In November 1988, the Source was back in touch with CSIS with respect to right wing extremist group activity. The Service decided to once again make use of him to get the needed information on these activities. Once more, what SIRC called "the old problem" recurred. On December 12, 1988, a police source advised CSIS that the Source was claiming to have Service contacts. Despite his failure to exercise discretion by revealing his activities on behalf of CSIS, the Source was kept on and allowed to continue in place until March, 1994, when he had his leave-taking. The Subcommittee has misgivings about the Service's decision to leave this Source in place for another five years. Although it is impossible to determine what the Heritage Front would have become without the presence of the Source as part of its leadership group, it is possible to know what it did while he was there. Reference to the Ministerial Direction, set out above, indicates that sources may not engage in illegal activities (principle #4) and that CSIS must do "everything reasonable to ensure" that this is the case.
They must instruct sources not to act as "agents provocateurs". Human sources are to operate not only within the law, but also within the spirit of the law. They are expected not to foster, nurture or implement the activities about which they are collecting information. They are to blend into the organizations they are covering and not to give a hint of the true reason for their presence. This is a difficult series of rules to respect, but it is not an impossible task. It is dependent upon forthrightness and honesty in dealing with CSIS on the part of the source, and effective direction and control on the part of the Service. The principled behavior threshold set by the Ministerial Direction is a high one. The level of tolerance for inappropriate source activity is low. Illegal activities by a source are obviously not acceptable. Activities that bring discredit upon the Service or the Government of Canada are also not permitted. Although these phrases are not further defined in the Ministerial Direction, their thrust is clear. Such activities should not bring the legitimacy, credibility or propriety of the Service or the Government of Canada into disrepute. The Subcommittee is concerned that a number of actions carried out by the Source could be seen to have contravened Principle 4 of the Ministerial Direction (which remains unchanged after the August, 1995 additional Direction)
- The "It" campaign was fostered, nurtured and implemented by the Source, with the agreement of his Handler, as an alleged means of turning an escalating mutual harassment campaign by the Heritage Front and Anti-Racist Action into an information-gathering effort, with t>The "It" campaign was fostered, nurtured and implemented by the Source, with the agreement of his Handler, as an alleged means of turning an escalating mutual harassment campaign by the Heritage Front and Anti-Racist Action into an information-gathering effort, with the Source in control. The Subcommittee sees no benefit being obtained from replacing one type of harassment by another. These actions could be viewed as those of an agent provocateur, in direct violation of the instructions given in the Ministerial Direction. In the Subcommittee's view, SIRC, in concluding that this campaign tested the bounds of what was acceptable, could have been more critical in its initial Report, as it was later on in its subsequent 1994-95 Annual Report to Parliament.er occasions. Although this may not have constituted the criminal offence of personation, it clearly tested the limits of acceptable behavior by a human source, if Bristow was one.
- The finding of a 12-gauge shotgun and semi-automatic rifle in the trunk of Bristow's car when US "white supremacist" Sean Maguire was arrested in September, 1991. One of the firearms was inoperative and both were in their cases when they were discovered. Although there may not have been a criminal offense as such, it was at best imprudent for Bristow, if he was the Source, to have had firearms in his trunk while associating with individuals with a propensity for a politically-motivated violence.
- The harbouring by Grant Bristow in his home for several days in September 1991 of Sean Maguire, a known "white supremacist". At that time, Sean Maguire was inadmissible under the Immigration Act, and this was known to CSIS. This action by Bristow, with the knowledge of CSIS of Maguire's immigration status, was, if Bristow was a source, in violation of the instructions given in the Ministerial Direction that human sources not engage in illegal activities, and of section 94(1)(m) of the Immigration Act (knowingly aiding and abetting a contravention of the provisions of the Act).
- The participation of the Source, as part of a group of Heritage Front members, in Reform Party of Canada functions may not have been direct participation in political activities as such. In case of doubt, however, the personal approval of the Director of CSIS should have been obtained in relation to the Reform Party of Canada.
There remains, to even the casual observer, an over-riding question as to whether the presence of the Source and/or Bristow (if he was a source) helped the Heritage Front to grow and develop. We feel compelled to ask whether the presence of a CSIS source or sources was a positive factor in the growth of the Heritage Front - CSIS could have more effectively pursued this issue. It is clear to the Subcommittee that the Ministerial Direction on confidential human sources is still in need of further revision even after the August, 1995 addition. SIRC has identified four issues that have to be addressed in revising the Ministerial Direction. The matters it has identified are:
- the nature of the proactive role to be played by sources;
- whether a source should play a leadership role in a target organization
- whether a source should engage in counter-measures to destroy a terrorist group; and
- whether the benefits of maintaining a source outweigh the benefits obtained by taking measures to destroy a group.
The Subcommittee agrees that these are important issues that, although difficult, have to be dealt with. There is another underlying question that has to be addressed in further revising the Ministerial Direction. It still does not enunciate clearly enough the types of activities engaged in by sources that are unacceptable. Vague references to proscribed "illegal activities" and "not to discredit the Service or the Government of Canada are an inadequate prescription of ministerial expectations. But even revised and strengthened Ministerial Directions are inadequate if they are not fully respected. They are part of the accountability scheme put into place by Parliament and must be effectively implemented.
Recommendation 1 The Subcommittee recommends that, in addition to what was proposed by SIRC and the August, 1995 changes, the Ministerial Direction on confidential human sources be further revised so as to clearly prohibit, as the general rule, human sources from engaging in illegal or discreditable activities. The revised Direction should make it clear that such activities include breaches of the laws of Canada, or encouraging, supporting or counseling any such law-breaking activities. Further, harassment, intimidation, or incitement to violence on the part of a human source should be prohibited by the revised Ministerial Direction. Provision should be made to permit a source to act in contravention of the general rule, in appropriate cases, but only after the Director of CSIS personally authorizes such activities for purposes allowed under the CSIS Act. The Director should be required to report such activities to the Minister in a manner similar to that required under section 20(2)-(4) of the Act (unlawful conduct of CSIS employees). In exceptional circumstances only, the Director could personally authorize such activities, nunc pro tunc (now for then).
ADVISING THIRD PARTIES On October 26, 1993, the Source learned that there was a threat of possible serious physical violence against certain leaders of the Jewish Community in Toronto. When this was learned by CSIS, it advised the Metropolitan Toronto Police six days later. The Jewish Community Leadership only learned of this threat of serious physical violence with the release of the SIRC Report on the "Heritage Front Affair". (SIRC Report, Chapter V, V.p. 34-35) In the Summer and Fall of 1991, the Service was being administered by an Acting Director, pending the appointment of a new Director. The Deputy Director, Operations and Analysis, occupied the acting position. He and the Assistant Director, Requirements, in the Summer of 1991, decided not to inform the Reform Party of Canada of the attempts to infiltrate and discredit it by various right wing extremists because, in their view, the situation was not sufficiently "egregious" to warrant such action. It was also observed at the time that the law did not allow for such a step. CSIS has, however, disclosed information held by it to third-party business interests in Vancouver and elsewhere, despite its strict interpretation of the law in this case. Section 19 of the CSIS Act deals with the authorized disclosure of information held by the Service.
It allows CSIS to provide information to law enforcement agencies, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defense, and, in the public interest, to ministers and public servants. These are the only circumstances under which the law allows the Service to provide the information held by it to others. In neither of the cases outlined at the beginning of this part of the Report would the law have permitted the provision of information to those most directly affected by it. And there is no provision to allow CSIS to follow up to ensure that those to whom they have reported the information have responded appropriately. SIRC dealt with a similar issue in its 1985-86 and 1986-87 Annual Reports. At that time, it asked if there were some way in which CSIS could warn voluntary organizations being infiltrated by persons wishing to subvert them. It also asked if there were some way to warn individuals joining "front" organizations, because they support their overt aims, that these organizations really have covert objectives. SIRC did not find an answer to these questions. The incident described in this part of the Report, and CSIS' inability to notify those most directly affected by threats of violence in one case and attempted infiltration in the other, demonstrate the restrictions imposed by the present law. The Sub-committee believes that some benefit can be derived from the provision of a form of third-party notification.
Recommendation 2 The Subcommittee recommends that the Government, CSIS, SIRC and the other stake-holders work together to develop a methodology for an effective third-party notification procedure. THE CSIS INVESTIGATION OF AN UNKNOWN CONTRIBUTOR TO PRESTON MANNING'S 1988 CAMPAIGN Chapter VIII of the SIRC Report deals with the CSIS investigation of an unknown contributor to Preston Manning's 1988 campaign. This Chapter was included in the Report by SIRC because it came across this 1989-90 investigation during its file review. The Subcommittee has singled out this Chapter of the SIRC Report for specific attention because of the sensitive issues it deals with and because of concerns with some of SIRC's findings. This part of our Report will not recite in detail what it found in Chapter VIII of the SIRC Report but will only set out the matters that are of concern to us. To deal with the issues addressed in this part of the Report, we have had access to the CSIS file on these matters in an expurgated form - it was obtained by Mr. Manning and provided to us by him. In November, 1988, CSIS received information that there may have been some attempt by a foreign country to influence the outcome of the 1988 election in a riding by contributing financially to the campaign of Preston Manning. The Regional Investigator dealing with this information urged caution with respect to its reliability because the veracity of the source was unknown. In January, 1989, CSIS Headquarters provided the Region with its analysis - it expressed some reservations about arguments supporting an investigation of this information.
Despite these concerns from within CSIS , the Unit Head in the Region on October 17, 1989, authorized a three-month Level I investigation. It is interesting to note that the TARC authorization form indicated that the information upon which it was based had been provided by a source of unknown reliability. An issue to be dealt with in this part of the Report is who or what was the target of the TARC Level I investigation. The caption on the October 17, 1989 targeting authority contained the name "Preston Manning". It was later changed on March 30, 1990 to read LNU-FNU (Unknown Contributor(s) to Preston Manning's Electoral Campaign)" - this change was made after the January 17, 1990 expiry of the TARC Level I authorization. The name contained in the caption of the targeting authority is important because, on its face, it indicates that the activities of this subject of investigation may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting a "threat to the security of Canada". There are two possible explanations for Mr. Manning's name being in the TARC caption - either he was the target of the TARC Level I investigation or his name appeared there as the result of a clerical error which was later rectified.
The fact that Mr. Manning's name was originally on the caption does not appear in Chapter VIII of the SIRC Report. It only came to light after SIRC at the Subcommittee's request, revisited this part of its investigation and in a January, 1995, letter to our Chairman confirmed the presence of Mr. Manning's name on the original caption. Two observations flow from these facts. The first of these is that the Service for three months did not appear to appreciate the impact of what may appear to be a mere clerical error which had the effect of making Mr. Manning the target, in technical terms at least, of a TARC Level I investigation. This investigation was underway shortly after a new Ministerial Direction had been issued dealing with, among other matters, sensitive institutions. The second observation is that this information only came to light at the Subcommittee's prompting and was not to be found in Chapter VIII of the SIRC Report. There are two possible explanations for this - either SIRC did not know about the changed caption or it did know and did not fully appreciate its importance. In either case, SIRC should have known of the changed caption and should have included this information in its Report.
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