. The questions that remain unanswered, are:
who ordered this matter re-opened, and why?
The other issue that must be answered is: Why are CSIS and SIRC going to
such extreme lengths to mislead the Sub-Committee, Parliament, and Canadians?
If they had maintained their original explanation that the file caption
was inappropriately opened in the name of 'Preston Manning', and subsequently
changed, the Reform Party would have little to complain about. But for
CSIS and SIRC to retract all their previous admissions without explanations,
and to out-and-out lie to a Parliamentary Sub-Committee, it is clear that
there is something important they are hiding. The question is: What?
Contrary to the assurances from SIRC and CSIS, the Reform Party has learned
that from October 17, 1989 to January 17, 1990. it was recorded in CSIS'
main database, N.S.R., that there was a TARC Level 1 on Preston Manning.
There was no restricted security on this file, so this information was
available to any CSIS employee who had access to N.S.R. Any employee who
came across this information would have believed that there was a legal
TARC Level on Manning, and could have legitimately carried out a Level
1 investigation.
If the government members of the Sub-Committee weren't so intent on burying
this report, the Sub-Committee itself may have been able to produce some
of its own answers. However, it became apparent, especially after the Liberals
changed the membership of the Sub-Committee, that government members are
just as interested in covering up the truth, as are CSIS and SIRC. This
is typified by the member from Windsor-St. Clair's vociferous objection
to the Bloc Quebecois attempting to give their time to question the Director
of CSIS to the Reform Party at the May 27, 1996 meeting. Why else would
they object to the Reform Party having a few extra minutes to ask questions?
It is clear to the Reform Party that SIRC's Heritage Front Affair report
is a complete whitewash. SIRC was able to divert what should have been
a review of the activities of a CSIS Source into a review of the Heritage
Front itself. Both SIRC and CSIS champion this case as a great success
for the Service, but the mere fact that the Source's own actions made this
case public, should suggest it was a failure.
But what this case has done is to show that the review system established
by the CSIS Act does not work. The government has joined with CSIS and
SIRC in covering up the truth. Why? What are they afraid of?
This government has expressed no concern that the leader of a legitimate
political party had his name on a document authorizing a CSIS investigation
on him. They have expressed no concern that all the original documents
authorizing that investigation were altered in one manner or another. They
have shown no concern that both CSIS and SIRC admitted that originally
the TARC level was on Preston Manning, then fifteen months later proceeded
to deny it, with absolutely no explanation.
It would appear that this government is not interested in holding the bureaucracy
accountable. How is it possible that the government is not concerned that
one of its agencies operates without accountability. Was that not why a
civilian intelligence agency was formed? Did not a previous Liberal adminstration
pass the CSIS Act, to make Canada's intelligence community accountable
to Parliament?
Those Canadians who care about the truth will have to wait until this country
has a government committed to Parliamentary accountability, before the
true version comes out. In the meantime, the Reform Party hopes that those
journalists, researchers or academics who are interested in pursuing security
issues continue their search for the real story. The truth is out there!
Reform Party Recommendation
In light of the negligent performance of the Security Intelligence
Review Committee in reviewing this investigation, it is clear that there
is no place in the review process for a group of patronage appointees who
believe that they do not have to answer to Parliament. To find an alternative
we need look no further than to our neighbors to the south. The Americans
utilize not only a House Select Committee on Intelligence, but a Senate
Committee as well. Given the immense intelligence network in the United
States with the CIA, the NSA and the Intelligence Division of the FBI,
the Americans have demonstrated that review by elected representatives
is not only workable, but in the Reform Party's opinion is preferable.
The Reform Party recommends that this government introduce legislation
in Parliament that would amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Act, deleting all reference to the Security Intelligence Review Committee.
All references to the Security Intelligence Review Committee should be
replaced by a Standing Committee on National Security.
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